There are no silver bullets to reduce the logistics demand or to make sustainment easier. Enhancing the sustainment capability of the Army of the future will require attention to technological, operational, analytical, managerial, educational, and cultural elements of the Army across a wide spectrum of activities, both inside and outside the logistics community.
As noted in Chapter 2, the effective sustainment of military forces in the future, under conditions of resource constraints and geographic and environmental realities will require reductions in the logistics burdens currently being experienced and improvements in the efficiency of the process through which sustainment is delivered. While technology and management improvements will assist in achieving these efficiency goals, real success may rest with modifications to the culture of the Army and the other Services as it affects logistics and sustainment. These cultural modifications pertain to the willingness of the Army and the other services to become more Joint, both logistically and operationally; to understand and accept a leaner logistics profile that continues to provide in-the-battle support at the levels required, while concurrently reducing nonessential logistics demands; and to educate the Army as a whole, not just its logisticians, concerning the logistics system—how it operates, its costs, and the role of the nonlogistician in ensuring that what is requested is what is needed and that it is available when needed. Ensuring implementation of such efforts will require carefully orchestrated change management.
Chapter 2 highlighted Department of Defense (DoD) and Joint staff guidance on Joint operations, noting that the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Forces 2020 calls for Joint force elements, globally postured, to be able to combine quickly with each other and mission partners to integrate capabilities fluidly across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations (JCS, 2012). The document identifies a series of implications for Joint Force 2020 tied to key warfighting functions of command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment, and partnership strategies, with partnership strategies being introduced as equivalent to the traditional warfighting functions. Future operating environments will be characterized by increasing uncertainty, rapid change, extreme complexity, and persistent conflict. In addition, as the United States rebalances to the Asia-Pacific region, the military must enhance its presence there to preserve peace and stability, invest in long-term strategic partnerships, and expand coordination with emerging partners throughout the region. In the midst of these new missions, the U.S. military, as a Joint force, must continue to project and sustain our military presence despite an increasingly capable adversary who will employ weapons and other technologies capable of denying access to or freedom of action within an operational area (JCS, 2012).
The 2010 Joint Concept for Logistics emphasized the need for increased integration and synchronization of Joint logistics processes within the Joint logistics enterprise in order to provide support for Joint force commanders across a range of military operations. The Defense Logistics Strategic Plan (July 2009) identified goals, performance measures, and key initiatives to drive the DoD logistics
enterprise in order to achieve its mission, which is to provide globally responsive, operationally precise, and cost-effective logistics support (DoD, 2010a).
A Joint Logistics White Paper (June 2010) offered a first step at defining a common framework for providing logistics support to Joint forces. It emphasized the importance of a whole of government approach and the need for integration and synchronization of DoD processes and capabilities and the implementation of a Joint logistics enterprise consisting of common metrics, business rules, and standardization that enable integration, synchronization, and optimization; the unifying of effort to achieve a common set of objectives; the simultaneous need to deliver, position, and sustain Joint forces across a range of operations; and the development of a digital network for sharing information across the enterprise. The expected outcome would be sustained Joint logistic readiness to support the Joint force commander and improved trust and confidence that the Joint logistics enterprise will provide the required resources at the right place and time. The paper called for an integration and synchronization of joint logistics enterprise processes and capabilities and suggested the need for further study to map logistics processes from end to end, identify integration and synchronization points, and apply metrics that lead to optimizing outcomes (DoD, 2010b).
Army 2020 and Beyond Sustainment White Paper: Globally Responsive Sustainment (August 2013) outlined the future strategic environment and strategic guidance; outlined the implications for sustainment in terms of people, organization, mission command and information systems, science and technology, and unified action partners; and defined the response in terms of the solution—globally responsive sustainment, the importance of measuring performance, and the big ideas that will transform Army processes (CASCOM, 2013).
