National Academies Press: OpenBook

Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health (2006)

Chapter: Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry

« Previous: Appendix D: Commissioned Paper on US Seaports and the CDC Quarantine Station System
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

E
Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry

A Commissioned Paper

Prepared by

Nga L. Tran, Dr.P.H., M.P.H., C.I.H.

Jesse Berman, B.S.

Exponent, Inc.

April 7, 2005

INTRODUCTION

At the request of the Institute of Medicine, Exponent prepared this report describing the legal framework that established the inspection activities at U.S. ports of entry (POEs) and the roles and responsibilities of the various agencies involved in the inspection and prevention of public health threats posed by the importation of animals. In addition, day-to-day activities at port locations, communication procedures and protocols between personnel at Centers of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) quarantine stations and other U.S. port agencies, and readily available budget and capacity information are summarized. Issues and concerns that are potential barriers to successful protection of U.S. borders from diseases in animals are also highlighted. Finally, special considerations for animal issues in the expansion plan of CDC quarantine stations are discussed.

The main sources of information that were used to develop this paper were literature posted at agency websites—those of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), CDC, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—results of an informal survey of CDC personnel at quarantine stations, and telephone calls to the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) and state agriculture specialists. Names and affiliations of individuals interviewed for this report are listed in Appendix 1. Questions used in the informal survey are provided in Appendix 2.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INSPECTIONS AT U.S. PORTS OF ENTRY

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA, P.L. 107-296) establishes DHS and its directorates. More than 22 federal agencies were consolidated into the new department, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Customs Service, and components of APHIS that conduct inspection and animal quarantine activities at U.S. ports (APHIS, 2003). The HSA specified which laws DHS agricultural inspectors might use to conduct inspections but it did not alter these underlying statutes (CRS, 2004). In addition, the transfer of the inspection functions of INS and Customs Service to DHS did not affect the laws that authorize these inspections. The following sections describe the underlying statutes for various types of inspections at U.S. ports.

Agriculture Inspections

Agriculture inspectors play an integral part in USDA’s role in supplying a safe and affordable food supply. In part, APHIS was responsible for enforcing the laws that protect and promote U.S. agricultural health from agricultural pests and diseases by conducting inspections at various ports of entry. Under the HSA, APHIS import and entry inspection activities relating to the laws specified below were transferred to DHS. The under secretary for border and transportation security is now responsible for conducting agricultural inspections at ports of entry in accordance with the regulations, policies, and procedures issued by the secretary of agriculture for the following Acts (CRS, 2004):

  • The Virus-Serum-Toxin Act (21 U.S.C. §§151 et seq.).

  • The Honeybee Act (7 U.S.C. §§281 et seq.).

  • Title III of the Federal Seed Act (7 U.S.C. §§1581 et seq.).

  • The Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §§7701 et seq.).

  • The Animal Health Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §§8301 et seq.).

  • The Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 (16 U.S.C. §§3371 et seq.).

  • Section 11 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. §§1540).

In some cases, agriculture inspectors have the authority to conduct warrantless searches of any person or conveyance entering the country in furtherance of those laws. For instance, under the Plant Protection Act and the Animal Health Protection Act, agriculture inspectors have the authority to conduct warrantless searches of any person or vehicle entering the United States to determine whether the person is carrying any plant or animal in

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

violation of the statute (7 U.S.C. §7331 (b)(1) and 7 U.S.C. §8307 (b)(1)). Agriculture inspectors also have the authority under the Lacey Act to detain for inspection any vessel, vehicle, aircraft, package, crate, or other container on the arrival of such conveyance or container in the United States from any point outside the United States (16 U.S.C. §3375). The Endangered Species Act also allows agriculture inspectors to detain for inspection any package, crate, or other container and all accompanying documents on importation (16 U.S.C. §1540).

Immigration Inspections

The former INS was responsible for enforcing and administering the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§1101 et seq.). The HSA transferred administrative authority over immigration enforcement to the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security. According to DHS regulations, all authorities and functions of the DHS to administer and enforce the immigration laws are now vested in the secretary of DHS or his delegate (8 CFR §2.1).1 Immigration officials possess a wide variety of enforcement mechanisms to carry out their mission of enforcing the INA. Immigration enforcement activities generally include providing border security and management, conducting inspections of persons at U.S. international ports, enforcing immigration law, detaining and removing aliens found in violation of immigration and related laws, and providing immigration intelligence.

Customs Inspections

Formerly housed in the Department of the Treasury, customs inspectors enforced a number of laws to ensure all imports and exports comply with U.S. laws and regulations, collect and protect U.S. revenues, and guard against the smuggling of contraband. The HSA transferred generally all customs functions (except for certain revenue functions) to DHS in §403. Customs border activities are now conducted through the CBP and interior enforcement activities are carried out by Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers.

1  

8 CFR §2.1 states, “the Secretary, in his discretion, may delegate any such authority or function to any official, officer, or employee of the DHS or any employee of the United States to the extent authorized by law.” This regulation was authorized, in part, by §103 of the INA, which was amended by the HSA to charge the secretary of DHS with the administration and enforcement of the INA. There is still some question, however, as to the extent to which the attorney general has concurrent authority.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Public Health Inspection

The secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has statutory responsibility for preventing the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases in the United States. Under its delegated authority, the Division of Global Migration and Quarantine (DGMQ) fulfills this responsibility through a variety of activities, including:

  • Operation of quarantine stations at ports of entry.

  • Establishment of standards for medical examination of persons destined for the United States.

  • Administration of interstate and foreign quarantine regulations that govern the international and interstate movement of persons, animals, and cargo.

The legal foundation for these activities is found in Titles 8 and 42 of the U.S. Code and relevant supporting regulations. Interstate and foreign quarantine regulations (42 CFR70 and 71) authorize the secretary of the DHHS, through CDC, to develop and enforce regulations to prevent transmission of infectious disease from foreign countries into the United States. Under these authorities, CDC can set policy to embargo certain animals from entering the United States (DGMQ, 2004).

Title III of the Bioterrorism Act provides the secretary of DHHS with new authorities to protect the nation’s food supply. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act requires notification and controls on the movement of agents or toxins deemed to be a threat to animal or plant health and to animal and plant products. To prevent the incursions of adverse animal health events, APHIS units are working with DHHS to implement the provisions of this act (APHIS, 2004b).

Table E.1 provides a summary of agencies that are involved in the inspection of animals and animal products at U.S. ports aimed to protect animal or public health and their legal authorities.

AGENCIES AT U.S. PORTS OF ENTRY—ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Deterrence and prevention are the first lines of defense against the introduction of animal and plant pests and pathogens from foreign sources (Personal communication, J. Annelli, APHIS, April 7, 2004). Several strategies are involved in border strategy that focuses on interdicting a threat agent at U.S. POEs (NRC, 2003). For the past several years, there have been 317 official POEs into the United States. At a given port, inspectors may be responsible for more than one mode of transportation (air, land, and sea).

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

TABLE E.1 Legal Authorities for Inspections at U.S. Borders

Agency

Legal and Regulatory Foundation

Authorities

DHHS-CDC

Titles 8 and 42 of the U.S Code and relevant supporting regulations, such as Interstate Quarantine (42 CFR 70) and Foreign Quarantine (42 CFR 71).

