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Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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3
OBSERVING LOCALLY

Infrastructure is primarily local. Communities around the United States work to maintain, enhance, and develop the nation's infrastructure. The various infrastructure modes are organized and managed differently, but they come together in local areas as a system that supports the local economy and the community's well-being.

There have been notable successes in which local communities have been united and mobilized to come to grips with their infrastructure problems. The committee determined that identifying the common elements of these successes will give infrastructure planners, administrators, designers, builders, and operators better understanding and guidance in formulating development and management strategies. This guidance will in turn enhance—at the national level—the performance and efficiency of our aggregate investments in infrastructure.

THE COLLOQUIA SERIES

The committee undertook its colloquia as fact-finding workshops to explore success stories that illuminated cases of local progress in solving infrastructure problems. The term "success stories" was adopted for discussion, but it was agreed that

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

unsuccessful (even disastrous) cases warrant consideration when transferable lessons can be learned.

The committee determined that several elements of these stories would be important to the study aims. First, successful (or not so successful) would be defined in the context of the specific community, as reported by local constituents.

Second, the cases examined should illustrate means for overcoming obstacles in the search for effective applications of infrastructure technology. While major enhancements or ''quantum leaps'' in infrastructure performance are of great interest, the committee also sought to document incremental improvements as

Box 3-1 Examples Considered for Case Study.

The committee considered a number of cases that might serve as the bases for colloquia, such as the following:

Boston, Mass.—major projects and interactions of government at several levels.

Cincinnati, Ohio—business-government coalition direct appeal to the local population to achieve consensus on repair needs and strategy.

Cleveland, Ohio—aftermath of fiscal crisis and aging systems.

Los Angeles, Calif.—air quality control as a force in transportation and municipal waste management.

New York City region—vulnerable systems, responses to system disruptions from major facility failures.

Phoenix, Ariz.—arts-engineering coalition in an area undergoing rapid growth.

Canadian National Railways—applications of acoustical monitoring for bridge condition assessment and maintenance management.

Mexico City, Mexico—environmental reclamation and restoration.

Nairobi, Kenya—private sector municipal waste management at low costs.

New Delhi, India—nongovernmental organizations mobilizing a range of environmentally more "friendly" infrastructure technologies.

Sao Paulo, Brazil—use of methane gas, from solid waste disposal, to operate transit vehicles.

Various areas—plastic and other polymeric linings for repair of concrete pipes and canals, and corrosion control on metal fittings in water supply and sewer subsystems.

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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well. The committee's aim in general would be to assess how the diffusion of beneficial new ideas into infrastructure practice occurs, and to identify ways to speed and enhance the effectiveness of this process.

Third, because infrastructures are typically so long-lived, the committee was particularly interested in cases of effective measurement, monitoring, and evaluation of life-cycle performance. Issues of standard setting and performance evaluation, and the balance between the benefits and costs of monitoring or assessment activities throughout the lifecycle, come into play in trying to determine the characteristics of a good infrastructure management system. Such a system would accommodate meaningful and practical consideration of the trade-offs among infrastructure's initial development (i.e., design and construction), operation, maintenance, and management costs, not only in planning and design but throughout the service life. Committee members were especially interested in data collection and management information systems, analytical models and other management tools to assist problem solving, system management tools well suited to the operation, maintenance, and asset management of existing systems rather than system expansion.

Fourth, and closely related to matters of life-cycle management, the committee sought to identify institutional structures that seem well suited to the management of infrastructure in the coming decades. Such structures might, for example, feature cooperative action (teaming) of private and public sectors at various levels, focus on users and their demand for and response to infrastructures, and emphasize specific and comprehensible desirable outcomes rather than abstract goals or objectives.

With these four broad aims in mind, the committee considered a wide range of international examples of "success stories." Examples were proposed initially on the basis of committee members' and staff knowledge of each situation (see Box 3-1). After some discussion, the committee developed a "short list" of examples for further consideration.

Foreign cases, drawn primarily from less developed countries, were quickly discarded as a basis for initial workshops. Useful

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

information and transferable lessons are available from such examples, but the committee concluded that cultural, economic, and institutional differences would require more substantial data collection and analysis to develop convincing conclusions for application in the United States.

The committee then defined eight specific selection criteria as the basis for choosing locations that would accomplish the study's broad aims, by illustrating the following:

  1. uses of innovative technology;

  2. transferability of technology;

  3. effectively overcoming barriers to the use of new technology;

  4. constituency building and community support;

  5. effective citizen involvement;

  6. effective improvement of existing infrastructure (versus new building);

  7. unique institutional approaches; and

  8. effective application of life-cycle cost-benefit analysis as a management tool, particularly in the context of political decision making.

After some additional data collection and discussion, the committee selected Phoenix, Cincinnati, and Boston as sites for the first three colloquia. Table 3-1 presents statistics characterizing the three areas.

A large number of people in each city participated in the committee's workshop and gave generously of their time and insights. Appendix C is a listing of these participants. Given more time and resources, the committee might have selected additional cities for study. The concerns of infrastructure in smaller communities and rural areas, for example, may differ from those in the medium and larger metropolitan areas included here. The experience of regions in which growth management strategies have been adopted (e.g., Miami, Florida; Portland, Oregon; communities in southern California) may differ from those in which economic losses have been more severe (e.g., Detroit, Michigan;

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

St. Louis, Missouri). Further variety in local government structure and metropolitan patterns of intergovernmental relationships warrants further attention as well. As a group, Phoenix, Cincinnati, and Boston represent a middle ground in size, complexity, and economic health. The range of experience may be widened in future studies.

In addition, some observers question whether these cases are indeed success stories. Phoenix, for example, is a sprawling metropolis that proponents of growth management cite as an example of why tighter land use, population growth, and environmental impact controls are needed. However, the city has consolidated its jurisdiction over the entire area and thereby eliminated many of the intergovernmental problems that older metropolitan areas face. Boston is dismissed by many observers as simply a case of "pork barrel" funding of transport and past failure to charge prices adequate to cover the real costs for water and sewer services. However, the region has survived decades of major economic change. In choosing these cases, the committee hoped to gain insight into the balance among such conflicting views of what is or should be happening in the nation's metropolitan areas.

PHOENIX, ARIZONA

The Committee on Infrastructure held its initial workshop colloquium in Phoenix, Arizona, on March 20 and 21, 1992. During the two days, the group visited several recently completed projects, observed broadly the elements of the city's infrastructure, and met with city and state government staff and members of community groups.

Background

Phoenix has been described by some residents as a city "at the threshold of maturity, evolving from a 'boomtown' into a cosmopolitan city." The city's desert setting, rapid growth, rich history,

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

Table 3-1 Summary Statistics on Workshop Cities

Statistics Category

 

Phoenixa

Cincinnati

Boston

Year of settlement

 

1864

1789

1630

Current population

Cityb

983,403

364,040

574,283

 

PMSAc

2,122,000*

1,453,000

2,871,000

 

CMSAc

NA

1,744,000

4,172,000

Current land area

Cityd

419.9 square mile

77.2 square mile

48.4 square mile

Per capita income

CMSAe

18,042*

18,632

24,315

Minority populations

Cityf

Black: 5.2%

Black: 37.9%

Black: 25.6%

 

 

Hispanic: 20.0%

Hispanic: 0.7%

Hispanic: 10.8%

 

CMSAg

Black: 3.5%

Black: 11.7%

Black: 5.7%

 

 

Hispanic: 16.3%

Hispanic: 0.5%

Hispanic: 4.6%

Labor force

PMSAh

Total employed: 1,028,100

Total employed: 754,100

Total employed: 1,481,600

 

 

Unemployment: 4.3%a

Unemployment: 4.2%

Unemployment: 5.1%

Cost of living index

PMSAi

101.7a

105.8

134.8

One-parent households

CMSAj

73,000a

64,000

118,000

Notes:

CMSA = consolidated metropolitan statistical area (Cincinnati CMSA, which lies in Ohio, Kentucky, and Indiana, includes the Hamilton, Kentucky area; Boston CMSA, which lies in Mass. and New Hampshire, includes the Lawrence and Salem, Mass., metropolitan areas);

MSA = metropolitan statistical area;

NA = not available;

NECMA = New England County metropolitan area;

PMSA = primary metropolitan statistical area (Cincinnati PMSA includes areas in Kentucky and Indiana); "The revised definitions [of different MSA's] appear in OMB [Office of Management and Budget] press release 83-20 of June 27, 1983. The official standards for defining MSA's appeared in the Federal Register, January 3, 1980 (part 6)" (Bureau of the Census, 1992, p. 896).

a For Phoenix, all metropolitan area data is for its MSA, which includes all of Maricopa County.

b The World Almanac and Book of Facts (1992, pp. 132–133)

c Bureau of the Census (1992, pp. 898–904).

d Bureau of the Census (1992, pp. 35–37).

e Bureau of the Census (1992, p. 440). Information is taken from April 1992 Survey of Current Business, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. The numbers are for 1990. For Boston, the designated area is its NECMA (Boston-Lawrence-Salem-Lowell-Brockton, Mass.).

f Bureau of the Census (1992, p. 35).

g Bureau of the Census (1992, p. 34).

h Bureau of the Census (1992, p. 385). Labor force is defined as "the civilian noninstitutional population 16 years old and over."

i Bureau of the Census (1992, pp. 474–475). Measures "relative price levels for consumer goods and services in particular areas for midmanagement standard of living." National average = 100.

j Bureau of the Census (1992, p. 50).