Appendix B of the Joint Concept, Key Indicators of the Military Problem, provided a detailed list of recognized concerns that need to be addressed in order to provide adequate logistics support for the Joint force in the anticipated future operating environment. These concerns include
- Insufficiently integrated logistics processes, organizations, and planning capabilities;
- Insufficient rules, tools, and authorities to exercise joint logistics;
- Shortage of logisticians trained in joint processes and operation;
- Insufficient joint material management;
- Deficiencies in policies and processes;
- Limitations in distribution capabilities and capacities;
- Insufficient expeditionary materiel management capability;
- Limitations in capabilities to manage and execute processes;
- Insufficiently interoperable or integrated command and control, logistics management, and financial systems;
- Insufficient visibility over requirements, assets, and processes; and
- Limited communications between logisticians. (DoD, 2010a, pp. B-1-B-4)
Army logisticians saw that addressing these issues would create process changes and new business rules that would allow for “visibility of knowledge, capacity, and expertise across the Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, nongovernmental, and commercial community,” and that would enable logisticians to tap into all resources as they were required (CASCOM, 2012). But, for the most part, changes in rules and processes have not been realized. Today the J-4 struggles with the language of Jointness:1 “The lack of a shared language has created or exacerbated many of the challenges to achieving the logistics community’s vision of integrated logistics capabilities and, ultimately, freedom of action for the Joint warfighter.” To deal with this, the J-4 has developed a lexicon, a “single,
1 The J-4 is the Logistics Directorate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
consolidated list of approved and emerging logistics terms to help facilitate logistics interoperability through a common operating language.”2
In 2011, LTG Mitchell Stevenson, then the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, pointed out that the Army needed to move on several Joint operations issues:
• Networked communications. While there are a number of communications systems in the theater, no single network provides guaranteed communications for all organizations. As a result, some organizations are unable to establish or maintain contact while they are on the move.
• Joint distribution information systems. A variety of information technology systems are used by joint and service organizations, but many are organization-centric and do not communicate or transfer data readily across the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE). This hinders their ability to coordinate and control distribution operations in a holistic manner.
• Distribution-based logistics. Distribution operations are managed by a variety of disparate joint and service organizations, and their efforts are not adequately synchronized. As a result, distribution operations are not managed for effectiveness, stock holdings are larger than they could be, and delays occur that adversely impact distribution.
• Joint operational-level logistics command and control. No standing joint logistics organization can command and control logistics and theater distribution operations at the operational level in the theater in support of the regional combatant and joint force commanders.
• Integration of coalition and host-nation capabilities. Current and future operations increasingly involve coalition and host-nation partners. These partners will have requirements that need to be provided for and capabilities that can contribute to the distribution operation. (Stevenson, 2011, p. 8)
The 1999 National Research Council report Reducing the Logistics Burden for the Army After Next: Doing More with Less pointed out the need for the Army to be a strong participant in Joint efforts across the spectrum of activities being undertaken by DoD and the Services (NRC, 1999). It also pointed out the need for Joint programs in several areas of research and technology. It noted that “the Army will depend on the Air Force and the Navy to ferry the battle force and sustaining supplies to the staging area, to provide coordinated fire support, and to assist with C4ISR. Therefore the Army should participate in planning for this support to ensure that AAN operational and logistical needs are met” (NRC, 1999, p. 5). It also urged that the Army identify overlapping requirements of the Services and encouraged DoD to establish responsibilities among the Services for satisfying these requirements. The 2012 Combined Arms Support Command document Path to 2028 identifies the same need for Joint development activities (CASCOM, 2012).
Although Congress specifically gave the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) the authorities it deemed necessary to create and maintain a robust and effective special operations capability, it is equally clear from 30 years of legislative history and supporting documentation that Congress also intended SOCOM to be dependent on the military departments and their respective Services for the provision of platforms, systems, equipment, and a variety of support functions that are common between a given Service and SOCOM—for example, logistics and sustainment and personnel administration. The types and extent of this dependence continue to evolve in response to national strategy and changes in the geopolitical and operational environments. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, the Central Command commander was able to provide significant breadth and depth
2 Additional information is available at Joint Chiefs of Staff, “J4 Logistics,” http://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J4%7CLogistics.aspx, accessed November 18, 2014.
of conventional force support to special operations forces (SOF) over this sustained period of engagement.
Within the SOCOM structure, the Army has the largest footprint when it comes to personnel and diversity of specified missions. Similarly, Army field manuals FM 4-94 (Theater Support Command) and the final draft of FM 3-93 (Theater Army Operations) articulate an impressive array of support and sustainment capabilities that would be beneficial for all SOF, not just Army SOF (DA, 2010, 2011). The Army is moving to become more expeditionary in nature. Taking these factors together, it would appear that the Army has the capability to become the common support provider for SOF across all geographic combatant commands (with the possible exception of the Pacific Command at the present time), albeit with appropriate assistance from the other Services. Box 8-1 discusses some of the factors that complicate integrating Army and SOF logistics.
