Technology: Processes of Assessment and Choice (1969)

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CHAPTER V. APPROAC H ES AND RECOMMENDATIONS GENERAL PRINCIPLES Thus far, we have described our conclusions about how decisions influencing technological change should ideal­ ly be made . We have urged th.at such decisions ought to reflect a wider circle of concerns than they have in the past ; that they should attribute greater importance to the preservation of future options ; that they should be pre­ ceded and accompanied by more comprehensive efforts to reduce uncertainties through basic understanding ; that they should build on a broader base of public par­ ticipation ; that they should be brought into greater harmony with one another through more sophisticated efforts to achieve consistency of criteria . And we have attempted to trace the myriad constraints, both concep­ tual and institutional, upon society's capacity to achieve these objectives. We turn now to perhaps the most diffi­ cult phase of our task-the prescription of an agenda for change. We preface our discussion of more operational matters with a number of observations about the spirit in which we believe a program of change ought to be formulated. Many of the goals expressed in this report are, at bottom, the goals of better government and, indeed , of a better world . To approach such goals with rigid formulae, or even to proceed in the belief that goals of this kind can be fully achieved rather than only approximated, would blunt the effort in advance . The only strategy with which co11fident steps can be taken eventually to move the 72 oi9,tized by Google 

system we have described in the broad directions sug­ gested here is an evolutionary one. The pervasiveness and complexity of the problems we have addressed, the scale and variety of the private and public interests affected, the nation's inexperience and the inadequacies of our knowledge, all call for a modest beginning, not a wholesale attack. Our search, therefore, must be for a manageable, and yet significant, point of departure. As we said at the outset of this report, the question before the panel is how we in the United States can best begin the awesomely difficult task of altering present evaluative and decision-making processes, and how we can best do so without sacrificing the benefits that those processes, in the service of continuing tech­ nological progress, have to offer. Clearly, the processes we seek to change are too bou�d up with the very fabric of our society to admit of sudden and sweeping alteration. But some of those processes at least are more amenable than others to purposeful change . At several points in this report we have noted the growing significance of federal programs and policies in the evolution of technology. We have observed that technological development in the private as well as the public sector has become increasingly dependent upon actions taken by Congress and the President, upon federal appropriations and legislation, upon the missions and practices of a wide variety of executive agencies and ad­ ministrative bodies. Frequently, in describing what have seemed to us to be important deficiencies in present processes of technology assessment and choice, we have taken our cues from the experience of the federal govern­ ment itself. If we seek a place to begin, then, what more appro­ priate starting point could there be than the federal government's present involvement in the support and regulation of technology? It is at the federal level that 73 Digitized by GoogIe 

the greatest pressure for action is now felt, and surely the case for action by the federal government is stongest in those areas in which federal policy already plays a major role in technological development. There is much to be said for the view that the federal government ought to put its own house in order before it seeks to impose new requirements for state or local action or new standards for the private sector. If a pilot program initiated within the federal government and limited to - technological developments and applications signifi­ cantly molded by federal policies could be carried out imaginatively and energetically, it could eventually serve both as a stimulus and as a demonstration, leading · to comparable activities in state a,nd local governments and in the private sector, or perhaps to gradual exten­ sions of the federal program itself. If the federal govern­ ment can point the way to more responsible manage­ ment of technological change, it will have accomplished no mean task ; if it cannot, little more can be expected of other institutions in our society. We have already described a variety of federal acti­ vities that might fall within the purview of the sort of pilot program we contemplate. Any such program would invariably become involved, for example, with federal support for highway and airport construction ; federal participation in water-resource development and weather-modification research ; federal sponsorship of supersonic transport and of nuclear-power generation ; foreign aid for the support of agricultural technology in developing nations ; federal promulgation and enforce­ ment of safety standards and regulations in the drug, automotive, and other industries. The anal sis of this y report does not call for the alteration of an of these activities y (though alterations might ultimately be deemed wise) or even the assumption of their technology-assessment respon­ sibilities b a new organization (though reassignments of y 74 Digitized by Goog Ie 

responsibility might eventually be deemed desirable) but simply the creation of a supplementary set of mechanisms designed to in ject into the activities falling within its purview a new and broadened set of perspectives. The members of the panel are persuaded, for the reasons developed in this report, that the creation of such additional mechanisms in the federal government is a matter of urgency. Before attempting to describe how the mechanisms we envision might function and how they might be organized, we think it useful to articulate here the broad principles that our analysis suggests should guide the design of any improved assess­ ment system within the federal government, however narrow or expansive the range of its substantive tech­ nological concerns might be . PLURALISM As one panel member recently testified, "the most important determinant of our future ability to use tech­ nology effectively and wisely to accomplish human ends will not be the existence or absence of formal mechanisms , governmental or private. Even the most centralized modern technological society-and ours is one of the least centralized-is highly pluralistic . No one does, or can 'mastermind' it-not even the whole Establishment, if there is such a thing. Decisions that do, or should, employ modern technology ; decisions that have effects which science and technology can anticipate : such de­ cisions are made by millions of people at millions of moments" (47) . It follows that intelligence about tech­ nology can be effective only if it is widely distributed . I t cannot be buried i n a Department of Technology Assessment or a Council of Technological Advisers, however useful such organizations might be for some purposes. What is needed, clearly, is a wide dijjusion of deeper 75 Digitized by Goog Ie 

understanding about technology and deeper concern about its implications. In part, the panel's demand for such diffusion is a corollaty of its belief that decisions affecting the cc urse of technology and hence the course of history require the broadest possible public participation and should not, even if they could, be delegated to narrow elites, whether scientific or political. But even apart from this value judgment, grave deficiencies would inhere in any self­ contained and centralized assessment operation, how­ ever well-intentioned and dedicated . First, it i s clear that no assessment mechanism broad enough to achieve the objectives this report envisions­ even if limited to the sphere of federally supported or controlled technology-could possibly command the range of expertise needed to make competent assessments of all the problems with which it might be confronted . Hence any mechanism we recommend must be em­ powered to commission external research, partly by contracting out defined assessment tasks to private agencies or groups, and partly by extending gran ts to finance unsolicited pt oposals for assessment studies by independent scholars in universities or other institutions. Only with such a capacity could a new mechanism marshal the necessary expertise without invariably relying upon studies funded or staffed by interested parties. Given this capacity, both the reality and the appearance of obj ectivity would be enhanced, as would the ability of the new mechanism gradually to instill new ways of thinking and new emphases thr oughout the professional and academic communities, and thus to contribute to the improvement of technology assessment generally. Second, even if it could be entirely self-reliant, no assessment mechanism in government could be trusted to retain its detachment and open-mindedness unless it 76 Digitized by Goog Ie 

were continually subjected to independent external criticism. One of the defects of existing systems is their excessive reliance upon unitary mechanisms to make particular assessments, with the result that distorted or partial perspectives too often become dominant. An y change we recommend should therefore seek to induce as man y dijjerent elements of socie{}' as possible to involve themselz,es in broadened assessment ejjorts. Indeed, our panel envisions not a single assessment mechanism but a network of such mechanisms extend­ ing throughout government and the private sector. The components of such a network already exist, but they have not developed a consistent framework of criteria with sufficiently wide perspective. They tend to confuse the technology-promotion, technology-regulation, and technology-evaluation aspects of their tasks. There is relatively little communication between those with technology-assessment and evaluation responsibilities in different parts of government and industry. Their tasks are perceived in overly specialized terms, and much of the technology assessment that goes on in programming and planning offices is not recognized as such. The ob jective of an proposal we make-whether or not limited to y federally in fluenced technology-should not be to transfer these assessment responsibilities to a new organization or to duplicate existing assessment activities in a new setting, but to subject such responsibilities and activities to critical review and constructive guidance in the hope of developing consistent principles and higher standards within a pluralistic frame. Any new assessment structure in the government should there­ fore supplement and coordinate existing mechanisms rather than supersede them. It should perform the junction of examining and influencing the ground rules and criteria of evaluations that are conducted within the agencies themselves. Scientists and engineers today manifest a growing tendency to view their professions and their responsi- 77 Digitized b y Goog Ie 

