Index
A
AAQS. See Ambient Air Quality Standards
ABC. See Allowable biological catch
Absentee landlords, 210
Access conditions, de facto open, 11
Actor-focused ecology, and the economics of flexibility, in common-pool resource studies, 375–378
Actors
calculating the numbers of, 23
generally correct understanding of, 459
rational, dominance of model of, 4
utility of, 159
Adaptation
to change in social and environmental conditions, 466
of institutions, 472
Adaptive management
in cross-scale interactions, 311–313
in design of tradable permits, 205–206
integrating uncertainty into decision-making, 311
Adaptive systems. See Complex systems
Adequacy, challenges to theoretical, 11
Administrative factors, 131
AEPS. See Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy
Aggregate limits, defining, in design of tradable permits, 206–207
Agreements, ability to build, 5
Agroforestry, 73n
Air pollution, 23
success in controlling, 221
Alaska, Native land claims in, 268
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 286n
Allocation of resources, 108n
initial, in design of tradable permits, 207–209
intrahousehold, 73n
relationship to maintenance levels, 102
Allowable biological catch (ABC), 207, 224n
Ambient Air Quality Standards (AAQS), 206– 207
Antarctica, 278
Anticipation, of future interactions, 5
Antisocial impulses, controlling, 5
Antitrust prosecution, 203
Apocalyptical beliefs, 431
Appropriate linkages, among institutions, establishing, 465–466
Appropriating the commons. See also Harvesters, Users
comparison of public goods, 176–178
contributions to the public good with and without punishment, 177
a theoretical explanation, 157–191
theoretical models of reciprocity and fairness, 159–163
theoretical predictions, 163–176
Arctic Council, 308
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), 280
Artisanal practices, 266
Asymmetric equilibria, with inequity-averse subjects, 168, 188–190
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, 343
Atmosphere, global, 19
greenhouse gases released into, 3, 24
Authority rules, 98
B
Baland, facilitating conditions for institutional sustainability identified by, 54–55
Bandwidth, broadcasting, 22–23
Bangladesh Department of Fisheries, 305–306
Barbed wire, example of exclusion, 57
Barents Sea, 281–282
Bargaining power, of users, 15
Baseline issue, in design of tradable permits, 204
Behavior
explanation of, 38
prediction of, 37–38
Beneficiaries, impossibility of excluding, 19–20
Benefits, unfair distribution of, 66
doughnut hole, 287n
Fishery Conservation Zone in, 275
Bering Sea Community Development Program, 210
Beverly-Qamanirjuaq Caribou Co-Management Board (Canada), 301, 303
Biases, in cultural evolution, 410
Biodiversity
loss of, 24
threats to, 23
Biological species, as resources, 22
Biophysical environment, as a sink, 29n
Biosphere, concern with, 28n
Boundary rules, 98
British North America Act, 267
Broadcasting bandwidth, 22–23
Bush, President George W., 73n
Bycatch, 213
Bycatch discard, 213
C
CAFF. See Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna
California water shortage, 131, 138, 203
CAMPFIRE program (Zimbabwe), 251
Canadian North, fur trade in, 297–298
Canal networks, 99–100
Capacity, in interplay between international and national environmental regimes, 276–279
Case study research, roles of, 467
Cattle herds, 56
Causal analysis, 67–68, 447–451
knowledge about processes and mechanisms, 458–459
links for institutional sustainability, illustrative sets of, 69–70
paths describing hypothesized effects of wealth or wealth inequality on the maintenance of common-pool resources, 448
Causal models
development and testing of, 468
specifying carefully, 66
Causation
contingent and multiple, 67
of perceptual factors influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas, 137–139
proximate, 408
in situated rational choice, determining, 367–369
ultimate, 408
CBMRs. See Community-based management regimes
CFCs. See Chlorofluorocarbons
Change
demographic, 477
global social, 476–477
in social and environmental conditions, adapting to, 466
technological, 477
Checkers, and learning in complex adaptive systems, 337–340
Chile, water resources in, 203
Chimpanzees, conditionally cooperative enforcers among, 181n
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), 264
Choice
building on existing institutions, 370–372
determining effects in, 367–369
and the emergence of institutions for the commons, 363–375
horizontal and vertical linkages, 372–374
muddling through, 374–375
situated rational, 363–375
step-wise model of, 365–370
Circumpolar Protected Areas Network (CPAN), 279–281
Citizen science, cross-scale linkages in, 307
global, 23
Closed-form solutions, 38
Co-management arrangements, 260–261, 284
between communities and governments, 301–304
cross-scale linkages in, 304–307
of environmental resources, 222
Coalition formation, 130
Coastal states, jurisdiction claimed by, 272– 273
Coercive dominance, 416–418
Coherence, social, 108n
Collaborative research, that enables cross-scale linkages, 308–310
Collaborative research centers, 16, 76n
Collective action, 73n
by small groups, 59–60
Collective efficacy, 132–133
Collective learning
in complex adaptive systems, 340–351
organizational question, 341–347
organizations, rights, and incentives, 347–351
Colonization, 295–296
Comedy of the commons model, 4
Commerce in resources, 247–250
Commitments, motives for follow-up on, 135
Common management, of irrigation systems, 47–49
Common-pool resource game, equilibria with sanctioning possibilities, 169–172, 190–191
Common-pool resource studies, 16, 26, 28n
actor-focused ecology and the economics of flexibility, 375–378
being specific and critical about community, 384–387
bibliography of, 6
deliberation and discourse, 383–384
embeddedness, 381–384
old and new directions in, 375–387
political ecology, 378–381
problems with, 45
Common-pool resources (CPRs), 3, 15, 17–18, 87–112.
See also Common resources, Commons
causal paths describing hypothesized effects of wealth or wealth inequality on maintenance of, 448
as collective goods, 93
cost of measurement, 24
governance of, 26
need for extending insights to a broader array of, 472–474
renewable or nonrenewable, 22–23
scale of, 23–24
sustainable management of, 46–54
Common-Pool Resources database, 5, 28n
Common-pool sinks, 19
Common property regimes, 15, 17–18, 27, 41– 85.
See also Community-based management regimes
designations given to, 253n
in Ethopia, 13
in the Swiss Alps, 13
in Upper Burma, 13
vs. open access conditions, 51
Common Property Resource Digest, The, 17– 18
Common resources, 17–18, 233–257.
See also Common-pool resources, Commons
addressing problems of method, 63–70
analyses of sustainable management of common-pool resources, 46–54
and CBMR and TEA regimes as management institutions, 237–253
critical enabling conditions for sustainability on the commons, 62– 63
facilitating conditions identified by Wade, 48
facilitating successful governance of the commons, from Baland and Platteau, 52
illustrative sets of causal links in commons research, 69–70
and institutional sustainability, 41–85
Ostrom’s design principles, 50
Panel on Common Property Resource Management, 14–17
supplementing the set of substantive factors, 54–63
synthesis of facilitating conditions identified by Wade, Ostrom, and Baland and Platteau , 54–55
Commons, 18.
