National Academies Press: OpenBook

The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294 (2008)

Chapter: Appendix B Literature Review

« Previous: Appendix A Congressional Request for the Study
Page 140
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 140
Page 141
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 141
Page 142
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 142
Page 143
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 143
Page 144
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 144
Page 145
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 145
Page 146
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 146
Page 147
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 147
Page 148
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 148
Page 149
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 149
Page 150
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 150
Page 151
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 151
Page 152
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 152
Page 153
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 153
Page 154
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 154
Page 155
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 155
Page 156
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 156
Page 157
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 157
Page 158
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 158
Page 159
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 159
Page 160
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 160
Page 161
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 161
Page 162
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 162
Page 163
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 163
Page 164
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 164
Page 165
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 165
Page 166
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 166
Page 167
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 167
Page 168
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 168
Page 169
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 169
Page 170
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B Literature Review." Transportation Research Board. 2008. The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12445.
×
Page 170

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Appendix B Literature Review The literature on the role of transit in emergency evacuation is not exten- sive. Nevertheless, interest in the topic has increased greatly in the wake of two events: the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in which tran- sit played a major role in the evacuation of Lower Manhattan, and more recently Hurricane Katrina, in which transit failed completely in evacuating local residents without access to a private vehicle. This review summarizes what is known from available studies about the role of transit in emergency evacuation, including both areas for improvement and limitations on the role transit can play. National Assessments of Emergency Preparedness and Evacuation Planning Congress mandated two major studies of emergency preparedness in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: (a) the U.S. Department of Home- land Security (DHS) conducted an in-depth assessment of the emergency evacuation plans of 56 states and territories and the 75 largest urban areas (DHS 2006), and (b) the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) prepared a companion report that evaluated emergency evacuation plans in the Gulf Coast region (USDOT 2006) (see Table B-1 and the discussion in the following section). Although transit was not identified separately for examination in either report, many of the findings are germane to this study. In its Nationwide Plan Review, DHS concludes that the majority of current emergency operations plans and planning processes for states and urban areas are not “fully adequate, feasible, or acceptable to manage catastrophic 140 37274mvp152_182 140 11/24/08 11:56:14 AM

TABLE B-1 37274mvp152_182 141 Summary of Primary Studies Reviewed Report Title Report Authors and Date Geographic Coverage Primary Issues Covered Nationwide Plan Review, Phase 2 U.S. Department of Homeland National In-depth assessment of emergency Report Security, 2006 response and evacuation plans of 56 states and territories and 75 largest urban areas Report to Congress on Catastrophic U.S. Department of Transportation Five Gulf Coast In-depth assessment of state and local Hurricane Evacuation Plan Evaluation in cooperation with DHS, 2006 states emergency evacuation plans Transit Emergency Planning and J. A. Goodwill and A. Reep, Florida Survey of emergency planning and Response Assessment Initiative Center for Urban Transportation response plans of transit systems in Florida Research, University of South Florida, 2005 Transportation-Disadvantaged U.S. Government Accountability National Special-needs populations Populations: Actions Needed to Office, 2006 Clarify Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations Transportation Equity in Emergen- D. Bailey, S. Swiacki, A. Byrnes, Twenty metropolitan Evaluation of emergency response and cies: A Review of the Practices of et al. 2007 areas evacuation plans of state DOTs, transit State Departments of Transportation, agencies, and metropolitan planning orga- Metropolitan Planning Organiza- nizations in 20 metropolitan areas with tions, and Transit Agencies in higher-than-average proportions of minor- 20 Metropolitan Areas ity, low-income, limited-English-proficient, and zero-vehicle households Strategies in Emergency Prepared- National Consortium on the National Special-needs populations ness for Transportation-Dependent Coordination of Human Services Populations Transportation, 2006 (continued on next page) 11/24/08 11:56:14 AM

37274mvp152_182 142 TABLE B-1 (continued) Summary of Primary Studies Reviewed Report Title Report Authors and Date Geographic Coverage Primary Issues Covered Emergency Evacuation Report Card W. Cox for the American National Evacuation capacity of the 37 largest 2006 Highway Users Alliance, 2006 urban areas, with an emphasis on highway capacity Effects of Catastrophic Events on John A. Volpe National Trans­ Selected urban areas In-depth examination of the effects of Transportation System Management portation Systems Center, with catastrophic four catastrophic emergency incidents on and Operations: Cross Cutting Study Cambridge, Mass., 2003 events transportation systems: the September 11 terrorist attack in New York City; the September 11 terrorist attack in the Washington, D.C., area; the 2001 CSX rail tunnel fire in Baltimore; and the 1994 earthquake in Northridge, California Identification and Analysis of Factors L. J. Dotson and J. Jones, Sandia National Factors contributing to the efficiency and Affecting Emergency Evacuations National Laboratories, 2005 effectiveness of public evacuations of 1,000 or more people in response to natu- ral disasters, technological hazards, and malevolent acts occurring in the United States between January 1, 1990, and June 30, 2003 Note: Reports are listed in the order in which they appear in this literature review. 11/24/08 11:56:14 AM

Literature Review 143 events” (DHS 2006, ix).,  The report attributes this performance record to four factors: • Poorly defined requirements for collaboration, fostering a tendency to plan internally. • Planning that emphasizes general roles and responsibilities rather than detailed procedures for specific hazards, scenarios, or response thresholds. • Outmoded planning processes, rudimentary tools and guidance, and insufficient planning expertise. • Lack of resource inventories and tracking mechanisms. The report cites significant weaknesses in planning for a mass evacuation as an “area of profound concern” (DHS 2006, ix). It rates only 13 percent of state plans and 7 percent of urban area plans as sufficient in describing in explicit and measurable terms how a successful mass evacuation could be conducted with current capability (DHS 2006, 8). More specifically, it rates only 12 percent of state plans and 8 percent of urban area plans as suf- ficient in estimating the time required to evacuate people located in differ- ent risk zones (DHS 2006, 23), and a similarly small fraction—18 percent of state plans and 7 percent of urban area plans—as sufficient in incorporat- ing all available modes of transportation into emergency plans. The report identifies a lack of adequate planning for special-needs populations as the most persistent shortcoming across all the operational aspects of state and  C  atastrophic events are defined as “any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the popu- lation, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A cat- astrophic event could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to state, local, tribal, and private-sector authori- ties in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened” (DHS 2006, vii).  D  HS peer review teams rated 27 percent of state emergency operations plans and only 10 per- cent of urban area plans “sufficient” with respect to the adequacy of the plan; the majority fell into the “partially sufficient” category (DHS 2006, 30). A plan was considered adequate when it complied with applicable guidance, contained valid planning assumptions, and provided a con- cept of operations that identified and addressed critical tasks effectively. The peer review teams, composed of former state and local homeland security officials, conducted site visits in all of the jurisdictions studied. They developed a scorecard for each area, establishing criteria for 34 ques- tions that were used to rate the state and urban area plans as “sufficient,” “partially sufficient,” or “not sufficient.” 37274mvp152_182 143 11/24/08 11:56:14 AM

