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Section 2. Annotated Bibliography Section 2 provides an annotated list of the references reviewed for the preparation of this final report. The references are categorized into five groups: general citations on agroterrorism and foreign animal diseases; case studies; simulations, training exercises and preparedness reports; federal and state response plans; and articles on emergency traffic control. Many of the references were gathered from state and federal websites, where response plans and reports are made publicly available, and URLs are included where this is the case. In addition to the documents listed in this section, many websites were reviewed. 2.1 General Sources on Agroterrorism and Foreign Animal Disease This section contains articles and reports related to agroterrorism awareness and preparedness, as well as references regarding foreign animal diseases. The literature summarized here will help the reader gain a general understanding of foreign animal diseases, the risk of infection and spread in the United States, and the general procedures in place for preventing introduction and spread of such diseases, as well as what further efforts should be made in this area. Homeland Security: Much is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05214.pdf This document examines the federal agenciesâ roles and responsibilities to protect against agroterrorism, the steps taken by the agencies to manage the risks of an agroterrorism event, and the challenges that remain. It finds that the USDA and other agencies are coordinating development of plans and protocols to better manage the national response to agroterrorism and have conducted exercises to test the protocols and response capabilities. Vulnerability assessments of agriculture infrastructure have been conducted, and a network of testing laboratories has been established. It also finds management problems that inhibit the effectiveness of efforts to protect against terrorism. Knowles, T., J. Lane, G. Bayens, N. Speer, J. Jaax, D. Carter, and A. Bannister. Defining Law Enforcementâs Role in Protecting American Agriculture from Agroterrorism. U.S. National Institute of Justice. 30 June 2005. http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/212280.pdf The National Institute of Justice authorized the study to determine the role of law enforcement in protecting against agroterrorism. The research points to an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) as the greatest threat to the United Statesâ agricultural economy, with catastrophic consequences including full-scale quarantines, depopulation 5
of millions of animals, stop movement orders and economic chaos. Focus groups, simulation exercises, field surveys, and interviews were used to gain input from stakeholders including law enforcement, livestock producers, meat packers, truckers, feedlot managers, and animal health officials. The research found that law enforcement would be required to remain on-site for two months or more to enforce quarantines and stop-movement orders, and that their focus should be on preventative strategies such as identifying threats, assessing vulnerability, developing partnerships, establishing a criminal intelligence network and developing community policing programs for agriculture. The report concluded that law enforcement does not have sufficient resources to respond to an FMD outbreak and that agencies have not been proactive in recognizing agroterrorism as a serious threat. Eight recommendations are presented to help strengthen Americaâs defense against threats of agroterrorism. Monke, J. Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness. Congressional Record Service Report for Congress. Order Code RL32521. 13 August 2004. http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32521.pdf This report provides a brief history and description of agroterrorism and then discusses the actions taken by the federal government to recognize and address its potential threat, including congressional hearings, presidential directives, and federal funding. The report summarizes federal strategies at deterrence, detection, and response. âResponding to the Threat of Agroterrorism: Specific Recommendations for the United States Department of Agriculture.â BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000-29, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP-2000-04, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, October 2000. http://ianrhome.unl.edu/inthenews/resources/bcsia_recommendations.pdf This paper provides a history of the research and use of biological weapons on agricultural targets, then discusses the feasibility of and motivations for an agroterrorist attack. The author provides a brief description of the biology of several plant and animal diseases, as well as their means of transmission. Existing prevention and response strategies at the national level are presented and recommendations to improve them are provided. Buhman, M., G. Dewell, and D. Griffin. Biosecurity Basics for Cattle Operations and Good Management Practices (GMP) for Controlling Infectious Diseases. NebGuide. Published by University of Nebraska-Lincoln Extension, Institute of Agriculture and Natural Resources http://www.ianrpubs.unl.edu/epublic/pages/publicationD.jsp?publicationId=433 This guide introduces biosecurity strategies to cattle producers and provides recommendations for preventing or containing infections disease. 6
