National Academies Press: OpenBook

Practices for Wayside Rail Transit Worker Protection (2012)

Chapter: Chapter One - Introduction

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Suggested Citation:"Chapter One - Introduction." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Practices for Wayside Rail Transit Worker Protection. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14657.
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter One - Introduction." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Practices for Wayside Rail Transit Worker Protection. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14657.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Chapter One - Introduction." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Practices for Wayside Rail Transit Worker Protection. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14657.
×
Page 5
Page 6
Suggested Citation:"Chapter One - Introduction." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2012. Practices for Wayside Rail Transit Worker Protection. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/14657.
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3According to the FTA’s Fall 2008 Rail Transit Safety Quarterly Newsletter, between 2003 and 2008 the nation’s heavy rail transit systems experienced eight accidents that resulted in the deaths of 10 right-of-way (ROW) workers, including track inspectors, track workers, and signal technicians, resulting in a 300% increase in the rate of fatalities and injuries from their historic average in the heavy rail industry. In 2010 two more rail transit ROW workers lost their lives when they were struck by a high-rail vehicle. Of the 19 worker fatalities reported to the National Transit Database (2003 to 2008) for rail transit, 17 were reported for heavy rail service and two for light rail service. Over half of those fatalities reported occurred on the ROW. This is in addition to the track worker injuries and close calls that occurred on the ROW during the period. This study focuses on the practices implemented by several rail transit agencies to establish or improve track worker safety protection programs. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND BACKGROUND The objectives of this study are to report the state of knowl- edge and practice regarding wayside worker protection programs at selected transit agencies and to document the state of the practice, including lessons learned and gaps in information. Improved safeguards and safety procedures can reduce accidents and fatalities for rail transit wayside workers across North America. This study identifies successful practices in track worker protection that could serve as models or foun- dations for programs developed at the system- or industry- wide level. The discussion of effective safety practices begins with an understanding of the hazards facing rail transit ROW workers. There are myriad potentially dangerous conditions present on the ROW, including slip, trip, and fall hazards; energized power; tight and dark working environments; and elevated work zones. However, the most injurious and fatal hazard to ROW workers continues to be the movement of trains and equipment through work areas. Although all of the agencies included in the study have rules and practices to address the range of hazards, the focus of their programs is on protecting workers from being struck by a moving train or piece of maintenance equipment. The initial panel discussion determined that the study should address both heavy rail and light rail modes of transit. The literature review and agency interviews revealed that modal delineations in track worker protection and overall safety programs are less relevant than an approach that con- siders a transit agency’s infrastructure and operations and the hazards associated with employees and contractors working safely within those parameters. The key considerations are listed here. Environmental Factors Environmental factors are any characteristics of the ROW or infrastructure that create a hazardous condition limiting a worker’s ability to clear the track in the event of train or other equipment or vehicle movement. Areas requiring special attention include: • Tunnels. This environment, regardless of mode, presents a variety of hazardous conditions, including limited light and therefore visibility; limited sight distances; tight clearances; and acoustic conditions that can amplify, deaden, or misdirect the sounds of oncoming trains. • ROW bridges and elevated structures. Although the diminished light and acoustic problems inherent in tunnels are not found in these areas, the hazards of tight clearances, combined with the need for prevention of falls and often amplified weather conditions, particularly wind and ice, present a unique set of hazards. • Tight or blind curves. Regardless of whether eight-car heavy rail trains are operating in revenue service or high-rail equipment is moving to or from a work site, the limited sight distance in tight or blind curves—above and below ground—presents a potentially very dangerous condition. • Multiple track ROWs. Most systems are configured with a two-track main line; only one of the systems studied has sections with three or four running tracks. That configuration allows maintenance and construction planners and supervisors to work with transportation and operations personnel to explore ways in which a work site can be bypassed using a local or express track. But the configuration presents a more dynamic and CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