144 The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation urban area plans. The term “special-needs populations” is broadly defined as including those without access to private vehicles and thus being poten- tial users of transit in an emergency evacuation. None of the state or urban area plans are rated sufficient on this item. The Role of Transit in Hurricane Evacuation The DHS study found that the states and urban areas in the Hurricane Belt—defined broadly to include the Gulf and Atlantic Coast states— generally had emergency plans that were more likely than other plans to be rated sufficient by the peer review teams. The report cites the role of a recurring seasonal hazard (i.e., hurricanes), as well as high population density, as an impetus for the development and maintenance of robust emergency plans in these states. The companion USDOT study mentioned earlier focuses more specifi- cally on a review of the evacuation plans of responsible state and local juris- dictions in the five hurricane-prone Gulf Coast states—Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. State and local operations plans in that region are generally rated effective with respect to highway evacuations (USDOT 2006). Two-thirds of the plans reviewed contained provisions for monitoring evacuation by motorized transport, rail, air, water, and other  T  hese elements of emergency plans are known as functional annexes. Their focus is on opera- tions before, during, and after an emergency, and they define what each function is and who is responsible for carrying it out.  S  pecial-needs populations are defined broadly to include the elderly, people with disabilities and other medical conditions, those with limited English proficiency, those with hearing and sight impairments, those who are in institutions, and those without access to private vehicles. Many of these groups have little in common beyond the fact that they are often left out of emergency planning (Kailes 2005) and that, because of their diversity of needs and vulnerability, planning for them is difficult.  T  here were some notable exceptions, however. The evacuation functional annexes of urban area emergency plans in the Hurricane Belt were rated not sufficient more often than those of plans in other U.S. urban areas.  T  he study adopted a somewhat different methodology and rating system from the DHS study. Sixty-three evacuation plans were examined for states, counties, parishes, and major urban areas within the five-state region. Plan review entailed site visits to each state to discuss plans with responsible state and local officials, coordinating where possible with the DHS site visits. The scheme for rating each plan resulted in four possible scores—marginally effective, partially effec- tive, effective, and very effective. 37274mvp152_182 144 11/24/08 11:56:15 AM

Literature Review 145 modes to determine the adequacy of resources, as well as contingency plans for securing additional vehicles if needed. At the same time, few plans pro- vided for coordination with neighboring jurisdictions, which may compete for common transportation resources. Moreover, limited information was available concerning the use of standby contracts with paratransit providers, private motor coach companies, ambulance companies, railroads, and air carriers. Most plans for urban areas included transit buses, and two-thirds designated pickup points for transit-dependent evacuees. However, few considered how evacuees would be transported to staging areas. Like the DHS study, the USDOT study found that in general, plans for evacuating persons with various special needs were not well developed. Evacuating those who are not institutionalized presents special challenges. In particular, those living independently who use wheelchairs, rely on spe- cial medical equipment, are hearing or visually impaired, and are elderly have unique communications, transportation, and sheltering requirements that require advance planning. According to the report, most evacuation plans reviewed did not consider these special needs. The report’s recom- mendations call for the following: • Joint development of regional plans for mass evacuations for events on the scale of Hurricane Katrina by state and local officials and appropri- ate federal agencies, providers of all modes of transportation and shelters, and representatives of various special-needs populations, among others. • Direct involvement of transportation agencies and operators in key aspects of evacuation planning and implementation to ensure that trans- portation is available for various special-needs groups and that agreements have been made on evacuee destinations. • Identification of the needs of those requiring specialized transporta- tion or sheltering services, and communication of these requirements to emergency managers and transportation operators in advance of an evacu- ation (USDOT 2006). Since the DHS and USDOT studies were conducted, the Federal High- way Administration within USDOT has developed a series of primers aimed at enhancing the role of transportation in evacuation planning. Although the focus is on highway evacuation, the primers provide some 37274mvp152_182 145 11/24/08 11:56:15 AM

146 The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation information about incorporating transit and evacuation of special-needs populations who lack vehicles into evacuation plans. As of this writing, two primers had been published—one focused on advance-notice evacua- tions (Houston 2006) and the other on no-notice evacuations (Zimmerman et al. 2007). Following the 2004 hurricane season, the Florida Department of Trans- portation (FDOT) conducted its own evaluation and assessment of emer- gency planning and response, focused specifically on the state’s transit systems (Goodwill and Reep 2005). In August and September of that year, Florida sustained four major hurricanes in a 6-week period—Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne. Florida has a sophisticated emergency response structure with a strong state emergency operations center (EOC) and duplicate EOCs in each of its 67 counties. FDOT’s Public Transit Office acts as the primary statewide coordinator for public transit systems and community transportation coordinators during emergencies and natural disasters (Transit’s Role in Florida’s Emergency Response 2006). Strong coordination also exists among public bus systems and school bus fleets because most school bus transportation is operated by county school boards (Florida’s Evacuations and Transit’s Role 2006). Evacuation plans involv- ing use of transit are included in each county’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, which addresses that county’s evacuation and shelter- ing needs. State and federal agencies have similar plans, with evacuation levels scaled to the expected severity of each hurricane. Despite the many strengths of the state’s emergency management struc- ture, the Florida study found that relatively few transit agencies maintain formal agreements with other transit agencies or local or regional govern-  A  t least two other detailed primers are planned for the Routes to Effective Evacuation Planning Primer Series—one on integrating multiple modes into evacuation planning for events with no notice and another on evacuating populations with special mobility requirements. Also planned is a summary overview of all five primers.  F  lorida has more than 24 fixed-route systems and 67 counties with community transportation coordinators, a state-funded position intended to help coordinate transportation for the dis­ advantaged (Transit’s Role in Florida’s Emergency Response 2006). FDOT hired the Center for Urban Transportation Research (CUTR) at the University of South Florida to survey all transit agencies and interview selected responders (Goodwill and Reep 2005).  T  hat office must also coordinate with several other state offices, including FDOT itself, the state EOC, FDOT district offices, and the Florida Commission for the Transportation Disadvantaged, as well as local transit agencies. 37274mvp152_182 146 11/24/08 11:56:15 AM

Literature Review 147 ments to provide for interagency cooperation and communication before, during, and after emergency events (Goodwill and Reep 2005).10 The study report identifies 23 best practices that, if implemented more widely, could help improve transit emergency response management in the state. The following are some of the most important of these practices: • Communicating expectations for staff, including their responsibili- ties during an emergency, staff training, and mock drills. • Protecting bus fleets, fueling in advance, and stocking emergency electric generators and backup communication devices. • Establishing and publicizing evacuation routes and bus assignments. • Preplanning for the transport of those with special needs, building on paratransit system expertise. • Developing procedures for the evacuation of homeless and transient populations. • Coordinating with evacuation shelters (Goodwill and Reep 2005). Many of these best practices, although tailored for Florida, are relevant for incorporating transit into emergency evacuations elsewhere. Evacuation of Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations Using Transit Both the DHS and USDOT studies identify a lack of adequate planning for the evacuation of special-needs populations in an emergency as a critical shortcoming of state and local area plans. Many of these populations are potential users of transit in an emergency evacuation and thus are of inter- est for the present study. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a study devoted entirely to the issue of preparedness for evacuation of “transportation-disadvantaged populations” (GAO 2006). The defini- tion of transportation-disadvantaged is very broad, encompassing not only vulnerable populations without access to private vehicles but also 10 A  mong the 29 counties that responded to the CUTR survey, only 40 percent of the fixed-route systems had such agreements and only 22 percent of the community transportation coordinators (Goodwill and Reep 2005, 38). 37274mvp152_182 147 11/24/08 11:56:15 AM