Authorizes CDC National Center for Infectious Diseases, DGMQ to make and enforce regulations necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the United States.

 

The Foreign Quarantine regulation (42 CFR Part 71.54, Etiologic Agents, Hosts, and Vectors)

Governs the importation of hazardous materials (etiologic agents, vectors, and materials containing etiologic agents).

Importation into the United States must be accompanied by a U.S. Public Health Service importation permit.

CDC regulations govern the importation of dogs, cats, turtles, monkeys, other animals, and animal products capable of causing human disease.

Under these regulatory authorities, CDC has established an embargo on monkeys and other animals that could carry monkey pox virus, and birds from specified Southeast Asian countries.

DHHS-FDA

Title III of the Bioterrorism Act

Provides the DHHS secretary with new authorities to protect the nation’s food supply against the threat of intentional contamination and other food-related emergencies. The Food and Drug Administration expects up to 420,000 facilities to register under this requirement.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

Agency

Legal and Regulatory Foundation

Authorities

DHS

The Homeland Security Act of 2002

Establishes DHS and its directorates.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Subtitle A, Title IV, of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C 201 et seq.)

Establishes Border and Transportation Security (CBP resides in this directorate).

CBP is responsible for controlling all U.S. land, sea, and air borders; protects U.S. economic security by regulating and facilitating the lawful movement of goods and persons across U.S. borders.

Agricultural Quarantine Program (border inspection) (former APHIS).

APHIS

The Animal Industry Act of 1884 as amended (21 U.S.C. 117)

The Cattle Contagious Diseases The Act of 1903 as amended (21 U.S.C. 111-115, 117, 120, 123, 125-127, 134),

The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Subtitle E

Animal Health Protection Act (PL 107-171), 21 U.S.C. 114

The Animal Industry Act of 1988

The Virus-Serum-Toxin Act (21 U.S.C. §§151 et seq.)

The Honeybee Act (7 U.S.C. §§281 et seq.)

Title III of the Federal Seed Act (7 U.S.C. §§1581 et seq.)

The Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §§ 7701 et seq.)

Provides secretary of USDA broad authority and discretion to prevent, detect, control, and eradicate diseases of pests and animals and to promulgate regulations and take measures to prevent introduction and interstate dissemination of communicable diseases of livestock within the U.S.

Legal bases for APHIS monitoring and surveillance programs.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

 

The Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 (16 U.S.C. §§3371 et seq.)

Section 11 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. §§1540)

 

 

9 CFR, Part 53, amended in 1985 (21 U.S.C., Section 151 et seq.)

To respond to certain foreign animal diseases (FADs) and other communicable diseases of livestock or poultry and pay claims growing out of destruction of animals.

 

9 CFR subchapter B

To establish cooperative programs to control and eradicate communicable diseases of livestock.

 

The Foreign Service Act (1980) and Executive Order 12363 (1982)

APHIS International Services (IS) activities.

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services

Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 U.S.C. 668-668C)

Lacey Act (18 U.S.C. 703-712)

Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. 1531-1543)

Prohibits possession, purchase, or barter of migratory bird, feathers or other parts.

Prohibits importation, exportation, transportation, sale, or purchase of fish and wildlife in violation of state, federal, tribal, and foreign laws.

Prohibits the importation, exportation, taking, and commercialization in interstate or foreign commerce of fish, wildlife, and plants that are listed as threatened or endangered species.

Implements provisions of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).

 

SOURCES: Bush, 2002; Crawford, 2003; Creekmore, 2003; DGMQ, 2003b, 2004; Grannis, 2003; OMB, 2004b; OSH, 2004; USFWS, 2003.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

Buffalo and Detroit, for example, have air, sea, and land POEs. The likelihood of inspectors having multiple responsibilities is greater at the smaller POEs. CBP currently reports there are 216 airports that are international POEs, 143 seaports, and 115 land POEs. Two locations are inland POEs (CRS, 2004). The roles and responsibilities of the various agencies involved in the inspection and prevention of animals and animal products that could pose a public health threat by entering the United States are described below.

Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention (CDC)

The foreign quarantine regulation (42 CFR Part 71.54, Etiologic Agents, Hosts, and Vectors) governs the importation of hazardous materials (etiologic agents, vectors, and materials containing etiologic agents (OSH, 2004). CDC has established regulations that govern the importation of dogs, cats, turtles, monkeys, other animals, and animal products capable of causing human disease. Under these regulatory authorities, CDC has established an embargo on monkeys and other animals that could carry the monkeypox virus and on birds from specified Southeast Asian countries (DGMQ, 2004).

CDC officials are not present at the border on a day-to-day basis, but there are quarantine stations at the international airports in Atlanta, New York, Miami, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, and Honolulu. The quarantine operations involve coordination of numerous agencies, including (DGMQ, 2003a):

  • Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) and other parts of CDC.

  • State and local health departments.

  • CBP.

  • USDA.

  • U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.

  • The aircraft and maritime industry.

The CDC National Center for Infectious Diseases (NCID) DGMQ trains CBP inspectors to watch for ill persons and items of public health concern, and they work with state and local health officials in jurisdictions that may be affected under particular circumstances (CRS, 2004).

DHS Border and Transportation Security (BTS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

On November 21, 2002, President Bush signed legislation creating DHS to unify federal forces and protect the nation from a new host of

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

terrorist threats. Approximately 2,600 employees from the APHIS Agriculture Quarantine and Inspection (AQI) force became part of CBP on March 1, 2003 (APHIS, 2003). This network of veterinary inspectors and animal health inspectors at all U.S. POEs is the first line of defense in identifying materials entering the United States that may be introducing foreign animal diseases. DHS acquired USDA’s authority to inspect passenger declarations and cargo manifests, international passengers, baggage, cargo, and conveyances and to hold suspect items for quarantine to prevent the introduction of plant or animal diseases (GAO, 2005).

A summary of the programmatic elements and functions of CBP is provided in Table E.2.

APHIS Veterinary Services

Although DHS is now responsible for protecting the nation’s border and the border inspection function of APHIS has moved to DHS, APHIS retains a significant presence in border inspection activities. The nearly 1,300 AQI employees who were not transferred continue to conduct certain domestic inspection functions, such as monitoring entry to the mainland from Hawaii and Puerto Rico (CRS, 2004). Through risk assessment, pathway analysis, and rule making, APHIS continues to set agricultural policy, including specific quarantine, testing, and other conditions under which animals, animal products, and veterinary biologics can be imported. APHIS policy is then carried out by DHS (APHIS, 2003). At POEs, there are also APHIS Veterinary Services (VS) port veterinarians who inspect live animals at border ports and animals in quarantine until testing is completed. They are at 43 VS office areas and report to the veterinarian in charge of the VS area office (Personal communication, J. Annelli, APHIS, April 7, 2004). With agricultural border inspectors now being a part of DHS, VS has identified the need for developing new protocol for training and interacting with these inspectors and the need to work with DHS to implement improvements recommended in the Animal Health Safeguarding Review regarding exclusion activities in its strategic plan (APHIS, 2004b). To ensure that necessary agricultural inspections are conducted, APHIS negotiates memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with DHS.

