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Appendix E The Evolution of U.S. Government Threat Reduction Programs Beginning in 2002, the annual legislative process included language in authorization bills for the Departments of Defense (DOD), State, and Energy (DOE) that reflected the changing nature of the threat environment and shift- ing security priorities. In particular, Congress expressed an interest in seeing U.S. government threat reduction programs diversify beyond their previous geographic boundary of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and become more relevant to post-September 11, 2001, efforts to counter terrorism and prevent possible terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction materials, tech- nologies, and expertise. The legislative evolution is summarized below by fiscal year starting in 2002. 143
144 APPENDIX E Fiscal Year Agency Congressional Action 2002 General Administration failed to certify Russia for DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) funding because it could not certify Russiaâs compliance with its obligations under the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. This finding (which continued in subsequent years) delayed several ongoing programs and required a waiver before programs could proceed. The program disruption affected principally DODâs programs and a few State Department efforts; most DOE and State Department efforts were unaffected. Following negotiations with Congress, annual waiver authority was granted for the next 3 years. DOD Congress asked that within 180 days of enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act that DOD produce âa report to Congress describing the steps that have been taken to develop cooperative threat reduction programs with India and Pakistan.â Such a report was to include ârecommendations for changes in any provision of existing law that was an impediment to the full establishment of such programs, a timetable for implementation of such programs, and an estimated 5-year budget that would be required to fully fund such programsâ (HR 3338). There is no evidence that this report was ever produced. 2003 DOS The omnibus appropriations bill authorized the State Department to use Nonproliferation and Disarmament Funds (NDF) âfor such countries other than the Independent States of the FSU and international organizations when it is in the national security interest of the United States to do soâ (H.J. Res. 2). This language was maintained in subsequent years. The State Department had already used NDF for transporting highly enriched uranium out of Belgrade, and by 2004 would be using it to aid in Libyan Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) dismantlement. Similarly, the State Departmentâs program to redirect former weapon scientists began work in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2004.
APPENDIX E 145 Fiscal Year Agency Congressional Action 2004 DOD Congress explicitly authorized use of DOD CTR funds outside the FSU, provided the project âwill assist the United States in the resolution of a critical emerging proliferation threat or permit the United States to take advantage of opportunities to achieve long-standing nonproliferation goals, can be completed in a short period of time, and that the DOD is the entity of the Federal Government that is most capable of carrying out such project or activityâ (HR 1588). No specific suggestions were given. DOE Congress authorized DOE to use international nuclear materials protection and cooperation program funds outside the former Soviet Union if it âwill assist the United States in the resolution of a critical emerging proliferation threat or permit the United States to take advantage of opportunities to achieve long-standing nonproliferation goals, can be completed in a short period of time, and that the Department of Energy is the entity of the Federal Government that is most capable of carrying out such project or activityâ (HR 1588). DOE soon organized its global nonproliferation efforts into the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and joined with the State Department in an effort to redirect former weapons scientists in Iraq and Libya. 2005 DOE Congress further emphasized the global role of DOEâs nonproliferation programs. The defense authorization bill stated the Sense of Congress that âthe security, including the rapid removal or secure storage, of high-risk, proliferation- attractive fissile materials, radiological materials, and related equipment at vulnerable sites worldwide should be a top priority among the activities to achieve the national security of the United States.â It then authorized a range of nonproliferation efforts, including scientist redirection, that are global in scope. In addition, it proposed a DOE pilot program in Georgia, called the Silk Road Initiative, to redirect weapons of mass destruction scientists. Eventually, it may include a much wider range of former Soviet republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
146 APPENDIX E Fiscal Year Agency Congressional Action 2006 General Congress requested a report from the President by November 2006, that details âimpediments to the effective conduct of CTR programs and related threat reduction and nonproliferation programs and activities in the states of the FSUâ and steps necessary to overcome them (Public Law 109- 163). DOD The 2005 National Academiesâ report Strengthening U.S.- Russian Cooperating on Nuclear Nonproliferation finds that â[t]he U.S. governmentâs ability to provide nonproliferation assistance to Russia has at times been severely complicated by legislative requirements stipulating that the President must certify that Russia has met standards that, in some cases, have little connection to the assistance in question. . . . The joint committee recommends that the U.S. Congress either repeal such certification requirements or provide the President with permanent waiver authority.â The defense authorization bill included permanent waiver authority, but the President must still present a waiver each year if he cannot certify Russiaâs compliance with the requirements, but this authority is available to him every year. Senator Richard Lugar attempted to broaden the bill to further encourage work outside the FSU, but those provisions were not included in the final version. DOS The State Department launched its Global Biosecurity Program aimed at countries in Middle East, South and East Asia, and the Pacific. In fiscal year (FY) 2006, projects began in Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines. By FY 2007, it was working in Egypt and Yemen, with contacts also in Latin America. The program focuses on laboratory security, pathogen consolidation and security, and biosafety. 2007 DOD Waiver authority extended.
APPENDIX E 147 Fiscal Year Agency Congressional Action 2008 General The 9/11 Commission Act recommended the following: âThe United States should expand, improve, increase resources for, and otherwise fully support the CTR program.â The Sense of Congress was that future funding should be increased and programs accelerated (HR 1). The act also authorized increased and accelerated funds for DOE various nonproliferation efforts. DOD Congress finally repealed the Presidential certification requirements. The act provides $10 million explicitly for new CTR initiatives that are outside the FSU (See Annex xxx, Title XIII of act), included a list of principles that should guide new initiatives, and suggested that new initiatives be considered in Asia, the Middle East, and that related to the denuclearization of the Democratic Peopleâs Republic of Korea. The conference report directed $5 million of the funds appropriated under chemical weapons destruction be made available as initial funding for a chemical weapons incinerator in Libya, pending authorization for such activity.