Toward a New Era in Space: Realigning Policies to New Realities (1988)

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TOWARD STABLE BUDGETING: A BALANCED BASE PROGRAM AND SPECIAL INITIATIVES A civil space program capable of achieving national goals should have two distinct components. The first should be a balanced, stable base program to ensure ongoing U.S. competence in fundamental space activities—for example, astronomical observation, Earth observation missions, microgravity research, planetary exploration that is not a specific precursor to manned missions, space commercialization, tracking and data processing, a robust research infrastruc- ture and its associated human resources, technology development, some space transportation, and some manned space flight. (It would not include major, multibillion dollar programs such as a space station, a return to the Moon, an automated Mars sample return mission, or human missions to Mars.) Within the base, the highest priorities should be assigned to assuring access to space with a variety of launch vehicles; ensuring the availability of advanced technol- ogy to maintain a competitive posture in national security and civil undertak- ings and to enable challenging missions in the future; and building a varied space science and Earth remote sensing applications program. The motivations for this component of the space program are largely scientific, technological, and economic. Stable funding for this base, or core, effort should be assured before any additional large-scale leadership initiative is undertaken. It must rest on a strong foundation of modern facilities and high-quality human resources. Ear- lier cuts from the base program to support large initiatives have put the U.S. space program in a position where adequate technology is not available for ap- plication to advanced program requirements in such areas as propulsion, life support systems, robotics, or automation. The second component of the civil space program should consist of large- scale, long-term special initiatives that the President and the Congress decide are in the national interest and for which they seek public support. This com- ponent, which would depend heavily on a stable base program, is motivated primarily by political, cultural, and international considerations, although it also may serve scientific and technological purposes. Much of the manned program falls in this category. Clearly, such initiatives should not be under- taken without the commitment to fund and support them adequately over the period necessary for their accomplishment. Since Apollo, NASA has entered into major projects without that commitment and has been forced to either cut back its base programs or compromise on the achievements of the new initia- tive. To ensure that primary space capabilities are not eroded by the costs of special initiatives, it is useful to think in terms of a base program with a stable annual budget of about $10 billion (1988 dollars). Each special initiative could

require additional funding on the order of $3 billion to $4 billion in peak years. (The committee did not undertake a detailed budget analysis, and all estimates are based on existing budget information.) Figure 1 shows historical and cur- rent NASA budgets, and Figure 2 illustrates the decline in the NASA portion of the federal budget over time. The notion of the NASA program consisting of national special initiatives and a base program need not be translated into formal separate budget or or- ganizational terms; it is rather related to the character of the presidential and congressional support required to initiate and carry out the different types of ac- tivities. NASA should manage both the base and large special initiatives as a unified whole. The point is that the country's fundamental competence in all areas of space activity should be assured before substantial resources are in- vested in any major program thrust. When commitment is made to a new spe- cial initiative, adequate funding must be provided or it should not be undertaken. Special Initiatives The special initiative requiring immediate decisions is a permanently manned space station, already subscribed to by international partners and well along in its design. The issue is whether or not to proceed with the space sta- tion as currently planned. The committee believes that some form of space sta- tion is essential to establish the feasibility of extended human space flight. It is the only way to properly research the need for artificial gravity in extended manned missions and to develop the necessary technologies for these missions. In 1987 a committee of the National Research Council (NRC) examined the various configurations for a space station that NASA had considered and that others from outside NASA had proposed. The committee found none met the broad requirements of the potential communities of users better than the revised Phase One of the currently planned station. But these requirements are poorly defined, largely due to the lack of widely accepted, long-term goals. To deal with this uncertainty, Phase One of the current station has been made quite flexible, and Phase Two postponed. Nevertheless, the current concept in its en- tirety will require revalidation to ensure that it fully supports the goals estab- lished by the President. Goals that emphasize human exploration, for example, would require that the U.S. space station module be optimized for research in the life sciences. Finally, the committee noted that the logistic systems supporting the sta- tion, and particularly, its dependence on the space shuttle, are principal sources of risk. NASA has adopted many of the NRC committee's recommendations, but continued special attention will be required.

