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3 Portsâ complexities exacerbate the difficulty of taking adequate steps to deal with possible natural disasters. Ports are often sprawling enterprises, and each port is unique. âGAO 2007, p. 1 2.1 Content and Organization This chapter provides a review of the literature on both the nature of, and responses to, significant disruptions to the movement of freight through U.S. ports. For the purposes of this study, the following definitions are used: â¢ Ports are defined as deep-draft coastal facilities and terminals capable of handling both inter- national and domestic marine cargo. â¢ Disruption is defined as any significant loss of a portâs regular cargo handling capacity. Since the formation of the United States, ports have been the gateways to international commerce and trade. In 2012, U.S. waterborne trade amounted to over 2.1 billion metric tons, including over 1.3 billion tons in foreign trades that were valued at over $1.78 trillion (MARAD, 2013), making efficient port operations one of the keys to U.S. economic health. Significant disruptions to port operations can prove very costly. Port disruptions not only affect those freight businesses directly involved in maritime operations, disruptions also can affect the broader regional economies and industrial sectors they support (Abt Associates, 2003; Hall, 2004; Gordon et al., 2005; CBO, 2006; Park et al., 2008; National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center [NISAC]/National Incident Management Systems and Advanced Technology [NIMSAT], 2011). Therefore, dealing efficiently with such disruptions should be a high priority for all levels of government. The focus of the review is on the actions required to recover and maintain a portâs cargo throughput following a disruption. The goal is continuity of port business activity, and the phrase most often used for measuring how well such efforts succeed is port resilienceâthe ability of a port to provide and maintain an acceptable level of service, notably a steady freight volume throughput, when disruptive forces are imposed on it (Rice and Caniato, 2003; Sheffi, 2005; GAO, 2010; Berle et al., 2011a, b; TISP, 2011; NAS, 2012). In keeping with the broader aims of the overall research project, the main product of the review is a list of issues and subsequent actions that need to be addressed to enhance port resiliency, including prior preventative actions, actions geared to immediate impact response, and actions geared to rapid post-incident recovery. A consistent finding from the literature was the need to draw on expert opinions on how to proactively plan for port resilience, as well as the identification of the many different types of stakeholders involved in port planning and operations. C H A P T E R 2 Literature Review
4 Making U.S. Ports Resilient as Part of Extended Intermodal Supply Chains Section 2.2 discusses the many different causes and characteristics of past port disruptions, how these events relate to the way U.S. ports are operated, and which public and private-sector organizations are usually involved in port response and recovery activities. With this background, the recent literature on port disruption events was searched for specific examples of past response and recovery problems (Section 2.3), and for specific actions as well as broader approaches that have been proposed for limiting the negative consequences of future occurrences (Section 2.4). Section 2.5 summarizes the reviewâs key findings, with an eye to developing a set of high-level response and recovery guidelines that can help decisionmakers focus on the important issues involved in a major port disruption event. The review does not recommend specific response or recovery actions. 2.2 Nature of the Challenge The review of port resiliency is made within the context of the following unique challenges involved with maritime operations: Ports Are Complex Physical, Transactional, and Institutional Entities As described in NCHRP Report 732 (GTRC et al., 2012), building on RAND Corporation Inc.âs (2005) treatment of supply chains, international goods movement involves a three-tiered structure (note: terms are slightly modified here): â¢ Physical/logistics layerâincludes physical transportation systems and entities such as truck, rail, and ocean carriers, etc.; â¢ Transactional/informational layerâprocures and distributes goods and is primarily driven by information flow (e.g., customer, retailer, foreign supplier); and â¢ Regulatory/oversight layerâprovides the policy framework for both commerce and security, and enforces rules of behavior through standards, fines, and duties. High-level port operations associated with each of these different activity layers are listed in Figure 2.1. A portâs continuing success in moving freight depends on effective coordination of the many aspects of port operations, each involving people, technology, information, and both physical and financial resources. As a result, ports are subject to a variety of vulnerabilities associated with human actions (e.g., industry disputes, terrorist attacks, operator mistakes), technological failures (e.g., computer networks, control systems, vessel and dock equipment, etc.), natural disasters (e.g., hydrologic, geologic/seismic, atmospheric hazards), and organizational failures (e.g., excessive bureaucracy, poor interagency coordination, poor training). Source: New York Shipping Association, The Economic Impact of the New York-New Jersey Port/ Maritime Industry, 2010, p.14. (prepared by A. Strauss-Wieder, Inc.). Figure 2.1. Components of port operations.