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×
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Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

and cultural diversity have been important factors shaping this transition, making Phoenix and Arizona as a whole into what some people have termed "the new California, a place where palm trees and the desert still beckon dreamers" (Johnson, 1991). Very rapid growth in recent years is measured by a more than 30 percent increase in Phoenix's population during the 1980s and even greater rates in surrounding communities. Phoenix is now the tenth largest city in the United States.

With very low-density urbanization, the incorporated area of Phoenix and surrounding communities is approximately 1,000 square miles, several times the size of other urban regions with similar populations. Some 50 percent of the land remains undeveloped. Phoenix encompasses large areas of open space reserve, notably in the mountain preserves, and South Mountain Park is, at 17,000 acres, the nation's largest city park.

The Salt River Valley, in which Phoenix is located, bears the mark of more than 1,000 years of infrastructure development. The modern settlement of Phoenix began in the late 1860s with construction of irrigation works built on the remains of ancient canals. Archaeologists have traced an extensive system developed by the Hohokam Indians that encompassed more than 300 miles of major canals and 950 miles of lesser canals by approximately A.D. 1450, all constructed with wood and stone tools and manual labor. The disappearance of these canal builders (named Ho Ho Kam—those who have gone—by subsequent native tribes) is attributed by some to extended drought and by others to flood-caused damage and subsequent failure of the canal system. The mythical Phoenix, rising from the ashes of this early civilization, was adopted by early white settlers as a symbol for the community.

The modern city and the state of Arizona are the sites of major, noteworthy, and sometimes controversial infrastructure investments such as the Central Arizona Project (water supply), Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport, and highway Interstate 10. Such projects have often reflected a major national resolve, made in earlier decades, to settle the nation's West and a consequent willingness to invest national resources out of proportion to the region's population and development at the time of decision.

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

However, as in other areas, these major investments have not always been viewed with favor by the residents of areas where construction is planned. Famed architect Frank Lloyd Wright, for example, fought against installation of electric power transmission lines that would bring energy to the growing city but would also, in his view, spoil the desert vista from his winter studio and home.

An important element in the completion of a number of the city's most recent infrastructure projects has been a unique coalition of the arts and public works communities that has fostered imaginative ways of dealing with community concerns and enhanced the levels of communication and trust between infrastructure professionals and the public at large.

How did this coalition develop, and how important has it been to success in infrastructure development? Has Phoenix been unusually successful in its ability to achieve high infrastructure performance through effective management and adoption of state-of-the-art technology? These are some of the questions the committee considered during its visit to Phoenix.

The committee was hosted and guided by the directors of the Public Works Department and the Phoenix Arts Commission, members of their staffs, consultants to their agencies, and staff of other city and state agencies. For a portion of both days, the committee visited infrastructure and urban development sites in Phoenix. Each site visited offered unique perspectives on the relationship between infrastructure technology and the community.

Asphalt Pavement Using Recycled Rubber Tires and Other Design Features

The committee observed that Phoenix makes extensive use of asphalt concrete for paving and overlays of city streets. Extreme summer temperatures, routinely exceeding 100°F, pose particular problems for pavement design and construction in the region.

Some years ago, an engineer for the city of Phoenix developed the idea that ground rubber from waste vehicular tires might be used as an asphalt additive to improve overlay adhesion and hot-

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

weather performance. Experiments and subsequent applications of the idea demonstrated that the new mix not only had superior working characteristics and physical behavior, but resisted bleaching in the Arizona sun and resulted in a 10-decibel reduction in tirepavement noise, compared to conventional pavements. The city now uses rubber from approximately 300,000 recycled tires annually, and suppliers are preparing to market recycled rubber to other regions.9

The city permitted the engineer to patent the rubber additive technology, subject to granting Phoenix the right to use it without paying royalties. The engineer profited from the patent, and the city has saved substantial amounts compared to royalties that would have been paid had the technology been developed and patented elsewhere. The committee felt that this case illustrates well a major incentive for any unit of government to encourage innovation among staff.10

In planning for the future, certain Phoenix streets and highways have been designed with centerline right-of-way space designated for the development of rail or restricted-guideway bus transit systems. On city arterials, this area is given special surface treatment or lane marking. The committee also visited the Central Avenue Beautification Project and Dunlop Avenue in Sunnyslope, areas in which community groups have worked with the Phoenix

9  

The Strategic Highway Research Program reports that about 250 million automobile tires and 25 million truck tires are disposed of annually. These wastes are nearly indestructible and pose fire, health, and other safety and environmental problems at sites around the country. However, tests to date suggest that the performance of rubber and asphalt pavements varies substantially with climatic conditions and construction problems can arise. The technology thus may not work equally well in all regions and remains controversial.

10  

Disincentives and obstacles to innovation are the subject of another BRB report, The Role of Public Agencies in Fostering New Technology and Innovation in Building (Dibner and Lemer, 1992).

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

Arts Commission to achieve neighborhood improvement through sidewalk reconstruction, street landscaping, and placement of art inspired by local history or artifacts of prehistoric Indian cultures.

Papago Freeway and Margaret Hance Park

More than 20 years in the planning, the recently completed Papago Freeway is the final link in the Interstate 10 coast-to-coast highway, a subject of long-term controversy and a construction project characterized by its designers as "among America's most unique urban highway ventures." Complex design features and extensive landscaping, customized noise barriers, and other measures were employed to mitigate adverse environmental impact on the communities adjacent to the highway. Extended belowgrade construction, combined with two major multiroad elevated interchanges (termed locally the "Stack" and "Short Stack"), made this highway particularly costly to construct. Slightly more than 94 percent of the construction costs were paid by federal program funds.

One major element of both mitigation and cost is the 29-acre Margaret Hance Park, of which 13 acres have been newly constructed atop a half-mile-long tunnel through which the freeway passes. This park, located at the intersection with Central Avenue, one of Phoenix's major arterials, is meant to serve nearby residents and office workers, bus riders using the transit station (provisions for future higher-volume modes have been made here also), and Phoenix residents and tourists expected to visit the attractions or special outdoor events planned for the park. City staff acknowledged that drainage maintenance problems have been encountered and explained the special design provisions to address safety concerns posed by possible vehicle accidents in the enclosed roadway below the park. The park itself served as an amenity that enabled the freeway's completion, balancing community concerns in the political forum in which decisions were made.

A prominent feature of the Papago Freeway, found also in other Phoenix highways, is a design profile intended to assist with

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

flood control in adjacent neighborhoods. For example, noise barriers are equipped with holes at street level to permit stormwater to flow onto the highway when the capacity of neighborhood street drainage facilities is exceeded by peak runoff volumes.

Squaw Peak Parkway and Thomas Road Overpass

Touring the Squaw Peak Parkway and adjacent neighborhoods, the committee had an opportunity to observe products of Phoenix's use of art to enhance visual and cultural aspects of the urban environment and to mitigate adverse impact of infrastructure. Jointly financed by the city of Phoenix and the Arizona Department of Transportation, the highway itself reflects a relatively unusual balancing of typically conflicting planning and design objectives: the widths of right-of-way and roadway lanes were narrowed to reduce land taking and neighborhood disruption, while maintaining highway safety; pedestrian, bicycle, and equestrian amenities are included; pedestrian bridges were treated as urban design elements rather than simply utilitarian constructions.

The Thomas Road Overpass is claimed by many to be the outstanding success of the Squaw Peak Parkway. By drawing on the "one percent for art" funds earmarked by the city's voters in a $1 billion capital improvement bond issue in 1998, an artist was made part of the design team from the early stages of design. The artist asked key questions of the structural designers regarding the rationale for the standard span length used on other highway overpass bridges. The questioning, motivated by the artist's own concerns for the work to be installed subsequently on the overpass, led the structural designers to rethink their assumptions and develop a custom bridge design. The changes were estimated to have saved about $1 million in construction costs, an amount more than four times the artist's fees and expenses to execute the art work.

The artist's work, primarily in adobe applied with the help of residents drawn from the neighborhood and citywide, includes frog-shaped structural columns inspired by Hohokam artifacts and

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

Figure 3-A

By questioning the state's standard bridge design originally planned for the Thomas Road Overpass, part of the Squaw Peak Parkway in Phoenix, the artist invited to ''beautify'' an austere structure motivated a money-saving custom design and created an award-winning community asset.

