Policing and Security Practices for Small- and Medium-Sized Public Transit Systems (2015)

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52 In contrast to the much more extensive and costly security-related requirements necessary to protect large-sized transit agencies, the scope and extent of countermeasures warranted for small- and medium-sized agencies is correspondingly smaller. Basically the difference lies in the reduced infrastructure and critical asset footprint and operating characteristics of small- and medium-sized agencies. Because the vast majority of these agencies are limited to “rubber tire” vehicles and conveyances, the need to protect infrastructure components or systems such as com- munications and signal systems, electric power and transmission systems is lessened. Similarly buildings, maintenance depots, and other large capacity facilities required to support light rail or commuter rail surface transportation systems are not required to operate smaller “bus-only” systems, so the list of assets in need of protection is much lower. And finally, protecting dedi- cated rights-of-way, including critical infrastructure such as tunnels or subways, overhead or elevated structures, tracks, or wayside assets structures is typically not required at small- or medium-sized systems. Lesser populations associated with the operating environment of small- and medium-sized agencies also contributes to the reduced need for security countermeasures. As previously dis- cussed homeland security concerns, crime rates and the occurrence of security issues at smaller agencies are directly proportional to the size, scope, and location of the agency’s service area and the population served. In summary, with a few exceptions, the small- and medium-sized transit agencies profiled in this study operate over the road with buses, trolleys, vans, or cars that require a level of security commensurate with the protection of (1) vehicles in transit on highways, rural and suburban city, borough, or township streets or other roadways; (2) infrastructure such as unstaffed bus shelters or bus stops, vehicle storage depots, bus stations, and maintenance facilities neces- sary to support these conveyances; (3) employees who operate the conveyances; (4) minimal administrative and management staff; and (4) the passengers who use the agency’s transporta- tion services. Under such circumstances, the security response associated with the protection of people, e.g., crimes against person, is mainly on-board-vehicle-focused with secondary concerns for transit system users who are along the roadside at shelters or bus stops awaiting the arrival of a transit vehicle. But even under this latter category, security is more so the responsibility of local authori- ties who have jurisdiction over what happens on the specific route. Property protection require- ments are more expansive with security concerns related to both the interior and exterior of vehicles in transit, as well as in storage depots, bus shelters along transit routes, bus stations, administrative facilities, material and equipment storage areas, and more recently, fare collection machines located in publicly accessible venues. Security Countermeasures C H A P T E R 7

Security Countermeasures 53 Protecting People On Board Survey results for small- or medium-sized agencies indicate that the occurrence of crime, in particular violent crime, on board transit buses is an infrequent occurrence. Of the 172 total respondents, just under 85% reported no criminal activity whatsoever had occurred in the pre- vious year period. However 1 homicide, 10 incidents of robbery, and 17 incidents of aggravated assault were reported, along with 2 sexual assaults (see Figure 7.1). Spotlight on On-Board Vehicle Security (Charlotte Area Transit System, http://charmeck.org/city/charlotte/cats/Bus/ridingcats/ Pages/Code%20of%20Conduct.aspx) Riders Code of Conduct The following has been adapted from Charlotte Code Sec. 15-272 and 15-273. Any violation of these articles may be enforced by the issuance of a civil penalty in the amount of $50 or by arrest. ACTS PROHIBITED It is unlawful for any person to commit the following acts on a CATS or LYNX vehicle: • Smoke or carry any lighted tobacco product or expel the residue of any other tobacco product including chewing tobacco • Consume any alcoholic beverage or possess an open container of any alcoholic beverage • Engage in disruptive, disturbing behavior including: loud conversation, profanity or rude insults, or operating any electronic device used for sound without an earphone(s) • Take any animal onto a vehicle unless its purpose is to assist a person with a disability or in training activities • Carry, possess or have within immediate access any dangerous weapon • Possess or transport any flammable liquid, combustible material or other dangerous substance such as gasoline, kerosene or propane • Litter • Vandalize the vehicle or station platform by writing, marking, scribbling, defacing or causing damage to the vehicle or platform facilities in any manner • Beg by forcing yourself upon another person • Excrete any bodily fluid or spit upon or at another person on the vehicle or station platform • Possess, use or sell any controlled substance • Lying down on seats, benches or tables at stations and bus stops • Standing, sitting or lying within 2 feet of the edge of the rail station platforms except for boarding and exiting the light rail vehicle • Skating or skateboarding on station platforms • Trespassing upon any area not open to the public and posted as such Only 3 total crime incidents occurring on board trains were reported, which included 1 aggravated assault (see Figure 7.2).

54 Policing and Security Practices for Small- and Medium-Sized Public Transit Systems On-Board Vehicle Countermeasures In contemplating the appropriate level of security needed to protect vehicle operators and passengers from violent offenses occurring on board a conveyance, small- and medium-sized agencies should first take into account the purpose and benefits of the various types of secu- rity countermeasures that are available. Security can be designed to prevent, deter, detect, mitigate, respond to, or recover from an incident. In the on-board vehicle context preven- tion, deterrence and response should take precedence from a planning standpoint with mitigation, detection, and recovery considered as close seconds. Definitions are provided in Table 7.1. Prevention Unfortunately there are very few security measures available to prevent violence from occur- ring on board a transit vehicle. Buses are not reserved. They are public open access vehicles avail- able for use by an unrestricted general population. Buses are populated by anonymous riders who present nothing more than a fare media or card to get on board. Typically, individuals who represent security risks are not pre-identified or barred from riding because their propensity to violence is generally unknown. There is virtually no screening for weapons or dangerous imple- ments prior to boarding. Riders are placed in close proximity to one other, strangers, friends 0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 80.0% 100.0% 120.0% Figure 7.2. Criminal incidence—Part 1 crimes—location of incidents— train. 0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0% 90.0% Figure 7.1. Criminal incidence—Part 1 crimes—location of incidents—bus.