Literature Review 5 Ports Are Multiple Stakeholder Operations An ICF International assessment of climate change impacts on transportation and infra- structure in the Central Gulf Coast region noted that ports present unique institutional as well as physical challenges, stating âthe mix of privately owned/operated facilities, publicly owned/ operated facilities, and publicly owned-privately operated facilities creates a unique mix when compared with other transportation infrastructureâ (2011, p. 53). Table 2.1 lists the most common types of participating organizations identified in recent literature, and summarizes their principal (but not always only) roles with respect to port dis- ruptions. Each stakeholder group has its own set of priorities and constraints that come to the fore whenever a port has difficulty moving cargo. How these various stakeholders interact with each other varies from port to port. A port may be operated by a state, county, municipality, private corporation, or some combination of these agencies. Although the number and make-up of the stakeholders involved in port operations varies a good deal, in general they include the port authorities themselves; private-sector operators doing business within the port; local, state, and federal government agencies; and information sharing and planning forums, often made up of representatives from both the public and private sectors (GAO, 2007; GAO, 2012b). With a great deal of todayâs freight being scheduled by freight brokers, including some large third-party logistics (3PL) agencies, port and terminal authorities must deal with these brokers as well as the freight carriers operating within their boundaries. The more âfreight agentsâ involved, the more involved transactional issues are likely to become, and the greater the need for increased coordination, communication, and planning throughout a productâs supply chain. Disruptive events trigger government participation at a number of different levels. When a major disruption to a portâs cargo operations occurs, federal, state, and local government agencies often become involved. Some of this involvement is mandated by law. Usually, local and state authorities take the lead in responding to emergencies, with federal agency support provided when needed, and especially when local resources become strained or when an event causes problems that go well beyond a portâs physical boundaries. In most instances, however, the working relation- ships among local, state, and federal agencies differs in practice according to the way that local and state authorities approach the issue of port planning. The level of federal involvement in international freight transportation systems increased sig- nificantly after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the damaging Gulf Coast hurricane sea son of 2005, and the impacts of Superstorm Sandy in 2012. Although the events of 11 September 2001 spurred considerable efforts to tighten port security, notably through pre-event prepared- ness, the severe weather events of 2005 and 2012 further focused attention not only on incident preparedness, but also on response and recovery. Several Government Agencies May Become Involved Knowledge of the laws and regulations that apply to different levels of government involve- ment need to be clear to all parties included in a major port disruption event. Through legislation and presidential directives, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the primary federal organization responsible for preparing the nation for terrorist attacks and for major natural disasters. Homeland Security Presidential Directives 5 and 8 require DHS to establish a National Preparedness System with a single, comprehensive (âall-hazardsâ) approach to managing emer- gency events, whether the result of terrorist attacks or large-scale natural or accidental disasters. This federal role is currently governed by the National Response Framework (NRF), which became effective on March 22, 2008, and supports the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Since 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) has required all federal departments and agencies to adopt NIMS as a condition for state, tribal, and local governments
6 Making U.S. Ports Resilient as Part of Extended Intermodal Supply Chains Stakeholder Organizaons Principal Roles (Freight) Port Authories Cargo loading/unloading, storage and throughput. Terminal Operators Cargo sorng, re-packaging, storage and throughput. Ensuring labor, chassis and container availability. Port Labor Force (Stevedores, Crane Operators, etc.) Cargo sorng, loading/unloading, storage and inter-modal transfer. Marime Vessel Operators Shipping Lines Cargo pickup and delivery. Inland Freight Carriers Trucking Firms, Railroads, Pipelines, Barge Operators Cargo pickup from and delivery to the port. Intermodal transfers of cargo within the port. Local, State and Federal Governments Including USCG (Captain of the Port), USACE, State and Federal DOT(s) Ensuring main channel operaon and safe debris removal. Ensuring highway, rail, inland water and pipeline access and egress capacity. Local Ulity Companies Electricity, gas, water, waste management Ensuring the needed power and water supplies to the port. Local Fire and Police Departments and Local Hospitals First responders to port disrupon incidents. Port Authories Cyber scheduling of cargo and equipment assets and fees, and tracking of cargo throughout and port equipment usage. Freight Brokers (inc. 3PLs) Freight Carriers Freight Shippers Supply chain cyber-transacons: inventory control, cargo manifesng, cargo and transportaon asset matching, cargo and transportaon equipment matching. Banking (fees). Insurance (damage, on-me delivery). Terminal Operators Cargo handling and storage and