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SCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS, AND TRACK-TWO DIPLOMACY A Half-Century of U.S.-Russian Interacademy Cooperation Glenn E. Schweitzer Development, Security, and Cooperation The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent an official policy of the National Academies. THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS Washington, D.C. www.nap.edu
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001 NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. This study was supported by the National Research Council. International Standard Book Number 0-309-09093-8 (Book) International Standard Book Number 0-309-52799-6 (PDF) A limited number of copies of this report are available from: Development, Security, and Cooperation National Research Council KECK 547 500 Fifth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 Additional copies of this report are available from the National Academies Press, 500 Fifth Street, N.W., Lockbox 285, Washington, DC 20055; (800) 624-6242 or (202) 334-3313 (in the Washington metropolitan area); Internet, http://www.nap.edu Copyright 2004 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America
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Preface track-two diplomacy n (2003): a term referring to the use of unofficial channels to facilitate negotiations between governments, to promote international engagement without arousing hostility, or to build confidence among elites across international boundaries.1 For several centuries, both the United States and Russia have relied on scientific prowess to help promote the social and economic well-being of their populations, albeit in very different ways. At the same time, military science and technology have been crucial in meeting security challenges to the governments of these countries, from civil wars and from abroad, in- cluding the cold war challenges from one another. During this long period, the governments of the two countries (includ- ing the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) have reached out to acquire technical expertise from abroad to complement home-grown scientific capacity. Thus, it is not surprising that achievements in one country have frequently spread to the other through direct and indirect routes, in- cluding exchanges of scientists and students, international trade in high-tech services and products, joint projects sponsored by the two governments, and espionage efforts targeting military and industrial secrets. 1 The many definitions of track-two diplomacy all emphasize unofficial channels and highlight advocacy for peace. This definition, devised by the author, is based on the defini- tions of diplomacy and elites in Merriam-Websterâs Collegiate Dictionary, 11th ed. (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster Inc., 2003). v
vi PREFACE Whatever the past motivations for the bilateral technical contacts of government officials in Washington and in Moscow as well as of specialists at the hundreds of hubs of scientific and technical activities in the two countries, the interests on both sides in staying abreast of the technical achievements of former adversaries remain high. Although Western interest in using Russian technology for space exploration and other cutting-edge endeavors has lessened significantly during the past decade, Russia as a market for Western technologies, Russia as a birthplace of dual-use tech- nologies that might be used irresponsibly by unreliable states, and Russia as an incubator of basic science and new ideas remain of considerable global interest. All the while, Russian specialists continue to look to the United States as the home of many of the worldâs best technologies, which seem to be essential ingredients of future Russian products if those products are to compete in the global marketplace. In the research arena, Russian special- ists know they must keep abreast of achievements in the United States if they are to be meaningful participants in international discussions of mod- ern science. During the second half of the twentieth century, a formally organized program of scientific cooperation between the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the Soviet Academy of Sciences (ASUSSR), and more recently the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), was a major factor in encouraging and facilitating direct cooperation between hundreds of labo- ratories and thousands of specialists in both Russia and the United States. The academies have organized and managed bilateral programs and con- vened bilateral and multilateral meetings in the two countries on a wide array of technical and policy topics. In addition, some bilateral pilot pro- grams initiated by the academies have stimulated other organizations to follow with expanded cooperative efforts patterned after the pilot programs. The academies have provided advice to their respective governments, both in reports and in face-to-face meetings with government leaders, and they have often influenced government officials to look favorably at the advan- tages of scientific engagement over scientific confrontation. During the 1960s, unprecedented access to Russian specialists, facili- ties, and data banks was a major motivation for the U.S. government to provide support for the interacademy program. Soon, the acquisition from Russian institutions of technical concepts and information of considerable importance to U.S. scientific endeavorsâan effort that built on the newly acquired accessâbecame the primary rationale for continued support. Then, as the Russian economy crumbled, humanitarian concerns and the