Security Countermeasures 55 and associates alike with on and off access readily available in case a hasty retreat is required. In summary, the openness of public transit systems makes them virtually unprotectable using modern security technology. In the absence of technology, the remaining option for preventing violence on board a con- veyance is the deployment of security forces. Although this response is more so one of deter- rence, it is technically possible to prevent an incident from occurring if security personnel are physically present and able to stop an ongoing attack or criminal assault. Deterrence There are security countermeasures available to deter criminals or other would-be attackers from committing violence on board transit vehicles. As mentioned above, security forces can serve as a significant deterrent to violent crime. Security-related technologies can also greatly reduce both the perceived window of opportunity of an individual and the potential impact of his/her actions. See Table 7.2. Response With respect to on-board violence from a security standpoint, the highest priority action that should be undertaken by small- and medium-sized transit agencies is to establish a robust capability and multi-layered capacity to respond immediately to the occurrence of either a threat of violence or a violent incident. The infrequent rate of occurrence, coupled with an inability to prevent all acts of violence leaves transit agencies in the conundrum of either deterring violent incidents or responding to them effectively. Deterrence as indicated in the table above is largely a matter of how the criminal or offender interprets the risk of apprehension or personal loss. Purpose Definion Source Prevenon Those capabilies necessary to avoid, prevent, or stop a threatened or actual act. DHS Naonal Infrastructure Protecon Plan NIPP (DHS 2013) Deterrence An acvity, procedure, or physical barrier that reduces the likelihood of an incident, a­ack, or criminal acvity. Transit Agency Security and Emergency Management Protecve Measures (FTA 2006) Detecon The idenficaon and validaon of potenal threat or attack that is communicated to an appropriate authority that can act. Transit Agency Security and Emergency Management Protecve measures (FTA 2006) Migaon The applicaon of measure or measures to reduce the likelihood of an unwanted occurrence and/or its consequences. DHS Risk Lexicon (DHS 2008) Response Capabilies necessary to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs a’er an incident has occurred. DHS Naonal Infrastructure Protecon Plan NIPP (DHS 2013) Recovery The development, coordinaon, and execuon of plans for impacted areas and operaons. Transit Agency Security and Emergency Management Protecve measures (FTA 2006) Table 7.1. Level of security.

56 Policing and Security Practices for Small- and Medium-Sized Public Transit Systems However, in many cases, the offender is not making a rational decision in the first place when they commit a violent act. Offenders can be mentally disabled, emotionally wrought, under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or simply pathological, in which case security measures aimed at deterrence can have minimal if any impact. Accomplishing this objective of immediate and effective response can be both demanding and costly. Indeed, the transit agency may need to weigh its tolerance for the infrequent occurrence of violent crime on board a conveyance against the daily effort and costs required to maintain a robust response capability and capacity. As shown in the survey, for the majority (85%) of small- and medium-sized agencies, this decision is based on circumstances in which their agencies are completely devoid of any criminal activity. There are numerous types of countermeasures that can support the maintenance of an effec- tive response program for on-board incidents. Many of these measures are low cost and/or low effort, consisting of policy responses, awareness and training, security planning, or coordination with local authorities. Because of the importance of the issue, it is suggested that all transit agen- cies, regardless of a lack of incidents or crime, engage at a minimum in these threshold security response activities. For those agencies that are experiencing periodic violence on board transit vehicles, additional efforts as listed should be undertaken. (It should also be noted that detec- tion, mitigation, and recovery types of security actions are included in the response category). See Table 7.3. Countermeasure Ease of Use Deterrent Value Cost Police or Security Staffing On Board Conveyance Easy High—Security personnel bring the capacity to perceive the true nature of a threat and to recognize ongoing aggressor taccs. When adequately armed or reinforced, they can repel or overcome the use of deadly force by responding with equal or greater force to neutralize the threat or acvity. Very High Visible Surveillance Systems Medium High—Readily evident CCTV creates a concern for offenders that they would be providing evidence that will lead to their apprehension. “Caught on camera” can have a tremendous deterrent impact. High Screening Hard High—Pre-boarding inspecons can eliminate or reduce the use of dangerous weapons or other implements. Very High Physical Barriers— Compartment Barriers or Shielding Medium High—Driver/operators can be protected from assault. High Barring Systems Difficult High—Technology that idenfies known aggressors who are then refused access to vehicles. Low-tech opon would include providing operators with photos of offenders. Low to Medium Public Address System and Signage Easy Medium—Educang passengers and the public on safe acons to take; advising would-be criminals of the presence of security. Signs and warnings prohibing guns, knives, scissors, etc. should be posted at the entry of the bus. Low Table 7.2. Security countermeasures.

Security Countermeasures 57 Response Acvies Ease of Use Response Value Cost Intelligence Informaon Sharing Cooperaon Medium High—Working as a team with local planners, law enforcement and first responders. Requires the designaon of a primary point of contact and dedicaon of significant me to maintain effecve liaison. Dollars—Low Time—High Training, Drills Immediate Acons Hard High—Praccing with first responders on how to respond to and migate on-board vehicle violent incidents. Dollars—High Time—High Alarms, Panic Buons with Police or Security Force Response Medium High—On-board vehicle emergency event noficaon technology coupled with immediate response by security forces. Vehicles with silent communicaon/emergency capability. Dollars—Low Time—Very High Surveillance with Immediate Police or Security Force Response Hard High—Real-me watching for suspicious acvity on board vehicles remotely coupled with rapid response to incidents can create an observable omnipresent impact. Dollars—High Time—Very High Shadowing Vehicles Hard High—High visibility security patrols or bus field supervision provide immediate response capability. Dollars— Medium Time— Medium Remote Sensors with Police or Security Force Response Hard High—Sensor/pager systems can be installed to detect dangerous substances, such as radioacve or biohazardous material, and alert the operator or dispatch when the vehicle has been contaminated. Dollars—High Time—Very High Driver Operator Security Awareness Training Easy High—Train employees to monitor and observe people, events, acvies, and items and take careful note of irregular or suspicious behavior. Dollars—Low Time—Low Driver Operator Security Training Medium High—Customer service, conflict migaon, self- defense or assault prevenon training. Training should be provided to all drivers concerning management of hosle passengers. Dollars—Low Time—Low Vehicle Locators Systems (AVLs) Medium High—Buses should have vehicle locaon systems (cell/satellite locators) to know a bus’ actual locaon at any time from dispatch or some other centralized locaon. Dollars— Medium Time—Low Communicaon Protocol for Violent Incidents Easy High—Make sure all people involved in the communicaon process are trained and prepared for deployment of the process if and when necessary. Dollars—Low Time—Low Electronic Distress Signs Easy High—Emergency “Call Police” signs observable from the exterior of the vehicle. Dollars—Low Time—Low Personal Protecve Equipment Medium Medium—Operator issued defensive weapons such as pepper spray. Requires policy and procedure promulgaon as well as defensive taccs training. Dollars— Medium Time— Medium Real-Time Audio Medium Medium—Streaming audio. Dollars— Medium Time— Medium Violent Incident Emergency Response Plan Easy Medium—Hold-ups, hijacking, shoongs, homicides, hostage situaons, assaults and severe passenger disturbances on the bus. Dollars—Low Time—Low Table 7.3. Response and cost. (continued on next page)