bilities to society in a far broader context than ever before . This is especially true within the universities, partly stimulated by the interest of the newer generation of students, and partly reflected by the emergence of new courses focusing on the social and environmental impact of engineering choices and technical decisions. In the business community as well, we have noted the emergence of social conscience with little parallel in our historical experience . But there is as yet no real focus for these new attitudes and activities . The creation of a new identity for technology assessment within the govern­ ment, even if little or no change were made in the formal responsibilities of existing organizations, could have a galvanizing effect in stimulating interest in the subj ect, providing an outlet for this interest within the professions, and channeling it in constructive directions. There might develop, as a byproduct, an improved professiona l literature of assessment, with the kinds of refereeing, citations, and standards characteristic of other types of scientific writing. But whether technology assessme n t itself will become a n independent profession, o r whether it will be characterized more by a new set of attitudes on the part of working scientists and technologists inside government and industry, is not clear. Probably it will be-and should be-a mixture of both. Unless the broadened criteria and perspectives de­ veloped by a new assessment entity find a place not only in the thinking of scientists and engineers but also in the planning of entrepreneurs and executives, the i mpact of any such entity will be superficial. For even if the entity is confined to areas of technology strongly in­ fluenced by federal action, it will need to draw on the resources of the corporate community if it is to perform capably� and it will ultimately have to influence the decision-making processes of that community if i t is to prove truly effective. It is therefore crucial that any 78 Digitized by GoogIe 

new mechanism we propose foster a climate that elicits the cooperation of business with its activities. Such a climate cannot be maintained if the relationship of the a ssessment entity to the business firm is that of police­ man to suspect. The needed climate requires that private industry be encouraged to find its own technical solu­ tions-not compelled to follow solutions formulated from above. Most businessmen will accept rather broad social goals so long as they can identify themselves with the effort and can do so without being placed at too great a competitive disadvantage. It seems clear, for example, that government sponsorship and leadership could induce the private development of far "cleaner" means of automotive propulsion-despite the fact that each individual company, without such leadership, might feel unjustified in undertaking the costs involved in the necessary changes. To that end, the government might well establish standards calculated to achieve specific environmental obj ectives. But for government to do more than that-for it to lay down detailed design specifications-would alienate the very community to which the government must ultima tely tum for compe­ tent technical work . Given the richness of contemporary technology, it may be expected that a number of alternative technical possibilities will emerge in response to each problem­ that there may, for example. be several efficient solutions to the problem of automotive air pollution short of scrapping internal combustion entirely and substituting steam or electricity. The optimal course is likely to re­ sult from an engineering balance of costs and benefits rather than from immutable first principles. Any new assessment mechanism that respects the importance of a pluralistic approach , and hence wishes to enlist the com­ petence of industry, must be ready for such situations 79 Digitized by Goog Ie 

and must be prepared to follow the engineering analy­ sis to the necessary depth rather than adhering inflexibly to a preconceived set of answers. Business will understand this sort of approach if it is followed consistently ; no other approach is likely to enlist the assistance of this vital resource. NEUTRALITY Any new technology-assessment mechanism must maintain as detached and neutral a stance as possible toward each issue that comes before it. We have already seen that a central defici ency of existing mechanisms for assessment is that they fail to separate promotion or pro­ teCtion from evaluation, and thereby compromise both their in tegrity and their credibility. To overcome that de­ ficiency, a1!Y new mechanism we propose must be carefully insulated from direct polic_y-making powers and responsibilities. Thus the mechanism must not be charged with re­ sponsibility for the accomplishment of any technological mission . Unlike the Federal Aviation Agency, for example, it must not be entrusted with the realization of a supersonic transport. Unlike the Public Health Serv­ ice, it must not be held accountable for the promotion of water fluoridation . Unlike the Department of Transpor­ tation, it must not be held responsible for the promotion of new or more effective means of transportation. Unlike the Department of Interior, the Department of Agri­ culture, the National Science Foundation, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, it must not be empowered to promote or finance weather­ modification efforts. Conversely, any new entity we recommend must not be charged with responsibility for the reduction or control of any technological problem. Unlike the Food and Drug Administration, it must not be held respon­ sible for the protection of the public from hazardous 80 Digitized byGoogle 

drugs. Unlike the Atomic Energy Commission, it must not be held accountable for the avoidance of excessive radiation. Unlike the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration or the National Air Pollution Control Administration, it must not be charged with preserving the quality of environmental resources against techno­ logical incursions. Above all, it must be given no authority to screen or "clear" new technological undertakings. To make its approval a prerequisite to action by any other agency or organization would immediately deprive it of its unique perspective as an entity with no ax to grind. Given the current popularity of proposals to entrust some environmental agency with the power to censor all technological developments and to forbid the introduc­ tion of those deemed excessively injurious, a further word on this subject seems in order. The panel strongly doubts that such vast authority could be lodged in any agency without subjecting it to external political pressures that it could not resist and thence leading it to prompt cor­ ruption and ultimate collapse. At a minimum, the panel is certain that entrusting such sweeping powers to a new assessment entity would rob it of any special claim to objectivity and would render its judgments at least as suspect as those of any other regulatory body. But even if these consequences could somehow be avoided, the panel would emphatically oppose any scheme that would empower an agency to decide, on behalf of some­ thing called "society" or "the environment," which . technological developments will be permitted and which prohibited . Selections among alternative technologies require that choices be made among competing and con­ flicting interests and values. To the extent that those choices are made and enforced collectively rather than individually, they are essentially political in character and must therefore be the responsibility of the politically responsive branches of government and of those pub- 81 Digitized by Goog Ie 

licly accountable bodies that are specifically entrusted with regulatory responsibilities in narrowly circumscribed areas . The making of such choices is, in principle, in­ distinguishable from the resolution of the many other conflicts that beset society . To entrust the resolution of all those conflicts to a single, all-encompassing authority would be incompatible with representative government. Any new assessment entity we propose, therefore, should be em­ powered to stud and to recommend but not to act. It must be able to y evaluate but neither to sponsor nor to prevent. We confront, how­ ever, something of a paradox, for though we wish to assure the neutrality of the new mechanism, we wish also to assure that it be influential . The panel has no though t of urging the creation of another organization simply to add one more voice to the many that alre ady cry out for change . Thus, while it must itself seek to be apolitical, any new assessment mechanism must be located close to the centers of . power in the polit,i�al process; given the vast powers of the con­ tending interests that will surround it, any organization less centrally situated would have no realistic hope of materially influencing public policy. There must therefore be a close relationship between some component of the new mechanism and the President in his politi­ cal capacity; and some component of the mechanism must be linked closely to Congress, either to that bod as a whole or to one y or more congressional committees, whether joint or parallel. Any such congressional component-whether an instrument of Congress as a whole or of one or more committees or both-must be empowered at the very least to review the work of the executive componen.t and also to undertake studies on its own initiative . Without connections of this kind, any new mechanism would invariably lack force vis-a-vis the executive bureaucracy and the government-industrial establish­ ments, both within the executive branch and in congres- 82 Digitized by Goog Ie 

