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Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000 (2001)

Chapter: Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program

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Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
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E
Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program

DOE’s energy efficiency (EE) R&D program1 focuses on three sectors: buildings (both residential and commercial), industry (manufacturing and cross-cutting technologies), and transportation (primarily automotive and heavy-duty trucks). The committee decided to analyze a group of technologies from each sector that would be representative of the overall program and that would demonstrate the range of benefits and costs of the program, given that the buildings and industry sectors tend to have many smaller projects and thus account for a small portion of the overall budget.

From all the programs and technologies in the buildings sector, the following were chosen:

  • Advanced compressors for refrigerator-freezers,

  • Compact fluorescent lightbulbs,

  • DOE-2 program,

  • Electronic ballast for fluorescent lamps,

  • Free-piston Stirling engine-drive heat pumps,

  • Indoor air quality, and

  • Low-emission (low-e) glass.

From the programs and technologies in the industry sector, the committee selected the following:

  • Advanced lost foam technology,

  • Advanced turbine systems,

  • Black liquor gasification,

  • Forest products Industries of the Future program, and

  • The oxygen-fueled glass furnace.

It selected the following technologies and programs from the transportation R&D sector:

  • Advanced batteries for electric vehicles,

  • Catalytic conversion for cleaner vehicles,

  • PNGV,

  • Stirling automotive engine, and

  • Transportation fuel cell power systems.

The case studies are presented here in the order they are listed above.

ADVANCED REFRIGERATION

Program Description and History

Refrigeration accounts for about $14 billion of the U.S. residential electricity bill and also has significant commercial sector applications (OEE, 2000a). In 1977, DOE initiated an appliance product development program that included emphasis on refrigerator-freezers and supermarket refrigeration systems. Manufacturer involvement was substantial from the outset. DOE targeted both improved components, starting with the electricity-intensive refrigerator compressor, and computer tools for analyzing refrigerator design options. Early successes included a compressor system that achieved 44 percent efficiency improvement over the technology commonly used in refrigerators of the late 1970s.

When the Montreal Protocol forced manufacturers of refrigeration equipment to replace chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), DOE responded with cooperative R&D agreements that helped the private sector investigate and test alternative refrigerants, new insulation materials, and new appliance designs. These partnerships helped industry phase out CFCs while continuing to improve the energy efficiency of refrigeration.2

1  

EE refers throughout this appendix to the energy efficiency component of DOE’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE).

2  

DOE’s role in easing the industry’s transition from CFCs was confirmed by Mark Menzer, Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute, in a presentation to the committee on October 31, 2000. Also see Geller and Thorne (1999).

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×
Funding and Participation

Total funding from 1978 through 1981 for refrigerator compressor R&D was $0.83 million, in current year dollars. Converting this to 1999 dollars with the implicit price deflator yields a total of $1.56 million (Table E-1). The research was cost-shared with industry through a competitive solicitation. The winning contractor, Columbus Products Company (CPC), contributed $0.276 million in direct costs over the course of the program (the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy could not provide the year-by-year data), or $0.55 million in 1999 dollars. However, the successful deployment of the technology in the marketplace required substantial outlays by CPC and other companies in the refrigerator industry.

Results

Figure E-1 presents one of the last half-century’s more remarkable technological achievements in the energy field: a reduction of more than two-thirds in the average electricity consumption of refrigerators over about 25 years, even as average unit sizes increased, performance improved, and ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons were removed. In the commercial sector, DOE-funded improvements in supermarket refrigeration systems fundamentally transformed that marketplace: “Without DOE’s financial and technical assistance, it is unlikely that the companies would have actively pursued what were then perceived as high-risk, uncertain technologies” (Geller and McGaraghan, 1998).

These outcomes reflect sustained industry and government cooperation, based on the integration of R&D, incentives for customers to purchase efficient models, and government efficiency standards at both state and federal levels. While many institutions were involved, DOE was an early and effective leader, starting with its 1977 launch of a program of appliance product development. DOE’s initial investment of some $772,000 helped demonstrate the feasibil

TABLE E-1 Funding for Advanced Refrigerator-Freezer Compressors

 

DOE Cost

Fiscal Year

(thousands of current year dollars)

(thousands of 1999 dollars)

1978

112

243

1979

264

529

1980

226

414

1981

225

377

Total

827

1563

 

SOURCE: Office of Energy Efficiency. 2000a. OEE Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Advanced Refrigerator/Freezer Compressor Program. December 12.

ity of a full-featured refrigerator using 60 percent less electricity than comparable conventional units and produced new computer tools for analyzing the energy-use implications of refrigerator design options. DOE R&D funds and partnerships also “played a key role” in allowing industry to phase out CFCs without an energy penalty (Geller and Thorne, 1999).

These successes strongly influenced the enactment of increasingly demanding efficiency standards, first in California and ultimately by DOE itself, under authority of the National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987. A reinforcing cycle began that continues to this day, under which targeted federal R&D helps make possible the introduction of increasingly efficient new refrigerator models, which themselves become the basis for tightening the minimum efficiency standards (based on their demonstration that meeting a tighter standard is technologically feasible).

Benefits and Costs
Improvements from R&D in Refrigerator-Freezer Compressors

In the late 1970s and early 1980s one of the DOE laboratories, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), began to work on improving the efficiency of major residential and commercial appliances. The refrigerator was one of these. ORNL subcontracted a major manufacturer of compressors to investigate how to improve the efficiency of these machines. By implementing a series of low-cost measures, compressor efficiency was improved from 3.6 Btu/Wh in 1980, to 4.2 Btu/Wh in 1981 and to 5.4 Btu/Wh in 1989. The manufacturer’s cost per compressor was estimated by ORNL to be in the range of $3 to $8 per unit. In the commercial market, this could have been as high as $15 to $40 per compressor (Baxter, 2001). ORNL provided technical support for various models of refrigerators to help manufacturers estimate the impacts of technical improvements (including the compressor). This R&D eventually included work to determine the impacts of HCFC substitutes and investigated how to reduce the performance degradation penalty to about zero.

To estimate the benefits from compressor improvement, the committee sent a data request to DOE and received in response a spreadsheet analysis of the energy savings and net energy cost savings to consumers due to the purchase of more efficient refrigerators. In this analysis, DOE used the sales-weighted average annual energy use of refrigerators sold by year over the period 1981 to 1990. It was further assumed that the sales-weighted annual energy use per unit sold in 1979 should be used as a base number from which to calculate the impact of improved compressors. In 1979, the energy use was 1365 kWh/year, and by 1990 it had decreased to 916 kWh/year, or about 33 percent improvement. It was estimated that one-half of the reduction in the use of energy

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

FIGURE E-1 Electricity consumed by refrigerators, 1947 to 2001. SOURCE: Goldstein and Geller, 1998.

was due to improved compressors. This assumption derives from the opinions of two different expert analysts (Baxter, 2001). The assumption is reasonable since the corresponding improvement in compressor efficiency was 50 percent and the DOE compressor contractor seemed to lead the field and pull improvements from other manufacturers.

The cost of efficiency improvements to the consumer was assumed to be $170 (Rosenfeld, 1991), and half this cost was assumed to be for the improved compressor. Thus, the cost of the compressor improvements was $85, which is likely too high for the reasons mentioned above. The lifetime of the refrigerators was assumed to be 20 years (Rosenfeld, 1991).

For each year from 1981 through 1990, the annual energy use reduction compared to 1979 was used to calculate the energy savings due to advanced compressors and the total life-cycle savings for units sold that year. From these savings and the national average residential cost of electricity, the life-cycle energy cost savings were calculated for units sold in each year. From this cost savings, the incremental cost of the compressors was subtracted and the net life-cycle savings were calculated and summed over the decade. The result was about $9 billion in energy cost savings and primary energy savings of about 2.2 Q. In addition, the committee applied its 5-year rule. To calculate realized benefits, half of the efficiency savings per unit in 1981 was applied to the units sold in 1986, and for 1987, half the energy savings per unit in 1982 was multiplied by the number of units sold in 1987, and so on for each year to 1990. Life-cycle energy savings were subtracted for each year from the previous savings for that year and the results summed to obtain a cumulative effect. This reduced net energy savings attributable to improved compressors from 2.2 to 1.3 Q, and the energy cost savings were reduced from $9 billion to $7 billion. The simple payback varied over a period beginning in 1981 for about 10 years and lessened to about 5 years in 1990.

The analysis assumed that half the annual energy use reduction measured by the industry for models sold in a particular year was due to improved compressors. Additional assumptions were made for the consumer cost of buying improved compressors. Nevertheless, the committee believes the cost savings and energy savings are reasonably attributable to improved compressors, and that the DOE R&D investment played an important role in bringing continuously improving compressors to market.

Improvements Resulting from Regulatory Standards

From 1990 through 2005, improvements in refrigerator-freezers have continued and will continue to occur. A princi-

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

pal cause of this continued improvement is the DOE standards. DOE R&D contributed to the setting of these standards. Improvements are also the result of finding ways to substitute non-ozone-depleting refrigerants for HCFCs without degrading energy performance. This was helped by DOE-supported R&D. The energy savings from these further improvements through 2005 are estimated to be 2.6 Q of primary energy. The corresponding net cost savings to consumers is estimated to be $15 billion (McMahon et al., 2000).

Lessons Learned

Table E-2 summarizes the benefits and costs of the program. This case study underscores the value to society of integrating RD&D and minimum efficiency standards as an instrument for accelerating technological innovation.

A key factor in the development of more demanding efficiency standards is simply “the availability of more efficient models in the market” (Goldstein, 2000). As a result, “sim-

TABLE E-2 Benefits Matrix for the Advanced Refrigerator-Freezer Compressors Programa

 

Realized Benefits/Costs

Options Benefits/Costs

Knowledge Benefits/Costs

Economic benefits/costs

DOE R&D costs: $1.6 millionb

Substantial benefits: Approximately $7 billionc

Design modifications to compressorsd

Facilitated efficiency standardse

Applications softwaref

Minimal: technology has been commercialized and deployed

R&D on system optimizationg

R&D helped develop and define future refrigerator efficiency

R&D on energy-saving components and features

Research findings were applied to air conditionersh

Environmental benefits/costs

Substantial emissions reductionsi

Reductions in energy consumptionj

Minimal: technology has been commercialized and deployed

Benefits could be large as technology is disseminated.

Security benefits/costs

Improved electric system reliability

Minimal benefits, since most of the electric energy saved displaced fossil, nuclear, or hydro, and little oil was displaced

Benefits are relatively small, because little oil would be displaced

Successful technology transfer to other nations could substantially increase worldwide energy efficiency and reduce environmental emissions

aUnless otherwise noted, all dollar estimates are given in constant 1999 dollars through 2000.

bFrom 1977 through 1982, DOE conducted a program on appliance product development with substantial manufacturer involvement, expending about $4.9 million (current dollars) for R&D. The largest product development efforts were focused on heat pump water heaters, refrigerator-freezer compressors, refrigerator-freezers, and supermarket refrigeration systems. Of the total budget, $1.6 million (1999 dollars) was spent on refrigerator-freezer compressors.

cAs a result of DOE R&D investment with a compressor manufacturer, a series of much more efficient compressors for refrigerator/freezers came on the market beginning in 1981. These compressors were assumed to have resulted in half the energy savings of the sales-weighted average refrigerator/freezers sold between 1981 and 1990 compared to 1979 as a base from which to calculate the savings. The net life-cycle cost savings of units sold through 1990 were reduced by assuming an improved compressor would have appeared on the market by 1986 without the DOE investment and that it would have followed the same penetration path displaced by 5 years. No energy or cost savings beyond 1990 were assumed, but the full life-cycle savings over the assumed 20-year life of the units was counted. Beyond 1990, improvements in efficiency were due to DOE standards and R&D on hydrochlorofluorocarbons substitutes without performance degradation, and these are estimated to have saved 2.6 quads of primary energy for electricity generation and $15 billion in net consumer lifecycle savings through 2005.

dDOE selected a suite of 13 modifications and incorporated them into a laboratory prototype unit. These involved two approaches to improving efficiency: through improved valve and port designs. A 44 percent improvement in efficiency was achieved over the compressor technology commonly used in refrigerators in the late 1970s.

eIn the late 1980s, DOE began to develop efficiency standards in response to industry requests for national standards to obviate a multitude of emerging state standards. The prospect of national standards would have spurred industry to begin work on improved compressors by the late 1980s. Therefore, without the DOE R&D program, market penetration of advanced compressors likely would not have begun until the early 1990s, about 10 years later than actually occurred.

fThe project developed a computer program for analyzing refrigerator design options. The program was further developed by Arthur D.Little after the project and was later used for a variety of purposes: to develop the technical basis for the DOE national minimum efficiency standards, to design advanced products for manufacturers, to evaluate refrigerant design options for EPA refrigerant rulemakings, and to help design efficient refrigerators for developing countries.

gFor example, the refrigerator- freezer development focused on systems optimization of the entire refrigerator- freezer, including the refrigeration circuit, case design, insulation, and controls.

hThe technology and knowledge base developed in the refrigerator compressor R&D effort was applied by industry to improving compressors for room air conditioners, and experience in improving refrigerator compressors enabled appliance manufacturers to increase the average efficiency of room air conditioner compressors by more than 25 percent through the 1980s.

iEE estimates avoided emissions of 41.6 million metric tons of carbon, 0.36 million tons of nitrogen oxide, 0.63 million tons of sulfur dioxide, 0.01 million tons of particulate matter (PM 10), 0.04 million tons of carbon monoxide, and 0.01 million tons of volatile organic compounds.

jImproved refrigerators reduce household electricity demand and, since the heat from refrigerators adds to the house cooling load, they also reduce cooling energy demands and thus peak demand.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

ply the introduction of the models based on DOE research, regardless of how well they sold or whether or not they were imitated by other manufacturers, is relevant to the development of standards” and ultimately to overall improvements in energy efficiency (Goldstein, 2000).

From this perspective, what is most important about the DOE technologies is not so much their ultimate commercial success but their role in influencing efficiency standards (which may themselves prompt other innovations that preempt the DOE precursors). The capacity of ambitious technology demonstrations to influence standards is suggested by the extent to which each DOE standard departed from industry-average efficiencies prevailing at the time of enactment: a full 30 percent reduction in each of the three iterations (1990, 1993, and 2001) (see Figure E-1).

COMPACT FLUORESCENT LAMPS

Program Description and History

Compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) were developed and introduced in the 1980s, principally by several European firms, as a more efficient replacement for standard incandescent lamps, which consume 85 percent of the lighting energy in U.S. residential applications. Since fluorescent lamps are four to five times more efficient than incandescent lamps, finding ways to replace existing incandescent lighting applications with CFLs could yield substantial energy savings and has become a key goal of the DOE lighting R&D program. Nevertheless, DOE did not have a program targeted at CFLs until 1997.

In the two decades since their commercial introduction, CFLs have been continuously improved and sales have grown, but slowly. CFLs are now widely used in commercial buildings in many applications that traditionally used incandescent lamps—for example, in recessed downlights. However, CFLs have not penetrated the residential market significantly, nor have they have replaced incandescent lamps in some commercial applications such as lighting in retail establishments and hotels, although some major hotel chains have replacement programs under way. In recognition of the potential energy savings, DOE decided, in 1997, to sponsor work on technology to reduce the cost and size of CFLs and hasten their commercial deployment.

The principal barrier to widespread penetration of CFLs in the residential marketplace is the combination of cost and bulk of the ballast. The bulk of 1980s vintage CFL units is a particular problem when installing CFLs in portable light fixtures such as table lamps, which are widely used in residences and hotels. While more modern unitized lamp-ballast products minimize bulk, they tend to be expensive because both the lamp and the ballast are replaced when the product wears out. Separable lamp-ballast products are far less expensive overall since just the lamp can be replaced, leaving the ballast in place. However, separable products are generally more bulky than unitized products since they require the additional connection apparatus between the bulb and the ballast. These were the principal issues challenging the DOE-sponsored joint program with industry to develop CFLs, initiated in 1997.

A key industry partner was General Electric (GE), which in the course of the first project of the new program, projected that reducing the cost of a CFL from $15 to $9 would increase sales by more than 250 percent. This first project, which concluded in 1999, identified evolutionary approaches to reducing cost by about 30 percent, concluding that more aggressive technical approaches to achieve greater cost reductions would probably result in less-than-adequate product performance (energy efficiency, size, and electronic interference). The second project, which started in 1999, is ongoing. It is exploring the possibility of miniaturizing the ballast electronics to such an extent that it can be built into the lighting fixture itself, with attendant reductions in lamp cost and size.

Another DOE effort has been to stimulate manufacturers to develop more compact, lower-cost CFLs by extending existing lamp technology. In this effort, DOE is fostering private sector R&D by guaranteeing a minimum level of CFL purchases, primarily from the public sector for schools, public housing, etc.

Portable lamp fixtures in the United States account for 20 percent of the energy consumed in lighting. There are 400 million to 500 million portable lighting fixtures in U.S. residences and another 30 million or so in U.S. hotels.

Funding and Participation

In FY 1999, Congress provided funds specifically for the competitive procurement of new R&D projects with industry, including a project for developing the CFL and a substantial increase in funding over the previous several fiscal years for lighting research. This was prompted in part by increased support from industry for collaborative work with the DOE, particularly in lighting. Table E-3 shows the funding history of the integrated ballast-fixture CFL project.

Results

The generic product (a lampholder) envisioned in the DOE CFL integrated ballast-fixture project being carried out jointly with GE is not part of the current GE product line. Indeed, since GE does not have a major product line in electronic ballasts and does not have an established market position to support, this project was not ranked very high in GE’s internal prioritization process for allocating internal R&D funding.

As a result, it is clear that without DOE funding, the project would probably not have been initiated.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

TABLE E-3 Funding for the Compact Fluorescent Lamps Program (thousands of 1999 dollars)

Fiscal Year

DOE Cost

Contractor Cost

Total

1999

1172

293

1466

2000 to 2001

579

462

1040

Total

1751

755

2506

 

SOURCE: Office of Energy Efficiency. 2000. OEE Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Compact Fluorescent Lightbulbs Program. December 12.

Benefits and Costs

The principal benefits of the DOE CFL program are in the area of options and knowledge for future development, as shown in the benefits matrix (see Table E-4). The target market for CFLs, as noted earlier, is enormous, which provides the rationale for continuing the projects.

Lessons Learned

Building on the recent history of successful DOE/industry collaboration in lighting R&D, the CFL program has adopted many of the features of previous efforts, in, for example, the electronic ballasts program. In particular, the role of industry in helping shape the direction of the program has helped ensure continued interest on the part of industry.

DOE-2 ENERGY ANALYSIS PROGRAM

Program Description and History

DOE-2 is a computer program for evaluating the energy performance and associated operating costs of buildings. DOE-2 is applicable to both new buildings and retrofits to existing buildings. Although the computer program has been used primarily to predict energy use associated with design alternatives for nonresidential buildings (e.g., offices, schools, and hospitals), it has also been used to predict the energy performance of residential buildings. It has also been used to simulate the performance of new technologies and to

TABLE E-4 Benefits Matrix for the Compact Fluorescent Lamps (CFLs) Programa

 

Realized Benefits/Costs

Options Benefits/Costs

Knowledge Benefits/Costs

Economic benefits/costs

DOE R&D costs: $1.8 million

Industry costs: $755,000

Benefits may be large: Market potential is significant, and industry appears interested in further commercializing the productb

R&D on halogen lights and CFL prototypes

Increased knowledge of circuit designs and heat dissipation methods to meet an extreme size and durability constraint

Research on miniaturizing the ballastc

Development of lower-cost CFLsd

Environmental benefits/costs

CFLs produce twice as much light and consume only 25% as much electricity as conventional halogen lights

Potential benefits are largee

Research on lighting, given its importance in terms of energy consumption and energy savings potential

Avoided emissions of carbon, SO2, and NOxf

Reduced hazards from reduced heat output in some applications

Security benefits/costs

Benefits are small to date

Potential benefits are large

R&D on reducing electricity demandg

With widespread use, possible under some future scenarios, deployment of CFLs will reduce electric system peak loads.

aUnless otherwise noted, all dollar estimates are given in constant 1999 dollars through 2000.

bEnergy savings of 15.4 billion kWh/yr would result in $5.3 billion of net dollar savings (energy cost savings less incremental first cost). Assumptions include lamp data: (1) average wattage of incandescent lamp = 75 W, average wattage of CFL = 18 W, (2) first cost differential for fixture with integrated CFL ballast and lamp = $12, and (3) average lifetime of ballast/lamp = 24,000/8,000 hours; Market data: residential energy market penetration = 50 percent, hotel occupancy = 81 percent, hotel market penetration = 80 percent. The benefits are calculated using 1999 energy costs and no discounting, and EE assumes that the DOE project accelerates the market by 7 years. EE calculates the area between the curves of two market penetration scenarios, one with and one without the DOE project. The market penetration curves (rate and maximum penetration) for the two scenarios are identical, but displaced by 7 years. The total long-run benefits (in energy savings) do not depend on the rate of penetration.

cThe goal is to miniaturize the ballast to such an extent that it can be built into the fixture, with attendant benefits in lower lamp cost and smaller lamp size.

dA focus of DOE efforts has been to stimulate manufacturers to develop more compact, lower cost CFLs by extending existing lamp technology. In this case, DOE is fostering private sector R&D by guaranteeing a minimum level of purchases, primarily from the public sector (schools, public housing, etc.).

eIncandescent lamps are a very inefficient way to generate light; only 3 to 5 percent of the electric energy they consume is converted into light. Fluorescent lamps, on the other hand, are four to five times more efficient than incandescent lamps.

fAvoided emissions total: carbon, 3 million tons/yr; SOx, 0.05 million tons/yr; and NOx, 0.03 million tons/yr.

gAs concerns grow about the adequacy of electricity generating capacity to meet future electricity demand, R&D focusing on the sources of electricity demand has received additional attention.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

guide research by estimating the impact of alternative R&D proposals. However, the most significant uses of DOE-2 have probably been for support of demand-side management and rebate programs by utility companies, support for the development and implementation of voluntary and mandatory energy efficiency standards, and as a tool for teaching and research in architectural and engineering schools (DOE, 2000a).

The first version of DOE-2, which was released by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) in 1978, evolved from previous versions that were developed in the public sector. In the early 1970s, the National Bureau of Standards Load Determination (NBSLD) program was released. The first dynamic simulation model for whole-building analysis, it supported the development of American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) Standard 90–75: Energy Conservation for New Building Design. In the mid 1970s, the program developed for the U.S. Postal Service added a life-cycle cost component to the NBSLD program. The Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) adopted the program for use in other federal buildings and promulgated ERDA-1. The California Energy Commission further developed it as CALERDA (Hunn, 2001). These predecessor programs focused on load determinations and had only basic capabilities to simulate the performance of heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems. When LBNL assumed responsibility for updating the CALERDA program, one of the first improvements was to provide a set of system simulation models (Hunn, 2001). Since then, this computer program has been continually updated and improved.

In 1994, LBNL released version DOE-2.1E, which incorporated new models for ice storage systems and evaporative cooling systems, desiccant cooling systems, and variable-speed heat pumps; an enhanced energy cost calculation to simulate complex rate structures; and a link to the WINDOW-4 program that simulates custom glazing (LBNL, 1994a; LBNL, 1994b). During the 1990s, personal computer versions of DOE-2 were released by the private sector, and a lighting simulation program, RADIANCE, was developed at LBNL and linked to DOE-2 (LBNL, 1992). Also in the 1990s, an indoor air quality simulation program, COMIS, which LBNL had developed together with the International Energy Agency, was linked to DOE-2 (Fisk, 2001). In October 2000, a beta 4 version of a new generation program, Energy Plus, was released; it combines features of DOE-2 and BLAST (Building Loads Analysis and System Thermodynamics, developed by Department of Defense) (OEE, 2000c).

Funding and Participation

According to the information provided by EE, DOE has invested about $23 million in the development of DOE-2 since 1978, and external funding to LBNL in support of this program was about $8 million during that time (investment reported in 1999 dollars) (OEE, 2000d). Approximately 20 percent of this external funding was provided by the Electric Power Research Institute, Southern California Edison Co., and the Gas Research Institute for the development of algorithms for thermal storage sizing methods, evaporative cooling methods, and gas-fired desiccant and gas-fired cooling models. The remainder of the external funding was from third-party resellers of versions of DOE-2 (OEE, 2000e). The level of funding for support of DOE-2, which peaked from 1993 through 1995, has receded since 1996. EE provided no information on investments for other simulation programs that have been developed within DOE or with other government agencies or the private sector.

Results

In addition to DOE-2 and BLAST, at least eight programs developed by the private sector dynamic simulation energy analysis programs are now available for commercial and large buildings, and at least 15 versions of DOE-2 adapted for commercial use are available with various interfaces.

As an alternative to prescriptive procedures, energy efficiency codes and standards for new buildings in the private and public sectors typically allow the use of simulation programs to demonstrate compliance with comparable performance criteria. During the last 25 years, these standards and the simulation programs needed to demonstrate compliance have evolved in an iterative manner. Thus, as the criteria for energy efficiency have become more restrictive, the computer programs have become more sophisticated in order to accommodate these changes.

According to EE surveys, DOE-2’s rate of penetration increased from 0.6 percent in 1984 to 25 percent in 1994, with a leveling off since then for new nonresidential building applications, and from 0.2 percent in 1984 to 1.5 percent in 1997, with a leveling off since then for existing residential building applications. EE did not estimate the penetrations of DOE-2 for new or existing residential buildings, nor did it estimate the penetration of other simulation programs developed by the public or private sectors for commercial or residential buildings.

The estimates of penetration provided by EE were not confirmed in interviews conducted with three consulting engineers who have extensive design experience of new and existing buildings throughout the United States.3 These interviews revealed that the penetration of DOE-2 as a design tool in professional practice is minimal due for two reasons: (1) DOE-2 has been difficult for architects and consulting engineers to use and (2) energy use, or “energy efficiency,”

3  

William Coad, McClure Engineering Associates and ASHRAE, personal communication, January 2001; Richard Pearson, Pearson Consulting Engineers, personal communication, January 2001; Lawrence Spielvogel, Lawrence G.Spielvogel Inc., personal communication, January 2001.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

is seldom the primary or final parameter in design decisions. These interviews also revealed that commercial or proprietary computer programs were most commonly used by consulting engineers to determine thermal loads in the buildings, to aid in the determination of the required system capacities, and, when required, to perform energy analyses.

Estimates have not been provided by EE on the prevalence of the use of DOE-2 for the development of standards and codes, rebate programs, and other policy making decisions. However, the interviews revealed that DOE-2 has been used extensively and has been influential in the development of voluntary national standards for energy efficiency, such as ASHRAE 90.1 and 90.2, since 1989.4 DOE-2 has also been used in the development of state building codes and regulations such as California’s Title 245 and international building codes and standards in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Switzerland, China, and Brazil (Talbott, 2001).

Benefits and Costs

The benefit and cost estimates for the DOE-2 program are shown in Table E-5. Realized economic benefits associated with the use of DOE-2 are estimated to be substantial but indeterminate. DOE’s estimates of net life-cycle cost savings as a result of using DOE-2 are based on two assumptions: (1) that by 1994 the penetration of DOE-2 as a design tool throughout the United States was 25 percent and will remain at that rate until 2005 and (2) incremental annual energy savings achieved in new and existing nonresidential buildings were 22.5 percent from 1983 to 1994 and are expected to be 25.5 percent from 1995 to 2005. These potential energy savings are likely to be overestimates for the following reasons: (1) as reported by EE, the latest survey response to 3000 inquiries was only 2.6 percent, (2) LBNL validation studies (Sullivan and Winkelmann, 1998) indicated that DOE-2 substantially overestimated the energy savings (i.e., by as much as 100 percent) in monitored buildings that were not operated as initially assumed in the DOE-2 simulations, (3) interviews with three practicing consulting engineers indicated that DOE-2 is not the primary computer program used as a design tool in the United States, and (4) contiguous annual incremental savings of 25 percent, compared to next-best alternatives (e.g., evolving building codes and standards), are not likely. Moreover, the second assumption double-counts the energy savings attributable to the improvement of the actual technology or the use of the system being simulated (e.g., low-e windows, compact fluorescent lamps, desiccant cooling systems, and variable-speed heat pumps). Conversely, DOE also has probably underestimated the benefit of DOE-2 as it did not estimate assumed energy savings in new or existing residential buildings or assumed energy savings associated with the promulgation of codes and standards or rebate programs, based on DOE-2 simulations.

To account for the next-best simulation tool, DOE has reduced its projected savings by 50 percent, which would mean that DOE-2 is twice as effective as the next-best simulation tool. This effectiveness was not demonstrated by DOE and was not supported in the interviews with the practicing consulting engineers. As the energy savings are dependent on the selection of alternative components in the design process and not necessarily on the computer program that was used for the analysis, the incremental energy savings attributable to DOE-2 rather than a next-best alternative program are suspect.6

A more likely realized benefit is that the use of DOE-2 confirmed to decision makers that substantial energy could be saved by incorporating and assuring the performance of certain sets of building systems, subsystems, and components into the building design, retrofit, or operations. Unfortunately, DOE has provided no data to show that the energy savings predicted with DOE-2 were actually realized and sustained. However, the 1998 report by Sullivan and Winkelmann indicated a tendency for DOE-2 simulations to overestimate monitored energy consumption in a set of buildings. Furthermore, this validation study did not examine the potential for degradation of energy savings owing to “value engineering,” construction defects, changing occupancy patterns over time, or deficient operating or maintenance procedures.

DOE’s estimates of realized environmental and security benefits are based on the same assumptions of causal results of using DOE-2. Thus, for the same reasons as described above, the realized environmental and security benefits associated with the use of DOE-2 are estimated to be substantial but indeterminate.

As shown in Table E-5, the enabling power of the DOE-2 computer program is demonstrated in the benefits that have accrued from its development. The program is in the public domain and has been continually upgraded to incorporate new technologies and operational schemes. Thus, it has been widely used as a reference for establishing government standards, motivating government programs such as Energy Star, and estimating impacts of rate structure scenarios and rebate programs.

Lessons Learned

The evolution of the DOE-2 computer program shows the importance of tools that allow designers, policy makers, and

4  

ASHRAE Standards 90.1–1989 and 90.1–1999, and others have all used DOE-2 to evaluate candidate changes.

5  

California Code of Regulations. California Energy Code, 1998. Title 24, Part 6.