58 Policing and Security Practices for Small- and Medium-Sized Public Transit Systems Response Acvies Ease of Use Response Value Cost Surveillance without Police or Security Force Response Hard Low—Event recording of incidents. Dollars—High Time— Medium Fire Suppression Equipment Easy Low—Migang or controlling the impact of an event in progress. Dollars—Low Time—Low Table 7.3. (Continued). Other On-Board Vehicle Incidents As disclosed in the survey, incidents of simple assault against a driver or passenger occur much more frequently than violent or aggravated assaults. 15.3% of agencies reported assaults against operators while 19.6% indicated they had experienced assaults against passengers. (See Figure 7.3.) Spotlight on Operator Assaults Public Awareness Campaigns, such as Septa’s Red Kite Training Program for Con- flict Management, developed from a post-war community healing approach into a training model used internationally. The program uses trauma-informed crisis management as a means to de-escalate violence with those who have experienced it. Program tenets include a belief that teaching public-service workers the effects of trauma and how to de-escalate those who have experienced it is the key to community safety. This training program is designed to help employees to be more aware and to show more understanding for individuals (the customers), by allowing them to understand self-importance, to show respect and to see the human factor, al- lowing them to focus on de-escalating potential problems before they happen. Operators participate in their training while learning they have choices in every interaction and how they can create a shift that can disarm a potentially difficult situation. 0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0% T he ft by p ic k po ck et in g T he ft of co m pa ny pr op er ty D ru g of fe ns e S ex o ffe ns e A ss au lt ag ai ns t op er at or A ss au lt ag ai ns t pa ss en ge r T re sp as si ng S cr ap /M et al T he fts N /A Figure 7.3. Criminal incidence—other crimes—location of incidents—bus.

Security Countermeasures 59 Included in this category of on-board vehicle incidents would be incidents of nonviolent offensive touching or verbal assault. Black’s Law Dictionary states, “an assault can be committed without actually touching, or striking or doing bodily harm, to the person of another.” The dic- tionary defines assault as “any willful attempt or threat to inflict injury upon the person of another, when coupled with an apparent present ability so to do, and any intentional display of force such as would give the victim reason to fear or expect immediate bodily harm.” Assault is sometimes confused with the crime of “battery” which is basically the use of illegal force—intentional and wrongful physical contact with a person without his or her consent that entails some injury or offensive touching—against another. Of course countermeasures for lesser degree assaults occurring on board vehicles would be the same as for more violent events. But one type of simple assault that deserves particular attention by all transit agencies is spitting on vehicle operators. TCRP Synthesis 93: Practices to Protect Bus Operators from Passenger Assault (Nakanishi 2011) disclosed that concerns about incidents of spit- ting were second only to verbal threats or intimidation. 100% of large agencies, 70% of medium agencies, and 26% of small agencies considered spitting on operators to be problematic. A Metro Transit Authority of NY statistical report summed up the gist of the issue: “Of all the assaults that prompted a bus operator to take paid leave in 2009, a third of them, 51, ‘involved a driver being spat upon.’ . . . No weapon was involved in these episodes. ‘Strictly spitting,’ said Charles Seaton, a New York City Transit spokesman. And the encounters, while distressing, appeared to take a surprisingly severe toll: the 51 drivers who went on paid leave after a spitting incident took, on average, 64 days off work—the equivalent of 3 months with pay. One driver, who was not identi- fied by the authority, spent 191 days on paid leave.” (www.ndtv.com Michael M. Grynbaum, NYT News Service | Updated: May 25, 2010) DNA swab “spit kits” are a recent countermeasure designed to combat the growing problem of spitting. Deployed first in England and now in Boston and soon to be in New York, DNA kits include swabs, a rinse, and a sealed container to store an assailant’s saliva sample for purposes of later prosecution. At present the kits cost $200.00 each. The FBI maintains a national DNA database known as CODIS. CODIS is the acronym for the “Combined DNA Index System” and is the generic term used to describe the FBI’s program of support for criminal justice DNA databases as well as the software used to run these databases. The CODIS system contains DNA profiles contributed by federal, state, and local participat- ing forensic laboratories. As of June 2014, the National DNA Index (NDIS) contained over 11,015,147 offender profiles, 1,922,415 arrestee profiles, and 565,159 forensic profiles. CODIS’s primary metric, the “Investigation Aided,” tracks the number of criminal investigations where CODIS has added value to the investigative process. As of June 2014, CODIS has produced over 250,809 hits assisting in more than 239,317 investigations. (www.fbi.gov) Protecting People at Bus Stops In a study of the 10 most dangerous bus stops in Los Angeles (Loukaitou-Sideris et al. 2001) the following summary was observed, “Bus stops are common settings for transit crime. They provide cover for criminals who can hang out waiting for victims without arousing suspicion. Bus stops are populated by anonymous riders, who represent easy targets. In their vicinity many bus stops had facilities, bars, liquor stores, ATMs typically known as crime generators.” Crime or violence at a bus stop is usually a matter for investigation and resolution by local authorities. Normally a small- or medium-sized agency would not be directly impacted by an event occurring at one of these locations. However, concern about the perception of passengers that an agency’s bus stops are unsafe could adversely impact ridership. Prevalent crimes include