Within the Army, the principal organization responsible for the support of Army SOF-unique equipment is the special forces group support battalion. This support battalion has a group support company that provides military intelligence, chemical reconnaissance, and tactical communications, along with an operations detachment and an associated service support company. The service support company provides medical, maintenance, distribution, and sustainment support for SOF-unique equipment and systems to the companies and detachments of the operational units of the special forces group.
SOF have organic contracting capabilities at all levels. For example, if an operational detachment-A (ODA) team has a requirement for a service or an item that is not available from the service support company within the required time frame, the theater special operations command (TSOC) may have the contracting capability to obtain this support via local contracts or, if the cost is below the contracting threshold, it could use operational funds to procure the commodity or service. If the ODA team is unable to get the support from the forward support company of a conventional Army battalion (e.g., a tank battalion) that occupies the same area of operations as the ODA, the ODA could pay for a commodity or service by paying cash if the cost is below the micropurchase threshold. Alternatively, the ODA could coordinate through command channels with the supporting TSOC to contract for the support. Normally, a request for support comes from the engineer noncommissioned officer of the ODA through the operational detachment-B, which is the headquarters element of a special forces company, to the support operations office of the group support battalion; or, in some instances, directly to the servicing forward support company. ODAs have soldiers trained as field ordering officers and paying agents. If a request is for a SOF-unique item, the request goes back through special forces supply channels.
The issue that most frequently arises in this arrangement is the duplicative resourcing of sustainment requirements for items that are not SOF-unique. For example, an ODA could be contracting locally for support requirements for daily living (e.g., food, water, and shelter) when the capability to provide those requirements already exists within a regionally aligned forward support company located within the combat battalion. Part of the problem is that the brigade or battalion commander may not know that the ODA is in his area of operations or that the forward support company is responsible for providing support of common requirements to SOF in the area. This ignorance is typically caused by either the timing of the request or the lack of communications between the deployed SOF task force and the theater logistics network. The typically small, but widely dispersed, SOF footprint, together with a rapid resourcing environment, often leads the deployed SOF to utilize internal resourcing actions such as contracting actions rather than fully articulating requirements to the theater sustainment enterprise early in planning cycles. The support of Marine Corps Special Operations Forces and Naval Special Warfare Forces within a Joint environment has similar issues. Establishing a training program to educate SOF commanders about the Army supply system and processes, and how to effectively integrate into the Army logistics network while deployed in a joint area of operations, may also be necessary.
Finding 8-1. There are opportunities to more tightly integrate Army and special forces logistics. For instance, it may be practical and desirable to designate each theater Army as the primary logistics and sustainment support organization for special operations forces in each geographic combatant command’s area of responsibility.
Recommendation 8-1. The Army G-4, working in conjunction with the individual geographic combatant commands and special operations command (SOCOM), should determine the feasibility and acceptability of designating each theater Army as the primary logistics and sustainment support organization for special operations forces in each geographic combatant command’s area of responsibility. A good test case for such an arrangement would be to examine the recent redeployment of special operations forces to Iraq to assess the feasibility of the concept and obtain valuable lessons learned in the process. Doing so would enable all parties (e.g., the Army, SOCOM, and Central Command) to build on previous efforts and experiences gained in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Many of the logistics challenges in the Army can be related to a culture within the Army that does not properly recognize the complexity of logistics operations and the necessity for operational planning to fully involve its logistics elements. It is frequently assumed that because logistics support has always been there, it will be there the next time it is needed. The availability of the exceptional funding stream in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan permitted the logistics community to work around issues as they arose, but often at considerably greater expense, with less efficiency, and at greater risk than had more attention been paid to the logistics challenges in planning. As indicated in Chapter 2, the more supplies that have to be moved, the greater the risk to those involved in the movement and the greater the logistics burden for the force as a whole. These cultural issues fall into the following categories.
Much of today’s Army has served the nation at a time when its focus was on nation building and counterinsurgency operations carried out from nearly permanent bases. As the focus shifts from conduct of such operations over extended periods in limited geographical areas to the employment of forces in an expeditionary mode with continuous movement and lean sustainment, leaders at all levels need to be prepared to adjust to a significant change in the manner in which operations are carried out and supported.