The VS National Center for Import/Export works to facilitate international trade; monitors health of animals presented at borders; regulates import and export of animals, animal products, and biologics; and diagnoses foreign and domestic animal diseases. This center works in partnership with the Department of the Interior’s (DOI) Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), the APHIS Plant and Protection Quarantine, and CBP (APHIS, 2004a).

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

TABLE E.2 DHS, Border and Transportation Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and Components Addressing Animal Diseases

Agencies

Function

Border and Transportation Security (BTS)

The largest of the five DHS directorates.

Includes former U.S. Customs Service, border security function and enforcement division of INS, APHIS, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and the Transportation Security Administration.

Responsible for securing the nation’s air, land, and sea borders.

Responsible for securing the nation’s transportation systems and enforcing the nation’s immigration laws.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

March 1, 2003, approx. 42,000 employees were transferred from U.S. Customs Service, INS, and APHIS to the new CBP, a new agency under the BTS Directorate within DHS.

Approximately 2,700 former USDA employees from the AQI program and APHIS were transferred into DHS.

Former APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine personnel at POEs who were directly involved in terminal and plane inspections (100% time) were transferred to DHS; those with 60-70% time not doing inspection at terminals or planes were not transferred.

The agricultural import and entry inspection functions that were transferred include reviewing passenger declarations and cargo manifests to target high-risk agricultural passengers or cargo shipments.

The new CBP also carries out the traditional missions of the predecessor agencies making up CBP (seizing illegal drugs and other contraband at the U.S. border; apprehending people who attempt to enter the United States illegally; detecting counterfeit entry documents; determining the admissibility of people and goods; protecting our agricultural interests from harmful pests or diseases; regulating and facilitating international trade; collecting duties and fees; and enforcing all laws of the United States at our borders).

Office Field Operations (OFO)

Oversees over 25,000 employees at 20 office field operations (OFOs), 317 POEs, and 14 preclearance stations in Canada and the Caribbean.

Responsible for enforcing customs, immigration, and agriculture laws and regulations at U.S. borders.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

 

Manages core custom and border protection programs (i.e., border security and facilitation, interdiction and security, passenger operations, targeting analysis and canine enforcement, trade compliance and facilitation, trade risk management, enforcement, and seizures and penalties and examines trade operations to focus on antiterrorism.

Administers Agricultural Inspection Policy and Programs, AQI at all POEs to protect the health of U.S. plant and animal resources.

Administers immigrations policy programs.

Annual operating budget of $1.1 billion.

Each OFO is run by a director of field operations (DFO).

Associate Commissioner of Agricultural Inspection Policy and Programs

Policy adviser to the Office of the Commissioner on all agricultural issues.

CBP port director

On March 1, 2003, CBP designated one port director at each POE in charge of all federal inspection services, establishing a single, unified chain of command.

CBP agricultural specialist

Enforces USDA regulations and seizes any articles in violation of those regulations. Conducts prearrival risk analysis.

Examines cargo for quarantine disease and pests.

Collects and prepares pest and disease samples and submits to USDA.

Handles seizures, safeguarding, destruction, or reexportation of inadmissible cargo.

Negotiates compliance agreements with importers of regulated commodities.

Stationed only at POEs with large volumes of cargo and only to support the CBP officers.

As of 10/4/2003, there were 1,471 full-time permanent agricultural inspectors on-board.

New CBP officers will be trained at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, GA, and agricultural specialists will continue to learn their trade at PPQ Professional Development Center in Frederick, MD.

Farm groups and some members of Congress have questioned whether CBP officers will receive enough agricultural training.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

Agencies

Function

CBP and FDA

In October 2003, CBP and FDA entered into an agreement to further protect U.S. food supply.

At POEs, CBP inspectors now carry out special inspection and sampling of foreign food imports and make referrals to FDA for further testing and analysis.

CBP and FDA work side by side in targeting efforts, making joint decisions about any food shipments that could pose a potential threat to the United States.

National Targeting Center

Part of CBP’s OFO, the National Targeting Center (NTC) provides tactical targeting and analytical research support for antiterrorism efforts to DHS and its operations center. NTC has representatives from all CBP disciplines.

CBP Laboratories and Scientific Sciences Division

On Dec. 8, 2003, moved its Radiation Portal Monitor to the NTC.

 

SOURCES: Bonner, 2004; CBP, 2003, 2004; DHS, 2004b, 2004c; FASS, 2003; FCBF, 2003; USAHA, 2003; Personal communication, K. Ahmad, APHIS, April 6, 2005.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)

USFWS is responsible for the protection of wildlife from environmental hazards, safeguarding habitat for endangered species, and inspection of international cargo, baggage, passengers, and mail to enforce U.S. and international laws regarding trade in endangered and protected species (USFWS, 2002). Generally, all wildlife imported into or exported from the United States for any reason must be declared to USFWS and cleared before release by CBP. Some wildlife inspection requires coordination with APHIS, FDA, INS, or CDC.

Other Agencies

The USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and the DHHS Food and Drug Administration (FDA) focus on protecting public health. At POEs, FSIS and FDA inspect shipments of food and food products imported into the United States from abroad to ensure that food and related products meet U.S. standards and do not present any risk to public health (CRS, 2004). As an example, AQI personnel may inspect a shipment of sausage casings to ensure that the shipment does not pose any animal health risks, while FSIS personnel may inspect the same shipment to ensure that the product was prepared in an approved processing facility.

RESOURCES AND BUDGETS

Budget information is publicly available from the Office of Management and Budget’s website for all U.S. federal agencies. However, line-item budget information on programs aimed at preventing public health threats at U.S. POEs is not readily available. Limited budget data on agricultural inspections at U.S. borders and tracking of animal and animal products movement are summarized in Table E.3. Table E.4 summarizes the existing CBP human resources dedicated to agriculture, customs, and immigration inspections at U.S. borders. The Congressional Research Service indicated that there have been more customs inspectors than immigration and agricultural inspectors combined over the period of FY 2001-2004 (CRS, 2004). Table E.5 summarizes existing human resources and capacity at CDC quarantine stations.

DAY-TO-DAY REALITY OF WORK

For Routine Notification of Imports

A survey of CDC personnel at quarantine stations indicated that most CDC work concerns animals that are regulated under CDC jurisdiction,

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

TABLE E.3 Level of Funding

Agency- Focus Area

FY 2003

FY 2004

FY 2005

FTEs

DHS—CBP

$5.9 billion

$5.9 billion

$6.2 billion

41,001

(Proposed for Agriculture Quarantine Program)

$407 million

 

USDA-APHIS-VS Import/Export program (to develop and implement an automated system to track animal and animal product movements)

 

$1.355 million

 

USDA-APHIS Pest and disease exclusion

$351 million (Actual)

$285 million (Est.)

$315 million (Est.)

 

 

SOURCES: Accord, 2004; DHS, 2004a; OMB, 2004a.

such as domestic animals (dogs and cats), nonhuman primates, some reptiles (turtles and tortoises), and any animals that have an embargo or are of special concern (civet cats and African rodents). Typically, CDC handles tasks related to checking vaccination certificates and shipping regulations, rather than conducting physical inspections of animals. When inspections are done, they are cursory, i.e., visual inspection for outward signs of illness. When illness is observed, a USDA veterinarian or a private veterinarian is called in at the owner’s expense. Nonhuman primates, turtles, and embargoed animals are most commonly checked. CDC will frequently field calls from the other federal agencies at POEs whenever there is a question about protocol or assistance.