60 Policing and Security Practices for Small- and Medium-Sized Public Transit Systems typically either those involving public nuisance or public offense (drinking in public, drug viola- tions, lewd or disorderly conduct), or crimes against persons (petty thefts such as pickpocket or jewelry snatching, robbery, assault, or rape). Anecdotally, it would not be unusual for a transit agency to be familiar with those locations along their bus routes where crime occurs. These locations, known as “hot spots,” usually possess certain environmental characteristics that create both opportunity for crime and concealment or routes of escape to preclude apprehension. To the extent practical transit agencies should con- sider bus stop or shelter placement and security taking the following factors into consideration. The environmental factors and the source for the empirical data are provided in Table 7.4. In 2010 the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) published Recommended Practice (RP) SS-SIS-RP-008-10, Bus Stop Design and Placement, Security Considerations (APTA 2010). The RP recommends that a transit agency perform a security risk assessment of all bus Table 7.4. Environmental factors/sources. Environmental Factor Source Offenders want to avoid the risk of being seen while comming a crime. The possibility of surveillance by shop owners, managers, employees, guards, or caretakers has been found to have a strong effect in reducing crime. Branngham and Branngham (1993) Specific commercial uses are more likely to generate crime than others, especially if there is a high concentraon of them in a limited area. The presence of a great number of liquor stores, bars, and taverns can have a negave effect on neighborhood crime. Block and Block (1995) Physical incivilies (trash, graffi, abandoned buildings, disrepair, unkempt lots) and social incivilies (rowdy behavior, drug dealing, public drunkenness, prostuon, panhandling, and loitering) result in higher crime and resident fear. The relaonship of physical incivilies to crime is expressed in the "broken window" thesis, popularized by Wilson and Kellig (1982). A broken window le‘ unrepaired implies that social control is weak in an area. Potenal offenders are more likely to act if they believe that no one is in control. Skogan (1990) and Wilson and Kellig (1982) Areas with vacant lots or buildings, public parks, and schools o‘en a“ract youth and gang-related crime. Perkins et al. (1992) Crime rates are higher at intersecons with alleys, midblock passages, mul-family housing, and undesirable establishments such as liquor stores and check cashing establishments, vacant buildings, and graffi and litter. The proximity of undesirable establishments, parcularly liquor stores, had a major negave impact on crime. The existence of graffi and li“er also aggravated crime incidence. Loukaitou-Sideris et al. (2001)

Security Countermeasures 61 stops in its system. The assessment should facilitate the use of CPTED, taking into account the need for natural surveillance, clear lines of sight, lighting, landscaping, natural access control, use and ownership, signage, physical barriers, selection of materials, CCTV utilization, commu- nications systems, and passenger amenities such as weather protection and seating. The RP also suggests that the placement of stops and/or shelters should be based on the following criteria: (1) pedestrian traffic and demographic information, (2) passenger volume, (3) traffic volume and circulation, and (4) crime rate in area of the bus stop. Protecting Transit Properties As mentioned previously the critical assets of small- and medium-sized agencies generally include vehicles, storage depots, bus shelters along transit routes, bus stations, administrative facilities, material and equipment storage areas, and more recently, fare collection machines located in publicly accessible venues. Spotlight on Fare Collection and Fare Evasion There are many ways to pay a transit fare—Cash/Tokens/Tickets/Transfers/Daily Passes/Monthly Passes/Magnetic Swipe Cards/”Tap” Proximity Readers/Contactless “Open” Fare Payments, etc. New technologies and ways of thinking are changing the way that fares are collected on transit systems. Electronic payment systems for mass transit agen- cies offer many benefits including ease of use, convenience for riders, security improvements, and reduced costs. Although methods for collecting cash fares remain a necessity for transit, there are ever increasing opportunities to allow passengers to use other forms of payment, including smart cards issued by the agency, debit or credit cards, or even smart phones to pay for their tickets. Collecting fares is handled at many agencies through proof-of-payment “honor” systems that use revenue collection officers to check compliance. These systems are supported by vandal resistant ticket machines that are made available to riders at station stops or depots. Often, the machines are covered by remote surveillance cameras that send images to central stations. In 2012, MBTA in Boston became the first transit agency to permit passengers to use smart phones to pay for tickets. Rather than spend large sums to outfit transit stops with new and improved ticket machines, the agency found a way to allow hand-held devices owned by system users to facilitate collection of revenue. Smart card-only fare boxes on vehicles are also being rolled out at different systems in the U.S. Cashless fare boxes are reliable, easily configurable, capable of processing all types of electronic fare media, and can interface with other devices or systems, including passenger count verification systems. Non-electronic drop boxes placed on vehicles continue to allow for the secure acceptance of coins and bills while allowing the operator to visually count the amount received. Cash is later removed from the boxes at a secure location. Cash validating fare boxes reject invalid coins, tokens, and bills without visual inspection.

62 Policing and Security Practices for Small- and Medium-Sized Public Transit Systems Vehicles and Conveyances Protecting vehicles consists of securing rolling stock while in transit and at rest. While there are infrequent occasions when larceny of a bus is reported, the main issue of security concern is vandalism. TRB’s Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Research Results Digest 9: Responding to Vandalism of Transit Bus and Rail Vehicle Passenger Windows (TCRP 1996) chronicled the increase in breakage and smashing of bus windows that was becoming endemic in the late 90s rising by as much as 11% each year. In New York City alone, the MTA New York City Transit reported that properly maintaining vandal-etched bus and rail windows was costing the city $60–70 million annually. The research digest identified a 3-part strategy for how to reduce the rate of incidence: (1) the development of repair techniques for the current system; (2) material solutions to the problem, i.e., materials or material systems that provide resistance to vandalism; and (3) prevention. Existing transparent window materials in use include safety glass, coated acrylic, and coated polycarbonate. Prevention includes police/security, maintenance, and opera- tor involvement, as well as transit authority policies, punishment, legislation, surveillance, and other technologies. (See Tables 7.5 and 7.6.) From a security standpoint preventing, deterring, or reducing incidents of vandalism to roll- ing stock must take into account the nature of the criminal, including those with a proclivity to engage in the acts of window smashing or shattering, destruction of other vehicle surfaces, or graffiti. Unfortunately in many, if not most instances, these types of acts are committed by juvenile offenders. Protecting against juvenile crime for transit vehicles at rest can be accomplished by the imposition of a security inspection process and perimeter protection measures such as fencing, access control, and surveillance or intrusion detection technology. The National Transit Insti- tute (NTI) published an excellent, Employee Guide to System Safety and Security, which contains Support equipment for today’s fare systems can include data systems, valida- tion technology, counterfeit detection readers, vaulting systems, ticket vending machines, ticket office machines, and web-based acceptance configuration software. A 2013 problem statement submitted to the TCRP titled Transit Fare Evasion: Measurement, Prevention, Economics, and Societal Factors postulates “while there is growing industry experience and statistics on this topic, resources are often obscure and considered an adjunct to research in law enforcement, secu- rity, fare collection, sociology, or financial audits. Information is not easily acces- sible or widely disseminated.” The problem statement recommends “synthesis to provide comprehensive, issue-centric guidance for practitioners on how evasion can be measured, monitored, and minimized under an assortment of different fare policies, fare collection methodologies, and operations.” The project pro- poses “to identify relationships between fare evasion rates and contributing factors, including inspection/ticket collection rates, penalty/on-board surcharge amounts, probability of getting cited or arrested, but also demographic factors (age, income, etc.), geography, and transportation fares.” The proposal also seeks to “discuss experience with different countermeasures, surveillance, and prevention strategies.”