148 The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation tourists and commuters who are frequent users of transit.11 Like the DHS and USDOT studies, the GAO study found that state and local governments generally are not well prepared to evacuate transportation- disadvantaged populations with respect to planning, training, and con- ducting exercises.12 Until October 2006, federal law required that emergency plans include an evacuation plan, but there was no specific requirement that it address how to transport those who cannot self-evacuate.13 Federal law14 now requires that the mass evacuation plans of state and local governments incorporate special- needs populations. Yet despite these provisions, the GAO study identified several remaining challenges if jurisdictions are to make these requirements operational, including difficulties in • Identifying and locating transportation-disadvantaged populations because of their diverse composition and changing status, as well as inad- equate or unavailable information about their geographic location; • Handling widely varying evacuation needs, from basic transportation to accessible equipment and medical assistance; and • Providing for the actual transport of these populations in an evacua- tion, such as acquiring the appropriate vehicles and other necessary equip- ment and having trained professionals to provide assistance. 11 T  he study did not examine the evacuation of institutionalized populations (e.g., those residing in hospitals, nursing homes, or jails), nor did it address issues other than transportation that are key to successful evacuations, such as sheltering. These topics are covered in other GAO reports. 12 G  AO based its findings on a review of the literature; federal, state, and local emergency plans; and studies conducted by the federal government, experts, national associations, and organiza- tions representing the transportation-disadvantaged and their transport providers. The study also included interviews with federal officials and site visits to the District of Columbia and four cities—Buffalo, Los Angeles, Miami, and New Orleans. 13 T  his requirement is part of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, U.S. Code Title 42, Chapter 116, Subchapter 1, § 11003, “Comprehensive Emergency Response Plans,” also known as the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Title III. The act requires that community emergency response plans for chemical accidents include provisions for a precautionary evacuation and alternative traffic routes. 14 P  ublic Law 109-295, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, requires the Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide guidance for incorporating persons with disabilities or other special needs into all aspects of emergency management, including evacua- tion, housing, sheltering, transportation, and communications. 37274mvp152_182 148 11/24/08 11:56:15 AM

Literature Review 149 In addition, legal and social barriers are an issue for some populations. Examples of the former are privacy issues in sharing medical informa- tion about those requiring transportation assistance and liability issues for private transportation providers or volunteers attempting to evacuate the disabled. Examples of social issues are concern about leaving one’s home unattended or leaving a pet behind, which can affect the willingness of some individuals to consider evacuation. The GAO report identifies steps that state and local governments have already taken to address these challenges. For example, some jurisdictions have worked with their metropolitan planning organizations and academic institutions to identify transportation-disadvantaged populations, using computerized mapping to locate those who are transit-dependent. In other cases, state and local entities not traditionally included in emergency man- agement and training—social service agencies, nonprofit organizations, and transportation providers for special populations (e.g., those offer- ing paratransit for the disabled)—are involved in preparedness planning efforts. In still other cases, memoranda of understanding and mutual-aid agreements have been established with other jurisdictions to help ensure that additional vehicles, drivers, and equipment will be available in the event of an emergency that overwhelms local response capability. Such prior arrangements may also address liability concerns and financial issues (e.g., reimbursement rates for drivers and equipment). The Federal Transit Administration (Office of Civil Rights) com­mis­ sioned a study of the emergency response and evacuation plans of state DOTs, transit agencies, and metropolitan planning organizations in 20 metropolitan areas with higher-than-average proportions of minor- ity, low-income, limited-English-proficiency, and zero-vehicle households (Bailey et al. 2007). Although most of the neighborhoods inhabited by these populations are well served by transit, which could play a role in evacuating those without other means of transportation, few of the agen- cies surveyed for the study had taken steps to include the transportation- disadvantaged in emergency plans. None of the plans reviewed identified the mobility needs of these populations, only a few agencies had targeted them in evacuation plans and communication strategies, and none of the agencies had measures in place for coordinating with other agencies for the transport of these populations both before and during an emergency. 37274mvp152_182 149 11/24/08 11:56:15 AM

150 The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation The study report offers four recommendations for enhancing consider- ation of the transportation-disadvantaged in emergency response plans: • Develop demographic profiles of the numbers and locations of transportation-disadvantaged populations to help in estimating the num- ber of people who may not be able to self-evacuate, planning evacuation routes and staging areas, and conducting targeted community outreach on emergency preparedness. • Encourage more public input in the establishment of emergency plans from those organizations knowledgeable about transportation-disadvantaged populations, including faith-based and community-based organizations. • Develop strategies for effective communication of emergency plans on the basis of demographic information about concentrations of limited- English-proficiency and other special-needs populations, as well as out- reach to community-based organizations. • Encourage transit agencies to be clear about their role in the event of an emergency; understand command and control procedures for use of their assets; and improve communication and coordination with county and state emergency management agencies, which have lead responsibil- ity for emergency response and evacuation. In September 2006, the National Consortium on the Coordination of Human Services Transportation15 issued a strategy paper and checklist on emergency preparedness for transportation-dependent populations. The paper built on a day-long panel discussion of emergency preparedness transportation among public and private transportation providers, com- munity organizations, government agencies, and national organizations (National Consortium on the Coordination of Human Services Transpor- tation 2006). The focus of the discussion was on the role that public and community transportation services can play in transporting individuals who may require assistance during an emergency—a narrower focus than the GAO study. The paper notes several key elements involved in suc- 15 T  he consortium, which operates under the auspices of the Community Transportation Associa- tion of America, is an alliance of national nonprofit organizations and associations dedicated to promoting mobility and the delivery of coordinated human services transportation for all individuals with disabilities, those with low incomes, older adults, and youths. 37274mvp152_182 150 11/24/08 11:56:16 AM

Literature Review 151 cessfully meeting the transportation needs of vulnerable populations in responding to an emergency, including the following: • Advance planning and collaboration among a variety of partners, includ- ing transportation agencies; emergency responders; and community-based groups, such as advocacy organizations, agencies that serve transportation- dependent populations, employment and training providers, health and human service agencies, and local faith-based organizations. •  Identification and tracking of the locations and needs of transportation-dependent individuals both before and during an emergency, including developing voluntary registries of those requiring transportation assistance; matching individual needs with appropriate transportation ser- vice providers; and ensuring the availability of accessible vehicles where needed, as well as the transport of personal caregivers. • Information on how, when, and where transportation services will be provided in an emergency (e.g., route maps and transit stop locations provided well in advance of such an event), as well as methods for com- municating with vulnerable populations in a variety of accessible formats during an emergency. • Agreements on where and when vehicles might be staged and stored during an emergency and the development of contractual agreements well in advance of such an event to ensure adequate availability of accessible vehicles, appropriate lift equipment, and fuel; means of accommodating service animals; liability coverage; funding arrangements; and methods for dealing with regulations involving charter bus companies or use of transit or intercity passenger railcars on nonstandard routes or tracks. • Development of a system of checkpoints for use by public and commu- nity transportation service providers during an emergency that feeds into the broader emergency evacuation plan, along with provisions for information sharing and communication among these providers during such an event. Evacuation of the Disabled Using Transit In July 2004, President Bush signed Executive Order 13347, Individuals with Disabilities in Emergency Preparedness, to help ensure that the federal government supports and strengthens measures incorporated in emer- 37274mvp152_182 151 11/24/08 11:56:16 AM

152 The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation gency preparedness plans to enhance the safety and security of those with disabilities. The executive order created the Interagency Coordinating Council on Emergency Preparedness and Individuals with Disabilities, chaired by DHS through its Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, to help with the order’s implementation. The Office of Civil Rights and Liberties participated in DHS’s Nation- wide Plan Review.16 That review found that few state and urban area plans reflected in-depth planning and proactive thinking with respect to meet- ing the needs of people with disabilities before, during, and after an emer- gency (DHS 2006). Most plans failed to address evacuation for persons with disabilities (DHS 2006). Some jurisdictions were devising ways for such individuals to preidentify themselves voluntarily to receive evacua- tion assistance, such as through special registries, but the report stresses that these plans must be updated regularly so that unrealistic expectations regarding evacuation assistance are not raised. The report notes that a critical but often overlooked component of the evacuation process is the timely availability of accessible transportation for people with disabilities, especially lift-equipped vehicles. These would presumably include para- transit vehicles, provided either by a transit agency or by a local school district. In fact, the report points to one urban area that had arranged with a local school district and its paratransit provider to use existing lift- equipped vehicles to assist with evacuation of persons with disabilities in a general emergency. As with the DHS study, USDOT had its Office of Civil Rights participate in its study of the catastrophic evacuation plans of the Gulf Coast states.17 The study report reinforces the finding of the DHS study that plans for evacuating disabled persons who are living independently were not well 16 A  review panel of 11 disability subject-matter experts was formed to review the documents sub- mitted by the state and urban areas participating in the Nationwide Plan Review. An assessment tool was designed specifically to capture information on the extent to which disability-related planning and readiness issues were integrated into state and urban area plans and to ensure a consistent assessment of these plans (DHS 2006). 17 U  SDOT also established the Emergency Transportation Subcommittee to support the goals of Executive Order 13347 and the work of the Interagency Coordinating Council on Emergency Preparedness and Individuals with Disabilities. The subcommittee serves as a mechanism for evaluating the status of emergency preparedness with respect to persons with disabilities and transportation systems. It is currently evaluating existing transportation regulations for the dis- abled in the context of emergencies and will provide examples of best practices. 37274mvp152_182 152 11/24/08 11:56:16 AM

