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Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
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TECHNICAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

Committee on Technical Issues Related to Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS
Washington, D.C.

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
×

NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS
2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20418

NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Council of the National Academy of Sciences. The members of the panel responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance.

This study was supported by Contract No. DE-AM01–99PO90016, Task Order No. DE-AT01–01NN40245 between the National Academy of Sciences and the Department of Energy, Contract No. S-LMAQM-00-C-0125 between the National Academy of Sciences and the Department of State, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John D. and Catherine T.MacArthur Foundation, and National Research Council Funds. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project.

International Standard Book Number 0-309-08506-3

Additional copies of this report are available from the Committee on International Security and Arms Control, 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20418, (202) 334–2811, cisac@nas.edu: the report is also available online at http://www.nap.edu.

Printed in the United States of America

Copyright 2002 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
×

THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES

National Academy of Sciences

National Academy of Engineering

Institute of Medicine

National Research Council

The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Bruce M.Alberts is president of the National Academy of Sciences.

The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Wm. A.Wulf is president of the National Academy of Engineering.

The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Harvey V.Fineberg is president of the Institute of Medicine.

The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce M.Alberts and Dr. Wm. A.Wulf are chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council.

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
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Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
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COMMITTEE ON TECHNICAL ISSUES RELATED TO RATIFICATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

JOHN P.HOLDREN (Chair), Director,

Program in Science, Technology & Public Policy, John F.Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and

Chair,

Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences

HAROLD AGNEW, President (retired),

General Atomics;

Director (retired),

Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico

RICHARD L.GARWIN, Senior Fellow for Science and Technology,

Council on Foreign Relations, New York, New York;

Emeritus Fellow,

Thomas J.Watson Research Center, IBM Corporation

RAYMOND JEANLOZ, Professor,

Department of Earth and Planetary Science, and

Professor,

Department of Astronomy, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, California;

Member,

National Security Panel, University of California President’s Council

SPURGEON M.KEENY, JR., Senior Fellow,

National Academy of Sciences;

President (retired),

Arms Control Association, Washington D.C.; and

Deputy Director (retired)

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

CHARLES LARSON, Admiral (USN, Ret.); former Commander in Chief of the Unified Pacific Command; Superintendent,

U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland

ALBERT NARATH, Director, (retired),

Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico

WOLFGANG K.H.PANOFSKY, Professor and Director Emeritus,

Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University, Stanford, California

PAUL G.RICHARDS, Mellon Professor of Natural Science,

Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, Columbia University, Palisades, New York

SEYMOUR SACK, Laboratory Associate,

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California

ALVIN W.TRIVELPIECE, President (retired),

Lockheed Martin Energy Research Corporation;

Director (retired),

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

Study Staff

JO L.HUSBANDS, Study Director

DAVID HAFEMEISTER, Staff Officer

CHRISTOPHER ELDRIDGE, Staff Officer

LA’FAYE LEWIS-OLIVER, Financial Associate

AMY GIAMIS, Program Assistant

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
×

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL

JOHN P.HOLDREN (Chair), Director,

Program in Science, Technology & Public Policy, John F.Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and

Chair,

Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences

CATHERINE KELLEHER (Vice-Chair), Visiting Professor,

Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island

JOHN D.STEINBRUNER (Vice-Chair), Professor and Director,

Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland

WILLIAM F.BURNS, Major General (USA, Ret.),

Carlisle, Pennsylvania

GEORGE LEE BUTLER, President,

Second Chance Foundation, Omaha, Nebraska*

STEPHEN COHEN, Senior Fellow,

Foreign Policy Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.

SUSAN EISENHOWER,

The Eisenhower Institute, Washington D.C.

STEVE FETTER,

School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland

ALEXANDER H.FLAX, President Emeritus,

Institute for Defense Analyses, and Senior Fellow, National Academy of Engineering, Washington D.C.

RICHARD L.GARWIN, Senior Fellow for Science and Technology,

Council on Foreign Relations, New York, New York;

Emeritus Fellow,

Thomas J.Watson Research Center, IBM Corporation

SPURGEON M.KEENY, JR., Senior Fellow,

National Academy of Sciences;

President (retired),

Arms Control Association, Washington D.C.; and

Deputy Director (retired)

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

CHARLES LARSON, Admiral (USN, Ret.)

U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland**

JOSHUA LEDERBERG, University Professor,

The Rockefeller University, New York, New York

MATTHEW MESELSON, Thomas Dudley Cabot Professor of the Natural Sciences,

Department of Molecular and Cellular Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts

ALBERT NARATH, Director, (retired),

Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico

WOLFGANG K.H.PANOFSKY, Professor and Director Emeritus,

Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University, Stanford, California

C.KUMAR N.PATEL, Professor,

Department of Physics and Astronomy, University of California, Los Angeles

JONATHAN D.POLLACK, Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies and Director,

Strategic Research, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island

F.SHERWOOD ROWLAND, ex officio, Foreign Secretary,

National Academy of Sciences, Washington D.C.