Security Countermeasures 63 Material Soluons Ease of Use Cost Sacrificial ply system, which is an inexpensive piece of plasc held to the window's interior side with two-sided tape, or is held in place by the window frame itself. These plies can be replaced quickly aer being vandalized. Easy Low Peel-ply protecve film placed over the interior of the window. When this peel-ply is damaged, it is stripped off and replaced. Peel-ply products are also inexpensive, but do not change-out as quickly as the sacrificial ply products. Easy Low Acrylic can be refurbished (ground, polished, and recoated) but it does not provide the impact protecon of laminated safety glass or polycarbonate (acrylic fractures into large jagged pieces when broken). Acrylic is subject to hazing and crazing, it burns, and it requires a protecve coang. Medium Medium Polycarbonate provides superior impact resistance but its soness is suscepble to abrasion and scratching, as well as environmental and chemical a‰ack, and it must have a protecve coang. Medium Medium An-spall films have been developed specifically to combat "smash and grab" robberies, car-jacking, and hurricanes. They are applied to the interior surface of glass windows to prevent glass spall (flying glass) when the window is damaged. In some cases, the relavely so an- spall film is further protection from carving and etching by a sacrificial acrylic ply. Medium Medium Glass provides superior service life and is impervious to chemical a‰ack, aging, and environment. Moreover, glass is the most difficult material to scratch. But its drawbacks are that it is heavy, cannot be refurbished easily, and has higher liability because of flying glass when a window breaks. Medium High Polyurethane coangs and liners have been developed that increase the durability of plasc transparencies. Polyurethane liners have self-healing properes (gouges and imprints and abrasion damage disappear with me and/or with the applicaon of heat). Medium High Acrylic side window clad with a very thin (0.030 in.) chemically tempered glass ply. This glass does not sha‰er on impact and only retains damage at the impact site. The interlayer adhesive system prevents the glass from spalling. Hard High Table 7.6. Material solutions. Repair Approaches Ease of Use Cost Easily procured replacements and easy maintenance, especially quick change-out of windows. Easy Low Flat windows are widely available, and can be changed relavely easily between window material systems. Easy Low Fixed windows are the most aracve from a maintenance standpoint. Easy Low Refurbishment of acrylic windows removed from service, ground, polished, and recoated at a refurbishment/repair facility. Medium Low Transom windows have been chosen as a compromise by many agencies for although they are more complex than fixed windows, they are less prone to failure than sliding windows. Medium Medium Window systems that allow very fast change-out (5 min or less is desirable). To achieve quick change-out, these window systems may require items such as dry seals on the outboard side of the window and a clamped interior frame, which is removed easily a‡er removal of a number of specialty head (e.g., Torx) quarter-turn fasteners. Medium Medium Curved window panes, while aesthecally pleasing, have a number of inherent disadvantages including limited availability. Hard High "Zero tolerance/no vehicle in service with graffi" standard. Hard High Sliding windows. Hard High Table 7.5. Repair approaches.

64 Policing and Security Practices for Small- and Medium-Sized Public Transit Systems Floors Restrooms Engine compartments Below seats Luggage compartments Exhaust system Operator’s area Lights Fuel tanks Steps Wheel wells Frame and underbody Table 7.7. Inspection points. information about how to inspect vehicles for security breaches. The guide recommends that operators perform sweeps during “pre- and post-trip inspections, layovers or when your bus has been unattended.” (See Table 7.7.) Inspection points include: Small- and medium-sized agencies should ensure at a minimum that trespassers cannot enter bus depots, garages, or other end-of-line bus storage facilities, maintenance and repair yards or other fleet layover locations. Chapter 2 of NCHRP Report 525, Volume 14: Security 101: A Physi- cal Security Primer for Transportation Agencies (Frazier et al. 2009), provides in-depth discus- sion of perimeter security countermeasures that can be utilized to protect buses in storage. The key concept discussed in the text is one of “layers of security,” which consists of the combined usage of supportive security measures such as CCTV, lighting, fencing, and alarm systems to form a virtually impenetrable security zone. (See Figure 7.4.) Spotlight on Juvenile Vandalism One of the difficulties associated with managing incidents of juvenile vandalism is the often random nature of the crime. To the transit agency, it may seem that the damage caused by vandals was the result of irrational unplanned acts com- mitted without a motive. Known as “malicious mischief,” this characteristic of randomness makes defending against incidents much more difficult because the timing, targeting, and occurrence of the vandalism cannot be easily predicted. Under such circumstances protective plans to secure critical assets and properties is the only solution. Transit agencies must identify what assets need protection and then establish a minimum acceptable security posture to defend against vandalism related losses. It is also worthwhile to note that sometimes although random in nature, juvenile vandalism can also be purposeful. For example, there have been occasions where juvenile offenders have entered school bus storage facilities and either deflated the tires on an entire fleet of school buses or slashed tires. The outcome of the vandalism was cancellation of school. Juvenile crime against property, in particu- lar graffiti, can also be committed for the purpose of gaining notoriety. Graffiti vandals are known to display their “identification” or paint over or deface the signature mark of another rival. As discussed in TCRP Research Results Digest 9 (TCRP 1996) the most successful method found to deter graffiti, etching, scrib- ing and other “moniker” markings or paintings is through taking a “zero toler- ance” approach. As it relates to rolling stock, zero tolerance means “no vehicle in service with graffiti.” By use of an integrated team of drivers, maintenance personnel, and security staff the agency combats the graffiti vandal’s desire for notoriety by immediately eradicating the graffiti. TCRP Research Results Digest 9 recommends a structured proactive approach that includes “anti-graffiti educa- tion, immediate reporting of problems, immediate response to problems, routine and random uniformed and undercover patrols, video surveillance, rewards and