Literature Review 153 developed (USDOT 2006). Identifying the locations of these individuals, handling the logistics for their evacuation, and addressing their special sheltering needs are all major challenges. Behavioral Issues in Evacuation A major issue affecting an area’s ability to plan for an emergency evacuation is uncertainty about the numbers of evacuees. Many people tend to wait until the last minute before evacuating, putting themselves and others at risk. Others may evacuate when doing so is unnecessary and it would be safer for them to shelter at home. The latter was the case in the “shadow” evacuation from Houston when Category 5 Hurricane Rita was bearing down on the region less than 1 month after Hurricane Katrina (Peacock et al. 2007). Risk perception and risk communication are critical to the decision to evacuate and the timing of that decision. A considerable literature exists on understanding risk and improving risk communication (e.g., NRC 1989; NRC 1996) and on risk communication in emergency conditions, when the credibility of the communicator is essential, messages must be understand- able, and openness about uncertainties is critical (CDC 1995). Another study is focused on warnings and decision making (Mileti 1999). In an emergency, communicating with vulnerable populations, many of whom are potential transit users should an evacuation prove necessary, presents special challenges. A recent review of the literature offers several examples (Phillips and Morrow 2007). Households with older members are often reluctant to evacuate, a finding that was vividly illustrated during Hurricane Katrina; current estimates suggest that close to 70 percent of Katrina fatalities were among those over age 65. Those who live in pov- erty, particularly female-headed households, have also reported difficul- ties in responding effectively to hurricane warnings (Enarson and Morrow 1997 in Phillips and Morrow 2007). Many racial and ethnic groups are less likely to accept a warning as credible without confirming it through other sources, such as family and social networks, thereby delaying evacuation (Lindell and Perry 2004 in Phillips and Morrow 2007). Finally, researchers have found that many persons with disabilities want to respond to warn- ings but lack the necessary support to assist with the evacuation and per- ceive that shelters cannot accommodate their needs (Willigen et al. 2002 37274mvp152_182 153 11/24/08 11:56:16 AM

154 The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation in Phillips and Morrow 2007). The authors of the review conclude that the research on warning messages and vulnerable populations is inadequate to provide reliable guidance to forecasters and emergency managers on the best ways to target warnings to high-risk populations. Highway Capacity Issues in Emergency Evacuation Many of the reports cited above address emergency evacuation from the perspective of those populations served by transit. Another approach is to focus on the capacity of transportation systems to handle an emergency evacuation. In late 2006, the American Highway Users Alliance (AHUA) issued a report (Cox 2006) focused on assessing the evacuation capacity of the 37 largest urban areas, essentially the same subset of urban areas examined in the present study. The analysis assumed that the entire urban area would have to be evacuated and that highways and private vehicles would be the principal means of evacuation. Why, then, is the AHUA study relevant for an investigation of the role of transit in emergency evacuation? The short answer is buses. Many of the transit systems of the 37 urban areas reviewed in the AHUA study are bus only. Moreover, many urban areas with rail systems would presumably use buses as well in an evacuation. Thus, highway capacity and coordina- tion between bus and automobile traffic are key issues for consideration in planning for a successful evacuation.18 The method used to evaluate and rate evacuation capacity in the AHUA study was based on three factors: (a) exit capacity—an estimate of the abil- ity of roads and highways leading out of an urban area to accommodate the evacuating population, (b) internal traffic flow—an estimate of the ability of roadway systems within an urban area to deliver traffic to exit routes, 18 E  vacuation capacity by bus is considerably larger than that by car. One estimate suggests that a highway lane carrying 600 buses an hour at an average capacity of 25 passengers each would evacuate 15,000 passengers per hour (Litman 2005). (According to the Highway Capacity Man- ual, a bus or truck represents 1.5 to 2.5 passenger car equivalents. Buses typically carry about 50 passengers, but with evacuees carrying baggage and wheelchairs, lower passenger load assumptions are more realistic.) By comparison, a highway lane can accommodate a maximum of 2,000 vehicles per hour, but more likely only 1,000 persons per hour in the congestion and confusion of an evacuation. Assuming an average vehicle occupancy rate of 2.5 passengers, each passenger car–only highway lane would evacuate 2,500 people per hour. 37274mvp152_182 154 11/24/08 11:56:16 AM

Literature Review 155 and (c) automobile access—an estimate of the percentage of the popula- tion that will evacuate by car (Cox 2006). These three factors are weighted together to produce an evacuation capacity index and a letter grade from A (best) to F (worst). Only four urban areas received an A or B grade; the vast majority fell into the bottom grade. The primary factors associated with a high score were lower population densities, higher-capacity roadway systems, and a lack of significant geographic barriers blocking exit direc- tions. The conclusion of the study is that there is considerable latitude for improving the evacuation capacity of the nation’s largest urban areas. One section of the report focuses on evacuating those who are transit- dependent, arguing that planning for those who cannot self-evacuate is a gov- ernment responsibility and far more complex than evacuating by automobile. Nevertheless, considerable resources are available to evacuate the transit- dependent, including buses—transit buses, school buses, motor coaches, and paratransit vehicles—and rail. According to the study, buses would be the most useful in evacuating those without cars because they can bring passen- gers directly to evacuation centers and return to make additional trips (Cox 2006). Subways and light rail could also be used, but in many areas rail serves primarily the central district.19 In these areas, the principal use of rail would be to feed buses that would complete the evacuation to destinations outside the urban area. In a few areas, high-capacity commuter rail and Amtrak, par- ticularly in the Northeast Corridor, could supplement bus traffic, but pro- vision would have to be made for transporting passengers to shelters from end-of-the-line stations. Finally, taxis and rental cars could be used, but the cost would probably be prohibitive for many transit-dependent households. The report offers several suggestions for improving evacuation by transit: • Establishing expedited exclusive bus routes so that buses could avoid the worst traffic congestion and make return trips, increasing the numbers of those who could be evacuated.20 • Establishing agreements among transportation providers, including standby or expedited contracts, in advance of an emergency so that operators 19 D  epending on the emergency, the rail system itself could be compromised. 20 W  here they are available, strategic use of lower-capacity exit routes, such as two-lane arterials, as exclusive bus routes might be preferable to attempting to enforce exclusive bus lanes on over- crowded major highways being used by cars. 37274mvp152_182 155 11/24/08 11:56:16 AM