Chesser, A. et. al. Preparedness Needs Assessment in a Rural State: Themes Derived from Public Focus Groups. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science. Vol. 4, No. 4, 2006. Focus group participants in rural and urban Kansas discuss their awareness of and trust in emergency response plans. The research finds that people trust information sources closest to them and that receiving information from a trusted source eases stress and increases compliance with government orders, such as quarantines. Foreign Animal Diseases, âThe Gray Book.â United States Animal Health Association. Sixth Edition. 1998. This document serves as a reference manual for identifying, treating, and containing foreign animal diseases for veterinarians. 2.2 Case Studies This section provides annotations of articles and reports related to specific incidents of foreign animal and plant disease outbreaks. Included are the foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2003, the 1993 FMD outbreak in Italy, exotic Newcastle disease (END) in California in 2002, soybean rust across several states in 2006, and citrus canker in Florida in 2000. While the references provide information on the extent of the quarantine and, in the case of the plant diseases, the restrictions associated with moving plant material out of the quarantine zone, none of the case studies provided information specific to traffic control. Maragon, S. and E. Fachin. The 1993 Italian Foot-and-mouth Disease Epidemic: Epidemiological Features of the Four Outbreaks Identified in Verona Province, The Veterinary Record, Vol. 135, July 1994, 53-57 FMD was introduced into southern Italy in 1993 by infected cattle imported from Eastern Europe. A protection zone of 3 km and a surveillance zone of 10 km were initially instituted. After the fourth outbreak, a protection zone of 5 km was requested. The following measures were applied in the protection zone: ⢠Several fixed points were organized for the disinfection of feedstuff trucks and other vehicles. All vehicles visiting farms had to be disinfected before and after each visit. ⢠Police check points were instituted to avoid uncontrolled movement of animals and vehicles. ⢠The main highway crossing the surveillance zone was closed to trucks carrying cloven-hoofed animals. 7
Hawkins L., and L. Rico. News Release: CDFA Release #02-076 The reporters have indicated that the early symptoms of Exotic Newcastle Disease (END) were identified in commercial egg-laying facilities in San Bernardino Country, California and reported to practicing veterinarians. The confirmation of the disease was made by the California Animal Health and Food Safety Laboratory in San Bernardino. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Exotic Newcastle Disease; Designation of Quarantined Area Federal Register: November 26, 2002 Volume 67, Number 228 Rules and Regulations Page 70674-70675 On October 1, 2002, END was confirmed in the State of California. The State of California and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service from the Department of Agriculture have begun an intensive END eradication program in the quarantined area in Los Angeles, Riverside, and San Bernardino Counties. The State of California has taken action to restrict the intrastate movement of birds, poultry, products, and materials that could spread END from the quarantined area. Accordingly, to prevent the spread of END into other States, the Department of Agriculture has announced restricted interstate areas. The quarantined areas were continually modified based on the progression of the disease. Many freeways were designated as boundaries of quarantined areas. Department of Agriculture Office of the Secretary Declaration of Extraordinary Emergency Because of Exotic Newcastle Disease Docket No. 03-001-1 The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has reviewed the measures being taken by California to control and eradicate END and has consulted with the appropriate State Government and Indian tribal officials in California. Based on such review and consultation, the USDA has determined that the measures being taken by the State are inadequate to control or eradicate END. Therefore, the USDA has determined that an extraordinary emergency exists because of END in California. DEFRA (Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs-UK) Exotic Animal Disease Generic Contingency Plan, Part II Food and Mouth Disease December 2005 FMD 6-39 This plan provides policy guidance for a foot-and-mouth disease response, establishing a 3 km protection zone and a 10 km surveillance zone around the infected premises. In both zones, requirements will include increased levels of biosecurity on farms, as well as cleansing and disinfection of vehicles, people, and machinery moving on and off farms. A person moving from a premise where infection was present could transmit infective material on their skin, hair, clothes, or footwear. Vehicles could carry infection 8