Committee Staff

JO L.HUSBANDS, Director

DAVID HAFEMEISTER, Staff Officer

PATRICIA STEIN WRIGHTSON, Staff Officer

EILEEN CHOFFNES, Staff Officer

CHRISTOPHER ELDRIDGE, Staff Officer

LA’FAYE LEWIS-OLIVER, Financial Associate

AMY GIAMIS, Program Assistant

*  

Until March 3, 2001.

**  

Until April 5, 2002.

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
×

PREFACE

Since the beginning of the nuclear era, the international community has debated proposals to reduce the risks posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and their proliferation. The environmental hazards of nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere, added to the dangers inherent in the nuclear arms competition, led to early initiatives designed to limit nuclear testing. In 1958 and 1959 groups of Soviet and American scientists met to discuss the technical issues raised by a potential ban on all nuclear tests. As a leading seismologist, Frank Press, my predecessor as President of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), was heavily engaged in the discussions within the U.S. scientific community over the desirability and technical feasibility of a comprehensive test ban, and he participated in the international dialogue. These issues have continued to engage U.S. scientists ever since.

The study that follows here resulted from a request to the NAS in April 2000 from General John Shalikashvili, (U.S. Army, ret.), then the Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). General Shalikashvili had been asked, after the U.S. Senate voted against providing its advice and consent to the ratification of the CTBT, to examine the major technical and political concerns that had led to the Senate’s rejection of the treaty and to explore a possible basis for its reconsideration. To support his efforts, General Shalikashvili commissioned several studies, including this one from the Academy, to address the major technical issues that had arisen during the Senate debate.

The Academy study was not asked to provide an overall “net assessment” of whether the CTBT is in the national security interest of the United States, and it did not do so. Its mandate was confined, rather, to a specified set of important technical questions that, along with political questions and other technical ones we were not asked to address, are relevant to this larger issue.

The formal U.S. government sponsor of the NAS study was the Department of State, with funding provided by the Department of Energy. Additional support for the study was provided by the John D. and Catherine T.MacArthur Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and internal funds of The National Academies.

To organize the study, the NAS turned to its standing Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), which was created in 1980 to bring the scientific and technical resources of the NAS to bear on critical security issues. CISAC conducts policy studies and carries out a program of private, off-the-record dialogues with counterpart groups in Russia, China, and India. CISAC worked with the NAS leadership and government sponsors to define the scope of the study. The committee that I appointed to carry out the study—the Committee on Technical Issues Related to Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (the CTBT Committee) contains a number of CISAC members, including CISAC chair John P.Holdren (Teresa and John Heinz Professor of Environmental Policy, John F.Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University) and CISAC chair emeritus Wolfgang K.H.Panofsky (Professor and Director Emeritus, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center), but has operated independently from CISAC. The report was written by the CTBT Committee and reviewed through the usual Academy process (see the Acknowledgments); those members of CISAC not on the CTBT Committee did not review the report and are not responsible for its contents.

Page viii Cite
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
×

The CTBT committee began its work on July 1, 2000 and undertook a demanding schedule of briefings and meetings in order to be able to provide a meaningful progress report to General Shalikashivili before completion of his report to the President and Secretary of State in January 2001.1 The committee had extensive access to classified reports and material and held all but its first meeting at the classified level. After the committee signed off on its draft report in December 2000, the report then entered what became an extended process of multi-agency classification review, Academy peer review, and classification re-review after modifications made in response to the Academy review. This long process, which was finally completed in June 2002, was necessary to meet the combined requirements of classification rules and Academy rigor. Although it delayed the final report beyond what anyone had expected, in both the committee’s judgment and mine the findings remain both current and highly relevant to the current policy context.

Several members of The National Academies staff contributed significantly to the preparation and production of the report. CISAC’s staff director, Jo Husbands, served skillfully as the study director for the project. Another senior staff officer, David Hafemeister, provided important technical expertise and collegial support to the effort. Once the report emerged from final classification review, staff officer Christopher Eldridge managed the production of the report, working with the relevant National Academies staff and with program assistant Amy Giamis, who prepared the manuscript. Their collective efforts are much appreciated.