6  

Published comparisons of the analytical results of most major programs indicate small deviations in estimated outcomes. These comparisons also indicate that more error can be expected from different operators of the same program than from one operator using different programs.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

TABLE E-5 Benefits Matrix for the DOE-2 Programa

 

Realized Benefits/Costs

Options Benefits/Costs

Knowledge Benefits/Costs

Economic benefits/costs

DOE R&D costs: $23 millionb

Industry costs: $8 milliond

Substantial benefitse

Ability to cost-effectively adjust efficiency choicesf

Ability to tailor efficiency choices to local markets and building practices

Ability to minimize first-cost impacts of buildings improvements

Improved building codes and standards

Better building designsg

Energy Plusc

Home Energy Saver (Web version) and RESFEN-3

Ability to model complex building interactions, material properties, and performance of energy-using equipment

Environmental benefits/costs

Substantial avoided emissionsh

Used to help implement new ventilation standards for indoor air quality with minimum energy or construction cost impacts

Tool for assessing impacts of proposed buildings energy policies on the environment

Tool for reducing emissions related to building energy use

Means of including the buildings sector in Clean Development Mechanism and other greenhouse gas emission credit options

Reduced global environmental impactsi

Ability to assess the air emissions impacts and trade-offs of building design choices and policies

Ability to identify least-cost means of realizing specific environmental benefits in the buildings sector

Ability to target building-related environmental research to areas with greatest opportunity

Security benefits/costs

Reduced peak-load electricity consumptionj

Reduced need for new generating capacity and for natural gas

Opportunity to target peak demand reductions to alleviate transmission and distribution congestion

Provides ability to incorporate distributed energy resources in building designs

Ability to model peak-load reduction strategies

Ability to model distributed energy resource technologies

Ability to model load- shifting strategiesk

aUnless otherwise noted, all dollar estimates are given in constant 1999 dollars through 2000.

bEstimate of constant 1999 dollar total. A complete time series budget is not available.

cDOE-2 combined with BLAST plus enhancements.

dEstimate of constant 1999 dollar total. A complete time series budget is not available.

eEE estimated that approximately $90 billion cumulative net energy bill savings will result from the use of DOE-2 through 2005. To estimate these savings, EE (1) assumed 25 percent penetration of new buildings design, (2) assumed that 1999 survey respondents represent only 20 percent of actual square footage designed using DOE-2, (3) used sq. ft. energy savings of 25.5 percent and average energy use of new buildings of 225,000 Btu/ft2 (this is originating source data, not end-use energy consumption), (4) used EIA and F.W.Dodge data to estimate new and existing building floor space, (5) assumed that buildings savings would continue for 25 years, and (6) assumed that DOE-2 results in twice the savings as the next-best alternative. Thus, the benefit estimate appears to be extremely high for a computer program that acts primarily as a facilitator. While it is clear that software programs and information technology can play an important role in building design, it is very difficult to precisely estimate how much energy can be “saved” by DOE-2 or any other analytical tool. At best, DOE-2 allows predictions of how much energy might be saved over a period if certain building components are assembled in specified sets and only under certain specific assumptions, as no actual data on energy savings are available. Nevertheless, DOE-2 did demonstrate that software tools can facilitate energy efficiency improvements, and it helped redefine the mode of thinking in the energy efficiency industry. The benefits are thus probably substantial and greatly exceed the R&D costs.

fThese can be adjusted to reflect increases in energy prices, changes in building product prices, labor costs, etc.

gProvides the opportunity to change building designs in light of changes in the relative cost of electricity and natural gas.

hEE estimated avoided emissions of 225 million tons of carbon, 1.8 million tons of nitrogen oxides, and 2.8 million tons of sulfur dioxide, as well as additional avoided emissions of suspended particulates. However, these benefit estimates are subject to the same reservations discussed in footnote e.

iAbility to assist other countries in improving building practices and reducing global environmental impacts.

jEE claimed that, in the short run, peak-load electricity consumption was reduced, often more than average consumption, and the probability of outages was also reduced. However, these benefit estimates are subject to the same reservations discussed in footnote e. Moreover, the propensity for DOE-2 modeling to overestimate energy savings may have resulted in a sense of false security.

kFor example, partial thermal storage.

other decision makers to evaluate the performance of complex systems by simulation. The technological improvement of a component or subsystem may offer the potential for energy savings and improved environments. However, how the components perform as an integrated whole system is difficult to evaluate without simulation tools. The primary lesson to be learned from this example is that the energy savings for a complex system are likely to be very uncertain

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

if the interactions of the candidate components are not accurately simulated. A corollary to this lesson is that care is needed to avoid double- or triple-counting the potential for energy savings of the components identified within a system in addition to the energy savings likely to be realized by the composite use of all of the components as a whole system.

A second lesson to be learned from this case study is that simulation models (i.e., software tools or instruments, such as DOE-2) are critically important enablers of decisions to improve energy economics, environmental quality, and security. However, as good as the tool or instrument may be, if the user misapplies it (e.g., provides incorrect assumptions or input data), incredible results can occur. It is therefore imperative that predicted results from whole-system simulations be carefully calibrated using data from actual systems, and that those who are responsible for the consequences of these simulations understand the limitations of the predicted results.

A third, and maybe the most important, lesson to be learned from this case study is that enabling tools such as DOE-2 do not themselves save energy. Rather, they provide methods by which energy-saving alternatives can be evaluated. Thus, the benefit/cost justification for support of these programs should not be based on how much energy can be saved through their use. In fact, if that is the measure of success of the program, the effectiveness of the simulation models could be biased. Because DOE-2 has been used to estimate the energy savings of various technologies in the EE program, another method for measuring their benefits and costs should be identified.

ELECTRONIC BALLASTS

Program Description and History

Fluorescent lights, the dominant lighting type in commercial buildings, require ballasts, which help start the flow of current through the lamp and then control it. The ballast provides the high voltage needed to start the lamps and subsequently limits the current to a safe value for operation of the lamp. Traditionally, magnetic ballasts, constructed from passive components such as inductors, transformers, and capacitors, have been used to operate fluorescent lamps at the same frequency as the power line. They are inexpensive and long-lasting devices that have been used for as long as fluorescent lighting has been used.

Operating fluorescent lights at higher frequencies has long been recognized as a way of increasing their energy efficiency. When DOE began its program on lighting research and development in 1977, it was, in part, attempting to exploit this potential. Electronic ballasts are designed to operate fluorescent lamps at frequencies a thousand times higher than the power line frequency used in traditional magnetic ballasts; such operation can increase the efficiency of converting electric energy into light by 10 percent. By using high-efficiency electronic components, the combined effect of improved lamps and ballast efficiency results in as much as a 30 percent increase in lighting energy efficiency over traditional fluorescent lighting. Moreover, more advanced electronics also lends itself to dimming, remote control, and other energy-saving features not possible with magnetic ballasts. The potential impact can be seen from the fact that in the United States, the energy associated with commercial lighting costs businesses on the order of $25 billion per year and accounts for about 26 percent of the total annual commercial building energy consumption.

The DOE work in this program over the years was conducted largely through subcontracts to industry and R&D firms and in-house research at LBNL. From 1977 to 1981, DOE supported the development, evaluation, and market introduction of electronic ballasts into the U.S. marketplace. The fluorescent lamp electronic ballast that emerged from this work in 1983 impelled industry to proceed with large-scale commercial development and has become arguably the most successful initiative in the entire DOE energy efficiency portfolio. In the early years of the program, DOE established contracts with three small businesses to develop and test prototypes. Interestingly, those contracts were the result of a competitive solicitation that received no responses from the major ballast manufacturers. One of the small businesses developed into a significant, independent ballast manufacturer.

In the 1970s, either before or shortly after the establishment of the DOE R&D program, all of the major firms in the ballast industry had considered but rejected introducing an electronic ballast into their lighting products businesses. The principal reason for this rejection was the strong disincentive to produce solid-state ballasts: a substantial capital investment would be required and the existing unamortized infrastructure for manufacturing magnetic ballasts would have to be retired early and replaced. Moreover, at the time, the market for magnetic ballasts was highly concentrated, with nearly 90 percent of it dominated by two firms. One of these firms actively sought to prevent the introduction of the electronic ballast by acquiring the technology from one of the small R&D firms DOE had supported and then preventing its dissemination. In 1990, after 6 years of litigation and a $26 million damage award, control over the technology was partially reacquired by the originating small business.

Accompanying the DOE-initiated path of electronic ballast technology development, the state of California promulgated the first efficiency standards for fluorescent lighting ballasts in 1983. Other states followed suit: New York in 1986, Massachusetts and Connecticut in 1988, and Florida in 1989. However, it turned out that the standards could be met by improved conventional magnetic ballast technology, so they did not spur further development or more widespread use of the electronic ballast. As a result, without the DOE program for research and demonstration of the electronic ballast technology, it is unlikely that manufacture of elec-

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

tronic ballasts would have taken place as early as it did or even at all. As the technology develops, however, the benefits of the electronic ballast have become so compelling that all major lighting manufacturers have been obliged to adopt and continue to develop the technology.

Funding and Participation

Over the years since the lighting program was introduced in 1977, sponsored activities have covered a wide range of energy-saving opportunities in lighting. In recent years, the overall strategy and individual activities have been organized into three distinct program thrusts: (1) light sources, (2) lighting applications (lighting design, fixtures and controls), and (3) lighting impacts. Light sources accounted for approximately half of overall program funding.

Total funding for the electronic ballast program from 1977 through the early 1980s was $3.2 million in current-year dollars, or about $6.0 million in 1999 dollars (Table E-6). The research was cost-shared with industry through a competitive solicitation for development of a reliable, efficient, and cost-effective ballast. As mentioned above, three small firms won the solicitation, and these awards served as important catalysts for DOE’s early cost-shared program with industry, even though it was terminated in 1983. Ultimately, as the technology became proven through these early joint DOE-industry efforts, industry was satisfied the technology had a bright future. Indeed, the successful deployment of the technology in the marketplace required very large capital outlays by ballast manufacturers, which they would not have made had they not been so confident. While no data are available on the magnitude of these investments, they have been quite substantial.

Results

Fluorescent lamp electronic ballast technology has produced a permanent and fundamental change in the lighting

TABLE E-6 DOE Funding for the Fluorescent Lamp Electronic Ballast Program (thousands of dollars)

Fiscal Year

Current $

1999 $

1977

345

802

1978

560

1215

1979

727

1457

1980

457

833

1981

389

652

1982

411

649

1983

274

400

Total

3163

6009

 

SOURCE: Office of Energy Efficiency. 2000f. Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Electronic Ballast for Fluorescent Lamps Program. December 12.

marketplace, both in the United States and worldwide. In some sense this development is not surprising, since its adoption did not require any significant change to the fluorescent lamp itself. Electronic ballasts can be used in retrofit applications easily and are now routine in most new commercial and industrial lighting applications because the life-cycle cost savings are so substantial given the very low incremental capital costs over magnetic ballast alternatives. As the technology continues to develop and penetrate residential markets in both retrofit and new applications, the nation’s energy saving benefits will grow even more. Moreover, as significant as the efficiency savings are, the dimming and other control features of the technology can also enhance the quality of lighting applications and accelerate adoption of the technology even when energy prices are low.

Even though electronic ballasts entered the market in the late 1970s, they did not achieve substantial sales until 1985, largely for the market intervention reasons described earlier. However, after a slow start, market penetration has now reached about 40 percent of all ballast sales and is expected to be 50 percent of sales by 2005. Moreover, as a result of the recent DOE-proposed minimum efficiency standard, nearly all ballasts will probably have to be of the electronic type by 2010.

Benefits and Costs

The DOE work on electronic ballasts derives from the work of the lighting research group at LBNL that began in 1976. Two small companies that won a solicitation from LBNL did the research on ballasts, and prototypes were field-tested in 1978 and 1979. Substantial energy savings of about 25 percent were demonstrated, but reliability and other problems remained to be worked out. In addition, the major manufacturers of magnetic low-frequency ballasts actively resisted the electronic high-frequency innovation. It was not until 1988 that the new ballasts began to penetrate the market, and now they have captured about a 40 percent share (Geller and McGaraghan, 1998).

Electronic ballasts have the added advantage of electronic control, including dimming. The efficiency of magnetic ballasts has been improved, and they are the next-best technology. They are also cheaper per unit, but the difference in cost has been decreasing. The capital investment involved in manufacturing the electronic ballasts on a large scale is considerable, which is another reason for the delay in penetration.

The DOE provided a spreadsheet analysis of the benefits of the electronic ballasts calculated from its sales, the energy savings per unit, and the average hours of use per year of fluorescent lights in commercial buildings. DOE’s number, 3200 hr/year, is now thought to be an underestimate by 500 hr/year, so this is a source of underestimation for energy savings.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

The lifetime of the ballasts was assumed to be 15 years, so life-cycle savings were calculated by multiplying the energy saved per unit in the year sold times 15, and the average cost savings were life-cycle energy savings times the average cost of electricity to commercial and industrial customers averaged over the 15-year lifetime minus the added capital cost of the ballast compared with the next-best alternative, the magnetic ballast. The electricity prices were from EIA historical data and forecast prices from the EIA reference scenario. From these, the average electricity price for each 15-year period was calculated. This was multiplied times the life-cycle savings of ballasts sold in each year to give a total life-cycle cost, from which the added cost of the ballasts was subtracted.

It was then assumed that the electronic ballasts would have been introduced into the market with the same penetration rate, but 5 years later if there had been no DOE program. This offset penetration curve was substracted from the first curve to give a net cumulative energy and cost savings associated with the DOE R&D and technical support efforts. The cumulative energy cost savings were $32 billion and primary energy savings were 5.5 Q. After substracting the 5-year offset curve, the net cumulative energy cost savings were $15 billion and primary energy savings were 2.5 Q.

Also, as noted earlier, DOE estimates that between the efficiency standard and wider commercial availability of electronic ballasts, the technology will gradually come to dominate the marketplace over the next 5 years and will be required in essentially all new applications by 2010.

The other benefits attributable to the DOE electronic ballast technology R&D program are listed in the benefits matrix shown in Table E-7.

The committee concludes that the energy and cost savings from the early entry of electronic ballasts into the marketplace was substantial and that DOE R&D involvement was highly significant for this outcome. The undiscounted economic benefits to consumers are given in Table 3–4 together with energy reduction and associated pollution reduction benefits.

Lessons Learned

The DOE energy efficiency program has a number of excellent examples of how a carefully developed standards effort, when coupled with a technology development program, can accelerate commercial deployment of new technologies very effectively.

Such is the case with fluorescent electronic ballasts. Perhaps another key to the success of this program was the nature of the joint development efforts with industry. This case study proves that it is not always necessary to work with major manufacturers to fundamentally transform a market. As noted above, the major manufacturers were highly resistant to the idea of adding the electronic ballast to their product offerings, forcing DOE to work initially with small, innovative firms to introduce the technology in the late 1970s. Now, 20 years later, the electronic ballast will soon have a 50 percent market share. This experience suggests that DOE should seek input and guidance from a wide range of industry participants and should critically evaluate their response in terms of their competitive position within the industry and the impact of the intended program on their businesses.

FREE-PISTON STIRLING ENGINE HEAT PUMP (GAS-FIRED)

Program Description and History

Heating and air-conditioning account for 36 percent of the energy used in residential and commercial buildings. Natural gas heat pumps can save 40 percent of the energy used by today’s best gas and oil heating systems and can reduce summer electric peak loads by providing an alternative energy source for air conditioning. The goal of the R&D is to develop and demonstrate basic technologies that could result in a technically sound and commercially viable natural gas heat pump technology for residential and light commercial buildings.

A gas heat pump can be constructed using various heat engine and refrigeration cycles. The DOE strategy in the late 1970s and 1980s was to explore a number of technology options and begin to identify the most likely paths to a commercial product. In addition to free-piston Stirling engines, DOE also funded the development and evaluation of other gas heat pump technologies including Brayton cycles, the free-piston internal combustion engine, and absorption cycles. DOE and the Gas Research Institute (GRI), jointly and in parallel, funded R&D contracts with a number of research firms. DOE often examined the more risky technologies with potentially greater payoff. This portfolio approach resulted in one or two gas heat pump concepts being identified as worthy of continued work and likely to achieve commercial success. Other technology paths have been dropped as they encountered specific technological difficulties or proved to be less effective than another emerging gas heat pump approach. Specifically, attempts to use the free-piston Stirling engine to drive a heat pump were discontinued by DOE in 1992. Since then, the DOE program has focused almost exclusively on absorption technology.

The DOE Role

In parallel with its development of other technologies, for a natural gas heat pump, DOE supported the development of three different mechanical design concepts for the free-piston Stirling engine heat pump from 1976 through 1992. The projects focused on residential and small commercial buildings. Two of them were jointly funded by the gas industry. In parallel, there was considerable effort by NASA to de-

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

TABLE E-7 Benefits Matrix for the Fluorescent Lamp Electronic Ballast Programa

 

Realized Benefits/Costs

Options Benefits/Costs

Knowledge Benefits/Costs

Economic benefits/costs

DOE R&D costs: $6 millionb

Benefits are substantial: $15 billionc

Electronic ballasts had captured about 25% of the $1 billion ballast market by 1998

Improved lighting quality (less flicker and hum)

Benefits may be substantial: Nearly all ballasts will be required to be of the electronic type by 2010, and by 2015, electronic ballasts are expected to capture 75% of the marketd

Enabling application of dimming and other lighting controlse

Future electronic ballasts may incorporate Internet addressable features coupled with wireless control

Development of advanced control systems incorporating advanced ballast technologies, chips, wireless control, integrated daylight and occupancy sensing, etc.

Facilitate subsequent development of electronic ballasts for high-intensity-discharge lamps

Contributed to broadening of lighting R&D through development of commercial lighting roadmap

Environmental benefits/costs

These ballasts save about 25% of the energy required by conventional magnetic ballasts, reducing energy requirements and the resulting environmental impacts

Substantial reduced emissions of carbon, NOx, and SO2f

Avoided emission of suspended particulates from reduced coal emissions

Benefits may be substantial: Lighting consumes 4.8 quads, about 14% of the energy used in buildings.

Increased lighting efficiency will decrease energy requirements and pollutant emissions of carbon, NOx, and SO2g

May reduce the number and severity of nonattainment incidents, resulting in improved health

Provides increased flexibility in responding to future environmental and energy regulations

Benefits may be substantial if technologies are widely disseminated and diffused

Security benefits/costs

Improved electric system reliability during a period in which electricity infrastructure is expected to be strained

Increased demand-side flexibility to reduce peak loads on congested T&D systemsh

Provided technical basis for additional research into controllable ballasts

aUnless otherwise noted, all dollar estimates are given in constant 1999 dollars through 2000.

bCost-sharing data are not available. However, EE notes that “The successful deployment of the technology in the marketplace required substantial outlays by ballast manufacturers.”

cEE estimates that reduced net energy bills from sales of electronic ballasts through 2005 will result in savings of $21.9 billion, $13 billion of which is due to a 5-year acceleration of market adoption. This assumes that 20 W is saved by replacing a magnetic ballast with an electronic ballast that has an annual 3200 hr of ballast operation in a lifetime of 45,000 hr.

dEE estimates that the ballast efficiency standard adopted on September 19, 2000, will save approximately 2 quads of energy by 2030, resulting in savings to U.S. industry with a net present value of about $2 billion. However, since the ballasts are required by DOE minimum energy efficiency standards, all of the benefits cannot be attributed to R&D.

eEspecially when used with design software, these save energy by increasing opportunities for day lighting and task-specific lighting, and they also could increase occupant satisfaction with the indoor environment.

fAssuming a 5-year acceleration of market penetration and the 1999 marginal fuel mix for electricity, EE estimates that the ballasts have avoided 44.7 million tons of carbon, 410,000 tons of NOx, and 720,000 tons of SO2.

gBased on the efficiency standard, EE estimates that for 2005 to 2030, the ballasts will avoid 15 million tons of carbon and reduce NOx emissions by 50,000 tons.

hDuring periods of peak demand (around 4:00 p.m.), electronic ballasts reduce energy demand directly and also indirectly, by reducing cooling loads which are highest on peak.

velop free-piston Stirling technology for space power applications.

Why Stirling?

Internally, several factors supported the choice of the freepiston Stirling engine as a leading candidate technology to achieve a gas heat pump:

  • Before DOE’s involvement in Stirling, the American Gas Association (AGA) assessed various gas heat pump approaches and concluded that the Stirling was most attractive. AGA (later GRI) approached DOE for support for a joint R&D program.

  • A DOE-sponsored study by Arthur D.Little in 1983 (Teagan and Cunningham, 1983) concluded that stationary (as opposed to transport) applications such as heat pumps,

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

cogeneration, and remote power were best suited to the characteristics of Stirling engines.

  • A government role seemed appropriate, given the high level of technical challenge and the relative immaturity of the technology.

  • There was substantial commitment from a variety of partners in the DOE development projects: private industry, GRI, gas utilities, and NASA. There also were a number of independent efforts under way on Stirling engine technology (e.g., DOE-OTT, Army) that validated the general view that the technology was generally attractive.

  • The free-piston type of Stirling engine appeared to have the greatest potential for achieving low cost required in the residential and small commercial marketplace, DOE’s primary focus.

The Stirling engine is theoretically capable of achieving the maximum efficiency limit for Carnot-cycle heat engines. In this sense, the Stirling engine is fundamentally superior to most other heat engines, such as the internal-combustion engine or the gas turbine. But as a practical matter, the Stirling engine, like all other heat engines, falls far short of its maximum theoretical potential.

Stirling engine hardware designs are of two types: the kinematic type and the free-piston type. In rough analogy, the kinematic type is similar to a conventional automotive engine in which the internal power-producing components (pistons) are mechanically linked together and coupled to the power-absorbing device (e.g., a generator or automotive drive systems). In the free-piston type, as its name implies, the power-producing components operate in unconstrained, oscillatory harmonic motion. The power-absorbing device is not coupled mechanically to the power-producing components but is driven through some type of hermetic coupling (e.g., magnetic).

There are inherent advantages and disadvantages associated with both kinematic and free-piston Stirling engines. The putative advantages of the free-piston type include the following:

  • It is less costly for low power outputs.

  • It has a longer life, is more durable, and needs less maintenance.

These advantages are particularly relevant to the residential gas heat pump application. In contrast, the larger power output and much shorter lifetime requirements of automotive use tend to favor the kinematic type.

Funding and Participation

The level of DOE funding for free-piston Stirling engine R&D was influenced primarily by the efforts of the natural gas industry to educate Congress and administration officials about the importance of gas-fired heat pumps. The rationale for gas heat pumps included source energy efficiency, environmental benefits, peak-load reduction, infrastructure utilization, and foreign competition. The willingness of the natural gas industry to cost share substantial portions of the work significantly increased the credibility of the industry’s arguments. The shift in R&D policy to long-range, high-risk research in 1982 did not impact funding for gas heat pump R&D, because the work was technically risky and costly and a significant government role appeared to be justified.

DOE spent $30 million in 1999 dollars on free-piston Stirling engine R&D for gas heat pump applications from 1977 through 1992. Table E-8 indicates annual funding in nominal and 1999 dollars. Industry cost-sharing contributions during the years 1984 through 1992 (the only years for which data are readily available) totaled 50 percent of the total (DOE + industry) program costs.

The program was nearly terminated in 1982 when initial efforts were not successful. It was rejuvenated as a result of significant continued interest by GRI and the identification of new business partners with different approaches.

Results

Initial efforts with one contractor led to a design that did not work. That project was terminated in 1982. The interest in the free-piston Stirling heat pump was renewed from 1983 to 1992 through a partnership between DOE, GRI, and an industrial partner. This second phase resulted in two con-

TABLE E-8 DOE Funding for the Free-Piston Stirling Engine Heat Pump Program (thousands of dollars)

Fiscal Year

Nominal $

Deflation Factor

Total 1999 $

1977

800

0.430

1860

1978

1100

0.461

2386

1979

2488

0.499

4986

1980

2509

0.549

4570

1981

845

0.596

1418

1982

109

0.633

172

1983

814

0.658

1237

1984

534

0.683

782

1985

1073

0.704

1524

1986

1221

0.720

1696

1987

1169

0.742

1575

1988

1432

0.767

1867

1989

1434

0.796

1802

1990

1404

0.827

1698

1991

1200

0.857

1400

1992

1100

0.878

1253

1993

0

0.899

0

1994

0

0.918

0

Total

17,332

 

30,226

 

SOURCE: Office of Energy Efficiency. 2000g. OEE Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Case Study on Heat Pumps: Free-piston Stirling Engine-driven Heat Pumps (failure). November 22.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

cepts, one of which was eventually tested by an HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning) manufacturer.

This concept met the thermal performance goals of the project, demonstrating that such systems could attain the projected efficiency levels and save significant energy. However, the final conclusion by all parties was that (1) the free-piston Stirling engine was less attractive than other technologies in the near- and midterm and (2) the long-term prospects for free-piston Stirling engines were somewhat attractive, but major development investments would be required to reach cost goals.

This conclusion allowed both government and private research managers to redirect scarce research funds to more attractive technologies. Among the technical and cost problems were materials for the refractive heater head and the extremely high tolerances needed for successful gas bearings.

At the end of the program, a prospectus was prepared to solicit interest from venture capitalists. No interest was shown. It is notable that work on free-piston Stirling applications for electric power production and combined heat and power applications continues, with some DOE support.7,8 Also, the knowledge gained about magnetic coupling across hermetic seals is currently being applied to an artificial heart pump by Foster Miller. Foster Miller bought part of MTI, the free-piston Stirling heat pump contractor. In addition, Sunpower proposed a duplex system where a free-piston engine drives a free-piston heat pump.

Some variations on these themes are still being pursued by Sunpower. There is still interest in the Stirling-engine-driven, Rankine-cycle heat pump. Stirling-driven generators and compressors have a variety of niche applications. Combined heat and power (CHP) for residential applications of Stirling-engine-driven generators will probably be commercialized in Europe.

There is no doubt that the DOE and GRI investments in Stirling-driven heat pumps advanced the technology. It is much further along today then when the program was terminated in 1993. The project did not merit commercialization.

Benefits and Costs

The realized benefits to the consuming public were zero, and the deflated cumulative costs were $30 million spent by the government and another $14 million spent by the industrial partners. Thus, the total realized economic benefit of the R&D was zero, with only costs of $44 million resulting from the program (see Table E-9). There were no realized environmental or security benefits.

Without DOE support, the technology would have developed much more slowly. Industry would have continued to invest in the technology, but overall funding would have been reduced. The critical information necessary to make informed decisions about the future technical and market potential of the technology would either have not been developed or would have been developed at a much later date. There would be considerably more uncertainty about the potential of the free-piston Stirling engine, and favorable viewpoints about the technology would have persisted.

Lessons Learned

It is the nature of R&D that not all concepts investigated prove successful. In this case, the most important lessons are that risky R&D efforts should (1) be undertaken on a portfolio basis to avoid the risk of betting on the wrong technology and (2) be structured to identify potential losers as early as possible to minimize wasted efforts.

The natural gas heat pump experience documents the importance to energy R&D efforts of a portfolio approach to addressing energy needs. In this case, the value of achieving a better seasonal distribution of both natural gas and electricity loads is clear. Utilizing natural gas to provide air conditioning would certainly accomplish this goal, but an early bet on any single technology would not have provided the opportunity to ensure that the best technology could emerge.

Competing technologies are often investigated concurrently until one emerges as superior to the others; research on the inferior options is halted, and resources are then focused on the more promising ones. In this case, the development program for the Stirling engine heat pump was terminated after it was judged to be inferior to the gas absorption heat pump and because budget constraints forced a choice to be made at the time the Stirling engine heat pump was dropped.

The time and cost required to develop and successfully commercialize important new products in the mature HVAC market are easy to underestimate. For instance, despite more than a decade of emphasis on absorption heat pumps, these have not yet penetrated the market.

Another lesson learned is that with a new technology the fundamental barriers need to be more fully explored before systems are constructed. Two such barriers are seals and magnetic or other indirect coupling approaches.

INDOOR AIR QUALITY, INFILTRATION, AND VENTILATION

Program Description and History

Research was begun before 1978 by DOE and its predecessors to address increased concerns about decreased in-

7  

“This combined heat and power (CHP) unit for the home is to be powered by a gas-fired piston Stirling engine supplied by Stirling Technology Company of the United States” (OECD/IEA, 2000).

8  

Free-piston Stirling engine application to a direct solar thermal electric generator was developed at Sandia National Laboratory. This application has the Stirling engine at the focal point of a parabolic reflector. The system has been completely automated to start and stop automatically. It will be tested at a remote Native American site.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

TABLE E-9 Benefits Matrix for the Stirling Engine Heat Pump Programa

 

Realized Benefits/Costs

Options Benefits/Costs

Knowledge Benefits/Costs

Economic benefits/costs

DOE R&D costs: $30.2 million

Industry costs: >$14 millionb

No realized economic benefits

Minimal benefits, but the technology can be resurrected for further development. One company may be interested.c

Niche applicationsd

Potential to save energy and reduce electricity peak loadse

Advances in the technologyf

Development of three different mechanical design concepts

Thermal performance goals achievedg

Basic knowledge with various applicationsh

Technical potential demonstrated

Understanding of key technical issues and R&D needs

Environmental benefits/costs

None

Minimali

Some applications of FPS engine technologyj

Combustion effluents well understood for natural gas

Use of environmentally benign working fluid (hydrogen) has been proven

Security benefits/costs

None

Minimal

Minimal

aUnless otherwise noted, all dollar estimates are given in constant 1999 dollars through 2000.

bThis is the total of industry cost-sharing contributions for 1984 to 1992, the only years for which the data are available. Thus, the total industry cost share for the total program is probably higher.

cNatural gas heat pumps can save 40 percent of the energy used by today’s best gas and oil heating systems and can reduce summer electric peak loads by providing an alternative energy source for air conditioning. However, other gas heat pump approaches investigated in the DOE program have better potential.

dStirling-driven generators and compressors have a variety of niche applications, and CHP for residential applications of Stirling-engine-driven generators will probably be commercialized in Europe.

eNatural gas heat pumps can save 40 percent of the energy used by today’s best gas and oil heating systems and can reduce summer electric peak loads by providing an alternative energy source for air conditioning.

fThere is no doubt that the DOE and GRI investments in Stirling-driven heat pumps advanced the technology, and it is much farther along today than when the program was terminated in 1993.

gThis concept met the thermal performance goals of the project, demonstrating that such systems could attain the projected efficiency levels and save significant energy.

hFor example, the knowledge gained during the program about magnetic coupling across hermetic seals is currently being applied to an artificial heart pump by Foster Miller.

iGas heat pumps can reduce energy and electricity use during peak summer cooling periods and have the potential for reducing heat island effects and nonattainment incidents.

jBasic FPS engine technology could facilitate the development of solar thermal power generation systems and remote power systems using agricultural waste fuels in developing countries.

door air quality (IAQ) caused by the design and retrofit of buildings to save energy. For this case study, EE provided information to the committee on the main research and technology transfer program on indoor air quality, which became a recognized budget activity in 1985.9 As indicated by EE, the goal of this program was twofold: (1) to provide a building science foundation for the national response to the IAQ issue and (2) to develop ways to harvest the large energy savings potential from reduced infiltration and ventilation, without degrading the resulting indoor environment. According to EE, the objectives of this program were to (1) quantify the relationships among infiltration, ventilation rate, building characteristics, indoor pollutant source, and acceptable indoor environments and (2) disseminate the results.

To achieve the objectives, EE conducted both basic and applied research projects in the Indoor Air Quality, Infiltration, and Ventilation (IAQI&V) program. Results were disseminated in scientific and technical papers10 and through active participation in the development of national consensus standards including the following:

  • ASTM Standard D5116. “Standard Guide for Small Scale Environmental Chamber Determination of Organic Emissions from Indoor Materials/Products.”

9  

IAQ research was funded under a much larger set of budget activities and not specifically identified before 1985. In 1985, IAQI&V became a distinct budget line, and budget numbers from that point are readily identifiable and official.

10  

Sherman. 1995a; Sherman, 1995b; Burch and Chi, 1997; Seppanen et al., 1999; Sherman and Dickerhoff, 1994; Sherman and Matson, 1993; Nero et al., 1985; Grimsrud et al., 1987; Turk et al., 1987; Daisey et al.,1994; Fisk, 2000; Mendell et al., 1996; Mendell et al., 1999; and Ten Brinke et al., 1998.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×
  • ASHRAE Standard 136–1993, “Method of Determining Air Change Rates in Detached Dwellings.”

  • ASHRAE Standard 119–1988 (reaffirmed as 119–1993), “Air Leakage Performance for Detached Single-Family Residential Buildings.”

  • ASHRAE Standard 129–1997, “Measuring Air Change Effectiveness.”

  • ASHRAE Standard 62–1999, “Ventilation for Acceptable Indoor Air Quality.”

  • ASHRAE Standard 62.2P (in progress), “Ventilation and Acceptable Indoor Air Quality in Low-Rise Residential Buildings.”

Although the development of new technologies was not the primary focus of the IAQI&V Program,11 EE claims that the program was influential in improving four IAQI&V-related technologies from 1985 to 1999:

  1. A device that is capable of pressurizing or depressurizing a building to identify and locate the source of air leaks (a “blower door”) was introduced into the United States by a Swedish researcher. EE reported that the device was improved through the IAQI&V program and mathematical models were derived for interpreting the results (Sherman, 1995a).

  2. Together with DOE’s Office of Science, research determined that the dominant source of indoor radon was the pressure-driven entry of soil gas rather than the constituents of building material. DOE claims that these results led to the development of effective and energy-efficient mitigation methods (Fisk et al., 1995).

  3. DOE research on radon transmission in buildings led to a parallel study on moisture migration and transmission in buildings. Moisture in building materials has been historically associated with mold impaction and a reduction of thermal resistance of the materials. As reported by EE, this research assisted in the development of mathematical models that were incorporated into the computer program MOIST, developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for estimating moisture transmission through building envelopes (Burch and Chi, 1997).