sional processes, whether related to substantive legisla­ tion or to appropriations. With such connections, however, the prospects for an effective system would be more favorable, particularly since it would then be feasible to lodge, within the component linked to Con­ gress, the power to obtain all pertinent information, by subpoena if necessary, from any government agency. Such connections could also facilitate communications between the executive component, the congressional component, and the general public, without the usual process of clearance through the Bureau of the Budget for c onformity to "the administration' s program . " S ome might wish that the priorities assigned t o tech­ nological effort and research could show the way for the political and social priorities of the future . This would in the extreme case amount to technocracy, with "expert" j udgment replacing political discourse as the mode by which society determines its goals and direc­ tions. But in the real world it is more likely that scientific and scholarly priorities will be determined by social and political priorities than vice versa, at least when it comes to the applied science, technology, and policy­ oriented scholarship with which we are concerned in this report. The most we can hope for in creating a new mechanism for technology assessment is to introduce a greater degree of ob jectivity into the process and to in ject a body of criteria and assumptions that reflect a wider set of interests and values than do the specialized organizations currently engaged in fragmented assessment activities. We can hope to raise the level of political discourse; we must not seek to eliminate it. Indeed, the best guarantee of objectivity might well be to open the new mechanism to as wide as possible a range of countervailing influences rather than to attempt to shut out such influences altogether. We have already noted the need to accompany any new assessment mechanism with 83 30-973 Q--69 ----7 Digitized by Goog Ie 

surrogate representatives or ombudsmen to speak on behalf of interests too weak or diffuse to generate effec­ tive spokesmen of their own . Citizens' committees or advisory panels of affected laymen might prove helpful but obviously will not suffice. Means must also be de­ vised for alerting suitable representatives of interested groups to the fact that a decision potentially affecting them is about to be made, and for informing such repre­ sentatives of the issues presented by that decision . Whatever structure is chosen, it should provide well-defined channels through which citizens' groups, private associations, or surrogate representatives can make their views known and, if insistent, be granted a hearing, though mechanisms should also be provided to filter out for summary treatment truly frivolous or irresponsible claims . Opportunities to intervene should come early in the decision-making process so that needless controversy is avoided later and so that participants can effectively influence the outcome. To increase the likelihood that the views expressed will receive adequate weight in the final assessments and decisions, care must be taken to secure a wide diversity of lay and professional per­ sonnel in the assessment entity itself and to guarantee thorough public review, though measures must also be devised to assure that at least the early stages of the assessment process, when experts should be encouraged to speculate candidly, will not later be exposed to em­ harassing public scrutiny. Thus it is through procedural arrangements calculated to elicit the broadest possible participation in its work, rather than through devices designed to separate it from the world of power, that a new assessment entity can best be protected from forces that would threaten to narrow its perspectives and thereby subvert its neutrality and integrity. 84 Digitized by Goog Ie 

CAUTION I t may seem superfluous to do so, but the panel wishes to stress the need for a cautious approach to the de­ velopment of new assessment institutions-an approach that does not confuse the urgent need for action with a mandate to ignore the risks that such action might entai l . One such risk flows from the problem of information overload and the limited attention span of the political process . Thus, the very fact that one must necessarily place some issues much higher than others on the tech­ nology-assessment agenda means that certain activities will be assessed more deeply than others and may thus be burdened with a larger share of the environmental and social costs that they generate. We have already noted that this sort of imbalance can create a serious mis­ allocation of economic resources, and we emphasize the problem here in order to highlight the importance of assuring that priorities in the assessment process be set along reasonab�y objective lines and that assessment criteria be developed and en forced in reasonably consistent wa ys. Another kind of difficulty results from the mixed values of technological consequences. Almost always, as we h ave noted , they will be perceived as beneficial by some and detrimental by others. The options made available by a given technology or by a particular way of intro­ ducing it encourage a reordering of social structures toward an equilibrium consistent with the newly re­ laxed constraints. Even when the ensuing configuration is plainly beneficial from some appropriately "public" perspective, various groups and institutions might well be worse off, either briefly or for long periods, as a result of the change. The entirely natural opposition of such groups to the technological development in question, already a barrier to many forms of innovation, might 85 Digitized by Goog Ie 

simply be accentuated by improved technology assess­ ment. For such assessment, in identifying and pub­ licizing the ·adverse side-effects of technological change to various sectors of society and of the environment, might arouse the opposition of powerful interest groups at times and in directions quite at odds with the "general welfare," however defined. Experience with the misuse of danger-identifying assessments as weapons to suppress competing technologies in the construction and trans­ portation industries, to name two examples, at least counsels caution. Indeed, even an assessment process designed to stress the potential benefits of technology by identifying its optimum uses might result in stifling desirable changes. In discussions of the future of audio-visual education, for example, the contrasting implications of two different technological choices have been noted : first, instructional TV programs broadcast from a central source to all schools in a given city ; second, film or videotape car­ tridges located in school libraries for use at the teacher's initiative. Choosing the first alternative would obviously diminish the flexibility of teaching schedules and re­ strict the play of individual teacher preferences and styles, though it might prove more efficient in an eco­ nomic and organizational sense and might permit wider dissemination of the "best" materials ; choosing the second alternative would permit teachers to adapt television materials to their own educational approaches and tastes-in timing and in content. A desire to keep the individual teacher in the center of the picture might lead one to prefer the second alterna­ tive. But the educational philosophy of the established bureaucracy might be rather different. Perceiving greater freedom for individual teachers as a threat to centralized control, and basically distrusting the judgment and com­ petence of individual teachers in comparison with those 86 Digitized by Goog Ie 

of their own more expert consultants, members of the educational establishment might well be alerted to oppose the decentralizing alternative. Unless those who stand to gain from a technological option that disrupts the system are as well organized and influential as those with a stake in seeing the system remain unchanged, the early and persuasive identification of which technological choices would produce which benefits could prove sadly self-defeating. For this reason it is particularly important to couple improved assessment with improved methods of repre­ senting weak and poorly organized interest groups. A third danger follows from the fact that it is ordinarily simpler to foresee difficulties than it is to foresee the technical or social inventions that can overcome them. Innovation, whether technological or social, requires a certain measure of faith and missionary zeal, a willing­ ness to proceed despite apparent problems whose solu­ tions are not yet foreseen (48) . There is a delicate balance between such faith, on the one hand, and rational analysis, on the other-a balance which must not be tipped too far either way. At the ver least, new assessment y institutions should be cautioned against the tendenc to stultif y y progress by magnif ing risks or difficulties and ignoring the y possibility of finding solutions as problems arise. A fourth danger is one that inheres in every exercise in seeming rationality in politically charged areas of discourse. Just as systems analysis has on occasion been used to provide a misleading mantle of objectivity for essentially predetermined value preferences (49) , so too there is a risk that technology assessment, unless continually subjected to independent criticism and countervailing pressures, ma become a weapon for individuals and groups in defense of y their own narrow interests. A final hazard is that the superposition of new review and assessment mechanisms upon those already exist­ ing in the federal government and elsewhere may exert 87 Digitized b y Goog Ie 

an excessively inhibitory effect upon innovative activity generally. Although we have recommended that new assessment institutions be given no formal clearance authority, we recognize that they will, if properly de­ signed, prove highly influential. Their very existence could create large new worries for the innovator ; how a proposed technological change would be viewed in the eyes of the new assessors could pose a perplexing question for business. The force of this consideration is obviously weakened to the extent that new assessment mechanisms are re­ stricted to areas where federal decisions already play a crucial role, but even mechanisms thus confined will - undoubtedly impose some higher costs. It should be noted, however, that such added costs can ordinarily be recovered in the eventual return on the investment, through higher prices. If it is feared that permitting the price system to reflect such costs would move vital prod­ ucts or services beyond the reach of certain segments of the population, then that problem can be addressed separately as an issue for income and welfare policy . When, for political or other reasons, investors consider reliance on future use of the price mechanism unwise, the government might assume enough of the initial risk (as it has with respect to atomic-energy develop­ · ment) to overcome the potentially retarding effect of assessment, eventually recovering the expense by a tax on the resulting private industry, by a direct rebating scheme, or, in the case of a technology remaining in the public sector, by a governmental charge to users. However the costs imposed by better assessment are borne, it is important to remember that the whole point of such assessment is to save society in the long run even higher costs that less disciplined technological development would be likely to inflict. The panel very much doubts that altering the cost-benefit calculations . 88 Digitized by GoogIe 