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

murals incorporating neighborhood artifacts as well as traditional symbols. The engineers who participated in the design describe the bridge, according to local newspaper reports, as "a structure like no other."

Phoenix's Percent for Art Program, administered by the Phoenix Art Commission according to city documents, was established to acquire works of art that "enhance the aesthetic quality of public spaces and advance public understanding of art." One percent of the city's annual capital construction budget is set aside for the program. Placing artists on the public works design team is only one element of the program. A Project Art Plan, developed and maintained by the Arts Commission with help from community members, artists, and staff of city departments, includes integration of artworks into construction projects, purchasing or commissioning artworks after construction, and interactive projects for artists to work with community groups to produce artworks.

In contrast to the generally acclaimed Thomas Road overpass, the installations of artworks along the Squaw Peak Parkway south of Glendale Avenue have been more controversial. Some 35 sculptures were commissioned to adorn noise barriers and adjoining landscaped areas in an effort to mitigate the intrusion of the highway cutting through older neighborhoods whose residents had unsuccessfully fought construction. Out-of-state designers selected by the Arts Commission produced brightly colored concrete and ceramic vases and teapots, intended—according to commission staff—to create a bridge of everyday objects between residents and the highway. Underlying the design approach was an effort to rethink the nature of the wall produced by the highway and its noise barriers. Press reports of residents' initial response varied from "unfavorable" to "outraged," and the city's entire public art program seemed threatened.

However, neighborhood anger may have been generated by disruptions associated with the taking of land and construction of the highway itself, and the art works provided an immediate focus. In June 1992, just four months after the controversy, the artwork and landscape project along the Squaw Peak Parkway won a prestigious local design award as the year's best public art project.

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

By the fall of 1992, reports in local and national publications suggested that the community was taking delight in this new landmark linear work of art.

27th Avenue Solid Waste Management Facility

Another application of the Percent for Art Program is Phoenix's 27th Avenue Solid Waste Management Facility, still under construction when the committee visited. This multifunctional facility will accommodate solid waste transfer from collection truck to large trailer haulers, materials sorting for recycling, mulching of yard and wood wastes, and educational programs targeted at school children and tourists. Public works personnel envision the facility as a future attraction comparable to the sewers of Paris in the nineteenth century or to major U.S. airports in the early years of commercial aviation.

There are many similarities with the Thomas Road Overpass. The Arts Commission and Public Works Department worked together, adding artists to the design team. The artists spurred the designers to change, and construction bids some $2 million below estimates quieted skeptics concerned that the artists' involvement would increase costs.

Seeking to design a facility that would illustrate principles of structural design as well as waste management for children and adults, the team developed a structural system that placed the primary structural element outside the building. Large steel trusses above the roof will be clearly visible as visitors approach the facility, and riveted joints, although infrequent in current construction, enhance the aesthetic appeal of the structure under closer scrutiny. Determined to attract public participation in the city's planned recycling program, the team designed catwalks, an amphitheater, and other elements to permit visitors to observe and learn how the municipal wastes are processed, how the facility works, and the more basic problems of waste management and environmental protection. A planned pond system adjacent to the facility and the nearby Salt River will demonstrate the use of

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

natural processes for sewage treatment and extend an existing wetlands area that serves as a small bird sanctuary.

The facility's location at the existing (but soon to be closed) landfill site not only overcame community resistance to new construction, but actually attracted vocal community support for the facility. Tipping fees at this and other city landfills were raised from unrealistically low levels (enabled for decades by the use of abandoned gravel pits along the river), ensuring the financial feasibility of recycling and the transfer operation.

Water Resources and Canals

Located in a hot desert environment, Phoenix demonstrates very effectively the truth of an early observation that "where water flows, life grows." Visitors to Phoenix neighborhoods cannot fail to be impressed by the differences in landscaping between areas served by government-provided irrigation and those without such service. In the areas served, residents flood-irrigate their properties with untreated water on a once or twice weekly basis. Generally open canals run parallel to streets and sidewalks. Landscaping in neighborhoods lacking access to canal irrigation typically depends on native desert plant materials and exposed soil and rock (i.e., xeroscaping).

The Salt River Project (SRP), a water and power utility that supplies approximately half of the Phoenix area's water and one-half to two-thirds of its electricity, is the oldest multipurpose project authorized under the Federal Reclamation Act of 1902. The price for water, uniform regardless of use, is heavily subsidized by power sales, and users are charged approximately one-sixth of the estimated production cost (per acre-foot).

The major canals, those of both the SRP and other projects, are gaining increasing recognition and use as public amenities and urban design elements. The Arizona State University's recently completed Metropolitan Canal Study, funded by the National Endowment for the Arts, the Salt River Project, and the seven Valley Cities of the Phoenix Region, with support by the Junior

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

Figure 3-B

The engineer-artist team responsible for design of Phoenix's 27th Avenue Solid Waste Management Facility, here under construction, created an entry to the building that would illustrate to the public something about how structures work.

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

League of Phoenix, explored multiple use of canals as "places for people." The Phoenix area is very widely spread, development densities are quite low, and approximately 50 percent of the land in Phoenix is undeveloped. The canals represent a possible means for directing development into efficient forms. SRP rights of way are used for siting power transmission lines, and the city is developing canal demonstration plans, a multidepartment and citizen effort to demonstrate ways to maximize the recreational and scenic value of some 78 miles of Salt River Project and other canals in Phoenix. Plans involve improved access between the canals and adjacent commercial properties, reorientation of development, and community education. Funding for the activity is provided by special budget allocations, eliminating any possible competition between these plans and other municipal needs.

A major canal maintenance problem is the growth of moss in the canals, which consumes water and—left unchecked—can block flow entirely. The SRP is exploring the use of new machinery that can operate from the bank or in the canal. Use is also being made of a specially bred fish, the white amur, a type of grass carp originally found in China, which consumes large quantities of vegetation (and reportedly jumps from the water to reach vegetation along the banks). The fish are sterilized, and grates are installed at canal gates to prevent their breeding and entering natural waterways.

The occasional but very heavy desert rainstorms with high peak flows of stormwater runoff have led not only to special highway design features already noted, but also to major diversion facilities. All extensive developments must provide retention basins on-site, and Phoenix has numerous areas that combine stormwater retention basins and drainage swales with parks and open space. These projects (one visited was "Desert Storm" Park) serve as community recreational facilities and amenities most of the time, but also provide important flood protection and runoff management services.

Serving on a much larger scale is the Arizona Canal Diversion Channel (ACDC), designed and constructed by the Army Corps of Engineers (using federal funds) with sponsorship of the Flood

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

Control District of Maricopa County. The channel protects developed areas by intercepting floodwaters and urban runoff. The ACDC follows the Arizona Canal and is intended to eliminate overtopping and levee failures caused by major storms. The design is based on the estimated 100-year storm. A variety of problems arising in design and construction, due to failure to work with the community, have been addressed by enhancing the visual design of channel fencing, provision of pedestrian facilities, and other amenities.

Grass-Roots Initiative and Sunnyslope Village

The Phoenix's Sunnyslope area, northwest of downtown Phoenix and at the foot of one of the city's mountain reserves, has evolved since its original development several decades ago into a diverse set of communities. One of these communities, faced with the threat of urban redevelopment planned from outside, undertook a grass-roots initiative to preserve the area and enhance its infrastructure. The Sunnyslope Village Alliance has been an active force in bringing together the community, government staff, and outside advisers, to ensure that the community's priorities are reflected in how urban development resources are used. The alliance's Community Planning and Design Committee has undertaken its own planning and design initiatives while working actively with city agencies to ensure that neighborhood concerns are understood and considered.

Concern about the conflict between narrow sidewalks and fastmoving traffic along Dunlop Avenue led to early action to improve safety and amenity by widening the sidewalks and installing landscaping and artist-designed tree guards. The Percent for Art Program was utilized, with community residents participating in all aspects of this project.

The Sunnyslope Transit Center, a bus route terminus, also bears the mark of the Percent for Art Program, in the form of sculptures produced by a collaboration of a professional artist and local school children. In addition, the center includes a technically

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

innovative bus shelter designed with a "cooling tower" that offers waiting passengers relief of about 20–30 degrees from ambient hot summer temperatures. Such shelters are relatively low cost, approximately $30,000 currently, and are expected to decline in cost as the numbers produced increase. When a prototype unit on loan to the city was about to be removed at the end of a summer's free trial period, the bus-riding community was instrumental in convincing city officials of the value of these shelters.

How Representative Is the Phoenix Experience?

There are questions, of course, whether the experience of Phoenix projects is replicable in other communities. High percentages of federal funding, rapid economic growth, low land prices, low density and availability of undeveloped land, and a governmental structure relatively congenial to innovation are among the factors that distinguish Phoenix from many other communities and may limit the ability of other communities to emulate its experience.