156 The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation would know what is required of them and drivers would be available and assured of payment. • Ensuring that communications capabilities would be operative so that drivers and equipment could be deployed effectively during an evacuation. Contraflow for Emergency Evacuation One means of increasing highway capacity is to use contraflow techniques to increase traffic flow dramatically during an emergency evacuation. Con- traflow involves the reversal of traffic flow on one or more of the inbound lanes and shoulders of roads and highways for use in the outbound direc- tion to increase evacuation capacity by using both sides of a roadway (Wolshon et al. 2001). Lane reversal is used in many larger urban areas to increase peak hour capacity on certain major highways, but contraflow operations for mass evacuation require a far more substantial effort. Before an event, provision must be made for lane crossover points for outbound traffic onto inbound lanes; traffic direction, including intersection, ramp, and exit control, by law enforcement personnel; and coordination of bus and automobile traffic. In addition, adequate inbound capacity must be preserved to bring emergency vehicles and equipment to the site of the emergency. During an evacuation, provision must also be made for fueling and rest stops en route, expedited removal of vehicles that break down, and access to the roadway for emergency vehicles. Contraflow measures underwent a critical test during Hurricane Katrina, when those with access to an automobile were evacuated successfully in advance of the storm (Wolshon 2006). In contrast, there was no effective plan for evacuating residents without access to reliable personal transporta- tion. The city had established ten locations where city buses were to pick such individuals up and take them to emergency shelters, but many drivers were evacuating their own families, the equipment was inadequate even if drivers had been available, and many public buses were ruined in the flood- ing (Litman 2005).21 21 S  ome 500 transit and school buses were available, but even assuming each bus could carry a maximum of 50 passengers each, they could have met only about 25 percent of evacuation needs unless multiple trips in and out of the city could have been arranged (Litman 2005). 37274mvp152_182 156 11/24/08 11:56:17 AM

Literature Review 157 Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, many jurisdictions studied the feasibility of adopting contraflow measures for emergency evacuation. The State of Florida, for example, held a major workshop on contraflow on Feb- ruary 14–15, 2006, at which hurricane-affected states shared experiences with contraflow (FDOT 2006), identifying practices that have worked well and those that have not.22 The workshop also identified many issues that remain to be resolved if bus transport is to be used successfully as part of contra­flow operations. Effective bus use in an evacuation requires coordi- nating bus and automobile traffic and giving some priority to expedited bus travel both outbound and inbound so that buses can make multiple trips. Effect of Transit System Characteristics on Emergency Transit Use A considerable body of literature exists on the factors influencing transit ridership (Taylor and Fink 2007), several of which could affect the pro- pensity of urban area residents to use transit in an emergency evacuation. Several studies have linked high transit ridership with high residential and employment densities (Pushkarev and Zupan 1977); others have linked it with mixed-use development and urban design (Crane 2000; Cervero 1993). High densities in particular make it easy for large numbers of residents and workers to access transit—an important consideration if transit is to play a role in emergency evacuation. Many areas with higher densities and multi- family housing also tend to be populated by lower-income households with lower levels of automobile access. Although it is difficult to sort out the respective importance of spatial and socioeconomic variables in explaining transit ridership in general (Taylor and Fink 2007), the distinction is less critical from the perspective of potential transit use for emergency evacua- tion; transit use is typically higher among lower-income individuals, who are thus apt to turn to transit for transport during such an event. Transit users can also be classified into two groups—captive and choice riders—a useful way of thinking about the use of transit in an emergency evacuation (Krizek and El-Geneidy 2006). Captive riders typically lack an alternative to transit and therefore use it as their primary means of 22 T  he workshop was hosted by FDOT and cosponsored by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, the Federal Highway Administration, and the I-95 Cor- ridor Coalition. 37274mvp152_182 157 11/24/08 11:56:17 AM

158 The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation transport; choice riders have realistic alternatives (e.g., driving) but choose to use transit for certain trips. Service availability and reliability affect ridership for both groups (Krizek and El-Geneidy 2006). In an emer- gency, captive riders would depend on transit for evacuation unless family or friends had access to a car. Choice riders, particularly commuters, could use transit, particularly in a no-notice emergency requiring an evacuation, if they had not brought their car to work or if the roads were clogged as was the case on September 11, 2001. Recent research in California found that immigrants fall into the captive rider group when they first come to the United States (Blumenberg and Evans 2007). They tend to settle initially in large urban centers and more densely populated “ports of entry” in the state, which are better served by transit than are other areas. As they assimilate and their economic status rises, however, they tend to purchase and use cars. The three main factors that determine their continued transit use are year of arrival in the United States, prevalence of driving and cars in their country of origin, and legal status (i.e., whether they can legally obtain a driver’s license) (Blumenberg and Evans 2007). The large numbers of new immigrants who arrive in many large urban areas suggest that many would be transit users in an emergency evacuation. If they are to use transit successfully during such an event, emergency managers and transit service providers must provide emergency response and evacuation information in appropriate languages. Role of Transit in Transport for Special Events and Emergency Evacuation Exercises Special events, such as the Olympics, major sports events, and Fourth of July celebrations on the National Mall, can provide an indication of the surge capacity of transit systems and highways in nonemergency conditions. Effective delivery of transportation services to accommodate ingress to and egress from the location of such events often requires cooperation among agencies that usually do not work together and use of innovative operating practices, both of which can be valuable in an emergency evacuation. Each Fourth of July, the District of Columbia hosts upwards of 400,000 residents and tourists who come to view the fireworks on the National Mall. Those attending the event are urged to use transit. To accommodate the 37274mvp152_182 158 11/24/08 11:56:17 AM

Literature Review 159 crowds, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), the regional transit system, has altered service in numerous ways, includ- ing adding rail equipment, shortening headways, and extending normal hours of service; implementing station control to avoid overcrowding; and using farebox and turnstile control to lessen passenger bottlenecks. Highway capacity is also enhanced by means of police control at critical intersections and changes in signal timing on certain routes to enhance the movement of vehicular traffic and pedestrians. In 2005, the District Department of Transportation used the Fourth of July celebration to con- duct a real-time test of four roads designated as emergency evacuation routes (DDOT 2005). Coordinating agencies included the District Emer- gency Management Agency, the Metropolitan Police Department, the U.S. Park Police, the U.S. Capitol Police, and the Office of Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton. The test was deemed a success but revealed sev- eral areas for improvement, including more reliable traffic signal timing, better coordination with the Advance Traffic Management Center, better staging and staffing of Metro buses, and collection of baseline traffic data with which to evaluate flow improvements with expedited traffic signals. In 2006 Chicago’s Office of Emergency Management and Communica- tions conducted a first-of-its-kind emergency exercise involving evacua- tion of four commercial high-rise buildings in the central business district at the height of peak hour traffic in which more than 4,000 individuals participated. The purpose was to test emergency notification and commu- nication systems; evacuate building occupants to assembly and transporta- tion centers; test these centers’ intake, registration, and triage operations; and increase public awareness and education regarding emergency pre- paredness. The Chicago Transit Authority, the second-largest transit sys- tem in the United States, was part of the exercise and staged buses at the centers, although no one was actually evacuated. An after-action report was prepared (Office of Emergency Management and Communications of the City of Chicago 2007). Many other urban areas conduct tabletop exercises and drills each year to test one or more components of emer- gency response and evacuation plans that may involve transit (e.g., annual hurricane exercises in many Gulf Coast states and bistate exercises to test evacuation of New Jersey commuters across the Hudson River in the event of an emergency in Manhattan). 37274mvp152_182 159 11/24/08 11:56:17 AM

160 The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation Role of Transit in No-Notice Emergencies Many of the studies reviewed in the preceding sections have examined emergency preparedness for and use of transit in emergencies, such as hurricanes, for which there is some advance warning or notice. This sec- tion focuses on what is known about the role of transit in evacuations dur- ing no-notice emergencies, such as September 11. Such evacuations can be necessitated by human-caused emergencies, such as a terrorist event or a chemical spill or nuclear release, or by natural disasters, such as an earthquake. Terrorist Event The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were the largest in the nation’s history. Transit played an important role in the immediate evacuations that followed the events in both New York City and the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, as well as in transporting emergency workers and equipment. The events and lessons learned are well catalogued in a 2003 study by USDOT’s John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (NTSC) (NTSC 2003). New York City is the most densely populated urban area in the United States and has the highest level of transit ridership. On a typical weekday, daily volume for all transit modes totals 7.6 million riders (NTSC 2003, 13). Following Mayor Giuliani’s instruction to evacuate Lower Manhattan a little more than 2 hours after the first plane crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center during the morning peak hour, transportation agencies were faced with the daunting task of evacuating some 1.2 mil- lion workers and residents of the area (NTSC 2003). Within minutes of the attack, subway services into Lower Manhattan had been suspended and bridge and tunnel crossings into Manhattan closed. Both New York City Transit (NYCT) and Port Authority of New York and New Jersey–run PATH trains began emergency procedures almost immediately after the first strike to evacuate those in World Trade Center stations, and PATH operated express trains from Manhattan back to New Jersey.23 New Jersey 23 T  he 900 passengers on the last PATH train to enter the World Trade Center station were told that the train would not stop in the station; it returned safely to New Jersey before the station was 37274mvp152_182 160 11/24/08 11:56:17 AM

