National Academies Press: OpenBook

Maritime Security Partnerships (2008)

Chapter: Front Matter

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2008. Maritime Security Partnerships. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12029.
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Committee on the “1,000-Ship Navy”— A Distributed and Global Maritime Network Naval Studies Board Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences

THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS  500 Fifth Street, N.W.  Washington, DC 20001 NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance. This study was supported by Contract No. N00014-05-G-0288, DO 15 between the National Academy of Sciences and the Department of the Navy. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project. International Standard Book Number-13:  978-0-309-11261-1 International Standard Book Number-10:  0-309-11261-3 Copies of this report are available from: Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, The Keck Center of the National Acad- emies, 500 Fifth Street, N.W., Room WS904, Washington, DC 20001; and The National Academies Press, 500 Fifth Street, N.W., Lockbox 285, Washington, DC 20055; (800) 624-6242 or (202) 334-3313 (in the Washington metropolitan area); Internet, http://www.nap.edu. Copyright 2008 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America

The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a ­mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Charles M. Vest is president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examina- tion of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Harvey V. Fineberg is president of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the ­National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering com- munities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone and Dr. Charles M. Vest are chair and vice chair, respectively, of the National Research Council. www.national-academies.org

Committee on The “1,000-ship navy”— a distributed and global maritime network ROBERT B. PIRIE JR., Chevy Chase, Maryland, Co-chair DAVID A. WHELAN, The Boeing Company, Co-chair NOEL K. CUNNINGHAM, Glendora, California HENRY H. GAFFNEY, The CNA Corporation GUNTHER HANDL, Tulane University Law School JOHN T. HANLEY, Institute for Defense Analyses THOM J. HODGSON, North Carolina State University JAMES D. HULL, Annapolis, Maryland HARRY W. JENKINS JR., Gainesville, Virginia CATHERINE M. KELLEHER, University of Maryland and Brown University JERRY A. KRILL, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University THOMAS V. McNAMARA, Textron Systems HEIDI C. PERRY, Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc. GENE H. PORTER, Nashua, New Hampshire JOHN S. QUILTY, Oakton, Virginia J. PAUL REASON, Washington, D.C. NILS R. SANDELL JR., BAE Systems H. EUGENE STANLEY, Boston University JOHN P. STENBIT, Oakton, Virginia ELIHU ZIMET, Gaithersburg, Maryland Staff Charles F. Draper, Director ARUL MOZHI, Study Director (as of May 19, 2007) EUGENE J. CHOI, Study Director (through May 18, 2007) RAYMOND S. WIDMAYER, Senior Program Officer IAN M. CAMERON, Associate Program Officer (through May 21, 2007) SUSAN G. CAMPBELL, Administrative Coordinator MARY G. GORDON, Information Officer SEKOU O. JACKSON, Senior Project Assistant SEYMOUR J. DEITCHMAN, Consultant SIDNEY G. REED JR., Consultant   John T. Hanley served on the committee from November 28, 2006, to August 5, 2007. 

Naval Studies Board MIRIAM E. JOHN, Livermore, California, Chair DAVID A. WHELAN, The Boeing Company, Vice Chair LEE M. HAMMARSTROM, Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University JAMES L. HERDT, Chelsea, Alabama KERRIE L. HOLLEY, IBM Global Services BARRY M. HOROWITZ, University of Virginia JAMES D. HULL, Annapolis, Maryland JOHN W. HUTCHINSON, Harvard University LEON A. JOHNSON, United Parcel Service EDWARD H. KAPLAN, Yale University CATHERINE M. KELLEHER, University of Maryland and Brown University JERRY A. KRILL, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University THOMAS V. McNAMARA, Textron Systems L. DAVID MONTAGUE, Menlo Park, California JOHN H. MOXLEY III, Solvang, California HEIDI C. PERRY, Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc. GENE H. PORTER, Nashua, New Hampshire JOHN S. QUILTY, Oakton, Virginia J. PAUL REASON, Washington, D.C. JOHN E. RHODES, Balboa, California JOHN P. STENBIT, Oakton, Virginia JAMES WARD, Lincoln Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology CINDY WILLIAMS, Massachusetts Institute of Technology ELIHU ZIMET, Gaithersburg, Maryland Navy Liaison Representatives RADM DAN W. DAVENPORT, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N81 (through July 25, 2007) RADM WILLIAM R. BURKE, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N81 (as of September 26, 2007, through August 22, 2008) RADM(S) BRIAN C. PRINDLE, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N81 (as of August 25, 2008) RADM WILLIAM E. LANDAY III, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N091 (through August 15, 2008) vi