Security Countermeasures 65 Figure 7.4. Layers of security (FTA Security Design Considerations, Rabkin et al. 2004). Of course not all vandalism is committed by juveniles. Infrequently, an angry or over zealous mob can band together at the same place and time to wreak destruction upon transit property. Similarly, there are incidents of targeted vandalism against fare boxes on board vehicles, dis- abling of fare collection machines, or damaging access control turnstiles so that they do not function. (In such cases, the likely motivation is either fare evasion or theft of revenues.) Other Transit Property As shown in the survey results below small- and medium-sized transit agencies own or operate minimal real property. Generally, the physical infrastructure of such agencies includes (1) one administrative building owned or leased; (2) one maintenance facility, rail yard or bus garage; and (3) less than 2 passengers terminals, owned or leased. (See Figure 7.5.) Buildings and Other Facilities As has been suggested throughout this text, small- and medium-sized transit agencies must specifically address the uniqueness in their operating environment when making security improvements. Buildings such as administrative offices, stations, warehouses, car shops, main- tenance facilities, plants and industrial areas, dispatch centers, and fuel depots all have the potential to demand specialized individual security countermeasures or solution sets. This is even more true when environmental and operational factors such as location of the asset, area crime rates, and hours of operation are taken into account. Of course the major influence on how building security is handled is based on functional purpose. For example, there is a significant difference between how public and nonpublic building security should be managed. bounties, truancy sweeps, documentation of incidents, interagency sharing of tag documentation and tagger files, prosecution of all vandals (treatment of van- dalism as a crime), punishment, including arrest and detainment as well as vandal and parental monetary fines and responsibility for damages, and immediate cleanup/repair of vandalism/damage (within 24 hours or less).”

66 Policing and Security Practices for Small- and Medium-Sized Public Transit Systems For nonpublic spaces, access control, perimeter security, intrusion detection systems, and other similar types of technology can be deployed to protect facilities from external losses. However, in transit buildings that are open to the public, during hours of operation, security personnel or possibly surveillance systems are the primary means of providing protection. Administrative Offices The federal government has spent substantial time and money to establish comprehensive building security standardization requirements and criteria to protect federal office space. The work began in earnest on April 20, 1995, 1 day after the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Build- ing in Oklahoma City, when the president directed the Department of Justice (DOJ) to assess the vulnerability of federal office buildings in the United States, particularly to acts of terrorism and other forms of violence. Within 2 months, DOJ completed the study and published its report, “Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities,” (DOJ 1995) containing “minimum security stan- dards” intended for use in all federally occupied facilities. The standards were based on DOJ security level criteria that basically considered occupancy, volume of public content, building size, and agency mission. See Table 7.8. The standards addressed 4 general areas of security and supplied a total of 52 minimum com- pliance requirements for countermeasures in: • Perimeter Security—Parking, Lighting, Physical Barriers. • Entry Security—Receiving/Shipping, Access Control, Entrances/Exits. • Interior Security—Employee/Visitor ID, Utilities, Occupant Emergency Plans. • Security Planning—Intelligence Sharing, Training, Admin Procedures. Summarizing the available standards and other building security guidelines suggests that the following potential areas of vulnerability should be reviewed for possible implementation of security countermeasures: Pedestrian Entranceways Vehicular Access and Circulation Parking Garages Public Toilets and Service Areas Refuge Collection Sites Loading Docks Shipping and Receiving Areas Stairwells A Bui Mainte (Rail Ter Inte dministrative ldings/Faciliti nance Facilit Yard and Bu Passenger minals/Statio rmodal Cente Critic 0.00 es ies s… ns rs al Assets: Ke 0.50 y Infrastructu 1.00 res Please in asset. 1.50 sert the num 2.00 ber of each t 2.50 ype of Figure 7.5. Critical assets: key infrastructures.

Security Countermeasures 67 Public Corridors Equipment and Maintenance Spaces Mailrooms Lobbies and Waiting Areas Roofs Water Supply Air Intakes Fuel Storage Areas Utility Feeds Elevators General Office Space Dining Facilities Retail Areas Computer Rooms In addition, the following systems or sub-systems should be considered for protective measures: Mechanical Engineering Electrical Ventilation Fire Protection Communications Emergency Power Structural Lighting Entry Control Physical Security Electronic Security Information Technology Command and Control For most small- or medium-sized transit systems a “Level 1” (10 employees, 2,500 sq ft, and low volume of public contact) or infrequently “Level 2” (11 to 150 Federal employees, 2,500 sq ft– 80,000 sq ft, moderate volume of public contact, routine operations similar to private sector and/ or facility shared with private sector) security posture would be sufficient. Table 7.9 depicts the minimum and desirable standards for Level 1 and Level 2 security for federally occupied facilities. However, note that there are often issues associated with ownership for security in leased spaces. If the transit agency is occupying leased space, security responsibility may lie with the Table 7.8. Security level and criteria (adapted from U.S. Department of Justice 1995). SECURITY LEVEL CRITERIA Level I 10 Federal employees 2,500 sq
Low volume of public contact Level II 11 to 150 Federal employees 2,500 sq
– 80,000 sq
Moderate volume of public contact Rou„ne opera„ons similar to private sector and/or facility shared with private sector Level III 151-450 Federal employees 80,000 – 150,000 sq
Moderate/high volume of public contact Contains agency mix such as: Law enforcement ops Court func„ons Government records Level IV More than 450 Federal employees Mul„-story facility More than 150,000 sq
High volume of public contact High-risk law enforcement intelligence agencies District courts Level V Level IV profile and agency/mission cri„cal to na„onal security Source: Adapted from DOJ 1995.