from a premise where infection was present to other premises where susceptible livestock are present. Such vehicles could include: ⢠Livestock transports ⢠Vehicles moving between livestock under the same ownership ⢠Vehicles collecting agricultural products (e.g. milk, wool) ⢠Vehicles delivering agricultural products (e.g. feed, fertilizer, fuel) ⢠Vehicles delivering nonagricultural products (post) ⢠Vehicle transporting persons for working on the premises. Checkoff Helps Keep Tabs on Rust. Delta Farms Press. 8 Feb 2007. http://deltafarmpress.com/soybeans/070208-rust-checkoff/ The article discusses the use of sentinel plots to track the spread of soybean rust, and describes the spread of the disease across the United States in 2006. Sentinel plots are soybean fields that are frequently scouted for early detection of soybean rust. Chamberlain, H. L., P. D. Roberts, L. W. Timmer, K. Chung, and M. Zekri. Crop Alert: A Citrus Canker Fact Sheet for Homeowners. Document PP194, Florida Cooperative Extension Service, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, University of Florida. Original Publication Date: September 2001. Reviewed: June 2003. http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/PP/PP11600.pdf This document provides pictures and descriptions of citrus canker and informs homeowners of Floridaâs eradication strategy. It discusses regulations and penalties regarding the shipment and transport of plant material within quarantine areas. 2.3 Simulations, Training Exercises, and Preparedness Reports The references in this section include three reports that use models to predict the spread and impacts of a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak. In one of these reports, the model was used to determine the value of Californiaâs surveillance programs and procedures for dealing with an outbreak. Also included is an after action report for a table top exercise simulating an FMD event in Kansas. Two reports discussing the role of law enforcement in quarantines and public health emergencies are included here as well. These reports focus on planning and partnerships and do not discuss traffic control in detail. Ekboir, J. M. Potential Impact of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in California: The role and contribution of animal health surveillance and monitoring services. Agricultural Issues Center, Division of Agriculture and Natural Resources, University of California, 1999. http://aic.ucdavis.edu/pub/fmd.html 9
The research modeled the potential epidemiological and economic impacts of an FMD outbreak in Californiaâs South Valley to estimate the value of animal health monitoring and surveillance programs designed to minimize losses, to analyze Californiaâs procedures for dealing with a foreign animal disease, and to develop a methodology for evaluating alternative strategies for dealing with an outbreak. The author concluded that the value of public animal health services is high provided that sufficient resources are available to implement an effective early response to the outbreak. Moutou, F., and B. Durand. Modeling the Spread of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Virus, Vet. Res., Vol. 25, 1994, 279-285 Moutou and Durand analyzed airborne diffusion of FMD with a predictive model that links epidemiological data associated with viral particle excretion and meteorological data to the few days before the slaughter of animals. The model computed the expected quantity of viral particles that could be found in a 10 km radius around the outbreak in every direction, and that originated on the breath of a sensitive animal. The model was used to define a risk area, according to the number and size of farms in the surroundings. Sanson, R. L., and R. S. Morris. The Use of Survival Analysis to Investigate the Probability of Local Spread of Foot-and-Mouth Disease: An Example Study Based on the United Kingdom Epidemic of 1967-1968, The Kenya Veterinarian, Vol. 18 No. 2, 1994, 186-188 The authors used survival analysis to estimate the probability of a farm contracting FMD due to local and windborne spread, where the independent factor is distance from a source infected farm. Historical data from the FMD epidemic of 1967-1968 in the UK were used to estimate diffusion probabilities, with the data set restricted to those farms in which the most likely reason for infection was recorded as local or windborne spread. Their findings showed that the probability of FMD infection in the period covering one day prior to the appearance of clinical signs to 2 days after the signs appeared was 0.13 for farms within a 3 Km radius from the source and 0.015 for farms within 3 and 5 Km from the source. High Plains Guardian: Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, Tabletop Exercise After Action Report. National Agricultural Biosecurity Center, Kansas State University. July 2004. This exercise simulated a Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak and was designed to evaluate the role of the Kansas National Guard and Department of Defense personnel in assisting civil authorities in a FMD event, and to assist emergency managers with refining the stateâs foreign animal disease emergency plan. The following findings were reported at the conclusion of the exercise: ⢠State and federal interests will not always coincide during an outbreak. 10
⢠Response to a widespread FAD outbreak will require unique and unconventional partnerships with the private sector. ⢠A successful stop-movement effort will require the cooperation of both neighboring states and affected general populations. ⢠States would benefit from improved resource-modeling capabilities. ⢠Quarantine of affected premises and related activities will quickly exhaust limited state and regional resources. ⢠State emergency responders may lack adequate vehicles and equipment essential for a timely FAD response. ⢠Time required for transportation of samples may delay response. ⢠Department of Defense and Kansas National Guard and civil authorities lack adequate institutional linkages for supporting a coordinated response to a FAD event. Friend, C. âQuarantines: The Law Enforcement Role.