  4. DOE research has demonstrated the importance of measuring building ventilation and concentrations of indoor air pollutants. As reported by EE, this research helped stimulate the development and refinement of a broad range of instruments and sensors used for building control systems (e.g., low-cost carbon dioxide sensors and pressure-sensitive sensors) and for diagnostic purposes (e.g., instruments to measure pollutants in investigations of IAQ problems) (Seppanen et al., 1999). The validity of these claims is discussed in the Results section.

Funding and Participation

According to the information provided to the committee by EE, DOE invested about $34 million (in 1999 dollars) for basic and applied research in the IAQI&V program between 1985 and 2000. The amount invested by DOE for IAQI&V research between the years 1978 and 1984 was not reported but has been estimated at $7 million.12 The total investment for IAQ research by federal agencies, including DOE, between 1987 and 1999 was reported by EE as $622 million (in 1999 dollars). This number is consistent with the GAO estimate, but GAO also reports that 10 federal agencies13 invested $1.1 billion (in nominal dollars) for indoor pollution research during this time, including IAQ (54 percent), lead (24 percent), radon (17 percent), and asbestos (4 percent) (GAO, 1999). Furthermore, according to the GAO report, about 64 percent of the federal funding for indoor pollution research during those years was accounted for by work conducted within four NIH institutes. Thus, research that focused on the interactions of IAQ and energy efficiency, IAQI&V, accounted for approximately 3 percent of the federal investment for indoor pollution research from 1987 to 1999. It is recognized that nongovernmental organizations, such as ASHRAE, EPRI, and ARI, have sponsored independent research on IAQ.

EE also reported that the annual DOE investment in IAQI&V research generally decreased since 1987 and that the amount received in 1999 was one-third of that received in 1987 (in 1999 dollars). EE reported that, at the same time, the total annual investment for IAQ research by federal agencies increased 175 percent, with most of the funding focused on health perspectives rather than energy perspectives. The committee is, however, aware that some of the objectives of the IAQI&V program have also been supported at the national laboratories with funding from other public and private sector sources (e.g., utility companies, corporations, states, and local communities), somewhat offsetting the reduction in DOE investment, but the amount of this funding was not reported to the committee. Also, as reported by EE, the IAQI&V research at LBNL after 1994 was aggregated with other activities into a larger program area, “Design

11  

EE reported that the primary research focus of the IAQI&V Program has been the development of knowledge and the application of this knowledge to other R&D areas, such as methods of incorporating energy-efficient technologies into building systems without compromising the health of occupants.

12  

This estimate is based on subsequent input from DOE at the request of the committee but is not an official budget item.

13  

The 10 agencies (and funding levels from 1987 to 1999) are the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences ($399.7 million); National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute ($175.2 million); Environmental Protection Agency ($140.4 million); Department of Energy ($136.5 million); National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases ($93.7 million); Department of Housing and Urban Development ($75.7 million); National Cancer Institute ($19.5 million); Consumer Product Safety Commission ($16.8 million); National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health ($14.6 million); and NIST ($5.9 million).

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

Tools and Strategies,” and is no longer featured as a distinct budget line item. It should also be noted that DOE did not give the committee an estimate of the amount the private sector had invested in IAQ and energy efficiency research from 1978 to 1999.

Results

The IAQI&V program has met its first goal, providing a building science foundation for the national response to the IAQ issue. Research conducted in the program served as the scientific and technical basis for the development of ASHRAE Standards 136–1993, 119–1988 (reaffirmed as 119–1993), and 129–1997, and it was influential in the development of ASTM Standard D511b and ASHRAE Standards 62–1999 and 62P (in progress). The considerable influence of this research is documented in the reference sections of these standards.

As for the second goal—developing ways to harvest the large energy savings potential from reduced infiltration and ventilation without degrading the resulting indoor environment—considerable technical progress has been made, but further work is needed to catalyze broader market use of the four IAQ-related technologies that were the focus of the IAQI&V program from 1985 to 1999:

  1. EE reported that three North American manufacturers14 now sell more than a thousand blower doors per year (Anderson, 1995). These devices are used by building diagnosticians to determine the air leakage rate in buildings. However, EE did not give the committee the numbers of investigations per year in which these devices are used, the energy saved by mitigating the air leakage rates, or the effects on IAQ and occupant health and performance. Blower doors have been used since the 1980s in weatherization and nonfederal programs for improving residential energy efficiency. Sherman and Dickerhoff (1994) published an analysis of data taken in the 1980s; their analysis showed the average house in the United States was quite leaky and that currently accepted standard methods of remediation typically reduce infiltration by 25 percent. The database contained about 12,000 measurements obtained throughout the United States. A statistical analysis of these data predicted a potential annual savings of 1 quad from the residential building stock in the United States (Sherman and Matson, 1993).

  2. In addition to identifying the primary pathway for radon entry into a house, DOE research in the 1980s also characterized experimentally, and by modeling, how radon entry rates depended on other factors that caused the pressure differences driving soil gas entry (Nero et al., 1985). DOE was the main sponsor of the research on radon entry, while DOE and EPA substantially supported the research on radon mitigation. This research provided the basic knowledge needed to devise radon mitigation strategies that work by preventing or reducing the rate of soil gas entry into buildings. These strategies are now used in nearly all instances of radon mitigation and typically reduce indoor radon concentrations by a factor of between 2 and 10 (Fisk et al., 1995). However, the number of mitigation system installations and the effects on average radon concentrations in the United States are not known. Moreover, the committee was not given any quantitative data that demonstrated the effects of these strategies on residential energy use or health.

  3. If DOE’s research on the reduction of unwanted moisture in buildings and buildings materials led to changes in the design or operation of buildings or reduced indoor mold concentrations, adverse health effects, reduced damage to property, or energy savings, these results were not reported to the committee.

  4. The claims that DOE research had helped to stimulate the development or refinement of a broad range of instruments and sensors for ventilation control and diagnostic purposes were not supported with documentation on specific products or market penetration. However, DOE’s research on indoor air quality has helped to document the importance of the indoor environment for human health and performance and has helped to identify the important determinants of these effects (Grimsrud et al., 1987; Turk et al., 1987; Daisey at al., 1994; Fisk, 2000).

As knowledge about the importance and determinants of indoor environmental quality advances and is incorporated into standards, guidelines, and handbooks (e.g., through ASHARE and ASTM), the private sector has developed an IAQ consulting/service industry that focuses primarily on problem mitigation, an industry that markets a broad range of instrumentation and sensors related to IAQ. However, the size of these consulting/service and instrumentation industries in the United States is not known, and DOE has not quantified the impact of its research on the development of these industries, even though the committee considers it to be significant.

EE also reported that research co-funded with NIOSH and EPA has led to a better understanding of the causes of sick building syndrome (SBS) and to the development of mitigation options. In a cross-sectional survey of office buildings cosponsored by NIOSH (Mendell et al., 1996), data were obtained on the prevalence of SBS in a set of office buildings. The study also identified certain building-related risk factors such as HVAC type, concentrations of volatile organic compounds, increased use of carbonless copy paper and photocopy machines, as well as personal and job-related risk factors. In another study cosponsored by NIOSH (Mendell et al., 1999), decreases in indoor concentrations of submicron particles did not significantly reduce the intensity of SBS symptoms, but increased air temperatures were associated with significant increases in their intensity. DOE has

14  

The Energy Conservatory, Infiltec, and Retrotec.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

also supported the statistical analysis of data from the EPA Building Assessment and Evaluation (BASE) study to investigate the relationship between SBS symptom prevalence and indoor concentrations of carbon dioxide and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) (Ten Brinke et al., 1998). By focusing on the most irritating VOCs and using principal component analyses, new VOC metrics were identified. These studies support the DOE claim that there is a relationship between occupant symptoms and complaints and indoor air quality, but they have not provided much information about corresponding building performance, mitigation options, or energy efficiency.

Benefit and Costs

The benefits and costs of the IAQI&V program are estimated in Table E-10. Calculations of realized economic benefits that have resulted from DOE’s influence on standards and from the market penetration of blower door technologies, radon and moisture mitigation methods, and new sen-

TABLE E-10 Benefits Matrix for the Indoor Air Quality Programa

 

Realized Benefits/Costs

Options Benefits/Costs

Knowledge Benefits/Costs

Economic benefits/costs

DOE R&D costs: $34 million (through 2000)

Other R&D costs: $585 millionb

Benefits are large and are likely to substantially exceed DOE costs.

Helped facilitate the establishment of the blower door testing industryc

Facilitated development of radon mitigation industry

Stimulated development or refinement of instruments and sensors used for building control systems

Facilitated development of consensus industry standards

Potential for reduced energy consumption owing to residential tightening measuresd

Increased knowledge about causes of sick building syndrome

Increased knowledge about source of radone

Increased knowledge about how tight building envelopes can bef

Increased knowledge of moisture migration and transmission in buildings and development of mathematical models and other tools for moisture prediction

Assisted in development of MOIST program for estimating moisture transmission through building envelopes

Environmental benefits/costs

Enabled industry and homeowners to avoid or mitigate many indoor environmental and related health problems through changes in materials, building design, and operation and maintenance practices

Potential for avoided emissions of carbong

Potential for avoided emissions of SO2 and NOx at power plantsh

Potential for avoided emissions of other criteria pollutants including particulates and heavy metals, especially from coal-fired power plants

Research demonstrated importance of building ventilation and indoor air quality and identified the important pollutants

Security benefits/costs

Reduction in electricity demand due to reduced AC loads; some reduction in energy consumption for heating

Reduction in peak electricity demand due to reduced AC loads; some reduction in heating oil use

Minimal

aUnless otherwise noted, all dollar estimates are given in constant 1999 dollars through 2000.

bA large fraction of spending by others on IAQ research is by the NIH, with considerable emphasis on asthma, allergies, and pesticide exposures and very little emphasis on building science. The second-largest spending is by the EPA, with a greater focus on education programs than on research. Some of the objectives of the IAQI&V program have also been supported at the national laboratories with funding from other public and private sector sources (e.g., utility companies, corporations, states, and local communities), but the amount of this funding was not reported to the committee. The IAQ research at LBNL after 1994 was aggregated with other activities into a larger program area, “Design Tools and Strategies,” and is no longer featured as a distinct budget line item. DOE did not provide an estimate to the committee of private sector investment in IAQI&V and energy efficiency research during the period 1978 to 1999, but it contends that, owing to the relatively low financial returns from conducting ventilation and other IAQ research, the private sector has invested little in this area.

cDOE research, through development of a series of mathematical models for interpreting the data derived from the use of the blower door, enhanced the blower door testing industry. The blower door has been extensively used to field-verify air leakage reductions from weatherization techniques and to improve the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of weatherization strategies.

dASHRAE Standard 119–1988 sets maximum leakage levels based on energy considerations, and it may result in substantial energy cost savings.

eDOE research determined that the dominant source of indoor radon was pressure-driven entry of soil gas, laying the foundation for effective energy efficient mitigation methods. Without DOE’s research, it is possible that the previous misperception would have persisted for several years, possibly with higher rates of exposure and higher energy usage.

fConsistent with sufficient ventilation rates for human health and performance.

gIf ASHRAE 119 is adopted, the energy use associated with ventilation in homes could be reduced substantially.

hThese savings can be estimated based on the electricity savings and the GPRA NOx and SO2 coefficients.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

sor technologies were not provided by DOE. However, the economic benefits from the development of these standards and technologies, in terms of the energy cost savings associated with improved infiltration and ventilation control and the reduced health care costs associated with improved indoor environmental quality, are likely to have substantially exceeded the DOE costs of the IAQI&V program—approximately $2 million per year since 1978 (Fisk, 2000; Sherman, 1995b).

The options benefits that might be realized from more general compliance with the voluntary, consensus standards that have recently been promulgated and from increased care in the design, construction, and operations of buildings are reported to offer the potential for a saving of tens of billions of dollars annually in energy and health care costs (Fisk, 2000).

Realized and options environmental and security benefits of the IAQI&V program are gained both indoors and outdoors. Improved air quality can directly affect the health and safety of building occupants. Several of the other federal agencies conducting IAQ research have focused on the health issues, but DOE has focused its research on energy-efficient ways of achieving acceptable IAQ. Although the realized benefits are estimated to be substantial, they are also uncertain, because of the inherent difficulties of quantifying them, the limited resources for quantifying what might be reasonably quantifiable, the highly dispersed nature of the benefits, and the dearth of documentation, described earlier.

Lessons Learned

DOE’s IAQI&V program is a good example of a successful, yet complex, relationship between several federal agencies that have different missions and research agendas. In this case study, research that focused on the interactions of IAQ and energy efficiency accounted for diminishing amounts (less than 3 percent in 1999) of federal investment for indoor pollution research from 1987 to 1999. Yet, the potential not only for energy savings but also for reduced health care costs and improved productivity from this research far exceeded the cost of the program. The primary lesson to be learned from this case study is that health and safety issues may be more important public goals than energy efficiency. Thus, the slightest perception of negative health consequences from increased energy efficiency can damage the credibility of the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy’s mission of reducing energy use. However, a corollary to this lesson is that energy efficiency, health, safety, and productivity are not mutually exclusive issues. Therefore, DOE should not only remain cognizant of the possible indoor environmental consequences of energy-efficient technologies and practices but should also work with other federal agencies on basic and applied research to enhance occupant health and well-being through these technologies and practices.

A second important, and maybe related, lesson to be learned from this case study is that credible cost and benefit analyses are required. Analyses of the impact of energy-efficient technologies and practices on the health and well-being of the public are not credible when they are based on simplistic assumptions about building performance or on less-than-complete information on the costs incurred to realize the outcomes. A more credible approach to the study of health and performance effects of energy-efficient environments would be acquisition of measured data through statistically based experimental designs that are generally used in health and social science research.

LOW-EMISSION (LOW-E) WINDOWS

Program Description and History

The low-emissions (low-e) window program was initiated by DOE in 1976. The objective of this program was to reduce energy consumption by reducing heat loss through the glazing component15 of windows designed for residential buildings in cold climates. To achieve this objective, the program initially focused on the development of coatings that could increase reflection by reducing the emission of infrared energy that irradiated the glazing from the room side.

From 1976 through 1983, DOE sponsored research at its Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) and at several small research firms on suitable coating systems and deposition processes. A small business attracted venture capital and built the first production facility for applying low-e coatings to thin plastic films. By 1980, this firm was working closely with several window manufacturers to develop and refine a fabrication technology that incorporated a low-e coating on a plastic film that could be applied to the window glazing. Subsequently, processes were developed to deposit the coatings directly onto the glass.

In 1983, the industry and DOE, through LBNL, began investigating modifications to the low-e coatings that could enhance nighttime performance of the window glazing and, more importantly, reflect most of the Sun’s near-infrared energy. The objective of these enhanced coatings was to produce a window that provided clear vision and reduced the cooling load (i.e., heat gain) in the room. By 1992, one nationally known window manufacturer had converted its entire line of standard windows to include glazing with these spectrally selective coatings. Glazing with these coatings transmitted nearly the same amount of daylight as untreated

15  

The glazing, or glass, is one of three major components of a window. Each has significant heat loss and heat gain pathways. The other two components are the framing and connection to the building, and the framing and connection to the glazing.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

glazing but prevented transmission of much of the ultraviolet and infrared radiation (i.e., heat), thus reducing solar heat gain into the room during summer and reducing heat loss from the room in the winter.

While industry was developing the spectrally selective coatings, DOE supported simulation efforts (i.e., WINDOW 4.1) (Arasteh et al., 1994) and field tests at LBNL’s field test facility to demonstrate that the cooling load reductions were measurable and real. During the 1990s, DOE also supported rating and labeling efforts so that the performance of spectrally selective glazings could be accurately conveyed to consumers and design professionals. As part of these efforts, LBNL was instrumental in developing a solar heat gain coefficient (SHGC) parameter for windows and other fenestration products (ASHRAE, 1997a), and for supporting the development of SHGC ratings and labeling through the National Fenestration Rating Council. In 1997, DOE expanded its promotion of spectrally selective glazings by funding the Efficient Windows Collaborative; promoting these glazings in the Sunbelt is one priority of the collaborative (Geller and Thorne, 1999).

Funding and Participation

According to information provided to the committee by EE, “DOE invested about $2 million in the development of low-e windows between the years 1976 and 1983. Unfortunately, annual funding of low-e research is not available in the references available” (OEE, 2000h). The committee has therefore estimated that $2 million in expenditures between 1976 and 1983 translates into about $4 million in constant 1999 dollars. Because LBNL continued to be involved in the research in the 1980s and 1990s, and in the promotion of the low-e technology, this estimate is likely to be low. EE provided no information on industry cost share.

Results

A range of spectrally selective glazings is now commercially available for residential and nonresidential buildings (e.g., schools, offices, and hospitals), and methods for calculating heat losses and heat gains for these glazings are readily available (ASHRAE, 1997a). References cited by EE (DRC, 1996 and DRC, 1998) estimate that low-e penetration of the residential market was 31 percent in 1991 and 33 to 35 percent from 1995 to 1997. The result was that commercial products began to appear in the market in 1983 and by the year 2000 had captured 40 percent of the residential window market (Ducker, 2000) and perhaps 15 percent of the commercial building market (Geller and McGaraghan, 1998). No comparable studies were provided for low-e penetration in the nonresidential market.

Standardized methods for rating low-e glazing and window assemblies with low-e glass are now available in the literature. These methods draw significantly on the computer modeling and field test data that were generated at LBNL.

DOE’s involvement in the development of low-e technologies for glazing and windows was critical in (1) publicizing the concept, (2) leading and supporting the development of technologies for applying the coatings to thin films and subsequently for directly depositing them on the glazing, (3) continuing support and encouragement for the development of spectrally selective coatings, (4) developing computer models and field test methods that formed the basis of rating standards, and (5) developing tools for design calculations that are now available in the published literature (ASHRAE, 1997a).

Benefits and Costs

The benefit and cost estimates of the low-e program are shown in Table E-11. Rather than using its WINDOWS 4.1 or DOE-2 programs in calculating the benefits associated with the DOE RD&D investment for the committee, DOE used the obsolete Heating Degree Day (HDD) Method (65 °F Base) to estimate the energy savings and corresponding consumer net energy cost savings for the residential market only and for heating energy savings only. The commercial buildings market was not considered nor was the impact of low-e glass on reducing the cooling load in residences. To this extent, the energy savings benefits probably are overestimated for reductions in residential heating loads and underestimated for reductions in cooling loads for residences and commercial buildings.16

Calculating heat load reduction depends on knowing the impact of low-e coating on the effective heat transfer coefficient of the low-e double-glazing compared with double-glazed windows without the coating. The double-glazed window without coating was assumed to be the next-best technology for which the low-e windows substituted. The effective heat conductance (U-value) of the windows was decreased, from 0.48 to 0.32 Btu/hr ft2 °F by the low-e coating. Low-e windows are used predominantly in the colder regions of the country, and the average of the degree-days17 weighted by region and by sales was 5200. Multiplying 5200 by (0.48–0.32) times 24 hours/day gives the heat loss reduction of 20,000 Btu/ft2 per year using low-e coating and double-glazing with a 1/2-in. air space (see ASHRAE, 1997,

16  

The committee realizes that the HDD method for estimating energy savings due to application of low-e glass is a rather gross approximation. More sophisticated techniques exist, including some that DOE itself sponsored, such as DOE-2, that it could have and should have used, especially when it expects others to. Not all members of the committee agreed with using the HDD method, but most members did agree that the HDD method was adequate for the committee’s purposes.

17  

This 5200 value is for a 65°F base. If a more energy-efficient base (e.g., 50°F) is assumed, the value would be closer to 3000 degree days and the projected energy savings would be approximately 12,000 Btu/ft2 per year (see Chapter 28, ASHRAE, 1993a).

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

TABLE E-11 Benefits Matrix for the Low-emission (Low-e) Windows Programa

 

Realized Benefits/Costs

Options Benefits/Costs

Knowledge Benefits/Costs

Economic benefits/costs

DOE R&D costs: $4 millionb

Benefits are substantial: approximately $8 billionc

Reduced ultraviolet light damage to furniture and carpets

Increased occupant thermal comfort from reduced air flow

Manufacturers have widely adopted low-e’s, and low-e’s have captured 1/3 of the residential market

Spectrally selective glazings are now available for all buildings

Standardized methods for rating low-e glazing and window assemblies with low-e glass are now available in the literature

Potential benefits are large, in both new and retrofit marketsd

Reduced air conditioning costs in the southern and southwestern United States and increased comfort in vehicles, from applications of specialty-selective glazings

Reduced gasoline use from application of extended specialty glazings to airconditioned vehicles

Ability to include different types of glazing in local building codes

R&D on spectrally selective coatings, methods for measuring glass properties, simulations and tests of monitored buildings, and ratings, labeling, and certification procedures

Improved understanding of the application of coating to glass

Software to evaluate the benefits of different types of coatings

Development of objective test data and energy ratings for windows

Improvements in varying the ability to filter different wave-lengths and associated heat and light products through glass Potential spin-off applications for photovoltaics and other technologies that utilize differing portions of the visible and infrared spectrum

Environmental benefits/costs

Substantial reduced emissionse

Associated emissions reduction from reduced energy usef

Reduced incidents of nonattainmentg

Increased ability to control indoor environment

Development of insulated shipping containers

Security benefits/costs

Reduced oil dependence from reduced use of heating oilh

Reduced winter peak demandi

Reduced pressure on electricity infrastructure

Reduced oil dependence

Technology transfer to other nations could reduce oil use and environmental emissions

aUnless otherwise noted, all dollar estimates are given in constant 1999 dollars through 2000.

bThe EE submission states: “DOE invested about $2 million in the development of low-e windows between the years 1976 and 1983. Unfortunately, annual funding of low-E research is not available in the references available.” The committee thus estimated that $2 million in expenditures between 1976 and 1983 translates into about $4 million in constant 1999 dollars. However, because of the continued research involvement of LBNL in the 1980s and 1990s and DOE’s involvement in the promotion of this technology, this estimate is likely to be low. EE provided no information on industry cost share.

cEE estimates that, of a total of $35.5 billion in life-cycle cost savings, $23.5 billion reflects a 5-year acceleration of market introduction and a doubling of market penetration. EE’s estimates are based on an assumed constant 35 percent (35.2 kBtu/ft2 per year) reduction in conduction heat loss through the coated glazing compared to a pre-1987 untreated double-glazed residential window (with no differences in heat losses in the framing or infiltration), in heating-dominated climates, for all years from 1983 to 2005. This basic assumption was apparently based on one referenced study in 1987 and does not consider the development of “next-best technologies” since that time. Moreover, this assumption does not consider potential energy savings from reduced cooling loads in residential nor any potential energy savings from reduced heating losses or cooling loads in nonresidential buildings. Finally, this assumption does not consider the added flexibility that the availability of low-e glazing provides to building designers. For example, the availability of low-e glazing allows the percent of glazed area to be increased without incurring additional heat losses or cooling loads. Thus, the availability of low-e glazing does not assure that energy savings, and corresponding net life-cycle cost savings, will be realized if other functional requirements such as view, comfort, or occupant performance dominate design requirements.

dEE estimates that full adoption of LEWs in all new residential and commercial construction by 2010 could save $2.5 billion annually in heating and cooling costs. Payback is 4 to 10 years in retrofit applications and shorter in new construction.

eEE estimates these benefits as avoided life-cycle emissions of 68 million tons of carbon, 540,000 tons of NOx, and 770,000 tons of SO2.

fEE estimates that full adoption of LEWs in all new residential construction by 2010 could save 0.45 Q annually and significantly reduce environmental impacts.

gThis assumes that spectrally selective glazing is used to reduce summer peak demand. EE also contends that low-e will reduce indoor stress on human health but does not quantify these benefits.

hEE estimates cumulative life-cycle savings of 0.41 Q of fuel and LPG for heating and a total of 0.65 Q of fuel and liquified petroleum gas saved.

iEE contends that this will also reduce the regional strain on infrastructure for natural gas, heating oil, and electricity delivery; also, “Because winter supply infrastructure for oil, natural gas, and electricity can be further constrained by adverse weather impacts (e.g., ice storms, frozen ports), the ability to reduce peak demand is especially important to avoid disruption during these periods” (OEE, 2000h).

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

for center of glass values). Then it was assumed that the home heating system was 60 percent efficient (heat source efficiency was assumed to be 75 percent and duct distribution efficiency, 80 percent), so the heating energy that was saved by the low-e window was 20/0.6, or 33.2 kBtu/ft2 per year (Selkowitz, 2001). This is a ballpark number, but in the opinion of the committee, it is an adequate estimate. This number was then multiplied by the square footage of low-e windows sold for residential applications per year, and national averages of fuel and electricity mixes for home heating were used to calculate the electricity, natural gas, fuel oil, etc., savings in the year the windows were sold. These energy savings were then multiplied by the average national cost of fuels and electricity. This process was then repeated for each year from 1983 to 2000. The data were then extrapolated to 2005 assuming market share increased from 40 percent in 2000 to 45 percent in 2005. Market penetration data for low-e glass were obtained from Ducker Research Company, Inc. (DRC, 2000) and other sources.

The average lifetime of the windows was assumed to be 30 years. For each year, the total life-cycle energy saving was calculated and the energy cost savings were calculated. From these, the incremental capital cost of the low-e glass was subtracted to obtain the net life-cycle cost savings of the windows sold for each year and summed to obtain a calculated net cost saving of $37 billion. The incremental cost of low-e glass was taken as $1.25 per square foot in nominal dollars. This added investment had a simple payback of 4 to 5 years. Additionally, the committee applied its 5-year rule, assuming that the DOE-associated R&D impact on energy was the introduction of low-e glass to the market 5 years earlier than it would otherwise have occurred given only private sector initiative. The penetration of low-e windows into the market 5 years later was assumed to take the same penetration curve, and the energy use and dollar savings were calculated and subtracted from the original calculations. The result was that the energy cost savings were reduced from $37 billion to $7.7 billion and the total primary energy saved was reduced from 6.1 Q to 1.2 Q. The associated pollution reduction and security benefits were similarly reduced in the numbers reported in Table 3–4. It should be noted that the large impact of the 5-year rule was because the penetration of low-e glass stabilized rather quickly, at about 35 percent of window sales by 1993. The 5-year offset meant that the two penetration curves coincided after about 1997.18

The committee can think of various reasons why these benefits may be overestimated. For one thing, the windows may not last 30 years in the field. If they lasted on average only 20 years, the net life-cycle cost savings would be reduced to $5.1 billion, about $3 billion less. Another is that the average number of heating degree days used in the analysis is too high. Also, one might speculate that reducing the thermal conductance of windows encourages people to design more glass into new residences than they would have before low-e glass. Thus, although the home is more livable and pleasant, not as much energy is saved as was estimated, that is, there is a “rebound effect” (Greening et al., 2000). The committee can also think of reasons why the $7.7 billion figure may be an underestimate. The principal reason is that the calculations ignore the impact on energy use in commercial buildings and in reducing cooling loads. These are indeed substantial and real benefits. Another reason may be that the 5-year rule is unrealistically strict. It should be noted that major window manufacturers were not interested in the low-e glass until it was proven relative to manufacturing technique and performance. If a 10-year offset were assumed, the overall net life-cycle energy cost savings would have been $20 billion instead of $7.7 billion, and the lifecycle cumulative primary source energy saving would have been 3.3 Q rather than 1.2 Q. Another possible reason for underestimation concerns the rate of penetration of low-e windows, which was undoubtedly helped by the work of LBNL and DOE in establishing testing and rating methods and design tools that helped the entire industry.

The reduction of ultraviolet light damage to furniture, carpeting, and, especially, valuable artifacts is another realized economic benefit from the application of low-e technology that is likely to be substantial, but this benefit is unquantified. Similarly, the reduction in radiant asymmetry between occupant and low-e glazing surface temperatures may be another benefit measurable by its effect on occupant performance or productivity.

In conclusion, the committee believes the DOE investment in RD&D to develop low-e glass and to encourage its adoption in the marketplace was highly significant in the early commercialization of this energy-saving technology. The undiscounted numbers are reported in Table 3–4. The committee feels confident that the $7.7 billion and the cumulative life-cycle primary energy savings of 1.2 Q are conservative estimates of the realized economic benefit. Furthermore, the committee believes that use of low-e glass has had a very large impact on improving the energy efficiency of buildings, and its overall effect is likely much larger than the committee’s estimate. Realized/option environmental and security benefits of DOE’s low-e RD&D program are also estimated to be substantial, but indeterminate, because of the same limitations on the basic assumption of energy savings that were described previously. Because of the early involvement of DOE in the development of low-e technologies, DOE contributed substantially to the realized economic, environmental, and security benefits that may have been realized. Moreover, DOE’s sustained support of the basic and

18  

The committee assumed that the penetration fraction of low-e glass for each year was just shifted by 5 years. Perhaps more realistic would have been to assume that the sale of the same number of square feet of low-e glass was displaced by 5 years rather than the penetration fraction. This assumption would yield a net life-cycle cumulative energy savings substantially higher than for the penetration fraction method and a correspondingly higher estimate of primary energy saving.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

applied research, development of software tools and field test facilities, and testing protocols contributed significantly to the knowledge base that is now available to researchers, manufacturers, and designers of glazings and window systems.

Lessons Learned

DOE’s low-e RD&D program is a good example of a successful, yet complex, relationship between the public and private sectors in the development and commercialization of a technology that is perceived to provide substantial economic, environmental, and security benefits. DOE’s early recognition and conceptualization of a novel technology attracted a small business and venture capital for the development of the technology in the face of some industry reluctance. After 4 years of development and sustained support from DOE, the success of the small business attracted the attention and cooperation of several manufacturers, which began to develop further enhancements of the technology. During this development stage, DOE worked on software and field test facilities that enabled the promulgation of test standards and design tools. Ten years after conceptualization, the technology was estimated to have achieved a market penetration of 10 percent, and 20 years after conceptualization, this market penetration had leveled off at approximately 35 percent. The primary lesson to be learned from this example is that significant time and effort are required to gain wide acceptance for a change in technology in the building sector that is not perceived to benefit building owners directly.

A second important, and maybe related, lesson to be learned from this case study is that credible cost/benefit analyses are required. The impact of changes in performance of building components cannot be assessed on simplistic assumptions of whole-building performance and less-than-complete information on the costs incurred to realize the outcomes. A more rational approach would be to analyze a range of scenarios that can be described with sets of credible assumptions on whole-building performance, as influenced by the component change and by other likely changes in occupant or building performance.

LOST FOAM TECHNOLOGY

Program Description and History

The lost foam process consists of first making a foam pattern having the geometry of the desired finished metal part. The pattern is dipped into a water solution containing a suspended refractory. The refractory material coats the foam pattern, leaving a thin, heat-resistant layer that is air-dried. When drying is complete, the coated foam is suspended in a steel container that is vibrated while sand is added to surround the coated pattern. The sand provides mechanical support to the thin refractory layer. Molten metal is then poured into the mold, and the molten metal melts and vaporizes the foam. The solidified metal, which is a nearly exact replica of the pattern, is then machined as required to produce the desired finished shape. Proper controls must be exercised in each step of the process to assure consistently high-quality castings. A lack of in-depth understanding of the measures necessary for proper control slowed adoption of the lost foam casting process.

Metal casting is an energy-intensive industry. DOE began funding research in 1989 in recognition of the significant energy-savings potential and other benefits of the lost foam process compared with the traditional means of metal casting. Before 1989, the lost foam process had been tried, even by a major automotive manufacturer, but was very little used owing to the difficult technical challenges that remained.

Lost foam casting has dramatic productivity and environmental advantages in addition to its energy-savings benefits—productivity increases and much less waste is produced. The lost foam process even enables metal casters to produce complex parts that often cannot be made using other methods, and it allows designers to reduce the number of parts and the machining and to minimize assembly operations.

To improve the competitive position of domestic metal casters, Congress enacted the Department of Energy Metal Casting Competitiveness Research Act of 1990. The act required the Secretary of Energy to establish a metal casting competitiveness research program. DOE helped establish an industry consortium and utilized university research centers to address the mission of the Metal Casting Act. In the mid-1990s, this lost foam program was subsumed as part of the Industries of the Future (IOF) program for metal casting.