The degree of recognition of the importance of maintenance and longer-term commitment to the full costs of ownership is difficult to observe in a community undergoing very rapid growth. Most federal programs that finance or otherwise influence infrastructure emphasize new construction and fail to confront maintenance issues. A significant conflict with efficiency and reliability is introduced by the typical reluctance, on the part of elected officials and the public, to consider the full costs of ownership when making major investment decisions. The major federal input to highway and water projects in Phoenix suggests that federal programs favoring new construction of large projects may introduce significant distortions in the efficient and equitable distribution of investment and management efforts among regions and in development patterns within regions.

The institutional structure of Phoenix's public works seems to have made infrastructure innovation somewhat easier than in many other cities. Although there is the usual patchwork of agencies

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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operating in the region, the Phoenix city government system—a strong city manager form, with strict separation of the city council from executive agencies—encourages enthusiastic and committed professionalism among city staff and facilitates the taking of calculated risks.

However, this ability to take calculated risks clearly has limits. The public has a limited appreciation of the value of public works investment and innovation and of the inherent uncertainties in trying new things. Government officials, both elected and professional staff, are themselves at risk, and when public controversy erupts even because of external events (e.g., changes in fiscal condition or political balance), the positive assessments that motivated decisions may be forgotten or reversed.

In addition, innovations on some projects may reflect simply changes in general practice or the availability of new products that enable activities that were previously too difficult, costly, or simply impossible. Current projects (like the Papago Freeway and Squaw Peak Parkway) are frequently the result of decades of discussion and planning, and so can take advantage of new technology (e.g., improved pavement materials, electronic traffic control devices, enhanced vehicle safety) to enhance the benefits and reduce the adverse impact of infrastructures.

Nevertheless, the Phoenix experience demonstrates how important continuing community involvement in infrastructure planning and development can be to successful project development. The use of public art and the coalition between the arts and public works communities provide a metaphor for this involvement, both successfully and not so successfully accomplished. The importance of community involvement extends well beyond simply easing the introduction of infrastructure into the community. In the context of multiple agencies pursuing their specific missions, the local public forum may be the most effective—and possibly the only feasible—mechanism for resolving conflicting objectives and counterproductive actions. To encourage involvement, many infrastructure projects in Phoenix have seemingly been given a relatively long time for planning.

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

On the other hand, the local forum cannot deal effectively with issues of the interregional allocation of infrastructure resources. The national political forum wherein needs are determined and investment priorities established seemingly deals poorly with intersectoral linkages (i.e., among water, transport, waste, and other infrastructure subsystems).

Extracting More General Principles

Some aspects of the Phoenix experience seem clearly to be replicable (i.e., to offer lessons for other cities and national policy):

  • If infrastructure is viewed as a flow of services, then those responsible for providing infrastructure should seek to ensure that the supply of these services is reliable and efficient. The Salt River Project and Phoenix Public Works Department include reliability among their goals, and an entrepreneurial approach to their affairs has helped ensure efficiency.

  • Bringing new points of view into the infrastructure management team, as the cases of the Thomas Road overpass and the 27th Avenue Solid Waste Management Facility illustrate, can be a very productive means for achieving innovation. New ideas were introduced that saved money and improved performance. Creative management by the Arts Commission and the Public Works Department have made the Percent for Art Program a highly effective mechanism for broadening the membership of the infrastructure team. Similarly, the Sunnyslope Village Alliance learned that some technological improvements may obscure the real issues or impacts of infrastructure, such as when infrastructure professionals depend uncritically on the results produced by analytical models (e.g., forecasting future traffic or rainfall). Permitting (and encouraging) new segments of the community (e.g., artists, neighborhood groups) to participate actively in the provision of infrastructure helps to ensure that questions are raised

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

about the technologies employed, questions that can lead to rethinking of assumptions.

  • Working to achieve multifunctional use of infrastructure sites (e.g., parks over highways, streets and transitways, solid waste and sewage treatment) may be an important policy for maximizing efficiency in land use, controlling risk, and reducing community resistance to infrastructure. Because conflicting objectives and counterproductive actions will inevitably occur in the development and management of urban infrastructure, projects that serve more than one end or solve more than one problem are more likely to be successful.

  • Infrastructure design has important implications for what urban designers may term ''quality of place,'' the characteristics (or ambience) that are a significant element of a community's quality of life and the acceptance of the infrastructure project. Concern for the aesthetics of infrastructure does not necessarily increase costs and may be viewed better as an essential rather than a luxury.

  • Infrastructure facilities can play a useful educational role as an instrument for teaching children and adults about stewardship of the natural and built environment, science, and mathematics. Infrastructure professionals (e.g., urban designers, municipal engineers, landscape architects, planners, public administrators) can be educated as well, to enhance their sensitivity to community concerns and the opportunities for innovation. Such education should always continue "on the job," but there may be improvements that university professional training programs could make to foster appreciation of the teamwork required to achieve effective infrastructure.

  • There are benefits to be gained by both the individuals who develop a new idea and the city or other government agency that fosters the individual creativity in introducing infrastructure innovation. The Phoenix experience typifies the win-win character of principles and strategies for infrastructure improvement, for which the committee was searching.

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

CINCINNATI, OHIO

The Committee on Infrastructure held its second workshop colloquium in Cincinnati, Ohio, on June 5 and 6, 1992. During the two days, the group met with city government staff and elected officials, business leaders, and members of community groups; visited several ongoing and recently completed projects; and observed other elements of the city's infrastructure.

Background

Cincinnati, Queen City on the Ohio River, was founded shortly after the American Revolution and by the middle of the nineteenth century was a booming frontier river town. Tourist brochures quote Charles Dickens, who journeyed down the Ohio River by steamboat in 1842, as finding it "a beautiful city; cheerful, thriving and animated." For the two decades before the Civil War, Cincinnati was the fastest growing city west of the Alleghenies and the sixth largest in the United States. Although the war brought a sharp decline in river trade and Chicago became the nation's inland commercial capital, Cincinnati's past left both the city and the region a rich legacy of industry and business participation in the community, as well as a pattern of urban development that frames its present situation.

Built on steep hills and bluffs overlooking the Ohio River and tributaries, present-day Cincinnati has some 25 miles of municipally owned retaining walls—more than any other city in the United States. A relatively compact downtown area that is largely separated from the river by highways and sports facilities features the "nation's most complete skyway system." Much of this system, which remains open to public use 24 hours per day, is maintained by city crews under contract to more than 30 property owners through whose buildings the walkways pass.

The city of Cincinnati lies within the boundaries of Hamilton County, where there are 49 local governments and county commissions that share responsibilities for government. The nine

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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members of the Cincinnati City Council are all elected at-large, and the member receiving the largest number of votes in the biennial election is named mayor. A professional city manager is responsible for administration of the city's activities. Cincinnati was among the first cities in the nation to adopt a manager-council form of government.

A network of 51 distinct and officially recognized community subareas in the city provides a channel for community activists to represent neighborhood interests. Each of these recognized community councils receives $10,000 in funding annually from the city (subject to certain qualifying conditions and requirements), to support communication and volunteer activities under the Neighborhood Support Program (NSP).

Several decades of declining population and tax base, aging facilities11, and expansion of city boundaries driven, in part by the lucrative profitability of the city's water supply utility,12 resulted in what some have termed a "classic big city infrastructure crisis." Alarmed by the level and rate of physical deterioration, city staff began to document that crisis in The Public Works Story, an annual report prepared by the Department of Public Works and published in the years 1983 through 1988. The report was widely circulated, contributing to public awareness and understanding of the need for improvements.

This report set the stage for a series of institutional changes, remarkable by comparison with many other cities facing similar

11  

City staff estimated 90 percent of Cincinnati's infrastructure to be more than 50 years old, and at least 30 percent to be more than 100 years old.

12  

Until 1948, suburban areas could obtain city water, but only under a binding agreement that the area served would be annexed to the city when it became contiguous to the city. The utility's profitability, without consideration of other municipal costs, made expansion of its service seem advantageous, and city boundaries grew. However, a change in state law prohibited the annexation requirement, and a city earnings tax was ultimately instituted.

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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problems, that comprised the focus of the committee's visit to Cincinnati.

The Stormwater Management Utility

Even before The Public Works Story began to appear, stormwater management was a public concern. Some 25 years of urban growth combined with inadequate budgets for both maintenance and new development of drainage facilities had given rise to serious flooding in several areas of Cincinnati. By the mid-1980s there were some 10,000 unresolved complaints from property owners regarding blocked, inadequate, and needed drains and sewers.

Much of the city is served by a combined system that handles stormwater runoff and sanitary and industrial wastewater. Begun in 1828 as a storm system only, the sewers were converted to serve both purposes late in the nineteenth century and expanded with that dual purpose until the early 1940s. Since then, most expansion has been undertaken with the separation of stormwater and sanitary flows. About 85 percent (in terms of miles of sewer line) is in the combined system. Hamilton County owns and the city operates this system, which passes about 25 percent of Cincinnati's annual sanitary sewage load untreated into the Ohio River in the course of some 70 storm overflow events.