While the Army has data, information, and doctrine concerning resupply rates once combat operations begin, operational commanders drive the requirements. No one questions the necessity for these commanders to identify their equipment and supply requirements to conduct their operations. However, as reports from both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom indicate, attention to the levels of supply and the justification of requirements in areas beyond direct combat, especially base support operations, is frequently put this way: “If we can get it, then let’s get it.” The use of bottled water is a reflection of this approach. While U.S. forces were clearly more comfortable being supplied with bottled water, the logistics burden created by this method of water supply not only resulted in losses of life in convoy operations but created other disposal and operational challenges. There are few service or theater standards established that limit what can be asked for, and the Services, eager to support their forces and to solidify their Title X responsibilities, do their best to respond to the theater requests. This results in part from a poor understanding of the implications of logistics requests that go beyond what is absolutely needed, and in part from a failure of either the Services or the combatant commands to establish standards. As resources become scarcer and supply lines become longer, it will be imperative for the Army to give greater attention to the control of requirements.
In discussions with active and retired civilian and military logisticians, it became clear that in planning exercises and war games, logistics support is frequently assumed to be available and passed over in dealing with the specifics of what support will be required, how supplies will be moved to the theater, and what forces will carry out the sustainment operations. An emphasis on ensuring the fighting capability of combat elements, including the brigade combat team, has led to the reduction in the structure of the forces that must sustain the combat elements and an assumption that supplies will get there somehow. As indicated in Chapter 7, contractors are not part of the planning process and may or may not be available to provide sustainment if they are not prepared to carry out these support operations. Nor are contractors included on the Time-Phased Force and Deployment List even though they are likely to be a substantial component of the overall force that needs to be moved. As plans are considered that move more and more of the sustainment forces to the reserves, the separation between the combat elements and their sustainment grows. Repetitive use of the reserve forces is highly dependent on national will to continue the exceptional load that is been placed in recent years on both the National Guard and the Reserves. As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted in his recent book, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, this use of the National Guard and Reserves could be called into question (Gates, 2014).
Consideration of logistics must be fully integrated into all Army activities, including requirements writing, budgeting, testing, research and development, operational, and force support activities. Logistics must also be integrated into professional military education on topics that would either impact, or be impacted by, logistics. Decisions made during the research and development process often consider trade-offs between the capabilities of a weapon system, an aircraft, or a vehicle and its logistics demands and its life-cycle costing. Pressure is great on developers to meet the capability requirements, while logistics demands and life-cycle challenges are often seen as concerns that can be pushed to the future. History has shown that this is shortsighted. Similarly, the logistics positions on sustainment issues are often represented by the system developer or user rather than by the logistics community, and logistics needs are frequently given less priority. At every level in the decision process for material development and operational planning, logistics needs to have a seat at the table and to be given the opportunity to be heard.
As indicated in Chapter 6, for the logistics community to be capable of effectively articulating its position, it must be given the analytical resources to carry out the appropriate logistics studies and to bring this information to the attention of decision makers who shape future force structures and plan future operations.
In a paper for the Army War College, career logistician COL Kevin Powers, found that
While it can be argued that Army transformation has been constant and ongoing for the past two decades, it is apparent that the change we have seen has truly only been evolutionary in nature for the sustainment community. Most of what has come about over this period has been adapting new technologies, improved process, and a basic reorganization of sustainment organizations to match the Army’s modular Brigade Combat Team redesign. In many cases, we have simply rearranged organizations and called it transformation. Dr. David A. Anderson and Major Dale L. Farrand postulated in 2007 that what we have seen has been ‘logistics evolution, logistics reaction, or logistics adaptation.’ Five years later, their analysis still serves as the best conclusion for the Army’s transformation efforts in an attempt to achieve a revolution in military logistics. Now is the time to harness the initiative and break new ground with Army logistics transformation. We certainly are in a time when the choices we make with the resources available will be very difficult. However, placing the necessary changes in the Army sustainment warfighting function at the bottom of the priority list cannot continue, we must invest in the technologies and equipment that will finally allow us to realize revolutionary change and enable us to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.