See also Common-pool resources;
Common property;
Common resources
early formal analyses by resource economists, 9–11
early work on, 8
future of research in, 17
Hardin’s model and its limitations, 11–14
heterogenity in, 88–96
ideal test bed for social sciences, 5
in Switzerland, 72n
large-n studies of, 96–102
large-scale multivariate research, 87–112
management questions, 426–432
theoretical explanation of appropriating, 157–191
tradable permits approach to protecting, 197–232
Commons dilemma, 114
factors influencing cooperation in, 113– 156
scale of, 146–147
Commons literature, 118–144
on the decision structure of the task, 122–127
functional classification of variables from, 455
intellectual history of, 6–17
on individual differences, 118–121
on perceptual factors, 137–144
on the social structure of the task, 128– 137
coordination of 173–175
in commons dilemmas, 134–137
directionality in, 136
impact of, 172–176
rational, 384
as a sanctioning device, 175–176
Communism, 8
Communities, 72n
being specific and critical about, in common-pool resource studies, 384–387
cross-scale linkages and co-management arrangements with, 301–304
epistemic, 307–308
imagined, 421
social identification with, 131
Communities for a Better Environment, 224n, 226n
Community-based management regimes (CBMRs), 27
and commerce in resources, 247–250
compared with TEAs, 233–257
extraction vs. pollution in, 245–247
as management institutions, 237–253
nested, 238–239
and resource complexity, 240–245
and resource size, 237–240
rights structures in, 248–249
synthesis in, 250–253
varying solutions under varying conditions, 237–253
Comparative methods, 467
Compatibility, in interplay between international and national environmental regimes, 276–279
Competence, in interplay between international and national environmental regimes, 276–279
Competitive individuals, 161
Complex systems, 327–359
collective learning in complex adaptive systems, 340–351
conditional view of uncertainty, 332–334
example from the New England fisheries, 328–329
learning in complex adaptive systems, 335–340
response to uncertainty, 329–332
uncertainty in complex adaptive systems, 334–335
Complexity, 312
of human motivation, 3
a problem in commons management, 426–427
of resources, 240–245
Compliance with rules, by users, and monitoring the resource, 462–463
Conceptual categories
challenges to, 11
inproving, 468–469
Conceptual developments, 17–26
cost of measurement of common-pool resources, 24
free-rider problem, 19–21
institutional attributes, 21
problem of overuse, 18–19
renewable or nonrenewable common-pool resources, 22–23
scale of common-pool resources, 23–24
search for effective institutions, 24–26
Conceptual framework, 452–454
Conceptual models, general, 458
Concern
with the biosphere, 28n
with ecosystems, 28n
with the welfare of other humans, 28n
with the welfare of species, 28n
Conditional conservation, by users, 92
Conditional generalizations, 458
Conditional preferences, 145
Conditional view, of uncertainty, 332–334
Conditionally cooperative enforcers (CCEs), 170–171, 190–191
among chimpanzees, 181n
Conditions, for emergence of self-organized organizations, 456
Conference on Common Property Resource Management, 300
Conference on Environment and Development, 282
Conflict management, 471–472
Conflicting values and interests, reconciling, 464
Conformance, in rules, 98, 100
Confucian system, 417
Consequentialism, 391
Conservation
indigenous, 370–371
by users, conditional, 92
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), 280–281, 287n
Consumption
jointness of, or rivalness of, 19
problem of overconsumption, 123
Contingent causation, 67
Contingent generalizations, 446–447
Contingent hypotheses, expanded use of multicase comparative methods for investigating, 467
Contingent relationships, 131
empirically supported, between group heterogeneity and institutional performance, 447
Contributions to the public good, with and without punishment, 177
Controls, of egotistical and antisocial impulses, 5
Cooperation, 404–406
contingent on many things, 405
cross-disciplinary, 39
effect of numbers of actors on, 23
heterogeneity inducing, 24
human proneness to, 404
uncertainty reducing, 126
Cooperation in commons dilemmas
experimental primer, 117–118
factors influencing, 113–156
framework, 115–117
historical roots of experimental research on commons dilemmas, 114–115
recent findings in the experimental literature, 118–144
a review of experimental psychological research, 113–156
synthesis, 144–148
Cooperative individuals, 120, 161
Cooperative institutions
evolution of, 412–425
segmentary hierarchy, 418–425
tribal social instincts hypothesis, 413– 415
work-around hypothesis, 415–418
Cooperative Resource Management Committees (CRMCs), 424, 428
Coordination, in appropriating the commons, 173–175
Correlations, identifying, 14
Corruption, in public officials, 13–14
Costly exclusions, 21
Costly punishment, 176–178
Costs. See also Low-cost enforcement of rules
of fishing effort, 9–10
of measuring common-pool resources, 24
of monitoring and enforcement, 450
of sanctioning systems, 169
CPR. See Common Property Resource Digest, The
CPRs. See Common-pool resources
Credit trading, 204
CRMCs. See Cooperative Resource Management Committees
Cross-disciplinary cooperation, 39
Cross-scale institutional linkages
adaptive management of, 311–313
characteristics of some institutional forms that enhance, 302
in citizen science, 307
and co-management arrangements between communities and governments, 301–304
collaborative research and management that enable, 308–310
in development and empowerment arrangements, 304–307
and dynamic interactions, 259–321
dynamics of, 310–315
effects of higher level institutions on local institutions, 295–300
environmental consequences of, 263–291
examples of multistakeholder bodies, 305
and institutional interplay, 263–291
between multistakeholder bodies, 304
perspectives from the bottom up, 293– 321
policy communities and social movement networks, 307–308
promising institutions for, 301–310
research and management approaches that enable cross-scale linkages, 309
resilience, 313–315
strategies from a project in Bangladesh, 306
strengthening local-level institutions for cross-scale interaction, 299
Cultural evolution, 406, 410–411
biases in, 410
natural selection in, 410–411
nonrandom variation in, 410
pace of in modern world, 430
small-scale, as problem or resource in commons management, 430–432
Cultural heterogeneity, 89
Cultural theory, 368
Cultural variation, processes that shape heritable, through time, 407–408
Culture, coevolving with genes, 413, 415
D
Data-driven research, vs. theory-driven, 39
Decision making. See also Framing deliberative processes in, 469–471
Decision structure of the task, 122–127
payoff structure, 122–125
uncertainty, 125–127
Deforestation, in Senegal, 95
Deliberative processes
in common-pool resource studies, 383–384
in decision making, 469–471
Demographic changes, 477
Density, of institutions, 263
Dependent variables, 455
Descent of Man, 403
Design considerations for tradable permits, 202–216
adaptive management, 205–206
baseline issue, 204
defining the aggregate limits, 206–207
enforcement, 215–216
governance structures, 202–204
initial allocation method, 207–209
legal nature of the entitlement, 205
monitoring, 212–215
the temporal dimension, 211–212
transferability rules, 209–211
Design of common-pool institutions, 327–359
collective learning in complex adaptive systems, 340–351