Literature Review 161 Transit provided for evacuation on its trains from New York City’s Penn- sylvania Station and on buses staged in New Jersey. It also supported emergency response units with employees, buses, and equipment on stripped-down railcars, which were rushed to the World Trade Center site. Likewise, NYCT made available a fleet of buses and personnel to help shuttle emergency responders to and from the site (American Public Transportation Association 2001). The Coast Guard helped organize a flo- tilla of water ferries and private boats, making a radio call to “all available boats” to help evacuate approximately 300,000 from Lower Manhattan following the collapse of the North Tower (Kendra et al. 2003).24 When the Port Authority’s main emergency control center was lost in the towers’ collapse, both NYCT and New Jersey Transit depended on mobile com- munications centers—transit buses equipped with satellite and computer technology—for communications support. By midmorning, most New York City businesses had closed for the day, releasing some 2.6 million commuters outside of Lower Manhattan to find their way home. At that time, most transit options were limited, with both the subway and commuter rail systems being shut down. Approximately 4 hours after the attack, partial NYCT subway service was resumed; redundant subway tunnels helped restore service between Manhattan and Brooklyn later in the day as trains were rerouted from the area of the attack. Outbound travel on PATH and the Long Island Rail Road also resumed later in the afternoon. The Metropolitan Transportation Author- ity bus system continued to operate throughout the day, running north of Lower Manhattan. In sum, transit was critical in the evacuation of many of those in harm’s way in Lower Manhattan immediately following the event; it was less of a factor in handling the surge of commuters in other parts of Manhattan as rail service was shut down for part of the day. Transit also played a role following the terrorist strike on the Pentagon. Like New York, Washington, D.C., has one of the highest proportions of transit use in the nation—16 percent of commuters use it to get to work destroyed in the World Trade Center towers’ collapse (American Public Transportation Associa- tion 2001). 24 A  lthough it had legal authority to take over the evacuation, the Coast Guard perceived that the evacuation was going well and played a largely supporting role. 37274mvp152_182 161 11/24/08 11:56:17 AM

162 The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation (NTSC 2003).25 That day, despite some communications issues, WMATA continued operations (with some closures near the Pentagon) to assist in the evacuation of those attempting to leave the city.26 The uncoordinated release of federal workers nearly 2 hours after the event, combined with the closure of Virginia Railway Express commuter rail, Maryland Transit Administration’s MARC commuter rail, and Amtrak service, placed con- siderable strain on the Metrorail system. WMATA also provided buses to help transport the injured and assist the D.C. Metropolitan Police in mov- ing personnel to various locations around the area. The NTSC study offers several recommendations for addressing an unplanned emergency evacuation that are relevant for transit systems and for successful evacuation more generally. They include the need for the following: • Advance planning and a well-established chain of command, because transportation officials must begin to implement evacuation plans and institute recovery procedures almost immediately after an emergency. • A well-rehearsed communications plan covering both internal and interagency communications. • Redundant systems—multiple methods of communication in case major communications centers are destroyed as they were on September 11, backup generators,27 and redundant critical infrastructure (e.g., subway tunnels and bridges) (NTSC 2003). Earthquakes and Release of Hazardous Materials The extent to which transit can assist in emergency evacuation directly after an earthquake depends on the severity of the quake, its location, and whether the transit system itself is compromised. On Tuesday, October 17, 1989, the Loma Prieta earthquake, registering 7.1 on the Richter scale, 25 A  verage weekday daily ridership tops 1 million. During the height of the peak hour, Metro moves close to 100,000 customers (WMATA 2006). 26 M  idmorning on September 11, the Metropolitan Police Department notified the Metro Police of a possible threat to Metro, suggesting that WMATA consider closing the system. Metrorail officials, in consultation with the FBI, decided to keep the system open (NTSC 2003). 27 I  n New York City, mobile generators enabled the restoration of power to some emergency control centers and prevented extensive water damage to subway tunnels and communications net- works (NTSC 2003). 37274mvp152_182 162 11/24/08 11:56:18 AM

Literature Review 163 struck the San Francisco Bay Area at 5:04 p.m. local time. The epicenter was located some 70 miles from the cities of San Francisco and Oakland, but the quake significantly damaged area highways and bridges, closing the San Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge and destroying the Cypress Street Viaduct along the Nimitz Freeway in Oakland, which feeds the Bay Bridge (Dames and Moore Earthquake Engineering Group 1999). The timing was such that the earthquake could have had a major effect on freeway com- muters during the evening rush hour. Fortunately, traffic was unusually light; many people had left early to see the World Series game between the Oakland Athletics and the San Francisco Giants or were already at Candlestick Park when the earthquake struck.28 Less than 3 hours after the earthquake, emergency ferry service provided by Crowley Maritime, a private provider, evacuated those stranded on the wrong side of the bay (Hansen and Weinstein 1991). Although inspec- tion of the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system’s underwater trans-bay tube showed no damage, many commuters were reluctant to take BART across the bay because of concerns about being trapped in the tunnel in an aftershock. Thus, BART did not play a major role in moving passengers immediately after the earthquake. It did, however, become the primary passenger transportation link between the San Francisco and East Bay communities on the Monday following the quake when commuters were expected to return to work (Dames and Moore Earthquake Engineering Group 1999). During the first full business week after the event, ridership grew from a normal average of 218,000 passengers per day to an average of 308,000 passengers per day. The Golden Gate Ferry and Golden Gate Transit Bus System provided another option for commuters, the Golden Gate Bridge being undamaged by the earthquake. Some of the 30,000 to 40,000 drivers diverted from the Bay Bridge used the Golden Gate Ferry and Richmond–San Rafael Bridge as alternatives, and to a lesser extent the Golden Gate Transit Bus System.29 Overall, transit played a major role as an alternative mode of travel after the earthquake (Deakin 1991) but played a lesser role as a means of evacuation. 28 e  n.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loma_Prieta_earthquake, accessed February 6, 2007. 29 I  ncreases in ridership on the Golden Gate Ferry averaged 40 percent over the 3 months follow- ing the quake (Golden Gate Bridge, Highway, and Transportation District 2006). Golden Gate Transit Bus ridership grew more modestly, by approximately 4 percent. 37274mvp152_182 163 11/24/08 11:56:18 AM