made by those who guide the course of technological innovation and diffusion will retard the total quantity of innovative activity ; it seems far more likely there will simply be a change in the quality of innova­ tion-a change that will quite properly reflect the broader concerns that have heretofore been given too little weight. * IN STITUTIONAL GuiDELINES To summarize, the analysis thus far developed argues for the creation of new institutions for technology as­ sessment in the federal government. Whatever their precise structure, such institutions : l . Should be developed with a cautious regard for the potential hazards latent in their operation. 2 . Should provide a continuing and critical evaluation of assessment and decision-making processes in those areas of technological development in which federal programs or policies play a significant and direct role. 3. Should serve not to supersede existing mechanisms for technology assessment but rather to enhance the consistency, breadth, and objectivity of their criteria for decision, the comprehensiveness and accuracy of their analyses, and the openness of their processes to wide participation by all potentially affected interests. 4. Should possess an effective capacity to stimulate in both private and public sectors an increased aware­ ness of, and competence in, the requirements of improved technology assessment. 5. Should foster a climate that elicits the cooperation of the professional and corporate communities with the new assessment activities while encouraging self-directed initiatives within those communities toward more sensi­ tive and comprehensive assessment standards. •one member of t h e panel, Morris Tanenbaum, does not fully agr ee with t h e other members on this Issue. His separate views are set forth In Appendix B, pgs. 148- 1ro. 89 Digitized by GoogIe 

6. Should be charged with neither promotion nor regulation of technology but should be held account­ able for maintaining, in the policy alternative and recom­ mendations derived from their research, as neutral and detached a stance as possible. 7 . Should operate at a strategic level in the political process, close to both the legislative and executive branches, in order to attract the most competent and imaginative personnel available and to enhance the quality of governmental response to the problems and opportunities of technological development. 8. Should remain open to the widest possible range of responsible influence by all potentially interested groups and by surrogate representatives of interests too diffuse or too weak to generate effective spokesmen of their own. 9. Should possess the ability to establish for themselves, and to suggest for others, a system of priorities among the multitude of possible assessment issues and activities in a manner calculated to promote rational and timely public identification of salient problems, opportunities, and points of decision. SPECIFIC FuNcTioN s Keeping in mind the broad guidelines set forth above, guidelines that should be considered in the design of any new technology-assessment mechanism or set of mechanisms in the government, we tum now to an enumeration of the kinds of functions that we would expect a new mechanism to perform : I . Examine particular areas of technology by con­ tracting with outside organizations to undertake studies of specific problems defined and selected by it. Such examination would be confined, at least at the outset, to technological developments or applications that are 90 Digitized by Goog Ie 

sponsored by the federal government or are otherwise affected in a major and direct way by federal activity. The primary effort would be to project social and en­ vironmental effects in the most comprehensive terms possible, with particular attention to dimensions of impact and options for policy that other assessments of the same area have failed to explore fully. From time to time, it might also be possible to experiment with assess­ ments centered not on particular areas of technology but on areas defined in terms of the environment, the society, or the individual, in order to investigate the cumulative impact upon these elements of all technologies with which the federal government is strongly involved (50) . 2 . Sponsor basic research on theoretical problems and issues related to technology assessment by extending grants to support independent studies proposed by other govemmental agencies, universities, or non-profit orga­ nizations. Unlike the contract program, the grant pro­ gram need not be restricted, even at the outset, to govemment-sponsored or government-affected technol­ ogy but might properly range over the entire set of concerns pertinent to the intellectual underpinnings of technology assessment and decision-making. 3. Review specific assessments performed by other government agencies or departments, either on its own initiative or by request from other agencies, from select<?d persons elsewhere in government, or from re­ sponsible spokesmen of various private interests. Such review would be confined to an evaluation of (a) the criteria and procedures employed in the assessment proc­ ess, (b) the nature and technical adequacy of the evi­ dence relied upon, and (c) the representation of poten­ tially affected interests. 4. Conduct studies of continuing assessmen t systems in various parts of the government, such as the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, or 91 oi9,tized by Google 

the Federal Communications Commission, again eval­ uating the adequacy and comprehensiveness of (a) the criteria used, (b) the evidence employed, and (c) the interests represented . 5 . Maintain an information center on technology assessment, which would in time become a primary source of critical data with respect to pertinent activities carried on in government, in the universities, and in other organizations. As a comprehensive information­ management system, the center should be designed to support systematic inquiry into past and present assess­ ment activities and findings, with emphasis upon identifying gaps in the resulting body of data and evalua­ tion. The center would issue bibliographies, abstracts, project lists, and state-of-the-art summaries on its own initiative . It would also operate an inquiry service to answer appropriate questions directed to it by any government official or private individual or group. 6. Issue an annual report on technology assessment (a) summarizing its own activities, (b) reviewing the work of technology-assessment mechanisms throughout the gov­ ernment, and (c) describing new methods that had been developed, new problems that had been encountered, and general issues that had emerged from an across-the-board examination. Largely educational in purpose, the report would seek to develop a framework for public discussion of such issues and would seek to publicize matters relevant to technology assessment that seem unlikely to receive adequate public attention through other channels. Most importantly, the annual report would suggest priorities as to the most pressing problems and the most promising opportunities in technology assessment. The system of priorities thus formulated would guide the work of the new mechanism through the subsequent year, enabling it to control its own agenda and to accept or reject proposed projects according to an explicit system 92 Digitized by Goog Ie 

of problem selection-a capacity that could prove invaluable in politically volatile situations. The priorities proposed in the annual report would reflect such considerations as (a) the urgency of an issue, in terms of the degree to which irreversible consequences might be expected to flow from postponement of assess­ ment or action, or in terms of the imminence of a large commitment of resources ; (b) the lack of adequate effort devoted elsewhere to the issue ; and (c) the contri­ bution that an attempt to deal with the issue might be expected to make to the improvement of technology­ assessment methodology and the development of consist­ ent technology-assessment principles. For such a priority-setting system to function well, it must be supported by ways of making effective quanti­ fiable guesses about technological trends and con­ sequences ; of reviewing the objectivity, thoroughness, and accuracy of prevailing estimates, claims, and warn­ ings ; of positing optimal sets of questions for interim assessments in light of other, related efforts ; of con­ ceiving the possible contents of still-unformed assess­ ment doctrines ; and of learning quickly who is looking at what problems and how adequately. Both the grant program and the information center will obviously prove critical to the development of the tools and the data necessary to the effective setting of priorities in terms of future need rather than past habit and present power. 7. Sponsor conferences and symposia on specific areas of concern bearing on federally supported or regulated technology and publish the proceedings thereof. Empha­ sis might be placed on international participation and on stimulation of cooperative studies between countries with technology-assessment problems crossing inter­ national boundaries. 8. Prepare in-house policy papers recommending specific actions to Congress, the President, executive 93 Digitized by GoogIe 

agencies, or administrative bodies. Such papers might recommend (a) new programs of research and develop­ ment ; (b) changes in policy with respect to the stimula­ tion or regulation of a technology with which the federal government is already involved ; (c) improvements in the continuing procedures followed by assessment mecha­ nisms in various parts of government ; (d) readjustments of the criteria, ground rules, or breadth of representation in a pending assessment within the government ; (e) reassignments of responsibility among government assess­ ment mechanisms ; or (f) the creation of entirely new evaluative or regulatory entities. Before such policy papers are prepared, and perhaps also before commissioned reports are approved for publication, public hearings should be held if requested by or on behalf of any potentially affected group. Any final report should then include a summary of the hear­ ing and a statement of the data and arguments upon which the report's conclusions are based . ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS The panel has devoted a significant part of its at­ tention to consideration of specific institutional structures that could perform the functions enumerated above in conformity with the general principles and guidelines set forth in the opening sections of this chapter. It is clear that no pattern of organizational arrangements can simultaneously meet all the criteria the panel would wish to suggest. We have noted, for example, that new assessment mechanisms must be close to the center of political power so that they may be influential in major decisions bearing on technological change ; yet such mechanisms must maintain the image and substance of political neutrality so that the integrity and credibility of their evaluations will not be impaired . We have ob- 94 Digitized by Goog Ie 