â International Association of Chiefs of Police/National Law Enforcement Policy Center. Policy Review. Vol. 17 No. 2. Summer/Fall 2005. http://www.theiacp.org/pubinfo/PRNewsltrVol17No2.pdf This article discusses the role of law enforcement in quarantine enforcement, and acknowledges that as the risk of bioterrorism, new diseases such as the avian flu, and public health emergencies created by natural disasters increase, the possibility of a major quarantine scenario in the United States becomes more likely. While the military and state and federal response agencies will likely play a major role in managing broad quarantines, state and local law enforcement will be critical in the early stages of the emergency. Large quarantines are outside the expertise of most local law enforcement agencies, and resources to manage and enforce them are scarce at this level. Careful planning, preparation and training will be required to equip local law enforcement agencies for carrying out quarantine measures. Richards, E. P., K. C. Rathbun, C. S. Brito, and A. Luna. Role of Law Enforcement in Public Health Emergencies: Special Considerations for an All-hazards Approach. U.S. Department of Justice. NCJ 214333. September 2006. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pdf/role_law_enforce.pdf Public health emergencies pose special challenges for law enforcement, whether the threat is manmade (e.g., the anthrax terrorist attacks) or naturally occurring (e.g., flu pandemics). Policing strategies will vary depending on the cause and level of the threat, as will the potential risk to the responding officers. In a public health emergency, law enforcement will need to quickly coordinate its response with public health and medical officials, many of whom they may not have worked with previously. An agencyâs ability to respond effectively to any emergencyâpublic health or otherwiseâgreatly depends on its preparedness, and this is directly linked to the law enforcement agencyâs planning and its partnerships. Depending on the threat, law enforcementâs role may include 11
enforcing public health orders (e.g., quarantines or travel restrictions), securing the perimeter of contaminated areas, securing health care facilities, controlling crowds, and investigating scenes of suspected biological terrorism. This document outlines key concerns that law enforcement officials must address in preparation for a virus-caused pandemic and other public health emergencies and identifies issues that may arise in the departmentâs âall-hazardsâ approach. 2.4 Federal and State Response Plans DEFRA (Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs-UK) Exotic Animal Disease Generic Contingency Plan, Generic Annex I December 2005 154-156 This plan describes how the Department for Transport (DFT) will provide robust support to DEFRA, associated agencies and stakeholders by responding to demands for information on transport related issues in the case of an exotic animal disease. The DFT will provide practical advice and guidance and facilitate contact with the transport industry where necessary. The police will assist wherever possible in: ⢠Enforcement of surveillance Zones and movement controls ⢠Stopping and checking vehicles transporting animals Local authorities are responsible for erecting road signs for publicizing the protection and surveillance zones around a premise where foot and mouth disease has been confirmed. Signs are required on all roads at the boundaries of the protection and surveillance zones. USDA APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine Emergency Programs Manual. 2nd Edition. Feb 2002. http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ppq/manuals/emergency/pdf_files/EPM.pdf The Emergency Programs Manual serves as a guide for Project Directors, Rapid Response Team members, Regional Program Managers, PPQ Surveillance and Emergency Programs and Coordination Staff, and other to plan, conduct, and monitor successful eradication projects against introduced plant pests. USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine Strategic Plan FY 2005-2009 http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ppq/strategic-plan.html The strategic plan addresses emerging concerns with exotic plant pests and the increasing threat of foreign plant diseases and pests due to globalization. 12
U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Plant Protection and Quarantine Incident Command System Guidelines (DRAFT). March 26, 2004. http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ppq/ep/ics/docs/drafticsguidelines.pdf The Plant Protection and Quarantine Incident Command System (PPQ-ICS) guidelines have been developed by the PPQ staff at all levels of government. PPQ-ICS provides an operational framework for confronting plant health emergencies, and provides a general description of the overall organizational structure of the ICS. In addition, the guidelines integrate PPQâs best practices in dealing with emergencies with a comprehensive ICS framework to maximize our efficiency and effectiveness in responding to agricultural emergencies. Volume Two: Homeland Security, A Governorâs Guide to Emergency Management. National Governors Association Center for Best Practices. 