Marine Corps Liaison Representative LTGEN JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat ������������������������������������������ Development Command (through July 2, 2008) LTGEN GEORGE J. FLYNN, USMC, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (as of July 28, 2008) Staff Charles F. Draper, Director ARUL MOZHI, Senior Program Officer RAYMOND S. WIDMAYER, Senior Program Officer BILLY M. WILLIAMS, Senior Program Officer EUGENE J. CHOI, Program Officer (through May 18, 2007) IAN M. CAMERON, Associate Program Officer (through May 21, 2007) MARTA V. HERNANDEZ, Associate Program Officer (as of March 15, 2008) Susan G. Campbell, Administrative Coordinator Mary G. Gordon, Information Officer SEKOU O. JACKSON, Senior Project Assistant vii

Preface By the end of the Cold War the United States had produced a navy, to a large degree in response to the global challenge posed by the Soviet Union, that was and remains the largest and most powerful navy in the world. This maritime supremacy confers great advantages on the United States in its foreign policy, but it has limitations. The U.S. Navy, while the dominant maritime force, must act in concert with other maritime forces in the quest for an orderly maritime domain. More and more, today’s dynamic maritime security landscape also involves such broad-ranging missions as countering global terrorism, providing humanitarian relief for natural disasters, interdicting drug trafficking, and regulating the migra- tion of people. No single navy or nation can do this alone. Security threats in the maritime domain are an important challenge. In today’s world 50,000 large ships carry about 80 percent of the world’s trade. To offer security in the maritime domain, governments around the world need the capabilities to confront directly such common threats as piracy, smuggling, drug trading, illegal immigration, banditry, human smuggling and slavery, environmental attack, trade disruption, weapons proliferation, and terrorism. Recognizing this new international security landscape, the former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) called for a collaborative international approach to maritime security. Initially branded the “1,000-ship Navy,” this concept envi-   VADM John G. Morgan, USN, and RDML Charles W. Martoglio, USN. 2005. “The 1,000-Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November, p. 15.   VADM John G. Morgan, USN, and RDML Charles W. Martoglio, USN. 2005. “The 1,000-Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November, p. 15.   Chief of Naval Operations (ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN), in remarks delivered to the 17th International Seapower Symposium, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., September 21, 2005. ix