SBillions 10 - Figure 1 NASA Appropriations* o 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 Budget Dollars ~^~ 1988 Dollars •Including DOD Transfers Figure 2 NASA Budget as Percent of Federal Budget Percent | 1 ; 0 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989

A second possible special initiative is articulated in the Report of the Na- *y *7 tional Commission on Space, the Ride Report, and in the February 1988 White House space policy statement—the expansion of "human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit into the solar system." The schedule for a program leading to human exploration and expansion could be adjusted to budgetary realities and still demonstrate sustained progress that could help build an endur- ing national consensus in support of the space program. A campaign of this scope could be accomplished at a measured pace over many decades, starting on the space station with the study of the effects of long-duration space flight on animals and humans. There is substantial disagreement on the specifics of the best plan for human expansion, and in particular whether an outpost or scientific base on the Moon should be established before or at the same time as initial exploratory missions to Mars. Further discussion within both the technical and political communities and between the United States and other spacefaring nations is in order before a commitment to a specific program for human expansion beyond Earth orbit. Another type of special initiative that would not require substantial in- space human involvement has been termed "Mission to Planet Earth." As con- ceived, it would be an international multisatellite program to provide simultaneous remote sensing information of all the Earth and predictive models of the global environment in conjunction with ground-based observations. This initiative promises significant near-term rewards in information about the Earth and its environment. An additional special initiative might be an accelerated program of solar system exploration using automated systems and carried out in collaboration with other spacefaring nations. A Mars sample return mission could be a central part of this initiative. U.S. special initiatives should be undertaken in consonance with other na- tions. The Soviet Union, Western Europe, Japan, and China are leaders among many nations that have developed advanced spacefaring capabilities. Through cooperative projects, the United States could achieve technological, financial, and geopolitical benefits that might otherwise be unobtainable. However, the United States must participate in these joint ventures as a reliable partner or not at all. A principal catalyst for international cooperation can be the International Space Year (ISY), which will begin in 1992. Planning for the ISY is under way in the United States and abroad, but prompt decisions about the nature of U.S. participation are needed if that participation is to be meaningful.

8 The Base Program To achieve competence across the board in space endeavors, the base program should include some elements of space infrastructure and the manned program as well as the following: investment in the technical capabilities needed to pursue advanced space programs; a vigorous, balanced space science program; an aggressive civil space applications program; and support for the commercialization of space. Investment in Technical Capabilities for Advanced Space Programs In recent years most of the increased investment in space, both in NASA and the Department of Defense (DOD), has supported the development of large systems rather than basic engineering research and technology development. Figure 3 illustrates the long-term decline in research and technology funding, and Figure 4 shows the decline in research and technology as part of the over- all NASA budget Operational pressures and short-term commitments have contributed to this turn from more basic research. If the United States is to be in the forefront in space, however, it must soon take action to fill the pipeline with the most ad- vanced technologies. Programs designed to enable future missions, such as the Pathfinder and Civil Space Technology Initiative, are steps in the right direc- tion but are not of sufficient magnitude to satisfy future needs for technology. The need for these investments—in space propulsion, materials, energy systems, sensors, and the technologies to enable long duration undertakings by humans in space—has been described in the 1987 NRC report Space Technol- ogy to Meet Future Needs. Such a program would be characterized by the fol- lowing critical elements: (1) stability and continuity of funding to carry out long-term research and development (R&D) in the most effective manner, (2) a strengthened basic research program for generating new options to meeting technology requirements for long-term goals, (3) interagency coordination of program formulation and budgeting stages to enhance synergy and avoid redun- dant investments, and (4) demonstrations of space technology to establish tech- nical feasibility and to facilitate the creation of competitive technical teams in the private sector working in partnership with NASA to translate advanced tech- nologies into applications. Finally, NASA must ensure its technology development is carried to a stage where it can be picked up by industry or other government agencies. The nation should invest in technology demonstration to ensure transition of new technologies to industry—as it has with experimental aircraft (X-airplane) programs. Investment should be made selectively in proof-of-concept demonstrations to facilitate technology transition. One way the federal govern-