164 The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation A release of hazardous materials may also trigger an evacuation. On July 18, 2001, Baltimore firefighters were notified that a CSX freight train was on fire in the Howard Street Tunnel, located in the heart of the city’s business and tourist districts. The train was carrying a variety of hazardous materials (NTSC 2003). Emergency response was further complicated by a 40-inch water main break located almost directly above the site of the derailment, which spilled water into the tunnel and onto the street. The event occurred just as the city was preparing for the evening peak hour and a baseball doubleheader at nearby Camden Yards stadium. Emergency responders were faced with a potential evacuation of the downtown area. Fortunately, they ascertained that the hazardous materials involved in the fire would not pose a serious environmental hazard, and evacuation proved unnecessary. The tunnel fire, however, had an immediate impact on transportation in Baltimore City (NTSC 2003). City streets were closed in the vicinity of the tunnel; the Maryland Transit Administration subway station closest to the fire was shut down; buses were rerouted around the closures; and light rail service in the vicinity of the water main break was disrupted, as was MARC commuter rail and Oriole game-day service. The Maryland Transit Administration set up a “bus bridge” to supplement service, bring- ing MARC passengers into the city and the game. Despite the disruption, the city was cleared of traffic within 2 hours of the end of the normal peak hour period (NTSC 2003). During this event, the primary role of transit was to help ease service disruptions. Nuclear Power Plant Accidents A nuclear power plant accident is likely to trigger an evacuation, with many people choosing to leave even if evacuation is not mandated. For- tunately, radiological releases are rare occurrences, although fears of a terrorist incident involving a nuclear facility have increased significantly since the attacks of September 11. The most noteworthy nuclear accident, of course, was at Three Mile Island in 1979. Richard Thornburgh, Gov- ernor of Pennsylvania at the time, recommended that some 3,400 preg- nant women and preschool children within a 5-mile radius of the plant leave, and schools within that area were closed. Evacuation plans for some 650,000 people living within 20 miles of the plant were prepared, but a 37274mvp152_182 164 11/24/08 11:56:18 AM

Literature Review 165 full-scale evacuation proved unnecessary (Pennsylvania Highways n.d.). Nevertheless, continuing uncertainty over the status of the plant and the beginning of the weekend prompted a spontaneous evacuation of about 200,000 people—nearly 40 percent of the population within 15 miles of the reactor (Zeigler and Johnson 1984). Numerous studies of evacuation behavior during the Three Mile Island incident suggest that the public is likely to overrespond to evacuation orders because of their fear of radiation exposure (Dotson and Jones 2005). If plans are not carefully formulated and implemented, self-evacuations of those farther from the event site could hinder the evacuation of those closer in and thus at higher risk. After the Three Mile Island accident, the Nuclear Regulatory Commis- sion and the Federal Emergency Management Agency instituted a require- ment that jurisdictions with nuclear power facilities, as well as neighboring jurisdictions, establish and exercise evacuation and sheltering-in-place procedures and identify vulnerable populations, including persons with disabilities. Many areas have also conducted evacuation time studies. It is not surprising, then, that the majority of jurisdictions that receive high marks for evacuation in the DHS Nationwide Plan Review are those with fixed nuclear facilities (DHS 2006). Nevertheless, many issues remain, particularly with respect to evacuating those without cars. The availability of buses—and more important, drivers—to transport those without access to a private vehicle in the event of a radiological release continues to be a concern. Summary and Findings Recent comprehensive reviews of emergency plans in all states and the 75 largest urban areas have found significant weaknesses in evacuation planning. Particularly relevant for the present study, only a small fraction of states and urban areas have incorporated all available modes of transpor- tation into their evacuation plans. Plans of state and local jurisdictions in the five hurricane-prone Gulf Coast states, which face recurring seasonal hazards and have high population densities, are generally rated effective for highway evacuations. However, there is little evidence of provisions for coordination between bus and automobile traffic or expedited use of higher-capacity buses during an evacuation. Moreover, the reviews deem 37274mvp152_182 165 11/24/08 11:56:18 AM

166 The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation all plans woefully inadequate with respect to the evacuation of those who are transit-dependent and may require special assistance (e.g., the elderly, the disabled) in reaching bus staging areas and rail stations or may need on-demand accessible vehicles. In addition, few plans provide for coordi- nation with neighboring jurisdictions in the event of an emergency evacu- ation or have standby contracts with paratransit providers, private motor coach companies, ambulance companies, or railroads to ensure that equip- ment and drivers will be available should local capacity prove insufficient. Transit, particularly buses and rail systems with regional coverage, can play a critical role in emergency evacuation, assuming that the systems themselves are not compromised during the event. Typically, however, limited time is available when an emergency strikes; transportation offi- cials frequently must implement evacuation plans and recovery proce- dures almost immediately following the event. Thus, advance planning, a well-established chain of command, and provision for communication among key responders and with the general public are critical to a success- ful evacuation. Many of the studies reviewed in this survey of the literature offer sug- gestions for strengthening the role of transit in emergency evacuations: • Inclusion of transit providers, as well as social service agencies, in the development of emergency plans. • Identification of transit-dependent populations and those requiring special assistance in an evacuation through special registries and com- puter mapping and provision of this information to emergency respond- ers, including information on where these individuals should be taken, well in advance of an event. • Specification of the responsibilities of essential transit personnel in an emergency, provision for the evacuation needs of their families, and securing of transit equipment to the extent possible. • Establishment of means of communication, including contingency communications plans, among transit agency personnel and with other emergency responders. • Development of memoranda of understanding with neighboring juris- dictions, sometimes across state lines, as well as standby contracts with private providers to help ensure that transit vehicles, including accessible 37274mvp152_182 166 11/24/08 11:56:18 AM

Literature Review 167 equipment and trained drivers, will be available to meet surge require- ments in an emergency and that transport destinations will be clear. • Establishment of protocols with a clear chain of command and check- lists for critical transit personnel and emergency responders. • Provision of emergency evacuation information in accessible formats to the public, particularly vulnerable populations, regarding how they can access transit (e.g., bus staging areas) and obtain assistance, if necessary, during an emergency evacuation. • Frequent drills and exercises, including evacuation of vulnerable popu- lations, under a wide range of emergency scenarios to determine how well evacuation plans work in practice, and planning of revisions accordingly. References Abbreviations DDOT District Department of Transportation DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention FDOT Florida Department of Transportation GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office NRC National Research Council NTSC John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center USDOT U.S. Department of Transportation WMATA Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority American Public Transportation Association. 2001. America Under Threat: Transit Responds to Terrorism. September 11, 2001, Special Report. Supplement to Passenger Transport. Wash- ington, D.C. Bailey, D., S. Swiacki, A. Byrnes, J. Buckley, D. King, V. Piper, M. Marino, S. Mundle, G. Pierlott, and A. Lynd. 2007. Transportation Equity in Emergencies: A Review of the Practices of State Departments of Transportation, Metropolitan Planning Organizations, and Transit Agencies in 20 Metropolitan Areas. Final Report. FTA-PA-26-8001-2007. Milligan & Company, LLC, and Mundle & Associates, Philadelphia, Pa., May. Blumenberg, E., and A. E. Evans. 2007. Transportation Assimilation: Immigrants, Race and Ethnicity, and Mode Choice. Prepared for 87th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, Washington, D.C., 2008. CDC. 1995. Crisis Emergency Risk Communication by Leaders for Leaders. Atlanta, Ga. 37274mvp152_182 167 11/24/08 11:56:18 AM