conditional view of uncertainty, 332–334
example from the New England fisheries, 328–329
learning in complex adaptive systems, 335–340
response to uncertainty, 329–332
uncertainty in complex adaptive systems, 334–335
Design principles, 390
Ostrom’s, for institutional sustainability, 50
for resource institutions, 16
robust, 25
Developing countries, poverty in, 12
Development arrangements, cross-scale linkages in, 304–307
Dictator game, 136
Dirección General de Aguas, 203
Directionality, in communication, 136
Discourse, in common-pool resource studies, 383–384
Dispute settlement, 15
Distribution of benefits, unfair, 66
Diversity, a problem in commons management, 426–427
Diversity of human cooperation, 404–406
cooperation contingent on many things, 405
human proneness to cooperation, even with strangers, 404
in institutions, 405
institutions as product of evolution, 405
Dominance, coercive, 416–418
Donors, international, needing to understand property rights impacts, 15
Doughnut hole, 287n
Drop-through mechanism, 206
Drosophilia melanogaster, 409
ideal experimental organism, 5, 28n
Dynamics in cross-scale interactions, 310–315
adaptive management, 311–313
the environmental consequences of, and institutional interplay, 263–291
resilience, 313–315
Dynamics of resource management institutions, 469–472
conflict management, 471–472
deliberative processes in decision making, 469–471
emergence, adaptation, and evolution of institutions, 472
institutional learning, 471
E
Ecology
actor-focused, and the economics of flexibility, 375–378
political, in common-pool resource studies, 363, 378–381
Economic heterogeneity, 37
Economic theory of tradable permits, 27, 199– 202
approach to optimal resource management, 199–200
comparing with environmental taxes, 201–202
Economists, resource, early formal analyses of the commons by, 9–11
Ecosystems
concern with, 28n
and learning in complex adaptive systems, 338–340
oceanic, fish harvested from, 3
EEZs. See Exclusive economic zones;
Extended economic zones
Effectiveness, of sanctioning systems, 124–125
Efficacy, 146
collective, 132–133
illusions of, 133
Efficiency issues, 93, 165–169, 193, 224n
Egotistical impulses
controlling, 5
studying, 130
Embeddedness, in common-pool resource studies, 381–384
Emergence, 337
Emergence of other-regarding behavior, 144– 146
Emergence of institutions for the commons
contexts, situations, and events, 361–402
directions in common-pool resource studies, 375–387
question-driven research on, 387–392
rapidity of, 429–430
situated rational choice in, 363–375
social constructionism in, 387–392
specifying the commons in, 392–393
Emergence of self-organized organizations, conditions for, 456
Emergency situations, response patterns in, 148n
Emissions Trading Program, 204
Empirical validity, questions of, 11, 16
Empowerment arrangements, cross-scale linkages in, 304–307
Enabling conditions, critical, for sustainability on the commons, 62–63
Endowment of resources
heterogeneity of, 60
initial, of users, 15
Enforcement
costs of, 450
in design of tradable permits, 215–216
of limits on environmental effects, 218– 219
of norms, 172
English Commons, 42
Entitlements, legal nature of, in design considerations for tradable permits, 205–206
Environmental conditions
adapting to change in, 466
external, of resource management institutions, 489
Environmental consequences, of cross-scale interactions, 263–291
Environmental degradation, in relation to population growth, 56
Environmental effects, 28n, 217–220
enforcing the limits, 218–219
in evaluating tradable permits, 217–220
meeting the limits, 218
on the resource, 219–220
setting the limits, 218
Environmental nongovernmental organizations, 274, 280, 282–283, 307, 366
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 202, 424
Environmental regulation, 235
Environmental resources, co-management of, 222
Environmental taxes, comparing tradable permits with, 201–202
Environmental uncertainty, 148
EPA. See Environmental Protection Agency
Epistemic communities, 307–308
Equal individual risks, 199
Equilibria, 224n.
See also Nonequilibrium thinking;
Selfish Nash Equilibrium
asymmetric, with inequity-averse subjects, 168, 188–190
choosing among, 181n
multiple, 174
with sanctioning possibilities, 170–172, 190–191
symmetric, with inequity-averse subjects, 167–168, 186–188
Equity
preferences for, 158–159
problems exacerbated by heterogeneity, 15
problems with, 25–26
Escherichia coli, ideal experimental organism, 28n
Essentialism, 368
Ethiopia, common property in, 13
in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 101
Ethnographic analysis, 42, 72n, 75n
Evaluation criteria for tradable permits, 216– 223
economic effects, 220–221
environmental effects, 217–220
implementation feasibility, 216–217
Evolution
of institutions, 472
institutions as product of, 405
Evolution as multilevel. See Multilevel evolution
Evolution of cooperative institutions, 412–425
segmentary hierarchy, 418–425
tribal social instincts hypothesis, 413– 415
work-around hypothesis, 415–418
Evolution of culture. See Cultural evolution
Evolutionary models
accounting for the processes that shape heritable genetic and cultural variation through time, 407–408
consistency with a wide variety of theories, 411–412
explaining the nature of preferences and institutions, 406–407
recursiveness of, 407
use in the social sciences, 412
Evolutionary theory of commons management, 4, 403–442
evolution of cooperative institutions, 412–425
outstanding questions, 426–432
testing hypotheses, 425–426
theories of cooperation, 404–412
of beneficiaries, impossibility of, 19–20
costly, 21
example of barbed wire, 57
Exclusive economic zones (EEZs), 266, 273, 281–282
Exit options, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 94, 100
Experimental literature on commons dilemmas, 118–144
decision structure of the task, 122–127
functional classification of variables from, 455
individual differences, 118–121
perceptual factors, 137–144
social structure of the task, 128–137
Experimental psychological research, 113–156
on cooperation in commons dilemmas, 113–156
elements influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas, 116
experimental primer, 117–118
framework, 115–117
historical roots of, 114–115
recent findings in, 118–144
synthesis of, 144–148
Explicit incentive devices, 172
Exploitation
of resources, 7
of symbolic systems, 420–423
Extended economic zones (EEZs), 371
External environment, of resource management institutions, 157, 489
Extraction, vs. pollution, 245–247
F
Facilitating conditions
for institutional sustainability, from Wade, Ostrom, and Baland and Platteau, 48, 54–55
for successful governance of the commons, from Baland and Platteau, 52
Fairness
procedural, 159
questions of, 63–64, 66, 131, 179–180
theoretical models of, 159–163
FCZ. See Fishery Conservation Zone
Feasibility, of implementation, in evaluating tradable permits, 193, 216–217
Federal Central Valley Project, 424
Federalist Papers, 354
Fish, harvested from oceanic ecosystems, 3
declines of, 23
example from New England, 328–329
governance structures for, 202–206
inshore, 16
relationships among effort, cost, and revenue, 9–10
South Texas shrimp, 93
understanding, 73n
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, 353n
Fishery Conservation Zone (FCZ), 275
Fishing technology, destructiveness of modern, 22
Flexibility
of cooperative institutions in commons management, 427–428
economics of, and actor-focused ecology in common-pool resource studies, 375–378
