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Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework (2005)

Chapter: Appendix F: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members

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Suggested Citation:"Appendix F: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
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Appendix F
Biographical Sketches of Committee Members

Kenneth Berns, University of Florida, Chair

Kenneth Berns is Director of the Genetics Institute and Professor of Molecular Genetics and Microbiology at University of Florida (UF). He is a former Vice President for Health Affairs and Dean of the College of Medicine at University of Florida. Dr. Berns has served as president and chief executive officer at Mount Sinai Medical Center, CEO at Mount Sinai Hospital, and CEO of the Mount Sinai School of Medicine in New York. He holds both a medical degree and a doctorate in biology from The Johns Hopkins University. He, along with eminent scholar Nicholas Muzyczka, won international recognition for work they performed at UF in the early 1980s when they modified the adeno-associated virus, or AAV, for use as a vector for carrying corrective genes. He is an American Association for the Advancement of Science Fellow and he has received the Distinguished Service Award from National Board of Medical Examiners. He served as President of American Society for Microbiology in 1996-97. He has also served on numerous NRC committees, including the Committee on Assessment of Future Needs for Variola (Smallpox) Virus. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Medicine.


Ronald M. Atlas, University of Louisville

Ronald M. Atlas is Professor of Biology and graduate dean at the University of Louisville. He received a B.S. from the State University of New York at Stony Brook and an M.S. and a Ph.D. from Rutgers University. After one year as a National Research Council Research Associate at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory he joined the faculty of the University of Louisville in 1973. He is a member of

Suggested Citation:"Appendix F: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

the American Academy of Microbiology and was the recipient of the American Society for Microbiology award in Applied and Environmental Sciences. He recently served as president of the American Society of Microbiology. His recent studies have focused on the application of molecular techniques to environmental problems. His studies have included the development of “suicide vectors” for the containment of genetically engineered microorganisms and the use of gene probes and the polymerase chain reaction for environmental monitoring, including the detection of pathogens and indicator bacteria for water quality monitoring. He was a member of the NRC committee that recently released the report “Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism.”


Manuel S. Barbeito, Independent Consultant

Manuel S. Barbeito is an independent Biosafety Consultant, Registered Microbiologist, and Certified Biological Safety Professional. He received his B.S. in microbiology from Pennsylvania State University and took postgraduate courses at University of Maryland and New York University. He worked with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Postal Service, and Consolidated Safety Services for the U.S. State Department on the decontamination of facilities and equipment contaminated with Bacillus anthracis. In 1996, he retired as Biological Safety Officer from USDA-Agriculture Research Services as the Biological Safety Officer where he served as the agency’s technical expert for construction and use of containment facilities and for decontamination and sterilization of laboratories and materials. He worked as microbiologist in the Agent Control Division at Fort Detrick from 1956 to 1972 in the biological, chemical, and industrial safety program for personnel handling pathogenic microorganisms and biological toxins. From 1969 to 1972 he worked with colleagues on the decontamination of Fort Detrick containment facilities following their extensive use with numerous pathogenic organisms and toxins.


Jacqueline Cattani, University of South Florida

Jacqueline Cattani is Professor of Occupational and Environmental Health and Director of the Center for Biological Defense in the College of Public Health at University of South Florida (USF). She received her Master’s Degree in Economics from the University of California, Santa Barbara, and her MPH and Ph.D. in epidemiology from the University of California, Berkeley. Prior to joining USF, she served as epidemiologist/scientist for the UNDP/World Bank/WHO Special Programme on Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR) at the World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland, as a faculty member in the Department of Tropical Public Health at the Harvard School of Public Health, and as malaria epidemiologist at the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Institute of Medical Research in Madang, PNG. Her current research is on dual-use disease surveillance for bioterrorism and other public health emergencies, the design, development, and evaluation of educational and training materials on biodefense for

Suggested Citation:"Appendix F: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

first responders, and management of research on a broad spectrum of technologies with applications to rapid recognition and response to potential bioterrorist events.