portservice contracts and fees, inventory monitoring. Port Authories Organizaons, who may own, lease and/or operate none, some, or all of the port's cargo terminals, docks, cranes, offices and other equipment and services. Safe, secure, efficient and environmentally sound port operaons. Local and State Governments State DOTs, OEMs, OHSs, Police, Fire, Water Supply Authories, etc. Monitoring port safety and security regulaons and records. Freeing up financial resources in mes of stress. Applying hazardous materials incident rules and regulaons. Federal Government DHS (FEMA, USCG, CBP, ICE, etc.), DOC (inc. NOAA), DOE, DOJ, DOD (notably USACE, USN), USDA, etc. as nature of incident/nature of cargo impacted warrants. (e.g., Federal relief assistance provided under the Stafford Act) Port command and control during conngencies (USCG Captain of the Port). Port safety and security regulaons and recordings. Freeing up addional financial and resources in mes of crisis. Applying hazardous materials incident rules and regulaons. Labor Unions Ensuring appropriate working condions and hours of operaon for port work force. Port Advisory Panels/Planning Councils Mulple stakeholder local/state/federal government & public/private sector agency organizaons with different start-up histories Pre-planning and development of incident management protocols and training exercises. Evoluon of stakeholder inter- agency coordinaon & communicaons roles, responsibilies and protocols. Marime and Ground/Intermodal Trade Associaons (e.g., Amer. Assocn. of Port Authories, Amer. Assocn. of State Highway and Transportaon Officials) Member supporng informaon gathering and sharing and member issues idenficaon, training and advocacy. A. Physical/ Logiscal Asset Ulizaon B. Communicaons & Informaon Flows C. Regulaons Table 2.1. Organizations commonly involved in U.S. port operations and planning.
Literature Review 7 to receive federal preparedness assistance. NIMS (DHS, 2008; see also http://www.fema.gov/ about-national-incident-management-system) offers a consistent nationwide approach for governments, the private-sector, and nongovernment organizations to work together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from, domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. Under Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8, March 30, 2011), and much of the federal legislation for port security, especially that contained in the 2002 Maritime Transportation Secu- rity Act (including requiring a national security plan, area security plans, and facility and vessel security plans) and in the 2006 Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act), a particularly damaging or widespread incident also may involve some or all of the following agencies: â¢ State and local departments of transportation (DOTs), other branches of FEMA and its regional offices, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) within DHS; â¢ U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and Department of the Navy (DON) within the Department of Defense (DOD); â¢ Maritime Administration (MARAD) within U.S.DOT; â¢ Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) within the Department of Justice (DOJ); and â¢ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) within the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC). Disruptions involving hazardous materials (hazmat) releases can pose some unique problems. HMCRP Report 9 (Ranous, 2012) addresses these issues in depth from the local community response and recovery perspective. The National Weather Service (NWS) is a component of NOAA. An Operating Unit of DOC, NOAA has become involved in disruption preparedness, particularly after Hurricane Katrina. For example, prior to Superstorm Sandy, it was NWS that briefed agencies and advised them of the projected storm surges and other conditions that led to decisions to close harbors and terminals (ASW Inc., 2013). In most instances, however, it is the port authority and its local emergency response and law enforcement agencies that prepare and begin the response to an incident, with subsequent assistance from federal agencies when needed. Within DHS, the USCG is responsible for the maritime environment and the safety and security of ports, including recovery after an incident, and the USCGâs Captain of the Port (COTP) has command responsibility during a major port disruption. The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 calls for Area Maritime Security (AMS) Plans to establish response and recovery protocols to prepare for, respond to, mitigate against, and recover from, a transportation security incident (TSI). Developed with input from other government and private agencies, these plans serve as the primary means of identifying and coordinating USCG procedures related to prevention, protection, security response, and maritime- transportation service recovery (GAO, 2012a). Which agencies and levels of government become involved in incident response depends on the severity of the disruption. Figure 2.2 shows this tiered response, passing from local to state to federal assistance as the severity of the incident and the resources needed to respond to it increases. One of the first steps in achieving compliance with NIMS is development of a systematic tool used for the command, control, and coordination of emergency response known as an incident command system (ICS, see http://www.fema.gov/incident-command-system#item3). ICS ideally allows different agencies to work together using common terminology and operating procedures for controlling personnel, facilities, equipment, and communications associated with an incident. ICS responsibilities include the following: â¢ Commandâproviding on-scene management and control authority, â¢ Operationsâdirecting incident tactical operations, â¢ Planningâpreparing an Incident Action Plan and maintaining situation and resources status,