2002. http://www.nga.org/cda/files/GOVSGUIDEHS2.pdf Chapter 6 of this document deals directly with incidents of agroterrorism. It addresses the need for consideration of the movement of people and commerce, especially since many agents are zoonotics (communicable between animals and people). In the United Kingdom, tourism in rural areas had to be restricted severely through traffic blockades and, in some cases, tourists themselves had to be quarantined or decontaminated. Not only do populations have to be controlled in these events, but access to hospitals, airports, industry, military bases, and other key sites must also be accommodated. Other chapters of the report deal with communication among agencies and jurisdictions, defining authority and chain of command, and creating preparedness plans. Kansas County Foreign Animal Disease Annex (Provided by Kansas Animal Health Department) This is a template document provided by the State of Kansas to individual counties to assist in the development of a Foreign Animal Disease Annex to include with their existing emergency operations plan (EOP). The purpose of the Annex is to ensure the countyâs EOP includes all necessary policies and provisions for adequate response to an actual or impending foreign animal disease (FAD) outbreak. The template helps counties identify existing agreements and memoranda of understanding among responding agencies, whether county, state, federal, professional, or voluntary. It also lays out the roles and responsibilities of all responding agencies. Kansas Country Foreign Animal Disease Standard Operating Guidelines (Provided by Kansas Animal Health Department) This document is a template of a Standard Operating Guideline (SOG) provided by the State of Kansas to the individual counties, that provides guidance for local government officials to address organizational structures, authorities, roles, and 13
responsibilities related to emergency actions required to respond to a livestock health threat. The template can be modified to fit the individual county and includes actions for coordinating all available federal, state, local, and non-governmental resources and is intended to be a stand-alone plan for application to any FAD incident â from small, localized outbreaks to multi-state and federally declared disasters. Kansas Department of Agriculture Plant Resource Biosecurity Response Guidelines. Kansas Department of Agriculture, Plant Protection, and Weed Program. 10 March 2004. (Provided by Kansas Department of Agriculture) This document serves as a guide when a new plant pest is detected in Kansas. It incorporates many components of the traditional approach to plant pest control, but includes an additional dimension by addressing the potential of intentional introductions of plant pest by persons wishing to cause harm to Kansas plant resources. The plan outlines an effective rapid response, including detection, identification, and mitigation activities. It also fosters communication between local, regional, state, and federal government agencies, as well as academia and industry professionals. Missouri SEMA Emergency Response Operations Plan (Provided by Missouri Department of Agriculture to the Research TeamâNot publicly available.) The purpose of this State Emergency Operations Plan (SEOP) is to direct the actions of state departments and agencies in the event of an incident requiring a response of unusual proportions. This Basic Plan provides a framework for emergency management activities in the State of Missouri. It outlines responsibilities of Missouri government officials, state agencies, and private organizations that the annexes specify in more detail. The document includes 23 functional annexes, including Annex WâAnimal Emergency Disaster. Missouri Department of Agriculture Animal Health Emergency Response and Recovery Plan (Provided by Missouri Department of Agriculture to the Research TeamâNot publicly available.) This document focuses on response to a large-scale animal health emergency beyond any single agencyâs capabilities. It coordinates response activities of the Missouri Department of Agriculture (MDA) with those of the USDA and other federal and local response organizations, while assuming that Missouriâs initial response will be independent of the federal government. MDAâs response plan is augmented by Missouriâs SEMA Emergency Response Operations Plan. North Carolina Emergency Operation Plan, Appendix 4 to Annex B, Foreign Animal Disease Operations Plan. Sept 2005. (pg B-4-1 to B-4-F-4; 361-402) http://www.dem.dcc.state.nc.us/NCEOP/NCEOP-Public-Sep2005.pdf This operations plan supports the North Carolina Emergency Operations Plan (NCEOP) and outlines actions and procedures taken by the State Emergency Operations 14
Center (EOC), the State Emergency Response Team (SERT), and the State Animal Response Team (SART) when a FAD threatens susceptible animals in North Carolina. North Carolina will seek the assistance of and cooperate with the USDA on a local and national level in accordance with their FAD Plan. Nebraska Emergency Management Agency State Emergency Operations Plan Emergency Support Function 11âAgriculture and Natural Resources http://www.nema.ne.gov/content/operations/ESF11.pdf The purpose of ESF 11 is to provide for interstate and interagency coordination during an emergency, ensure coordinated communications between state and federal agencies and the public, and establish policy and procedures for incident response. Foreign Animal Disease Emergency Response Executive Overview, California Department of Food and Agriculture. Revised January 2006. http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/ahfss/ah/pdfs/Overview_FAD_Response_1.pdf The purpose of this document is to outline consideration related to a FAD response for executive managers, emergency operation center (EOC) personnel, and responders. Effective eradication of large FAD outbreaks will require coordination of not only the critical veterinarian response, but of the many expected missions in support of those specialized activities. This document focuses on response to a large-scale FAD outbreak beyond any single agencyâs capabilities. While the California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA) and USDA have the infrastructure to address most FAD outbreaks, CFDA does not have the ability to support personnel, redirect or obtain resources, or