complicated work area to control owing to the multiple tracks. Two systems in the study have track configura- tions that appear to be three- or four-track mainlines but actually are two running tracks separated or paralleled by one or two siding or “pocket” tracks. These allow storage of revenue trains between peak periods or of work equipment without returning it to end-of-line yards. The operating rules on these systems require trains and equipment using these tracks to move at restricted speed, permitting the operator to stop when anyone or anything is observed fouling the track. • Shared-use ROW. A significant variable in the develop- ment and implementation of work zone safety measures is whether track runs along an exclusive-use ROW or on the street in mixed traffic. Shared-use ROW introduces a host of additional complications and considerations in protecting employees from not only train movement but also mixed, rubber-tired vehicular traffic. Operational Factors Operational factors are system characteristics that introduce or compound a hazardous condition through continuous train or equipment movement, and energized traction power, including: • Train speeds. When trains or equipment are operated through work areas at normal or close-to-normal speeds, track workers are constrained in their options and ability to safely clear the “foul area,” and operators are limited in their stopping distances. • Daily hours of revenue service. Revenue service hours vary from system to system. Systems often shut down revenue service overnight for approximately 4 h. This service cessation provides a work period for track, com- munications and signals, and traction power employees to perform inspections, repairs, and replacements that otherwise would be performed during normal operating hours. • Train headways. The variable headways between systems, as well as between different lines within one system, affect the design and implementation of effective prac- tices to protect workers. Panel discussions and some of the initial agency interviews explored ways in which emergency responders are addressed in ROW safety programs. All the systems in the study offer some form of “ROW Hazard Awareness” training to all police, fire, and emergency medical services agencies serving their system. However, the systems do not offer extensive ROW protection training because operational practices or rules typically dictate the suspension of service and operations once an emergency response agency enters the ROW. During prolonged periods of service disruption, agencies may work cooperatively with the police, fire, or emergency medical services officers to provide them with safe operational zones while starting limited service, but these activities are always 4 done under the close, on-scene supervision of transportation or operations department supervisors or managers from the rail transit agency. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Literature Review As part of the initial research, a literature review was con- ducted to identify available, relevant documents and resources. The review used an array of web-based search tools, includ- ing TRB’s Transport Research International Documentation database, which integrates more than 900,000 records of transportation research from TRB’s Transportation Research Information Services (TRIS) database and the OECD’s Joint Transport Research Centre’s International Transport Research Documentation database. The researchers also reviewed relevant, open-source documents available from the NTSB, the U.S. Government Accountability Office, and FTA, includ- ing research, academic, technical, guidance, and training docu- ments produced by the Volpe Center, the Transportation Safety Institute, and the FTA University Transportation Centers. This process also utilized advice and direction from panel members, APTA staff, rail transit system safety professionals, and rep- resentatives from rail transit-oriented labor unions and the Transportation Trades Division of the AFL-CIO. The search revealed several investigative or analytical reports that examined specific incidents and organizational or systemic issues in the public transit industry and the FTA. The reports issued by the NTSB or the U.S. Government Accountability Office primarily provided detailed insights into incident root and contributing causes for some accidents, recommendations for changes in FTA oversight and data man- agement practices, or suggestions for organizational measures to improve overall system safety practices and cultures within the transit agencies addressed in the report or investigation. Also discovered in the search were a number of technical and academic research papers, trade publication articles, and trade association reports that focused primarily on railroad— as opposed to rail transit—ROW safety practices. Also, many of these resources were generated abroad, most typically in the United Kingdom, and focused on rail operations in that and other European or Asian countries. These were usually developed by academia, industry, or partnerships and tended toward technical rather than practice-based issues. The two primary domestic resources identified in the review were the CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) 214, Subpart C—Roadway Worker Protection, which is the regu- lation governing maintenance-of-way practices on all rail lines under the oversight of the FRA, and the “Standard for Work Zone Safety,” developed through industry consensus, by APTA. The APTA standard—as with most industry standards regardless of sector—provides high-level, conceptual guide- lines for what should be included in rail transit system work