Staff of Cincinnati's Department of Public Works (DPW) began in the early 1980s to conduct background studies and search for new ways to finance the stormwater management system. An early analysis was a simple mapping of the locations of citizen complaints about runoff and drainage. This map demonstrated graphically that the problems were citywide, and helped the DPW to gain the city council's understanding and support of the need to take action.

Drawing on experience from other parts of the United States, city staff proposed that a utility user service fee might be established to support stormwater system improvement. In addition, DPW staff recognized that a central point of management responsibility was needed. After more than two years of studies and pub-

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

lic meetings, the Cincinnati City Council in 1984 (acting under a provision of the Ohio constitution) established the Stormwater Management Utility (SMU), administered as a division of the DPW.

The SMU's purpose is to provide for effective management and financing of a public stormwater system within the city. That system now includes some 250 miles of storm sewers (accounting for about 15 percent of Cincinnati's sewer system). The utility was given responsibility for inspection, construction, operation, and maintenance of city-owned drainage facilities under the control of the DPW, and provision was made for a system of "reasonable" service charges to finance SMU activities. The utility was also given regulatory responsibilities for ensuring public safety with regard to privately owned facilities.

Initial activities of the SMU were concentrated on making improvements that the public could readily observe, using a "worst-first" approach to setting priorities. These activities included cleaning drains that had long been clogged, responding quickly to calls during storms, and repairing notoriously deficient drainage structures. However, awareness of the SMU increased more rapidly than the utility's ability to make improvements, and there was an initially high incidence of complaints that taxed SMU's telephone system. The fact that the system was able to remain responsive was probably crucial to the utility's acceptance. Currently the utility maintains a target of response to all complaints within 72 hours.

There was initially no comprehensive data base to support assessment and collection of the user charge. The property tax rolls, which provided the starting point, excluded tax-exempt properties. A telephone response system was established to answer property owners' questions and register complaints, and special efforts were made in the early weeks of the new program to ensure responsiveness.

An effort was made to ensure that the billing system remained simple. Property owners pay a charge based on property type: one-to-two family residential, less than 10,000 square feet, $15.36 per year; one to two family residential, greater than 10,000 square

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

feet, $21.50 per year; for all others, rates are based on site development intensity and coverage. After some five years of experience, the utility found that not everyone was receiving a bill. A task force was established to find ways to correct that situation. Current experience is that there is approximately 90 percent compliance and payment, without significant enforcement effort. About one-third of the utility's revenue, currently some $4.5 million annually, is derived from residential properties. The overall investment cost of implementing the stormwater plan was estimated to be approximately $120 million.

The utility has developed a total Stormwater Wastewater Integrated Management master plan that looks 50 to 100 years to the future to identify needs and current priorities for dealing with local surface drainage problems and unimproved streets. The planners have sought to address issues at a drainage basin level, but there has as yet been no substantial effort to take advantage of the underlying natural hydrological patterns in planning Cincinnati's stormwater drainage.

In addition, some areas continue to have complaints. Residents of the Hartwell community, for example, cite the city's failure to construct sewers and improve streets promised under the 1912 agreement that incorporated the area into Cincinnati. The low-lying area experiences flooding that has been exacerbated by the construction of new highway, as well as road improvements and related clearing of vegetation in neighboring communities. The SMU has attempted to construct dry wells to reduce the flooding problems, but poor maintenance and the depth of the water table have made them less successful than anticipated. The SMU estimates that dealing effectively with Hartwell's problems could cost some $7 million, a significant amount in terms of the utility's total budget, and would involve construction of retention caverns in the limestone beneath the community, a proposal that is outside the scope of SMU authority and, in addition, has elicited vocal community resistance.

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

The Infrastructure Commission

In a sense, establishment of the SMU foreshadowed formation of Cincinnati's Infrastructure Commission, a highly effective strategy that culminated in passage of a new tax referendum and initiation of the city's major Infrastructure Improvement Program. The commission and the consequent program were interesting models of how a community can mobilize resources to manage its infrastructure.

In 1986, in response to growing recognition that the city's infrastructure needed attention, city council asked John Smale—at that time Chief Executive Officer of Procter & Gamble, Cincinnati's largest employer—to serve as chairman of an independent commission to assess the situation and make recommendations for bringing the city's physical assets back to good condition and appearance. The council and the city's administration offered the commission the full cooperation of all city government departments in the commission's work.

In setting up this commission, the city was building on previous experience with commissions. Earlier in the decade, a group of business leaders had come together to study the operation of the city administration. This group, popularly called the "Phillips committee" (in recognition of its chairman), recommended changes in city administration to enhance efficiency and save taxpayer money, but concluded also that the professionalism and performance of the city's civil service staff were indeed quite high. The committee's work and recommendations gained council approval (about three-quarters were adopted, according to editorial comments in one of Cincinnati's leading newspapers) and convinced the business community that it could work productively with the city. The stage was thus set for effective cooperation between the city and the business community in addressing its infrastructure problems.

As the commission's chairman, Mr. Smale called on 10 other community leaders, primarily from the business community, to serve with him. These leaders, in turn, recruited other participants from throughout the business community. In the commission's report to the city council, presented on December 3, 1987,

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

Figure 3-C

Accumulated "superficial" deterioration and subsequent structural damage on Cincinnati's Ludlow Viaduct were a direct result of the neglect of maintenance, attributable to legislative budgetary decisions. Until repairs could be made, the bridge had to be closed to truck traffic, adding substantially to street congestion and the costs to businesses located in the area.

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

Mr. Smale cited the work of almost 200 volunteers who had contributed more than 10,000 person-hours over the course of the previous year to accomplishing the commission's charge. The commission—and Mr. Smale, in particular—participated in extensive public meetings in Cincinnati's local areas to enhance public understanding and support of the commission's work and recommendations. Publishers of the city's two principal newspapers and other media representatives were involved in the commission's work, resulting in thorough news coverage of the report.

The business community took on the responsibility for ensuring passage of the tax increase (described below) recommended by the commission to finance infrastructure, donating some $125,000 to prepare and circulate a videotaped presentation, a television commercial, and ads in local papers and to recruit volunteers to provide information to voters at the polls. The 1988 referendum was accepted by voters, although by a very narrow margin of fewer than 300 votes out of some 50,000 ballots cast.

Prominently featured in the materials prepared to present the commission's work and recommendations to the community were the ideas that infrastructure represents the city's physical assets—which the commission estimated to have a replacement value of $10.2 billion—and that these assets, properly used, make the area more competitive in attracting business and tourism. In his letter transmitting the commission's report to the mayor and council members, Mr. Smale also cited the goal that the plan would restore Cincinnati's infrastructure as a "source of pride and enjoyment to the people of this region," for today and succeeding generations.

The Smale commission drew heavily on information provided by city staff and technical resources within the private sector to conduct its assessment and develop recommendations. The commission's report included 100 specific recommendations covering planning, repairs, new construction, and financing. Cost estimates for these actions dealt explicitly with both a "one-time catch-up" amount of $217.3 million needed to correct the effect of past neglect and the $29.8 million in increased yearly spending needed for ongoing operations and maintenance. In selecting this

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

package, the commission's infrastructure improvement program neglected some elements of infrastructure that, although warranting attention, were judged to fit less well into a feasible program (e.g., cyclical replacement of fire hydrants, maintenance and upgrading of telecommunications for police and fire services, additional data collection, and study of sewer and slope stability problems).

The commission devoted considerable attention to the potential sources of funding for these improvements. Approximately half of the funds were to come from enterprise funds, accounts deriving income from user charges and other fees for city garages, water supply, rubbish collection, and stormwater management. One unusual but important revenue source was the city's Cincinnati-to-Chattanooga rail line. This line, acquired in the nineteenth Century, is leased to Southern Railway. Renegotiation of the lease terms, initiated prior to the Smale commission's work, and a threatened court action against the railroad yielded a substantial one-time payment and increased annual revenues that are available for servicing and repayment of bonded debt.

The balance of funding was recommended to come from the city's general fund, and a package of new or enhanced revenue sources was specified. Recognition of the problems that had led to neglect of maintenance in the past, the centerpiece of the commission's recommendations was a dedicated general fund revenue increase, generated primarily from a small rate increase in the city's earnings tax (paid by employees working in Cincinnati and collected as a payroll deduction), from 2 to 2.1 percent, that would have to be spent on infrastructure. Rate increases or new taxes were recommended for gasoline, auto registration, sidewalk maintenance, tree planing and maintenance, and other city services as well.

The legislation developed to implement the earnings tax increase included the provision that failure of the city to appropriate and spend funds at the recommended levels would result in reversion of the tax rate to its initial 2 percent level. A formula and index were defined as the basis for determining the amount to be spent in future years, referenced to growth in the Commerce Department's implicit price deflator (based initially on

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

gross national product but changed by the department in 1992, to gross domestic product or growth in the city's general fund revenues, whichever is less.13 City staff found the crafting of this amendment to the income tax chapter of the Cincinnati Municipal Code to be a complex task. Realistic allowance had to be made for the time required to increase spending levels without gross inefficiencies and for the inability of current officials to impose on future officials an absolute requirement for spending. Annual certification that the appropriation and spending have met requirements is necessary.