served, too, that new mechanisms for technology assess­ ment must be concerned with matters of current ur­ gency ; yet, unless such mechanisms maintain a longer time horizon than do most government organizations, their preoccupation with problems that are momentarily highly visible may lead them from crisis to crisis without the continuity of attention and action necessary for sustained progress. Thus the whole technology-assessment process could become little more than an exercise in futility. Clearly, any institutional arrangement that is finally established must involve some compromise between these kinds of considerations. It is especially important, therefore, that an system we propose be conceived in the most flexible y terms, with the possibility of restructuring its agenda and modif ing its procedures, its assumptions, and even its location y within government, as it learns from experience. Special care must be given to a continuing evaluation of the system's operation and impact, as viewed not only from within but also from the perspectives of independent critics, with direct feedback from such evaluation to the system's internal design. There must, in short, be a built-in capacity for self-renewal. Having thus emphasized the tentative character of all that follows, we tum to the components of an organiza­ tional pattern that seems to the panel to be worthy of serious consideration. EXECUTIVE We have indicated previously that one component of the new mechanism must be closely linked to the President in his political capacity. An interdepartmental group, particularly one that, like the Environmental Quality Council, is composed of agency heads and established at the cabinet level, can furnish a useful 95 Digitized by Goog Ie 

mechanism for the implementation of a new emphasis, such as an emphasis on environmental protection, throughout the executive branch, so long as that new emphasis remains high among Presidential priorities . Once its mandate fades from the spotlight of Presidential concern, however, an interdepartmental council tends to operate through subordinate officers with little in­ fluence over the policies of their respective agencies, officers who may in any event be too committed to specific technology-related missions to provide the neces­ sary neutrality. More promising for technology-assessment purposes, both in terms of detachment and in terms of continuity, might be a high-level staff operating on the model of the Council of Economic Advisers, serving the President and answerable directly to him. But the inherent difficulty of separating the kinds of issues that such a council would have to consider from those for which the President's Office of Science and Technology bears responsibility argues strongly for merging the executive component of the new system with an appropriately expanded version of that Office. Moreover, and apart from the fact that science-policy issues are inextricably intertwined with one another and with issues of technology assessment, it seems clear that the individual or individuals in charge of whatever new activity is established within the Ex­ ecutive Office of the President must themselves be scientists, or at least persons with high credibility among scientists and engineers. Individuals of this sort would probably be easier to place within the Office of Science and Technology or a comparable entity than outside it. The panel is therefore agreed that the Office of Science and Technology, once its resources and responsibilities have been appropriately expanded, will provide a natural focus for any new technology-assessment activ­ ity to be established in the executive branch. 96 Digitized by Goog Ie 

There remains a difference of view within the panel as t'J whether the enlarged assessment responsibilities of the Office of Science and Technology should be centered within a new Technology Assessment Department in that Office or should be distributed within the expanded Office of Science and Technology along other lines. In the former case, the new department would be placed under the direction of a Deputy Director for Technology Assessment, serving immediately under the President's Science Adviser : in the latter case, staff and resources would be significantly expanded, but no new deputy · directorship would be created. However the effort might be organized, the intemal operating responsibilities of the broadened Office of Science and Technology would include the last four of the eight functions enumerated earlier : direction of an information-management system for technology assess­ ment, preparation of an annual report, initiation of conferences and symposia, and preparation of in-house policy papers. The Office, or its Technology Assessment Department if one were established, would also operate in close cooperation with a new Technology Assessment Division within the National Science Foundation, appropriately expanded to accommodate the new re­ sponsibilities that such a division would undertake. This new division, which should report at a fairly high level within the Foundation, would be authorized to perform the first four of the eight functions enumerated earlier­ that is, to administer a program of contracts and grants to outside organizations for specific assessments and for developing new conceptual tools and criteria for assess­ ment. The panel envisions that the Technology Assessment Division of the National Science Foundation, by prior agreement with the Office of Science and Technology 97 Digitized by Goog Ie 

or its Technology Assessment Department, would com­ mission specifically defined assessments under contract. Each contract should be made with whatever agency or institution is judged most competent to perform the required study, whether another government agency, a professional association, a research institute, or an in­ dustrial group. Contracts could be concluded either on a "sole source" basis or by competitive bidding, but the competitive process should be employed primarily to select the best problem definition and the most promising approach rather than to produce results at minimum cost. Studies and reports prepared under contract would be subject to review prior to publication by the new assessment entity. If a report were considered to be of poor quality, its publication might be withheld. When­ ever it chose to release a report, the Office of Science and Technology would have discretion either to assume responsibility for the contents of the product or to dis­ claim such responsibility, explicitly stating in each case which of these alternatives it had selected. The National Science Foundation's Technology As­ sessment Division would also administer a grant pro­ gram, through which it would support unsolicited pro­ posals from universities, independent scholars, non-profit organizations, and public agencies. Emphasis would be placed on the work of academic groups, but other capable organizations would not be excluded. The selection of proposals for grant support would be based on the relevance of a proposed study to issues high in the priorities of the Office of Science and Technology or its Technology Assessment Department ; the possible significance of the study for future policy or for the de­ velopment of assessment doctrine ; the scientific original­ ity of the proposal ; its general intellectual merit ; its technical feasibility ; the record of previous performance of the potential grantee ; the expertise of the grantee's 98 Digitized by Goog Ie 

proposed investigators ; and the ethical implications of any proposed experiments. The perspectives of several related disciplines should be involved, but interdis­ ciplinarity should not be promoted as an end in itself. There should be review by peer judgment, but the grantee should be fully responsible for the intellectual content of any completed report or study, with no censorship whatever by the supporting agency. An important purpose of the grant program would be to identify new problems and issues, particularly those not yet politically visible or not yet widely recognized in various professions. Even proposals too poorly framed or ill-conceived to be worth supporting might serve to alert assessment institutions to new kinds of dangers or to opportunities not previously considered, or might high­ light the importance of questions formerly too low on the agenda of such institutions to receive sufficient attention. The panel believes that a grant program of this sort is indispensable if new assessment entities are to serve an "early warning" function that transcends habitual assumptions and momentary priorities. The grant program, moreover, would serve as a channel of inputs from the broadest possible technical community and would stimulate thinking throughout that community about the higher-order effects of technological develop­ ment and the conceptual bases of technology assessment. Since the whole concept of technology assessment is not yet well defined, the National Science Foundation's Technology Assessment Division might initially receive few worthy proposals. Growth of the program should be carefully controlled in relation to the quality of the proposals submitted, with close retrospective review of the merit of work completed. Initially, the contract program would probably be much larger than the grant program, but we would expect this situation to reverse with time. The total budget of the new assessment 99 ao-973 �69---- s Digitized by Goog Ie 

operation in the executive branch might ultimately reach the order of $50 million, with about 20 percent being spent "in-house" and 80 percent in the contract or grant program, including contracts and grants with other government agencies. Many of the assessment studies currently carried out by committees of the National Research Council under contract with specific government agencies and by other quasi-public groups under similar arrangements might in the future be supported under the technology­ assessment program here described. This would be particularly valuable for studies on issues of considerable significance for national policy, in which the present supporting agency has an interest in a particular out­ come-such as a Federal Aviation Agency-supported study of the sonic boom, a Department of Defense­ supported study of the ecological effects of the military use of defoliants, or a Department of Agriculture­ supported study of the role of fertilizers in contributing to lake pollution and eutrophication. Existing agencies would not, of course, be precluded from supporting similar studies. The important point is that the sources of funds to support extensive assessments would no longer be limited, as they are today, to agencies that are proponents of the technologies being assessed or crusaders on behalf of particular segments of the environment. CONGRE SSIONAL As we noted earlier, another component of the new assessment mechanism must be linked closely to Congress. Although continued reliance on existing substantive and appropriations committees to provide the required bridge is a theoretical possibility, it is the panel's view that such reliance would miss the real point of congres­ sional involvement in the new technology-assessment institutions we propose. We have observed elsewhere 1 00 Digitized by Goog Ie 