Ford Foundation, conference sponsored by, 28n
Forests
timber harvested from, 3
Framing
in perceptual factors influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas, 140–144
of property rights, 142
in social dilemmas, 140
Free-rider problem, 4, 19–21, 177
in the context of the village, 12
Functional interplay, 260
Functionalist theory, 4
Fungibility, 212
Fur trade, in the Canadian North, 297–298
G
Gadus morhua, 391
Game theory, 12, 37, 89, 174, 452
repeated, 107n
Games
coordination, 181n
one-shot, 163–164
GEF. See Global Environment Facility
Generalizability, challenges to, 11
Generalizations
conditional, 458
contingent, 446–447
Genes, coevolving with culture, 413, 415
Genetic variation
between groups, factors limiting, 434n
processes that shape heritable, through time, 407–408
Georges Bank, 349
German General Staff, lessons from, 432
Global climate change, 23
Global Environment Facility (GEF), 265
Global social changes, 476–477
Globalization syndrome, 74n, 475–476
Golden rule, 124
Gordon-Schaefer model, 9–10
Governance of the commons, 26, 44
facilitating conditions for successful, from Baland and Platteau, 52
Governance structures, 393n
in design of tradable permits, 202–204
for fisheries, 202–206
Governments
cross-scale linkages and co-management arrangements with, 301–304
Grandfathering approach, 202, 208, 216
Grasslands, 367
Greenhouse gases, released into the global atmosphere, 3, 24, 264
Greenland Home Rule, 268
Groundnut farming, 95
Group characteristics, of resource management institutions, 488–489
Group exchange condition, 122
Group heterogeneity, empirically supported contingent relationship with institutional performance, 447
Group selection, in multilevel evolution, 409
Group size, 65
in commons dilemmas, 132–134
effect on performance of institutional arrangements, 15
and likelihood of collective action, 59–60
Groups
self-efficacious, 132
symbolically marked, 422
Guarantors of property rights, 58
Gujarat, irrigation systems in, 92
H
Hardin’s model, of the commons, limitations of, 11–14
Harvesters. See also Users
behavior of, 9, 20, 56–57, 95, 117, 126– 127, 367
poor monitoring of, 11
Head-end differences, vs. tail-end, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 88, 99–100
Herding
in Mali, 95
in Mauritania, 95
Heritable genetic and cultural variation, processes that shape through time, 407–408
Heterogeneity, 26
cultural, 89
economic, 37
of endowment of resources, 60
ethnic and social, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 101
four types of, 29n
group, empirically supported contingent relationship with institutional performance, 447
of individual preferences, 161
inducing cooperation, 24
of interests, 60
intragroup, 60
large-n studies of, 96–102
in large-scale multivariate research, 87– 112
social, 146
spatial and temporal, 15
summary of empirical studies, 104–105
Heuristic classifications, 480n
Historical context, 474–477
globalization syndrome, 475–476
major demographic changes, 477
other global social changes, 476–477
technological change, 477
Hoarding, 210
Homo economicus, perspective of, 170
Horizontal interplay, 260
Horizontal linkages, in institutions for the commons, 293, 372–374
How Institutions Think, 387
Human cooperation. See also Cooperation
contingent on many things, 405
extent and diversity of, 404–406
human proneness to, even with strangers, 404
in institutions, 405
institutions as product of evolution, 405
Human ecological arguments, 4
Human motivation. See Motivation
Humans, concern with the welfare of other, 28n
Hunter-gatherer societies, 414, 427
Hydraulic economies, poor, 88
Hypotheses. See also Contingent hypotheses
empirically supported causal, 468
proposed, about resource management institutions, 487–489
for research, 446–447
I
IASCP. See International Association for the Study of Common Property
ICC. See Inuit Circumpolar Conference
ICNAF. See International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Identification, social, with communities, 131
IFRI. See International Forestry Resources and Institutions
IGOs. See Intergovernmental organizations
Illusions of efficacy, 133
Imagined communities, 421
Imperfect knowledge, managing resources with, 464–465
Implementation feasibility, in evaluating tradable permits, 193, 216–217
Incentives, 72n.
See also Economic theory of tradable permits
explicit devices for, 172
of institutions, 347–351
Income inequality, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 98–99
Independent variables, 455
India
irrigation systems in, 97
Joint Forest Management in, 301
management in, 73n
People’s Biodiversity Registers in, 307
Indigenous conservation, 370–371
Indigenous institutions, rejection of existing, 11
Indirect effects, 457
Individual characteristics, of resource management institutions, 488–489
Individual differences, 118–121
gender, 121
social motives, 118–121
Individual-level selection, in multilevel evolution, 408–409
Individual preferences, heterogeneity of, 161
Individual risks, lower vs. equal, 199
Individual transferable quotas (ITQs), 203, 210, 213–216, 218–221, 272, 274–275
Indonesia, harvesting of tropical forests in, 270
Indulgences, sale of in the Middle Ages, 224n
Industrialization, effects of, 42
Inequalities, 75n
of income, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 98–99
of wealth
causal paths describing hypothesized effects on the maintenance of common-pool resources, 448
in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 99
Inequity-averse subjects, 37, 160–161
asymmetric equilibria with, 168, 188–190
best response function of, 165
symmetric equilibria with, 167–168, 186–188
Information technology, 214
Infrastructure investments, in Pakistan, 97, 99
Initial allocation method, in design of tradable permits, 207–209
Initial endowment of resources, of users, 15
Institutional arrangements
defining performance of, 14
effect of group size on performance of, 15
in resource management institutions, 487–488
Institutional attributes, 21
Institutional design challenges, 27–28, 461–466
adapting to change in social and environmental conditions, 466
addressing negative externalities for other resources , 463
establishing appropriate linkages among institutions, 465–466
low-cost enforcement of rules, 462
managing resources with imperfect knowledge, 464–465
monitoring the resource and users’ compliance with rules, 462–463
reconciling conflicting values and interests, 464
refining understanding of, 469
Institutional Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, 308
Institutional dynamics, 316
Institutional forms, 316
Institutional interplay
between international and national environmental regimes, 276–283
between (sub)national and local resource regimes, 11, 266–276
environmental consequences of cross-scale interactions, 263–291
implications of, 283–285
need for study of, 477–479
Institutional performance, relationship with group heterogeneity, 447
Institutional rules, 45
Institutional supply, problem of, 90, 93
Institutional sustainability
addressing problems of method, 63–70
analyses of sustainable management of common-pool resources, 46–54
and common resources, 41–85
enabling conditions, 62–63
facilitating conditions identified by Wade, 48
facilitating successful governance of the commons, from Baland and Platteau, 52
illustrative sets of causal links in commons research, 69–70
Ostrom’s design principles, 50
substantive factors, 54–63
synthesis of facilitating conditions identified by Wade, Ostrom, and Baland and Platteau, 54–55
Institutions, 72n.