Lee Clarke, Rutgers University

Lee Clarke, Ph.D.., is Associate Professor in sociology at Rutgers University. Clarke writes about organizations, risk communications, culture, and disasters. His early work concerned how decision makers choose among risks in highly uncertain environments. Publications include: Acceptable Risk? Making Decisions in a Toxic Environment, University of California Press; Organizations, Uncertainties, and Risk, edited by James F. Short, Jr. and Lee Clarke, Boulder: Westview Press; “Explaining Choices Among Technological Risks,” Social Problems; “Oil Spill Fantasies,” Atlantic Monthly; “Sociological and Economic Theories of Markets and Nonprofits,” American Journal of Sociology, “The Disqualification Heuristic: When Do Organizations Misperceive Risk?” Research in Social Problems and Public Policy, “Prosaic Organizational Failure,” American Behavioral Scientist, The Myth of Panic, Contexts. Clarke’s most recent edited book is a hard-bound issue of Research in Social Problems and Public Policy, Terrorism, and Disaster: New Threats, New Ideas, Elsevier Press. His most recent book is Worst Cases: Inquiries into Terror, Calamity, and Imagination, to be published by University of Chicago Press, fall 2005. Clarke has written, and frequently lectures about, organizational failures, leadership, terrorism, panic, civil defense, evacuation, community response to disaster, organizational failure, and the World Trade Center disaster. He has also worked with the U.S. Department of Energy in fashioning a research agenda for problems of long-term stewardship of contaminated properties. Clarke’s work was featured in the New York Times in May 2003 and the Harvard Business Review in June, 2004. Lee Clarke exists virtually at http://leeclarke.com.


Christopher J. Davis, CUBRC, Inc.

Christopher J. Davis is the Chief Scientist and Director of Biomedical Research at CUBRC, Inc. and President of Intuitive Intelligence International, a management consulting company providing risk assessment, mitigation and consequence management, policy analysis, technology acquisition strategy and R&D investment advice, and market and business development strategy and advocacy. He received his M.D. from University of London, King’s College Hospital Medical School and his Ph.D. in Neuropharmacology from University of Oxford. Christopher Davis is a recognized international authority on biological warfare and biodefense issues. He has 17 years experience in military medicine as a specialist in nuclear, biological, and chemical defense, and retired from the Royal Navy as a senior Surgeon Commander in 1996. As a member of the Defense Intelligence Staff for 10 years he was directly responsible for the collation, analysis and assessment of all global source intelligence on biological weapons and the medi-

Suggested Citation:"Appendix F: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

cal aspects of CB warfare and terrorism. He sits on the National Academy of Sciences Working Group on Biological Weapons and is a Professor in the Department of Molecular and Microbiology at George Mason University’s National Center fo Biodefense. He is also a member of the Board of Advisors of The Critical Decision Institute, Oregon. He was awarded the Order of the British Empire in 1992 for his contributions to international security and is a former Visiting Professor of Medicine at Johns Hopkins University’s Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies.


Patricia Fellows, DynPort Vaccine Company, LLC

Patricia Fellows is a manager of nonclinical research at Dynport Vaccine Company, LLC in Frederick, Maryland. She received her M.S. in Biomedical Science from Hood College in 1992. She has worked in the field of biomedical science for 16 years, in both government and private laboratories. Much of her research efforts and interests have focused on Bacillus anthracis. She has been involved in the development and testing of new anthrax vaccine candidates in a variety of animal models. She served as a member of an Integrated Project Team providing assistance to the manufacturer of the current licensed human anthrax vaccine with respect to the potency assay used to release lots of vaccine for human use. In her current capacity as manager of nonclinical research, she serves as a lead in the planning, development, and management of nonclinical studies in support of new vaccine candidates.


Charles N. Haas, Drexel University

Charles N. Haas is the Betz Chair Professor of Environmental Engineering at Drexel University. He was formerly a professor and acting chair in the Department of Environmental Engineering at the Illinois Institute of Technology. He received a B.S. in biology and an M.S. in environmental engineering from the Illinois Institute of Technology and a Ph.D. in environmental engineering from the University of Illinois. His research interests include bioterrorism—assessment of risks from exposures to deliberately released agents (e.g., anthrax) and engineering analysis and optimization of chemical decontamination schemes—drinking water treatment, and hazardous and industrial waste treatment. Dr. Haas has served on several NRC committees, including the Committee to Review the New York City Watershed Management Strategy, the Committee on Drinking Water Contaminants, and the Committee on Toxicants and Pathogens in Biosolids Applied to Land.