 preface sioned that U.S. naval forces would partner with “a diverse array of multinational, federal, state, local and private sector entities to ensure freedom of navigation, the flow of commerce, and the protection of ocean resources.” Furthermore, said the former CNO, this vision would bring all nations together to build a global maritime network—including the sharing of information that would be available to all participants—that would promote security on the seas and enable global, regional, and national prosperity through international cooperation and coordi- nation. Working toward this vision would often involve developing partnerships with selected nations on a regional or even subregional basis. Some key components for the 1,000-ship Navy vision to be successful have been identified., First, there must be incentives for participating nations to join in such a partnership. Most maritime threats are not global; therefore, the regional and local interests of each country must be accommodated. The operat- ing principle behind the 1,000-ship Navy is that it must satisfy the interests of all participants, many of them held in common. Second, there must be low barriers to entry, both technologically and operationally, to make this truly a coalition of the willing for all nations, even those without formal navies. Third, the partner- ship should advance security, local and global economic prosperity, and overall cooperation among governments. For example, as the network grows one would expect to see increases in the number of sensors and responders available to moni- tor and support security in the maritime domain. Finally, building trust among all nations should be an overarching objective of such partnerships and one that will be crucial for such a coalition of the willing to be realized. Since the CNO’s speech in 2005, the U.S. Navy has been actively engaged in working demonstrations of the 1,000-ship Navy concept; in particular, the U.S. Navy has participated in multinational counterpiracy efforts off the coast of East Africa as well as in conducting training with navies in the Gulf of Guinea and Latin America. Also, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Coast Guard have jointly released a new maritime strategy document that gives preventing a war the same military priority as winning a war and advocates more   Chief of Naval Operations (ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN) and Commandant of the Marine Corps (Gen Michael W. Hagee, USMC). 2006. Naval Operations Concept, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C.   Christopher P. Cavas. 2006. “The Thousand-Ship Navy,” Armed Forces Journal, December.   RDML Jeffrey A. Wieringa, USN, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (International Pro- grams) and Director, Navy International Programs Office, Office of the Secretary of the Navy, “DASN (IP): Role of International Programs in Developing the 1000-Ship Navy,” presentation to the committee, January 10, 2007.   VADM John G. Morgan, USN, and RDML Charles W. Martoglio, USN. 2005. “The 1,000 Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November.   Chief of Naval Operations (ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN). 2007. CNO Guidance for 2007: Focus on Execution, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., February 2.

preface xi cooperation with foreign fleets. The concept of such maritime partnerships has received positive support from the world’s maritime leaders.10,11 Terms of Reference At the request of the former Chief of Naval Operations,12 the Naval Stud- ies Board of the National Research Council conducted a study to examine the technical and operational implications of the 1,000-ship Navy concept as they apply to four levels of cooperative efforts: (1) U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and merchant shipping only; (2) U.S. naval and maritime assets with others in treaty alliances or analogous arrangements; (3) U.S. naval and maritime assets with ad hoc coalitions (examples to be postulated in the study); and (4) U.S. naval and maritime assets with others than the above that may now be friendly but could potentially be hostile, for special purposes such as deterrence of piracy or other criminal activity. Specifically, for each of these four levels, the study addressed the following tasks: •  xamine previously established models and other possible operational E concepts for the four levels of cooperation, to include both the NATO and Interpol models; •  dentify force structure and interoperability needs, to include information I sharing and assurance; •  xamine the extent to which sensor technology, information and opera- E tional techniques must be held classified; and the utility, advantages and disadvantages of using civilian communications and encryption technolo- gies; and •  ssess potential vulnerabilities and countermeasure susceptibilities to U.S. A military forces inherent in the “1,000-ship Navy” concept, and the means to mitigate them. The COMMITTEE’s Approach There has been much discussion about whether the U.S.-led initiative 1,000- ship Navy would be widely acceptable to potential partners and would offer the   Department of the Navy, 2007, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, Washington, D.C., October; Inside the Navy, 2007, “Document Released: New Maritime Strategy Urges Tighter Ties for Sea Services,” October 22. 10  Chief of Naval Operations (ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN). 2007. CNO Guidance for 2007: Focus on Execution, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., February 2. 11  U.S. Naval Institute. 2007. “The Commanders Respond,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March. 12  ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN, Chief of Naval Operations. Letter dated June 29, 2006, to Ralph J. Cicerone, President, National Academy of Sciences.