Figure 3 NASA R&T Funding* 1000 800 - 600 - 400 - 200 - Millions 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 SffiS Budget Dollars —— 1988 Dollars •Excludes Nuclear and Standards and Practices Percent Figure 4 NASA R&T Funding as a Percentage of NASA Appropriations* 0 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 •Excluding Nuclear and Standards and Practices

10 ment can help U.S. industry to remain competitive is by advancing tech- nologies that industry is unlikely to undertake because their chances for suc- cess seem low, even while their potential payoffs are high. These technologies often require long lead times to mature and the initial investments impose large barriers for individual firms. A Balanced Space Science Program James Van Allen's startling discovery that the Earth is surrounded by regions of intense radiation trapped in the geomagnetic field was the first major success in U.S. space science. Since that unexpected finding thirty years ago, space science has altered our view of the universe, the Solar System, and the Earth and its environment. These discoveries provide a firm basis for a program of continuing leadership in this area. A challenging space science program should be pursued both as an instru- ment of U.S. leadership and for the intrinsic knowledge that can be gained. Scientific objectives addressing outstanding, fundamental questions must be the dominant factors in defining the space science program and in determining the characteristics of individual missions such as spacecraft, launch vehicles, and instrumentation. Space science is a principal objective of the overall space program and one that is best accomplished with a large degree of independence from other major elements of the program. Although the manned program is central to life sciences research and can provide opportunities for other research in areas such as microgravity science, in general the space science program should not be forced, as it has been at times in the past, into a manned mode. A base program in space science would be designed to increase under- standing of astrophysical phenomena and the origin and evolution of the universe; the Earth and the solar-terrestrial environment; the origin and evolu- tion of the Solar System; fundamental physical, chemical, and biological processes; the effects of the space environment on living beings; and the fac- tors governing the origin and spread of life in the universe. Assured, predict- able, and frequent access to space is critical to an effective base program. There should be a spectrum of flight opportunities, with major facilities such as the Hubble Space Telescope balanced with increased opportunities on Explorer- class missions and continued availability of low-cost opportunities using aircraft, balloons, rockets, and shuttle-carried experiments. There also must be a strong program of research and data analysis that sus- tains intellectual vigor both through the development of the scientific and tech- nical basis for future missions and through detailed study of results from current and past missions. This requires investment in university facilities and educational programs to train the next generation of scientists and engineers.

11 Future national leadership in space will depend critically on the supply of top scientific and engineering talent from our colleges and universities. The educa- tion of this talent will require that university investigators have access to space to conduct meaningful experiments and that they be involved in R&D programs and missions at the NASA centers and in industry. The important elements of a base program in space science have been out- lined in the strategy documents prepared by committees of the National Re- search Council's Space Science Board and in the report of its Astronomy Survey Committee. Many of these elements are incorporated in the 1988 Strategic Plan of NASA's Office of Space Science and Applications. Possible special initiatives beyond the base program include an automated Mars sample return mission (which is also a logical precursor to a manned Mars mission), space-based interferometry, and a Mission to Planet Earth. These and other challenging major science initiatives described in Space. Science in the Twenty-First Century should eventually be considered, but only with the commitment of sufficient additional resources beyond those required for the base program. The current NASA space science program development and coordination processes work well and should be pursued. Although many of the currently operational U.S. spacecraft continue to return unique results, including observa- tions of Supernova 1987a, the planet Uranus, and the ozone hole, most were launched before 1980 and have completed their primary missions. There is an impressive array of new U.S. missions that will be active through the middle of the next decade due to the backlog of launches delayed from the 1980s. However, U.S. leadership beyond the mid-1990s must take into account the in- creasing strength of other nations' programs, which have continued to expand and mature. Plans for the next generation of missions should be established to continue the momentum that the United States is expected to regain in the next several years. An Aggressive Civil Space Applications Program Communications, navigation, Earth remote sensing, and the use of the microgravity environment to conduct research on materials and processes are the primary applications of space technology for the benefit of society. In less than three decades the use of satellites for communications has revolutionized global telecommunications. Satellite mobile communications systems and navigation networks hold similar promise for the future. Weather and environmental monitoring, resource location, mapping, and assessment of agricultural productivity and natural disasters are a few benefits of Earth remote sensing. Remote sensing may be key to understanding, and eventually predicting, the consequences of human actions for life on planet Earth. Al-