5zone safety rules and procedures. It does not provide detailed information or prescriptive direction for developing rules, practices, training courses, or other ROW worker protection program components. Likewise, CFR 214 Subpart C provides direction relative to complying with the regulation. It does not offer guidance for developing a track worker protection program. A third document that is in development is another APTA standard, entitled “Roadway Worker Protection Pro- gram Requirements.” The draft version of this standard closely follows the 214, Subpart C regulations relative to levels of protection, types of protection, and terminology. Apart from post-incident reports, which tend to focus on bad practices that caused or contributed to an accident and therefore should not be used, the literature review found minimal resources that could be employed in developing such elements as rules, practices, personal protection equipment (PPE) requirements, communication guidelines, core equip- ment needs, or training courses, of a comprehensive rail transit ROW worker safety program. Transit Agency Interviews and Site Visits Extensive consultation with project panel members deter- mined that a survey method of research would not provide the appropriate level of detail to the study. Although a survey would have helped identify broadly which systems had track worker protection processes and specific rules, it would not have provided the needed breadth and depth of relevant information on successful practices. Focusing in detail on a sample of systems would allow for greater exposure of the procedures and practices used, as well as the experiences and lessons learned in developing and implementing track worker protection program elements, including work rules, training, and technology. Panel members and TCRP staff determined that an acceptable and more effective research process for this project would be to develop case studies that focused on four to five systems that would participate in the study through face-to-face and telephone interviews, host research site visits, and provide extensive materials for review. These materials included rule books; training programs; work orders; bulletins; policy and rule change orders; agency work forms; and specifications for PPE, warning and flagging devices, and other technological devices or infrastructure modifications. The site visits were used to conduct face-to-face meetings with all levels of relevant personnel and to observe track worker protection practices firsthand, from off the ROW. Witnessing flagging and work-site procedures in practice helped illustrate the manner in which policies and rules regarding flagging, PPE, warning devices, and general track-level work practices are synergized to provide an effective track worker protection program. Ultimately, the five systems that provided materials, participated in extensive interviews and site visits, or both were the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), New York City Transit (NYCT), Maryland Transportation Administration (MTA), the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC), and the Southern New Jersey Light Rail Transit System (River LINE) operation. These systems were selected with thorough input, guidance, direction, and suggestions from the project panel to ensure that, within the scope and resources of the project, the sample set would represent a range of modal, operational, demographic, size, and historical charac- teristics, including a spectrum of organizational, cultural, and environmental factors. Within this group, two of the largest and oldest rail transit systems in the United States and the oldest in Canada provided a perspective on approaches to addressing large, complex track maintenance operations in systems with little or no downtime and minimal headways. They also offer insights into how the systems, and the ROW safety practices and rules, have evolved over time and through unfortunate incidents. Initial discussions with panel members identified that “maintenance windows” in which track inspec- tions or maintenance can be done, are the biggest challenge in scheduling and in protecting track workers. By including systems with little or no “maintenance windows,” including NYCT, which operates 24 h a day, 7 days a week, the study would identify practices for affording protection in the most challenging situations. Three of the systems also demon- strated how multi-rail modal systems adapt and modify rules to fit the needs of each operation or line. One system, MBTA, has adopted the rail ROW practices for maintenance- of-way (MOW) employees on its new bus rapid transit line and tunnel infrastructure. Lastly, two systems that operate lengthy and growing light rail systems, MTA and the River LINE, have built track worker safety programs on existing Federal Railroad Regulatory guidelines to establish an effective MOW protection program and comply with FRA rules. The literature review and site visits also revealed a lack of standardization in terminology. Some systems use the terms “flagman” or “flagperson” and “watchman” or “watchperson” to define positions with different duties and responsibilities, and some of the systems use the terms interchangeably. The term “right-of-way” or “ROW” is also defined in varying ways. Some systems define or establish ROW as an area that is a set and consistent distance from either the center of the track or the outside rail. Other systems define it as the area from one edge of the ballast to the other; the property on which all of the track, power, signals, and other wayside equipment and structures are located; or from wall-to-wall or fence-to-fence. Some of the definitions are applicable primarily to heavy rail systems that have fences or walls separating the tracks and supporting systems from public spaces. These definitions, however, would not be appropriate for many light rail systems that run through public streets or on at-grade ROWs that are not protected by fences or other barriers. Another area of a rail transit system that is called by multiple terms is the zone that rail equipment occupies when moving down a track. On some systems, this is part of the broader ROW; on others it defines the ROW. Termed “the dynamic envelope” on some systems, this area or zone is where anyone or anything

within its limits would be fouling the track and be struck by a moving train or work equipment. Throughout this report, sections that are quoted or para- phrased from specific rail system documents use the termi- nology of the cited system. The glossary definition represents a consensus of system definitions and/or provides alternate terms or definitions. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT The report is organized in a way that reflects the three phases of protecting track workers: pre-work, work site, and post-work. Although some would view these three steps as a 6 linear, “cradle to grave” process for each project (such as replacing a section of rail, rebuilding an interlocking, or installing new signal components), from an overall system perspective, it is a cycle whereby work practices are evaluated continually, along with reported incidents and near misses, all of which inform the pre-work and work-site activities of train- ing, rules modification, job planning, PPE selection and usage, and staffing. By organizing the study and the report in this manner, specific practices for tasks in each step could be discussed, as well as broader, programmatic approaches that have been implemented to ensure continuous improvement in track work safety efforts.

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TRB’s Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Synthesis 95: Practices for Wayside Rail Transit Worker Protection is designed to highlight knowledge, practice, lessons learned, and gaps in information related to wayside rail transit worker protection programs.

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