The Infrastructure Improvement Program

The commission's recommendations became the basis for the city's Infrastructure Improvement Program and were largely implemented. Among these recommendations were catch-up spending for prompt construction of the Cornell pumping station (needed to better match the patterns of supply and demand in the city) and strong support for the previously recommended construction of the Cincinnati Water Works' activated granulated carbon treatment facility (at the California Water Treatment Plant) to remove organic carbon contaminants (i.e., pesticides and other chemical residues). This facility, with a treatment capacity of 270 million gallons per day and on-site regeneration of the carbon filters, was proposed to provide, words of in the commission report, the ''safest affordable water from an industrial river source.''

Another substantial action recommended was the replacement of electrical systems that power and control flood protection works in the Mill Creek Valley, which bisects the city and contains a significant portion of the city's industrial activity. The valley is also the location of the Metropolitan Sewer District's Mill Creek (Gest Street) Wastewater Treatment Plant, which provides secondary treatment for 70 percent of the city's sanitary and industrial

13  

Experience has led city staff to wish that a less complex formula had been developed.

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

wastes, by using activated sludge, anaerobic digestion, belt press sludge watering and incineration, and effluent chlorination. (Ash, trucked to a county landfill, can be used for daily cover in landfill operations.) In the same vicinity, a viaduct serving one of the city's more heavily used roads crosses the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Mill Creek Project, a flood control facility begun some 40 years ago. The severely deteriorated viaduct deck and structure required imposition of vehicle weight limitations. The city and the Corps have had to work together to ensure the continuity of traffic flow during both the design and construction of the Mill Creek Project and the viaduct's rehabilitation.

A notable exception to the record of successful implementation was the proposed construction of an incinerator and electrical cogeneration facility for municipal solid waste management. Known to be controversial, the incinerator was nevertheless included in the commission's recommendations because, in the commissioners' view, it was the best solution to the city's solid waste problems. The recommendation and subsequent activities to implement that recommendation aroused strong local community opposition, centered in the neighborhood where the facility was to be located, 14 which the city council chose not to override. Defeat of the incinerator forced a complete change of the city's waste management strategy to the current emphasis on composting and recycling being pursued by DPW's newly formed Solid Waste Management Division (another of the commission's recommendations).

A budgeting and progress-monitoring process was established, with a major focus on how to control effectively the substantial increases in spending, over a relatively short period of time, required by the program's funding provisions. City staff prepared an implementation plan that included projections of budgets, staffing needs, and performance measures to be used in monitoring activity on the infrastructure improvement program. The task—and

14  

The location was the site of an older incineration facility that had for some years been out of service. Neighbors associated the soot, noise, and other nuisance of that previous operation with the proposed new operation.

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

the city budgeting process, in general—is made complex by the relatively large number of enterprise funds that have been established for specific restricted purposes. This complexity is an area to which the Smale commission did not give extensive attention.

The early stages of program implementation required careful planning and project management to coordinate and accomplish the large number of actions that individually seemed minor but had critical impact on the ability of the city to meet the program's spending requirements. The engineering staff often underestimated the time and effort required to complete administrative tasks on the critical path. For example, the commission recommended that consultants be used to reduce the need for city staff increases, but some new city contracting staff nevertheless had to be trained and able to deal effectively with consultants and contractors before the levels of construction activity could be raised substantially. Many easements and small parcels of property had to be acquired for rights of way, and DPW's direct costs for administrative actions (e.g., appraisal and negotiating fees) frequently exceeded the payment to the property owner. City agencies often had little basis for allocating indirect costs incurred in the program's execution. The city's mapping and administrative information systems also had to be upgraded substantially, although one of the Smale commission's recommendations—to develop a computerized geographic information system—is now being implemented and should make program management easier in the future.

City staff prepare performance reports, initially at six-month intervals and now annually, on progress in implementing the infrastructure improvement program. These reports to the city council were also reviewed by the Smale commission, which was not officially disbanded until 1991. The Cincinnati Business Committee, a continuing group of business leaders (not the same as the Smale Infrastructure Commission) agreed to continue this informal monitoring of the program's progress. The council and the business community may undertake a more formal fifth-year progress review and assessment.

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

How Representative Is the Cincinnati Experience?

Although not specifically included in the Infrastructure Commission's recommendations, refurbishment of the Ault Park Pavilion and the Union Terminal are symbolic of many of the special features of Cincinnati's experience. The Ault Park Pavilion, initially dedicated in 1930 on a scenic hilltop in one of the city's many parks, housed a restaurant and hosted dancing to live bands under the stars until the early 1960s. The limestone building and gardens suffered some two decades of neglect and vandalism, but have been restored as an important neighborhood and citywide amenity. The Union Terminal railroad station was opened in 1933 but was used for less than four decades before passenger rail traffic was terminated in 1972. (Limited Amtrak service has recently been reintroduced.) The station has been converted into the Museum Center at Cincinnati Union Terminal, housing a variety of displays on Cincinnati's natural and cultural history and attracting national acclaim for the quality of both the physical renewal and the museum operations.

Both projects may be seen to symbolize a community that has assessed the value of its physical assets and acted to maximize the return on those assets. Community representatives praise the Smale commission process for building community interest in these infrastructure assets. The community was willing to accept business leadership in this matter15 and had a wealth of such leadership to draw upon. For many in the community, the orange barrels used as safety barriers in highway and street construction have become a widespread symbol of progress, and infrastructure investment is viewed as sending the "right signals" about Cincinnati's future. The committee found it difficult to assess the extent to which such attitudes and resources may be so abundantly available and effectively mobilized in other communities.

15  

Some participants, reflecting on the experience, acknowledge that a broader range of participants in the process might have been beneficial, even to the extent of achieving acceptance of the recommended incinerator project.

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

Figure 3-D

Cincinnati's Ault Park Pavilion was renovated in 1992 and returned to service as a popular place for strolling and a center for community recreation. Parks, open space, and such public facilities are likely to become increasingly important as elements of infrastructure.

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

At the same time, the margin of victory for the city's tax increase was small. Less effective strategies and leadership might have failed to achieve that victory. In addition, few cities own interstate freight rail lines or other already productive commercial assets. In such aspects, the financial arrangements of Cincinnati's program will be replicable in only a few communities.

Implementation of the Infrastructure Improvement Program, while administratively challenging, has benefited from the nation's and region's recessionary economic conditions that reduced total construction demand, intensified competition among contractors, and yielded lower bids for city projects. The program's administrators have been able to exceed most of the program's performance targets.

Extracting More General Principles

Notwithstanding such singular elements of success, Cincinnati's experience offers valuable insights for developing local programs and addressing national infrastructure policy:

  • Individual leadership makes a crucial difference. The public works professionals had a clear vision of what was needed and maintained this vision in working with the community during strategy development and implementation. The community was organized under effective leadership by both elected officials and outside interests. The Smale commission, following on the results of the earlier Phillips committee's conclusions, provided a clearly defined way for this leadership to be exercised.

  • Intimately involving community leadership—the business community in this case, but other institutions might be key in other communities—in the process of needs review was an important step. Development of a strategy for this involvement was crucial to the success of the program. There must be mutual respect of the participants for one another's competence and motives for the coalition of interests to form and work effectively. In addition, the coalition brings into the process important skills and judgments

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
×

that public works and public administration professionals alone infrequently possess.

  • Bringing the problems of infrastructure and the issues of how to deal with those problems to the voters' attention is a substantial challenge that must be met continuously, from early planning through strategy development and as implementation proceeds. The public must be kept apprised of progress, and must be able to see and understand that progress. Communication—in this case, through an effective media campaign and numerous neighborhood meetings—is a crucial element in program development and implementation.

  • It is possible to deal with infrastructure as an entire system supporting community activity. Cincinnati's business community and voters recognized the importance of the whole, even while questioning the configuration of specific parts (e.g., the incinerator debate), and accepted the notion that the Infrastructure Improvement Program is "building Cincinnati's future" (the phrased used on project signage and progress reports).

  • The process of dealing with infrastructure problems takes years. The community must have a mechanism for ensuring continuity in developing an understanding of its problems, formulating an effective program, and implementing that program. In Cincinnati, the highly professional city staff and a business community habituated to community service combined effectively to provide this continuity.

  • The earlier work of the Phillips committee and the Cincinnati Business Committee's proposed midterm review of the Infrastructure Improvement Program are, in effect, community "peer reviews" of the work of city staff. These peer reviews may be an helpful tool for building mutual respect, defining common goals, and enhancing government staff's ability to identify and implement realistic infrastructure strategy.