According to the surveyed CDC personnel, CDC is usually notified of imports from the airline carriers or any of the CBP or APHIS inspectors that are out in the field. Most of the time, CDC will examine a paper list of what is coming into a port and from this can usually determine quickly which can be immediately released and what needs further review by its inspectors. Most of the day’s activities are in the office—conducting manifest reviews, approving documents, and answering telephone queries. CDC mostly delegates different parties to check out certain cargo, since it does not have sufficient staff to conduct the physical inspections.

The procedure at the CDC quarantine location in Hawaii differs from other U.S. continental locations. Hawaii has separate regulations from the continental United States and requires all foreign carriers to submit a list of

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

TABLE E.4 CBP’s Inspection Staff for All POE Locations, FY 2001–2004

Fiscal Year

Immigration

Customs

Agriculture

CBP non-APHIS

2001

4,717

08,184

N/A

 

2002

5,422

09,008

N/A

2003

6,741

10,538

1,480

2004

1,446

17,784

 

SOURCE: CRS, 2004.

cargo coming into the state. This is usually looked at by CDC, which then clears all animal cargo or allows CBP to handle it when they are not present.

According to the surveyed CDC personnel, CBP inspectors conduct the physical inspections and determine the release of importations. CDC will study lists of incoming goods and often tells CBP what has to be inspected for the day in terms of live animals and animal products. In return, CBP will notify CDC when something of special interest arises unexpectedly. It should be noted that CBP has other major inspection responsibilities and does not actively seek animal products or other items that might be of public health concern; rather, as a courtesy, CBP will notify CDC if it sees something “unusual” during its routine work.

CDC allows CBP to sign through materials and goods when the CDC office is closed (most CDC offices are open only during business hours, except for New York’s, which is open all the time). CBP provides notification to CDC of importation of dogs, cats, turtles, monkeys, other animals, and animal products capable of causing human disease. CBP will also take consideration of animals of special concern, such as civets, that have been banned by CDC. CBP personnel are trained by CDC in what to look for in animals with respect to public health threats.

According to the surveyed CDC personnel, APHIS focuses its inspections on different types of animals depending on port locations, for example, horses at the New York location and dogs at the Atlanta location. The animals for which APHIS and CDC have inspection roles and responsibilities do not overlap. Nevertheless, APHIS will frequently refer items of public health concern to the CDC quarantine staff. On the other hand, since APHIS has trained veterinarians, CDC will seek APHIS’s help when it needs further veterinary investigation. While APHIS and CBP work closely together in inspections, CDC mostly performs paperwork evaluation and is infrequently called in to conduct inspections. However, CDC always inspects nonhuman primates. A procedure is also in place for APHIS to notify CDC of nonhuman primate shipments, as well as the importation of hunt-

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

TABLE E.5 Resources at CDC Quarantine Stations at Major U.S. Airports

Location

Holding facility or laboratory

FTEs

Atlanta

None

2

Chicago

None

3 and 1 contractor

Hawaii

None

2 and 1 contractor (not being renewed)

Los Angeles

None

2

Miami

None

1 medical officer, 1 officer in charge, 2 inspectors and 1 contracted inspector

New York

No physical resources

Private veterinary facility at airport where shipments of animals can be held for inspection

6 inspectors, 1 officer in charge, 1 medical officer, and 2 contract clerical staff

Quarantine officers work rotating shifts 8–8, 7 days a week

San Francisco

None devoted; animals inspected where they arrive in baggage or cargo area

2 full-time inspectors, 1 officer in charge, and intermittent clerical staff

Seattle

None

4

 

SOURCE: Based on Survey of Personnel at CDC quarantine stations.

ing trophies and porcupine quills that have not received the proper treatment required by CDC guidelines.

In addition, USFWS inspectors are frequently found at U.S. ports of entry conducting inspection of animals and products under their regulatory jurisdiction. USFWS will primarily contact CDC when nonhuman primates are involved. USFWS will also notify CDC of goods manufactured from animal parts, for example goatskins, which potentially carry anthrax. USFWS has a good working relationship with CDC and will frequently notify CDC of issues that fall under CDC’s jurisdiction.

Local law enforcement, airlines and cargo carriers, local veterinarians, and local health groups can also be involved. These groups will inform CDC when they perceive something that might be a health threat. CDC will also contact certain private groups (such as local veterinarians and law enforcement officers) when it needs assistance. According to the Miami office, since CDC has so little staff, it frequently will involve state and local partners for assistance with law enforcement responsibilities, especially when dealing with port locations other than the home office. In these cases,

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

a product will be held until a CDC inspector can arrive or until directions about how to proceed have been given.

For Contraband

According to CDC personnel at quarantine stations, contraband occurs infrequently. At the Los Angeles location, a frequency of six times a year was noted. At the Chicago location, it was indicated that very little contraband actually comes into the United States. However, when this occurs, contraband issues could consume from 1 to 25 hours to address, depending on CDC duty officer familiarity with the product and the circumstances surrounding the contraband, according to CDC personnel in San Francisco.

When contraband is discovered, CDC staff in Hawaii work primarily with CBP and the air carriers to find someone to take care of or dispose of it. If a situation arises such that appropriate management and disposal of animal products cannot be readily determined, CDC Atlanta would be asked to handle the situation.

At the New York quarantine location, contraband discovered in cargo is handled differently from that found on passengers. A passenger who is discovered with contraband will be isolated and told to double-bag the product for incineration by the state department of agriculture or New York City health department. Contraband discovered in cargo would be handled by a combination of CDC officers and CBP inspectors, who then relay the product for disposal by either a city or federal group.

Miami has some of the largest levels of confiscated goods, mostly in the form of animal products (skins, bone, etc.), coming into the United States as manufactured goods from the Caribbean. In Miami, any contraband found must be seized and destroyed. Currently, all contraband (waste) is burned in a state department of agriculture incinerator, but this disposal is sporadic and can vary from week to week. As a result, waste will be stored in unsafe places, such as airline hangars and storage facilities. Miami CDC personnel had suggested hiring a private medical waste disposal company that could provide dumpster and daily pickup. This approach is preferred over incineration, as it would minimize the potential of releasing pathogens into the environment and exposing the general public. Airlines are another potential partner in the discovery of contraband, and they will often let CDC know when something unusual or suspicious is found.

Game and Bush Meat: An Example of Overlapping Roles and Responsibilities

Bush meat is a term broadly applied to game meat from wild animals that are hunted for consumption, typically in the bush of Africa but also

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

elsewhere. A wide variety of animals are associated with this practice, including primates, hoofed animals, reptiles, birds, and rodents, many of which are protected by international wildlife and trade laws, such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). Their commercial harvest and importation into the United States is often illegal and a violation of treaties. In addition, consumption of bush meat may pose a public health risk since the animals health and origin is unknown, increasing the potential spreading pathogens to both animals and humans. Human health concerns related to bush meat include Ebola, HIV/SIV, monkeypox, herpes B, Rift Valley fever, rabies, tuberculosis, anthrax, salmonellosis, and brucellosis; animal health concerns include chronic wasting disease and TSEs (e.g., bovine spongiform encephalopathy, Creutzfelt-Jacob disease, and scrapie) (Klein, 2005).