See also Institutional arrangements;
Cooperative institutions;
Self-organized organizations
building on existing, 370–372
density of, 263
effective, 24–26
emergence, adaptation, and evolution of, 363–375, 429–430, 472
establishing appropriate linkages among, 465–466
evolutionary models explaining the nature of, 406–407
flexibility of, 427–428
horizontal and vertical linkages, 372–374
huge variation in, 405–406
importance of, 405
indigenous, 11
learning in, 471
legitimate, 423–425
legitimization of local-level, 299
muddling through, 374–375
as product of evolution, 405
rights and incentives of, 347–351
and step-wise model of situated rational choice, 365–370
viability of, to manage resources, 74n
village-level, 12
voting, 131
Integration, of research results, 451–452
Intellectual history of the commons, 6–17
early formal analyses of the commons by resource economists, 9–11
early work on the commons, 8
Hardin’s model and its limitations, 11–14
Panel on Common Property Resource Management, 14–17
point of departure, 6–8
Interactions
anticipation of future, 5
one-time, 4
in resource management institutions, 489
Interests
heterogeneity of, 60
reconciling conflicting, 464
Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 269
Intermarriage patterns, 434n
Internalized personal commitment norms, 135– 136
International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP), 385
meetings of, 7
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF), 328– 329, 353n
International conventions, 277
International donors, needing to understand property rights impacts, 15
International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI), 16, 76n
International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA), 279–280
Year 2000 Objective, 280
Interplay between international and national environmental regimes, 260, 276– 283
competence, compatibility, and capacity, 276–279
regimes for marine resources, 281–283
regimes for terrestrial resources, 279–281
Interplay between (sub)national and local resource regimes, 11, 266–276
systems of land tenure, 267–271
systems of sea tenure, 271–276
Intervening variables, 455
Intragroup heterogeneity, 60
Intrahousehold allocation of resources, 73n
Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), 308
Irrigation systems, 16, 56, 96
commonly managed, 47–49
exceptionalism in, 103
in Gujarat, 92
in India, 97
in Mexico, 97
in the Philippines, 97
unequal, and heterogeneity and commons management in large-scale multivariate research, 87–112
ITQs. See Individual transferable quotas
ITTA. See International Tropical Timber Agreement
J
James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (Canada), 300, 302–303
Joint Forest Management, in India, 301
Joint-stock company, 8
Jointness of consumption, 19
Juntas de vigilancia, 203
Just society, life in, as a public good, 20
Justice, local, 75n
K
Key terms, 17–26
effective institutions, 24–26
free-rider problem, 19–21
institutional attributes, 21
problem of overuse, 18–19
renewable or nonrenewable common-pool resources, 22–23
scale of common-pool resources, 23–24
Kin selection, in multilevel evolution, 409
Knowledge, scientific, as a public good, 5
Knowledge base, 26–27, 466–469
case study research role, 467
causal paths describing hypothesized effects of wealth or wealth inequality on maintenance of common-pool resources, 448
classification of variables from the commons literature, 455
costs of monitoring and enforcement, 450
development and testing of causal models, 468
directions for research, 466–479
improving conceptual categories, 468–469
lessons learned, 454–466
managing resources with imperfect, 464– 465
multicase comparative methods for investigating contingent hypotheses, 467
progress in the field, 445–454
proposed hypotheses about resource management institutions, 487–489
refining understanding of institutional design, 469
relationship between group heterogeneity and institutional performance, 447
roles of case study research, 467
systematic development of, 466–469
triangulation, 468
L
Lakes
exclusion in, 29n
pollution of, 23
Lamarckian effects, 408
Land tenure, in interplay between (sub)national and local resource regimes, 267–271
Large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 38, 68, 96–102
choosing rules, 101–102
ethnic and social heterogeneity, 101
exit options, 100
head-enders and tail-enders, 99–100
income inequality, 98–99
wealth inequality, 99
Large-scale multivariate research
on heterogeneity, 88–96
heterogeneity and commons management in, 87–112
large-n studies, 96–102
summary of empirical studies, 104–105
legitimacy of, 132
Learning, institutional, 471
Learning in complex adaptive systems, 335– 351
from checkers to ecosystems, 338–340
collective, 340–351
Legal nature of entitlement, in design of tradable permits, 205
Legitimacy
of institutions, 423–425
of leaders, 132
Legitimization, of local-level institutions, 299
Lessons learned, 221–224
about evaluation, 221–223
challenges of institutional design, 461– 466
practical value of research, 457–461
substantive lessons, 27, 456–457
unfulfilled theoretical expectations, 223– 224
kleptocratic, 417
Life in a just society, as a public good, 20
Limitations
aggregate, in design of tradable permits, 206–207
enforcing, 218–219
of Hardin’s model of the commons, 11– 14
meeting, 218
of privatization, 193–257
setting, 218
tradable permits approach to protecting the commons, 197–232
of the tragedy of the commons model, 456
on use of resources, 3
Linkages among institutions, 27
establishing appropriate, 465–466
Linking Social and Ecological Systems, 316
Literature, commons, 27, 72n, 118–144, 455
intellectual history, 6–17
Local justice, 75n
Local-level institutions, legitimization of, 299
Logic of Collective Action, The, 114
Low-cost enforcement of rules, 462
Lower individual risks, 199
Lumpiness, of monitoring, 75n, 107n
M
Magnuson-Stevens Act, 202, 227n
Maintenance, of common-pool resources. See also Resource management;
resource management institutions;
Sustainable management
hypothesized effects of wealth or wealth inequality on, 448
Maintenance levels, relationship of resource allocation to, 102
Malaysia, harvesting of tropical forests in, 270
Mali, herding in, 95
Management. See also Adaptive management;
Co-management;
Common management;
Resource management
in Africa, 73n
enabling cross-scale linkages, 308–310
in India, 73n
multilevel, 15
in the Philippines, 73n
Management institutions, CBMR and TEA regimes as, 237–253
Marginalization, of sheep flocks, 75–76n
Marine resources
in interplay between international and national environmental regimes, 281–283
regimes for, 281–283
effects of emerging and spreading, 42, 56
to implement policy, 193
Market integration, 57
Mating systems, 434n
Matrices, for payoff structure, 141
Mauritania, herding in, 95
Maximum economic yield (MEY), 241
Maximum sustainable yield, 10
Maximum use, sustainable yield (MUSY), 241
Measurement of common-pool resources, cost of, 24
Mediated effects, 457
Mediterranean Action Plan, 308
Memes, 412
Meritocracies, 429
Methodology
in design of tradable permits, 207–209
for investigating contingent hypotheses, 467
problems of, 69
for researching institutional sustainability, 63–70
traditions of the social sciences, 5
Mexico, irrigation systems in, 97
MEY. See Maximum economic yield
Military organizations, 420
Mismanagement, 323
Mobility, 65
Model specification, 47
Moderator variables, 455
Modernist orientation, 380
Monitoring, 181n
costs of, 450
in design of tradable permits, 212–215
of resource boundaries and harvesting practices, poor, 11
of resources, and users’ compliance with rules, 462–463
various forms of, 67
Moral suasion, 124
Motivation. See also Reciprocally motivated subjects
assumptions about, 3
complexity of, 3
diverse, 179
for follow-up on commitments, 135
individual differences in social, 118–121
prosocial vs. proself, 118–121
for willingness to tackle social dilemmas, 139
Multicase comparative methods, for investigating contingent hypotheses, 467
Multilevel evolution, 408–409
group selection, 409
individual-level selection, 408–409
kin selection, 409
Multilevel management, 15
Multiple causation, 67
Multiple equilibria, 174
Multistakeholder bodies
cross-scale linkages between, 304
examples of, 305
Multivariate research, large-scale, heterogeneity and commons management in, 87–112
MUSY. See Maximum use, sustainable yield
N
Nash equilibrium, 157, 163, 174.