Research cofunded by DOE and an industry consortium of more than 30 partners and in large part being performed at the University of Alabama at Birmingham, which has a Lost Foam Technology Center, and the University of Missouri, Rolla, has resulted in significant improvements to the lost foam process, which are being used by the industry.

Funding and Participation

The DOE both sponsored research and encouraged industry to work collaboratively to address the technical challenges that were preventing the lost foam process from being widely adopted. Without DOE as a catalyst and as a funder, the lost foam technology would have languished. Industry experts said that DOE was absolutely critical in getting the research conducted and assembling the consortium to address the multiple challenges. They also gave DOE very high marks for the manner in which the consortium was run.

Federal funding was matched 1:1 on a cost-share basis by the metal casting industry. Much of the research was performed at university research centers.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

Funding commenced in 1989 and is still being provided. Federal funds spent, in 1999 constant dollars, are given in Table E-12. No funding was provided in 1994, 1996, and 1998, when carryover funds were used.

In 1995, chief executive officers and presidents from the foundry die-casting and foundry supply industries developed a Vision as part of the IOF process. Guided by priorities in the Metal Casting Act, the Vision provides a framework for addressing industry needs in six important areas besides increasing energy efficiency:

  • Production efficiency,

  • Recycling,

  • Pollution prevention,

  • Application development,

  • Process control, and

  • New technology development.

Specific industry goals were also identified in the Vision:

  • Improve the use of casting in existing markets (by as much as 10 percent), recapture lost markets (by 25 to 50 percent), and increase new market entries.

  • Develop materials technologies by improving the variety, integrity, and performance of cast-metal products.

  • Develop advanced manufacturing technologies to increase productivity by 15 percent, reduce average lead time by 50 percent, and reduce energy consumption by 20 percent.

  • Environmental goals are to achieve 100 percent pre-and postconsumer recycling, 75 percent beneficial reuse of foundry by-products; and the complete elimination of waste streams.

Results

DOE sponsorship of lost foam research removed a number of important technical barriers that had been impeding commercialization. Examples of some of the barriers to lost foam were a lack of control over pattern dimensions, pattern distortion, lack of control in achieving appropriate vibration amplitude and direction of sand, and a lack of understanding of the conditions surrounding sand flow and fill in the pat-

TABLE E-12 Funding for the Lost Foam Program (thousands of 1999 constant dollars)

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1995

1997

1999

2000

2001

277

366

311

302

304

507

228

611

325

340

 

SOURCE: Office of Energy Efficiency. 2000i. OEE Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Advanced Lost Foam Technology Program. December 13.

tern cavity. These were overcome through both process improvements and new technologies.

Some specific technology and processes/improvements developed as a result of this research to date include the following:

  • A single-stage air gauging system was developed, followed by a 30-channel commercial air gauge for rapid determination of pattern dimensions.

  • Instruments and transducers were developed for measuring vibrational frequencies and amplitudes on compactor tables, on flasks, and in sand. Sand vibrational amplitude and direction are important in achieving efficient compaction.

  • A distortion gauge was developed to determine when and under what conditions pattern distortion occurs during compaction.

  • A fill gauge was developed that can be put in a pattern cavity to determine the conditions that cause sand to flow and fill.

  • Two types of compaction gauge were developed to measure sand density in cavities during pattern compaction.

  • A procedure was developed to measure the liquid absorption characteristics of liquid pattern pyrolysis into castings.

Research to advance lost foam technology continues in the IOF program. To date, the lost foam program has concentrated on the iron and aluminum industries. Another important focus now is to move the lost foam process into steel castings. This requires a better understanding of the role of coatings and the ability of a vacuum to reduce carbon-related defects. The process also needs a better understanding and methodology to eliminate casting quality problems related to porosity, folds, polystyrene bead formulations, coating, and quality control. An accurate, quick, user-friendly process simulation modeling capability will reduce lead time and quality problems encountered in the start-up of the lost foam process.

The transfer of a technology from one IOF industry to another is valuable. The technology is cross-cutting and relates to modeling, sensors, and control technology. The energy and productivity improvements this technology produces will encourage many other applications in industries such as motors and tools and automotive. Care must be exercised to ensure that internal budget battles about which IOF industry within DOE is funding the next round of solicitations do not hamper DOE’s ability to do valuable cross-cutting work.

Benefits and Costs

This has been a cost-effective program. As with many industrial technologies that are process-related, the savings from the use of lost foam technology will vary greatly by the application. Nevertheless, it is apparent that lost foam tech-

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

nology has dramatic energy, productivity, and environmental benefits. It also is enabling the production of parts that cannot be produced using the traditional casting methods. These benefits account for its rapid expansion in the marketplace (Birkel and Hunter, 1998). See Table E-13 for a presentation of the benefits.

Industry experts consulted estimated an average of 25 to 30 percent energy savings relative to traditional casting methods, although there is no such thing as a typical application. They also emphasized the other benefits of the technology: a simpler process with less machinery, less waste and pollution, and increased output.

Estimates of these other benefits are a 46 percent improvement in labor productivity and the use of about 7 percent by weight fewer materials in lost foam casting compared with green-sand or resin-bonded-sand molding. Production cost reductions of 20 to 25 percent are possible

TABLE E-13 Benefits Matrix for the Advanced Lost Foam Technologies Programa

 

Realized Benefits/Costs

Options Benefits/Costs

Knowledge Benefits/Costs

Economic benefitsb/costs

DOE R&D costs: $3.6 million

Industry costs: $4 million

Substantial benefits, circa $60 milliond

Removed a number of important technical barriers that had been impeding commercializatione

Enables production of complex parts with greater dimensional accuracyf

Enables new products to be cast that could not previously be cast

Substantially reduced materials and machinery requirementsg

Nearly eliminates the need for coresh

Significant potential benefitsc

Significantly advanced understanding and control over the lost foam process

Research on a single-stage air gauging system, instruments and transducers, distortion gauges, fill gauges, and compaction gauges

Procedure developed to measure the liquid absorption characteristics of liquid pattern pyrolysis into castings

R&D applied to the iron and aluminum industries and to steel castingsi

Environmental benefits/costs

Reduced energy use and environmental emissionsj Reduced solid wastek

Reduced energy requirementsl

Improves ability of localities and states to meet air pollution standards

Increased comfort and reduced need for end-of-pipe emissions approaches

Research on reducing the materials and energy requirements of castings

Security benefits/costs

Minimal

Security of supply for critical cast parts in transportation, defense, and other sectors

Minimal

aUnless otherwise noted, all dollar estimates are given in constant 1999 dollars through 2000.

bThe next-best alternative to lost foam casting is assumed to be sand casting, and all benefits calculations were made relative to conventional sand casting technology, which has been the dominant technology used by industry.

cEE estimates energy cost savings will be $24.5 million per year in 2010.

dEE projects that energy cost savings will total $12.8 million annually by 2005. All avoided energy consumption, energy cost savings, and environmental benefits were estimated using the DOE/OIT Impact Projections Model, Advanced Lost Foam Casting. Environmental benefits were based on emission reductions resulting from energy savings, and emission rates, emission savings, and electricity generation capacity type are based on the DOE/OIT Impact Projections Model. EE assumed that the total annual energy consumption of iron, steel, and aluminum sand castings (adjusted for scrap and yield) is 24 trillion Btu, that the lost foam process would save 27 percent of the energy requirements, and that under lost foam, energy consumption would be 17 trillion Btu. It was assumed that the ultimate accessible market is 70 percent, and that the likely market share is 40 percent over a 30-year time frame. The estimated likely market share is 11 percent by 2005 and 19 percent by 2010. The energy forecasts used by the Impact Projections Model are based on EIA data and forecasts, and the fuel type is electricity.

eExamples of some of the barriers to lost foam are a lack of control over pattern dimensions, pattern distortion, lack of control in achieving appropriate vibration amplitude and direction of sand, and a lack of understanding of the conditions surrounding sand flow and fill in the pattern cavity. These were overcome through both process improvements and new technologies.

fIn addition to improving productivity, this improves the competitiveness of metal casting vis-à-vis other forming techniques by increasing the range of parts that can be formed using metal casting.

gEE estimates that materials requirements are reduced by 7 percent and that productivity is increased by 46 percent.

hThis is one of the more labor- and energy-intensive stages in casting.

iCurrent research concentrates on understanding and methodology to eliminate casting quality issues related to porosity, folds, polystyrene bead formulations, coating, and quality control.

jEE estimates that energy savings will total 3.23 trillion Btu (0.315 billion kWh) in 2005 and 5.13 trillion Btu (0.615 billion kWh) in 2010, and that carbon dioxide emission reductions will total 0.063 millions tons of coal equivalent (MMTCE) in 2005 and 0.12 MMTCE in 2010. Emissions of carbon, SO2, NOx, volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and other pollutants are also reduced.

kReduces solid waste (foundry sand) by 700,000 tons per year.

lEE estimates that electricity requirements will be reduced by 0.0692 billion kWh in 2005, thus reducing consumption of coal, natural gas, and oil.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

on reasonably simple cored items and of 45 to 50 percent on complex castings.

The next-best alternative to lost foam casting is assumed to be sand casting, and all benefits calculations are being made with reference to conventional sand-casting technology, which has been the dominant technology in the industry. There are capital costs associated with retrofitting an existing facility for the lost foam process. These are difficult to estimate since they would be company- and plant-specific and would depend largely on the production capacity of the particular facility. Retrofit costs would largely be one-time costs.

Comparing initial capital costs of a lost foam casting facility with the initial capital costs of a sand casting facility is also difficult. The information is often company-specific and proprietary. Because the lost foam process significantly reduces core-making, postcast operations, and other steps in the casting process, initial capital costs may be lower than those for sand casting.

Lost foam casting is rapidly increasing market penetration. Aluminum lost foam castings increased 105 percent from 1984 to 2000; iron had a 325 percent increase. Over the next two decades, as more new plants are built and older ones retrofitted as needed: lost foam should become the pre-dominant casting technology. The adoption rate will vary by end-user industry, but DOE’s role in addressing unique technological challenges and educating companies about the technology clearly accelerates that rate. All experts consulted considered that the formation of the industry consortium and the addressing of several technological challenges by DOE-sponsored research have been critical to the successful development of the technology and its market penetration.

Lessons Learned

Although the lost foam technology has very significant savings in energy, this was not in most cases the primary reason it was adopted by industry. The productivity improvements and environmental benefits in terms of waste minimization outweighed the importance of energy savings to industry. The ability to make parts that could not be made using other casting methods also was a driving force for its adoption. The lost foam technology for casting is a revolutionary development and is recognized by the industry as such. Adoption strategies must, as DOE’s strategies did, recognize the drivers for industry’s adoption of technology. DOE must always focus on the energy impacts to ensure that the technologies being developed meet a threshold criterion for significant energy benefits.

DOE can be a catalyst for bringing industry together to address precompetitive common concerns that are inhibiting the development of a promising energy-efficiency technology. The convening power of DOE is not to be underestimated when industry is an active participant in the visioning and roadmapping. Bringing industry together helps make the federal research cognizant of industry drivers and concerns, and a true partnership is developed to address research needs and facilitate technology adoption. The current DOE partnership with the metal casting industry includes over 250 participants. The DOE must ensure that public purposes are being served, and care has to be taken that the research is not applied purely for short-term gain. This will be a continuing challenge given the nature of the IOF partnerships, but DOE appears to be aware of the importance of this balancing act.

DOE and industry are using universities for much of the research, especially those with a center of excellence in the relevant field. DOE’s part in this effort, which is helping to develop and train future engineers and scientists for industry, was commended by industry participants.

ADVANCED TURBINE SYSTEMS PROGRAM

Program Description and History

DOE, in partnership with gas turbine manufacturers, universities, and national laboratories, initiated the Advanced Turbine Systems (ATS) program in 1992 to produce the next generation of gas turbine systems for electric power generation. A comprehensive ATS program plan was submitted to Congress in July 1993 (DOE, 1994). As stated in the plan, the goal of the ATS program was to produce commercial turbine systems by the end of the decade that would do the following:

  • Be 15 percent more fuel efficient than the 1991 baseline of 29 percent,

  • Be cleaner (demonstrate 10 percent lower NOx emissions than the best turbine system available then—25 parts per million), and

  • Lower the cost of electricity by 10 percent compared with conventional systems meeting the same environmental requirements.

From its beginning, the ATS program consisted of two main parts: (1) an industrial gas turbine (<15 MW) program under the direction of the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) whose original scope covered clean electric and combined-heat and power-generation systems for manufacturing, commercial buildings, institutions, and district energy applications and (2) a central-station, combined-cycle gas turbine program under the direction of the Office of Fossil Energy (FE), which covered utility-scale applications. The following discussion pertains to the EERE portion of the ATS program.

The ATS program was implemented under a memorandum of understanding (MOU) within DOE between EERE and FE. Specifically, EERE was to manage the following key activities:

  • Development and testing of two advanced industrial

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

gas turbine designs,

  • Development and testing of advanced ceramic parts, components, and subsystems for both advanced and retrofit applications,

  • R&D in strengthening the technology base for turbine systems and advanced materials and manufacturing, and

  • Investigation of the fuel-flexibility possibilities of biomass fuels and applications.

As a result of these activities, major cost-shared contracts were competitively awarded to the following companies:

  • Solar Turbines, Inc., San Diego, California, and Rolls-Royce, Indianapolis, Indiana, to develop advanced distributed-generation gas turbines;

  • General Electric and Solar Turbines for the development of advanced ceramics materials for turbine components and subsystems;

  • Siemens-Westinghouse and Pratt & Whitney for the development of advanced thermal barrier coatings; and

  • PCC Airfoils, Inc., and Howmet Corporation for the development of advanced castings for gas turbines blades and vanes.

The thermal barrier coating contracts and advanced casting contracts were part of the technology-base efforts managed for EERE by the University of Tennessee-Battelle Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

The focus of EERE’s participation in the ATS program has been enabling gas turbine manufacturers and other RD&D performers to develop advanced systems that perform substantially better than existing systems, well beyond what could be expected from the incremental improvements that were part of the industry’s long-term RD&D plans. In fact, the federal government’s role has been to fund more innovative and higher-risk concepts to obtain specific improvements that will benefit the public interest in areas such as energy efficiency and environmental quality, which would not have been undertaken by industry otherwise. In fact, the performance targets for energy efficiency and environmental emissions of the advanced turbine systems that are the cornerstone of the ATS program were well beyond what the industry had considered attainable (at acceptable cost) in its own RD&D plans.

The ATS program cross-cuts several of the subsectors addressed by the EERE technology development programs. The benefits matrix covers the potential application of advanced turbine systems in a variety of end-use sectors based on marketing studies done by Solar Turbines as it developed the Mercury 50 (OEE, 2000j). The primary markets identified by Solar Turbines include the following:

  • Industrial: oil and gas exploration, petrochemical, pulp and paper, pharmaceuticals, cement, and textiles.

  • Commercial/institutional: universities and colleges, hospitals, and airports.

The economic benefits of avoiding outages and spikes and sags in voltages can amount to millions of dollars a day for industries that rely on e-commerce or that produce sensitive products such as silicon-based devices, pharmaceuticals, and specialty chemicals and metals (see Table E-14). By avoiding outages and production losses and reducing consumer complaints, productivity and profits will be higher. The result of rolling brownouts and blackouts in California in January 2001 provided real evidence of economic losses by industry.

The overall goals of the EERE portion of the ATS program have been achieved, although all manufacturers did not achieve all of the goals. Several products have resulted directly from the EERE portion of the ATS program, and some are nearing commercialization, including the following:

  • The primary product, the Mercury 50 advanced turbine system, was developed by Solar Turbines, Inc.;

  • Howmet and PCC have demonstrated a low-sulfur melt process as a result of the casting RD&D initiative;

  • Pratt & Whitney and Siemens-Westinghouse are currently demonstrating two advanced thermal barrier coatings;

  • Solar Turbines will reach a world record in January 2001 for the 15,000 hours of continuous service of its advanced ceramic-composite combustor liner;

  • Rolls-Royce achieved over 800 hours of continuous service for ceramic vanes; and

TABLE E-14 Selected Outage Costs (dollars per hour)

Industry

Average Cost of Downtime

Source

Cellular communications

41,000

Teleconnect Magazine

Telephone ticket sales

72,000

Contingency Planning Research–1996

Airline reservations

90,000

Contingency Planning Research–1996

Credit card operations

2,580,000

Contingency Planning Operations–1996

Brokerage operations

6,480,000

Contingency Planning Operations–1996

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×
  • Solar Turbines achieved over 1000 hours of continuous service for its ceramic blades.

With these achievements, FY 2000 was the final year for the federally funded portion of the EERE ATS program. The culminating activity in FY 2000 was the field demonstration of the Mercury 50 that began during the summer of 2000 at Rochelle Municipal Utilities (July 2000). The field test is a 24,000-hour test that has accumulated 900 hours of service to date. The Mercury 50 and the other ATS products mentioned above exemplify a successful government-industry RD&D partnership and set an industrywide standard of leadership in assuring clean, efficient, and reliable electricity.

Funding and Participation

The EERE ATS program has its roots in the policy directives contained in the National Energy Strategy (NES) and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct). The effort received steady and bipartisan support from the appropriations committee of Congress. This support meant that annual appropriations were generally close to requested levels, but unfortunately lower than the requirements outlined by the DOE’s 1994 program plan to Congress. Funding limitations placed constraints on the annual budget request to Congress.

However, one aspect of the generally consistent funding support from Congress has been the industry-driven structure of the program, which has been a key element since the inception. For example, during the initial planning workshop for the ATS program that was held in 1992, industry and government participants reached agreement on several fundamental principles, including the need to improve the energy efficiency of power generation in the United States, which had been largely stagnant since the 1960s, and the need to improve environmental quality and reduce emissions. The participants at the planning workshop believed that a well-designed industry-government RD&D partnership could achieve these aims while lowering costs.

The EERE portion of the ATS program was originally developed under the Cogeneration Program in the Office of Industrial Technologies (OIT). In 1995, OIT was reorganized under a new strategy that targeted the Office’s RD&D activities at the Industries of the Future (IOF). Under the IOF strategy, the cogeneration and ATS programs were designated crosscutting, with a strengthened focus on application in the nation’s most energy-intensive industries. This meant that somewhat less emphasis was given to ATS applications in buildings, institutions, and district energy applications.

In March 2000, the ATS program, then in its final stage, was moved from OIT to the Office of Power Technologies (OPT). This move was part of an overall effort to improve coordination throughout EERE on distributed energy resources. At that point, the EERE portion of the ATS program had completed its original technical mission of developing the next-generation advanced turbine system. However, the move from OIT to OPT has led to a broader scope and has enabled program participants once again to devote their attention to the full suite of potential applications, which includes manufacturing, buildings, institutions, and district energy systems, as well as the Industries of the Future.

Significant changes in market conditions affected the program’s directions and priorities. For example, after the program plan was finalized but before significant development activities were under way, SCONOx technology was introduced as the lowest-achievable emissions rate (2.5 ppm) for gas turbines in California in 1995, based on 6 months’ operation of a General Electric combustion turbine. This change led the program to reassess the emissions goals and place greater emphasis on achieving single-digit emissions of NOx. To address this change, each of the RD&D performers had to reconsider the cost/benefit trade-offs—for example, efficiency vs. cost and emissions vs. cost—in achieving stricter targets for emissions.

Another market condition that is affecting the program is the restructuring of the electric power industry in the United States, which began in the mid-1990s. As of January 2001, 24 states and the District of Columbia had enacted comprehensive electricity restructuring legislation or regulatory orders. Restructuring is opening energy markets and allowing customers to choose their energy providers, delivery methods, and an array of other services. Restructuring is also creating market demand for more energy-efficient equipment and systems to provide increased reliability and reduce on-peak operating costs. Market forces are beginning to favor small, modular, distributed energy systems that can provide an economic hedge against peak energy prices, grid reliability problems, and future emissions costs.

DOE spent $184.70 million (constant 1999 dollars) over a 9-year period from 1992 to 2000. The private sector contributed almost 50 percent of total program cost share, or about $171.80 million. Table E-15 lists annual funding for government and industry through the various R&D stages.

NASA’s High Speed Civil Transport program also provided support to the ATS program under a DOE-NASA MOU. Under the terms of the MOU, no formal cost sharing or funds transfer were used, but NASA did provide critical pioneering technologies for ceramic combustor liners, which DOE-sponsored RD&D teams scaled to full-size products and tested successfully. The ceramic combustor liners have accumulated more than 15,000 hours of operations at an industrial facility. The ATS program was initiated in 1992 and was completed, as planned, in FY 2000, the final year of federal funding.

During the various phases of the ATS program, certain projects were started and terminated for a number of reasons, including the completion of intermediate products, changes in direction, unproductive RD&D pathways, and funding limitations. For example, the engine manufacturers conducted several assessments of the potential for biomass

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

TABLE E-15 Funding for the Advanced Turbine Systems Program (Energy Efficiency Component)

Fiscal Year

Actual Federal Funding (millions of nominal $)

Federal Funding (millions of constant 1999 $)

Estimated Private Cost Share (millions of constant 1999 $)

R&D Stage

1992

2.2

2.5

0.60

Early phases of applied research

1993

3.0

3.30

0.80

 

1994

7.3

7.90

2.00

 

1995

18.50

19.70

13.70

Applied research

1996

21.60

22.58

15.58

 

1997

24.65

25.31

23.78

 

1998

34.65

35.16

33.03

Development and field testing

1999

50.10

50.10

47.07

 

2000

18.30

18.15

35.24

 

Total

180.30

184.70

171.80

 

 

SOURCE: OEE. 2000j. Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Advanced Turbine Systems Program. December 12.

fuel to be used in ATS engines. A total of $6.8 million was allocated to investigate alternative concepts. One critical issue was the need to clean up the biomass-derived fuels prior to their direct firing in gas turbines. A project was initiated to address this issue, but funding limitations, as well as the DOE decision to focus on emissions reductions rather than fuel flexibility, led to its termination. The plan had been to undertake this RD&D jointly with DOE’s Biomass Power program, with field tests at the Biomass Gasification Project in Burlington, Vermont. It is estimated that an additional $10 million would have been needed to accomplish this, but no funding was appropriated.

Results
Direct Results

Solar Turbines initiated six field demonstrations of the Mercury 50 in 2000. These demonstrations are expected to show the long-term durability of the product (24,000 hours—approximately 3 years of continuous operation). Full-scale commercialization of the Mercury 50 is scheduled to begin in 2003, with approximately 25 units being installed in the United States in the first year and approximately 50 units per year by 2005. Final commercialization plans depend on the final results of the field tests currently under way.

Howmet and PCC are currently utilizing the melt desulfurization technology in their processing lines. They had produced more than 155,000 lb of this material as of September 2000, which is being used for both land-based and aircraft castings. Advanced thermal barrier coatings are currently under long-term testing, and final commercialization of these coatings will depend on the results of these field tests.

This DOE program has contributed to the development of technical capabilities and expertise in several areas. It has also provided capabilities for the thermophysical evaluation (environmental effects) of advanced materials in gas turbine environments at ORNL, accessible to all engine manufacturers. In addition to providing new standards for the development of sulfur measurements (low-sulfur alloys for gas turbine components) through NIST, the program also developed precompetitive teams (including the national laboratories, NASA, DOE, the Office of Naval Research, and industry) to demonstrate new coated-ceramic composite materials. The EE ATS program also provided a measurable difference in outages, spikes, and sags.19,20

The program has also contributed to the development of effective government-industry-university partnerships, including industry/laboratory fellowships. It has helped to raise awareness of the regulatory and institutional barriers to the expanded use of distributed energy resources and combined heat and power systems. Participants have included poten-

19  

The first ATS system, Solar Turbine’s Mercury 50 turbogenerator, started in the summer of 1999 at Rochelle Municipal Utilities. The city of Rochelle, Illinois, is 75 miles west of Chicago. With a growing industrial base and facing escalating wholesale prices and transmission line constraints, the city recognizes a need for more reliable, efficient power generation, especially during summer demand peaks. The city is extremely vulnerable to the summertime capacity problems that have occurred. (See Department of Energy, Power Outage Study Team, Findings and Recommendations to Enhance Reliability from the Summer of 1999, March 20, Final Report. The study team was brought together by the Secretary of Energy.) The Mercury 50 ensures reliable power at stable prices. The natural-gas-fueled turbine is more energy- and cost-efficient than companion diesel units. The turbine’s emissions are consistently below regulated limits. The additional generation capacity of the Mercury 50 also provides offsets to charges for capacity reservations with the utility.

20  

The Mercury 50 actually came to the rescue when Clemson University’s Taurus 60 failed to start due to a lube oil pump and lube oil temperature problem (now repaired). Using the Mercury 50, Clemson was able to generate 4138 kW for peak shaving during the hour ending 0800, saving approximately $40,000.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

tial users of these systems, equipment suppliers, project developers, and federal and state regulators and energy and environmental policy officials—for example, officials from the EPA and the Treasury Department, state environmental siting and permitting officials, and state public utility regulators.

Products Being Commercialized in Other Than the Original Program

Rolls-Royce has decided not to commercialize its 701 engine, which was its RD&D effort under the ATS program. The 701 never proceeded to field demonstration (phase 3). The products intended for the 701 engine are now being evaluated by Rolls-Royce for potential application in its current fleet of engines, including the 601 and the 501 series. The most promising products include thermal barrier coatings, advanced disc alloys, and low-emission technologies.

The recuperator developed by Solar Turbines for the Mercury 50 is potentially applicable to other turbine designs, including microturbines under the Advanced Microturbine Systems program, which was launched by the EERE in FY 2000. Solar Turbines is a major supplier of recuperators to the various microturbine manufacturers.

As mentioned above, the primary product of the ATS program has been the Mercury 50. The Mercury 50 features a 4.2-MWe, energy-saving cycle that achieves 38 percent energy-generating efficiency (measured at the bus bar) and ultralow exhaust emissions (current Centaur efficiency is 29 percent). This engine is the first engine of its class (i.e., having access to the combustor) to be recuperated.

The low-emission technology and ceramic materials developed under the ATS program are only now beginning to be commercialized. These technologies are currently being evaluated by both Solar Turbines and Rolls-Royce for other applications on other engines in their respective product lines.

Role of DOE Funding

The DOE contribution is significant. Without the ATS program, the Mercury 50 would not have been developed and there would not be six engines under long-term testing today. While it is likely that the gas turbine manufacturers would have developed new turbine products in the time frame covered by the ATS program, the manufacturers say that they could have accomplished only incremental improvements to lower installation and operating costs. Most manufacturers did not expect to improve beyond the baseline for energy efficiency—the Centaur 50S baseline of 29 percent efficiency. The federal RD&D funding gave the industry an incentive to go beyond incremental improvements and aim at public benefits such as energy efficiency and environmental protection. In the face of the highly competitive global market for power generation equipment, which is becoming even more competitive as a result of utility restructuring initiatives in the United States and around the world, DOE’s participation has helped U.S. gas turbine manufacturers to position themselves and their products for success in the battle to produce efficient, clean, and cost-effective power generation systems.

Products produced by the EERE portion of the ATS program have already contributed to the development and deployment of distributed energy systems and will continue to do so. Distributed energy systems are becoming an increasingly valuable energy solution in restructured markets, where customers need power quality and reliability beyond what the utility grid was designed to provide.

EERE’s portion of the ATS program was at the forefront of activities aimed at eliminating the barriers to deployment of distributed energy systems. ATS program participants were actively involved in numerous conferences, workshops, and seminars convened to discuss the regulatory and institutional barriers to such deployment. At those forums, the manufacturers, universities, national laboratories, and state agencies were able to share lessons learned about the use of turbine power systems in distributed energy applications, including the successes and failures in overcoming the regulatory and institutional barriers. The barriers include grid interconnection difficulties; environmental siting and permitting issues; and poor awareness and understanding of the energy, economic, and environmental benefits of advanced industrial turbines and other distributed energy systems.

As a result of these outreach activities, several key industrial participants in the ATS program had the opportunity to learn about and participate in the formation of organizations such as the California Alliance for Distributed Energy Resources (CADER), one of the power industry’s most influential organizations devoted to distributed energy systems, and the Distributed Power Coalition of America (DPCA), a trade group dedicated to improving education and awareness of distributed energy technologies and their potential benefits to our nation.

EERE and FE established a cooperative program to facilitate the management of the ATS program, and joint annual meetings have been held. As part of the ATS program’s effort in distributed energy resources, a joint working group was established in EERE and EPA. This working group, along with several industry participants, trade associations, and nongovernmental organizations, conceived and launched the Combined Heat and Power (CHP) Challenge Program, which subsequently led to the joint DOE-EPA Energy Star Award program for CHP systems.

In short, the nationwide effort by state policy makers, equipment manufacturers, and others to address the regulatory and institutional barriers to the development and deployment of distributed energy systems has been aided greatly by the ATS program. This effort has been made more effective by the lessons learned in the ATS program.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×
Benefits and Costs

The primary benefits to be derived from federal investments in advanced turbine systems are in the form of reduced energy consumption and costs and reduced environmental emissions. The estimated benefits take into account efforts to develop advanced turbine systems, advanced materials (ceramics and castings) for turbine components and subsystems, and low-sulfur alloys for turbine components and subsystems, and thermal barrier coatings for turbine, components, and subsystems. Table E-16 summarizes the benefits of the ATS programs,

All in all, the ATS program is a good example of a suc cessful industry-government R&D program. The focus on

TABLE E-16 Benefits Matrix for the Advanced Turbine Systems Program (Energy Efficiency Component)a

 

Realized Benefits/Costs

Options Benefits/Costs

Knowledge Benefits/Costs

Economic benefitsb/costs

DOE funds: $185 million

Private industry funds: $172 million

Substantial energy savings: approximately $400 millionc

Prevents outages and spikes and sags in voltaged

Mercury 50 appears to be close to commercialization

Rolls-Royce products are being reevaluated

Low-emission technology and ceramic materials are beginning to be commercialized

Recuperator is potentially applicable to other turbine designs.

Low-sulfur melt process is nearing commercialization (155,000 lb produced as of 9/00 by Howmet)

Advanced thermal barrier coatings may be commercialized (in final testing)

Improvements in the manufacture of advanced materials: ceramics, low-sulfur alloys, and thermal barrier coatingse

Enhanced knowledge of advanced design options and cooling for components; combustion and premixing; process manufacturing and coating of ceramics; thermophysical properties of ceramics; designing and engineering ceramic components; low-sulfur measurement techniques and standards; castability of low-sulfur alloys; repair issues; and refurbishment and failure mechanisms

Increased understanding of the effect of sulfur on protective coatings and of lifetime models

Environmental benefits/costs

9793 tons of NOx reductionsf

Technologies’ commercialization could increase efficiency and reduce emissionsg

Potential applications that could increase efficiency and reduce emissions in a wide variety of other types of industrial combustion processes

Security benefits/costs

Minimal

Little impact on oil importsh

Potential impact on the reliability and security of the power system

Could lead to the use of biofuels and to the displacement of oil

aUnless otherwise noted, all dollar estimates are given in constant 1999 dollars.

bThe next-best alternative EE uses for comparison is the existing Centaur 50S Gen Set at ISO conditions, using natural gas. The Centaur 50S has an ISO heat rate of 11,628 Btu/kWeh (29.35 percent efficiency). For emissions savings, the Centaur 50S baseline is 25 ppmv NOx at 15 percent O2, or 18 tons/year.

cEE estimates that $390 million in energy savings will accrue between 2000 and 2005 resulting from Mercury 50 and ceramic liners. EE estimates another $9.6 billion in energy savings from 2006 to 2010. However, it should be noted that EE is claiming credit for all of the economic benefits resulting from this program, even though nearly half of the total funding for development of advanced turbine technologies was provided by private industry. EE’s justification for this is that “If DOE did not provide half of the funding, then there would have been no funding, and, consequently, no program. Thus, it is fair for DOE to take credit for all economic benefits.” Based on its analysis, the committee believes DOE had a substantial role in developing more efficient gas turbines for industrial applications.

dHowever, the next-best alternatives that need to be considered here include the various uninterruptible power supply options, such as batteries and supraconducting magnetic energy storage.

eExamples of products that may benefit from the ATS program include industrial furnaces, boilers, and combustors, and other applications may include cooling flows, blades, fuel injector tips, nozzles, shrouds, and combustor liners. In addition, the advanced design turbine components, systems, and subsystems can be used in the design of equipment such as compressors.

fThis represents EE’s estimate of the cumulative NOx reductions between 2000 and 2005 resulting from Mercury 50 and ceramic liners. In addition, because of the higher efficiency and lower fuel use of the Mercury 50 and the ceramic liners, the emission of other pollutants, including CO2, will be reduced as well. Where the Mercury 50 or the ceramic liners replace coal or diesel units, the emissions reductions will be even greater. However, only NOx emissions were considered in this analysis, since the ATS program plan stated that the focus would be on one emissions reduction metric, namely NOx. In addition, EE estimates another 211,000 tons of cumulative NOx reductions, from 2006 to 2010.

gIn addition to reduced emissions from greater efficiency and lower fuel consumption, thermal barrier coatings also lower CO and unburned hydrocarbon emissions.

hThere is expected to be little impact on oil imports, because oil is a small part of the nation’s power mix and the analysis uses natural gas-fired units as the baseline.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

designing and building actual equipment with a parallel supporting technology and with well-defined measurable performance goals and intermediate milestones led to this success. The program has also shown that collaborative programs between EE and FE are possible.

