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Suggested Citation:"Color Plates." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
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Figure 2–1 A global map showing five networks of IMS stations, which use the technologies of seismology, infrasound, hydroacoustics, and radionuclides. Data from all these stations are telemetered to the IDC in Vienna. Certified laboratories at 16 locations, not shown, contribute to the analysis of radionuclide data. (Figure courtesy of W.Y.Kim.)

Suggested Citation:"Color Plates." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
×

Figure 2–2 Contours of seismic magnitude for which signals would be expected (with signal-to-noise amplitude ratio greater than 3.2, i.e. 10 dB) at three or more stations of the IMS primary seismic network (solid squares), from 90 percent of the events at the contoured magnitude or larger. The contour interval is 0.25 magnitude units. The detection threshold for Europe, Asia, North America, and North Africa is in the magnitude range 3.5 to 3 or lower. (Figure provided by the Center for Monitoring Research)

Suggested Citation:"Color Plates." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
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Figure 2–3 Contours of approximate yield for tamped explosions, for which detections can be expected at three IMS primary stations (solid squares). These contours are the same as those of Figure 2–2, but with an expanded view of Europe, Asia and North Africa, and using the approximate yields of Table 2–2 (expressed now in tons rather than kilotons) to interpret seismic magnitudes.

Suggested Citation:"Color Plates." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
×

Figure 2–4 Projected 90 percent probable two-station detection thresholds for underwater explosions expressed in kilograms for the IMS network of 11 hydroacoustic stations. (Source: Center for Monitoring Research).

Suggested Citation:"Color Plates." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
×

Figure 2–5 Projected 90 percent probable two-station detection thresholds for atmospheric explosions expressed in kilotons for the planned IMS network of 60 infrasound stations. (Source: Center for Monitoring Research.)

Suggested Citation:"Color Plates." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
×

Figure 2–6 Probability of one-station detection of a 1-kiloton atmospheric nuclear explosion within five days by the planned 80-station IMS radionuclide network. (Figure provided by the Center for Monitoring Research.)

Suggested Citation:"Color Plates." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
×

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Suggested Citation:"Color Plates." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
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Suggested Citation:"Color Plates." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
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Suggested Citation:"Color Plates." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
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Suggested Citation:"Color Plates." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
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Suggested Citation:"Color Plates." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
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Suggested Citation:"Color Plates." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
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Page 89
Suggested Citation:"Color Plates." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
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Page 90
Suggested Citation:"Color Plates." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
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Suggested Citation:"Color Plates." National Academy of Sciences. 2002. Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10471.
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Drawing upon the considerable existing body of technical material related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the National Academy of Sciences reviewed and assessed the key technical issues that arose during the Senate debate over treaty ratification. In particular, these include: (1) the capacity of the United States to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of its nuclear stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing; (2) the nuclear-test detection capabilities of the international monitoring system (with and without augmentation by national systems and instrumentation in use for scientific purposes, and taking into account the possibilities for decoupling nuclear explosions from surrounding geologic media); and (3) the additions to their nuclear-weapons capabilities that other countries could achieve through nuclear testing at yield levels that might escape detection, and the effect of such additions on the security of the United States.

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