8 Making U.S. Ports Resilient as Part of Extended Intermodal Supply Chains â¢ Logisticsâproviding services and support to the incident, â¢ Finance and Administrationâtracking incident costs and accounts for reimbursements, and â¢ Intelligenceâproviding analysis and sharing of information during the incident. USCG is actively involved in what it terms Marine Transportation System (MTS) Recovery Planning. MTS plans require, among other things, an inventory of what the U.S. military often terms essential elements of information (EEIs) representing the critical items of information or intelligence required to plan and execute an operation such as a response to a port disruption event (see DOA, 1993, for an example list of port EEIs; for additional details on the roles played by the USCG during port contingencies, see USCG, 2008, 2009 and Young 2009a, b). Understanding Ports Means Understanding Supply Chains Ports are not stand-alone facilities. Rather, they are integral components of many of the nationâs most important commodity supply chains. At the same time, ports represent some of the most important nodes in the nationâs multimodal transportation network. As such, their operations both influence and depend heavily upon the landside (highway, rail, pipeline, inland barge) and deep-water transportation networks accessing them (see Figure 2.3), and on the efficiency of the intermodal transfers that take place within or in close proximity to the port itself. Efficient operation of these inland modes is also essential to port resiliency. For example, in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy, barges and rail freight options were used to transport cargo from vessels offloaded at alternative ports, back to customers in the New York-New Jersey region (ASW Inc., 2013; and see Chapter 4). Port stakeholder notiï¬es US Coast Guard and local First Responders Local First Responders Arrive on scene National Response Framework (NRF) And Stafford Act Implemented Federal Coordinating Oï¬cer and Principal Federal Oï¬cial Are Activated IncidentManagement Assistance Team and other response elements are deployed to State Joint Field Oï¬ce established Federal Assistance Provided Incident Handled at State Level Incident Handled at Local Level Local EOC* Activated Maritime (Port) Incident Occurs USCG COTP/FMSC** Commandant sets MARSEC*** Level for Maritime Community MARSEC 3 MARSEC 2 MARSEC 1 Severe Threat Level High Threat Level Low or Elevated Threat Level All Port Stakeholders must attain set MARSEC Level State resources are adequate Local resources are adequate State EOC Activated or or Local oï¬cial requests aid from Governor State oï¬cial requests Presidential Declaration *EOC = Emergency Operations Center **COTP/FMSC Commandant = Captain of The Port/Federal Maritime Security Coordinator ***MARSEC = MARitime SECurity Source: Adapted from USCG, 2009, p. 63 Figure 2.2. Different levels of government involvement associated with different levels of incident severity.
Literature Review 9 The National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security (Washington, D.C., Jan. 23, 2012, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/25/fact-sheet-national-strategy-global-supply chain-security) articulates the federal governmentâs policy for strengthening the global supply chain, focusing on the assets and infrastructure by which goods are moved, as well as supporting commu- nications infrastructure and systems (GAO, 2012b). As noted in NCHRP Report 732 (GTRC et al., 2012), supply chain disruptions have defining characteristics including â¢ Geographic scope; â¢ Facilities disrupted; â¢ Modes impacted; â¢ Commodities and characteristics of the shipments disrupted (e.g., time sensitivity, temperature controlled, seasonality, etc.); and â¢ Likely timeframe needed for service resumption. These same factors affect port resiliency. Berle et al. (2011a, b), for example, identify a number of common âfailure modesâ in maritime transportation, from loss of entire port services, to the loss of one or more terminals, and the loss of individual intermodal connections (e.g., truck- water, rail-water), navigable waterways, and shipping vesselsâall of which can cause serious and costly delays to port operations. However, understanding the physical components of such supply chains is only one aspect of port resilience. For example, if one or more ports are affected by a disruption, what efforts must be undertaken to divert vessels to neighboring ports? The ways in which different types of freight will be able to move through neighboring ports also depends on numerous business-specific factors, such as the financial and regulatory options available to a shipper or carrier, as well as on the urgency attached to specific types of cargo delivery. An All-Hazards Approach to Contingency Planning Although no two port disruption events are identical, and no two ports operate in exactly the same manner, sufficient similarities exist in port operations to draw useful lessons from the most common types of cargo handling disruptions. In particular, federal response to emergencies such as port disruptions has evolved since 2001 into an all-hazards approach that adopts the premise that at a suitably high level of decision making there are a common set of actions or decisions to be made that apply to a wide range of seaport disruption events (FEMA, 1996; GAO, 2007). Land-Side Port-Side Access/Egress Access/Egress (truck, rail, (deep sea, inland water) Great Lakes) Shipper(s)/ Receivers Shipping/ Receiving Port(s) = Important Intermodal Co-ordination & Transfer Points Within-Terminal Operations Figure 2.3. The port as an intermodal connector in product supply chains.