The illegal importation of and trade in bush meat have grown in recent years, along with an increased demand for farmed game meat. Much of this meat is illegally smuggled into foreign nations under unsanitary conditions. According to USFWS, USDA, and CBP, the total amount of bush meat entering the United States is unknown, but the agencies estimate that only a small fraction of it is intercepted. The United Kingdom’s Department of Food and Rural Affairs estimates that about 12,000 tons of smuggled bush meat enters the U.K. each year (Klein, 2005).

Four federal agencies have regulatory authority over domestic and imported game meats: APHIS, USFWS, CDC, and FDA. APHIS has jurisdiction under the Animal Health Protection Act to inspect, detain, quarantine, seize, and destroy animals, meat, and meat products in interstate commerce or those being imported into the United States that pose a risk of introducing a pest or foreign animal disease, such as foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) or avian influenza. USFWS has authority under the Endangered Species Act, the Lacey Act, CITES, and the Wild Bird Conservation Act to prohibit the importation of any wild animals or animal products that may threaten native wildlife or violate state, federal, or local wildlife laws.

CDC has jurisdiction under the Public Health Service Act to prohibit the importation of animals and animal products and to regulate foreign quarantine to prevent introduction of communicable diseases that threaten public health. CDC bans include importation of all nonhuman primates, African rodents (42 CFR §71.56), civets, and Asian birds. These bans specifically target protecting the public against Ebola, SIV, monkeypox, SARS, and avian influenza.

Finally, FDA’s role comes under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which says that all foods not covered by standard meat and poultry inspections must meet the same safety standards applied to all domestic foods. In addition, under the Public Health Safety Act, FDA can prohibit the inter-

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

state commerce of animal products to prevent the transmission of communicable disease harmful to humans (Klein, 2005).

When multiple federal agencies have jurisdictions over a single product (such as bush meat), determining responsibility is based primarily on the particular situation at hand. Interagency communication occurs frequently, and most federal groups are kept informed about the others’ responsibilities. If an importation is discovered, the heads of local agencies will contact one another and determine whose jurisdiction involves the most stringent regulation. One interviewed source provided an example in which endangered monkey meat crossed the U.S. border. Although USFWS has primary jurisdiction because the animal is endangered, because the bush meat may contain pathogens dangerous to humans CDC would have greater priority, and its responsibility would supersede that of USFWS. Since CDC has very few local inspectors and no disposal facilities, it will often rely on inspectors from other groups (usually APHIS) to notify it of confiscated bush meat. Then, CDC can either seize the product or instruct APHIS to seize and dispose of the product on its behalf, since APHIS would have access to the proper disposal facilities.

INTERAGENCY COMMUNICATION AND REFERRALS

There is no formal or written protocol for when CDC would contact APHIS and CBP. Rather, the flow of communication is at the discretion of the officers. Interviewed CDC personnel indicated that the CDC frequently trains CBP’s agricultural inspectors (formerly APHIS staff) on what to look for when inspecting animals and when to contact CDC. CDC also provides them with updates on new CDC regulations. Regular meetings are scheduled between the various groups involved with inspections at POEs (usually on a monthly basis), along with luncheons and other meetings to exchange information. CDC regularly sends informational handouts to different regions so each individual inspector will have his or her own copy of protocol and new regulations. And staff are frequently shared between the various agencies whenever the need arises.

Most interviewed CDC personnel indicated that they have not had any problems with this informal communication mechanism and that the relationship between the various agencies at U.S. POEs has been very positive. In fact, most believe that the more relaxed relationship fosters better sharing of knowledge at the local level between the various agencies and hence offers better protection against public health threats. However, several acknowledged that a more formal working protocol with APHIS and CBP could help avoid overlapping of responsibilities. Further, many noted that the effectiveness of the existing informal communication is strongly tied to

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

the established working relationship between CDC personnel and agricultural inspectors (who are experienced former APHIS staff). With the reorganization of homeland security and the changing staff within DHS, it is becoming more difficult for CDC personnel to keep track of who in CBP is working on what project and who is in charge. CDC is finding it difficult to contact the right person to make sure that proper inspection procedure is being conducted to ensure public health protection. In addition, there is some concern regarding the reassignment of CBP inspectors into new jurisdictions that are no longer in alignment with their training or expertise.

While written protocol was not found for CDC personnel, there exists a procedure manual for animal product inspection that was created by APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ): the Animal Product Manual (APM), second edition, September 2004 (PPQ, 2004). The manual describes in detail the procedures to be used by CBP agricultural inspectors and APHIS PPQ Officers to assist them in deciding regulatory issues and referral protocols. The APM spans airport, maritime, and border operations. While primarily for regulatory decisions associated with imported cargo, the manual has an appendix that deals with baggage and the mail. The APM also has sections on procedures that cover such things as disinfection, export certification of animal products, handling of pet birds, collecting of user fees, and a glossary that provides some background on the variety of animal products the CBP agricultural inspectors and PPQ officers may encounter. The manual summarizes the referral systems described below.

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)

Referral to a USFWS officer or to CBP if a USFWS officer is unavailable:

  • All nonfarm animals, including birds, but excepting horses, cattle, sheep, goats, swine, dogs, cats, and pet birds.

  • Animal byproducts such as pelts, coats, skins, game trophies, ivory products, and tortoiseshell products; and egg importations if from an endangered or threatened bird.

  • Abandoned pet birds (also contact VS, which has jurisdiction over birds).

  • All amphibians, fish, and reptiles (to determine whether they are protected by CITES).

Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

Referral of the following importations to CBP for referral to an FDA inspector:

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
  • Any drug, medication, or food intended for animals that FDA has indicated an interest in. A local FDA inspector should be consulted for specific items of interest.

  • Commercial importations of food products.

  • Wild fowl meat.

  • Wild ruminant meat.

Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)

All meat, meat products, and shell eggs for breaking (i.e., unprocessed shelled eggs for consumption) must be referred to both Customs and FSIS. Exporters should be directed to request FSIS export certification of meat and meat products. Foreign countries must have FSIS approval that the foreign inspection service is the equivalent of FSIS. The foreign country is then allowed to issue certificates for the commercial importation of meat and meat products. In addition, FSIS inspects and samples imported meat and meat products for meeting APHIS requirements and regulations designed to prevent the spread of animal diseases. Referral of importations of shell eggs for breaking to FSIS to issue FSIS Form 5200-8, Import Request Egg Products.

DHHS Public Health Service

Referral of the following importations to customs for referral to the local Public Health Service inspector:

  • Dogs, cats, and monkeys (nonhuman primates).

  • Lather brushes made from hair and bristles.

  • Human tissues, serum, blood, secretions, and excretions.

  • If it is questionable whether an importation is of animal origin and has been imported for biological use, the question should go to a supervisor or PPQ Veterinary Regulatory Support (VRS).

APHIS Veterinary Services (VS)

VS regulations control domestic and foreign commerce in live animals, live poultry, and their products. Since 1971, VS and PPQ have shared the responsibility for implementing, enforcing, and administering animal product and foreign garbage regulations and policies to prevent the introduction of foreign animal diseases.