that it is only in the executive agencies and in private organizations that the required broadening of assess­ ment criteria and the needed readjustment of assessment priorities can ultimately be effected. But executives and entrepreneurs who might be disposed to bring about the necessary shift in perspective will find it exceedingly difficult to do so unless there is a significant alteration in the present play of forces in the private sector and in the executive branch. At least with respect to technologies sponsored by executive departments and agencies, which comprise the bulk of our present concern, it can hardly be assumed that adequate pressure for alteration of perspectives will come from the Executive itself (51) , although the Presi­ dency, as opposed to the executive bureaucracy, can obviously serve as a crucial source of altered criteria and priorities. In part, added pressures may make themselves felt through the judiciary : as the lawsuit arising out of the Santa Barbara oil spill (52) and the threatened suit by Howard Hughes against the Atomic Energy Commission (53) suggest, litigation may occasionally supply new incentives. But the litigation mechanism is largely retro­ spective and sporadic, and is today of little use where either causation or damage or both are highly atten­ uated . The major source of pressure that remains is the Con­ gress. And it is precisely because public concern and criticism, channeled through Congress, can serve as the catalyst for the changes we think necessary that we view congressional involvement as indispensable. But the existing system of specialized committees, riddled with rivalries and fragmented by jurisdictional divisions, cannot be relied upon to provide the focus without which public concern is just so much undirected energy. Some­ how Congress must give shape to that energy and aim it coherently toward key points of decision in executive 101 Digitized by Goog Ie 

departments and private firms, and that is precisely what the present committee system is least capable of doing. Even if that system could serve as an adequate base for technology-assessment activities directly per­ tinent to pending congressional legislation-something history tends to disprove-it could not serve as an ade­ quate platform for pressure directed toward the crucial centers of decision outside of Congress with respect to technological change. Something more than the existing committee system, therefore, seems necessary. An institutional arrangement should be devised that will : Provide, within or close to the Congress, an effec­ tive public forum for responsible assessment activi­ ties of individuals or groups operating outside the present governmental and industrial technology­ assessment apparatus. Allow the Congress effectively to utilize the input of data, complaints, and suggestions pertinent to technological development or its consequences that may be expected to flow from the general public, in part spontaneously and in part under stimulus. Enable the Congress to make constructive and systematic use of existing assessment systems in the government, with special emphasis on the identi­ fication of gaps in information and analysis with respect to ongoing or proposed federal programs directly influencing major technological applica­ tions. Enhance the comprehensiveness and competence of technology-assessment activities engaged in by the staffs of congressional committees or by other groups responding to requests from members of Congress, by developing in Congress a greater capacity to mobilize independent professional re­ sources to assist it in technology-assessment tasks. 102 Digitized by Goog Ie 

Strengthen the ability of Congress critically to review findings, recommendations, and decisions potentially bearing on federal policy with respect to technology, whether made by existing executive departments and agencies, or embodied in the reports of the proposed addition to the Office of Science and Technology, or reflected in studies sub­ mitted to the proposed Technology Assessment Division of the National Science Foundation . Equip Congress with a mechanism for generating conclusions of its own bearing on technology­ assessment issues and priorities, supported by a systematic search of current professional literature and by continuing contacts with professional groups. In order to accomplish, or even approximate, these objectives, new technology-assessment institutions linked to Congress will have to be furnished with mechanisms enabling them : To enlist the aid of outside organizations, either directly or through the expanded National Science Foundation, in obtaining specific assessments and developing new assessment tools and criteria. To utilize the information-management system developed under the aegis of the proposed tech­ nology-assessment operation in the Office of Science and Technology, or, conceivably, to establish a second such system. To obtain on request from executive agencies data bearing critically on technologies supported or regula ted by them. To organize congressional hearings upon, and assist in the formulation of recommendations with respect to, assessment activities conducted in various parts of the government. To review and comment upon all technology­ assessment studies, policy papers, and reports re- 103 Digitized by Goog Ie 

leased by the Office of Science and Technology or its Technology Assessment Department . To file reports on their own initiative, perhaps including a congressional analogue to the previously described Annual Report on Technology Assess­ ment to be prepared within the Office of Science and Technology. The congressional component we envision might take either of two primary forms : Joint Committee The new congressional activity might be centered in a Joint Committee on Technology Assessment, equipped with a small but varied and highly qualified professional staff. To minimize the risk of domination by a single powerful individual, it might be desirable to consider a system of rotating chairmen. The committee's relation­ ship to the proposed technology-assessment entity in the executive branch might be analogous to the relationship of the Joint Economic Committee to the Council of Economic Advisers, or analogous to the relationship of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation to the Department of the Treasury. Like the Joint Economic Committee, the new Joint Committee on Technology Assessment would review the work of a most influential component of the executive advisory apparatus ; like that committee, it could elevate the exploration of issues within its jurisdiction to a high standard of professional competence throughout the Congress ; and, like the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, the new joint committee would be charged with oversight re­ sponsibilities with respect to operations and legislation and would be entrusted with important powers and duties of investigation and systematic review. As we envision the new joint committee, it would set its own agenda and define its own priorities, rather than auto- 1 04 Digitized by Goog Ie 

matically pursuing projects proposed from outside or routinely following the priority schedule adopted by the assessment entity in the Executive Office. We contem­ plate giving the Joint Committee on Technology Assessment no jurisdiction over specific legislation or appropriations, but we emphasize that the result of this choice might well be to give the new committee a charter far broader and more difficult to circumscribe than would otherwise be the case. Provision could perhaps be made for the committee to administer d irectly an information center and pro­ grams of contracts and grants like those already proposed for the Executive Office operation. But if it were thought that information-management systems and programs of extramural studies on the scale here contemplated would be too large for direct administration by a con­ gressional committee, reliance might be placed instead upon the proposed technology-assessment information system in the Office of Science and Technology and the suggested Technology Assessment Division of the ex­ panded National Science Foundation, which would then administer programs of contracts and grants both for the Office of Science and Technology and for the Joint Committee on Technology Assessment. £7on�ress-uuilie JkfeclU7nisr.n The new congressional actlvity might instead be centered in a separate Technology Assessment Office serving the Congress as a whole. As we envision such a Congress-wide mechanism, it would execute assign­ ments of responsibility given it by the Vice President, the Speaker of the House, or the chairman of any in­ terested committee of Congress. Unlike the Legislative Reference Service and Legislative Drafting Service, it would not be subject to requests for work by individual members of Congress. Its powers and duties would 1 05 Digitized byGoogle 

parallel those already suggested for the Joint Committee on Technology Assessment ; and, as in the case of the Joint Committee, it could either administer its own programs of information management and extramural studies or rely upon the new technology-assessment structure in the executive branch to administer those phases of its work. Although the Technology Assessment Office could be headed by a commission rather than a single director, such an arrangement might too easily lead to inter­ necine political and doctrinal strife. It seems preferable, therefore, to organize the mechanism under the leader­ ship of a single director. Given the complexity of arrang­ ing for the appointment of such an individual by Con­ gress as a whole and the advantages of involving the President in the choice, the director might well be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for an appropriate term of years, perhaps (though not necessarily) chosen to straddle rather than duplicate the term of the President himself, as in the case of the President's Science Advisory Com­ mittee, in order to provide a measure of insulation from Presidential politics. For the same reason, the director should be removable only by a concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress. Both the director and his staff should be compensated at sufficiently high rates to make it possible to attract first-rate men . The staff should include representation from a variety of scientific and non-scientific disciplines ; its size might be similar to that of the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation-approxi­ mately fifteen professionals, some senior, some junior. The panel is not prepared to recommend a choice as between a Congress-wide unit and a joint committee. The latter might more readily achieve the prominence , political visibility, and public access that the technology- 1 06 Digitized by Goog Ie 