See also Selfish Nash Equilibrium
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), 202, 225n, 329–331
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 353n
National practices, 266–267
National Research Council, 480n
Panel on Common Property Resource Management, 6–7, 14–17, 28n
National Science Foundation, 278
Natural selection, in cultural evolution, 410–411
Nature Conservancy, 373
Necessity, of sanctioning systems, 124–125
Negative externalities, 157
ignored by selfish subjects, 165
for resources, addressing, 463
Nepal, irrigation systems in, 97, 107n
Nested CBMRs, 238–239
New England fisheries, example from, 328–329
New England Fisheries Management Council, 332, 353n
New institutions, rapidity of the emergence and spread of, 429–430
NGOs. See Nongovernmental organizations
NMFS. See National Marine Fisheries Service
NOAA. See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Nonconvexities, in production technology, 91
Nonequilibrium thinking, 241
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 269, 304–306, 372
environmental, 274, 280, 282–283, 307, 366
Nonrandom variation, in cultural evolution, 410
Nonrenewable common-pool resources, 22–23
Norm enforcers, 172
Norms, 135–136
North Pole, control of the use of, 23
NOx budget air pollution control program, 224n
O
Ocean fisheries
declines of, 23
exclusion in, 29n
Oceanic ecosystems, 327
fish harvested from, 3
One-shot games, 163–164
Open access conditions, 234
de facto, 11
vs. common property arrangements, 51
Optimal resource management, economic approach to, 199–200
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 197, 211, 218–219, 227n
Origin of Man, 403
Ostrom
design principles for institutional sustainability, 50
facilitating conditions for institutional sustainability identified by, 54–55
Other-regarding behavior, emergence of, 144– 146
Outcome framing, in social dilemmas, 140
Outer space, control of the use of, 23
Overuse, problem of, 3, 18–19, 126
Ownership
of resources, 21
Ozone depletion, 24
P
Pakistan, infrastructure investments in, 97, 99
Panel on Common Property Resource Management, 6–7, 14–17
sponsorship of, 28n
PAR. See Participatory Action Research
Participatory Action Research (PAR), 309–310
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), 309–310
Path dependency, 353n
Payoff structure, 159–163
in decision structure of the task, 122– 125, 138
matrices for, 141
PD. See Prisoners’ dilemma
Peace. See World peace
People’s Biodiversity Registers (PBR), in India, 307
Perceptual factors influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas, 137–144
causes, 137–139
frames, 140–144
Philippines
harvesting of tropical forests in, 270
irrigation systems in, 97
management in, 73n
Plan of Pitic, 418
Platteau, facilitating conditions for institutional sustainability identified by, 54–55
Play. See also Game theory protocols of, 127
Players. See Actors
Poaching wildlife, 123
Poles, control of the use of North and South, 23
Policy communities, and social movement networks, cross-scale linkages in, 307–308
Policy options, 61
using markets to implement, 193
value-maximizing sustainable, 200
Policy target, identifying, 199
Political ecology, 363
in common-pool resource studies, 378– 381
Political interplay, 260
Pollution, 24
of air, 23
of rivers and lakes, 23
vs. extraction, 245–247
Population, role in resource management, 56
Postmodern critical theory and analysis, 368, 380
Poverty
in developing countries, 12
hydraulic economy in, 88
Power
bargaining, of users, 15
in commons dilemmas, 128–132
Powers, vesting, 27
PRA. See Participatory Rural Appraisal
Preconditions, for trading permits, 200–201
Prediction, of behavior, 37–38
Preferences
conditional, 145
evolutionary models explaining the nature of, 406–407
heterogeneity of individual, 161
of inequity aversion, 162
for reciprocity and equity, 158–159
for type of public good, 96
Prisoners’ dilemma (PD), 4, 12, 118, 136, 174, 233, 404
overcoming, 238
Private goods, vs. public, 29n
Private property, in the Swiss Alps, 13
Privatization, 95
comparing community-based management to tradable environmental allowances, 233–257
and its limitations, 50–51, 193–257
tradable permits approach to protecting the commons, 197–232
Procedural fairness, 159
Processes, 27
deliberative, in decision making, 469–471
that shape heritable genetic and cultural variation through time, 407–408
Production technology, nonconvexities in, 91
Progress of the field, 445–454
causal analysis, 447–451
contingent generalizations, 446–447
development and differentiation of typologies, 446
integration of research results, 451–452
toward a conceptual framework, 452–454
See also International Association for the Study of Common Property;
Panel on Common Property Resource Management
in Ethopia, 13
regulatory, 233–257
in the Swiss Alps, 13
in Upper Burma, 13
Property rights, 72n
framing of, 142
guarantors of, 58
international donors needing to understand impacts of, 15
Proself motives, 118–121
Prosocial motives, 118–121
Prospect theory, in social dilemmas, 140
Protocols of play, 127
Proximate causes, 408
Psychological research
on cooperation in commons dilemmas, 113–156
experimental, 113–156
framework for, 115–117
historical roots of, 114–115
primer of, 117–118
recent findings in, 118–144
synthesis of, 144–148
Public domain, 267–268
comparing, 176–178
preferences for type of, 96
providing, 20
vs. private, 29n
Public officials, corruption in, 13–14
Public property, 267–268
Public radio stations, as a public good, 5
Pulse patterns, 244
contributions to the public good with and without, 177
costly, 176–178
Q
Question of the Commons, The, 386
R
Radon exposure, risks from, 364
Rational actor model
dominance of, 4
in game theory, 12
Rational choice, 160
building on existing institutions, 370–372
determining effects in, 367–369
and the emergence of institutions for the commons, 363–375
horizontal and vertical linkages, 372–374
muddling through, 374–375
step-wise model of, 365–370
Rational communication, 384
Reciprocally motivated subjects, 175
Reciprocity, 180n
preferences for, 158–159
theoretical models of, 159–163
RECLAIM system, 202, 212, 217–219, 226n
Reconciliation, of conflicting values and interests, 464
Recursiveness, of evolutionary models, 407
Regimes
for marine resources, 281–283
for terrestrial resources, 279–281
Regulatory measures, traditional command and control, 200
Regulatory property, 233–257
CBMR and TEA regimes as management institutions, 237–253
Reinforcement, 124
Renewable common-pool resources, in the drama of the commons, 22–23
Research. See also Lessons learned;
Psychological research;
Substantive lessons;
Understudied issues
case study, 467
collaborative, that enables cross-scale linkages, 308–310
conditional generalizations, 458
general conceptual models, 458
hypotheses, 446–447
integration of results, 451–452
knowledge about causal processes and mechanisms, 458–459
large-scale multivariate, heterogeneity and commons management, 87–112
practical value of, 4, 457–461
theory-driven vs. data-driven, 39
Research directions, 17, 28, 466–479
continuing the systematic development of knowledge, 466–469