PREFACE vii need to preserve Russian schools of science also became drivers of the coop- erative program in Washington. Although the cooperative programs developed by the National Acad- emies and the Russian Academy of Sciences have the longest history of any U.S.-Russian (including U.S.-Soviet) cooperative programs in science and technology, they have been but a small component of the collaboration of American and Russian scientists and engineers. For example, in the 1960s the Soviet government invited thousands of American scientists to partici- pate in a series of international conferences in Moscow and then to visit research centers in other cities. In the 1970s, the U.S. government took the initiative to establish 11 intergovernmental science and technology agree- ments, and the National Academy of Sciences played a leading role in only the physics subagreement. Also during the 1970s, U.S.-Russian coopera- tion in manned space flight increased spectacularly and has continued ever since. By the late 1990s, the U.S. Department of Energy and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy had entered into a dozen agreements involving nuclear science and technology, and the U.S. Civilian Research and Devel- opment Foundation had come into being with science-oriented programs in Russia that in financial terms and number of participants exceeded the programs of the National Academies severalfold. All the while, the Interna- tional Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) has for several decades mobi- lized the U.S. social science community to become engaged in Russia in a major way on a continuing basis as contrasted with the occasional social scientists traveling across the ocean under the auspices of the National Acad- emies. This report does not address these and many other related organized and informal activities, but their contributions to building bridges for sci- ence and for peace have been manifold. From the Russian perspective, as noted earlier, easier access to U.S. technical achievements has always been a big inducement to Russian par- ticipation in scientific exchanges and related activities. Since the 1960s, Russian scientists have been eager to gain international recognition for their capabilities, and the interacademy channel provides a prestigious route to this end. In the present economic environment, Russian specialists have been forced to search the globe for any source of financial support to sus- tain their efforts. The interacademy exchanges help them to establish con- tacts that sometimes lead to new sources of financing. Over the decades, the differences in the structures and roles of the National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences (as well as the Soviet Academy of Sciences) have caused both confusion and difficulties in
viii PREFACE organizing cooperative activities. The academies in both countries are hon- orific organizations. However, the National Academies, with no research facilities to manage, have traditionally emphasized studies that provide ad- vice to the U.S. government on issues that have significant science, engi- neering, and health dimensions. The RAS has always been primarily con- cerned with fundamental science investigations carried out at more than 400 research institutes. In years past, when American participants in cooperative projects ex- pressed interest in working with colleagues outside the academy system, the ASUSSR lost enthusiasm in the projects. At the same time, the ASUSSR had difficulty understanding why the NAS could not simply order Ameri- can scientists to participate in joint endeavors. In recent years, exchanges have been organized primarily on a scientist-to-scientist basis, thereby alle- viating most of the problems surrounding where the scientists work. Also in earlier times, the Soviet and Russian academies of sciences showed limited interest in cooperation in policy studies. However, during the past few years the RAS has increased its advisory role to government, preparing many dozens of policy documents for government consideration each year. And it has significantly expanded its applied research activities, which often become entwined with science policy issues. At the same time, the RAS has increasingly reached out to involve specialists from other orga- nizations in its international policy-oriented activities. Thus today, the asymmetry in structures and roles of the academies is far less of an impedi- ment to effective cooperation than in the past. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS REPORT Against this background, the purpose of this report is threefold: 1. To provide a brief historical perspective of the evolution of the interacademy program during the past half-century, recognizing that many legacies of the Soviet era continue to influence government approaches in Moscow and Washington and to shape the attitudes of researchers toward bilateral cooperation in both countries. Of special interest is the changing character of the program during the age of perestroika (restructuring) in the late 1980s in the Soviet Union. 2. To describe in some detail the significant interacademy activities from late 1991, when the Soviet Union fragmented, to mid-2003. In some instances, the report provides insights into the unusual circumstances that have stimu-