Thomas V. Inglesby, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center

Thomas V. Inglesby, M.D., chief operations officer of the Center for Biosecurity of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC), previously served as deputy director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, and as a faculty member at the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. Dr.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix F: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

Inglesby was a principal designer, author, and facilitator of the Dark Winter Exercise of June 2001. He is lead author of the article “A Plague on Your City: Observations from TOPOFF,” which appeared in Clinical Infectious Diseases in January 2001. Dr. Inglesby has acted as an advisor and consultant to federal and state agencies on issues related to bioterrorism preparedness. He is a member of the committee revising “The 1996 Olympic Clinical Treatment Protocols for Casualties Resulting from Terrorist Incidents Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Dr. Inglesby is a board-certified internist and infectious disease specialist. He received his B.A. from Georgetown University in 1988 and his M.D., at the Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons in 1992. He completed his internal medicine residency at the Johns Hopkins Hospital. In 1996-1997, he was an assistant chief of service in the department of medicine at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine. He completed specialty training in infectious diseases at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine.


Harvey W. Ko, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

Harvey W. Ko is the Chief Scientist at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (ARL) National Security Technology Department. He obtained a B.S. in electrical engineering and a Ph.D. in electrophysics from Drexel University in 1967 and 1973, respectively. Since joining APL in 1973, he has been active in chemical and biological defense, biomedical engineering, nonacoustic antisubmarine warfare, ocean electromagnetics, and radar propagation. He holds eight patents in biomedical engineering for various technology methods in biodetection, brain edema, osteoporosis, magnetoencephalography, and magnetic holography. His current research interests include prostate bioimpedance, low-frequency electromagnetic holography, chemical and biological detection, and immune building countermeasures. As manager of the counterterrorism and counterproliferation efforts, he is involved in the development of biological and chemical mass spectrometers and miniature affinity chromatography biosensor systems, the biological and chemical characterization of operating environments, the evaluation of biological neutralization methods, and the characterization of chemical and biological aerosols. He is a member of the IEEE and the Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation. He has had both functional line supervisory and programs management responsibility and has been a member of numerous government panels. He is also a guest lecturer in The Whiting School of Engineering and The Bloomberg School of Public Health.


R. Paul Schaudies, SAIC

Dr. Schaudies is Assistant Vice President and Division Manager of the Biological and Chemical Defense Division at SAIC. His division focuses in three major business areas, contract biomedical research, technology assessments, and scientific studies. He was key in establishing the levels for reentry into the Hart Building and is a nationally recognized expert in the fields of biological and

Suggested Citation:"Appendix F: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

chemical warfare defense. He has served on numerous national-level advisory panels for the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Department of Energy. He has 14 years bench research experience managing laboratories at Walter Reed, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, and as a Visiting Scientist position at the National Cancer Institute. He served for 13 years on active duty with the Army Medical Service Corps and separated from service at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel-select, and spent 4 years with the Defense Intelligence Agency as Collections Manager for Biological and Chemical defense technologies. As such, he initiated numerous intra-agency collaborations that resulted in accelerated product development in the area of biological warfare agent detection and identification.


Monica Schoch-Spana, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center

Dr. Schoch-Spana is a Senior Fellow with the Center for Biosecurity of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. She received her B.A. in anthropology from Bryn Mawr College, and Ph.D. in cultural anthropology from The Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Schoch-Spana has led research, education, and advocacy efforts to encourage within bioterrorism response policy and planning circles greater consideration of the general public’s capacity to confront bio attacks constructively—a realm she has termed “the people’s role in biodefense.” She has encouraged authorities to move beyond the prevailing assumption of a panic-prone public and plan proactively for a positive population response to public health crises. Dr. Schoch-Spana organized the 2003 national leadership summit, The Public as an Asset, Not a Problem. She currently chairs the multidisciplinary Working Group on “Governance Dilemmas,” a group charged with enhancing the ability of mayors, governors, and health authorities to reduce the socially disruptive quality of biological attacks and to safeguard the public’s trust and cooperation during the government’s response. She has served as a technical advisor to the Ad Council’s national campaign on emergency preparedness, in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security.


