Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
References Annan, K. 2006. Uniting Against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global Counter- Terrorism Strategy. Report of the Secretary-General. A/60/825. New York: United Nations. Available at: http://www.un.org/unitingagainstterrorism/contents.htm. Atlas, R., and M. Dando. 2006. The dual use dilemma for the life sciences: Perspectives, co- nundrums, and global solutions. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 4(3):276-286. Balali-Mood, M., P.S. Steyn, L.K. Sydnes, and R. Trapp. 2008. Impact of scientific develop- ments on the Chemical Weapons Convention (IUPAC Technical Report). Pure and Applied Chemistry 80(1):175-200. Available at: http://www.iupac.org/publications/pac/80/1/0175/. Biological Weapons Convention Meetings Secretariat. 2006. Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention. Final Document. Geneva: United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. Available at: http://www.opbw.org. Bügl, H., J.P. Danner, R.J. Molinari, J. Mulligan, D.A. Roth, R. Wagner, B. Budowle, R.M. Scripp, J.A.L. Smith, S.J. Steele, G. Church, and D. Endy. 2006. A Practical Perspective on DNA Synthesis and Biological Security. International Consortium for Polynucleotide Synthesis. December 4. Available at: http://pgen.us/ICPS.htm. Carter, A., J. Deutch, and P. Zelikow. 1998. Catastrophic terrorism: Tackling the new danger. Foreign Affairs 77(6):80-94. Epstein, G.L. 2001. Controlling biological warfare threats: Resolving potential tensions among the research community, industry, and the national security community. Critical Reviews in Microbiology 27:321-354. Fischer, J.E. 2006. Stewardship or Censorship: Balancing Biosecurity, the Publicâs Health, and the Benefits of Scientific Openness. Washington, DC: Stimson Center. Available at: http://www.stimson.org/globalhealth/pdf/Stewardship.pdf. Fox, J.L. 2003. Bioterrorism threat could make some research too âsensitiveâ to disclose. ASM News 69(3):112-114. Available at: http://www.asm.org/microbe/index.asp?bid=13147. 71
72 THE 2ND INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON BIOSECURITY Frerichs, R.L., R.M. Salerno, K.M.Vogel, N.B. Barnett, J. Gaudioso, L.T. Hickok, D. Estes, and D.F. Jung. 2004. Historical Precedence and Technical Requirements of  Biological W  eapons Use: A Threat Assessment. SAND2004-1854. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia N  ational Laboratories. Garfinkel, M.S., D. Endy, G.L. Epstein, and R.M. Friedman, eds. 2007. Working Papers for Synthetic Genomics: Risks and Benefits for Science and Society. Available at: http://hdl. handle.net/1721.1/39658. Jackson, R.J., A.J. Ramsay, C.D. Christensen, S. Beaton, D.F. Hall, and I.A. Ramshaw. 2001. Expression of mouse interleukin-4 by a recombinant ectromelia virus suppresses cyto- lytic lymphocyte responses and overcomes genetic resistance to mousepox. Journal of Virology 7(3):1205-1210. Journal Editors and Authors Group. 2003a. Uncensored exchange of scientific results. Pro ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 100(4):1464. Journal Editors and Authors Group. 2003b. Statement on the consideration of biodefense and biosecurity. Nature 421:771. Journal Editors and Authors Group. 2003c. Statement on scientific publication and security. Science 299(5610):1149. Khan, M. 2006. Preparations and expectations. Presentation to the United Nations Gen- eral Assembly First Committee. Sixth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: New York: United Nations, October 11. �������������� http://www. Available at: unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/298DFC7CC2CD636BC125720D0045B3C8/$file/ First_Committee_BWC_thematic_presentation_slides.pdf. Leitenberg, M. 2005. Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. Meselson, M. 2000. The problem of biological weapons. Symposium on Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC, May 2. Miller, J., S. Engelberg, and W. Broad. 2001. Germs: Biological Weapons and Americaâs Secret War. New York: Simon and Schuster. Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, France, Indonesia, Norway, Senegal, South Africa, and Thailand. 2007. Oslo Ministerial DeclarationâGlobal Health: A Pressing Foreign Policy Issue of Our Time. Lancet 369(9570):1373-1378. NRC (National Research Council). 2004a. Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism. Wash- ington, DC: The National Academies Press. NRC (National Research Council). 2004b. Seeking Security: Pathogens, Open Access, and ÂGenome Databases. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. NRC (National Research Council). 2006. Globalization, Biotechnology, and the Future of the Life Sciences. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2004. Promoting Responsible Stewardship in the Biosciences: Avoiding Potential Abuse of Research and Resources. Chairmanâs Summary. Paris: OECD. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/ dataoecd/30/56/33855561.pdf. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2007. OECD Best Prac tice Guidelines on Biosecurity for BRCs (Biological Resource Centers). Paris: OECD. Avail- able at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/27/38778261.pdf. Parshall, G.W., G.S. Pearson, T.D. Inch, and E.D. Becker. 2002. Impact of Scientific De- velopments on the Chemical Weapons Convention (IUPAC Technical Report). Pure and Applied Chemistry 74(12):2323-2352. Available at: http://www.iupac.org/publications/ pac/2002/7412/index.html. Pearson, G.S. 1993. Prospects for chemical and biological arms control: The web of deter- rence. The Washington Quarterly 16(Spring):145-162. Rappert, B. 2004. Towards a Life Science Code: Countering the Threats from Biological Weapons. Bradford Briefing Paper No. 13. Available at: http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc.