68 Policing and Security Practices for Small- and Medium-Sized Public Transit Systems Perimeter Security Level 1 Level 2 Parking ○ ○ Control of Facility Parking ○ ○ Control of Adjacent Parking ○ ○ Avoid Leases where Parking Cannot be Controlled ○ ○ Leases Should Provide Security Control for Adjacent Parking ○ ○ Post Signs and Arrange for Towing Unauthorized Vehicles ● ● ID System and Procedures for Authorized Parking (If Applicable) ○ ○ Adequate Ligh ng for Parking Areas ○ ○ Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Monitoring CCTV Surveillance Cameras with Time Lapse Video Recording ○ ● Post Signs Advising of 24 Hour Surveillance ○ ● Lighng Lighng with Emergency Power Backup ● ● Entry Security Level 1 Level 2 Receiving and Shipping Review Shipping and Receiving Procedures (Current) ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Implement Shipping and Receiving Procedures (Modified) ○ ○ Access Control Evaluate Facility for Security Guard Requirements o o Security Guard Patrol o o Intrusion Detecon System with Central Monitoring Capability o o Upgrade to Current Life Safety Standards (Fire Detecon, Fire Suppression Systems, Etc.) Entrances/Exits X-Ray & Magnetometer at Public Entrances N/A o Require X-Ray Screening of All Mail/Packages N/A o Peep Holes o o Intercom o o Entry Control w/CCTV and Door Strikes o o High-Security Locks Interior Security Level 1 Level 2 Employee/Visitor Idenficaon Agency Photo ID for All Personnel Displayed at All Times N/A o Visitor Control/Screening System o Visitor ID Accountability System N/A o Establish ID Issuing Authority o o Ulies Prevent Unauthorized Access to U
lity Areas o o Provide Emergency Power to Cri
cal Systems (Alarm Systems, Radio Communica
ons, Computer Facili
es, Etc.) Occupant Emergency Plans Examine Occupant Emergency Plans (OEPs) and Conngency Procedures Based on Threats OEPs in P lace, Updated Annually, Periodic Tesng Exercise Assign & Train OEP Officials (Assignment Based on Largest Tenant in Facility) Annual Tenant Training Daycare Centers Evaluate Whether to Locate Daycare Facilies in Buildings with High-Threat Acvies N/A Compare Feasibility of Locang Daycare in Facility’s Outside Locaons N/A Table 7.9. Standards for Level 1 and Level 2 security (adapted from DOJ 1995).

Security Countermeasures 69 building’s owner. In such circumstances, the transit agency should participate in decisions regarding the appropriate levels of security and also engage in contractual negotiations as needed to ensure that agency personnel and properties are adequately protected. Transit Stations The text Policing Transportation Facilities (DeGeneste and Sullivan 1994), was one of the first transit crime-specific studies to chronicle the types of crime and order issues specifically related to transit. Chapter 1 of the text, “Moving the Masses,” described transportation facilities as a vital link in the economic and social life of communities. Drug trafficking, terrorism, cargo theft, smuggling, organized crime, fear of crime, and the risk of hazardous cargo release were all identified as threats to public safety and order. Chapter 8 of the text, “Public Bus/Rail Terminal Crime,” dealt directly with the security issues associated with operating a public surface transportation facility. Crimes identified include theft, pickpocketing, fraud, prostitution, drug use and sales, passenger assaults, and robberies. Although focused more so toward larger intermodal facilities, the text also included references to the types of quasi-criminal disorder issues that often plague terminals regardless of size. Problems such as loitering, panhandling, runaways, truants, and homeless populations were identified as exacerbating criminal activity occurring at terminals. These lesser offenses and con- ditions were also recognized as contributing to the public’s perception of disorder or fear that is sometimes associated with a transit station. ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Security Planning Level 1 Level 2 Intelligence Sharing Establish Law Enforcement Agency/Security Liaisons Review/Establish Procedure for Intelligence Receipt/Disseminaon Establish Uniform Security/Threat Nomenclature Training Conduct Annual Security Awareness Training Establish Standardized Unarmed Guard Qualificaons/Training Requirements Establish Standardized Armed Guard Qualificaons/Training Requirements Tenant Assignment Co-Locate Agencies with Similar Security Needs o o Do Not Co-Locate High-/Low-Risk Agencies o o Administrave Procedures Establish Flexible Work Schedule in High-Threat/High-Risk Areas to Minimize Employee Vulnerability to Criminal Ac€vity o o Arrange for Employee Parking In/Near Building A‡er Normal Work Hours o o Conduct Background Security Checks and/or Establish Security Control Procedures for Service Contract Personnel Construcon/Renovaon Install Mylar Film on All Exterior Windows (Sha‰er Protec€on) o o Review Current Projects for Blast Standards Review/Establish Uniform Standards for Construc€on Review/Establish New Design Standard for Blast Resistance o o Establish Street Set-Back for New Construc€on o o Key ● Minimum Standard ○ Desirable Table 7.9. (Continued).

70 Policing and Security Practices for Small- and Medium-Sized Public Transit Systems The survey results shown below confirm that 20 years later these types of quasi-crime, offenses or disorder continue to have the highest and most adverse security impact on small- and medium-sized agencies (see Figure 7.6). While any occurrence of assault or robbery would instantly command the highest level of concern at such facilities, on a daily basis it is the disorder of a terminal that causes small- and medium-sized agencies the most problem in terms of opera- tions and public perception. Similarly, homeland security concerns regarding bomb threats or explosions, chemical or biological agents, or the use of WMDs are not at the forefront of security issues confronting small- and medium-sized agencies. Although one occurrence of a homeland security event would immediately change both this condition and perspective, for purposes of deciding upon the appropriate security posture for a small- or medium-sized terminal or station, it is the prevention or deterrence of disorder and low-level crime that should be given the greatest consideration. Fortunately, as borne out by the survey, less than 2% (3 out of 164 Figure 7.6. Criminal incidents—quality of life—location of incidents—station. Criminal Incidents - Quality-of-Life—Loca on of Incidents—Sta on Answer Op ons Response Percent Response Count Disorderly Persons 36.2% 63 Homeless/Vagrancy 33.3% 58 Drunkenness/Liquor Law Violaons 30.5% 53 Smoking/Eang/Liering 27.6% 48 Loud Music 11.5% 20 Graffi/Vandalism 31.6% 55 N/A 52.9% 92 answered queson 174 skipped queson 6 0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% D is or de rly P er so ns H om el es s/ V ag ra nc y D ru nk en ne ss /L iq uo r la w vi ol at io ns S m ok in g/ E at in g/ Li tte rin g Lo ud m us ic G ra ffi ti/ V an da lis m N /A