Senior Army leadership must create the environment and set the conditions for us to succeed… The logistics community must articulately state the case for ensuring the placement of the distribution function of sustainment at the top of the list of priorities when it comes to equipping our force in order to ensure we remain the best-equipped fighting force and finally realize a revolution in military affairs by achieving a revolution in military logistics. (Powers, 2013, pp. 22 and 23)
Overall, there is no tool that allows the Army G-4 to see and track resources allocated to budgets and programs and their impact upon current readiness and future capabilities. Furthermore, the Army leadership responsible for logistics does not and cannot know all the work going on across the Army, and across DoD, that impacts Army logistics. This deprives the Army G-4 of the ability to impact and influence programs that have a logistics component, or even those programs that are explicitly devoted to logistics. It also prevents collaboration among programs and Services that could allow the fielding of logistics improvements more quickly and at less cost.
Finding 8-2. Logistic activities within the Army do not receive the attention necessary to ensure the effective sustainment of operational forces on the battlefield over the long term. Currently there is no management tool that allows the G-4 to track the resources allocated to logistics across the program evaluation groups. A logistics-centric look at those programs that reduce the logistics burden and make the logistics system more efficient—across the science and technology, research and development, procurement, operations and maintenance, and procurement phases—would provide the G-4 the information to track all the resources being applied to making logistics more effective and efficient.
Recommendation 8-2. Army leadership should develop a logistics-centric resource management system or program that will allow senior Army leadership to ensure that adequate resources and priorities are given to logistics activities across the spectrum of Army activities, to include research and development, analytical and decision support, force structure, and operational planning.
In the Army education system, 21st century logistics operations and the challenges of Joint and combined logistics across a global area of operations are largely omitted from the curriculum of Army personnel not attending logistics-specific courses. When they are considered, they are focused on notional organizational structure as opposed to the higher-level issues that must be addressed and the trade-offs that must be made to accomplish the long-term materiel development goals and effective sustainment operations. If the importance of logistics is to be appreciated and the complexity of logistics activities is to be understood across the military community, logistics education should not be confined to those in the logistics community. Service members attending military education programs, from the senior service college-level to the basic entry program, need to better understand the role of Joint logistics in the conduct of military operations, and their responsibilities for facilitating the execution of logistics activities. It would be helpful to include logistics activities in training exercises and war games, such as at the National Training Center.
Army commanders lack adequate training in how Army SOF are to obtain support for common items. The unique nature of Army support for SOF requires greater attention in the Army and SOF schoolhouses to ensure that all individuals involved with the support function understand their responsibilities and the opportunities that exist to facilitate the operations of both conventional and SOF forces. Nor are the SOF commanders themselves adequately trained in coordinating with the Army to obtain support. Attention must continue to be paid in the education system to the responsibilities of nonlogistics personnel who serve as contracting officer representatives for a wide variety of in-theater contracting activities in both SOF and non-SOF organizations. While improvements are taking place and
as a result many serious problems have been avoided, the education program must be fully supported because of the frequency of personnel turnover in these positions. The duplicative provision by both the Army and SOF of sustainment requirements for support of non-SOF-unique items results in additional logistics costs. The committee notes that the Naval Postgraduate School offers a graduate curriculum in operational logistics that addresses many of the issues raised in this section.
Finding 8-3. Army personnel not directly engaged in logistics need better training and education about their roles in facilitating logistics support and driving logistics demand. There also needs to be better education of both Army and special operations forces (SOF) personnel about the Army’s role in supporting SOF and improving coordination in this regard. Including logistics activities in training and exercises and war games would be useful in this regard.
Recommendation 8-3. The commander of Training and Doctrine Command should undertake a review of the logistics content of Professional Military Education across all levels to determine where insertion of logistics education would be appropriate. Specific attention should be paid to courses that include individuals likely to be responsible for in-theater contracting activities and support for special operations forces (SOF). Precommand courses should cover how Army Special Forces are employed and how their Service-common and SOF-unique needs are appropriately supported. Consideration should also be given to the inclusion of logistics activities in war games and at the National Training Center.