The following should be referred to the local VS office:

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
  • All live animals, live birds, and hatching eggs.

  • Animal semen, ova, or embryo importations; empty containers are handled by PPQ.

  • Dogs imported to handle livestock except dogs from Canada, Mexico, Central America, and the West Indies.

  • Abandoned pet birds (USFWS should also be contacted).

ISSUES AND CONCERNS

Interviewed CDC personnel and others raised a number of issues and concerns about potential barriers to successful protection of U.S. borders from diseases in animals. These issues and concerns are summarized below. Special considerations for expansion of CDC quarantine stations are also described.

Information Access

The biggest challenge to efforts to prevent public health threats from animal diseases imported into the United States is keeping knowledge current and getting information in a timely fashion. Interviewed New York state agriculture officials indicated that while federal agencies are fairly successful in mitigating the threat of human diseases transferred by animals in most cases, they have not been so successful in some situations, such as that of monkeypox. This is a result of failure to pass information on to local inspectors as to what the “hot” diseases are.

In a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report (March, 2005), it is noted that CBP’s agricultural inspectors do not always receive timely information about high-risk cargo that should be held for inspection (GAO, 2005). For example, after Canada confirmed a case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in 2003, inspectors at one border crossing did not receive a warning from USDA to hold shipments of Canadian beef in time to intercept it, and they let the shipment through. In another instance, CBP’s inspectors at a seaport in a major agricultural state did not receive an alert in late 2004 about an outbreak of a strain of avian influenza that can cause death in humans until a week after the warning was released. Agricultural inspectors and port officials attributed the delay in receiving information to the transfer of some inspection roles and responsibilities from USDA to DHS. This transfer has created additional layers of communication that have impeded the rapid delivery of critical information to port inspectors. USDA used to communicate critical information directly to its agricultural inspectors, but CBP’s inspectors now receive information indirectly through DHS headquarters.

CDC is usually notified of imports from the airline carriers or CBP or

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

APHIS inspectors who are out in the field. As the lead agency at U.S. ports, CBP has access to the Automated Manifest System (AMS), which gives advance notification of any shipments that are coming into the country and allows electronic clearance of shipments. CDC does not have access to the AMS and therefore has to rely on CBP for information. Because of the lack of access to the AMS, both CDC and USFWS require hard copies from the airlines and shippers about their importation. However, under the new Trade Act, airlines and brokers are no longer required to have hard copy of importations. CDC is concerned that compliance with requests for hard copies will cease in the future. It is also concerned about complete reliance on CBP for information since CBP is regulation-driven and does not necessarily focus on animals when it reviews the AMS. Access to the AMS would enable CDC to review incoming cargo and to capture importations of public health interest.

Human Resources

Lack of adequate staff at CDC quarantine stations is the primary concern among the interviewed CDC personnel. With severely limited human resources, CDC has had to rely on other agencies to enforce most of its regulations at U.S. POEs and is not able to oversee the vast majority of the importations. Consequently, CDC has had to accept on faith that most items are being imported with the appropriate permits or are innocuous. CDC’s ability to grasp the full picture of what goes on at U.S. POEs that may have public health implications is severely affected by lack of staff.

The ratio of CDC to CBP agricultural inspection staff (former APHIS staff) is about 1:50. Given this disparity, there are not enough CDC personnel and time to conduct all the necessary training, communication, and education to keep knowledge current among CBP’s inspection staff.

Another problem is that the CDC is open only during regular business hours, while CBP and APHIS are open 24 hours a day. Since shipments can come in at any hour, this makes it very difficult and haphazard for animals to have to wait until morning to be looked at. It is also costly to have to keep animals fed and watered.

The lack of veterinarian expertise at CDC quarantine locations is also of concern. Although basic knowledge of how to identify animal diseases and work with animals exists among some CDC staff at most quarantine locations, the level of training and depth of knowledge are too limited and not uniform. At the New York port location, while there is a good working relationship with veterinarians at APHIS and the state Department of Agriculture (DOA), consideration for having veterinary support in the field from CDC is suggested. One of the major issues with APHIS and DOA veterinarians is that they are not assigned to the CDC and are not always

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

available on short notice. A CDC veterinarian will not have these prior engagements and can focus on zoonotic disease. Another advantage of having a CDC veterinarian is that he or she will have a direct link with CDC headquarters (unlike APHIS veterinarians), can help keep the local inspectors apprised of new and emerging disease threats to humans, and can speed the process of moving living organisms through quarantine. CDC veterinarians would also be an important asset in the occurrence of an outbreak, since they are better educated to handle a zoonotic threat and can better identify symptoms of new illness. It is envisioned by certain ports that a CDC veterinarian would spend part of the his or her time assisting in the physical inspection of live animals while educating inspectors and other port or airline employees about identifying and preventing zoonotic threats perceived by CDC.

Specific concerns are also being raised that primary inspectors in CBP from customs and immigrations backgrounds may not have sufficient agricultural training. Some have argued that current CBP training in agriculture for new inspectors may be inadequate. Former APHIS inspectors had required science and biology backgrounds combined with extensive pest and disease training (CRS, 2004).

Regulatory and Policy Issues

Noted as an area with overlapping regulatory authority between federal agencies are birds from Asia, which are regulated by both CBP and CDC. Some species of nonhuman primates are regulated by both USFWS and CDC. However, the general feeling is that despite these overlapping regulatory authorities, things are working well at port locations. There is a concern that there may be issues with communication among the headquarters groups.

Lack of consideration for policy implementation at the local level (i.e., port locations) is an issue that was raised by several interviewed CDC personnel. Often, CDC headquarters will issue a broad embargo policy (such as those on the importation of monkeys or civets), without any specific policies and guidance on roles, responsibilities, and interactions at the local level among the various agencies, namely, CBP, APHIS, and CDC. Leaving the details to be sorted out at the local level has often led to different and inconsistent implementing policies across the different quarantine stations. Also, in situations involving rush embargoes, time is of essence; having to spend time to sort out the details often leads to frustration at the local level. There is a need to establish plans and policies at the national level that can then filter down to the local level in a more consistent and efficient manner. CDC’s set of regulations on how to deal with

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

nonhuman primates and associated paperwork was identified as a good example that should be repeated for other animals and protocols.

While specific policies are needed in roles and responsibilities, too-specific protocols can prove to be burdensome. Protocols for specific types of rodents instead of one broad rodent protocol are an example. Efficiencies can be gained with broader protocols.

Agricultural Inspection Issues

In a recent report, GAO indicated a concern that agricultural inspections at ports of entry have declined over the last 2 years while imports have increased. Data show a decline in the number of agricultural inspections at POEs nationwide from 40.9 million in FY 2002, when USDA was fully responsible for agricultural inspections, to 37.5 million in FY 2004, when DHS had primary responsibility (GAO, 2005). No clear explanation has been found as to why this drop in inspections occurred.

Another concern is that the majority of live animals coming through ports get a cursory examination based on overall appearance of health. Only for select diseases are specific examinations or tests being done (e.g., for rabies), which can be done at import locations or before importation.