PREFACE ix lated program initiatives and into the well-established reasons for promoting international science in the age of globalization. Some of the interacademy activities should be of continuing interest both to government officials and to scientists and engineers in the two countries, because related programs are cur- rently being implemented through other channels with support of the two governments, private foundations, and individual laboratories. 3. To set forth lessons learned about the benefits and limitations of interacademy cooperation and to highlight approaches that have been suc- cessful in overcoming difficulties of implementation. These insights should help policy makers both in understanding how scientific cooperation has achieved a special, and seemingly permanent, status in U.S.-Russian rela- tions and in designing future bilateral programs of the academies and other organizations. This report focuses primarily on the activities organized on the U.S. side by the National Academy of Sciences and implemented by the Na- tional Research Council (NRC). Recently, the National Academy of Engi- neering (NAE) and the Institute of Medicine (IOM) have become more involved in cooperative activities with Russian counterparts, and the im- portance of this trend for the future is recognized.2 On the Russian side, most of the projects have involved the active participation of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Even on those occasions that the principal Russian partner has been another organization such as the Ministry of Atomic En- ergy or the Ministry of Health, the staff of the RAS has provided valuable support for the projects. This report does not describe the activities of the Russian and U.S. Committees on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), an interacademy effort that dates back to 1982. These committees have held 30 bilateral meetings, and their activities have been so extensive as to war- rant a separate report. At the same time, the complementary nature of the CISAC activities to the programs discussed in this report has been clear for many yearsâparticularly in carrying out track-two diplomacy when inter- governmental diplomatic efforts on sensitive issues such as nuclear con- frontation have been at a low ebb. Thousands of books and scholarly articles have been written about the changes to the environment in Russia that surrounds cooperative programs. 2 The National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, and National Research Council are known collectively as the National Academies.
x PREFACE A limited number have addressed the evolution of the Russian scientific establishment (Medvedev, 1978; Holloway, 1983; Vucinich, 1984; Balzer, 1989; Sakharov, 1990; Graham, 1993; Sagdeev, 1994; Marchuk, 1995; Gokhberg, 1997; Josephson, 1997). Only a handful has focused specifi- cally on U.S.-Russian cooperation in science and technology, and some of these works are cited in this report. The single previous report that targeted exclusively interacademy cooperationâthe Kaysen report published in 1977âis discussed in Chapter 2. Much of the information set forth in this report is not available else- where. The National Academies Press (NAP) has published reports describ- ing specific projectsâperhaps the findings of 20 percent of the projects noted in this report are presented in more detail in reports published by NAP. And a few NAS and NRC press releases, newsletters of the Office of Central Europe and Eurasia, internal project documents, and web postings are in principle available for public scrutiny. Yet it is not easy for govern- ment officials or scholars, let alone the general public, to identify the spe- cific documents that would be of interest. The RAS has very limited infor- mation readily available on the interacademy program.3 Only by directly participating in projects or interviewing the staff and participants who have been involved in projects is it possible for one to gain more than a superficial impression of the interacademy effort over many years, or even during the past decade. Unfortunately, because of budget limitations an earlier comprehensive review of past accomplishments and past difficulties was not possible. In the 1980s, limited summaries of pro- gram activities were presented to the U.S. Congress. The handful of more detailed reviews that have been conducted have usually been tied to re- newal of contracts with federal agencies or applications for supplementary grants from private foundation, and thus they have been quite narrow in scope and buried in internal budget documents. This report, prepared with the support of private funds of the National Research Council, is intended to help fill the âevaluationâ void common to many organizations absorbed in promoting action programs with near-term results. Another aspect of this report that should be of interest is the inclusion in the text and the appendixes of extracts from several documents prepared by the RAS and the Russian government that relate directly to the objec- 3 Usually the scientific secretary of the RAS includes in his annual report comments on interacademy activities. Summaries of his report are published each year in the journal of the RAS, Vestnik.