xii preface respect for their national sovereignty that is critically important. 13,14,15 This con- cern led the committee to a search for alternative terminology for the 1,000-ship Navy and for an appropriate and effective mechanism of leadership and coordina- tion. The committee adopted the term “maritime security partnerships” (MSP) in this report.16 The technical and operational implications of MSP are addressed in this report, along with the mechanisms of leadership and coordination. As the study progressed, the committee refined its understanding of the four levels of cooperative efforts for maritime security called out in the terms of refer- ence and discovered that a different organizing principle would be more appropri- ate given the complexity of the 1,000-ship Navy concept as it is being developed and implemented. The committee’s approach was to take into account and build on the ongoing efforts and respond to the spirit of the CNO’s request for the study while at the same time addressing the four levels of cooperative efforts for maritime security and the tasks (the four bullet items) in the terms of reference. Discussions with the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) at the committee’s first meeting encouraged a broader approach to the study—namely, to consider the more important question of how to achieve MSP. This meant going beyond technical and operational support for MSP to the matter of bringing in the wide range of participants called for in the terms of reference. With this in mind the committee turned to a somewhat more complicated set of bilateral and multilateral models of cooperation to address the tasks in the terms of reference. Chapter 1 presents the committee’s understanding and assumptions, its approach to the terms of reference, and the organization and content of this report. The committee17 was first convened in January 2007. It held additional meetings and site visits over a period of 6 months, both to gather input from the relevant communities and to discuss its findings and recommendations. The agendas of the meetings are summarized below:18 • January 9-10, 2007, in Washington, D.C. Organizational meeting: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Headquar- ters U.S. Coast Guard, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Maritime Adminis- tration, and Office of the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy briefings on the operational and technical implications of the 1,000-ship Navy. 13  Amy Klamper. 2006. “Traction,” Seapower, December. 14  Michael W. Coulter, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional Stability, Bureau of Political- Military Affairs, Department of State. Discussion with the committee, February 6, 2007. 15  CAPT Bruce B. Stubbs, USCG (Ret.). 2007. “Making the 1,000-Ship Navy a Reality,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January. 16  As of this writing, the U.S. government was moving to replace the name “1,000-ship Navy” with “global maritime partnerships” (GMP). 17  Biographies of its members are provided in Appendix A. 18  During the course of its study, the committee held meetings in which it received (and discussed) materials that are exempt from release under 5 U.S.C. 552 (b).

preface xiii • February 6-7, 2007, in Washington, D.C. Military Sealift Command; Office of the Under Secretary for Science and Technology in the Department of Homeland Security; Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command; Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional Stability, Bureau of Political-Mili- tary Affairs, Department of State; CNO Strategic Studies Group; International Maritime Organization; and the Maersk Line, Ltd., briefings on the global per- spective of the 1,000-ship Navy as well as on the policy, operational, and techni- cal implications of the 1,000-ship Navy. • March 12, 2007, in Suitland, Maryland. Site visit to the Office of Naval Intelligence. • March 13-14, 2007, in Washington, D.C. Defense Information Systems Agency, Office of Naval Research, the Royal Navy (U.K.), Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Interpol, Embassy of Singapore, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/Office of the DOD (Department of Defense) Chief Information Officer, Consortium for Ocean- ographic Research and Education, and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations briefings on networks and information-sharing needs for and global perspective of the 1,000-ship Navy. • March 29-30, 2007, in Naples, Italy. Site visit to Commander, Naval Forces Europe–Commander, Sixth Fleet, and NATO Component Command, Maritime Naples. • April 2-3, 2007, in London, England. Site visits to Lloyd’s of London; International Maritime Organization; Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee; Shell International Trading and Shipping Company, Ltd.; the Royal Navy (U.K.); and Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. • April 16-19, 2007, in Alexandria, Virginia. Site visit to Maritime Domain Awareness Data Sharing Community of Interest Pilot Spiral 3 and Maritime Domain Awareness Connectivity Technology Insertion Game Workshop. • April 25-26, 2007, in Miami, Florida. Site visits to Center for Southeast- ern Tropical Advanced Remote Sensing at the University of Miami, Headquarters of the Seventh Coast Guard District, and the U.S. Southern Command. • May 15-17, 2007, in Washington, D.C. Office of the Chief of Naval Oper- ations; Headquarters U.S. Coast Guard; National Security Council; Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional Stability, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State; Naval War College; Center for Naval Analyses; Naval Criminal Investigative Service; Joint Interagency Task Force-South; U.S. Pacific Command; Joint Interagency Coordination Group; Joint Interagency Task Force West; Pacific Fleet N5; Indian Embassy; and Chilean Embassy briefings on the global perspective of the 1,000-ship Navy, as well as the policy, operational, and technical implications of the 1,000-ship Navy. • May 17, 2007, in Laurel, Maryland. Site visit to the National Security Agency Information Assurance Directorate.