Special Considerations in the Expansion of CDC Quarantine Stations

Although there is a need for additional quarantine stations, the consensus is that it is an impractical idea at this point, since there are not even enough staff for existing stations. Rather, the first priority should be to hire new workers and expand the resources and capabilities at existing stations. Only when newly hired staff have gained enough experience and background should they be moved to staff new locations. Field inspection is more or less a hands-on learning experience. Staff can function only with adequate background and familiarity on the job. This is especially true with medical officers. It is stressed that new quarantine stations should never be opened with inexperienced inspectors and officers.

There are also some suggestions that only ports with significant internationally arriving travelers be considered for the addition of a quarantine station. Further, only if additional funding is available should consideration of quarantine staff at airports with a primarily domestic traveling public be entertained. Another suggestion is that there should be differential levels of staffing for different locations depending on volume of importations. For examples, some ports might need just a single high-level person rather than several lower-level staff. There is a huge flow of freight from Canada and Mexico, and it is questioned whether these land borders are closely watched. Food, such as bush meat, may be imported through Canada to avoid the

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

authorities. Without staff on-site, these cases would be missed. Finally, a major expansion plan must take into consideration the fact that office space is at a premium at U.S. airports.

REFERENCES

Accord B, Administrator, APHIS. 2004. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Statement at the March 4, 2004 hearing of the Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies, U.S. House of Representatives.

APHIS (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Department of Agriculture). 2003. APHIS Fact Sheet. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and Department of Homeland Security: Working Together to Protect Agriculture. [Online] Available: http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/fsheet_faq_notice/fs_aphis_homeland.pdf [accessed April 7, 2005].

APHIS. 2004a. Veterinary Services Safeguarding Animal Health: Import/Export. [Online] Available: http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ncie/ [accessed March 1, 2004].

APHIS. 2004b. Veterinary Services Strategic Plan FY 2004 to FY 2008. [Online] Available: http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/pdf_files/strat_plan.pdf [accessed April 7, 2005].


Bonner RC, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 2004. Statement of Robert C. Bonner to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Statement at the January 26, 2004 hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.

Bush GW. 2002. Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the Nation. [Online] Available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/homeland_security_book.html [accessed April 7, 2005].


CBP (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security). 2003. Customs and Border Protection Today. [Online] Available: http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2003March/ [accessed March 31, 2004].

CBP. 2004. Preventing Animal and Plant Pests and Diseases: More than 1.7 Million Prohibited Agricultural Items Intercepted Last Year. [Online] Available: http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/press_releases/0012004/01142004_4.xml [accessed April 2, 2004].

Crawford LM, Deputy Commissioner, FDA. 2003. Agroterrorism: The Threat to America’s Breadbasket. Statement at the November 19, 2003 hearing of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate.

Creekmore L. 2003. Preventive Measures and Existing Regulations for Chronic Wasting Diseases in the U.S. Presentation at the September 10-11, 2003 Meeting on TSE in Animal Populations: Fact and Fiction, Fort Collins, CO.

CRS (Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress). 2004. Border Security: Inspection Practices, Policies, and Issues. [Online] Available: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/33856.pdf [accessed April 7, 2005].


DGMQ (Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). 2003a. History of Quarantine. [Online] Available: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/history.htm [accessed April 7, 2005].

DGMQ. 2003b. Mission. [Online] Available: http://wwwcdc.gov/ncidod/dq/mission.htm [accessed April 6, 2004].

DGMQ. 2004. Importation of Pets, Other Animals, and Animal Products into the United States. [Online] Available: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/animal.htm [accessed March 18, 2004].

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

DHS (U.S. Department of Homeland Security). 2004a. Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 2005. [Online] Available: http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/FY_2005_BIB_4.pdf [accessed April 7, 2005].

DHS. 2004b. DHS Organization: Department Components. [Online] Available: http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=9&content=2973 [accessed March 1, 2004].

DHS. 2004c. Protecting Against Agricultural Terrorism. [Online] Available: http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=43&content=3117 [accessed April 2, 2004].


FASS (Federation of Animal Science Societies). 2003. No Retraining for Agricultural Inspectors in Border Agency Plan. [Online] Available: http://www.fass.org/fasstrack/news_item.asp?news_id=1646 [accessed April 6, 2004].

FCBF (Florida Customs Brokers & Forwarders Association, Inc.). 2003. CBP Agriculture Specialist Fact Sheet. [Online} Available: http://www.fcbf.com/NewsFlashDetail.asp?NewsId=47 [accessed April 4, 2004].


GAO (United States Government Accountability Office). 2005. Homeland Security: Much Is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain. GAO-05-214. Washington, DC: GAO.

Grannis J. 2003. Animal Disease Outbreaks: 21st Century Issues. Presentation at the July 11, 2003 Conference on the Economic Impact of Animal Disease on the Food Marketing Sector, Denver, CO.


Klein PN. 2005. Regulatory report: Game meat: A complex food safety and animal health issue. Food Safety Magazine 10(96).


NRC (National Research Council). 2003. Countering Agricultural Bioterrorism. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.


OMB (Office of Management and Budget, the Executive Office of the President of the United States). 2004a. Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 2005: Appendix. [Online] Available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/appendix.html [accessed April 7, 2005].

OMB. 2004b. Department of Agriculture Part Assessments [Online] Available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/pma/agriculture.pdf [accessed April 12, 2004].

OSH (Office of Health and Safety, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). 2004. Etiologic Agent Import Permit Program. [Online] Available: http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/imprtper.htm [accessed April 6, 2004].


PPQ. 2004. (Plant Protection and Quarantine, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Department of Agriculture). Animal Product Manual (Second Edition). [Online] Available: http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ppq/manuals/pdf_files/APM.pdf [accessed April 7, 2005].


USAHA (United States Animal Health Association). 2003. USAHA 2003 Resolution No. 21. [Online] Available: http://www.usaha.org/resolutions/reso03/res-2103.html [accessed April 6, 2004].

USFWS (Division of Law Enforcement, US Fish and Wildlife Service). 2002. Annual Report FY 2001. [Online] Available: http://library.fws.gov/Pubs9/LEannual01.pdf [accessed April 7, 2005].

USFWS (Office of Law Enforcement, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service). 2003. FY 2002 Annual Report. [Online] Available: http://www.fws.gov/le/pdffiles/FY2002rpt.pdf [accessed April 7, 2005].

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

APPENDIX 1—INTERVIEWED INDIVIDUALS

Ahmad, Khawaja N.

Supervisory VMO

USDA-APHIS-VS, JFK Airport

Akey, Dr. Bruce

Acting State Veterinarian

NYS Department of Agriculture & Markets

Becker, Margaret

Officer in Charge

CDC NYC Quarantine Station

Becker, Margaret

Deputy Commissioner

NYS Department of Agriculture & Markets

Blumensaadt, Sena

Acting Officer in Charge

CDC Chicago Quarantine Station

Ehart, Robert

 

National Association of State Departments of Agriculture

Dailey, Terrence

Officer in Charge

CDC Atlanta Quarantine Station

Dick, Jerre

Associate Deputy

USDA, APHIS, VS

Drew, Anthony

Officer in Charge

CDC Miami Quarantine Station

Dwyer, Susan

Officer in Charge

CDC San Francisco Quarantine Station

Houck, Dr. Peter

Quarantine Medical Officer

CDC Seattle Quarantine Station

Marty, Michael

Officer in Charge

CDC Los Angeles Quarantine Station

Mitruka, Dr. Kiren

Medical Officer

CDC Miami Quarantine Station

Riley, Lucinda

Director of Agriculture

DHS U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Tapia, Dr. Robert

Officer in Charge

CDC Hawaii Quarantine Station

Thomas, Lee Ann

Director (Live Animal)

USDA, APHIS, VS, NCIE

APPENDIX 2—LINES OF INQUIRIES

Inquiries for CDC
  1. Please describe the various personnel and their respective agencies involved with prevention/mitigation of public health threats originating from animals entering the United States through the U.S. quarantine stations. What are their specific roles and responsibilities?