  • The importance of facility maintenance—and the costly consequences of its neglect—are clearly demonstrated. More than half of the Smale commission's recommendations involved catch-up expenditures.

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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  • Inadequate understanding and respect for natural features—topography, geotechnical factors, hydrology, and growing conditions for plants (i.e., biotic communities)—have allowed development in Cincinnati, as in many other cities, to occur in patterns that have increased the costs and reduced the performance of infrastructure. Improved understanding of and respect for these features facilitate development of more efficient and environmentally less damaging urban patterns and infrastructures.

  • The need for data to support infrastructure system planning and management had been underestimated, with the result that both the SMU and the Infrastructure Improvement Program were hampered by a lack of data for their implementation efforts. The development and maintenance of accurate, comprehensive, and current geographic information, in a readily and economically accessible system, may constitute one of the single most cost-effective steps a community can take toward addressing its infrastructure problems.

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

The Committee on Infrastructure held its third workshop colloquium in Boston, Massachusetts, on August 31 and September 1 and 2, 1992. The workshop was scheduled to coincide with the 1992 International Public Works Congress and Exposition of the American Public Works Association. During the committee's meeting, members met with city and state government officials and members of community groups, visited several major projects, and observed various elements of the city's infrastructure.

Background

Capital of one of the original 13 colonies and an early commercial center, Boston is one of the nation's oldest and most historic cities. Over the years, the city has repeatedly demonstrated a

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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willingness to consider new visions and remake itself, while seeking to preserve its most important historic landmarks.

Well established as a city by the time of the Revolution, Boston occupied a small area—almost an island—on the Shawmut Peninsula, joined to the mainland by a narrow neck of land. Filling of the coves and tidal flats within the Charles River Basin and the harbor surrounding this peninsula has added more than 3,200 acres to the original 785-acre area of the central city.

Boston's initial location and the region's geometry combined to encourage formation of a strongly radial pattern of arterial roads, with relatively weak interconnections between radials. Large-scale filling of an old milling pond extended the city's northern edge early in the nineteenth century, under a plan laid out by noted architect Charles Bullfinch. The "Bullfinch Triangle," a road pattern created by this plan, with Haymarket Square at its apex, responded in some degree to the radial pattern and survived intact for more than a century before being progressively obliterated by such projects as the initial Central Artery Scheme of the 1950s.

The Back Bay residential and commercial area is a product of another landfill operation of some 40 years' duration. The 1859 state legislation authorizing the filling and annexation of the new lands to the city of Boston included provision of funds for the construction of a major sewer across the lands that emptied into the Charles River. Included also was designation of land for a public garden adjacent to the Common, removing the possibility that land might be sold by the city for home sites.

Frederick Law Olmsted's late nineteenth century system of parks, the Emerald Necklace designed to provide for the physical and spiritual well-being of the urban residents, built on two decades of preparation by advocates for such a system. Olmsted's successor, Charles Eliot, extended the concept to a regionwide open space network that is today a landmark of achievement in landscape architecture.

In recent decades, Boston's economy has dipped and rebounded into what some observers term the "Boston Renaissance." Beginning in the late 1960s with the construction of the new city hall

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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and rebuilding of its surroundings, a chain of major projects marks the progress of development and redevelopment that have made Boston a city with a diversity of people, style, age, and use.

Public Transport, Public Involvement, and the Southwest Corridor

The diversity of Boston is reflected in the Southwest Corridor project, a relocation and extension of the MBTA's (Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority) Orange Line and related urban design development started in 1979 and, despite completion of the transit line's construction, still evolving. Built on a right of way originally intended for an interstate highway, the corridor's rail and rapid transit facilities serve a large local and commuter population while providing parkland and other open space in several neighborhoods along a corridor 4.7 miles long, from downtown Boston to the community of Forest Hills.

The project is an end product of a history beginning with community anger and activism in the 1960s, aimed at stopping highway construction that had disrupted strong ethnic communities, and the conflict with construction industry workers whose jobs would be threatened if highway construction were curtailed. Participants in the discussions about the city's transportation realized that a way had to be found to give something to all sides. In 1970, the governor of Massachusetts halted highway construction and ordered a complete review of all aspects of transportation for the Boston region. After this review, which included then-unprecedented levels of public involvement and review of plan alternatives, the decision was made to improve rail and transit facilities and local and arterial street systems. The transfer of interstate highway funds to other uses, enabled by the 1973 Federal Highway Act, was the first such major transfer in the nation, made possible by the coincidence of what some observers characterize as an unusually talented and committed set of government officials at local, state, and national levels.

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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The planning process that evolved in this environment involved the extensive participation of community groups of many types, from residents of neighborhoods located along the right of way to labor union representatives. An unusual coalition of interests evolved as this planning proceeded.

The planning team worked closely with neighborhood people to define the nature of appropriate urban design responses to the rail line and stations that would be placed in their areas. The socioeconomic characteristics of these areas spanned a broad range. One technique used, for example, was to ask neighborhood children to draw and discuss what they would like to see in the neighborhood, and then use that information in the landscape design of parks constructed on decking over the rail line.

The plan that emerged for the Southwest Corridor replaced the highway with a transit line, as well as extensive parks and station area development. An antiquated elevated section of the old MBTA line was relocated and placed in an open-cut, below-grade right of way, subsequently covered over by decking in segments to provide playgrounds and a stronger link between previously highway-divided neighborhoods. Existing rail lines were accommodated, protecting commuter rail service.

Members of the planning team felt that a key point in the planning was acceptance by both elected and transportation agency staff officials that the result of planning would be a complete community redevelopment project, rather than simply a transit line extension. For example, a series of drawings was prepared to illustrate to design engineers the sorts of architectural and visual conditions that should be provided in each area, and how such conditions would contribute to the solution of neighborhood problems beyond those of the transit line alone. The enhanced urban design character along the corridor is credited with stimulating private investment in it and convincing residents to turn toward the corridor in their private planning and design.

An element of the project's success has been demonstrated in the community's response to governmental budgetary problems of the early 1990s. Faced with reduced budgets, the Metropolitan District Commission, which is responsible for maintenance of the

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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Figure 3-E

This approach to downtown Boston—lined with houses and small shops, and passing through flower and vegetable gardens, parks and playgrounds—is built above the Metropolitan Boston Transportation Authority's Orange Line. Much of the rapid rail transit line is, in turn, located in a right of way cleared in the 1960s for construction of a segment of the interstate highway system. Community questioning of the balance and distribution of costs and benefits of this segment led to the nation's first major reprogramming of federal transportation funds from one mode to another.

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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park system constructed on decking over the transit line, reduced maintenance activities. Residents of the South End who live along the corridor ''adopted'' sections of the line and took on cleanup activities in their sections.

Building the Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel

Also resulting from the review process that spurred the Southwest Corridor were plans to build a third tunnel under Boston Harbor and to reconstruct the elevated Central Artery underground through Boston's downtown area. Management of these two projects was subsequently combined, creating the nation's largest transportation project, estimated to total some $6.5 billion in construction costs (1992 dollars).

The combined Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel (CA/THT) project is designed to relieve serious traffic congestion, complete a linking of the Massachusetts Turnpike to Boston's Logan Airport, and remove a visual and physical barrier dividing the downtown area. The project is expected to generate no more traffic than would have been anticipated without this construction. The Central Artery, originally designed to carry 75,000 vehicles per day, now serves 190,000. The new facility is planned to accommodate 220,000 vehicles daily, and will divert thousands of vehicle trips from downtown routes by providing them with direct airport access.

Current traffic is heavily congested for 8 hours per day, a figure that is projected to grow to 14 hours a day by the year 2010 unless action is taken. The tunnel to the airport is designed to improve goods movement by serving truck traffic that now must use the badly congested existing tunnels or neighborhood streets in East Boston. Utilities along the Central Artery, now scattered throughout the area, will be consolidated into a few corridors adjacent to the roadway and in designated crossover corridors.

In addition to traffic relief, the project is forecast to generate 5,000 construction jobs and 10,000 additional jobs in Boston and elsewhere. Employment generation, along with the consequent

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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support of organized labor in the political decision making process, was an important contributor to the coalition building apparent in the CA/THT as well as the Southwest Corridor projects. Some residents and other observers question the wisdom of such major investment in highways, and attribute the decision to make this investment to political and business interests. Federal funding was in fact provided as part of the congressional action to override a presidential veto of a major highway bill.

While such questions concerning the project's planning are still discussed, the CA/THT is now under construction, and the management team's primary goal is to maintain progress and thus control the costs and adverse impact of this construction. Continuing opposition from some segments of the community requires the management team's steady attention to avoiding disruption. To this end, the team brings together sound engineering knowledge, good negotiating skills, and tough litigation experience to demonstrate that it can discuss issues of the project's implementation but is prepared to fight if necessary to maintain progress.