10 Making U.S. Ports Resilient as Part of Extended Intermodal Supply Chains The past three decades have seen U.S. port disruptions come in many different forms and severity levels, occasioned by various manmade and natural causes, and with a wide range of physical and economic impacts on the ports and on their wider trading areas. These include the multi-port and protracted disruptions listed in Table 2.2. This port disruption history also includes many other, less widespread but often costly, disruptions to freight movement through individual ports or port terminals. For example, in looking through the Major Hazard Incident Data Service database (MHIDAS, 2002), Darbra and Casal (2004) found 471 hazmat-related âseaport accidentsâ reported in 95 countries from 1900 to 2002, including 399 seaport-based accidents since 1981. Over half of these accidents involved some form of chemical release, followed in frequency by fires (29 percent) and explosions (17 percent). More than 56 percent of the accidents occurred during transport (mainly involv- ing ships, but also some truck- and rail-related incidents). Incidents during loading/unloading operations, warehousing, and storage accounted for over 30 percent of total occurrences. External causes, involved in 17 percent of accidents, included high winds, sabotage, and fire. Human factors were attributed to 16 percent of accidents. Where a disruption is either geographically widespread, such as the West Coast seaports shutdown of 2002 (Hall, 2004), or of long duration, such as the post-hurricane season recovery Table 2.2. U.S. seaport disruption events. Type of Disruption Event Year Seaports Affected Natural disasters Hurricane Katrina 2005 Gulfport, MS; Miami, FL; Mobile, AL; Morgan City, LA; New Orleans, LA; Pascagoula, MS Hurricane Rita 2005 Freeport, TX; Houston, TX; Miami,FL; Morgan City, LA; New Orleans, LA; Port Arthur,TX Hurricane Ike 2008 Port Arthur/Beaumont,TX; Freeport, TX; Galveston,TX; Houston,TX; Texas City,TX Hurricane Irene 2011 East Coast ports including Wilmington and Morehead City, NC; Norfolk,VA; Baltimore, MD; Philadelphia, PA; Newark, NJ; and New York City, NY. Superstorm Sandy 2012 Northeast coast ports, including Norfolk,VA; Baltimore, MD; Newark, NJ; and New York City, NY. Earthquake Nisqually 2001 Tacoma, WA Earthquake Loma Prieta 1989 Richmond and Oakland, CA Labor disputes Lockout West Coast 2002 29West Coast ports, including Los Angeles, Long Beach, Oakland and San Diego, CA; Portland, OR; and SeaÂle and Tacoma, WA. Strike San Pedro Bay 2012 Los Angeles and Long Beach, CA Note: The list shown in this table does not include all major hurricane events over the past three decades, many of which might have caused similar levels of port disruption had their paths been a little different.