Lessons Learned

The committee considers the ATS program to be a good example of a successful industry-government RD&D partnership. Some lessons learned include the following:

  • The importance of focusing federal RD&D resources on a program that emphasizes designing and building actual equipment, and the value of enlisting teams made up of representatives from industry, universities, and the national laboratories to collaborate in this, as well as the importance of a parallel supporting technology program devoted to material development and processing, test procedures, modeling, etc. The partnership with FE allowed for greater leveraging of funds in the crosscutting areas of materials, combustion, and university research.

  • The need for continual assessment of changing market conditions and requirements and flexibility in adjusting technical directions and priorities.

  • The need to develop a commercialization plan and commitment from the industrial participants at the earliest possible stages of the program to ensure that technical performance, cost sharing, siting, permitting, and high-volume manufacturing are well understood and accepted. It would be valuable for DOE to continuously review this commercialization plan to ensure that it can be adjusted as market forces change.

  • The need to coordinate with other federal and state agencies that could share in the costs and benefits of the program and to communicate findings with them.

  • The need to understand fully the cost targets and their trade-off implications for the design of advanced technologies.

  • The need to clearly define the performance goals and quantify them to the maximum possible extent, establishing a schedule for contract milestones that is consistent with the achievement of the goals.

  • The need to take business ownership decisions into account and understand the possible implications for the industrial participants.21

  • The need to encourage coordination among the various agencies of the federal government to ensure that all are well informed and able to take advantage of potential synergies.

Because of the decision not to proceed with the 701 design, the RD&D contract with Rolls-Royce did not succeed in developing a commercial advanced turbine system. The decision not to proceed was a result of several factors. One was the change in management. The initial RD&D contract was with Allison Engine Co. When Allison was purchased by Rolls-Royce, management infused new corporate strategies for integrating the turbine product lines of the two companies. In fact, Rolls-Royce has had several changes in management since its purchase of Allison, with the net result being greater emphasis on refinements to existing product lines at the expense of progress on the 701 advanced turbine design.

The 701 design has the potential to be a technical success if further field testing of prototypes takes place. The expected efficiency of the 701 design far exceeds the ATS target; however, the projected cost of electricity from the 701 engine also exceeds the ATS target. Unfortunately, the projected costs of RD&D to produce a more economical 701 design exceeded the funding available in the ATS budget. This resulted in DOE’s decision in FY 1999 to focus the Rolls-Royce activity on identifying viable commercial products from the 701 development effort and getting those technologies to the market as soon as possible rather than on working toward the costly field testing of a design that might not ever achieve the ATS program’s cost goals. In any case, the 800-hour field test identified unexpected recession of the ceramic nozzles and led to a more aggressive environmental coatings program.

New programs for developing the next generation of microturbines and reciprocating engines for distributed energy generation are using the same successful approaches as the ATS program. For example, like the ATS program, the Advanced Microturbine Systems program began with a technical workshop in which industry practitioners evaluated the energy, economic, and environmental performance of existing microturbine systems in order to gain agreement on the performance improvements needed in public benefits areas such as energy efficiency and environmental emissions.

These became the performance targets that were used in the competitive RD&D solicitation that was issued and in the evaluation of proposals. There is also a parallel materials, control, and sensor modeling program in support of the actual designing and building. A similar process is being followed for the Advanced Reciprocating Engine Systems program, which was started in FY 2000.

BLACK LIQUOR GASIFICATION

Description and History of Program

The papermaking process produces a waste product called black liquor, composed of chemicals used in the pulping process and (depending on the process) roughly half the carbon from the initial organic input. For most of the 20th century,

21  

During the course of the ATS program, one of the participants, AlliedSignal, purchased Honey well, Inc. (June 1999), which is now being acquired by General Electric. Another participant, Westinghouse, was purchased by Siemens (August 1998). A third participant, Allison Engine Co. was purchased by Rolls-Royce (March 1995).

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

TABLE E-17 Predicted Environmental Emissions from the MTCI/StoneChem Steam Reformer and from a Tomlinson Recovery Boiler

Emission

Steam Reformer

Recovery Boiler

TRSa (ppmv)

1

1–2

NOx (ppmv)

25

150

CO (ppmv)

25

250

HCl (ppmv)

Not detected

5

Particulates (g/ft3)

0.01

0.02

VOCs (ppmv)

5

80

aTRS, total reduced sulfur; ppmv, parts per million by volume.

SOURCE: Office of Energy Efficiency, 2000k. OEE Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Black Liquor Gasification Program for the Forest Products Industry, December 12.

mills used Tomlinson boilers to recover the inorganic chemicals and burn the organic material. The recovered chemicals are recycled in the mill and are critical to the economic production of pulp and paper. Tomlinson boilers also produce steam, which is either used directly in the industrial process or run through a steam turbine to produce electricity. Paper and pulp mills are among the most energy-intensive industries in the United States, but over half of this energy, about 1.6 quads, is generated internally from biomass-derived fuels, mainly the spent black liquor.

Replacing Tomlinson boilers with gasification units is a primary objective of the IOF-Black Liquor Gasification program, part of the Forest Products IOF. Black liquor gasification technology has very significant environmental and energy efficiency benefits. A kraft mill (the dominant type of mill in the United States) gasifier is projected to have 10 percent higher thermal efficiency and 5 percent better chemical reduction efficiency than a current Tomlinson boiler. Predicted environmental emissions from the Manufacturing and Technology Conversion International, Inc. (MTCI) StoneChem steam reformer (the technology chosen for the first DOE Black Liquor Gasification demonstration) and from a Tomlinson recovery boiler are summarized in Table E-17.22

The key energy benefit of black liquor gasification would arise from the production of electricity. When used with a combined-cycle generator, black liquor gasification combined cycle (BLGCC) is expected to produce twice as much electricity as the current arrangement, cause the industry to become a net producer of electricity, and generate up to 1.2 quads of electricity per year. Assuming that fossil fuels are displaced, this corresponds to a reduction of 31 million tons of carbon equivalent per year.

Black liquor gasification has been investigated in both the United States and Scandinavia for several decades. Commercializing BLGCC requires solving some hard technical problems. One set of issues involves the temperature of gasification: if it is low, tars form that inhibit the gasification process; if high, both chemical recovery and gas cleanup are more problematic. Producing either sufficiently clean gas or sufficiently robust gas turbines is another focus of research. Like coal gasification, the specific characteristics of the fuel (here, the type of black liquor) have implications for the viability of the process, and serious questions remain about how well the process will scale up and whether it will operate reliably under commercial conditions. The characteristics of both black liquor gasification and the forest and paper industry suggest that, absent government intervention, commercialization of the technology would proceed slowly. The paper and pulp industry in the United States has been challenged by intense international competition, increasingly stringent environmental requirements, and low profits.

In addition to the low profits, the uncertainty over both demand (the industry is very cyclical) and future regulations has caused long-term investment in the industry to decline sharply (Finchem, 1997; Jensen and Rockhill, 2001). Currently, there is overcapacity in the industry, and the past 5 years have witnessed significant consolidation. One consequence is that research spending by the industry, never high, declined in the past half decade, in sharp contrast to the trend for U.S. industry overall. The prospects for sponsoring or demonstrating an expensive and risky new technology, even if the bulk of the research and development is conducted by a supplier industry, are not, therefore, good.

The Tomlinson boiler is the largest single investment in a pulp mill and costs $150 million. It is a long-lived investment. Eighty percent of the boilers now in use in the United States are over 20 years old and will need to be replaced over the next 20 years. This is seen as an opportunity for the gasification process that may be missed by purely private-market-driven commercialization, which would rely on incremental additions and a slow accumulation of experience at pulp mills. Although black liquor gasifiers can be used as incremental capacity in a mill that has a Tomlinson boiler (and is being done in at least two plants in Sweden and one in the United States), the energy efficiency advantages of the process, and in particular a BLGCC, accrue when it is used instead of, rather than in addition to, a Tomlinson boiler. But the size of the investment make the risks large and unattractive. Hence the importance of demonstrations and the reluctance of any single mill to host one.

BLGCC commercialization was identified as a priority by the forest and paper industry (American Forest and Paper Association, 1994). The program received a boost in 1999, when Congress approved funding of the Biomass and Black Liquor Gasification Demonstration Initiative, part of Presi-

22  

By another estimate, the Big Island Demonstration is projected to reduce volatile organic compounds (VOCs) from 1646 with the current smelters at the mill to 7.5 tons per year and from 7592 to 11.7 tons per year (Martin, 2000).

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

dent Clinton’s BioEnergy Initiative. Congress authorized $100 million for the program over 8 to 10 years. While Congress has appropriated about $15 million per year for the program, DOE is still planning for the demonstrations and has spent less than $2 million a year to date (see Table E-18).

Three gasification technologies are being considered for demonstration. Farthest along is the steam reforming technology, which DOE has supported since 1987. The pulse combustor-based, indirectly heated process (steam reforming) was developed by MTCI and is now licensed in the United States to StoneChem, a subsidiary of TRI and Stone & Webster. MTCI has been involved in the Clean Coal Technology program at DOE and participated in the coal gasification demonstrations with analogous technology. DOE sponsored two pilot plants using the MTCI/StoneChem technology. A plant capable of processing 25 tons per day was tested at the Inland Container mill in Ontario, California, in 1992, using paper mill sludge. The experience led to design and operation of a 50-ton-per-day (tpd) plant at the Weyerhaeuser plant in New Bern, North Carolina. Experience with these plants suggested a number of problems remained with the technology and particularly using it in conjunction with a gas turbine. OIT (Office of Industrial Technologies) has since supported a group of projects at the national laboratories and universities investigating generic issues that arise in black liquor gasification (not exclusively from the steam reforming process), including a project on

TABLE E-18 Funding for the Black Liquor Gasification Program (constant 1999 dollars)

Year

Project Name

OIT Funding (thousands of $)

Industry Cost Share (thousands of $)

1987

Black Liquor Gasification—Pulse Combustion

40

0

1988

Black Liquor Gasification—Pulse Combustion

563

0

1989

Black Liquor Gasification—Pulse Combustion

1,093

0

1990

Black Liquor Gasification—Pulse Combustion

1,677a

92

1991

Black Liquor Gasification—Pulse Combustion

2,817a

203

1992

Black Liquor Gasification—Pulse Combustion

2,398a

230

1993

Black Liquor Gasification—Pulse Combustion

2,405a

250

1994

Black Liquor Gasification—Pulse Combustion

1,070

0

1995

Black Liquor Gasification—Pulse Combustion

797

0

 

Advanced Technologies for Biomass Energy Utilization in the Pulp and Paper Industry

462

109

1996

Biomass Gasification Combined Cycle Study

393

372

1997

Biomass Gasification Combined Cycle Study

23

0

 

Tars Produced During Black Liquor Gasification

137

61

1998

Tars Produced During Black Liquor Gasification

78

62

 

Gas Cleanup for Combined Cycle Systems

507

0

 

Black Liquor Gasification Kinetics

108

50

1999

Gas Cleanup for Combined Cycle Systems

821

0

 

Black Liquor Gasification Kinetics

92

0

 

Development of Materials for Gasification

300

0

 

Engineering Study for a Full Scale Demonstration of Steam Reforming Black Liquor

455

396

2000

Black Liquor Gasification

189

0

 

Kinetics Catalysts for Destruction of Tars in Gasification

149

41

 

Engineering Study for a Full Scale Demonstration of Steam Reforming Black Liquor

233

120

 

Appropriated funding for Biomass and Black Liquor Gasification Demonstration projects—proposals under evaluation

13,616

TBDb

2001

Catalysts for Destruction of Tars in Gasification

178

43

 

Development of Materials for Gasification

300

167

 

Appropriated funding for Biomass and Black Liquor Gasification Demonstration projects—proposals under evaluation

13,500

TBDb

aHigh funding levels in these years are due to design and testing at a New Bern, North Carolina, mill of a 50-tpd pilot unit.

bTBD=to be determined.

SOURCE: Office of Energy Efficiency. 2000k. OEE Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Black Liquor Gasification Program for the Forest Products Industry.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

handling tars produced during black liquor gasification, gas cleanup for combined-cycle systems, black liquor gasification kinetics, and development of materials for gasification.

In 1999 the Georgia-Pacific Corporation announced that it would replace the smelters at its Big Island, Virginia, mill with the MTCI/StoneChem gasification technology. This is the first demonstration funded under the BioEnergy Initiative. OIT has committed $1.75 million for engineering studies, of which $700,000 had been spent by FY 2001. Georgia-Pacific and OIT anticipate that DOE will pay for 50 percent of the project, which is projected to cost $36 million (versus $25 million that the traditional technology would have cost) and have operating expenses of $2.1 million per year (versus $2.5 million).23 This is a semichemical mill, not a kraft mill, but Georgia-Pacific plans to run tests in the facility using kraft black liquor. (The kraft black liquor will be imported, and while the test is in progress the plant would use its old smelters for its own production.) The demonstration does not involve using the product gas in a gas turbine.

The narrow demonstration value of the project—showing that the technology works in commercial operation for a reasonable length of time to encourage adoption by other mills—is quite limited, as only about a dozen other mills in the United States have the relevant characteristics of the Big Island mill (called a semichemical mill). However, it is an attractive demonstration opportunity, both because the technology has been investigated on smaller scales and because of the intense interest in the project by its sponsoring mill. Georgia-Pacific’s primary interest in the demonstration at its Big Island mill is environmental. The mill is over a hundred years old, and the current smelters are 50 and not capable of satisfying the Cluster Regulations maximum achievable control technology (MACT-II) regulations. However, the Cluster Regulations have a provision (for which IOF gets some credit—see the IOF-Forest case study) allowing regulatory flexibility to encourage the use of innovative technology that may be better than traditional regulatory approaches.24 In this case, the EPA agreed that if delays ensue in the installation of the technology, or if it fails to be as environmentally sound as expected, the company will receive an extension beyond the MACT-II deadline to install alternative technology. Furthermore, the company has permission to use its old smelters when the kraft black liquor test is conducted. The Big Island project is one of the first projects approved under Project XL (for excellence and leadership). In its filing with the EPA, the company stated that it would assume financial responsibility for the project if DOE withdraws from it, although presumably in this case it would not conduct the kraft black liquor tests or other DOE-mandated demonstration activities.25

Agenda 2020 (AFPA, 1994) contemplates demonstrating two other technologies as well: pressurized kraft black liquor gasification and low inlet velocity gasification of biomass such as bark and wood residuals (PIMA’s North American Papermaker, 1999a). An atmospheric draft black liquor gasification process, called Chemrec, was commercialized by Kvaerner Pulp & Paper Co. and has been available for incremental capacity but not as replacement for a Tomlinson boiler. The process is in use in Scandinavia, and Weyerhaeuser installed a unit at its New Bern facility in 1997. However, the process is not suitable for BLGCC at atmospheric pressure, and pressurization, as well as other scale-up features, is not a simple extension. Kvaerner sold its Chemrec R&D project in 1999 due to losses in its paper and pulp business, and the technology is now being developed by Nykomb Synergetics (PIMA’s North American Papermaker, 1999b). In July 1999, DOE awarded $1.75 million to Champion International to plan a demonstration project of pressurized kraft black liquor gasification.26 If this project is successful, it would have wide applicability in the U.S. paper and pulp industry. In particular, the lion’s share of energy efficiency and electricity generation estimates claimed to potentially accrue to the technology are associated with commercializing this option. Weyerhaeuser is considering hosting a demonstration of the third technology at its New Bern mill. This technology is for biomass gasification (not black liquor), and it builds on experience at small projects in Europe and South America.

Funding and Participation

The funding and participation for projects in the Black Liquor Gasification area are detailed in Table E-18. The estimated DOE R&D funding is $14,880 million (1999 dollars) and the industry cost share is $2196 million (1999 dollars). This encompasses the period from 1987 to 2001.

Costs and Benefits

DOE anticipates that these demonstrations could lead to replacing the Tomlinson boilers in a 10- to 20-year time frame. This is probably optimistic. The StoneChem process may be available for commercialization soon (and used, particularly if the EPA follows through with both the MACT-II

23  

Cost estimates are inconsistent across sources. Newspaper accounts project the cost at $65 million (Fales, 2000). The lower estimate is from Georgia-Pacific’s filing with the EPA, Final Project Approval.

24  

Section 112 of the Clean Air Act.

25  

Georgia-Pacific Corporation. 2000. Big Island, Virginia, Project XL, Final Project Agreement, at <www.epa.gov/projectxl/georgia/finalpa.pdf>. May 31, p. 24.

26  

Champion International was recently acquired by International Paper, which has caused some concern about the fate of this project. The usual pattern is for R&D activities to be cut when companies in this industry merge.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

regulations and Project XL), but few plants can take advantage of it, and it does not yield the large benefits associated with electricity generation from a BLGCC. A large pressurized version of the Chemrec process is farther in the future—probably at least a dozen years—and uncertainty goes with the substantial technological development that remains to be done prior to commercializing the gas cycle piece of the technology. Industry observers are not sanguine about the economic benefits of the technology, at least in the near future. Factors that will influence its adoption include the price of electricity and the stringency of the final MACT-II environmental regulations. A third factor of importance is the extent to which carbon emissions will be regulated.27

The technology thus yields benefits in the options and knowledge categories (see Table E-19). Substantial options benefits accrue in the environmental category. The market

TABLE E-19 Benefits Matrix for the Black Liquor Gasification Programa

 

Realized Benefits/Costs

Options Benefits/Costs

Knowledge Benefits/Costs

Economic benefits/costs

DOE R&D costs: $14.9 million

Industry costs: $2.2 million

No realized benefits: technology has not yet been proven to be commercially successful on a full scaleb

Program has helped to bring gasification technology to the point where it can be commercially demonstrated

Large potential for the technologyc

Increased energy productiond

Technology can provide the same critical energy and chemical recovery functions as a Tomlinson boiler at the same cost and with many advantagese

Development of a pulse combustor-based, indirectly heated process for the gasification

Development of the MTCI/StoneChem steam reforming technologyf

Basic research on the kinetics of black liquor gasification, development of corrosion-resistant gasifier materials, analysis of the formation and control of tar deposits, and studies of the technology and economics of black liquor and biomass gasification

Testing of the PulseEnhanced Steam Reformer using a variety of fuels, including sawdust, paper mill sludge, and municipal solid waste

Engineering study to design a full-scale steam reformer demonstration project

Research on the DOE BioEnergy Initiative

Engineering study of a full-scale demonstration of StoneChem’s PulseEnhanced Steam Reformer technology

Environmental benefits/costs

None

Large potential reduction in fuel consumption and CO2 emissionsg

Technologies produce significantly less environmental emissions than the MTCI/StoneChem steam reformer or a Tomlinson recovery boiler

If technology can be demonstrated to be fully reliable and able to meet all environmental regulations, it is likely that the industry will use these systems to replace the less-efficient, lower-power-output Tomlinson boilers

Security benefits/costs

None

Minimal oil displacement

Minimal

aUnless otherwise noted, all dollar estimates are given in constant 1999 dollars through 2000.

bBlack liquor gasification technology has not yet been proven to be commercially successful on a full scale. Two smaller units have been operating at mills in Sweden as incremental capacity additions since the early 1990s; however, the technology has not been demonstrated as a replacement to the Tomlinson boiler.

cThere is a large potential for increased use of biomass- and waste-derived fuels such as wood and agricultural residues, chemical manufacturing by-products, and food processing waste that could be utilized through successful development of commercial-scale gasification technologies. Pulp and papermaking is a very steam- and electricity-intensive process and requires close to 1.3 quad of fossil-derived fuel annually, making it the fourth-largest consumer of fossil energy in the U.S. manufacturing sector.

dEE estimates that commercialization of this technology could generate between 454 trillion and 1200 trillion more Btu of electricity per year than would be produced with Tomlinson recovery boilers. This assumes a total market size of 220 units, a unit size of 1327–1500 tons of kraft pulp/day, an annual market growth rate of 2 percent, market share of 55 percent, and market introduction in 2008.

eThe advantages include up to 10 percent higher thermal efficiency, much higher power output, two to three times the kWh/ton depending on the system configuration, lower NOx, SOx, VOC, and CO2 emissions, elimination of the danger of smelt-water explosions, up to 5 percent increase in chemical reduction efficiency, more compact size, and lower-capital-cost construction.

fEE contends that the MTCI/StoneChem steam reforming technology would not currently be ready for demonstration without the DOE program.

gBiomass and black liquor are important sources of energy for the forest products industry, and increasing the efficiency and utilization rates of these fuels can have a major impact on U.S. fossil fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. Assuming that the electricity generated replaces fossil-fuel-fired power generation, this corresponds to a reduction in CO2 emissions of between 12 and 31 million tons of carbon equivalent/year.

27  

Industry participants quoted in Swann (2000).

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

depends more on the regulatory regime than on successful integration with combined-cycle generation. In the knowledge category, the current demonstrations and IOF-funded projects may contribute to development of BLGCC. Potential economic and environmental benefits would then accrue due to the increased efficiency of biomass electricity production and its displacement of fossil-fuel-generated electricity.

Results

Industry has invested substantially in black liquor gasification, and several technologies are commercially available in the United States and Europe. The driver for adopting gasification technology in the United States has been EPA’s Cluster Regulations. DOE’s role, however, is critical to accelerating the development of BLGCC. Commercialization of BLGCC is inhibited in two ways. First, the (projected) economics of the technology involves scaling the gasification units to replace the current technology rather than using it in an incremental fashion. The risks associated with relying entirely on the new technology are considerable. DOE’s contribution here is in sharing the financial risk and, indirectly, through the influence of the IOF-Forest program on the EPA Cluster Regulations (see the IOF case study).

Second, technological hurdles need to be addressed in the combined-cycle part of the program. Moving from the existing black liquor gasification units to systems suitable for use with combined cycle requires bench-scale research as well as demonstration. Here, current economic drivers are inadequate: the price of electricity (at least in Scandinavia, the leader to date in kraft black liquor gasification technology) is not high enough to justify a large effort. The IOF-Forest program supports precompetitive and generic research on combined-cycle problems, drawing from the earlier pilot plants and activities in other DOE (both EE and FE) programs.

The institutional framework of the IOF-Forest program may be DOE’s most important contribution to this RD&D program. Over the past decade, the mill equipment industry underwent numerous reorganizations, reflected in the multiplicity of names associated with each black liquor technology (Air Products-Kvaerner-Nykomb; ThermoChem-MTCI-StoneChem), while the mill industry itself has been involved in consolidations and acquisitions, generally to the detriment of their R&D activities. The IOF-Forest program, alternatively, has been stable, with logical investments in benchscale R&D and pilot plants and further generic projects responding to the pilot plant experiences. This sustained investment depends on the organizational structure developed in the IOF program.

As with other OIT programs, the black liquor gasification demonstration program also illustrates the interaction between government technology programs and government regulatory programs. The opportunity for flexibility in meeting the 2002 Cluster Regulations emissions standards with DOE cost-sharing—together, of course, with the Cluster Rules themselves—created the incentive for Georgia-Pacific’s interest in the new technology. Coordinating strategies works to the benefit of both environmental goals and innovation.

INDUSTRIES OF THE FUTURE PROGRAM

Description and History of the Program

OIT initiated the IOF program in response to the EPAct, which provided DOE with a mandate to work with the largest energy users in the industrial sector to develop new energy-efficient technology. OIT approached the challenges of technological development and transfer in this program by inviting nine energy-intensive industries to develop a vision of how the industry would evolve over the next 20 years and the technological advances necessary to accomplish it. These documents would form the basis for project selection and prioritization. The philosophy of the program thus goes beyond industry participation in project definition and cost-sharing-standard features of federal technology programs in the 1990s in its attempt to formulate a research program around a set of strategic goals that derive from an industrywide context.

The forest products industry was the first industry to respond to the initiative with a technology vision and strategy (AFPA, 1999). By the early 1990s, the industry was suffering from low-cost competition from South America, South Africa, and Indonesia and cyclical demand downswing (AFPA, 1994). On p. 5, Agenda 2020, written in 1994, says, “Technological leadership, once clearly owned by the U.S. industry, has also been shifted towards Canada and the Scandinavian countries over the past 20–30 years.” Finally, regulatory pressures were clearly mounting. The average share of capital expenditures for environmental protection increased from 8 percent in the 1980s to 14 percent (AFPA, 1998).

The EPA was in the process of formulating new air and water regulations for the industry, known as the Cluster Regulations, that were anticipated both to be costly and to require greater energy use by the industry.

Given these problems, the IOF framework appeared very attractive to the industry. The forest products industry is the third-largest industrial energy consumer in the United States (3.2 quads per year). By 1994 it produced 57 percent of the energy that it consumed (AFPA, 1994). Thus, both improvements in energy production within the industry and reductions in energy consumption can yield substantial productivity gains. Moreover, with R&D spending at about 1 percent of sales, the forest products industry is among the lowest R&D performers in the U.S. manufacturing sector (NSF, 1997). With little individual R&D competition among firms in the industry, a consortium-based precompetitive program had considerable latitude and generated little internal opposition.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

Coordinated by the American Forest and Paper Association (AFPA), the industry formulated an overall technology development strategy and implementation plan (AFPA, 1999), and signed a compact with DOE in 1994. Agenda 2020 identified six focus areas for DOE-supported research: sustainable forestry, environmental performance, energy performance, capital effectiveness, recycling, and sensors and control.

Projects in the first solicitation were funded in FY 1996. By FY 2001, the program had supported 130 projects at an annual cost to DOE of approximately $10 million per year and to the private sector of about $5 million (see Table E-20).28 Forty-six R&D projects are funded in FY 2001. These projects range from science to precompetitive technology development. Over 80 percent of the projects have involved one or more universities. Approximately 40 percent have a federal lab partner, 65 percent list an industry supplier as a partner, and 60 percent list a manufacturer as a partner (see Table E-20).29

As of December 2000, DOE had identified only one new commercial product from the program and a handful of others in demonstration. However, the program draws widespread support from the industry and from industry observers for its structure and potential in an industry that has traditionally performed very little research.

The program is responsible for the formation of important new institutional arrangements in the industry, including a working group of AFPA-member chief technology officers, who provide input on long-term goals and research priorities to IOF; task forces that plan and manage each of the five identified programmatic areas; an association of universities that work on the IOF projects (the Pulp and Paper Education Research Alliance, or PPERA); an innovative outreach program cosponsored by the Institute of Paper Science and Technology and OIT; and the partnerships that conduct R&D under the program, which include universities, federal laboratories, suppliers, and manufacturers.30

In addition to the specific knowledge benefits discussed below, the program, through these groups, has yielded benefits important to the industry, although difficult to quantify.31 Among the significant accomplishments cited by industry was the input provided by these groups and the IOF research program to EPA in its formulation of the 1997 Cluster Regulations. The industry also credits the program with focusing university training, as well as research, on forestry product technological problems and expanding the base of scientists working in the area.

TABLE E-20 Total Funding in IOF/Forest by Program Area (constant 1999 dollars)

 

Program Area

Fiscal Year

Source of Funding

Capital Effectiveness

Energy Performance

Environmental Performance

Recycling

Sensors and Control

Sustainable Forestry

Total

1996

OIT

278,581

2,852,887

3,146,350

456,797

3,598,554

1,017,319

11,350,488

 

Industry

154,568

1,093,248

1,256,851

306,976

1,419,804

864,300

5,095,748

1997

OIT

457,593

1,160,680

4,630,175

237,399

2,118,520

1,908,182

10,512,549

 

Industry

158,564

367,026

1,368,685

230,719

731,757

937,144

3,793,894

1998

OIT

186,848

1,714,008

3,471,158

594,179

2,334,573

2,564,301

10,865,067

 

Industry

134,955

1,561,767

1,527,931

461,968

550,656

1,208,338

5,445,616

1999

OIT

752,899

1,948,647

2,120,855

367,258

3,379,396

1,865,119

10,434,174

 

Industry

337,023

985,036

703,420

155,167

1,324,296

999,861

4,504,803

2000

OIT

877,464

1,326,056

2,168,769

1,032,229

3,782,627

1,242,838

10,429,984

 

Industry

377,563

796,465

1,099,562

574,963

1,264,702

746,552

4,859,807

2001

OIT

960,000

1,350,000

2,320,000

1,050,000

3,850,000

1,270,000

10,800,000

1996–2000

OIT

2,553,385

9,002,279

15,537,307

2,687,863

15,213,671

8,597,759

53,592,262

 

Industry

1,162,674

4,803,541

5,956,449

1,729,792

5,291,216

4,756,195

23,699,868

 

SOURCE: Office of Energy Efficiency. 2000l. OEE Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Forest Products Industries of the Future (IOF) program. December 12.

28  

The IOF Web page lists 82 active and 48 completed projects. The information provided by EE to the committee identifies 46 as currently receiving federal support and lists 126 projects in total, of which 18 received no support in FY 1996 to FY 2000. The difference in totals between the sources appears to be due to minor differences in project identification and the inclusion of some new projects on the Web page.

29  

Based on the ongoing projects listed at the IOF/Forest Web site.

30  

The Institute of Paper Science and Technology-OIT Business Development Executive program sponsors a group of retired industry executives to advise mills on emerging technologies and best practices (AFPA, 1999).

31  

EE anticipates completing a study in summer 2001 that characterizes benefits that are currently speculative. For example, the mills are believed to have adopted better process technologies as a result of the collaborations and discussions. Given the low R&D nature of the industry, it is plausible that significant productivity improvements could ensue from the IOF structure even in the absence of specific new technologies.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

The program has yet to demonstrate that its structure facilitates technology transfer. The forest products industry, in common with other OIT target industries, such as buildings, presents barriers to technology transfer owing to the modest industry research establishment and the narrow profit margins. Recognizing the problem for very large capital investments, IOF/Forest has started a large demonstration program for black liquor gasification (see the Black Liquor Gasification case study). The industry anticipates suppliers commercializing technology, but the adequacy of suppliers’ activities remains a key concern. Compared with suppliers to the buildings industry, the forest products supplier industry lacks a competitive research-intensive base. Furthermore, the lead partner in nearly all projects is a university or national lab, and these entities typically retain intellectual property rights in the IOF projects. A current working group at AFPA is considering how better to integrate the suppliers and the university technology licensing offices.

Funding and Participation

Tables E-20 and E-21 contain budgetary information on the IOF/Forest program, including funds associated with the Black Liquor Gasification demonstration. To date, the largest expenditures have been in the environmental performance and sensors areas, with somewhat smaller totals in energy performance and sustainable forestry and relatively modest (to date) expenditures in the remaining areas of recycling and capital effectiveness. It should be noted that there is considerable overlap in the areas—for example, black liquor projects appear in both the capital effectiveness and energy performance categories; recycling projects tend to overlap as well. However, the categories do indicate to some degree the priorities of the program and reflect the combination of industry and public sector priorities.

While real resources devoted to the program have been stable, priorities have shifted. Expenditures on projects associated with the environmental performance category have declined, reflecting the conclusion of the Cluster Regulations negotiations. The increased emphasis on capital effectiveness is associated with the Black Liquor Gasification demonstration.