  • CDC’s Division of Global Migration and Quarantine (DGMQ):

  • USDA/Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS):

  • U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP):

  • Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

  • U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS):

  • Other personnel:

  1. What is the relationship between the APHIS staff with the CDC/DGMQ staff at our ports of entry?

  • Is there a protocol for when Q-station CDC/DGMQ staff would call in the APHIS staff or vice versa?

  • Are there challenges in implementing the above protocol?

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
  1. What is the relationship between the CDC/DGMG staff with other agencies such as CBP, ICE, USFWS, etc…?

  • Are there protocols from communication between CDC/DGMQ staff with other agencies, i.e. CBP, ICE, USFWS, etc…?

  • Are there challenges in implementing the above protocol?

  1. What is the day-to-day reality of the work?

  • For routine notification of imports

  • For contraband

  1. What are the resources currently devoted to animal inspection activities at quarantine stations?

  • Facility size in square feet _______

  • Number of animals facility can hold at any point in time_______

  • Laboratory capacity: _______

  • Human resources (Full Time Employees)_______

  1. Are there barriers to successful protection of our borders from diseases in animals? If yes, what are these barriers?

  • Human resources?

  • Legal authority—overlapping authorities?

  • Location capacity—need of additional Q-Stations?

  • Other?

  1. Is there anything else of note?

Additional Inquiries for the CBP and State Department of Agriculture
  1. Are there any written policies, procedures, manuals, and training given by the CDC to prevent the spread of zoonotic disease through live animals and animal products?

  2. How are responsibilities delegated among the different federal and state groups?

  3. How well mitigated are the threat of disease under current policy and do live animals or animal products pose the greater threat to the general population?

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×

ABBREVIATIONS


AMS

Automated Manifest System

APHIS

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA)

APM

Animal Product Manual

AQI

Agriculture Quarantine and Inspection (USDA APHIS)


BTS

Directorate of Border and Transportation Security (DHS)


CBP

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (DHS BTS)

CDC

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CITES

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna


DFO

Director of Field Operations (DHS OFO)

DGMQ

Division of Global Migration and Quarantine (CDC NCID)

DHHS

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

DHS

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

DOI

U.S. Department of the Interior

DOJ

U.S. Department of Justice


EIS

Epidemic Intelligence Service


FAD

foreign animal diseases

FDA

Food and Drug Administration

FLETC

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

FMD

foot-and-mouth disease

FSIS

Food Safety and Inspection Service

FTE

full-time-employee


HSA

Homeland Security Act


ICE

Immigration and Customs Enforcement

INA

Immigration and Nationality Act

INS

U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (formerly DOJ, now DHS)

IOM

Institute of Medicine


LSS

Laboratories and Scientific Services (CBP)


MOU

Memorandum of Understanding


NCID

National Center for Infectious Diseases (CDC)

NCIE

National Center for Import and Export (USDA APHIS)

NTC

National Targeting Center (CBP OFO)


OFO

Office of Field Operations (DHS)


POE

Port of Entry

PPQ

Plant Protection and Quarantine (USDA APHIS)


SARS

severe acute respiratory syndrome

SIV

simian immunodeficiency virus


USDA

U.S. Department of Agriculture

USFWS

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service


VRS

Veterinary Regulatory Support

VS

Veterinary Services (USDA APHIS)

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 169
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 170
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 171
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 172
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 173
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 174
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 175
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 176
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 177
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 178
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 179
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 180
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 181
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 182
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 183
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 184
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 185
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 186
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 187
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 188
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 189
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 190
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 191
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 192
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 193
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 194
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 195
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 196
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 197
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry." Institute of Medicine. 2006. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11435.
×
Page 198
Next: Appendix F: International Legal Considerations for the Quarantine Station Expansion »
Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry: Protecting the Public's Health Get This Book
×
Buy Paperback | $59.00 Buy Ebook | $47.99
MyNAP members save 10% online.
Login or Register to save!
Download Free PDF

To mitigate the risks posed by microbial threats of public health significance originating abroad, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) places small groups of staff at major U.S. airports. These staff, their offices, and their patient isolation rooms constitute quarantine stations, which are run by CDC's Division of Global Migration and Quarantine (DGMQ).

Congress began to allocate funds in fiscal 2003 for the establishment of new quarantine stations at 17 major U.S. ports of entry that comprise airports, seaports, and land-border crossings. In a significant departure from the recent past, both the preexisting 8 quarantine stations and the new 17 are expected to play an active, anticipatory role in nationwide biosurveillance. Consequently, DGMQ asked the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to convene an expert committee to assess the present CDC quarantine stations and recommend how they should evolve to meet the challenges posed by microbial threats at the nation's gateways. DGMQ specifically requested "an assessment of the role of the federal quarantine stations, given the changes in the global environment including large increases in international travel, threats posed by bioterrorism and emerging infections, and the movement of animals and cargo." To conduct this assessment and provide recommendations, IOM convened, in October 2004, the Committee on Measures to Enhance the Effectiveness of the CDC Quarantine Station Expansion Plan for U.S. Ports of Entry.

At the sponsor's request, the committee released the interim letter report Human Resources at U.S. Ports of Entry to Protect the Public's Health in January 2005 to provide preliminary suggestions for the priority functions of a modern quarantine station, the competences necessary to carry out those functions, and the types of health professionals who have the requisite competences (Appendix A). This, the committee's final report, assesses the present role of the CDC quarantine stations and articulates a vision of their future role as a public health intervention.

  1. ×

    Welcome to OpenBook!

    You're looking at OpenBook, NAP.edu's online reading room since 1999. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website.

    Do you want to take a quick tour of the OpenBook's features?

    No Thanks Take a Tour »
  2. ×

    Show this book's table of contents, where you can jump to any chapter by name.

    « Back Next »
  3. ×

    ...or use these buttons to go back to the previous chapter or skip to the next one.

    « Back Next »
  4. ×

    Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book.

    « Back Next »
  5. ×

    Switch between the Original Pages, where you can read the report as it appeared in print, and Text Pages for the web version, where you can highlight and search the text.

    « Back Next »
  6. ×

    To search the entire text of this book, type in your search term here and press Enter.

    « Back Next »
  7. ×

    Share a link to this book page on your preferred social network or via email.

    « Back Next »
  8. ×

    View our suggested citation for this chapter.

    « Back Next »
  9. ×

    Ready to take your reading offline? Click here to buy this book in print or download it as a free PDF, if available.

    « Back Next »
Stay Connected!