As already mentioned, the issues surrounding the CTBT have a long history and a voluminous literature. In carrying out its study, the committee benefited greatly from this substantial body of prior work, both from classified and open sources; not all these could be cited in the report. The Committee is profoundly grateful for the assistance of the many scholars and government analysts previously and currently engaged in aspects of CTBT issues. It asked me to recognize especially its fruitful interactions with the other studies undertaken for General Shalikashvili by JASON and by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

The CTBT committee was also fortunate to receive help from many parts of the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Intelligence Community. Staff members from these agencies—and the directors and staff members from the three DOE nuclear-weapon laboratories—were generous with their time in clarifying technical questions and ensuring that the committee had access to the most up-to-date information. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory hosted several of the committee’s meetings, providing a gracious and productive working environment that was much appreciated.

Last but not least, I would like to thank the members of the CTBT committee. I believe that their report provides an indispensable input to the wider, on-going discussion of nuclear-weapons testing in general, as well as to the U.S. position on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Bruce Alberts

President, National Academy of Sciences

1  

John M.Shalikashvili, Findings and Recommendations Concerning the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (Department of State, January 2001).

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
×

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the NRC’s Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this report: Sidney D. Drell, Stanford University; John R.Filson, U.S. Geological Survey; John S.Foster, TRW Inc.; William Happer, Princeton University; John L.Kammerdiener, Los Alamos National Laboratory (Retired); Steven E.Koonin, California Institute of Technology; Hans M.Mark, University of Texas, Austin; Michael M.May, Stanford University; James B. Schlesinger, MITRE Corporation; Charles H.Townes, University of California, Berkeley; Karl K.Turekian, Yale University; Larry D.Welch, Institute for Defense Analyses; Peter D.Zimmerman, U.S. Senate.

Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Sheila E.Widnall, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Gerald P. Dinneen, Honeywell Inc. (Retired). Appointed by the National Research Council, they were responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution.

The Committee on Technical Issues Related to the Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty operated under the auspices of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), a standing committee of the National Academy of Sciences. For purposes of administration, CISAC is part of the Policy and Global Affairs Division of the National Research Council.

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
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Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
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CONTENTS

 

 

Executive Summary

 

1

   

 • Confidence in the Nuclear-Weapon Stockpile and in Related Capabilities

 

1

   

 • Capabilities for Monitoring Nuclear Testing

 

5

   

 • Potential Impact of Foreign Testing on U.S. Security Interests and Concerns

 

7

 

 

Introduction

 

13

   

 • The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

 

14

   

 • U.S. Safeguards

 

16

Chapter 1:

 

Stockpile Stewardship Considerations: Safety and Reliability Under a CTBT

 

19

   

 • Nuclear Testing: Historical Perspective

 

20

   

 • Factors Influencing Safety and Reliability

 

22

   

 • Elements of an Effective Stewardship Program

 

27

   

 • Maintaining Nuclear Design Capabilities

 

32

   

 • Change-Control Discipline

 

32

   

 • Priorities in Stockpile Stewardship

 

33

   

 • Concluding Remarks

 

33

Chapter 2:

 

CTBT Monitoring Capability

 

35

   

 • General Aspects of All CTBT Monitoring Technologies

 

37

   

 • Monitoring Underground Nuclear Explosions

 

39

   

 • Radionuclide Releases From Underground Explosions

 

45

   

 • Monitoring Against Underground Evasion Scenarios

 

46

   

 • Methods For Improving Seismic Monitoring Capability

 

49

   

 • Monitoring Underwater Nuclear Explosions

 

51

   

 • Monitoring Nuclear Explosions in the Atmosphere

 

52

   

 • Monitoring Nuclear Explosions in Space

 

53

   

 • The Role of Confidence-Building Measures and On-Site Inspections

 

55

   

 • Research and Development in Support of CTBT Monitoring

 

56

   

 • Conclusions on CTBT Monitoring Capability

 

57

Chapter 3:

 

Potential Impact of Clandestine Foreign Testing: U.S. Security Interests and Concerns

 

61

   

 • Two Reference Cases: No CTBT and the CTBT Strictly Observed

 

63

   

 • Evasive Testing Under A CTBT

 

67

   

 • Assessment of the Impact on U.S. Security Interests Of Nuclear Weapons Tests of Selected Countries

 

70

   

 • Summary of Potential Effects of Clandestine Foreign Testing

 

77

Appendix A:

 

Biographical Sketches of Committee Members

 

79

Appendix B:

 

List of Committee Meetings and Briefings

 

83

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
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Drawing upon the considerable existing body of technical material related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the National Academy of Sciences reviewed and assessed the key technical issues that arose during the Senate debate over treaty ratification. In particular, these include: (1) the capacity of the United States to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of its nuclear stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing; (2) the nuclear-test detection capabilities of the international monitoring system (with and without augmentation by national systems and instrumentation in use for scientific purposes, and taking into account the possibilities for decoupling nuclear explosions from surrounding geologic media); and (3) the additions to their nuclear-weapons capabilities that other countries could achieve through nuclear testing at yield levels that might escape detection, and the effect of such additions on the security of the United States.

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