During the first 4 years of the program, partnerships became more inclusive. As Tables E-22 and E-23 show, most projects now have a university partner and virtually all have either a university or national laboratory member. The inclusion of suppliers and manufacturers as partners32 is nearly twice as common for current projects as for completed ones, although as Table E-20 shows, these entities have partnered in most of the larger projects since 1996. Currently, either a supplier or manufacturer participates in projects that receive over 80 percent of the IOF/Forest budget. In theory, this structure should keep research focused on activities relevant to industry problems and should facilitate technology transfer.

The DOE Role

The DOE program caused the forest products industry to establish a unified technology strategy. While specific technologies await further development, the government’s influence in catalyzing the industry’s assessment of its technological needs and options is considered by all of the participants in the process to be a major step toward achieving energy efficiency, environmental improvements, and industrial competitiveness in the industry.

DOE financial support has been leveraged by industry contributions; the industry anticipates further leveraging of its R&D portfolio to other precompetitive arenas outside DOE’s traditional agenda, through joint projects with the Forest Service, NSF, and the Department of Education. Thus,

TABLE E-21 Changes in IOF Priorities: Share of OIT/Forest Budget by Program Area (percent)

 

Program Area

Fiscal Year

Capital Effectiveness

Energy Performance

Environmental Performance

Recycling

Sensors and Control

Sustainable Forestry

Total

1996

2.45

25.13

27.72

4.02

31.70

8.96

100.00

1997

4.35

11.04

44.04

2.26

20.15

18.15

100.00

1998

1.72

15.78

31.95

5.47

21.49

23.60

100.00

1999

7.22

18.68

20.33

3.52

32.39

17.88

100.00

2000

8.41

12.71

20.79

9.90

36.27

11.92

100.00

2001

8.89

12.50

21.48

9.72

35.65

11.76

100.00

 

SOURCE: Office of Energy Efficiency. 2000l. OEE Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Forest Products Industries of the Future (IOF) program. December 12.

32  

All projects have AFPA members as advisors. Tables E-22 and E-23 include a manufacturer as partner if it is listed on the IOF/Forest Web site in that capacity.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

TABLE E-22 Participation in IOF/Forest Program Then and Now (percent)

Share of Projects with Participation by

Completed Projects

Ongoing Projects

University

60.87

82.50

Federal laboratory

30.43

41.25

University or laboratory

78.26

95.00

Supplier

36.96

63.75

Manufacturer

32.61

58.75

Supplier or manufacturer

54.35

80.00

 

SOURCE: Office of Energy Efficiency. 2000l. OEE Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Forest Products Industries of the Future (IOF) program. December 12.

TABLE E-23 Changes in Participation by Share of Budget (percent)

 

Fiscal Year

Share of Budget for Projects with Participation by

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

University

58.80

70.92

75.99

76.41

79.10

Federal laboratory

48.71

53.90

56.80

58.57

49.29

University or laboratory

77.82

88.48

94.12

98.74

98.15

Supplier

54.39

38.07

54.01

68.04

66.50

Manufacturer

32.67

38.09

51.58

47.81

54.46

Supplier or manufacturer

66.39

53.08

71.77

78.39

82.39

 

SOURCE: Office of Energy Efficiency. 2000l. OEE Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Forest Products Industries of the Future (IOF) program. December 12.

DOE can be characterized as having helped establish an R&D infrastructure in the wood products industry.

Notwithstanding these institutional achievements, a critical contribution of DOE to this RD&D effort is financial. DOE pays for about two-thirds of the RD&D performed under this program. This contribution has not redirected or extended industry research activities. At this time, it represents a very major share of the R&D and is close to all of the research undertaken by the industry.

Results

The IOF/Forest program (technology) results to date lie in the knowledge category (see Table E-24). In part, this reflects the program’s focus on projects led by universities and national laboratories. DOE, however, identifies a set of technologies that is expected to result in deployable technologies over the next 5 to 10 years. According to project participants, their actual deployment remains speculative, so that the benefits belong in the knowledge rather than the options category at this time. Anticipated results will improve the energy efficiency, capital utilization, and overall productivity of plants and mills; develop infrastructure (e.g., sensors) to further improve operations and understanding of the manufacturing processes; and improve forest sustainability practices.

Benefits and Costs

Benefits of the program remain speculative, but it is easy to reach a general conclusion that the program is valuable (see Table E-24). Given low-cost competition from developing economies and technological competition from Canada and Scandinavia, the continued competitiveness of the forest products industry may rely on technological advances. And given the industry’s cost structure and other public imperatives, these advances will contribute to the energy efficiencies goals of the EE program. Finally, given the industry’s tradition of very little research, public support has been critical in establishing institutions for the conduct of R&D.

The program was established to allow industry management as well as direction and input. It also appears to have the flexibility to continue strategic planning beyond the precompetitive research phase to consider issues of commercial development and deployment. Thus, the structural aspects of the program appear well designed to meet the very considerable challenges of successful technology development.

OXYGEN-FUELED GLASS FURNACE

Program Description and History

The U.S. glass industry is a large user of energy in furnaces to produce glass containers, float glass for windows in construction and automobiles, glass fiber insulation and other specialty products, such as TV tubes, fiber-optic cables, and lightbulbs. Furnaces for these products have traditionally burned natural gas or oil with preheated air to produce about 30 to 1000 tpd of glass. The high temperatures (>2800°F) required for glass manufacture and the raw materials used in glass result in significant emissions of NOx and particulates.

DOE began an R&D program in 1985 to explore the feasibility of using oxygen instead of air in the combustion process in the furnace for midsize glass facilities. Oxygen furnaces had been used in extremely small applications (10 tpd), but both technical and economic challenges remained to adapt it for larger uses (>25 tpd). This change in the process reduces the amount of energy required per ton of glass produced, reduces NOx emissions, reduces levels of other gases, and reduces the capital costs for furnace regenerators and emissions control equipment.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

TABLE E-24 Benefits Matrix for the IOF/Forest Programa

 

Realized Benefits/Costs

Options Benefitsb/Costs

Knowledge Benefits/Costs

Economic benefits/costs

DOE R&D costs: $53.6 millionc

Industry costs: $23.7 million

No economic benefits as yet

Development of the XTREME cleanere

Introduction of better process technologies to the mills

Technologies offer substantial advantage over conventional alternativesd

Reduced capital, operating, and maintenance costs

Improved forest productivity

Potential to make the paper industry a net power producerf

Served as a catalyst for a wide array of research partnerships that otherwise would probably never have materialized

Improved knowledge of technology performance and benefits in operating biomass boilers

Improved knowledge of commercial- scale performance of fiber optic sensor for web scanning with applications to other web manufacturing processes

Improved knowledge of sensor systems that combine computer control systems, analytical chemistry, and chemometrics in commercial applications

Environmental benefits/costs

Provided assistance to EPA in formulation of 1997 Cluster Regulations

Reduced energy consumptiong

Reduced environmental emissionsh

Reduced emissions of SO2, NOx, CO, VOCs, SOx, and greenhouse gases

Reduced energy and water consumption

Reduced process wastes and reduced landfill requirements

Reduced smelt-water explosion hazards

Improved knowledge of how to control orientation and flow of pulp slurry using pressure pulses

Improved understanding of how to separate suspended solids from the liquid phase of pulp slurries, whitewaters, and process filtrates

Improved knowledge of using radio frequency/microwaves in industrial applications for drying and material pretreatment

Security benefits/costs

Minimal

Minimal

Minimal

aUnless otherwise noted, all dollar estimates are given in constant 1999 dollars through 2000.

bThe EE assumptions for the benefits estimation include the following. Biomass and black liquor gasification demonstration initiative: Market introduction is in 2008, with 31 units installed by 2015. Combined-cycle configuration for maximum electric power production increases power output from a 1500-tpd kraft mill from 70 MW (using conventional technology) to 300 MW. Market size is estimated at 220 existing recovery boilers, and over 80 percent of these will require major retrofit or replacement prior to 2020.

cExcluding $16.2 million in R&D for black liquor gasification. This program is analyzed as a separate case study and matrix.

dThese advantages include higher thermal efficiency, higher electrical power generation, improved product quality, improved process uniformity and productivity, reduced electricity costs, and reduced chemical costs.

eAs of 1997, the XTREME Cleaner was operating in three wastepaper recycling mills, and the reported savings from reduced energy and raw material costs were $3500–$11,000 per day per mill.

fEE estimates that the biomass and black liquor demonstration will result in cumulative benefits (2008–2015) of 2.3×1015 Btu and $11.2 billion in energy cost savings.

gEE estimates that use of the XTREME Cleaner resulted in savings of 0.04 trillion Btu in 1997.

hEE estimates that use of the XTREME Cleaner in 1997 resulted in emissions reductions of 29 tons of SOx, 11 tons of NOx, 2667 tons of CO2, and 8 tons of particulates.

A three-phase program was begun by DOE with Praxair (then part of Union Carbide) to evaluate the technical and economic feasibility of using oxygen-enriched combustion for industrial applications in midsize applications. Technical research, such as burner testing and combustion modeling, and economic studies were conducted initially.

A vacuum-pressure swing adsorption (VPSA) system was developed to produce oxygen at reduced costs. The VPSA process, introduced in 1991, is a point-of-use oxygen supply process that makes the use of 90 to 95 percent pure oxygen more economical and convenient. DOE then cofunded a demonstration project at Gallo Glass Company in California. The reduction in NOx was one of the main drivers for Gallo to try the technology as part of the cofunded demonstration.

The VPSA system is only one of several point-of-use oxygen-generating systems now available, but it continues to be the most energy efficient and cost effective when compared with similar vacuum swing adsorption or pressure swing adsorption systems—though the specific capital and operating costs of competing technologies are unique to each installation.

Research is still being conducted by DOE in cooperation with the industry as part of the glass industries IOF program

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

on complementary oxy-fuel technologies even though the original technology has been commercialized. The reasons for the continued research include further potential significant energy savings, improvements in the industry’s competitive posture, further reductions in environmental loadings from the glass manufacturing process, and its applicability to other industrial sectors.

These research efforts focus on (1) a better understanding of the heat flux fundamentals and the characterization and modeling of the process, (2) reductions in the cost of producing oxygen through improvements in existing processes or the development of new ones or waste-heat-recovery schemes, (3) sensing and control instrumentation to better monitor and optimize the melting process, (4) refractories that are exposed to the oxy-fuel combustion environment, (5) batch and cullet preheating to utilize exhaust heat, and (6) burners used in oxy-fuel furnaces.

Participation and Funding

DOE began looking at enriched combustion methods in the late 1970s, first with air and later with oxygen. DOE recognized that lower-cost oxygen production technologies would be needed to enhance the commercial viability of oxygen-enriched combustion for industrial applications.

While Corning had proven oxy-fuel firing technology for very small, specialized furnaces, DOE opened the door for expansion of the technology to larger furnaces by sponsoring research on combustion modeling and related technical challenges, as well as by providing cofunding for demonstration of the new technology on larger furnaces. Without the DOE program, the commercialization and penetration of the oxy-fuel furnace for large glass furnaces would have been substantially delayed.

Commercial-scale glass furnaces represent large capital investments ($20 million or more per unit, although the fuel system, burners, and related equipment represent only a portion of this total), with the majority of the burners running continuously for 5 to 10 years. Therefore, testing the viability of a new furnace represents a substantial risk. The DOE provided about $1.3 million, with cofunding from the glass industry, for the first demonstration projects and also provided the initiative for technical cooperation between glass producers and material suppliers. Restriction in the standards for the emission of NOx as well as particulates strongly impacted the industry. The decision by glass companies to use oxy-fuel firing was dependent on their individual situations. Initially, the primary reason for employing oxy-fuel firing was either for NOx reduction to meet standards or for energy savings. Additional reductions in the cost of oxygen during the 1990s also increased the likelihood of utilizing oxy-fuel firing. More recently, the increase in production rate that accompanies oxy-fuel firing has been a deciding factor for several manufacturers.

Table E-25 indicates the DOE obligations and cost-shar

TABLE E-25 General Funding for the Oxy-fueled Glass Furnace Program (thousands of dollars)

 

Constant 1999 Dollars

Current Dollars

Fiscal Year

OIT Funding

Industry Cost Share

OIT Funding

Industry Cost Share

1988

1127

445

869

343

1989

207

82

166

66

Total

1334

527

1035

409

NOTE: While DOE-sponsored research began before 1988, the amounts provided by DOE before that year are believed minimal.

SOURCE: Office of Energy Efficiency, 2000m. OEE Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Oxygen-Fueled Glass Furnace program. December 12.

ing for the oxy-fuel firing program. The primary funding for the demonstrations was for a cost-shared agreement with Praxair, which provided all of the industry cost sharing. Praxair is still the leader in VPSA technology, with competition from other major oxygen suppliers such as Air Products, BOC Gases, and American Air Liquide.

No DOE funds were provided for the 1990 to 1995 time frame. Carryover funds were used. Projects in the 1990s continued to explore techniques to improve oxy-fuel firing for other aspects of glassmaking (Table E-26). It is notable that DOE in many cases provided more than 50 percent of the research funding even though this technology was considered commercial at that time for some portions of the glassmaking industry.

Not all of the funding shown in Table E-25 is directly attributable to oxy-fuel for the glassmaking considered as part of this case study, but it is interesting to see how DOE itself lists its ongoing research agenda. Projects are not easily categorized and are often put in categories for a variety of purposes.

In addition, OIT has recently funded research on oxy-fuel burners for use in the steel industry under the OIT Steel Industries of the Future program. The technical challenges in steel are different from those in glass, but the expertise acquired in the glass program will be very valuable. This extension of a successful project to another IOF industry is commendable.

Results

Generally, smaller air-gas furnaces have been less efficient, and the conversion to oxy-fuel has resulted in a reduction of up to 45 percent in energy consumption for glass manufacturers. Energy savings in larger furnaces are generally about 15 percent, based on measurements at individual facilities. However, the energy required to produce the oxygen utilized in the furnace does offset some of the energy

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

TABLE E-26 Funding for the Oxy-fueled Glass Furnace Program by Technology to FY 2000 (thousands of dollars)

 

Constant 1999 Dollars

Current Dollars

Technology

Fiscal Year

OIT Funding

Industry Cost Share

OIT Funding

Industry Cost Share

High-luminosity, low-NOx burner

1996

239

79

229

76

1997

221

62

215

60

1998

305

61

301

60

1999

250

356

250

356

2000

250

581

250

581

Diagnostics and modeling of corrosion of refractories for oxy-fuel glass furnaces

1998

264

101

260

100

1999

325

120

325

120

2000

325

155

325

155

Modeling of glass processes

1997

480

252

468

245

1998

325

146

320

144

1999

200

114

200

114

2000

200

182

200

182

 

SOURCE: Office of Energy Efficiency. 2000m. OEE Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Oxygen-Fueled Glass Furnace Program. December 12.

savings seen by glass manufacturers. On a net basis, energy requirements are still reduced.

Productivity improvements of as much as 10 percent (including product quality and throughput increases), as well as environmental benefits, in particular NOx reductions, are also achieved when converting to oxy-fuel.

As of September 2000, 114 glass furnaces had been converted to oxy-fuel firing in the United States. This represents about 28 percent of U.S. commercial scale glass furnaces, a significant increase from the 11 percent converted by 1995. As other air-gas furnaces are rebuilt at the end of their cur

TABLE E-27 Oxy-fuel Penetration and Characteristics by Glass Industry Segment

Industry Segment

Number of Oxy-Fuel Furnaces

Total Number of Furnaces

Oxy-Fuel (%)

Typical Furnace Size (TPD)

Container

24

126

19

250

Pressed and blown

27

79

34

75

Textile fiber

31

68

46

75–100

Wool fiber

12

43

28

100–150

Flat

2

40

5

500+

Lighting

8

21

38

75–150

TV glass

9

12

75

100–300

Total

114

406

28

 

 

SOURCE: OEE. 2000m. OEE Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Oxygen-Fueled Glass Furnace Program. December 12.

rent useful life, more conversions to oxy-fuel firing are likely both in the United States and abroad.

Table E-27 depicts the penetration of oxy-fuel firing by U.S. glass industry segment. The flat glass industry has the lowest penetration, as it still has concerns about the potential for bubbles, and many of the flat glass facilities are located in rural areas that have less-stringent environmental regulations. Efforts are currently under way to determine the applicability of this technology in other industries where heating or firing at high temperatures is required. For example, the technology has been tested in a batch steel reheat furnace at an integrated steel plant through a DOE cofunded project (NICE3) with Bethlehem Steel and North American Manufacturing (Reed, 1997). A privately funded demonstration project is testing oxy-fuel firing in an aluminum smelter as well. Other potential applications have been identified in many other industries, including steel, aluminum, copper, petroleum, and chemicals.

Other potential applications include the production of chemicals such as ethylene oxide, propylene oxide, vinyl chloride monomers, titanium oxides, and sulfuric acid. Oxygen could also be used in sulfur recovery in the petroleum refinery industry. Other environmental applications include wastewater treatment and hazardous waste incineration. The paper and pulp industry and the health care industry also will benefit from these technologies. Finally, industries that depend on various partial oxidation processes during production will benefit from the ongoing development of oxygen-production technologies initiated by the oxy-fuel-fired furnace.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×
Costs and Benefits

The project does have positive energy, environmental, and productivity benefits that clearly outweigh its costs. Scientific knowledge has also been advanced in several areas. The DOE clearly accelerated the adoption of this technology through both its research and its sponsorship of key demonstrations. The benefits matrix presented in Table E-28 represents national benefits and costs for oxy-fuel firing in glass furnaces.

Lessons Learned

The demonstration of the technology was critical to its successful adoption by industry. DOE’s research on oxy-

TABLE E-28 Benefits Matrix for the Oxy-fueled Glass Furnace Programa

 

Realized Benefits/Costs

Options Benefits/Costs

Knowledge Benefits/Costs

Economic benefits/costs

DOE R&D costs: $1.3 millionb

Industry cost share: $527,000c

Energy savings of 128 trillion Btu and reductions in energy costs of approximately $300 milliond

By 1999, about 30% of all glass made in U.S. used this technology

Reduced capital expenditures for furnace regenerators and emission control equipmente

Increased productivityf

Benefits are moderate since technology has been commercialized and has already captured 30% of the market

Improved cost competitiveness by reducing fuel requirements

Offers a simpler way of melting and refining glassg

Oxy-fuel systems can be installed at reduced capital costs with rapid paybackh

Potential applications in other industriesi

Development of burner designs, sensors, modeling, expert systems controls, and refractories

Improved technical understanding of high-temperature processing industries, such as steel

R&D on applications in other industries where heating or firing is required at high temperatures

Applications in the production of ethylene oxide, propylene oxide, vinyl chloride monomers, titanium oxides, and sulfuric acid

Related R&D benefitsj

Environmental benefits/costs

Reduced air emissions of about 3.3 million tonsk

Process reduces NOx, CO, and particulate emissionsl

Reduced landfill disposal of regenerator refractories

Reductions in furnace energy requirements of 15% to 45%

Assistance in adherence to CAAA 1990, particularly concerning NOx

Improved air quality and other environmental benefitsm

Facilitates meeting permitting requirements to continue glass production

Improved information on emissions and opportunities to reduce emissions

Application to sulfur recovery in petroleum refining

Batch and cullet preheating to utilize exhaust heat

Applications to wastewater treatment and hazardous waste incineration

Security benefits/costs

Reduced net fossil fuel demandn

Minimal

Minimal

aUnless otherwise noted, all dollar estimates are given in constant 1999 dollars through 2000.

bThe estimated budget for the program was approximately $200,000 for the years prior to 1988, $1.3 million for 1988 and 1989, and approximately $450,000 for 1998 to 2000.

cThe industry cost share for 1988 and 1989 was 28 percent and totaled $527,000; the industry cost share for the other years is indeterminate.

dIncludes all units put in place by 2005 and assumes an 8-year lifetime for each unit. The 1997 level of penetration of the technology was increased by 2 percent annually. Average energy savings vary from up to 45 percent on a small furnace to 15 percent on large furnaces.

eCosts for the oxygen production systems vary greatly depending on system features and capacity. VPSA system costs range from $200,000 to $600,000, with an additional $200,000 in installation costs.

fEE estimates that glass furnace production rates can improve by up to 25 percent in comparison to conventional furnaces, although 10–15 percent improvements are more common. For example, by retrofitting oxy-fuel firing technology for a wine manufacturer’s bottle production facility, OIT and its industrial partners achieved energy savings of 25 percent while reducing NOx emissions by over 80 percent and particulate emissions by about 25 percent.

gAs a result, all costs of production are reduced while the product quality is improved.

hSystems can be installed at a capital cost of $50 to $100 per annual ton of oxygen capacity, with a payback of 2 to 4 years.

iOxygen could be used in sulfur recovery in the petroleum refinery industry, and other environmental applications include wastewater treatment and hazardous waste incineration. The paper and pulp and the health care industries may benefit from these technologies, and industries that depend on various partial oxidation processes during production may also benefit from the ongoing development of oxygen production technologies initiated by the oxy-fuel-fired furnace.

jThese include (1) a better understanding of the heat flux fundamentals and the characterization and modeling of the process, (2) reductions in the costs of producing oxygen, (3) sensing and control instrumentation to better monitor and optimize the melting process, (4) refractories that are exposed to the oxy-fuel combustion environment, and (5) burners used in oxy-fuel furnaces.

kEE estimates 3.3 million tons of CO2, 3970 tons of NOx, and 84 tons of particulates.

lNOx emissions are reduced by up to 90 percent, CO by up to 96 percent, and particulates by up to 30 percent.

mThe process does not require regenerators to achieve the high temperatures required for glass production, it eliminates the burden on landfills for disposal of regenerator refractories when furnaces are rebuilt every 5 to 10 years, and it increases the use of recycled glass.

nEE estimates about 57 trillion Btu, primarily natural gas.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

fuel began before the IOF program under the Office of Industrial Technologies auspices, and research had been sponsored and a successful demonstration completed before that initiative was begun. Ongoing research is still being conducted under the IOF glass program, as well as in the IOF steel program. Incorporating appropriate existing research initiatives into the IOF program appears to have progressed well. The transfer of a technology from one IOF industry to another is commendable. The convening and road mapping that the IOF industries are doing is very valuable.

DOE, however, needs to assess whether the technology, since it is in commercial use, is now perceived by the marketplace to be much less risky than at its inception. If so, even if research challenges remain, the federal role should perhaps change.

The federal role may be still very appropriate and important, but perhaps the cost share provided by industry needs to be increased as the technology moves along the development curve. DOE has been providing over 50 percent for much of this research, although new projects require a 50 percent cost share by industry.

A formal process for DOE involvement and funding should be part of the visioning and road mapping, with expectations about DOE and industry involvement agreed upon and made clear from the beginning. DOE should have a role through much of the road mapping and visioning for individual technologies as well as for the industry, but the nature or amount of federal support for research on a technology should be expected to change at a predetermined point.

For basic research or directed exploratory research, the industry cost share should be very low or even zero. As the technology moves to applied research, the industry cost share should increase. As the technology achieves commercialization and refinements or enhancements are the main research focus, DOE participation needs to be carefully examined and industry’s cost share made more significant. This is particularly true when the DOE funding is being provided to only one firm as opposed to an industry consortium. There are clearly many factors that must be weighed, such as the nature of the industry, nature of the research, state of the technology, or type of benefits expected, in determining the DOE role and the amount of funding that is appropriate. These considerations should all be agreed upon early in the roadmap process.

ADVANCED BATTERIES FOR ELECTRIC VEHICLES

Program Description and History

Electric vehicles have a long history dating to the beginning of the 20th century. The internal combustion engine quickly displaced most engines because of its better performance, longer range, and lower cost. Only very small niche markets for electric vehicles survived through most of the century. The nemesis for the electric car has always been the battery, its energy storage and power capacity, its life cycle, its weight, and its cost. Lead acid batteries (used for starting, lighting, and accessories in cars today) were the battery of choice for electric cars through most of this history, but it was always known that something better was needed to make the electric car more widely acceptable.

The DOE has conducted R&D in advanced batteries over much of its history. In the 1980s the modest funding was usually earmarked for specific technology programs. In the fall of 1990, California adopted the zero emissions requirement for vehicles marketed in that state by 1998 (later amended to 2003). This prompted the formation in 1991 of a joint government-industry program, the United States Advanced Battery Consortium (USABC) to develop advanced high-energy batteries for electric cars. This program resulted in an increased federal contribution and a 50 percent cost share from industry, which significantly increased the overall R&D funding available.

In 1993 the USABC became associated with Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV), and as a result of discussions held by PNGV participants in 1994, a second program was added in high-power batteries, required in hybrid propulsion vehicles. This program was complementary to the existing high-energy battery program and eventually addressed similar technologies but with different parameters. Since no new resources were made available for PNGV, the advanced battery funding was split between the two efforts. The present discussion focuses only on the high-energy battery program for all-electric cars and not on the high-power batteries for hybrid vehicles, although there is considerable crossover of research results.

Each program from the time before USABC had an opportunity to propose its development activities to the USABC. Existing programs in advanced lead acid batteries and zinc-bromine batteries could not meet the USABC performance criteria. Nickel-iron systems were not sealed, and air battery systems were too inefficient from an energy cycle viewpoint. These programs were all terminated.

USABC decided in 1991 that R&D efforts for advanced electric vehicle batteries would be split into two efforts. Mid-term technology was sought that would be responsive to the proposed California requirements for electric vehicles in 1998, even though it was recognized that such vehicles would not be competitive with conventional gasoline-powered vehicles in a normal market. Long-term efforts would focus on lithium-based technologies, which involved much higher technical risk. The goal of the long-term program was to produce advanced batteries that would allow for fully competitive electric vehicles.

USABC continued research on sodium-sulfur and lithium-iron disulfide batteries in USABC’s phase I (1991 to 1996) program. Toward the end of phase I, comparative evaluations of all batteries were conducted. USABC invested

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

about $60 million (50 percent from DOE) in these technologies that were not carried forward into the phase II program.

The nickel-metal hydride (NiMH) battery was selected as the midterm candidate for USABC’s phase II (1996 to 2000). One lithium polymer technology was also carried forward to phase II, and a smaller program was started in lithium ion batteries. During phase II, USABC invested about $16 million (about $7 million from DOE) in a lithium ion technology program that did not result in a successful product.

The discontinued technologies either had major technical problems or represented such high financial risks that the developers elected not to continue the private funding. The high-temperature sodium sulfur and lithium iron disulfide batteries were discontinued because they could not meet certain technical goals. Stiff potential competition from Japanese developers and the need for considerable capital investment also discouraged some firms from continuing work on lithium advanced batteries, especially in light of continued technical problems.

Funding and Participation

Participants in USABC were USCAR (Ford, General Motors, and DaimlerChrysler) along with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and an assortment of battery developers, national laboratories, and universities.

During phase I (1991 to 1996), USABC expended about $190 million of total federal and private funds. In 1996, PNGV put in place a phase II agreement for continuing development of advanced batteries. The value of this phase II agreement was $106 million for 1996 to 2000. Almost all of the phase II resources are now expended. In 1999, a phase III agreement was put in place for $62 million for 2000 to 2003.

Table E-29 shows DOE funding for advanced battery R&D for FY 1978 through FY 2001. Directed exploratory research was also supported at a level of about $3 million per year through this time period. Directed exploratory research is focused on developing new electrode and electrolyte materials for advanced batteries. This program also works on advanced diagnostics and modeling techniques for understanding battery operation. This work is conducted at DOE’s national laboratories and at supporting universities.

The cost share for USABC was 50 percent in phase I; 55 percent in phase II; and 65 percent in phase III.

The original partnership agreement and subsequent contracts also included provisions for battery manufacturers to repay USCAR and DOE for some or all of their financial contributions to the consortium when the batteries developed by USABC are commercialized.

For reference, the funding for high-power energy storage for hybrid vehicles under PNGV continued in 1996 and 1997 at about $15 million per year, with federal resources equally split between cost-shared industrial development and the Advanced Technology Development program in the national laboratories. This is double the effort for electric vehicle batteries.

TABLE E-29 DOE Funding for Advanced Battery R&D (millions of 1999 dollars)

Fiscal Year

DOE Development Programs, Supporting Work, and Benchmarking

Directed Exploratory Research Programs

DOE Portion of USABC Cooperative R&D (Phase)

1978a

12.4

0.9

 

1979a

11.2

1.7

1980

13.7

6.1

1981

11.8

6.6

1982

8.7

9.7

1983

8.6

6.9

1984

6.6

6.6

1985

2.9

6.6

1986

3.0

5.4

1987

4.1

4.4

1988

6.7

4.0

1989

8.3

3.6

1990

8.8

4.0

1991

5.1

5.7

7.9 (I)

1992

0.6

3.0

24.1 (I)

1993

2.8b

4.4

24.7 (I)

1994

0.3

3.6

29.6 (I)

1995

0.2

2.2

23.8 (I)

1996

0.4

2.0

15.8 (II)

1997

0.0

2.4

13.3 (II)

1998

0.5

3.3

12.1 (II)

1999

0.8

2.9

3.7 (II)

2000

1.0

3.7

3.0 (III)

2001

1.0

2.7

4.0 (III)

aData for FY 1978 and FY 1979 are estimated from combined program elements in program budget.

bIncluded work on an air battery system that was not part of USABC.

SOURCE: Office of Energy Efficiency. 2000. OEE Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Advanced Batteries for Electric Vehicles Program. December 4.

Results

At the outset, USABC and DOE established battery performance and cost targets for both midterm and long-term development (NiMH and lithium-based batteries, respectively). These targets have not been fully attained, but considerable progress toward them has been made.

NiMH batteries are now being used in commercially produced electric vehicles, although only in very small niche markets. Currently, electric vehicles are being manufactured by the USCAR partners as well as Honda and Toyota. Using the NiMH battery, General Motors introduced the EV-1 and the S-10 Chevrolet electric pickup, and DaimlerChrysler has developed the EPIC interurban commuter vehicle. However, General Motors recently stopped production of its EV-1 passenger car owing to poor customer acceptance.

Although the USABC R&D has made considerable progress, the batteries remain the limiting factor in the widespread application of electric cars. They remain too costly, and too heavy, and their cycle life is too short. The result is

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

that the vehicles’ travel range before recharging and the time to battery replacement are too short, and their cost is too high for general public acceptance. Battery recycling is also still of concern because of the toxic materials that might be released.

It is expected that the transition from the use of NiMH batteries to lithium-based batteries for electric vehicles may occur in the near future. Lithium ion and lithium polymer batteries are being demonstrated in electric vehicles by one Japanese manufacturer (Nissan). This will likely result in more economically competitive electric vehicles with longer ranges and smaller cost differentials. If that occurs, the overall goals of the program will largely have been met. Market forces will determine the competitiveness of electric vehicles with other advanced vehicles developed to meet the requirements of the California zero emissions program and the parallel programs in the northeastern states.

Outside the automotive field, advanced NiMH, lithium ion, and lithium polymer batteries are the mainstays of the consumer electronics industry. They are widely used in cellular telephones, laptop personal computers or digital assistants, and video camera-recorders. Lithium polymer batteries are emerging now as the preferred technology for these electronics because of their performance levels. In these applications, the annual value of the products is several billion dollars. Advanced NiMH, lithium ion, and lithium polymer batteries are also being developed and tested in a variety of electric and telecommunications utility applications. In electric utility systems, they would play a key role in storing electric energy to allow for load management and improved power quality or to serve as backup power sources. In telecommunications applications, they would serve as a backup power source for equipment, especially in remote locations with harsh environments. Some of these parallel efforts are sponsored by DOE’s Office of Power Technologies and by EPRI. Workshops on advanced battery technology are sponsored jointly with DOE’s Office of Science and organizations in the Department of Defense.

TABLE E-30 Benefits Matrix for the Advanced Batteries (for Electric Vehicles) Programa

 

Realized Benefits/Costs

Options Benefits/Costs

Knowledge Benefits/Costs

Economic benefits/costs

DOE R&D costs: $376 million

Private industry cost share: $169 millionb

Few benefits thus far: electric vehicles have achieved little market penetration.