Literature Review 11 of a number of Gulf Coast ports in 2005 (Grenzeback and Lukmann, 2009), and/or involves a significant port cargo hub as in Superstorm Sandy (ASW Inc., 2013), freight movements must be considered in a broader regional, national, or international network context. In such instances, sudden shifts in goods movements across two or more terminals may place undue strain on a portâs cargo handling services, representing yet one more form of disruption to normal port operating conditions. Port congestion levels may become especially high should such diversions occur during seasonal traffic peaks. For example, a major disruption to cargo throughput during late summer and fall peaking of ship traffic at the Los Angeles and Long Beach seaports could prove especially troublesome (CBO, 2006). Port Resilience Requires Multi-Stage Contingency Planning and Implementation Much of the post 9/11 literature on port disruptions focuses on port security issues, with increasing attention given to the broader issue of maritime-transportation involved product supply chains. Most of the specific actions recommended in the literature for mitigating the effects of a disruption fall into the following three categories: 1. Prior actions geared to avoiding or limiting a disruptionâs impacts (preparedness); 2. Actions geared to dealing with the immediate impacts of the disruption (response); and 3. Actions geared to getting the port back up and running again as soon as possible (recovery and, eventually, resumption of pre-incident operating levels). Collectively, these three sets of actions seek to increase a portâs resilience to threats through greater planning, redundancy, and flexibility. Planning was evident in the preparation for Superstorm Sandy (see Chapter 4 of this report)âalthough the anticipated landfall location and severity of impacts were not known until the day before, notifications to New York-New Jersey port tenants began several days earlier following the USCG Sector New York Hurricane/Severe Weather Plan, and the Port Authority of New York and New Jerseyâs Emergency Operations Plan (ASW Inc., 2013). Pre-event planning also was a key ingredient in the response to the Columbia River lock outage (see Chapter 5 of this report). Redundancy refers to any duplication of systems necessary for accommodating throughput during, or immediately following, a port disruption. This includes redundancy in a variety of port assets in addition to transportation and cargo handling equipment. For example, a number of the 17 ports interviewed by the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO, 2007) reported purchasing back-up phone systems and power generators, creating alternative administrative sites, and developing alternative storage for computer information in case of emergencies. Most of this redundancy is the result of actions taken by port authorities prior to a disruption. Flexibility, in contrast, entails redeploying existing cargo handling capacity in an effective manner. For example, normal operating practices and working hours may need to be changed in the interim. Flexibility was evident in the recovery from Superstorm Sandyâthe freight rail- roads repositioned equipment away from the stormâs path to locations where the assets could then be used to move cargo that had been diverted to Baltimore and Norfolk. Vessels docked at alternative terminals within the New York-New Jersey Harbor, as marine terminals became operational in different timeframes. Private terminal operators and labor worked throughout the weekend after the storm to handle backlogged vessels and cargo after the New York-New Jersey port was reopened (ASW Inc., 2013). Such changes, in turn, require the necessary authority and willingness to do so, as well as the ability to inform those involved of the changes being implemented. Recognizing that actions taken during the immediate response and short-term recovery stages of an incident will go better if based
12 Making U.S. Ports Resilient as Part of Extended Intermodal Supply Chains on well-established and well-exercised prior event planning and training. Most studies reviewed suggest that ports and their local authorities engage in a number of these pre-event activities. Response actions then seek to limit any further damage to the port once an incident occurs, allowing for recovery to begin by fixing, replacing, or redeploying available port operating assets. Planning and Resource Allocation Should Be Consistent with the Nature and Severity of a Disruption Although the literature identified a number of port security and contingency response activi- ties that have value to most types of incidents, the flexibility to adopt an all-hazards approach to deal with different types of events also is important. In particular, the physical extent and severity of the damage inflicted, the duration of the disruption to cargo movement, and the length of time between the disruption occurring and the time port authorities are made aware of the threat (see Table 2.3) can affect both how and how well a port complex can respond. Not all port disruptions involve the entire port complex, and although the physical effects of some events may last for weeks, in other cases they are over in a few days. Public agency responses should be scaled accordingly, and planning for a range of different levels of event severity, as well as event type, makes good sense. Early assessment of event severity therefore is a very useful step in the incident identification and response process. Port Disruptions Often Increase the Danger to People as Well as Cargo Many types of port disruption involve danger to people as well as to cargo, and planning for such emergencies necessarily prioritizes human life and safety. Actions that protect port workers Source: Based on Kidby, 2008 Events with Lile or No PriorWarning Events with Some PriorWarning Hazardous Materials Accidents: Severe Weather Events: Chemical Spills Hurricanes Oil Spills Tsunamis Gas Leaks Floods Fires Tornadoes Acts of Terror/Sabotage/Human Error: Snow/Ice build up Explosions Earthquakes Chemical, radiological or biological releases (inc. Dirty Bombs) Labor Shortages: Fires Port Lockouts Cyber attacks on computer systems Labor Strikes Vessel sinkings Work to Rule Slowdowns Channel blockages Epidemics (e.g., Avian Flu) Power systems sabotage Train derailments Unancipated equipment (truck, chassis, container, etc.) shortages Severe Weather Events: Port access route closures (e.g., due to rockslides, flash flooding, etc.) Table 2.3. Causes and classes of disruptions to port operations.
