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Section 4. Lessons Learned This section presents lessons learned from the literature review, case studies, and interviews, which were summarized in Sections 2 and 3 of this report. The key lessons learned are those that have the greatest impact on traffic control requirements for quarantine and had the greatest impact on the development of a guide to traffic control of rural roads in an agricultural emergency. These key lessons learned are highlighted first. The remainder of the section presents other lessons learned and is organized by the following topics: ⢠Background on agroterrorism and animal disease ⢠Case studies ⢠Awareness and attitudes ⢠Local, state, and federal response plans ⢠Agencies involved and command structure ⢠Preparation and resource availability ⢠Quarantine, isolation, and traffic control Familiarity with general FAD response procedures may aid the reader in understanding the lessons described in this section. Therefore, the reader may want to refer to Table 2-1 in NCHRP Report 525 Volume 13: A Guide to Traffic Control of Rural Roads in an Agricultural Emergency that illustrates the sequence of events and agencies involved in an agricultural emergency. 4.1 Key Lessons Learned ⢠From the state emergency response plans reviewed, it appears that a foreign animal disease diagnostician (FADD), Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC), or other trained veterinarian acting on behalf of the state can issue a quarantine on a farm or other agricultural premises if animals are exhibiting symptoms that indicate a possible FAD. If the FADD determines a FAD to be likely, local, state and federal officials will be notified so that a response can be planned while waiting for sample test results. State and federal officials will become immediately involved in the response, since the FADD will be in communication with the state veterinarian and his or her federal counterpart in the state, the AVIC, from the initiation of the investigation. ⢠Plum Island, NY, is the only lab in the U.S. that can test samples for some FADs, such as Foot and Mouth Disease. While most states have provisions to send samples by private or state owned jet as soon as they are taken, results from APHIS Lab on Plum Island may not be available until 24 to 48 hours after the sample is taken. This response time establishes a timeline for a full response to a positive confirmation of a FAD. 33
⢠The local agencies will be responsible for organizing traffic control, storing, and caring for animals that are stopped or held, locating areas for carcass disposal, caring for the mental and physical welfare of the people in the area, and assisting the state with public information. Rural county law enforcement officials have very few resources for wide-scale traffic control (barricades, signs, disinfection equipment). Local highway maintenance buildings, contractors, utility companies, fire departments, emergency responders, and public works may all have resources that could be used in times of emergency. Few counties have formal agreements between agencies or jurisdictions to share such resources. ⢠Agroterrorism exercises and plans typically revolve around Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), as many experts feel that this is not only one of the more likely FADs, but also that it is highly contagious and could cause the most economic damage to the country. ⢠Many officials in rural counties do not perceive a biological attack on their livestock or crops to be very likely. They believe an accidental or natural disease outbreak to be more likely than an attack, but still not a high probability. ⢠County officials expressed concern about their lack of resources and manpower to respond to a large-scale event. Most rural sheriffâs departments have between three and eight deputies and patrol cars. County sheriffs in particular do not feel that traffic control during a quarantine would be one of their biggest problems. One sheriff interviewed stated, âWe can stop trucks on our roads; we do it every day.â ⢠Most states have a plan for addressing foreign animal disease response. Many state departments of agriculture have stand alone plans, and some states have an Annex that addresses animal health issues in the State Emergency Operations Plan. While state plans acknowledge that the federal government will be aware of a FAD situation from the earliest stages, their plans are, for the most part, self- sufficient, since they know that resources from the federal government may be either tied up in other responses or slow to arrive. Many state plans are very similar to one another and follow a standard template that assigns responsibilities to the various state organizations involved in the response (DOT, National Guard, Fish and Wildlife, Highway Patrol, DNR, Department of Health, etc.). ⢠If a FAD is confirmed, two zones may be established: (1) a hot, protection, or exposed zone [1.5- to 2-mile (2.4- to 3.2-km) radius around infected premises], and (2) a buffer or surveillance zone [6-mile (10-km) radius around the infected premises]. Local authorities will be responsible for coordinating and handling traffic control along the perimeters of these zones, although most state plans assign additional state resources to aid in this effort. Since it is evident that local law enforcement agencies will not have personnel or resources to man the number of stops that would be required in a 6-mile (10-km) buffer zone, manned stops would need to be located according to route priority. One example suggested having two entry/exit points along the hot zone perimeter and six along the buffer zone, equipped with disinfection equipment, closing all other roads along the perimeters. 34