Reservoirs, 56
building into tradable permit systems, 207
in cross-scale interactions, 313–315
Resource allocation
initial, in design of tradable permits, 207–209
intrahousehold, 73n
relationship to maintenance levels, 102
Resource boundaries, poor monitoring of, 11
Resource complexity, 240–245
CBMRs and, 243–245
TEAs and, 241–243
Resource dilemma. See Commons dilemma
Resource economists, early formal analyses of the commons by, 9–11
Resource management. See also Maintenance;
Sustainable management
economic approach to optimal, 199–200
with imperfect knowledge, 464–465
role of population in, 56
Resource management institutions, 26
and costs of monitoring and enforcement, 450
design principles for, 16
external environment, 489
group and individual characteristics, 488–489
institutional arrangements, 487–488
interaction among factors, 489
proposed hypotheses about, 487–489
and resource system characteristics, 488
Resource size, 237–240
CBMRs and, 237–238
nested CBMRs and, 238–239
TEAs and, 239–240
Resource systems, 37–191
appropriating the commons, 157–191
and characteristics of resource management institutions, 488
common resources and institutional sustainability, 41–85
factors influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas, 113–156
heterogeneity and commons management in large-scale multivariate research, 87–112
and unequal irrigators, 87–112
Resource theft, 123
Resource users. See Users
Resources
addressing negative externalities for, 463
characteristics of, and costs of monitoring and enforcement, 450
commerce in, 247–250
environmental effects on, 219–220
exploitation of, 7
heterogeneity of endowment of, 60
intrahousehold allocation of, 73n
managing with imperfect knowledge, 464–465
ownership of, 21
race to use, 11
regimes for marine, 281–283
regimes for terrestrial, 279–281
supplements to, 49
of users, initial endowment of, 15
value of, 129–130
viability of institutions to manage, 74n
Response function, best in inequity-averse subjects, 165
Result efficiency, 193
Revenue, from fishing effort, 10
Rights, 72n
bundled, 29n
in CBMRs, 248–249
of institutions, 347–351
Rio Declaration, 286n
Risks
individual, 199
from radon exposure, 364
Rivalness of consumption, 19
Rivers, pollution of, 23
Robust design principles, 25
Roman legal system, 417
Rules
ability to build, 5
authority, 98
boundary, 98
choosing, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 101–102
compliance with by users, and monitoring the resource, 462–463
difficulty of detecting breakers of, 47
institutional, 45
low-cost enforcement of, 462
as a public good, 20
for transferability, in design of tradable permits, 209–211
wide diversity of, 29n
S
Sanctioning possibilities
common-pool resource game with, 169– 172, 190–191
cost of, 169
value, necessity, and effectiveness of, 124–125
Santa Fe Institute, 312
Scale. See also Cross-scale institutional linkages
of common-pool resources, 23–24
of the commons dilemma, 146–147
Scale in cross-scale interactions, 27, 310–315
and adaptive management, 311–313
resilience of, 313–315
Scientific knowledge, as a public good, 5, 20
Scientific uncertainty, 327–359.
and collective learning in complex adaptive systems, 340–351
in complex adaptive systems, 334–335
conditional view of, 332–334
example from the New England fisheries, 328–329
and learning in complex adaptive systems, 335–340
response to, 329–332
Sea tenure, in interplay between (sub)national and local resource regimes, 271– 276
Segmentary hierarchy of cooperative institutions, 418–425
exploitation of symbolic systems, 420– 423
legitimate institutions, 423–425
Selection
group, in multilevel evolution, 409
individual-level, in multilevel evolution, 408–409
by kin, in multilevel evolution, 409
natural, in cultural evolution, 410–411
Self-efficacious groups, 132
Self-organized organizations, emergence of, 456
Selfish Nash Equilibrium (SNE), 165–167, 185–186
Selfish subjects, 28n, 163–164
negative externalities ignored by, 165
Senegal, deforestation in, 95
Sequential protocol, 127
Setting limits, on environmental effects, 218
Settlement, of disputes, 15
Sheep flocks, 56
marginalization of, 75–76n
Shellfish, 55
Shrimp. See South Texas shrimp fisheries
Sierra Club, 425
Simple CPR game, without reciprocal preferences, 173–174
Sinks
biophysical environment as, 29n
Situated rational choice, 361
building on existing institutions, 370–372
determining effects in, 367–369
and the emergence of institutions for the commons, 363–375
horizontal and vertical linkages, 372–374
muddling through, 374–375
step-wise model of, 365–370
Size, of resources, 237–240
Small-scale cultural evolution, as problem or resource in commons management, 430–432
SNE. See Selfish Nash Equilibrium
Social changes, global, 476–477
Social coherence, 108n
Social context, 474–477
adapting to change in, 466
globalization syndrome, 475–476
historical context, 477
major demographic changes, 477
other global social changes, 476–477
technological change, 477
Social dilemma situations, 157–195
motives for willingness to tackle, 139
outcome framing in, 140
prospect theory in, 140
Social exchange condition, 122
Social heterogeneity, 146
in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 101
Social identification, with communities, 131
Social motives, individual differences in, 118– 121, 144
Social movement networks, in cross-scale linkages, 307–308
Social optimum, calculating, 186
Social sciences
methodological traditions of, 5
wide use of evolutionary models in, 412
Social structure of the task, 128–137
communication, 134–137
group size, 132–134
power and status, 128–132
Societies, of hunter-gatherers, 414, 427
South Coast Air Quality Management District, 217
South Pole, control of the use of, 23
South Texas shrimp fisheries, 93
Southeast Asian forests, 270
Space, control of the use of outer, 23
Spatial heterogeneity, 15
Species
biological, as resources, 22
concern with the welfare of, 28n
Spread of new institutions, rapidity of, 429–430
Stag hunt game, 28n
Stakeholders. See Multistakeholder bodies
Standard common-pool resource game, 164–169
asymmetric equilibria with inequity-averse subjects, 168, 188–190
Selfish Nash Equilibrium (SNE), 165– 167, 185–186
symmetric equilibria with inequity-averse subjects, 167–168, 186–188
State California Water Project, 424
State policies, 72n
Stationarity, 103
Status, in commons dilemmas, 128–132
Stealing, 123
Step-wise model of situated rational choice, 365–370
Stockholm Declaration, 286n
Storage, 103
Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement, 282
Strangers, human proneness to cooperation with , 404
Strategy considerations, in situated rational choice, 369–370
Studies. See Case study research;
Common-pool resource studies;
Large-n studies of unequal irrigators;
Research;
Understudied issues
Subsistence practices, 266
Successful management, 73n, 106
Supply, institutional, problem of, 90, 93
Sustainability, 313
on the commons, critical enabling conditions for, 62–63
institutional, and common resources, 41– 85
Sustainable management
best tool for, 25
of common-pool resources, 46–54
Sustainable policy instruments, value-maximizing, 200