Security Countermeasures 71 respondents), reported experiencing a bomb threat or other homeland security-related threat against transit properties in the previous year. Spotlight on Homeless Programs Homelessness is not a crime, but with large numbers of the homeless population finding shelter and sleeping in transportation facilities across the country, it is a problem—a problem that’s been around for decades, analyzed, written about, and confronted in many ways, but with little success. Transit facilities are fre- quently used by those seeking shelter. Many of these individuals suffer from serious health concerns, such as alcoholism, drug addiction, or mental illness and their presence can compromise the transportation facilities’ ability to provide safe and efficient service to the public. The availability of social services offering shelter and food has not resolved the problem, as the homeless continue to re- sist using these services out of fear, shame, and as some think, pride, leaving the transportation facility to find a solution to dealing with this indigent population by working to bring them to the services they need or force them out into the street. To answer the problem, programs have been developed such as “Wheels to Work.” A Sacramento, CA-based program, “Wheels to Work” offers the home- less transportation, employment search services, health resources, and training about how to use public transit. Similarly, in their effort to move the population from their facilities into services that can provide the help they need, San Luis Obispo Transit partnered with other organizations to build a new homeless shel- ter, an effort that has taken years and encountered resistance in the community, but one that is nearing completion. Also in California, BART, the Bay Area Rapid Transit System, has put in place Crisis Intervention Training for police and com- munity service people. BART created a new position to manage the homeless issue, not a police position but a “Crisis Intervention Training Coordinator and Community Outreach Liaison” position. The core security issue that planners must decide upon in establishing a protective environment for the occupants, passengers, employees, retail, and premises of a transit station is whether an “enforcement-only” level of security is appropriate. If the occurrence of crime and/or disorder is rare or infrequent, the best approach may be to establish collaboration with local authorities and first responders who have enforcement responsibility for the facility. However, where incidents of either crime or disorder are prevalent, the transit agency should consider the deployment of proactive security forces or, as an alternative, real-time live-action CCTV surveillance systems. Answering this question will require significant interaction with local law enforcement authori- ties to establish the level of protection and response to security incidents that can be expected. Agencies should consider the following questions: • Is there a need for a part-time or full-time security presence? • Should the security force be proprietary or contracted? • Should the security force be armed? • Does the security force need arrest powers? Because of the costs associated with personnel, where other types of countermeasures will suf- fice, such as training existing personnel to perform security functions, placement of alarm sys- tems, using access controls, or deploying surveillance cameras, serious consideration should be

72 Policing and Security Practices for Small- and Medium-Sized Public Transit Systems given for opting for one of these types of solutions. As mentioned in Chapter 6, typically small- and medium-sized agencies depend exclusively upon local law enforcement random patrol for security support. See Table 7.10. Surveillance system deployments can also be somewhat costly, particularly those systems that have the capability of real-time live-action monitoring. However, there is a significant increase in the use of surveillance systems underway in transit, indeed in all transportation. From a transit standpoint, CCTV systems are currently being deployed in stations, on board conveyances— buses, light rail and commuter trains, on trolleys, ferries, and even on paratransit vehicles. The positive aspects of such systems extend beyond support of security efforts. (See Figure 7.7.) APTA SS-SIS-RP-002-08, Final Version 8/26/08, Recommended Practice for CCTV Camera Coverage and Field of View Criteria for Passenger Facilities (APTA 2008) provides criteria for CCTV camera coverage and fields of view at transit passenger facilities. The RP states, “CCTV cameras are placed in such a manner as to observe and monitor certain locations to aid in Security Countermeasures CCTV: Is Video Surveillance Used on Your Property? Answer Op
ons Response Percent Response Count Yes 66.5% 109 No 33.5% 55 answered queson 164 skipped queson 16 Yes No Figure 7.7. Security countermeasures CCTV: Is video surveillance used on your property? SECURITY PERSONNEL SMALL MEDIUM Local Police Random Patrol 95% 77% Contracted Security and Dedicated Local Police Patrol 1% 30% Off-Duty Police Part-Time >1% 9% Table 7.10. Security personnel.

Security Countermeasures 73 Entrances/exits The CCTV cameras should be placed to view pedestrian and vehicular entrances and exits. There may be mulple entrances and exits that may require camera view at each locaon. Consideraon should be given to bidireconal flow. Ticket sales, cket vending machines and turnsles, gates, staon-agent kiosks, booths The cameras should provide a recognizable image of the person(s) involved in the transacon/interacon. Elevator Each elevator cab should have a camera mounted in the cab, with the intent to obtain full coverage and field of view of the cab interior and entrance to monitor passenger acvity. Pla‚orms and pla‚orm edges Cameras should provide coverage and field of view of the enre length and width of the pla‚orm and pla‚orm edge to monitor passenger acvity. Pedestrian passageways/concourses Cameras should provide coverage and field of view of the entrances, exits, and the enre length of the passageway, including stairways, ramps, elevator lobbies, and escalators to monitor passenger acvity. Access locaons to nonpublic areas (ancillary areas) Cameras should provide coverage and field of view to monitor nonpublic entrances/exits, including temporary revenue vehicle storage areas. Restricted area entrances Cameras should provide coverage and field of view to monitor and idenfy entrances and access points to restricted rights-of-way (e.g., tunnel portals from staon areas or elevated structures). Concession areas Cameras should provide coverage and field of view to monitor concession areas. Other locaons to be considered Cameras should provide coverage of other locaons idenfied as warranng security monitoring through the systemwide and asset- specific security risk assessments. Other CCTV resources Coverage and field of view from other exisng and planned camera networks such as state (e.g., department of transportaon), local (e.g., city or county transportaon departments), joint-use facility security systems, local private businesses and media also should be considered. Table 7.11. Location monitoring. maintaining safe and secure transit environments for people, operations and critical infrastruc- ture.” Table 7.11 details the recommended monitoring locations. A second RP from the recommended practice program, APTA IT-CCTV-RP-001-11 pub- lished June 2011, Selection of Cameras, Digital Recording Systems, Digital High-Speed Networks and Trainlines for Use in Transit-Related CCTV Systems (APTA 2011) provides definitive infor- mation about the types of cameras, recording systems, transmission systems and trainlines that are relevant to transit placement of surveillance systems. It is recommended that transit agency personnel who are considering the utilization of CCTV surveillance systems consult the APTA RP for additional guidance. There are essentially 2 types of surveillance systems available today, those that are basic in design and those that are supported by smart technology. The tradeoff between the 2 is that basic systems that are required to perform real-time monitoring specifica- tions require multiple monitoring screens and stations and additional personnel, while smart systems can be designed and taught to detect events, isolate coverage, and notify personnel of security-related issues. Smart systems can also cause an increase in transmission costs.