xiv preface • June 12, 2007, in Key West, Florida. Site visit to the Joint Interagency Task Force-South. • June 25-29, 2007, in Woods Hole, Massachusetts. Committee delibera- tions and report drafting. The months between the committee’s last meeting and the publication of the report were spent preparing the draft manuscript, gathering additional infor- mation, reviewing and responding to the external review comments, editing the report, and conducting the security review needed to produce an unclassified and unrestricted report.

Acknowledgment of Reviewers This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National Research Council’s (NRC’s) Report Review Commit- tee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical com- ments that will assist the institution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this report: Michael Brock, MITRE Corporation, John D. Christie, LMI, Archie R. Clemins, ADM, USN (retired), Boise, Idaho, Robert L. Jervis, Columbia University, William B. Morgan, Rockville, Maryland, David A. Richwine, MajGen, USMC (retired), Burke, Virginia, Harvey Sapolsky, Massachussetts Institute of Technology, John Tozzi, RADM, USCG (retired), L-3 Communications Systems, and George M. Whitesides, Harvard University. Although the reviewers listed above provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommenda- tions, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Alexander H. Flax, Potomac, Maryland. Appointed xv

xvi ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF REVIEWERS by the National Research Council, he was responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution.

Contents SUMMARY 1 1 INTRODUCTION: CREATING MARITIME SECURITY 15 PARTNERSHIPS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY Background, 15 Terms of Reference, 16 The Committee’s Understanding and Assumptions, 16 The Committee’s Approach to Addressing the Terms of Reference, 27 Organization and Content of This Report, 28 2 MARITIME SECURITY: COOPERATION MODES AND MODELS 30 Need for International Legal Framework, 30 Models for Maritime Security Partnerships, 32 Prerequisites for Maritime Security Partnerships, 33 The Range of Present MSP Relationships, 34 Findings and Recommendations, 42 3 INFORMATION SHARING, A KEY ENABLER 52 Maritime Security, 52 Operational Models, 56 Current and Emerging Information Architectures, 57 Building Mission Capability, 81 Protecting While Sharing Information, 112 Strengthening and Accelerating Partnership Operations and Initiatives—Mission-Driven System Engineering and Analysis, 118 xvii

xviii CONTENTS 4 IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY 123 PARTNERSHIPS The National Strategy for Maritime Security, 123 U.S. Participation in MSP, 127 Shortfalls in Operational Functions, 132 Foundations of Maritime Security Partnerships, 138 Strategic Interaction with Interagency Initiatives, 141 Finding and Recommendation, 146 APPENDIXES A Committee and Staff Biographies 151 B Sea Lanes of Commerce in the Various Regions of the World 157 C The International Legal Framework 164 D Specific Reference Information 192 E Land Imaging Satellites 201 F International Databases as Potential Sources of Shared 214 Information G Acronyms and Abbreviations 218

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To offer security in the maritime domain, governments around the world need the capabilities to directly confront common threats like piracy, drug-trafficking, and illegal immigration. No single navy or nation can do this alone.

Recognizing this new international security landscape, the former Chief of Naval Operations called for a collaborative international approach to maritime security, initially branded the "1,000-ship Navy." This concept envisions U.S. naval forces partnering with multinational, federal, state, local and private sector entities to ensure freedom of navigation, the flow of commerce, and the protection of ocean resources.

This new book from the National Research Council examines the technical and operational implications of the "1,000-ship Navy," as they apply to four levels of cooperative efforts:

  1. U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and merchant shipping only;
  2. U.S. naval and maritime assets with others in treaty alliances or analogous arrangements;
  3. U.S. naval and maritime assets with ad hoc coalitions; and
  4. U.S. naval and maritime assets with others than above who may now be friendly but could potentially be hostile, for special purposes such as deterrence of piracy or other criminal activity.
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