⢠Responses to foreign animal diseases will require a Unified Command System (UCS), since several agencies with different priorities and areas of expertise will be involved, and their cooperation is essential. The UCS is a central feature of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Counties are required to be NIMS compliant to receive funding from the federal government for emergency response planning and activities. Section 3 of the guide provides incident command structures used in an agricultural emergency. These ICS examples were adapted from state emergency operations plans. ⢠While rural counties have limited manpower and resources for a response, they may be better equipped for response, since local responders are more likely to be familiar with agriculture and livestock producers and volunteers, and may be able to access private resources (hay bales, pens, gates, feed, etc.) more quickly than in areas with greater populations. ⢠Most of the local response should occur in the planning phases before an incident occurs. Counties should be aware of the animals in the county, be familiar with the producers, know where animal care resources can be obtained if needed, understand the routes used to transport animals in the county, identify all sources (public and private), of traffic control devices, and have detour plans for high- volume routes. When counties have this information at the start of an incident, it should ensure a quicker, more efficient response to management of the incident. ⢠Trust and cooperation of livestock producers can be a tremendous help to local officials in a FAD emergency. Response plans and reimbursement procedures should be part of an informational packet for livestock producers. ⢠The states and the federal government have formal, thorough response plans in place to respond to a foreign animal disease outbreak. Some Midwest states are working with their counties to develop local plans and to provide training for response preparation. ⢠Many elements of an animal health emergency response will be the same as those for any other emergency and will already be covered in existing LEOPs. Some modifications or additions, such as procedures for animal housing and care and quarantine-related traffic control, can be added to the existing plan to ensure it covers animal health emergencies. 4.2 Other Lessons Learned Background on Agroterrorism and Animal Diseases ⢠Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9), signed on January 30, 2004, deals specifically with the defense of the agriculture and food system in the U.S. It establishes a policy to defend it against intentionally or unintentionally introduced diseases, pests or other poisonous agents that could result in a disaster and/or emergency and have catastrophic effects on health and economy. 35
⢠The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) is made up of 168 member countries who voluntarily report outbreaks of animal diseases so the OIE can pass the information along to other countries, allowing them to take preventative measures. The OIE maintains a list of reportable diseases, and the US keeps a careful watch over which countries are currently detecting those diseases. ⢠The purpose of agroterrorism is to create fear and undermine the stability of the food supply. This can be accomplished by introducing agents into the food supply that affect the health of the consumers or by damaging or destroying livestock and crops. While the latter may not result in direct harm to the health of humans, it can have severe economic consequences for producers and the nation as a whole. ⢠Even FAD agents that are not a direct threat to human health can be carried and spread by humans, their domestic pets, and their vehicles. Biological agents can live on clothing, shoes, skin, tires, pet hair, and other items and be carried from sick animals and plants to healthy animals and plants when biosecurity procedures are not carefully followed. Case Studies ⢠Case studies of soybean rust in the U.S. point to fungicidal treatments as a means of management and control. Livestock producers and the federal government use soybean sentinel plots to monitor the movement of soybean rust and to act as an early detection system. No information regarding quarantines or traffic control was found. ⢠Case studies of citrus canker in Florida since the mid-nineties indicated an initial strategy of eradication, requiring the destruction of infected and exposed trees within a perimeter of infected trees. In January 2006, it was determined that eradication was no longer feasible, and since then APHIS has worked with state officials to implement new strategies to manage the disease. New federal shipping regulations are in place to prevent citrus plant material in Florida from entering other citrus-producing states and territories. Commercial businesses have been subject to mandatory sanitation procedures statewide since April 2000, including growers, lawn care services, and utility workers in quarantine areas. However, no information was found regarding traffic control, detours, or checkpoints. ⢠During the 2002 outbreak of Exotic Newcastle Disease in California, owners of illegal fighting game cocks had increased incentive to smuggle birds out of the quarantine area, since they were both illegal and valuable. Because individual birds can be easily hidden in passenger vehicles, enforcing restriction of animal movement became much more difficult. ⢠The 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the U.K. spread so quickly that traffic control was ultimately under military enforcement. 36