REFERENCES 73 Reppy, J. 2007. The end of dual use? Implications for export control policy. Paper prepared for presentation at the 48th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL. March. Available at: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_ citation/1/7/8/8/3/p178830_index.html. Ripandelli, D. 2005. Building blocks for a code of conduct for scientists, in relation to the safe and ethical use of biological sciences. Presentation to the 2005 Meeting of Experts of the Biological Weapons Convention. Geneva. June 13. Available at: http://www.opbw.org/. Rossiskiye Vesti. 1992. Interview with President Boris Yeltsin. Washington, DC: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-SOV-92-103, May 27. Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. 2007. A Code of Conduct for Biosecurity. Report by the Biosecurity Working Group. Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. Available at: http://www.knaw.nl/cfdata/publicaties/detail.cfm?boeken_ _ordernr=20071092. Royal Society. 2006. Report of the RS-IAP-ICSU International Workshop on Science and Technology Developments Relevant to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. London: Royal Society. Available at: http://royalsociety.org/displaypagedoc.asp?id=22789. Tumpey, T.M., C.F. Basler, P.V. Aguilar, H. Zeng, A. Solórzano, D.E. Swayne, N.J. Cox, J.M. Katz, J.K. Taubenberger, P. Palese, and A. GarcÃa-Sastre. 2005. Characterization of the reconstructed 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic virus. Science 310(5745):77-80. United Nations. 2006. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. UNGA Reso- lution A/RES/60/288. New York: United Nations, Annex, IIâ11. Available at: http:// www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml#resolution. UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) and Interna- tional Council for Science. 1999. Science AgendaâFramework for Action. Adopted by the World Conference on Science, July 1. Available at: http://www.unesco.org/bpi/Âscience/ wcs/eng/framework.htm. Vogel, K.M. 2006. Bioweapons proliferation: Where science studies and public policy collide. Social Studies of Science 36(5):659-690. Vogel, K.M. 2008. Framing biosecurity: An alternative to the biotech revolution model?  cience and Public Policy 35(1):45-54. S WHO (World Health Organization). 2004. Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 3rd ed. Geneva: WHO. WHO/CDS/CSR/LYO/2004.11. Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/resources/ publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_CSR_LYO_2004_11 /en/. WHO (World Health Organization). 2005. Life Science Research: Opportunities and Risks for Public Health. Geneva: WHO. WHO/CDS/CSR/LYO/2005.20. Available at: http:// www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/deliberate/WHO_CDS_CSR_LYO_2005_20/en/index. html. WHO (World Health Organization). 2007. Scientific Working Group on Life Science Research and Global Health Security: Report of the First Meeting. Geneva: WHO. WHO/CDS/ EPR/2007.4. Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/deliberate/WHO_ CDS_EPR_2007_4. Wimmer, E. 2006. The test-tube synthesis of a chemical called poliovirus. EMBO Reports 7(Special Issue):S3-S9. Zilinskas, R., and J.B.Tucker. 2002. Limiting the contribution of the open scientific literature to the biological weapons threat. Online Journal of Homeland Security (December). Avail- able at: http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/.tucker.html.