assesment function in Congress requires. A Congress­ s wide organization such as the Legislative Reference Service, however skillful and conscientious, might be politically colorless to the point of ineffectuality in maj or areas of controversy. And such an organization might develop an excessive tendency to accept the broad political assumptions under which technological decisions are made-precisely the assumptions that a joint committee would be prone to question in depth. On the other hand, the very political associations from which a joint committee would draw its strength and its capacity to focus attention on key issues could danger­ ously subvert its integrity. Although we have considered a rotating chairmanship as a conceivable antidote to this sort of risk, we recognize the obstacles to such a proposal and realize that a Congress-wide entity might be pref­ erable from this perspective. Such an entity, moreover, might be more responsive to the diverse and pluralistic character of the problems it would be required to address. The process of technology assessment is so broad and varied in its reach that it touches the concerns of a great many different congressional committees. It might prove difficult to devise a procedure whereby other committees could make effective use of a Joint Committee on Tech­ nology Assessment without overloading it with requests that it would be less capable of rejecting than would a Congress-wide mechanism. And, even if an acceptable interface with other committees could be designed, it might be a mistake, in terms of both the job to be done and practical congressional politics, to suggest that re­ sponsibility within Congress for technology assessment be concentrated in a single committee. From this viewpoint it might be thought more realistic, and more consonant with the need of Congress to continue the progressive evolution of its own organization and procedures, to provide a new Congress-wide mechanism that will serve 1 07 Digitized by Goog Ie 

all the relevant committees through their respective chairmen. Given the powerful considerations favoring the joint committee, however, the choice becomes a very difficult one. In the final analysis, of course, Congress itself will have to decide which approach to take. There is yet another matter on which the panel is un­ prepared to offer any precise recommendations. Although the panel is in essential agreement that there must be a new locus of technology-assessment activities both in the executive branch and in Congress, there remains some difference of opinion as to how responsibilities and re­ sources should be allocated between the executive and congressional branches of the activity and where the greater weight should lie. A congressional base would be better suited for educating the public on the issues and ensuring representation of the widest possible range of interests. Moreover, many technology assessments may result in new or amended legislation or in the restruc­ turing of government organization or of congressional committees in response to technological change. Much can therefore be said for having Congress intimately involved throughout, since it is the views of congressmen and of their affected constituents that will ultimately determine the fate of many important policy recommen­ dations emerging from assessment activities. On the other hand, congressional institutions have not tradi­ tionally provided an effective base for highly professional­ ized activities or for extensive contractual relations with private organizations. The mere magnitude of the funds involved may argue against direct congressional manage­ ment. Institutions serving all of Congress have tended historically to be understaffed and overworked . They have often felt constrained for political reasons to respond to the request of any legislator, regardless of their own evaluations of the significance of the issue. Thus they 1 08 Digitized by Goog Ie 

have retained little control over their own priorities and over the definitions of the problems they have addressed. Since, in the panel's view, one of the most essential functions of new technology-assessment institutions will be to establish priorities among problems for attention on a basis more objective than "the squeaky wheel gets the grease," centering the activity in a congressional body may cause serious difficulties. A center of gravity in the executive branch would tend to ensure a more professional and continuous operation, one that would almost certainly enjoy greater credibility among scientists and technologists-an im­ portant matter if assessments are not be be sabotaged, consciously or unconsciously, by the tyranny of srpall decisions (54) made primarily by technologists them­ selves. On the other hand, the weakness of an executive agency in this area is that, while it may do its job with greater technical competence within a fixed framework of assumptions and criteria, it may do a poorer job of examining the assumptions or changing them. Even an executive agency that is relatively free from opera­ tional responsibilities and direct decision-making powers with respect to specific projects must be responsive in some measure to "the President's Program" unless it is established as a quasi-independent body like the Federal Reserve Board, a possibili ty to be considered below. Finally, an executive agency may be less inclined than its congressional counterpart to listen sympa­ thetically to all the many affected constituencies. To some extent these competing considerations can be accommodated by an imaginative sharing of respon­ sibilities between the executive and cong1 essional com­ ponents of the assessment activity. Thus the research and information-management elements of the activity might be centered in the executive unit while the educa­ tional and participatory elements might be centered in 1 09 Digitized by Goog Ie 

its congressional counterpart. The panel recognizes, however, that difficult choices of emphasis will have to be made, and, with respect to such choices� the panel has agreed to disagree. We would insist only that the balance not be tipped completely one way or the other­ that is, that both a congressional and an executive agency should play some role in the assessment process­ and that on the congressional side this role should be embodied in some mechanism that lies outside the present structure of specialized committees. INDEPENDENT There remains the possibility of a new technology­ assessment entity separated from both of the political branches, much a� the quasi-independent commissions and boards are separated today. The chairman of such an entity would presumably be appointed for a fixed term by the President but could be removed neither by him nor by Congress except for cause and after a full hearing. Such an institution might be contemplated as an addition to the Executive Office structure proposed above, in which case it could serve simply as a sub­ stitute for a Congress-wide mechanism, or it might contain internal divisions for information management and the administration of contract and grant programs, in which case it might approximate a self-contained Technology Assessment Board, supplanting the unit in the executive branch as well as the unit in the Congress. It might be thought that this sort of separation would possess certain advantages. Thus an entity removed from Congress and supposedly freed of the momentary parochial concerns of local and state-wide constituencies might find it possible to take a broader view than any likely to emerge from a congressional mechanism� while an entity removed from the Presidency and theoretically 1 10 Digitized by Goog Ie 

liberated from the pressures of the executive bureaucracy and the momentum of the Presidential personality might be able to steer a more objective and daring course than any likely to meet the approval of a mechanism in the Executive Office. Yet, for the reasons developed earlier, the panel regards the image of a totally apolitical assess­ ment mechanism as highly unrealistic. Moreover, to the seeming advantages of insulation from political influence there correspond the grave disadvantages of weakened access to political power ; to the apparent benefits of detachment from narrow constituencies there correspond the high costs of inaccessibility to a concerned public ; to the arguable gains of protection from executive perspec­ tives there correspond the serious losses of separation from the wellsprings of federal science policy. On balance, therefore, the panel considers the mechanisms whose formation we have recommended in the executive and legislative branches to be distinctly preferable to an independent or quasi-independent assessment body. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY The area of military technology has not received major attention in the panel's deliberations. Yet this area accounts for more than half the resources devoted by the federal government to research and development. In discussing the impact of technology on our society it is, in a sense, absurd to exclude consideration of military technology, for its dynamic development in competition with other nations determines much of what we do in technology assessment. Plainly, the exploitation of military technology has a major impact on our environment and on our future options. The continuing arms race affects the security not only of the world super-powers but also of the rest of the world's people, vast numbers of whom would suffer 111 Digitized by Goog Ie 