⢠Animal-borne, or zoonotic, diseases have afflicted human populations throughout history. The ability to rapidly transport people and commercial goods over long distances increases the possibility that susceptible populations will be exposed to new and previously eradicated diseases. Examples of national global events include West Nile virus, monkeypox, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and avian influenza. Monkeypox drew attention to the potential for introduction of communicable diseases via the exotic pet trade. Most states have taken measures to create legislation that helps to reduce the risk of future zoonotic disease outbreaks associated with pet animals. ⢠While the U.S. has experienced intentional attacks on the food supply chain (e.g., salmonella in salad bars in Oregon in 1984), nearly all of the case studies involved foreign animal diseases or plant pests that occurred accidentally or naturally. The distinction is only relevant to the response plan in that a coordinated intentional attack will stretch the resources of the federal and state governments and place more responsibility on local governments to contain and control the outbreak with limited outside help. Awareness and Attitudes ⢠In rural counties, many emergency response officials are also producers of crops and/ or livestock. For the most part, they are aware of the potential for diseases and pests that could damage their crops or harm their animals. ⢠Rumors of foreign animal diseases can spread quickly in rural areas and can be as destructive as a confirmed case. These suspicions can cause local markets to crash. Local, State, and Federal Response Plans ⢠From the very beginning of a FAD response, the state and federal governments are involved. In some cases, state and federal officials might be aware of a suspected foreign animal disease before local officials are. Table 2-1 in NCHRP Report 525 Volume 13: A Guide to Traffic Control of Rural Roads in an Agricultural Emergency provides a chart adapted from state response plans that illustrate the sequence of events and agencies involved in a FAD response. ⢠The Federal government has implemented an infrastructure for diagnosing foreign animal diseases and notifying the proper agencies and authorities. ⢠State Animal Health or Agriculture Disaster plans reviewed include: Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, California, Vermont, Virginia, North Carolina, Indiana, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Arizona, Wisconsin, and Texas. Additional policies on plant and animal disease preparedness in Michigan and Nevada were reviewed. ⢠US Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Veterinary Services (VS) has two Regional Animal Disease 37
Eradication Organization READEO teams (in Fort Collins and Raleigh), each with three-person Emergency Response Teams (ERTs). READEO members are highly trained and ready to fight exotic diseases and parasites anywhere in the US, and the Emergency Response Teams can be anywhere in the US within 24 hours to diagnose foreign animal diseases. ⢠Most counties have Local Emergency Operations Plans (LEOPs) that cover general emergency response protocol. In some Midwest states, counties have been encouraged and aided in developing annexes to these plans, or stand alone plans that specifically address animal health emergencies. Agencies Involved and Command Structure ⢠The State Veterinarian will communicate with the USDA Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC) to determine quarantine and stop-movement orders. ⢠Local officials will be required to assist the FADD in enforcing any quarantine issued around the premises. This could include stopping the movement of animals or aiding in disinfection of people and vehicles exiting the premises. ⢠In most cases, the state department of agriculture will be the lead agency in coordinating the response. Other agencies involved in the emergency response include local law enforcement, wildlife agencies, public health agencies (state and local), national guard, producer organizations, emergency management (state and local), and others. ⢠A positive test result will almost necessarily cause the governor to issue a state of emergency for the area or the entire state. If the stateâs resources become overwhelmed, the state may request the federal government to declare an emergency. At this point, FEMA will become involved. ⢠The state and federal government will manage the incident in terms of the epidemiology, quarantine and isolation requirements and boundaries, disinfection strategies, and animal depopulation. Preparation and Resource Availability ⢠Some states are providing training to local county officials regarding emergency response in an FAD incident. In a few states, counties are also encouraged to add a FAD response plan to their LEOP. ⢠Federal and state governments are prepared to handle an occurrence of FAD in one location, as might happen in an accidental or naturally occurring outbreak. However, it is unlikely that the states and federal government could handle a simultaneous outbreak in several locations across the county, as might occur in a terrorist attack. In this type of situation, the local governments will be even more burdened with the responsibility of containing the disease. 38
Quarantine, Isolation, and Traffic Control ⢠Laws and regulations concerning quarantine and stop movement orders differ from state to state. The local law enforcement officers contacted indicated that they were unsure of their authority to stop animals or people in the early stages of a response (prior to confirmation from test results). Most indicated an unwillingness or hesitation to engage with quarantine violators until a formal quarantine or stop-movement order was issued from a state official. ⢠Voluntary compliance and cooperation can go a long way to help prevent the spread of a foreign animal disease, especially in the earliest stages, before test results have been received. ⢠Producer organizations have a great deal of influence on how their members will respond to emergency quarantine. 39
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