meet the financial requirements potentially associated with large or rapidly spreading outbreaks. Californiaâs statewide emergency response system will augment this plan. California Response to Foreign Animal Disease: A Multi-Agency, Statewide Plan for Response. California Department of Food and Agriculture and Governorâs Office of Emergency Services. April 2001. http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/ahfss/ah/pdfs/Ca_Response_to_FAD.pdf The purpose of this document is to outline considerations related to a FAD response for executive managers, emergency operation center (EOC) personnel, and responders. The California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) have developed infrastructure to efficiently address most FAD outbreaks. This document, however, focuses on response to a large-scale FAD outbreak beyond any single agency capabilities. CDFA does not have the ability to support personnel, redirect or obtain resources, or meet the financial requirements potentially associated with large or rapidly spreading outbreaks. California has planned to augment CDFAâs capability with the proven statewide emergency response system. This document is intended to coordinate with rather than direct the USDA or other federal response organizations that are expected to cooperate with state and local response efforts. Though CDFA and the USDA enjoy similar roles and a cooperative relationship, 15
this document intentionally assumes an initial California response independent of the federal government. Indiana Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan. September 2003. http://www.in.gov/dhs/emerg_mgt/cemp.pdf The Indiana State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan establishes the basis for providing state assistance to local governments impacted by a disaster or emergency requiring state and possibly federal assistance. The Plan assumes that a disaster or emergency overwhelms the capability of local governments and covers all four phases of emergency management: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. The Plan is in a checklist format that requires all state agencies to develop and implement Standard Operating Procedures and Guides. It uses the Federal Emergency Management Agencyâs Emergency Support Functions concept, and includes a section on animal health. Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, Division of Agriculture Animal Disease Plan http://www.dem.ri.gov/topics/erp/6_9.pdf This document provides a plan for a cooperative emergency response to highly contagious and zoonotic animal diseases in the State of Rhode Island. The goal of this emergency response plan is to detect, control, and eradicate a highly contagious disease or zoonotic disease of animals as quickly as possible and return Rhode Island and the United States to a disease free status. A presumptive positive case will generate immediate, appropriate local and national measures to accurately diagnose the disease and minimize any potential spread of infection. A confirmed positive case will generate additional measures on a regional, national, and international scale. The implementation of control and eradication protocols will be dependent on the epidemiology of the outbreak and state or federal regulations. Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Operating Plan for Foreign Animal Disease. http://www.avma.org/disaster/state_resources/va_operating_plan_fad.pdf This brief document provides an illustrative and written flow chart of events in a foreign animal disease response in the state of Virginia. Oregon Animal Disease Emergency Plan. Oregon Department of Agriculture Animal Health and Identification Division. http://www.oregon.gov/ODA/AHID/oadem_plan.shtml#Edits The Oregon Department of Agriculture (ODA) is the primary state agency with statutory authority pertaining to animal and animal industry issues. ODA is responsible for, but not limited to, coordinating disease control procedures, disposition of abandoned, disabled, or dead animals, and agroterrorism. This plan recognizes certain catastrophic events related to animals, animal and production agriculture as events requiring activation 16
of the state emergency operations plan. This plan supports the control efforts of public health agencies in controlling zoonotic diseases and law enforcement in acts of terrorism where animal agriculture is the vehicle for dissemination of a chemical or biologic agent. The purpose of the Oregon Animal Disease Emergency Management Plan (OADEMP) is consistent with the National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) with the overall intention of protecting the agricultural resources by providing a guide for a rapid and coordinated response to a FAD or other disaster. This plan coordinates the application of local, state, federal, tribal, and volunteer resources in mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery efforts to assist domestic animals and animal agriculture in a livestock/poultry animal health emergency to provide for a seamless integration of county, state, and federal response. Wildlife disease emergency response is described in the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife emergency response plan. This plan identifies the roles and responsibilities of the OADEMP participants to protect the public health and the agricultural industry of Oregon. Ohio Emergency Operations Plan, Animal Disease Incident Plan. Ohio Emergency Management Agency. http://www.ema.ohio.gov/Ohio_EOP/s_p_Animal_Disease_Incident_Plan.pdf The Animal Disease Incident Annex addresses emergency management responsibilities for