PREFACE xi tives of interacademy cooperation. Dozens of Russian government decrees, strategy documents, and reports on the role of international cooperation in supporting Russian economic, social, and security goals, as well as refer- ences to some of the most important documents, also can be found in publications cited in this report. Many American participants in interacademy programs, as well as in cooperative activities sponsored by other organizations, have been advo- cates of implanting in Russia elements of the U.S. model for the organiza- tion, management, and funding of science and technology. Certain con- cepts such as peer review, special tax considerations for nongovernmental organizations, and support for small, innovative businesses have begun to take root in Russia. However, there are many uncertainties about whether other elements of the U.S. model are appropriate for Russia, including, for example, establishment of a large number of research universities, wide- spread commercialization of university research, or support of only a lim- ited number of research centers not aligned with universities. The purpose of this report is clearly not to join the debates on such important issues. They will undoubtedly continue to be the subject of discussion when lead- ers of Russian and U.S. science and technology meet under governmental, academy, or other auspices. And they will be discussed at meetings involv- ing the leaders of France, Germany, Japan, and other countries that have their own models. In the end, Russia must develop Russian models, and international cooperation can only assist in identifying options that might be considered. Finally, for the past several decades the Soviet and then the Russian systems of political governance and the frameworks for economic and so- cial development have been undergoing dramatic changes, while domestic U.S. policies have been evolving much more slowly. Thus, in this report the background discussions of domestic developments that influence coopera- tion focus largely on changes in the Soviet Union and Russia and offer little information about the relatively stable situation in the United States. The foreign policies of both countries have undergone radical transformations, however, and these policies are treated in a more equitable manner.4 4 For discussions of linkages between science and foreign policy, see, for example, Joyce (1982), Woodrow Wilson Center and Smithsonian Institution (1984), and Schweitzer (1988).
Acknowledgments This report reflects the efforts of the thousands of American and Rus- sian officials, scientists, and engineers who have been involved in scientific engagement between two of the worldâs largest countries. Some of these participants have been members of the academies of the two countries, others have been junior researchers who were destined to become mem- bers, but most have been less well-known specialists with strong technical capabilities essential for the efficient functioning of the science and tech- nology infrastructures of the two countries. Dozens of administrative per- sonnel also have provided essential support in organizing the details of ac- tivities of the participating specialists. Deserving special recognition are the officers of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and the Russian Academy of Sciences, who, since the late 1950s, have consistently sup- ported bilateral engagement and have included bilateral cooperation among the high priorities of their academies. In recent years, the presidents of the National Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine have joined in this support. Also singled out for special appreciation are the leadership and staff of the National Science Foundation, which has provided financial support for scientific exchanges for almost a half-century. Moreover, dozens of other government agencies in the two countries have provided both fi- nancial and logistical support for interacademy programs, and private foun- dations have provided substantial financial contributions as well. The following U.S. government departments and agencies, private or- ganizations, and individuals (listed in order of magnitude of support) have xiii
xiv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS served as the principal funders for the National Academies in their coopera- tion with counterpart organizations in the Soviet Union and then Russia: National Science Foundation, National Research Council, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Department of Defense, Agency for International Development, Department of Energy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Department of State, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Nuclear Threat Initiative, The Rutter Foundation, Environmen- tal Protection Agency, The Russell Family Foundation, National Institutes of Health, Trust for Mutual Understanding, Rockefeller Family and Associ- ates, and Office of Science and Technology Policy. Having helped to guide the interacademy program for 16 years, I have been in a unique position to witness the details of the formulation and implementation of cooperative efforts, and I take full responsibility for the content of this report. At the same time, many current and former mem- bers of the staff of the National Research Council and the RAS have pro- vided substantial information that I have used here. Indeed, these staffers have served as the backbone of the program and deserve special credit for sustaining an ambitious and productive array of activities over many years. I wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this re- port: Kennette Benedict, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Founda- tion; Loren Graham, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Inta Morris, U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation for the Indepen- dent States of the Former Soviet Union; Victor Rabinowitch (retired), John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation; Gerson Sher, U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union; and Alvin Trivelpiece (retired), Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Although the reviewers listed have provided many constructive com- ments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the reportâs conclu- sions or recommendations, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. I am also indebted to consulting editor Sabra Bissette Ledent for her assistance in transforming a hastily assembled and often confusing document into a coherent and readable manuscript. As noted, responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the author.