Niche markets for nickel metal hydride battery powered vehicles. (NiMH batteries are 150 lb lighter than lead acid batteries and store twice as much energy)

Economic benefits probably negative, since electrics cost more than conventional vehicles

Potential expanded markets for NiMH and/or lithium-based systems if cost of alternatives increases (EE contends that a doubling of gasoline prices would render the technologies cost-effective)

Economic benefits may be negative, if electric vehicles are forced into the market by regulation, since they cost more than conventional vehicles. Battery costs are far above target values

Cooperative R&D through the USABC avoids duplication of R&D costs.

R&D on lithium polymer and lithium ion batteries for future applications could provide economic benefits.

U.S. battery industry in intense competition with Asian industry

Environmental benefits/costs

Benefits have been minimal to date

Benefits are potentially large: mobile sources generate substantial pollution, and many urban areas require cleaner vehicles to achieve environmental compliance

Zero-emission-vehicle mandates in California and the Northeast

Potential waste management problems associated with battery life-cycle management

Increased scientific understanding developed in exploratory research primarily at the national laboratories and universities

Batteries have a variety of other applications and commensurate potential environmental benefits

Batteries can provide the opportunity for emission-free power generation in buildings and other closed areas where immediate air quality is a concern

Research on infrastructure and recycling issues

Security benefits/costs

Benefits have been minimal to date

Benefits are potentially large: if commercially successful, electric vehicles could displace substantial amounts of imported oil and increase fuel diversity

Technology transfer to other nations could reduce worldwide demand for oil

Potential military applications

aUnless otherwise noted, all dollar estimates are given in constant 1999 dollars through 2000.

bEstimated on the basis of the private industry cost shares for the different phases of USABC: phase I, 1991 to 1995, $111 million; phase II, 1996 to 1999, $55 million; phase III, 2000+, $3 million.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×
Benefits and Costs

As indicated in the benefits matrix (see Table E-30), there have been minimal realized economic impacts from this program to date, and those that do exist are probably negative. However, if petroleum prices increase dramatically and/or if zero emission vehicles become the required standard in the nation, then electric cars may become competitive with the alternatives in spite of their current shortcomings and could have a significant impact in improving the environment and energy security.

Additional electricity generating facilities would undoubtedly be required for a large population of electric vehicles. It is generally recognized that emissions of sulfur oxides could increase in some regions if high-sulfur fuels are used by the generating electric utility and there are no sulfur dioxide scrubbers on the generating facilities. However, if the best available pollution control technology is used in the generation of the electricity, then this should not be a problem for electric vehicles. Domestically available energy sources such as coal, nuclear, natural gas, and renewable resources can always be used in place of imported oil.

The DOE program, through its knowledge benefits, has maintained effective competition in the critical area of advanced batteries for automotive applications. The best example of what would happen in advanced batteries without DOE support can be seen in battery technology for the consumer electronics industry. The consumer electronics rechargeable battery market has been dominated by Japanese producers. Most NiMH and lithium-based battery technology found in these products comes from Japanese companies. Only recently have other companies begun to enter this marketplace, and in most cases they are still dependent on Japanese suppliers for critical materials and manufacturing equipment.

Overall, it appears to the committee that the insurance provided by potential environmental and security benefits and the knowledge benefits of the DOE program are well worth the $376 million expended to date. Even if the electric car never extends beyond niche markets, the carryover of battery R&D knowledge to PNGV’s hybrid engine-electric and fuel cell vehicles will remain a significant insurance benefit.

Lessons Learned

Among the lessons learned from this program is the need for regularly evaluating the technologies under development and, when barriers to further progress are encountered, to consider conducting more scientific research on new concepts in options that lie beyond current technology performance: life, abuse tolerance, and cost (in the case of batteries).

Also, it was realized that it is necessary to consider detailed manufacturing cost estimates and infrastructure issues such as recycling for each technology.

There were numerous delays in the program caused by paperwork and complicated negotiations arising from government policies and procedures. Streamlining these processes would benefit the program greatly.

CATALYTIC CONVERSION OF EXHAUST EMISSIONS

Program Description and History

Compression-ignition direct-injection (CIDI) engines—that is, diesel engines—have the highest thermal efficiency of any proven automotive power plant. They are currently widely used in heavy-duty vehicles and are candidates for use in conventional or hybrid electric vehicle propulsion systems in passenger cars and light-duty trucks. The Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV) in 1997 targeted CIDI engines as one of the most promising technologies for achieving 80 miles per gallon (mpg) fuel economy in a lightweight hybrid vehicle while adhering to future emissions standards and maintaining such attributes as performance, comfort, and affordability.

However, in 1999, tier 2 emission standards were promulgated that are much more stringent than those that existed in 1997. Before widespread use of CIDI engines in the domestic light-duty vehicle market can become a reality, their emissions must be reduced. To date, diesel engines have had low enough hydrocarbon, CO, and NOx emissions that exhaust emission control devices (such as the catalysts required for gasoline vehicles) were not required. But to meet future vehicle emissions standards, it will be necessary to develop catalytic emission control devices for CIDI engines. To overcome this technical barrier, advanced materials for catalyst-based systems that reduce NOx and particulate matter (PM) emissions from CIDI engines are being developed by the DOE in cooperation with DaimlerChrysler, Ford, and General Motors. If emissions can be reduced, CIDI engines could increase fuel economy by up to 35 percent compared with present-day gasoline engines with no other changes to the design of the vehicle. Hybrid power trains with diesel engines could perhaps also meet the PNGV goal of 80 mpg (gasoline equivalent) for a midsize family sedan.

Both NOx and PM emission control devices will have to achieve conversion efficiencies of 80 to 95 percent so that light-duty vehicles with CIDI engines will be able to meet the strict tier 2 emission standards for volume production that are being phased in starting in 2004 (Federal Register, 2000). It is widely acknowledged that emissions of nonmethane hydrocarbons (NMHCs) and carbon monoxide (CO) are likely to be within standards given the emission control technologies being developed to control NOx and PM. Diesel fuel with reduced sulfur content is required to enable most of the NOx emission control devices to work properly and will make emission control devices more efficient through reduced production of sulfate PM.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

R&D projects on catalytic control of emissions from leanburn engines were initiated in 1994. (It should be noted that typical gasoline light-duty vehicles today use stoichiometric combustion engines with highly developed catalytic converters that are not the focus of the current research.) At that point in time, the focus was on emission control from spark-ignited, direct-injection (SIDI) engines. Lean-burn engines such as the SIDI and CIDI engines cannot use the highly effective catalysts developed for typical gasoline engines to control NOx. Since 1997, the focus of R&D on catalytic emission control has been CIDI engines, though work still continues on emission control for SIDI engines, which can use most of the technology developed for CIDI applications.

Funding and Participation

Auto manufacturers, diesel engine manufacturers, the Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association, and other suppliers contributed matching amounts through several cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs) with DOE. All the funds shown in Table E-31 were for the joint technology development efforts only; additional, unknown amounts are being expended by industry to develop CIDI catalytic exhaust emission control devices. The DOE work on catalytic control of emissions from CIDI engines receives direction as part of a yearly peer review process of the PNGV program.

Results

The emissions goals for CIDI exhaust emission control devices have yet to be achieved, and no commercial products have resulted from this work. However, progress to-

TABLE E-31 DOE Funding for the Catalytic Conversion Program (thousands of 1999 constant dollars)

Fiscal Year

DOE

Industry

1994

487

487

1995

435

435

1996

1,208

1,208

1997

2,168

2,168

1998

2,368

2,368

1999

4,190

4,190

2000

8,469

5,288

Total

19,325

16,144

 

SOURCE: Office of Energy Efficiency. 2000o. OEE Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Catalytic Conversion of Cleaner Vehicles Program. December 15.

ward those goals has been made. Meeting tier 2 emission standards appears to require an 80 percent to 95 percent reduction in NOx and particulate emissions, and while some bench tests approach these figures, no such performance has yet been attained for extended periods under real automotive diesel exhaust conditions.

Work largely at the national laboratories (OTT, 2000a) has demonstrated 20 percent to 55 percent reduction in NOx in exhaust from a diesel vehicle over five operating points using plasma-assisted catalytic conversion and injected hydrocarbon fuel (a 6 percent fuel economy penalty is incurred). Several promising new catalyst materials have been developed with very high NOx conversion in bench tests. A new dopant for silica-doped hydrous titanium oxide-supported Pt (Pt/HTO:Si) catalysts has been identified that lowers the light-off temperature and widens the temperature window for appreciable NOx reduction. Investigation is also under way to increase the conversion rate and durability of urea injection system catalysts in the selective reduction of NOx, as well as adsorber catalysts that store and reduce NOx on their surfaces. A variety of emissions detection and measurement systems are under development as well as catalyst surface diagnostics. Considerable basic research on catalyst behavior is also under way.

Diesel fuel with drastically reduced sulfur content is required to enable NOx emission control systems to work. The EPA recently promulgated a standard requiring diesel fuel sulfur content to be reduced from present values, near 500 ppm, to a maximum of 15 ppm. However, it has been reported (DOE, 2000b) that “no emission control devices have demonstrated the capability for full useful life certification at any fuel sulfur level.”

The catalytic converters do not contribute directly to fuel savings, but they are critical enablers for market introduction of the engine technology. DOE’s role has accelerated the development of these devices, contributed much to the fundamental understanding of emission control processes, and obviated duplicative R&D among the numerous auto and engine manufacturers. Without DOE involvement, it is unlikely that industry alone would work to develop light-duty CIDI catalytic emission control technology to meet U.S. tier 2 standards because of the cost and technological risk involved. It is also likely that the DOE contributions to catalytic emission control technology have saved industry much of the cost of R&D to date.

Many of the R&D results for catalytic conversion derived from PNGV efforts are equally applicable to heavy-duty vehicles and are now carried over into the new 21st Century Truck program. In addition, the technology to reduce NOx from CIDI engine exhaust has been employed on stationary CIDI engines, where conditions are more favorable and the control system much less complex. One technology supported by DOE (microwave reduction of PM) is being commercialized on a separate path to reduce emissions from restaurants and dry-cleaning operations.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

TABLE E-32 Benefits Matrix for the Catalytic Conversion Programa

 

Realized Benefits/Costs

Options Benefits/Costs

Knowledge Benefits/Costs

Economic benefits/costs

DOE cost 1994–2000: $19.325 million

Industry cost share: $16.144 million

No benefits yet

None yet

U.S. industry is in the forefront of development of such devices and could benefit from worldwide sales. However, direct economic benefits for diesels with catalyzed emission controls will be negative since they cost more than uncontrolled engines.

Environmental benefits/costs

None yet

None yet

Catalyzed emission controls, if they meet tier 2 standards, will drastically reduce emissions of toxics and particulates from current levels. Can also be used on stationary engines and other lean-burn engines and fuels.

Security benefits/costs

None yet

None yet

PNGV vehicles or conventional diesel engines using this emission control technology, if successful, will reduce petroleum consumption.

aUnless otherwise noted, all dollar estimates are given in constant 1999 dollars through 2000.

Benefits and Costs

As indicated in Table E-32, the economic benefits from this catalytic conversion R&D are likely to be negative, because the emission control systems are expensive and are added to otherwise conventional engines. However, the potential benefits in the environmental and energy security areas that are bought with these economic costs are substantial. If these catalytic conversion systems are successful in permitting CIDI engines to be used in either conventional or hybrid power trains, very stringent emission standards will be met, and improved fuel economy will reduce greenhouse gas (CO2) and dependence on imported petroleum. (This assumes that the catalytic conversion systems do not reduce too much the fuel economy advantage of the engine over gasoline engines.)

The dollar savings from reduced petroleum consumption is not expected to cover the initial cost premium of CIDI engines with catalytic emission control in conventional or hybrid configurations when compared with conventional engines (see discussion in the PNGV case study).

Given a successful catalytic conversion system and the success of the PNGV program (including solving the affordability problem), CIDI vehicles could penetrate the market very rapidly. Currently, about 30 percent of all new vehicle sales in Europe are diesels with CIDI engines; in Austria, Belgium, and Spain the penetration is more than 50 percent (Automotive Industry Data Newsletter, 2000). The customer perception of diesels in the United States is adversely colored by the failed introduction of diesels following the oil shortages and price spikes of the 1970s. Although they still cost more than gasoline engines, several advances in diesel engines since then have made them similar to gasoline engines in terms of performance and noise, and they retain a significant fuel economy advantage.

Development of catalyzed emission control devices is key to enabling the widespread use of CIDI vehicles in the United States, and as such it is a necessary component of PNGV as long as that engine is considered a viable option.

Lessons Learned

The principal lesson learned to date in this program is that goals, objectives, and R&D direction must be sensitive to changing policies and external constraints. The selection of the CIDI engine as the top candidate for PNGV vehicles in 1997 changed the direction of catalytic system R&D from gasoline engines to CIDI engines, and the promulgation of tier 2 emission standards in 1999 greatly increased the pressure for more radical emission control system designs.

Another lesson is that in a large R&D program like PNGV, effort must be focused intensely on overcoming the formidable barriers to success. The tier 2 emission standards are likely to rule out the use of CIDI engines completely in both conventional and hybrid electric vehicle power trains unless successful catalytic conversion of its exhaust emissions can be accomplished; this technology therefore is a top priority for the PNGV.

PARTNERSHIP FOR A NEW GENERATION OF VEHICLES

Program Description and History

The Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV) is one of DOE’s larger efforts, involving almost 13 percent of EERE’s budget (DOE, 1999). The program attacks one of the nation’s largest consumers of energy, the highway transportation sector, which consumes about 75 percent of all petroleum used in transportation in the United States and half of the nation’s total petroleum demand and which accounts for nearly all of the nation’s petroleum imports (DOT, 2000a; EIA, 1999a).

PNGV was formed by a Presidential Initiative in Septem-

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

ber 1993, as a partnership between the federal government and the United States Council for Automotive Research (USCAR). The federal partners are the Departments of Energy, Commerce, Transportation, and Defense; the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Science Foundation, and NASA. The USCAR members are Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler Corporation (now DaimlerChrysler).

The goals of PNGV are (1) to improve national manufacturing competitiveness, (2) to implement commercially viable technologies that increase the fuel efficiency and reduce the emissions from conventional vehicles, and (3) to develop technologies for a new class of vehicles with up to three times the fuel efficiency of 1994 midsize family sedans (80 mpg) while meeting emission standards and without sacrificing performance, affordability, utility, safety, or comfort (EIA, 1999a). Concept vehicles were scheduled to be built by the year 2000 and production prototypes by 2004. Although the R&D focused on midsize passenger cars, the technologies clearly are applicable to most segments of highway transportation, some even to heavy trucks and buses.

The jointly funded R&D was to be precompetitive, with the government portfolio of projects to focus on longer-term, high-risk technologies while industry focused on nearer-term development efforts aimed at commercialization.

The National Research Council (NRC) has conducted a peer review of the program annually, and the observations and recommendations of this committee have played a significant role in the formulation and prioritization of the research portfolio (NRC, 1994; NRC, 1996; NRC, 1997; NRC, 1998; NRC, 1999; NRC, 2000).

Funding and Participation

Since Congress did not initially authorize new funds for PNGV, to a considerable extent PNGV was a consolidation of R&D projects already under way in the various agencies. Total federal funding for PNGV has ranged between about $220 million and $309 million per year, of which about $120 million to $135 million was provided by DOE, the remainder by the other six federal agencies (OEE, 2000p; OEE, 2000q). Virtually none of the current government funding goes to the automobile companies; most goes to the 21 national laboratories, along with a number of universities and supplier companies. It has been reported by both the GAO (GAO, 2000) and industry representatives that most of the non-DOE federal funded R&D is not directly relevant to PNGV goals and is poorly coordinated with industry R&D (DOE claims that although it is not coordinated, it is relevant). On the other hand, industry representatives say the DOE funding at the national laboratories has been very helpful to their industry programs. At the 2000 Detroit Auto Show, Vice Chairman Harry Pearce of General Motors said, “It was the Department of Energy that took fuel cells from the aerospace industry to the automotive industry, and they should receive a lot of credit for bringing it to us.”

The distribution of DOE funding among the various PNGV technologies varied considerably over the years of the program. Figure E-2 (NRC, 2000) shows DOE’s Office of Advanced Automotive Technologies (OAAT) funding of PNGV from 1995 through 2000 (according to DOE there were only minor changes in 2001).

The three automobile companies claim to have spent together about $980 million per year on PNGV-related R&D during each of the past 3 years. This represents essentially all of their R&D on energy, environment, and safety. The auto companies’ cost share for PNGV, which was intended to be nominally 50 percent in the original agreement, was included in this figure, but the actual cost share is uncertain. According to DOE, about $130 million total was spent by industry from 1997 through 1999 on direct cost sharing in support of DOE R&D (GAO, 2000), but this was predominantly from the supplier community.

One might wonder why the automobile industry agreed to enter into this partnership when it had been opposing fuel economy and emission standards for years, and demonstration of technologies for an 80 mpg car could lead to new corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards at that very high level. From discussions with industry representatives it can be speculated that top management in the auto companies had as a motive the public good, the idea that energy security of the nation, the environment, and climate change were at risk, and what is good for the nation is good for their companies. In addition, although customers have been unwilling to pay much for technologies that increase fuel economy, society (represented by the government) was clearly pushing for petroleum conservation, and the public did want a clean and safe environment. Also, it may have appeared to be a good idea to get some technology in place to meet future regulation ahead of the regulation, as opposed to past practice, when regulation often preceded technology. The companies may also have believed that the national laboratories could be of help in this effort and that government assistance in this public good was not inappropriate. That the program allowed industry technical staff to provide direct input to government representatives in planning the R&D of the national laboratories along lines relevant to PNGV was a great advantage.

The goal for fuel economy in PNGV put forward by the industry was as much as a twofold increase (about 60 mpg), but in negotiation it finally accepted the stretch goal of “up to three times.” The other constraints in the goals—that the resulting vehicle must not sacrifice performance, affordability, utility, safety, and comfort of 1994 midsize family sedans—made them acceptable to industry by recognizing up front the realities of marketing.

Would industry have done this R&D without government involvement? It appears to the committee that probably most of the $980 million per year spent by the three auto companies (all but the amount directly matching DOE) would probably have been spent anyway in the industry’s ongoing pro-

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

FIGURE E-2 Distribution of OAAT PNGV funds by technology. SOURCE: NRC. 2000. Standing Committee on the Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles. Sixth Report. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press; Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicle (PNGV). 1999. Answers from the PNGV to questions from the Standing Committee to Review the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles. December 17.

grams in fuel economy, environment, and safety in response to regulations or the threat of regulation. But this would probably have occurred at a slower rate, in a more traditional and evolutionary way rather than in the quantum-leap manner of PNGV.

Results

Since the partnership does not end until 2004, final results are not known and overall success cannot be determined. However, there have been some interim successes and failures, as indicated in Table E-33. With respect to goal 3 of PNGV, concept cars from each of the three auto companies were built and demonstrated to the public in 2000. These vehicles have not met all requirements of goal 3. In particular, only one reached 80 mpg (the others were about 70 mpg). Although not expected in concept cars, none met the affordability requirement (DaimlerChrysler predicted at least a $7500 price premium), and none met the expected strict tier 2 emissions requirement for volume production. Also, none met the cargo capacity requirement (two came close). However, all three demonstrated functioning hybrid power trains, light-weight materials, exceptional aerodynamics, and satisfactory performance, comfort, and safety. Altogether the concept cars represented a triumph of technology by demonstrating the technical feasibility of very efficient passenger cars.

The concept cars all used diesel-electric hybrid power trains, but the future use of diesel engines is in serious doubt because of their current inability to meet the recently promulgated tier 2 emission requirements for NOx and particulates. Intensive research is under way to overcome this barrier. A fall-back technology would use a gasoline engine, which should meet tier 2 standards, in a similar hybrid power train, but it would have lower fuel economy than the diesel. It now appears to the committee unlikely that the 2004 production prototype vehicles will meet the goal 3 requirement of affordability or that they will closely approach 80 mpg.

Goals 1 and 2 both have to do with implementing tech-

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

TABLE E-33 Benefits Matrix for the PNGV Programa

 

Realized Benefits/Costs

Options Benefits/Costs

Knowledge Benefits/Costs

Economic benefits/costs

DOE cost (1995–1999) approximately $371 million. Total federal funding approximately $1.3 billion. Industry cost share: substantial but indeterminate.

Lightweight materials are generally more expensive than steel, giving negative economic benefits. However, improved manufacturing processes, fuel savings, and reduction in subcomponents can sometimes compensate for higher material costs. (For example, the Chevrolet pickup bed has a positive economic benefit, as much as 2%, if compared with steel at annual volumes less than 75,000, but a negative benefit at higher volumes due to tooling replacement. Customer saves about $12 in fuel cost per year. Benefit is positive if compared with a composite aftermarket liner.)

Some manufacturing technologies in use have positive economic benefits (e.g., welding, forming, drilling, springback).

Lightweight materials

Aluminum

Magnesium

Composites

Chevrolet Pickup Bed

Jeep Hardtop

When eventually applied, option economic benefits will be positive for the following:

Improved body structure

Design

Manufacturing technologies

Casting

Painting

Ion-implantation

Induction heating

Adhesive bonding

Rapid prototyping

Combustion diagnostics

Phosphor thermometry

Simulation/modeling

Virtual reality

Recycling

Because they appear to be more expensive than the corresponding conventional technologies they replace, when and if eventually applied to automobiles, option economic benefits may be negative for the following:

Hybrid power train

High-power batteriesb

Materials

Ni-aluminide dies

Diamond-like coatings

Lightweight airbag

Hybrid power train technology

High-power batteriesb

Materials

Ni-aluminide dies

Diamond-like coatings

Lightweight airbag

Gaining knowledge collaboratively reduces duplication of effort and corresponding cost.

Recycling

Gas turbines/ceramics

Fuel cellsb

Fuel reformers

Stirling enginesb

Exhaust catalystsb

Plasma treated

Vacuum insulated

Lean burn

Lightweight engines

Alternative fuels

High-power energy storage

Highpower batteriesb

Ultracapacitors

Flywheels

Pneumatic/hydraulic

Power electronics

Diesel injection pump

Diesel emission control

Modified diesel fuel

Variable compression ratio engine

Air conditioners

Lightweight interiors

Aerodynamic drag

Environmental benefits/costs

Reduced weight gives improvement in fuel economy and reduced CO2 emission.

Pickup bed gives 1.3 percent vehicle weight reduction, or 0.18 mpg fuel economy improvement.

Reduced weight and more efficient vehicle gives improvement in fuel economy and reduced CO2 emission.

Reduced weight and more efficient vehicle that meets emission requirements gives improvement in fuel economy and reduced CO2 emission.

Security benefits/costs

Same as environmental

Improved fuel economy reduces demand for imported oil.

Same as environmental

Improved fuel economy reduces demand for imported oil.

Same as environmental

Improved fuel economy reduces demand for imported oil.

Knowledge applicable to military use.

aUnless otherwise noted, all dollar estimates are given in constant 1999 dollars through 2000.

bSee separate case study for this technology.

nologies in manufacturing, energy conservation, and emission reduction as soon as possible, and there have been a number of realized successes in these areas, e.g., in the manufacturing and use of lightweight materials (aluminum, magnesium, and composites), welding, metal forming, hole drilling, and leak testing. These technologies are all critical in reducing the weight (improving fuel economy) and cost of vehicles and so are directly relevant to goal 3, but they are already being used in production vehicles. Some specific examples are weight reductions of 23 lb in a Jeep Wrangler, 50 lb in a Chevrolet Silverado, and 188 lb in a Lincoln LS (USCAR, 2000).

Hybrid power train technology has reached the point where the auto companies are planning production and mar-

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

keting of some sport utility vehicles (SUVs) and pickup vehicles with these power trains in the next several years. Specific details are proprietary, but General Motors indicated that its ParadiGM hybrid system would be available worldwide, across a variety of market segments, from compacts to SUVs, starting in 2004. DaimlerChrysler said a $3000 subsidy or tax rebate would be required for its Dodge Durango hybrid, but it apparently is ready to go ahead with or without that marketing aid. Ford plans hybrid Escape and Explorer vehicles in 2003. These vehicles will not have fuel economies of 80 mpg, but they may be 10 percent to 40 percent better than comparable current vehicles and, as sales increase, will have a substantial impact on fuel consumption in some high-volume market segments. It should be recognized that a 20 percent improvement in mpg for a sport utility vehicle might save 124 gallons per year, while it would take a 41 percent improvement in mpg to get the same gallon savings with a midsize passenger car. In the opinion of the committee, a possible eventual outcome of PNGV could be a fleet of light-duty vehicles with a cost premium of several thousand dollars and a 40- to 50-mpg fleet average fuel economy (i.e., double today’s value).

In addition, there has been a great deal of knowledge developed about other technologies that may be useful in the future, some more useful than others. Among the more useful knowledge is that concerning diesel engine fuel and emissions (which is helping heavy-duty engines for trucks), fuel cell technology, aerodynamic drag, lightweight interiors, efficient air conditioners, vehicle system modeling, engine combustion, and power electronics.

The fuel cell has captured a great deal of attention lately because it promises great benefits in emission reduction, and surprising progress has been made in developing the technology. The fuel cell itself is highly efficient, but the fuel supply and preparation may not be. In addition there are severe technical problems remaining before it can be commercialized in significant volumes, notably the cost and a fuel infrastructure. The promise remains, and R&D, both in DOE and the private sector, is extensive.

Some of the less useful knowledge has been in automotive Stirling engines, automotive gas turbines, and flywheel, ultracapacitor, and hydraulic energy storage. These projects might be considered failures of the PNGV program, and it might be questioned whether their potential was sufficient to have warranted starting them in the first place or whether they should have been terminated sooner. However, the program was established with a portfolio of projects covering many possible solutions to the problem, each enthusiastically put forward by promoters. A planned downselection, scheduled for 1998 to terminate those projects that had proved to be less likely to succeed in the time frame of the program, was carried out. Some of the research results from these terminated projects have migrated to nonautomotive applications and may prove useful there.

It also seems possible that PNGV spurred international research that led Honda and Toyota to introduce vehicles with hybrid propulsion systems that achieve significant improvements in fuel economy, though falling short of PNGV’s original objectives in many respects, notably fuel economy and cost. The Toyota Prius has fuel economy of 58 mpg, about 1.5 times that of the comparable Corolla vehicle, and the two-passenger Honda Insight has 76 mpg, about 1.7 times that of the less-comparable four-passenger Civic (Vyas et al., 2001).

Benefits and Costs

The benefits from PNGV are summarized and illustrated in Table E-33. They reflect the successes and failures mentioned in the previous section. Since few of the PNGV technologies have been commercialized so far, it is necessary to rely on somewhat uncertain projections to estimate what benefits might eventually result.

Economic

The economic benefits realized to date have mostly been with respect to goals 1 and 2 of PNGV, that is, in the areas of manufacturing and materials, where technologies can be directly applied to conventional vehicles. The dollar value of these benefits is hard to determine, but would not seem to be large in the overall picture. Many other manufacturing and materials technologies have been developed and are ready for application as soon as manufacturers can make changes to their systems. Knowledge gained in PNGV about certain other processes and procedures should help reduce engineering costs as they are put into use.

In general, many of the option and knowledge economic benefits of PNGV could be negative when and if they are eventually commercialized, since most of the technologies under development are now more expensive than the corresponding conventional technologies they will replace, and the consumer’s savings in fuel consumption may not cover the initial cost premium over the life of the vehicle. This should not be surprising, since the principal purpose of PNGV, goal 3, is to reduce petroleum consumption and reduce CO2 in the atmosphere, while meeting very strict hydrocarbon, NOx, and particulate emissions requirements. It should not necessarily be expected that these important gains can be obtained with no cost to the nation. Every technology in PNGV, if successful, will impact these goals.

The cost premium of PNGV vehicles over conventional vehicles will probably be reduced and may be eliminated in the future, but there is no assurance of that now, since planned PNGV power trains generally represent more content than the power trains they replace, and the new content is usually more expensive. Also, the conventional technology against which PNGV is compared also becomes less expensive and more efficient with time.

The DOE has published several detailed analyses (OTT,

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
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2000b; DOE, 2000c) estimating the future energy, environmental, and economic benefits of EERE programs. These analyses project the market penetration of PNGV technologies in passenger cars and light- and heavy-duty trucks out to the year 2020 with the resulting benefits and costs. A variety of analytical models were used for the projections. With many of the technologies still undergoing intensive R&D and suffering from major problems (especially cost), and with very little knowledge of customer acceptance and other market trends, the committee feels these analyses are too uncertain to form the basis for the current study.

However, if all PNGV goals are met (at 80 mpg) or even a portion of them (at, say, 40 to 50 mpg), and if the entire highway vehicle fleet were instantaneously converted to PNGV technology, there would be a very large impact on petroleum consumption in the nation and probably the world. To gain an impression of the magnitude of this potential benefit and the possible costs to the nation, the following “back of the envelope” example is offered.

Doubling light-duty vehicle fuel economy from 25 mpg to 50 mpg and assuming the vehicles travel 12,000 miles per year, the gasoline saved per vehicle would be 240 gallons per year. For a 220-million-vehicle fleet (DOT, 2000b), that would amount to 52.8 billion gallons per year, or almost 40 percent of our nation’s yearly crude oil imports (EIA, 1999b). There would be a correspondingly large reduction in CO2 emissions to the atmosphere.

Assuming gasoline costs $1.08 per gallon ($1.50 retail minus taxes of 42¢ per gallon (Cook, 2000) the savings to the nation discounted at 3 percent over the 14-year life of the vehicles would amount to $644 billion. Discounted at 8 percent, this would be $469 billion. These figures need to be compared to the initial cost of the PNGV vehicles, which DaimlerChrysler has estimated at a $3000 premium (cost, not price) over conventional vehicles. The total cost for 220 million vehicles would be $660 billion, and the net benefit for the nation would be a negative $16 billion, or $191 billion depending on the discount rate. This negative benefit would be repeated each 14 years as the fleet is replaced.

Even though the direct economic cost could be high, the economic value of the environmental and security benefits could be great. The preceding calculations do not include the possible economic costs of climate change, which are presently unmeasurable, or the economic costs of oil supply disruptions (Greene and Tishchishyna, 2000), which could far outweigh any negative economic benefits from applying the new technologies.

If the economic benefit to the nation is negative, it might be asked what the deal looks like to the individual car buyer. If the customer pays $3000 extra for a PNGV vehicle and doubles the fuel economy to 50 mpg, and drives 168,000 miles in 14 years with gasoline at $1.50 per gallon (including taxes), he or she will have saved $5040. Discounted at 3 percent, this would have a present value of $4068. Discounted at 8 percent, the savings would be $2963. If the customer happens to be an economist and recognizes this $1068 gain or $37 loss, it might affect his or her purchase decision. If the new car purchaser keeps the car only for 3 years, which is more typical, the savings will be much less, and the loss will be over $2000. In any case, considering customers’ traditional concerns with initial cost and minor concern with fuel economy, it is unlikely that they will buy without some other incentive, such as regulation, subsidies, or rebates.

Environmental

Introduction to the market of PNGV vehicles operating on hydrocarbon fuels would not reduce hydrocarbon, NOx, and particulate emissions below the already promulgated tier 2 standard, but this very stringent level, much lower than today, would be met as a constraint. On the other hand, CO2 emissions to the atmosphere would be reduced in direct proportion to the reduction in carbon fuel consumption. Although CO2 is currently unregulated, it is a known greenhouse gas and a potential threat for climate change. Fuel cell vehicles, if employed, would probably have emissions well below the tier 2 level, but the emissions from fuel preparation are still uncertain, since the supply system has not yet been chosen.

Security

The security benefits of PNGV technologies are primarily related to the reduction in need for imported petroleum. As pointed out above in the “back of the envelope” example, imported petroleum could be reduced by almost half even if the fuel economy of the highway fleet were only doubled. This benefit centers on economic security from price and supply volatility and disruptions (either domestic or foreign) in the near term and national defense in the longer term. Also, some of the PNGV technologies are applicable to military use, where logistics support and agility could be improved.

Whether the security and climate benefits, potentially very large, would be worth a possible direct economic penalty is a societal issue that the committee cannot decide. It may only be said that the people are already paying about $2100 extra (in 1999 dollars) for fuel economy and emission control and $1700 for safety equipment in their vehicles (Department of Labor, 2000), so with proper recognition of the environmental and security risks to the nation, they may accept similar costs for additional fuel economy.