state-level organizations in the event of an animal disease outbreak that requires actions that are beyond the capabilities of the Ohio Department of Agriculture and may require a declaration of emergency by the governor. The primary goal is to coordinate state and federal efforts to prevent, stop and eliminate the spread of animal disease and minimize the human and economic impact of the disease. USDA â APHIS and Vermont Cooperative Emergency Response Plan for a Highly Contagious Animal Disease. State of Vermont Emergency Operations Plan, Appendix 3E. 30 April 2005. http://www.dps.state.vt.us/vem/eop/appendix_3e_highlycontagiousdisease.doc The goal of this emergency response plan is to detect, control, and eradicate a highly contagious disease as quickly as possible to return Vermont and the United States to disease-free status. The plan provides guidance for a response to a highly contagious animal disease in Vermont and includes a concept of operations, movement control guidelines, and foot-and-mouth disease operational guidelines. 17
State of Texas Foreign and Emerging Animal Diseases (FEAD) Response Plan, Appendix 3 to Annex O. http://www.tahc.state.tx.us/emergency/State_FEAD_Plan_8-23-04.pdf The purpose of this plan is to provide guidance for mitigating against, preparing for, identifying and responding to, and recovering from any highly contagious animal disease affecting Texas livestock and wildlife. Emergency Animal Disease and/or Animals in Disaster (Wisconsin) http://www.astswmo.org/Working%20Folder%20with%20Publications%20- %20Sept.%2026%202005/SW%20Foot%20Mouth%20Web%20Page/Wisconsin/FMDis asterinWI.doc The purpose of this document is to coordinate the initial as well as ongoing response of state and federal agencies and private organizations and entities in response to and recovery from an outbreak of an emergency animal disease or disaster (EAD/D). In as much as some EAD's are zoonotic, this coordination may also involve the identification and control of diseases of public health significance. Issues of major concern in preparedness and response to an EAD outbreak or disaster include: prevention of introduction, disease surveillance, rapid identification, initiation of steps to reduce the further spread of the disease, and disposal of infected, exposed, and dead animals during an outbreak, and provide for adequate housing and care of animals displaced during a disaster. 2.5 Articles on Traffic Control During Emergencies The literature specifically relevant to traffic control is included here. While not all of the articles are specific to quarantine and isolation, the principles discussed may prove to be transferable to quarantine-related traffic control. Topics include traffic control for incident management, sobriety check-points in low-staffing situations (very relevant to rural counties), and emergency alternate routes. Also included is Nebraskaâs traffic control monograph to be used in the event of a foreign animal disease outbreak, and a discussion of the Incident Command Structure specific to transportation professionals. Nebraska Department of Agriculture. Agricultural Response Monograph No. 1: Traffic Control http://www.agr.state.ne.us/homeland/monograph_001.doc The monograph provides functional guidance about the establishment, operation, and maintenance of traffic-control points associated with a contagious animal disease outbreak resulting in animal quarantine. It serves as a template for local emergency management officials to develop an operational plan for traffic control. 18
Simplified Guide to the Incident Command Structure for Transportation Professionals http://www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/ics_guide/index.htm This document, published by the US Department of Transportation, presents the Incident Command Structure (ICS) as part of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to stakeholders responsible for managing and clearing incidents on the highway system. It is also used as a means to provide health and safety officials already familiar with the ICS with an understanding of how it applies to transportation agencies. Model Procedures Guide for Highway Incidents. First Edition (Draft Version 8) Prepared by the National Fire Service Incident Management System Consortium Model Procedures Committee. Fire Protection Publications, Oklahoma State University. March 2003. This document provides guidance for highway incident responders to mitigate the incident, maintain the flow of traffic, and support responder safety. It discusses command procedures, organizational structure, command structure, safety, unified command, and specific information related to highway incidents. NHTSA article on Low-Staffing Sobriety Checkpoints http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/enforce/LowStaffing_Checkpoints This article discusses traffic control and check-point operations in low-staffing situations. Implementing Emergency Alternate Routes: Wisconsin Experience http://www.ctre.iastate.edu/pubs/midcon2005/MielkeEmergency.pdf While this discussion focuses on quickly clearing incidents on freeways and reducing delay and secondary collisions, the principals can be applied to rerouting traffic around quarantined areas. The primary focus of creating emergency alternate routes is threefold: 1. Identify, in advance, alternate routes to use along each corridor 2. Establish procedures for when and how to implement alternate routes 3. Enhance interagency communication during events Lessons learned from the references summarized above are presented in Section 4 of the final report. 19
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