A threat to progress that has influenced other highway projects is action from environmental groups, and the Sierra Club has expressed solid opposition to the CA/THT projects. However, other environmental groups have seemingly accepted that gains such as the new open space being developed and the projected reduction in air polluting emissions render the project, on balance, an asset to the community, whether viewed as the last activity of the interstate highway era or the first of a new wave of urban investment.

The Federal Highway Administration is viewing the project as one of a new generation of transport improvements with fully integrated attention to environmental concerns. Of the estimated $6.5 billion cost of the total project, some 10 percent will be spent to mitigate or avoid adverse environmental consequences or to enhance the environment. In many cases the actions taken to further environmental aims make good economic sense as well. For example, the "fish startle" program intended to reduce fish kills during dredging and blasting operations avoids 70-day project

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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delays that would otherwise have been necessary during the fish migration season in Boston Harbor.

Massachusetts Water Resource Authority "Turning the Tide on Pollution"

Adverse impact and its prevention or mitigation are topics that assume major proportions when discussion turns to the construction project at Deer Island, known as the Boston Harbor Cleanup or more recently as "Turning the Tide on Pollution." The waste-water and water system project, with a projected 10-year cost of $6 billion to $7 billion, is a court-ordered response to what some people view as the Boston region's years of neglect that had turned Boston Harbor into one of the nation's most polluted and persistent violations of federal Clean Water Act (CWA) requirements. Poor maintenance and inadequate capacity had made even the existing treatment plants almost totally ineffective. Funding for improvements, politically controlled, was not forthcoming.

Communities along the shoreline were exposed to the pollution and associated odor and health hazard of the millions of tons of raw sewage dumped regularly into the harbor. In 1982 the city solicitor for Quincy, one of those communities, filed suit in the state court against the Metropolitan District Commission (MDC), the responsible state agency, seeking relief. A regional environmental group filed suit the following year in federal court against the MDC and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Court action was felt to be needed because (1) there was no information available on the existing plant's performance or current environmental conditions, (2) no local constituencies for action had yet formed, and (3) there was no political leadership for action. In addition, the state's elected officials continued to neglect to provide for the MDC's funding needs.

The court provided leadership and brought groups together. However, agreements reached under the first suit failed to have significant effect, and a consensus of the parties to the related discussions was that a new entity should take over MDC sewage

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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functions. A combination of actions by the two courts and the EPA forced the state legislature to establish the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA), which is now responsible for supplying water and sewer services in 61 cities and towns, in the Boston area.

Almost immediately after the MWRA was created, the EPA in early 1985 filed suit against the authority for alleged violations of the CWA. By the end of the year, a court-ordered schedule of action had been established to bring the MWRA into compliance with the Act. This schedule has subsequently been modified several times in negotiations with EPA, nearby communities, and other parties to the suits.

A major element in the schedule of action is the consolidation and upgrading of sewage treatment operations at the MWRA's Deer Island facility, where a large secondary treatment plant is now under construction. That project, currently estimated to cost $1.5 billion, includes a 9.5-mile, 24.5-foot-diameter, hard rock tunnel under Boston Harbor to discharge treated waste through 55 diffusers located 110 feet under the surface of Massachusetts Bay. Local environmental groups and residents of communities on Cape Cod are questioning the potential impact of the project on aquatic life, while the scientific community is deeply divided on the environmental benefits and cost-effectiveness of secondary treatment for coastal waste disposal.

Hence, the MWRA management team is concerned, like the CA/THT team, about timely progress as a primary goal. In the agency's view, delay will only add to the project's already high costs, payment of which has multiplied the water and sewer rates of households in the region to levels that are now among the highest in the nation. Although some 87 percent of the estimated costs of the Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel project are federally funded, 90 percent of the estimated costs of the Deer Island project will be local. Authority staff report that no provision is yet being made to ensure the availability of adequate funds for facility maintenance in the future.

The context provided by the court's involvement has required that many alternatives for each major decision be considered, and

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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the judge in the case has tended toward selecting the more difficult options (politically or administratively) to achieve environmental benefits. Although other approaches might in principle yield even greater benefits (e.g., several satellite treatment facilities rather than the large Deer Island plant), the practical feasibility of these options is questionable (e.g., neighborhood resistance to the siting of several satellite plants). Nevertheless, little if any consideration seems to have been given to conservation efforts, such as replacement of plumbing fixtures in the region, that might reduce the need for a major treatment plant.

How Representative Is the Boston Experience?

The Boston experience, reflected in the Southwest Corridor, Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel, and Harbor Cleanup projects, brings to the forefront the question of national interests in local infrastructures, primarily because of their large scale and use of federal resources. In this case, "resources" must be broadly viewed as encompassing the judicial and administrative systems, as well as flows of funding.

Scale is of course very significant. The estimated combined cost of the two ongoing projects, $14 billion, even when distributed over a 10-year period, is a significant fraction of U.S. spending on infrastructure. The allocation of those costs among the residents and businesses of the Boston region, the state of Massachusetts, and the nation as a whole is a matter of national importance, as the histories of the three projects illustrate. However, this huge scale necessarily limits the applicability of the Boston experience.

The projects also illustrate the trade-offs to be made among services provided by infrastructure, the jobs created by infrastructure investment, and the environmental consequences of construction and long-term operation of the systems. In both the CA/THT project and the Southwest Corridor, jobs were a key issue in building the coalitions that determined that those projects would

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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Figure 3-F

Infrastructure construction projects are often among the largest and most complex and costly civil engineering undertakings. Operations of this dredge working on Boston's Third Harbor Tunnel project adjust to seasonal fish migrations as well as tides and storms.

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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proceed. The Central Artery, projected to reduce congestion without increasing traffic volume over what would otherwise have been expected, could be portrayed as likely to enhance the environment as well as improve transport. Such trade-offs are inherent to all infrastructure investment and operation, regardless of scale.

Extracting More General Principles

Thus, the Boston experience is in many ways unique. Nevertheless, it yields more general principles that may be useful both in dealing with infrastructure matters elsewhere and in understanding how national policy shapes local infrastructure:

  • Very large projects "crowd out" and force deferral of other smaller but possibly beneficial projects, particularly over the term during which high "carrying costs" must be borne. Powerful political forces tend to favor larger projects or programs, which suggests that smaller projects will be more appealing if grouped into some credible unifying framework.

  • A long-term perspective for financing the maintenance and repair of major facilities is needed. The apparent lack of such perspective in Boston's major projects is a serious flaw suggesting that these major new investments will not yield their highest possible return. This lesson was clearly demonstrated in the Cincinnati experience.

  • The long gestation period of large projects increases their costs and poses inherent obstacles to their ultimate completion. These large projects are often, as one observer termed them, "faith-based" investments. Nevertheless, the Boston experience demonstrates that such projects, once they gain a critical mass, possess a momentum that carries them through changes in political leadership and economic cycles.

  • The availability of funds earmarked for some purposes may give particular agencies or infrastructure modes considerable advantage, sometimes—to the extent that total resources are limited—at the expense of other programs and projects. The

Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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progress of the Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel project is made possible in a period of record government deficits by the availability of earmarked highway gasoline tax revenues.

  • Economic growth is a significant element of success in developing the political coalitions needed to accomplish major shifts in infrastructure policy. When all sides can come out better in the end, it is easier to convince them to join together for a common purpose. The need for jobs and the advantages to local businesses combined to facilitate local political support for Boston's large projects.

REFERENCES

Bureau of the Census. 1992. Statistical Abstract of the United States, Appendix II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce.


Dibner, D.R., and A.C. Lemer. 1992. The Role of Public Agencies in Fostering New Technology and Innovation in Building. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.

Dolin, E.J. 1992. Environment 34(6):7–33.


Johnson, D. 1991. Arid economy, desert states thrive. New York Times May 13: A1.


Krieger, A., and L.J. Green. 1985. Past Futures: Two Centuries of Imagining Boston. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Graduate School of Design.


World Almanac and Book of Facts. 1992. New York: Pharos Books.

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Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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Suggested Citation:"3 Observing Locally." National Research Council. 1993. In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2205.
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Next: 4 Principles for Action on Infrastructure »
In Our Own Backyard: Principles for Effective Improvement of the Nation's Infrastructure Get This Book
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This volume takes a fresh look—primarily from a technological perspective—at the nation's "infrastructure": a collection of diverse modes that function as a system supporting a wide range of economic and social activities. Within an infrastructure system, operating and maintenance procedures, management practices, and development policies (i.e., the software) must work together with the facilities' hardware.

This study has a strongly local perspective, drawing valuable information from workshops held in Phoenix, Cincinnati, and Boston. These workshops illustrated common elements of local experience that offer infrastructure practitioners, policymakers, and the public at large both understanding and guidance in the form of specific strategies that can lead toward "win-win" situations, where parties with potentially opposing interests seek a way to resolve infrastructure issues so that all parties gain.

Local issues, combined across many regions, give infrastructure its strategic national significance. The book recommends specific principles that should be applied in national policy to support effective local infrastructure development and management.

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