168 The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation Cervero, R. 1993. Ridership Impacts of Transit-Focused Development in California. Chapter 2. National Transit Access Center, University of California, Berkeley. Cox, W. 2006. Emergency Evacuation Report Card 2006. American Highway Users Alliance, Washington, D.C., Oct. 13. www.highways.org/pdfs/evacuation_report_card2006.pdf. Crane, R. 2000. The Impacts of Urban Form on Travel: An Interpretive Review. Journal of Planning Literature, Vol. 15, pp. 2–23. Dames and Moore Earthquake Engineering Group. 1999. The Loma Prieta Earthquake: Impact on Lifeline Systems. Disaster Recovery Journal Online. Deakin, E. 1991. Transportation Impacts of the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake: The Bay Bridge Closure. Working Paper. UCTC No. 294. University of California Transportation Cen- ter, University of California, Berkeley, Oct. DDOT. 2005. July 4th 2005 Emergency/Evacuation Route Test After-Action Report. Wash- ington, D.C. DHS. 2006. Nationwide Plan Review, Phase 2 Report. Washington, D.C., June 16. www.dhs. gov/xlibrary/assets/Prep_NationwidePlanReview.pdf. Dotson, L. J., and J. Jones. 2005. Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations. Main Report. NUREG/CR-6864, Vol. 1. Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, N. Mex., Jan. Enarson, E., and B. H. Morrow. 1997. A Gendered Perspective: The Voices of Women. In Hurricane Andrew: Ethnicity, Gender, and the Sociology of Disasters (W. G. Peacock, B. H. Morrow, and H. Gladwin, eds.), International Hurricane Research Center, Miami, Fla., pp. 116–140. FDOT. 2006. Contra Flow Workshop. Orlando, Fla., Feb. 14–15. Florida’s Evacuations and Transit’s Role. 2006. CUTRlines, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 4. GAO. 2006. Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify Responsi- bilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations. GAO-07-44. Washington, D.C., Dec. www.gao.gov/new.items/d0744.pdf. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway, and Transportation District. 2006. Golden Gate Ferry and Golden Gate Bridge Play Critical Role in Responding to Bay Area Emergencies. San Rafael, Calif., April 3. Goodwill, J. A., and A. Reep. 2005. Transit Emergency Planning and Response Assessment Initiative. Center for Urban Transportation Research, University of South Florida, Tampa, Sept. Hansen, M., and S. Weinstein. 1991. East Bay Ferry Service and the Loma Prieta Earthquake. UCTC No. 162. Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Dec. Houston, N. 2006. Using Highways During Evacuation Operations for Events with Advance Notice: Routes to Effective Evacuation Planning Primer Series. FHWA-HOP-06-109. Booz Allen Hamilton, McLean, Va., Dec. 37274mvp152_182 168 11/24/08 11:56:18 AM

Literature Review 169 Kailes, J. I. 2005. Disaster Services and “Special Needs”—Term of Art or Meaningless Term? Center for Disability Issues and the Health Professions, Western University of Health Sciences, Pomona, Calif., Feb. Kendra, J., T. Wachtendorf, and E. Quarantelli. 2003. The Evacuation of Lower Manhat- tan by Water Transport on September 11: An Unplanned “Success,” Forum. Joint Com- mission Journal on Quality and Safety, Vol. 29, No. 6, June, pp. 316–318. Krizek, K. J., and A. M. El-Geneidy. 2006. Better Understanding the Potential Market of Metro Transit’s Ridership and Services. Final Report. Center for Transportation Studies, Minneapolis, Minn., Oct. Lindell, M. K., and R. W. Perry. 2004. Communicating Environmental Risk in Multiethnic Communities. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, Calif. Litman, T. 2005. Lessons from Katrina and Rita: What Major Disasters Can Teach Transporta- tion Planners. Victoria Transport Policy Institute, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, Nov. 1. Mileti, D. 1999. Disasters by Design. Joseph Henry Press, Washington, D.C. National Consortium on the Coordination of Human Services Transportation. 2006. Strategies in Emergency Preparedness for Transportation-Dependent Populations. Wash- ington, D.C., Sept. www.dotcr.ost.dot.gov/Documents/Emergency/Emergency%20 Preparedness%20Strategy%20Paper.doc. NRC. 1989. Improving Risk Communication. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. NRC. 1996. Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. NTSC. 2003. Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Oper- ations: Cross Cutting Study. Cambridge, Mass., Jan. Office of Emergency Management and Communications of the City of Chicago. 2007. September 7, 2006 Central Business District Evacuation Exercise After Action Report. Chicago, Ill., April 3. Peacock, W. G., P. Maghelal, M. K. Lindell, and C. S. Prater. 2007. Hurricane Rita Behavioral Survey. Final Report. Hazard Reduction and Recovery Center, Texas A&M University, College Station. Pennsylvania Highways. n.d. Three Mile Island. www.pahighways.com/features/ threemileisland.html. Accessed Feb. 2, 2007. Phillips, B. D., and B. H. Morrow. 2007. Social Science Research Needs: Focus on Vulner- able Populations, Forecasting, and Warnings. Natural Hazards Review, Vol. 8, No. 3, Aug., pp. 61–68. Pushkarev, B. S., and J. M. Zupan. 1977. Public Transportation and Land Use Policy. Indiana University Press, Bloomington. Taylor, B. D., and C. N. Y. Fink. 2007. The Factors Influencing Transit Ridership: A Review and Analysis of the Ridership Literature. Working Paper. Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California at Los Angeles. 37274mvp152_182 169 11/24/08 11:56:19 AM

170 The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation Transit’s Role in Florida’s Emergency Response. 2006. CUTRlines, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 1–3. USDOT. 2006. Report to Congress on Catastrophic Hurricane Evacuation Plan Evaluation. In cooperation with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C., June 1. www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/hurricanevacuation/. Willigen, M. V., T. Edwards, B. Edwards, and S. Hessee. 2002. Riding Out the Storm: Experiences of the Physically Disabled During Hurricanes Bonnie, Dennis, and Floyd. Natural Hazards Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 98–106. WMATA. 2006. Transit and Evacuation. Presented at Virginia Emergency Management Conference, April 6. Wolshon, B. 2006. Evacuation Planning and Engineering for Hurricane Katrina. The Bridge, Vol. 36, No. 1. Wolshon, B., E. Urbina, and M. Kevitan. 2001. National Review of Hurricane Evacuation Plans and Policies. Louisiana State University Hurricane Center, Baton Rouge. Zeigler, D. J., and J. H. Johnson, Jr. 1984. Evacuation Behavior in Response to Nuclear Power Plant Accidents. Professional Geographer, Vol. 36, No. 2. Zimmerman, C., R. Brodesky, and J. Karp. 2007. Using Highways for No-Notice Evacua- tion: Routes to Effective Evacuation Planning Primer Series. FHWA-HOP-08-003. Batelle, Columbus, Ohio, Nov. 37274mvp152_182 170 11/24/08 11:56:19 AM

Next: Appendix C Assessment of Transit's Role in Emergency Response andEvacuation Plans of 33 Urbanized Areas and Related States »
The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation: Special Report 294 Get This Book
×
MyNAP members save 10% online.
Login or Register to save!

TRB Special Report 294: The Role of Transit in Emergency Evacuation explores the roles that transit systems can play in accommodating the evacuation, egress, and ingress of people from and to critical locations in times of emergency. The report focuses on major incidents that could necessitate a partial to full evacuation of the central business district or other large portion of an urban area. According to the committee that produced the report, transit agencies could play a significant role in an emergency evacuation, particularly in transporting carless and special needs populations, but few urban areas have planned for a major disaster and evacuation that could involve multiple jurisdictions or multiple states in a region, or have focused on the role of transit and other public transportation providers in such an incident. The report offers recommendations for making transit a full partner in emergency evacuation plans and operations, while cautioning emergency managers, elected officials, and the general public to be realistic in their expectations, particularly in a no-notice incident that occurs during a peak service period.

  1. ×

    Welcome to OpenBook!

    You're looking at OpenBook, NAP.edu's online reading room since 1999. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website.

    Do you want to take a quick tour of the OpenBook's features?

    No Thanks Take a Tour »
  2. ×

    Show this book's table of contents, where you can jump to any chapter by name.

    « Back Next »
  3. ×

    ...or use these buttons to go back to the previous chapter or skip to the next one.

    « Back Next »
  4. ×

    Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book.

    « Back Next »
  5. ×

    To search the entire text of this book, type in your search term here and press Enter.

    « Back Next »
  6. ×

    Share a link to this book page on your preferred social network or via email.

    « Back Next »
  7. ×

    View our suggested citation for this chapter.

    « Back Next »
  8. ×

    Ready to take your reading offline? Click here to buy this book in print or download it as a free PDF, if available.

    « Back Next »
Stay Connected!