Recommendation 8-4. If an agreement is reached for the Army to provide primary logistics support to special operations forces (SOF), the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) should join with the Special Operations Command-Joint Capabilities organization within the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Joint Special Operations University to create two sets of courses, a TRADOC set and a SOCOM set. The TRADOC courses should enable Army personnel to understand the proper employment of SOF in general and their associated support. Conversely, the SOCOM courses should familiarize SOF personnel with the logistics and sustainment support organizations and associated capabilities that the Army can provide to them when they have been assigned to a Theater Special Operations Command. Establishing a program to teach SOF commanders about the Army supply system and processes and how to effectively integrate themselves into the Army logistics network while they are deployed in a Joint area of operations, may also be necessary.
The report Reducing the Logistics Burden for the Army After Next: Doing More with Less (NRC, 1999) found that
The rapid growth and global competition in commercial markets for complex technological products, coupled with decreases in defense spending, are challenging the role DoD has played since World War II in determining the direction of product development, although DoD is still the principal sponsor of high-risk, innovative research at universities and federal laboratories. In their roles as consumers of technology, DoD and the Army must take full advantage of cooperative endeavors involving industry, academia, and the other services.…Army dollars should be invested primarily in projects that address Army-specific requirements or projects that would not be undertaken without Army support. (NRC, 1999, p. 5)
This finding continues to be relevant and is clearly reflected in the research and technologies associated with logistics. The commercial logistics sector has grown immensely since 1999 and carries out many functions identical to those required of the military. Commercial efforts to improve vehicle and aircraft maintenance activities, increase reliability, and lower energy demands are objectives of both the manufacturers of end items and those who use them. In addition to commercial research and
development, such work is ongoing in the multinational and nongovernmental sectors. One example of this is the Safe Road Trains for the Environment work discussed in Chapter 4. Another example is the Coca Cola Foundation’s deployment of Slingshot water distillation technology as part of its efforts to deploy Ekocenters around the world. The Slingshot system appears to be an efficient, compact system for purifying large quantities of water. (Coca Cola Company, 2013) There is a tremendous amount of work that the Army might be able to take advantage of.
Finding 8-4. Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, nongovernmental, and commercial activities remained heavily involved in material development and technology innovation in areas directly relevant to logistics operations and sustainment goals. Continuous monitoring of the efforts of entities outside the Army and collaborations with them offer opportunities for reducing military expenditures for needed technologies and for the early acquisition of systems that have been proven in the private sector. The Army should avoid duplication of efforts under way in other sectors wherever possible.
Recommendation 8-5. In carrying out its material development programs, the Army S&T community should continue and increase, where appropriate, close collaboration with Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, nongovernmental, and commercial organizations in S&T areas where these organizations are pursuing program similar to those required by the Army.
CASCOM (U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command). 2012. The Path to 2028. Distribution White Paper, March. Fort Lee, Va.: CASCOM.
CASCOM. 2013. Army 2020 and Beyond Sustainment White Paper: Globally Responsive Sustainment, August 30. http://www.cascom.army.mil/PDF/Army%202020%20and%20beyond%20sustainment%20white%20paper%20globally%20responsive%20sustainment.pdf.
Coca Cola CompanyTM. 2013. EKOCENTER Delivers Safe Access to Water and Other Basic Necessities to Communities in Need. Press release. September 24. http://www.coca-colacompany.com/presscenter/press-releases/.
DA (Department of the Army). 2010. Theater Support Command. FM 4-94. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army.
DA. 2011. Theater Army Operations. FM 3-93. http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-93.pdf.
DoD (Department of Defense). 2010a. Joint Concept for Logistics. August 6. http://www.jcs.mil/portals/36/Documents/102710173839_Joint_Concept_for_Logistics_v1_FINAL_with_CJCS_Sig.pdf.
DoD. 2010b. Joint Logistics White Paper. June 4. http://wss.apan.org/1539/JKO/ocs/OCS%20Documents/Joint_Logistics_White_Paper.pdf.
Gates, R. 2014. Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War. New York, N.Y.: Alfred A Knopf.
JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff). 2012. Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Forces 2020. September 10. http://www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/BOV_Documents/2012/Chairman’s%20Capstone%20Concept%20for%20Joint%20Operations-2012.pdf.
NRC (National Research Council). 1999. Reducing the Logistics Burden for the Army After Next: Doing More with Less. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
Powers, K.M. 2013. Sustainment Transformation: Achieving a Revolution in Distribution Based Logistics. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA590208.
Stevenson, M.H. 2011. A vision of Army logistics with 20/20 hindsight. Army Sustainment 43(2): 3-8.