Benefits and Costs

The benefit/cost ratio for the nation should be based on the above described net benefits and the total cost of the

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
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R&D. There is no final value, since the program is still in progress, and in any case it will always be difficult to determine, since the net benefits (positive and possibly negative) are ill-defined. However, the total potential environmental and security benefits are immense, and to the committee they seem well worth the cost of the program to date.

The current annual cost of PNGV-related R&D is made up roughly of the total federal and industry funding, $240 million per year plus $980 million per year, plus the $130 million supplier industry contribution, totaling $1350 million. DOE’s contribution to PNGV might be taken as the 50 percent matching with industry that was planned when PNGV was formed. However, the potential benefits of PNGV (environmental and security) are more nearly the result of the total program costs, so perhaps a better ratio for DOE’s contribution to the benefits is 130 divided by 1350, or 10 percent. Figures are not available to match DOE’s funding with the specific degrees of success and failure in the benefits matrix chart, but DOE’s funding was specifically aimed more at basic enabling research than at product development, and 10 percent might be considered a typical percentage for basic research in any major R&D effort. On the other hand, DOE’s contribution is much more than its dollar input. The government involvement in PNGV certainly served as a catalyst to accelerate industry’s R&D on fuel economy, and the expertise of the national laboratories has a value beyond dollars. On these bases the committee believes that the potential benefits of PNGV measure favorably against the expenditures of DOE since 1993.

STIRLING AUTOMOTIVE ENGINE PROGRAM

Program Description and History

The transportation sector is the dominant user of oil in the United States, accounting for more than 60 percent of the nation’s oil demand and using more than is domestically produced. Passenger cars are the most energy-intensive subsector of the transportation sector, consuming over one-third of all transportation energy; they consumed 8743 trillion Btu out of the total 24,411 trillion Btu consumed in the transportation sector in 1997. These data are taken from the 1999 Transportation Energy Data Book, which is published annually by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and DOE (Davis, 1999).

DOE’s Office of Transportation Technologies (OTT) worked for many years to develop Stirling engines for automotive applications. The rationale for this work included the potential for high average thermal efficiency, multifuel capability, low maintenance requirements, smooth operation, and low emissions. None of the efforts to date has resulted in the development of a commercial product in the intended use or other uses.

The first DOE Automotive Stirling Engine program was initiated in response to the energy crisis of the mid-1970s. The OPEC action spurred the examination of a wide range of alternative propulsion systems for autos. At that time, it was felt that the Stirling engine was attractive for an automotive engine because it offered high efficiency and multifuel capability, the latter point being particularly attractive because of the gasoline shortages and price volatility of the time. The Stirling engine was actually invented in 1816. In the late 1930s the Phillips Company in the Netherlands revived the engine and continued independent development for the next 20 years. In the late 1940s, General Motors started research on the engine and in 1958 signed a formal agreement with Phillips for cooperative R&D. By May 1969, GM had accumulated over 22,000 hours of operation on Stirling engines from 2 to 400 hp. Because the Stirling engine uses an external continuous combustion process, it can be designed to operate on virtually any fuel. Several automotive concepts were developed and evaluated along with the Stirling engine. The second foray into Stirling engine development came about as a result of the PNGV program.

OTT worked with Mechanical Technology Incorporated (MTI) from 1978 until 1987 to develop an automotive Stirling engine. The goals of the program included a 30 percent fuel economy improvement, low emission levels, smooth operation, and successful integration and operation in a representative U.S. automobile. At the culmination of the program, the engine was demonstrated in a 1985 Chevrolet Celebrity, meeting all the program technical goals. The Stirling engine was never put into production for a number of reasons, including commensurate improvements in Otto cycle engines, high manufacturing cost, and lack of interest from the mainstream automobile manufacturers. Subsequent to DOE’s involvement, NASA supported further development of the MTI Stirling engine for a few years but then eventually abandoned it.

From 1993 until 1998, General Motors teamed with Stirling Thermal Motors (STM) to develop and demonstrate a Stirling engine for hybrid vehicles as part of the PNGV initiative. The engine was designed to drive a generator in a series hybrid configuration. Six engines were eventually built by STM, and three were delivered to General Motors for testing. By the end of the program, the Stirling hybrid propulsion system was integrated into a 1995 Chevrolet Lumina. The Stirling hybrid vehicle failed to meet several key requirements. Specific shortcomings included lower-than-expected thermal efficiency, high heat rejection requirements, poor specific power, and excessive hydrogen leakage. The engine did meet its emission target, demonstrating half the ultralow-emission-vehicle (ULEV) standard. There are no plans for further development of the Stirling hybrid concept with GM or any other auto manufacturer. STM is working to commercialize a small Stirling-powered generator for commercial use.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
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TABLE E-34 MTI Stirling Engine Development Project Budgets (millions of constant 1999 dollars)

Year

DOE (estimated)

Cost Share

1978

18.00

0

1979

22.77

0

1980

20.90

0

1981

20.88

0

1982

22.96

0

1983

18.84

0

1984

22.65

0

1985

24.99

0

1986

25.74

0

1987

16.68

0

Total

214.41

0

 

SOURCE: Office of Energy Efficiency. 2000r. OEE Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Stirling Automotive Engine Case Study (failure) Program. November 29.

TABLE E-35 General Motors STM Stirling Engine Development Project Budgets (millions of constant 1999 dollars)

Year

DOE Funding

General Motors Cost Share

1993

0.28

0.28

1994

2.75

2.75

1995

3.74

3.74

1996

5.25

5.25

1997

4.85

4.85

Total

16.88

16.88

 

SOURCE: OEE. 2000r. OEE Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Stirling Automotive Engine Case Study (failure) Program. November 29.

Funding and Participation

The initial automotive Stirling Engine program was generously funded from 1978 through 1987 as a result of the oil embargos (see Table E-34). The second program, in which the Stirling engine was an alternative prime mover, was funded as part of the PNGV, which has enjoyed government and industry support (OEE, 2000r)33 (see Table E-35). PNGV required a 50 percent cost share from industry. Most of the work in both programs was applied research. Both programs focused on developing specific engines meeting prestated requirements.

Results

Both programs eventually reached the demonstration stage, when they were demonstrated in driveable passenger cars. However, both had significant technical and market barriers that prevented the technology from reaching commercial success. The MTI Stirling engine was supported and further developed by NASA for several years after DOE ended its project. The NASA effort did not result in any commercial or government applications. MTI initiated a program called APSE (Advanced Production Stirling Engine), which was funded within MTI and which utilized the capabilities of the United Stirling and Riccardo Consulting Engineers. The team also included MASCO, a broad-based manufacturing company with automotive product lines (and a major MTI shareholder). It attempted to design a cost-competitive engine. Although it potentially improved the manufacturability of an automotive Stirling engine, it could not come close to being a true competitor to the Otto cycle, even on paper.

The STM Stirling engine is currently under development as a generator system. STM is on the verge of forming a joint venture with an industrial partner to assist with this commercial application. The generator will use an engine block different from the DOE hybrid Stirling engine, but some of the research on hydrogen containment, engine kinematics, and control will be embodied in the generator if it reaches commercial success.

Benefits and Costs

There have been no realized economic environmental or security benefits since no commercial products or spin-offs have been developed or introduced into the marketplace (see Table E-36). For MTI Stirling engine program, it is likely that none of the research and development would have occurred had there been no funding from DOE. MTI would not have had the means to carry out a research project of this scope for so many years without DOE support. After DOE support was discontinued, NASA continued to work with MTI for a year or two but eventually abandoned the project as well. MTI tried in vain to interest the natural gas industry in providing funding to support further development for other applications. No further work on the MTI Stirling engine was performed.

For the STM Stirling engine project, the answer is essentially the same. STM is a small R&D firm that does not have the resources to independently support a project such as the one DOE funded. Although General Motors cofunded this project with DOE, it is unlikely that even those funds would have been expended on this technology had DOE not agreed to share the costs and the risks of the project.

33  

All budget data came from DOE in response to the committee’s requests for information (OEE, 2000r).

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
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TABLE E-36 Benefits Matrix for the Stirling Automotive Engine Programa

 

Realized Benefits/Costs

Options Benefits/Costs

Knowledge Benefits/Costs

Economic benefits/costs

DOE R&D costs: $231 million

Industry costs: $17 millionb

No benefits resulted, since no commercial products were developed

Minimalc

Minimald

Environmental benefits/costs

None

Minimale

Stirling Thermal Motors (STM) is currently attempting to commercialize various applications of the DOE technologyf (unlikely to happen)

Benefits are indeterminate: substantial R&D progress made, but overall the program was not successful

Developed improvements in Stirling engine technologies

Alternative engine concepts were developed and evaluated along with the Stirling engine

R&D on the Stirling hybrid vehicle project as part of the PNGV program

Some technology spin-off to NASAg

Security benefits/costs

None

None

None

aUnless otherwise noted, all dollar estimates are given in constant 1999 dollars through 2000.

bThis represents General Motors’ cost share for the period 1993–1997.

cDOE contends that, as a result of utility deregulation, the market for small (30- to 100-kW) generators is expected to increase to several hundred million dollars annually by 2005 and that STM could compete for a share of that market if it is successful in commercializing the Stirling generator. However, the committee is skeptical of the Stirling generator meeting the efficiency and emission levels of equipment currently on the market by 2005.

dIf the knowledge derived from this program ever results in a commercial automotive Stirling engine, the economic benefits would probably be negative, and any resulting benefits should be classified as environmental.

eEE notes that STM is working with a commercial partner to commercialize Stirling generators for distributed power systems. However, the potential success of this venture is uncertain.

fAlong with the technical and economic shortcomings of the automotive Stirling engine, the automobile industry has so much plant and equipment devoted to the manufacture, service, and sale of gasoline and diesel engines that incremental improvements in competing technologies do not justify the enormous cost and logistical difficulties of introducing an entirely new engine type, such as the Stirling engine. Potential gains under programs such as PNGV could be large and would be implemented in the appropriate circumstances.

gHowever, the MTI Stirling engine was eventually abandoned by NASA as well.

Lessons Learned

The committee finds it should have been clear to DOE from the beginning that the Stirling program was a high-risk backup technology that had only a small chance of commercialization but that had considerable benefits if its problems could be solved. The engine had a history of unsuccessful efforts to commercialize that went all the way back to its invention in 1816.

With this understanding, there should have been several critical go/no-go points where cancellation could occur, based on technical progress. As an assist to the contractor, the contract should have had a comprehensive cancellation clause that would have allowed at least 6 months for ongoing research to be completed and documented. This was not done, and competition for budget by proponents of the Stirling engine led to continuation of the program over many years, even though there was minimal progress against several serious technical barriers. If the R&D had focused on progress on critical barriers, including hydrogen containment and engine kinematics, instead of on engine design, build, and testing, the go/no-go decisions might have been easier. After a second run at the effort with minimal matching funds from industry, a no-go decision was finally made by PNGV in 1997.

The chance for a radically different power plant like the Stirling engine to displace the internal combustion engine in the automobile industry is small unless the new power plant brings a dramatic improvement in performance, fuel economy, convenience, or cost, or meets a severe new social requirement unattainable by conventional means. The auto industry has so much plant, equipment, and experience devoted to the manufacture and service of gasoline and diesel engines that incremental improvements by competing technologies do not justify the cost and logistic difficulty of introducing an entirely new engine type. In addition, the internal combustion engine is a moving target since it has dramatically improved in power density, fuel consumption, and emissions over the past 20 years and continues to do so. All this does not mean, however, that the auto industry and

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
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the DOE should not continue to fund R&D on promising alternative power plants and implement them if the potential benefits are appropriate.

PEM FUEL CELL POWER SYSTEMS FOR TRANSPORTATION

Program Description and History

The Transportation Fuel Cell Power Systems program focuses on polymer electrolyte membrane (PEM) —also sometimes referred to as proton exchange membrane—fuel cell technology for automotive applications. Projects within the program focus on removing technical barriers that limit or inhibit PEM technology commercialization in the transportation market. A complete description and progress report for each project in the program is contained in the 2000 Annual Progress Report (OTT, 2000c).

The mission of the R&D program for PEM fuel cells for transportation power systems is to develop technology for highly efficient, low- or zero-emission automotive fuel cell propulsion systems. DOE has selected PEM as its leading fuel cell technology candidate because of its high power density, quick start-up capability, and simplicity of construction, attributes that closely match the requirements of an automotive power plant.

The program supports the PNGV program (see the PNGV case study), which has targeted PEM fuel cell power systems as one of the promising technologies for achieving the objective of an 80-mpg automobile (a threefold improvement). It is the next generation of technology after the frontrunner, the CIDI, or diesel engine in a hybrid configuration. The fuel cell is considered not quite ready for prime time because it still requires a major R&D effort aimed at primarily cost reduction.

The program focuses effort in three major areas: (1) fuel cell power systems development, (2) the fuel processing subsystem, and (3) the fuel cell stack subsystem. Fuel cell power systems development efforts consist of activities to integrate component technologies into complete systems, including systems modeling, cost analysis, and systems control. Fuel processing subsystem activities address key barriers to the onboard processing of conventional and alternative fuels to produce hydrogen of PEM fuel cell stack quality. Fuel cell stack subsystem development activities address the development of critical stack component technology such as advanced membranes, bipolar plate technology, and electrode catalyst development.

Funding and Participation

General Electric developed the PEM fuel cell for NASA about 40 years ago. GE sold it when NASA needs declined, and the PEM fuel cell did not seem to have any immediate

TABLE E-37 Funding for Transportation PEM Fuel Cell Power Systems

Fiscal Year

Funding (millions of current $)

Funding (millions of 1999 $)

1978–1989

0

0

1990

3.1

3.84

1991

5.8

6.9

1992

7.5

8.62

1993

10

11.3

1994

17.5

19.2

1995

20.7

22.1

1996

21.5

22.6

1997

21.1

21.5

1998

23.5

24.0

1999

33.7

33.7

2000

37

37a

2001

41.5

41.5a

Total (rounded)

243

252

aNo deflation applied.

SOURCE: OEE. 2000s. OEE Letter response to questions from the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D in Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy: Transportation Fuel Cell Power Systems Program. December 12.

place during the energy crisis of the 1970s because it was too costly.

DOE initiated work on PEM fuel cells in 1990, and this rekindled interest. The budget history is shown in Table E-37. The growth in budget from 1990, when it was approximately $3 million, to FY 2001, when it is $41.5 million, is due to five factors:

  • EPAct explicitly authorized DOE fuel cell R&D.

  • The early and continued success and rapid development of PEM technology demonstrated consistent progress in becoming commercially viable (early work was conducted largely at Los Alamos National Laboratory and funded at a very low level by the Electric Vehicle Battery Exploratory Technology Program.

  • PEM technology was included in the PNGV program in 1993 (a decision made jointly by the government and USCAR representatives) and subsequently selected (by joint industry-government recommendation and approved by the PNGV Operating Steering Group) in 1997 as one of two candidate technologies capable of achieving 80 mpg in a PNGV-class vehicle (this decision was influenced by the third PNGV NRC peer review and commended in the fourth review) (NRC, 1998; NRC, 1999).

  • Early success led to growing industry interest and heightened legislative visibility.

  • There was increased need for domestic manufacturers to compete with foreign auto manufacturers.

Approximately one-third of the work effort takes place at national laboratories (no cost share). The remaining two-

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
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thirds takes place under cost-shared contracts with industry partners. The cost share for these efforts varies between 20 and 50 percent (average cost shared is estimated at 25 to 30 percent). In addition, in the last 3 years both the auto manufacturing and fuel cell supplier industries have initiated large R&D fuel cell efforts that include no government cost share. Negative budget growth from FY 1995 to FY 1997 can be attributed to general tightening of federal spending during that time to achieve a balanced budget.

Results

DOE R&D investments in PEM transportation applications have led to tremendous interest in the stationary power area (residential and small commercial buildings). Early demonstrations of the technology are under way, and announcements of commercialization efforts have been made. At least three U.S. companies (Plug Power, International Fuel Cells, and Honeywell) have announced intentions to commercialize the technology. Each of these companies was supported early in its development of PEM technology by DOE and would not likely be poised for commercialization without DOE assistance. The committee expects that fuel cells will increasingly become part of the heavy-duty vehicle market, including urban transit buses and service vehicles. U.S. automobile manufacturers are heavily involved in PEM development due to early DOE interest and support. In January 2000, General Motors unveiled the Precept, its fuel cell concept car, at the North American Auto Show in Detroit. (The car shown was not operational, but it demonstrated packaging of the fuel cell stack in the space generally occupied by the internal combustion engine). It is fueled by hydrogen stored on board as a hydride. When he introduced the Precept, Harry Pearce, vice chairman of General Motors, said, “It was the Department of Energy that took fuel cells from the aerospace industry to the automotive industry, and they should receive a lot of credit for bringing it to us.” This is an unusually strong endorsement of a government-supported technology and reflects both the potential of the program as well as the key role DOE has played as a catalyst for industry activity.

DOE has had a major role in the development of PEM fuel cell technology. Therefore, it is likely that significant differences would be noted in the absence of the DOE program:

  • The U.S. industry base would be virtually nonexistent. Companies such as: Plug Power, Energy Partners, and NUVERA exist primarily because of early DOE solicitations and support. Other larger U.S. companies such as 3M, International Fuel Cells, and Honeywell have instituted PEM programs primarily because of DOE R&D support. For example, in 1992 DOE funded Arthur D.Little to perform a fuel chain analysis and identify appropriate reforming technologies for fuel cells. This work led to a partial oxidation (POX) research effort at Little funded by DOE where previously there had been no work. This work was successful and grew (almost exclusively funded by DOE) until Little spun off a separate company, Epyx, to continue work in the area. DOE continued to fund Epyx and urged it to form a partnership that involved a fuel cell stack technology company, which it did in 2000, when NUVERA, a joint venture between Amerada Hess, Little, and DeNora Fuel Cells, was formed. It should be noted, however, that foreign companies were excluded by DOE rules from competing for DOE contracts even though such companies represented the state of the art at the time.

  • There would probably be no U.S. automotive programs in PEM. For eample, early work with General Motors established that company’s PEM fuel cell program (approximately $28 million in DOE funding). A large General Motors program continues today without DOE funding (see General Motors’ statement above regarding the importance of the DOE work in fuel cells). The DOE effort established PEM as an early PNGV technology, helping to promote automotive industry interest. If it had not been part of PNGV at the inception of the program (including PEM as part of PNGV was a joint industry-government decision), PEM technology would probably never have been included in PNGV due to the aggressive timetable of the program.

Overall, DOE estimates, if PEM were not part of PNGV, the current performance of the technology would be set back approximately 10 years, significantly delaying the introduction of the technology into early market areas such as portable and stationary power and subsequently delaying the emergence in the automotive application. The DOE impact has been significant because it concentrated on high-risk barriers that are often not addressed by industry.

For example, 8 years ago, the concept of reforming gasoline onboard the vehicle was not thought possible. It was extremely unlikely that industry would have devoted the required resources to solve this technical challenge. Because of DOE success in this area, multiple industry programs now exist to refine, package, and lower the cost of gasoline reforming systems (General Motors, International Fuel Cells, DaimlerChrysler, etc.).

It should be noted, however, that the development of PEM for vehicles is an international endeavor. For example, the involvement of Ballard, a leader in the field, came through funding from Canadian governments (central and provincial). Xcellsis, the firm created by the partnership between Ballard and DaimlerCrysler and later with Ford, depends on a European subsidiary for advanced onboard reformers.

In discussing the DOE technical contributions with people from the fuel cell companies, it is clear that the work on platinum catalyst loading, air bleed to control carbon monoxide (CO) catalyst poisoning, and onboard gasoline reforming by partial oxidation are all significant. These gave momentum to the private sector developments. Now that the

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
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momentum is under way, what is needed are policies by DOE and DOT that will stimulate the deployment of fuel cell vehicles.

Benefits and Costs

Fuel cell vehicles have the potential to reduce harmful emissions and the consumption of nonrenewable energy sources because they are clean and efficient. Fuel cells are a technology that could, if economically developed, power automobiles with little or no tailpipe emissions, provide energy to homes and factories with virtually no smokestack pollution, and use renewable, domestic energy at high efficiency.

Fuel cells may provide significant energy, environmental, and economic benefits at the national, regional, and local level. These benefits include the following:

  • Reduced dependence on foreign oil;

  • Reduced local, regional, and global environmental impacts of transportation while maintaining a high level of mobility;

  • Fuel cell technology leadership that will help domestic automotive companies and their fuel cell suppliers capture larger market share not only in international markets but also in markets for electricity generation in buildings and industry.

  • Accelerating the growth of stationary fuel cells through shared technology development, leading to system reliability through distributed power.

Because fuel cells in vehicles (or stationary applications) are not yet commercialized, there are no realized benefits yet (see Table E-38). Also, because fuel cell systems are still undergoing intensive R&D, the committee does not consider the technology as being commercially available. Therefore, there are no option benefits at this stage. This conclusion is arguable, but it is what the committee believes is the current state of the development, despite the fact that fuel cell-powered buses have been demonstrated in various cities, there are experimental fuel cell cars, and stationary sources are being tested.

For the purposes of this discussion, the benefits are classified as knowledge benefits (see Table E-38).

The principal advantages of the PEM fuel cell are its cleanliness and its efficiency even at part loads. Its disadvantages are its cost and the infrastructure costs associated with hydrogen (and methanol) production, distribution, and fueling.

Fuel cell vehicles using gasoline, methanol, and hydrogen have been compared to other advanced light-duty vehicles in three recent studies (Wang et al., 1998; Weiss et al., 2000; ORNL, 2000). The Clean Energy Future (CEF) study (ORNL, 2000) looked at market penetration most extensively. In that study it was concluded that the fuel cell light-duty vehicle would not penetrate the market substantially before 2020. However, if much more intensive R&D can make the fuel cell learning curves substantially steeper than is assumed for the business-as-usual and moderate scenarios, then substantial penetration of the market is projected to occur by 2020, i.e., up to 2 million new vehicles out of 14 million. For this to occur, the cost of the fuel cell vehicle must be equal to or less than the cost of a standard evolved internal combustion engine vehicle. The MIT study indicates that this is unlikely, but it is possible. Even with favorable economics—for example, lower life-cycle costs—policy is often needed to initiate market penetration, allowing manufacturing scale-up and allowing the technology to move along the learning curve.

Why is this possibility important? If a situation develops in which constraints on greenhouse gases are required, then the fuel cell with onboard hydrogen is the only alternative (except electric) that is free of carbon emissions. This implies that the hydrogen will have to come from electrolysis using electricity free of carbon emissions or from the reforming of fossil (or biomass) fuels with carbon capture and sequestration. In such a situation, the fuel cell vehicle can be thought of as an insurance policy for lowering the cost of meeting the greenhouse constraint (see Box 3–6).

There is one other future situation that may be important. If the CIDI (diesel) engine (in either a hybrid or conventional vehicle) turns out not to be able to meet tier 2 standards, then the fuel cell vehicle becomes more important. The CEF study considered this case. The result of stripping diesel from the mix of advanced technologies was that fuel cell vehicle penetration increasing from 2 million to 2.8 million new vehicles sold in 2020 under the advanced (i.e., steep learning curve) scenario. The gasoline internal combustion engine hybrid takes up the rest of the slack. This is in qualitative agreement with the cost ranges reported in the MIT study (Weiss et al., 2000). The one technology not considered was a compressed natural gas hybrid vehicle, which may be the best of all. Recent progress on controlling diesel emissions indicates that this situation may be remote.

One further point should be made. Stationary applications may be commercialized before vehicle applications. The stationary source must have much longer life under continuous operating conditions, but the constraints on reforming and capital cost per kilowatt may be relaxed. Stationary applications will benefit from the development of higher-temperature membranes that will make combined heat and power applications more prevalent.

Lessons Learned

An important lesson is that systematic and repeated peer review pays off. The project benefits from this continuity, as measured by the ability of the program and its projects to prioritize and focus.

The DOE transportation program’s PEM is part of the yearly peer review process of the PNGV program. The Na-

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
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TABLE E-38 Benefits Matrix for the Transportation PEM Fuel Cell Power System Programa

 

Realized Benefits/Costs

Options Benefits/Costs

Knowledge Benefits/Costs

Economic benefits/costs

DOE R&D costs: $210 million

Private industry R&D cost share: $54 millionb

Industry is now investing much more on this technology than the government for both stationary and mobile applications

There are no realized economic benefits to date as the technology has not been commercialized

Likely minimal, depending on circumstancesc

Substantial—see below

Environmental benefits/costs

None realized to date, since the product has not been commercialized

Minimal since R&D is ongoing

Benefits are potentially large, because fuel cell vehicles have very low emissions (much lower than tier 2 EPA emission limits (1/100) for gasoline-fueled PEM

The DOE program contributed importantly to the acceleration in PEM fuel cell technologyd

Various fuel cell prototype vehicles from cars to buses have been tested: e.g., GM introduced an experimental prototype of its Zafira concept minivan in 1998 and the Precept concept car in 2000 and R&D is ongoing on reduction in size and weight, reduction of manufacturing costs, improving rapid start and transient performance, increasing durability and reliability, achieving higher-temperature membranes, and improving fuel processing, including further development of fuel-flexible fuel processing and better on-board storage of hydrogen, although there is no breakthrough yete

Stationary PEM fuel cell systems are being developed for building applications by a variety of companiesf

Security benefits/costs

None since the product has not been commercialized

Minimal since R&D is ongoing

Benefits are potentially large since fuel cells can use a variety of fuels (including hydrogen from natural gas and coal reformation and electrolysis) as substitutes for oil derivatives. Transportation accounts for 67% of oil consumption, and PEM fuel cells can substantially increase the energy efficiency of a vehicle using alternative fuelsg

Potential option for distributed generation and creation of electricity on the demand side of congested T&D linesh

aUnless otherwise noted, all dollar estimates are given in constant 1999 dollars through 2000.

bEstimated on the basis of information provided by EE indicating the portion of the work effort conducted at the national laboratories (about one-third) for which there is no cost sharing and the average cost share of the remaining two-thirds of the R&D effort, where the average cost share by industry is about 28 percent.

cNone of the fuel cell technologies will have significant economic benefits to the consumer until the cost of a fuel cell vehicle can be brought down to the level where the life-cycle cost (including fueling costs) is less than that of advanced ICE vehicles. The benefits will be almost exclusively in the environmental and security areas. Under some circumstances, i.e., the regulation of greenhouse gases, the advantages of the fuel cell may cause it to be the least expensive way of dealing with the constraints imposed. The CEF study indicates that it is unlikely fuel cell vehicles can achieve the necessary low costs before 2020 without very significant success in RD&D. The MIT 2020 study indicates the possibility of such success is within the range of uncertainty estimates, however. Under those circumstances, the fuel cell vehicle and the stationary source fuel cell may have economic benefits.

dThese contributions include reductions in cell stack costs, size reductions, harsh environmental operability, research on partial oxidation, advanced membranes, bipolar plate technology, and electrode catalyst development. Early work on minimizing Pt catalyst loading, control of CO poisons, and gasoline partial oxidation reforming is due to or benefited greatly from the DOE program. It is fair to say that the DOE program has catalyzed the interest of many firms.

eEE estimated that fuel cell hybrid vehicles running on gasoline with on-board conversion to hydrogen could achieve up to 80 mpg; hydrogen fuel cell vehicles running on stored hydrogen could achieve the equivalent of 110 mpg.

fThese would use natural gas reforming to supply hydrogen. The systems are very clean, with little or no NOx or SO2 and with less CO2 emissions, because of higher efficiency on a total fuel cycle basis. Stationary systems may reach the market before vehicles.

gThe CEF study does not indicate much penetration of fuel cell vehicles by 2020 unless R&D is very successful at bringing down costs and other policies are invoked to stimulate the learning curve progress and buy-down costs. Without such policies, a realistic estimate of new car fuel cell sales in 2020 is probably only about 200,000. Finally, although the potential benefits of fuel cells are large and the promise is fairly good, the R&D is not complete, and large barriers remain. There may well be prototypes in a few years and field demonstrations, and buses may be even sold (at a financial loss) to clean city environments, but passenger car fuel cells cannot currently be classified as an option according to the definition used in this study. It is impossible to predict 20 years in advance what the market for these vehicles will look like. However, oil market volatility, environmental pressures, policy changes, and other factors will all strongly influence the evolution of vehicle markets. What is clear, however, is that these technologies have the potential to significantly reduce oil consumption.

hHigher-temperature membranes, currently the object of intense investigation, may also enable PEM fuel cell systems to provide combined heat and power for some applications.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
×

tional Research Council’s Standing Committee to Review the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles performs this review and publishes its findings (NRC, 2000). DOE has found this external peer review process helpful and has typically responded to the findings of the committee through changes in the program. Most recently, the NRC PNGV committee recommended that DOE focus more on high-risk, long-term PEM R&D and less on systems development activities. DOE agreed with this assessment and responded in the current R&D solicitation by eliminating full-scale systems development work and emphasizing more fundamental R&D, such as the development of a membrane that operates at higher temperatures.

Within the PEM program, specific projects are brought to conclusion when targets have been met or when progress is insufficient to justify continuing the effort. One example of success has been DOE’s work with the Institute of Gas Technology to develop composite bipolar plate technology for fuel cell stacks. This project no longer requires research into basic plate properties or composition, and work has progressed to the point where it focuses only on the development of high-volume production techniques.

An example of termination of effort is the work in fuel cell air management, in which four different technologies were investigated. This air management work was the subject of a peer review convened by DOE to evaluate DOE work in the area and make recommendations for future activities. Based on the recommendations of the review committee, DOE will downselect to retain one or two development efforts in this area. This downselection was partially completed by allowing two existing projects to terminate; it was to have been completed in the spring of 2000.

Another example of termination of effort is work that was supported for direct ethanol fuel cell technology. This work was terminated and has not been continued by other government or industry organizations. It was terminated for lack of progress in demonstrating adequate power density and catalyst activity for the automotive application. Approximately $200,000 was spent on the program in 1997 and 1998.

There are no instances in which elements of the DOE transportation program’s fuel cell were continued after first commercial sale since no true commercial sales have yet occurred. However, it is the general strategy of the program not to pursue areas of R&D that are being adequately pursued by industry. One example of this has been the decision to eliminate systems integration activities to demonstrate full-scale, integrated PEM power systems. During the last 2 years, industry initiated a number of projects in this area, eliminating the need for DOE financial participation.

Instead, the program is focusing more on R&D areas that are high risk, high payoff. DOE has significantly increased the efforts to develop a high-temperature membrane. This membrane is needed to solve three problem areas for fuel cells: (1) greatly increase tolerance of the fuel cell stack to carbon monoxide poisoning, (2) eliminate the need for stack humidification, and (3) significantly improve system heat rejection by increasing the temperature differential between the fuel cell operating temperature and the ambient temperature.

Conclusion

DOE’s PEM fuel cell program has been very effective. It has been a leader in the technology development and at kindling the interest of the automotive companies and the many other firms that now invest more heavily than the government. Are the public benefits (or potential benefits) worth the government investment? At this stage of development, the answer is a judgment call, but the committee believes the insurance value against the risk of climate change (and urban air quality degradation risks) does justify the government investment. The PEM fuel cell is not the only way to provide this insurance; indeed, OTT is pursuing other options. But the fuel cell surely is promising for both vehicles and stationary electric source applications. It also holds potential for reducing the oil dependence risk (oil price shock) in the long run.

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Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Case Studies for the Energy Efficiency Program." National Research Council. 2001. Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It? Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978 to 2000. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10165.
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In legislation appropriating funds for DOE's fiscal year (FY) 2000 energy R&D budget, the House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee directed an evaluation of the benefits that have accrued to the nation from the R&D conducted since 1978 in DOE's energy efficiency and fossil energy programs. In response to the congressional charge, the National Research Council formed the Committee on Benefits of DOE R&D on Energy Efficiency and Fossil Energy.

From its inception, DOE's energy R&D program has been the subject of many outside evaluations. The present evaluation asks whether the benefits of the program have justified the considerable expenditure of public funds since DOE's formation in 1977, and, unlike earlier evaluations, it takes a comprehensive look at the actual outcomes of DOE's research over two decades.

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