John D. Spengler, Harvard School of Public Health

John D. Spengler is the Akira Yamaguchi Professor of Environmental Health and Human Habitation in the Department of Environmental Health, at Harvard University’s School of Public Health. He received a B.S. in physics from the University of Notre Dame, an M.S. in environmental health sciences from Harvard University, and a Ph.D. in atmospheric sciences from the State University of New York, Albany. He has conducted research in the areas of personal monitoring, air pollution health effects, aerosol characterization, indoor air pollution, and air pollution meteorology. More recently, he has been involved in research that includes the integration of knowledge about indoor and outdoor air pollution as well as other risk factors into the design of housing, buildings, and communities. He uses the tools of life-cycle analysis and risk assessment and

Suggested Citation:"Appendix F: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

activity-based costing as indicators to measure the sustainable attributes of alternative designs, practices, and community development. He serves as advisor to the World Health Organization on indoor air pollution, personal exposure, and air pollution epidemiology, and he has served as either a member or consultant on various U.S. EPA Science Advisory Board committees.


James Tucci, K and J Consulting Services

James Tucci is President and Chief Engineer of K and J Consulting Services. He is a Senior Associate Instructor for the U.S. Department of Transportation, Transportation Safety Institute, and the Federal Transit Administration’s Office of Safety and Security, teaching transit system security and response to weapons of mass destruction. His expertise is concentrated in the areas of transit environmental regulatory compliance, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) compliance, transit system safety/security compliance audits and investigations, pro-ject management, alternative fuels incident investigation and facility inspections and system safety auditing. He is also under contract to the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a counterterrorism consultant for the transit industry and is assisting with security/ventilation design engineering for the East Side Access Project in New York City. He formerly worked for Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Department of Labor/OSHA, and Transit Safety/Security Division of the Transportation Safety Institute of the U.S. Department of Transportation. He received a B.S. in environmental engineering/environmental management from LaSalle, and an M.S. in analytical chemistry.


James Wilding, Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority

James Wilding retired as President of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA). He holds a degree in Civil Engineering from Catholic University in Washington. He spent his entire career at the two Washington airports, National and Dulles. He worked for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) from 1959 to 1987. He was Deputy Director in both National and Dulles Airport from 1974 to 1979 and became President and Chief Executive Officer in 1979. In 1987, he began working with MWAA, when it was formed to take over the two airports from FAA, until he retired in May 2003. He has served in a variety of industry, civic, business, and transportation organizations, including the Executive Committee of TRB.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix F: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page 204
Suggested Citation:"Appendix F: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page 205
Suggested Citation:"Appendix F: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page 206
Suggested Citation:"Appendix F: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page 207
Suggested Citation:"Appendix F: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page 208
Suggested Citation:"Appendix F: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page 209
Suggested Citation:"Appendix F: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
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The anthrax attacks in fall 2001 spurred an extensive and costly decontamination effort where many decisions had to be made about which sites required cleanup, what method to use, how to determine the effectiveness of the cleanup, and how "clean" the building had to be for reoccupation. As part of a project funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and managed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the National Research Council was asked to consider the criteria that must be met for a cleanup to be declared successful, allowing the reoccupation of a facility. The report finds that efficiently sampling and characterizing a pathogen is critical for choosing the best remediation strategy. However, there should be no universal standard for deciding when a building is safe to re-enter because varying pathogen amounts and characteristics could require different strategies. The report offers a flowchart for decision-makers that includes questions about the characteristics of the pathogen; how far it has spread; whether it is transmissible between humans; and how long it will survive to pose a threat. The report also recommends that a risk-assessment approach be adopted as part of a strategy for achieving a "socially acceptable" standard for cleanup.

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