12 though the benefits cannot be specified today, space can provide the medium for novel and important research on materials and processes as well. Each of these applications has unique problems. Since NASA itself is not an end user, NASA's technology development for applications is weak. In com- munications the current U.S. policy provides for minimal government involve- ment. Technology research and development are not actively pursued, and government-industry coordination is lacking. Previously, U.S. industry dominated this market by using superior technology; now, other nations are seeking an expanded niche. Competition from fiber optics also can be expected to drive the communications industry toward different types of services, and new technology could be instrumental in assuring future successes. The diminution of NASA's earlier role in remote sensing research and technology demonstration has left voids that other user agencies have been un- able to fill. Thus, the U.S. Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) program is in jeopardy, the transfer of land remote sensing capabilities to the private sector is foundering, and there are no firm plans to capitalize on remote sensing of the oceans to meet research and operational needs. Last, with the lack of space flight opportunities and problems in develop- ing a long-term program, other nations are challenging the United States in microgravity research and applications experiments. Clear goals are needed to provide long-term, stable commitments to program development and operations that are commensurate with needs and op- portunities. • In space communications, government-industry cooperation in developing advanced technology should be pursued. Affordable, reliable launches are also essential. • In remote sensing, coordination should be enhanced between government agencies such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the DOD, and NASA in technology development and demonstration. • In microgravity research, as discussed in Industrial Applications of the Microgravity Environment, NASA should play a key role in providing access to the space environment for microgravity research, encourage collaboration between U.S. and foreign microgravity scientists, and maximize multisectoral (industry, university, and government) participation in the program. Some of the mechanisms described below in the discussion of space com- mercialization are applicable here as well. Finally, in each area of space applica- tions, efforts should be strengthened to assure full cooperation with other nations where such cooperation broadens the technological base in the interest

13 of the United States, reduces cost and technological risks through sharing, or results in equal or better return of benefits to the United States. Private Capabilities in Space With the exception of communications satellites and possibly launch vehicles, the development of commercial space activities is far off. Efforts to achieve success will take time and will require partnerships between govern- ment and industry. The foremost need for space businesses and entrepreneurs is access to capital and to technology developed by the government. Two prin- ciples should guide all aspects of commercial space policy: first, the govern- ment should procure private space services wherever feasible; and second, government commitments should be long term and stable. Specific government actions that would help U.S. industry to compete in- ternationally include • Continued support for the Air Force family of expendable launch vehicles and their commercial derivatives. • Use of government-owned facilities. Factory tooling, launch facilities, range safety facilities, and down range tracking support during launch represent capital investments that the commercial launch industry cannot afford to provide. These facilities should be made available when their use does not compromise the government mission. • Commitment to purchase services from the commercial sector. Apart from communications, the largest customer for most space system services is the federal government. With the exception of security requirements and vital public services, the government should not provide its own services if equivalent services are available or can be procured commercially at comparable cost. • Engineering research and technology development. These are needed to reduce costs and increase reliability in areas of high risk without immediate commercial application and in areas that require long technology maturation lead times. As noted earlier, proof-of-concept demonstrations are sometimes necessary to enable technology transition to industry. • Indemnity against hazards that cannot reasonably be covered with conventional insurance, perhaps by means of limited third party liability in the event of a launch disaster. It seems clear that the federal government must continue to be directly in- volved in supporting and in regulating national efforts and in seeking interna- tional fair trade in space-related goods and services for the foreseeable future.