Contents About the Author xviii 1 U.S.-Soviet Scientific Cooperation in the Age of Confrontation 1 Technology Transfer and National Security, 6 International Security and Arms Control, 8 Dissidents, Refuseniks, and the Exile of Andrey Sakharov, 9 Reviewing the Early Record, 11 2 Perestroika and Expansion of Scientific Cooperation 15 The Wider Program, 17 Reflections on the Expansion of Cooperation, 26 3 Emergence of the New Russia: High Expectations, Harsh Realities, and the Path Ahead 30 Weathering the Economic Crisis, 34 Saving Russian Science, 35 Reorienting the Interacademy Exchange Program, 38 4 National Security Issues and a Wider Agenda for Cooperation 41 Protecting Nuclear Material, 43 xv
xvi CONTENTS Controlling Exports of Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials, 46 The Wayward Weaponeers, 49 Redirecting Russian Biological Expertise from Military to Civilian Pursuits, 50 Counterterrorism on Center Stage, 55 Disposition of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Nuclear Waste, 58 Insights from Interacademy Consideration of Security Issues, 61 5 Supporting Innovation: From Basic Research to Payment for Sales 63 Individual Exchange Programs, 66 Three Short-Lived Programs and One New Start, 66 The Fifth Program: COBASE Continues Support of Basic Science, 68 Commercialization of Technology, 70 Improving Ethnic Relations in Russia, 74 Role of Russian Universities, 77 Global Environmental Problems, 77 Cooperation on Nonsecurity Issues: Lessons Learned, 79 6 Lessons Learned and the Future of the Interacademy Program 81 The View from Washington, 84 Insights from the Interacademy Program, 85 Learning from Reviews of Past Cooperative Activities, 85 Cooperating on Important Topics Not Adequately Addressed in Moscow and Washington, 87 Documenting Conclusions from Interacademy Projects, 88 Engaging the Leaders of the Academies in Cooperative Activities, 89 Encouraging Russian âBuy-inâ for Concepts Developed Abroad, 89
CONTENTS xvii Emphasizing the Sustainability of Short-Term Projects, 91 Adopting Modest Goals for Interacademy Projects, 91 Interacademy Cooperation in the Years Ahead, 92 Epilogue 96 Appendixes A Highlights of Early U.S.-Soviet Scientific Relations (1725â1957), 101 B Agreement on the Exchange of Scientists between the National Academy of Sciences of the USA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1959), 104 C Agreement on Cooperation in Science, Engineering, and Health between the U.S. National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences (2002), 114 D Agreement for Scientific Cooperation between the Institute of Medicine of the USA and the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR (1988), 117 E Joint Statement by the Presidents of the U.S. National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences [on Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Material], February 2, 2002, 122 F Annex 2 to the Agreement on Cooperation in Science, Engineering, and Medicine between the Russian Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Academies (2002), 125 G Joint Statement by the Presidents of the U.S. National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences [on the Development of Knowledge-Based Economies], February 2, 2002, 127 H Cooperation Between U.S. and Russian Academies Encour- ages Russian Investments in Innovative Research, 129
xviii CONTENTS I Innovation in the Russian Federation (2001), 131 J Personnel Trends in the Russian Academy of Sciences, 133 K Innovation Projects of National Significance, 135 L The Threats to Russia (View of the Ministry for Emergency Situations), 137 References 139
About the Author Glenn E. Schweitzer has served as director of the Office for Central Europe and Eurasia (previously named the Office for Soviet and East European Affairs) of the National Research Council since 1985. From 1992 to 1994, he was on a leave of absence to serve as chairman of the Intergovernmental Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the International Science and Tech- nology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and then as the first executive director of ISTC, which was established by the governments of the United States, Eu- ropean Union, Japan, and Russian Federation. Since 1989 he has written six books on U.S.âRussian scientific cooperation, the proliferation of weap- ons of mass destruction, and high-impact terrorism. xix