from a thermonuclear exchange between the major powers. The environmental effects of a possible military conflict, and indeed of the arms race itself� can less and less be confined to the battleground or even to the politi­ cal units and people immediately engaged . Yet military technology is unique in several respects. In the first place, despite growing concern in Congress and elsewhere, military technology remains much less publicly visible, relative to its importance, than other technologies and much less subject to full discussion and debate in a public forum. A considerable proportion of the technological data is either classified or proprietary, and the controls over its flow are essentially in the hands of the proponents of technological innovation in the military sphere. Furthermore, the environment in which military technology is developed is strongly conditioned by the interpretation of intelligence information, which is even more highly controlled and sensitive than is information about military technology itself. Crucial arguments concerning whether or not to go forward with a new military technological development often involve information that is not available to the public or is subject to controlled release to the public in such a way as to support particular policy viewpoints. Finally, during the period of the cold war, national security has enjoyed such overriding priority that the secondary consequences of military technology have tended to receive even less consideration than have those of other technologies. It has been relatively easy to disarm the critics and the skeptics both inside and outside of govern­ ment, both as a result of military or semi-military control over information sources, and in consequence of a general public attitude that military technology is too crucial to challenge or too complicated to understand. The panel does not propose to pass judgment on military technology or on the decision-making mech- 1 12 Digitized by Goog Ie 

anisms regarding it. Our remarks concerning the pro­ ponents' control of crucial information for technology assessment are not intended to suggest that the pro­ ponents of military technology have used this control irresponsibly or to the detriment of the larger public interest, although a growing number of people believe this to be the case. We wish simply to point out that the present system for the assessment of military tech­ nology violates most of the canons suggested by the panel with regard to the representation of affected interests, the consideration of larger social and environ­ mental contexts, the maintenance of future options, and public visibility and review of the crucial information and arguments. Many of these limitations in the process of technology assessment for the military may be essential to national security, but the panel would be remiss in its responsi­ bility if it did not point out what appears to be almost the most glaring gap in our present technology-assessment mechanisms. The significance of this gap becomes even clearer when one recalls that the prior development of military technology often serves as a channel for the introduction of new technology into the civilian market, as in the case of computers, jet aircraft, and nuclear reactors. Under such circumstances there is a tendency for the relatively loose assessment criteria established under the urgency of national security to be transferred more or less automatically into the field of civilian ap­ plications. Assumptions and biases created under mili­ tary auspices become much more difficult to modify under the civilian aegis because of the vested interests built up in the process of satisfying military requirements. These observations suggest the possible inclusion of some mechanism for technology assessment in classified areas-a mechanism utilizing people who are not directly responsible for national security matters. Creating such 1 13 Digitized by Goog Ie 

a mechanism would require an extension of the concept of "need to know" beyond those immediately involved in the promotion of national security as defined in military terms. One would wish to incorporate more institutionalized criticism into the decision-making proc­ ess for military technology--criticism designed deliber­ ately to broaden the criteria of technology assessment well beyond the strictly military context. Unless this is done, there is a real danger either of great social or en­ vironmental damage, or, conversely, of a broad public reaction against all forms of military technology, which might endanger the security position of the United States . . 1 14 oi9,tized by Google 

CHAP:rER VI . S U M MARY AND CONCLUSIONS The members of this panel are persuaded that mecha­ nisms for technology assessment beyond those currently operating are clearly needed. Although technology­ assessment activities are already widely dispersed among government instrumentalities and private organizations, it is our conclusion that such activities suffer in their totality from basic inadequacies that will prove increas­ ingly critical as the scale and intensity of technological development continue to mount. Our study has revealed that existing mechanisms, whether they involve government agencies, private industries, or professional groups, possess intrinsic limi­ tations, some structural and others psychological, that leave serious gaps in the spectrum of processes that assess and direct the development of technology in our society : In the formulation of issues for assessment and in the attribution of value to alternative outcomes, those processes too often ignore the broader social and en­ vironmental contexts in which their effects are felt. In the calculation of costs and benefits, they ascribe too little significance to the preservation of future options. They give too little attention and support to research and monitoring programs calculated to minimize techno­ logical surprise and to deal more rationally with the burdens of uncertainty. They frequently reflect the views, interests, enthusiasms, and biases of unduly narrow constituencies and create insufficient opportunities for meaningful public participation in choices having major public consequences. And they manifest too little concern 1 15 30-973 0-69 - 9 Digitized by Goog Ie 

for the evolution of consistent principles in the formula­ tion and enforcement of assessment criteria. The reasons for these shortcomings are complex and varied. In part, the difficulties are conceptual-inade­ quacies in analytic tools and in theoretical under­ standing ; failures of imagination ; deficiencies of data ; the sheer technical difficulties of perceptive and precise evaluation. In greater measure, the problems are in­ stitutional-economic, legal, or political constraints upon the interests that each individual decision-maker is encouraged to treat as his own ; limits upon the repre­ sentation of varied interests in collective processes of decision ; constraints upon the coordination and focusing of pertinent efforts. These difficulties cannot be overcome at a single stroke ; but they can gradually be reduced by a program of technology assessment that is broader in fundamental conception and scope than any now exist­ ing, one that takes into account the changing values, sensitivities, and priorities of society. The present organization of private and public assess­ ment systems is too fragmented and uncoordinated, too lacking in professionalism, continuity, and detachment, to provide a viable institutional basis for the support of the research and education that a sufficiently broad technology-assessment program will demand and for the development of the professional competence and vision that such a program will require. No institution or group of institutions is today charged with the responsibility, or equipped with the resources, to review the criteria and assumptions� monitor the operating procedures, and integrate the findings, of our many technology-assessment efforts-even those undertaken within the federal gov­ ernment-or to stimulate the development of a set of coherent principles that might increase the quality and influence of such efforts and enhance their sophistica­ tion. 1 16 Digitized by Goog Ie 

Although we recommend the creation of new in­ stitutions in the federal government to perform these integrating functions of review and stimulation, we acknowledge that the present multiplicity of technology­ assessment processes is both desirable and necessary. Technological development pervades so many aspects of contemporary life that no limited number of organiza­ tions devoted to technology assessment could com­ petently span the enormous range of relevant activities. Thus we do not contemplate in this report or foresee in the future a highly centralized process -of technological evaluation, even for the areas of technology that are largely dependent upon federal programs and policies. Such centralization would be not only unworkable but unwise, politically unacceptable, and extremely danger­ ous. Thus new institutions are needed not to supersede existing mechanisms but to supplement them. With these principles in mind, the panel urges the creation of a constellation of organizations, with com­ ponents located strategically within both political branches, that can create a focus and a forum for re­ sponsible technology-assessment activities throughout government and the private sector. Limited at the outset to those areas of technology that are strongly and directly influenced by federal policy, such organizations must be separated scrupulously from any responsibility for promoting or regulating technological applications and must have the authority and resources for : I . Undertaking substantial in-house studies to evaluate trends in technology and in technology­ assessment practices ; to examine th�perations of existing assessment mechanisms ; to establish priori­ ties for technology-assessment efforts : and to derive policy alternatives and recommendations from research. 1 17 Digitized by Goog Ie 

2. Supporting major research activities in ex­ ternal organizations with respect to technical issues aris�ng in the course of specific assessments and theoretical issues pertinent to the improvement of the intellectual base for technology assessment in general. 3. Encouraging activities and programs related to the stimulation of public awareness of, and interest in, assessment issues and the education and development of professional groups with broadened perspectives to staff future technology-assessment activities in industry, in government, and in other institutions. It is the panel's hope that, out of a set of mechanisms capable of performing these functions, there will evolve a consistent and influential body of assessment principles, derived not only from conscious attempts to formulate general policy but also from experience with individual cases selected in part for their precedent-setting potential. Although limited at its inception to federally supported or regulated technologies, the program we envision could, over time, inspire parallel efforts at other levels of government, from the local to the international, and in the private sector as well. However our specific recommendations might be viewed, the members of this panel are convinced that some form of constructive action is imperative and that such action cannot be long delayed without greatly increasing the difficulty of its implementation and significantly diminishing the prospects for its success. The future of technology holds great promise for man­ kind if greater thought and effort are devoted to its development. If society persists in its present course, the future holds great peril, whether from the uncon­ trolled effects of technology itself or from an unreasoned political reaction against all technological innovation. 1 18 Digitized by Goog Ie