Sustainable yield, maximum, 10
Switzerland
commons in, 72n
private and common property in, 13
Symbolic systems, exploitation of, 420–423
Symbolically marked groups, 422
Symmetric equilibria, with inequity-averse subjects, 167–168, 186–188
Synthesis in commons dilemmas, 144–148
emergence of other-regarding behavior, 144–146
environmental uncertainty, 148
scale of the dilemma, 146–147
social heterogeneity, 146
Systems. See also Complex systems;
Resource systems;
Symbolic systems
of land tenure, 267–271
of sea tenure, 271–276
T
TAC. See Total allowable catch
Tail-end differences, vs. head-end, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 88, 99–100
Tasks
decision structure of, 122–127
payoff structure of, 122–125
uncertainty concerning, 125–127
TEA. See Tradable environmental allowances regimes
Technology
pace of change in, 477
production, nonconvexities in, 91
Temporal dimension, in design of tradable permits, 211–212
Temporal heterogeneity, 15
Tenure systems
land, 267–271
sea, 271–276
Terrestrial resources, regimes for, 279–281
Territoriality, 124
Testing, of causal models, 468
Teutonic families, 8
Texas. See South Texas shrimp fisheries
Theoretical adequacy, challenges to, 11
Theoretical expectations, unfulfilled, in the tradable permits approach, 223–224
Theoretical explanations, of appropriating the commons, 157–191
Theoretical models of reciprocity and fairness
in appropriating the commons, 159–163
preferences of inequity aversion, 162
Theoretical predictions
about the common-pool resource game with sanctioning opportunities, 169–172
about the impact of communication, 172– 176
about the standard common-pool resource game, 164–169
Theories of cooperation, 404–412
consistency of evolutionary models with a wide variety of theories, 411–412
evolution as multilevel, 408–409
evolution of culture, 410–411
evolutionary models accounting for genetic and cultural variation through time, 407–408
evolutionary models explaining the nature of preferences and institutions, 406–407
extent and diversity of human cooperation, 404–406
huge variation in institutions, 405–406
wide use of evolutionary models in the social sciences, 412
Theory-driven research, vs. data-driven, 39
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 114
Theory of Moral Sentiments, 115
Third World Network, 308
Timber, harvested from forests, 3
Time preference, rate of, 89
Total allowable catch (TAC), 203, 205–206, 218, 272
Townships, 8
Tradable environmental allowances (TEA) regimes, 27, 193–194
commerce in resources, 247–250
compared with CBMRs, 233–257
extraction vs. pollution, 245–247
as management institutions, 247–250
resource complexity, 240–245
resource size, 237–240
synthesis, 250–253
varying solutions under varying conditions, 237–253
Tradable permits approach to protecting the commons, 197–232
the basic economic theory, 199–202
building resilience into tradable permit systems, 207
compared with CBMRS, 233–257
compared with environmental taxes, 201–202
design considerations, 202–216
economic effects, 220–221
environmental effects, 217–220
evaluation criteria, 216–221
implementation feasibility, 216–217
lessons learned, 221–224
Tragedy of the commons model, 6, 114, 157, 467
challenges to, 13
logic of, 3
Transfer payment condition, 133–134
Transferability rules, in design of tradable permits, 209–211
Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Act (New Zealand), 210
Triangulation, increased emphasis on, 468
Tribal social instincts hypothesis, for the evolution of cooperative institutions, 413–415
Trust, 5
Typologies, development and differentiation of, 446
U
Ultimate causes, 408
Uncertainty. See also Scientific uncertainty
in complex adaptive systems, 334–335
conditional view of, 332–334
in decision structure of the task, 125–127
defined, 333
environmental, 148
integrating into decision-making process, 311
reducing cooperation, 126
response to, 329–332
Understanding
of actors, generally correct, 459
of institutional design, refining, 469
Understudied issues, 27, 469–479
dynamics of resource management institutions, 469–472
effects of social and historical context, 474–477
extending insights to a broader array of common-pool resources, 472–474
institutional linkages, 477–479
Unequal irrigators
and commons management in large-scale multivariate research, 87–112
and heterogeneity, 88–96
large-n studies of, 96–102
summary of empirical studies, 104–105
Unfair distribution, of benefits, 66
Unfulfilled theoretical expectations, lessons on the tradable permits approach, 223– 224
United Nations, Conference on Environment and Development, 282
U.S. Agency for International Development, conference sponsored by, 28n
U.S. Constitution, 431
position on authority of international conventions, 277
Upper Burma, common property in, 13
See also Harvesters;
Overuse
bargaining power, initial endowment of resources, and shared values of, 15
calculating the numbers of, 23
characteristics of, and costs of monitoring and enforcement, 450
compliance with rules by, and monitoring the resource, 462–463
conditional conservation by, 92
defections by, 95
of water resources, 38
V
Validity, questions of empirical, 11, 16
Value-maximizing policy instruments, sustainable, 200
Value of research, 457–461
conditional generalizations, 458
general conceptual models, 458
generally correct understanding of the actors, 459
knowledge about causal processes and mechanisms, 458–459
Values
reconciling conflicting, 464
of resources, 129–130
of sanctioning systems, 124–125
shared by users, 15
functional classification from the commons literature, 455
heritable genetic and cultural, processes that shape through time, 407–408
nonrandom, in cultural evolution, 410
Vertical interplay, 260
Vertical linkages, in institutions for the commons, 293, 372–374, 477–478
Vesting powers, 27
Viability of institutions, to manage resources, 74n
Village institutions, 12
free-rider problem in the context of, 12
Violations, 225n
Voting institutions, 131
W
Wade, facilitating conditions for institutional sustainability identified by, 48, 54– 55
Water resources
in Chile, 203
instream uses of, 219–220
shortages in California, 131, 138, 203
users of, 38
Watercourses, 19
Wealth inequality
causal paths describing hypothesized effects on the maintenance of common-pool resources , 448
in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 99
Welfare
of other humans, concern with, 28n
of species, concern with, 28n
WEO. See World Environment Organization
Wildlife resources, 55
poaching, 123
Work-around hypothesis of cooperative institutions, 413, 415–418
coercive dominance, 416–418
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, 74n
International Forestry Resources and Institutions Program, 76n
World Environment Organization (WEO), 265
World peace, as a public good, 5, 20
World Trade Organization (WTO), 265, 308
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 385
World Wildlife Fund
Arctic Program, 287n
conference sponsored by, 28n
WTO. See World Trade Organization
WWF. See World Wide Fund for Nature
Y
Year 2000 Objective, 280
Yield, maximum sustainable, 10
Z
Zero-revenue auctions, 226n