Literature Review 13 and visitors draw on resources and set priorities that need to be recognized in pre-event plan- ning activities as well as in the immediate response and recovery phases following an incident. For example, based on the severity of the impending storm, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey ordered all of the maritime terminals closed to all but essential personnel the night before Sandy hit the coast, and ordered all remaining personnel and security off port facilities by the evening of the day of the storm, prior to the first anticipated storm surge. As a result, no personnel were lost during the storm (ASW Inc., 2013). Much less dramatic but potentially protracted events (such as a port labor strike) also place a burden on maintaining safe operations during abnormal working conditions. Therefore, while the focus in this review is on issues and actions needed to keep the freight moving through a port, these actions are always subject to human health and safety concerns and to the regulations governing safe cargo handling and equipment operating practices, including potential exposure to hazardous materials. 2.3 Issues Raised by Past Port Disruptions This section focuses on responses given by experts to port security, port resilience, or post- disruption incidence response surveys, or via panels and workshops convened to discuss these issues and typically involving a wide range of stakeholder groups. In particular, this section draws on the findings reported by Allen et al. (2003), Hultin et al. (2004), CBO (2006), Hudgins (2006), USCG (2006), Zegart et al. (2006), GAO (2007), Rice and Trepte (2010) and Berle et al. (2011a, b), as well as those reported by government agency reviews of the main elements incorporated in specific port preparedness, incident response, and recovery plans (e.g., GAO, 2012a). As a set, these sources associate the following issues with port disruptions: â¢ Loss of shipboard and intermodal cargo handling equipment; â¢ Loss of terminal/port access/egress routes; â¢ Loss of terminal storage space; â¢ Loss of navigable channel clearances (channel depths); â¢ Loss of navigation support vessels; â¢ Damage to port servicing truck, rail, inland barge, or pipeline assets; â¢ Loss of on-dock storage space; â¢ Loss/damage to within and outside port communications; â¢ Loss/damage to cargo/container/vessel tracking/security systems; â¢ Utility (power and/or water) system failures; â¢ Loss/lack of waste and debris removal assets; â¢ Lack of availability of transportation fuels; â¢ Lack of availability of financial resources; â¢ Lack of availability of labor; and â¢ Uncertainty/lack of coordination among responding agencies. For example, CBOâs (2006) look at container port disruptions identifies the following physical components as key aspects of port throughput capacity: â¢ Channel depth (a ship size restriction); â¢ Number of berths (number of ships processed at one time); â¢ Capacity of container loading/unloading equipment (cranes, etc.); â¢ On-dock storage space and equipment for moving containers to local terminals (or to storage and distribution centers farther inland); â¢ Intermodal connections for loading containers on trucks or rail cars; â¢ Truck fleet and railcar capacity; and â¢ Skilled labor, in order to fully utilize cranes for loading and unloading tasks, etc.
14 Making U.S. Ports Resilient as Part of Extended Intermodal Supply Chains Loss of on-dock storage space was noted as a potentially expensive bottleneck. As the stacks of containers on a dock grow, the process of sorting, locating, and moving individual containers to specific terminals can âquickly bog down.â Sufficient truck and rail capacity must be available to carry these containers away. Constraints on rail capacity are considered to have contributed to a slowdown in the distribution of U.S. imports in late 2004 (CBO, 2005). Structural damage to buildings and piers, and silting and debris clogging key waterways were two significant problems reported to the GAOâs (2007) survey of seaports impacted by the 2005 hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, as well as Superstorm Sandy (ASW Inc., 2013). Port authorities also reported difficulties restoring power, water, and other utilities. Proposing a supply-chain-based business continuity plan for dealing with maritime system disruption, Berle et al. (2011a) carried out 16 semi-structured interviews with terminal operators, port authorities, and the USCG in selected ports in California, Texas, New York, New Jersey, and Panama; also drawing on empirical evidence from two MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics (CTL) surveys, as follows: â¢ From the MIT CTL Port Resilience Projectâsome 525 respondents, including shippers, port authorities, and terminal operators provided insight into disruptions in the port environment (Rice et al., 2010). â¢ From the 2010 MIT CTL Global Risk Surveyâinvolving 2,400 supply chain respondents worldwide (Arntzen, 2011) who were asked about the importance of failure modes on major supply chain disruptions. In responding to questions about importance and frequency of failures, the loss of materials supply and interruptions to internal operations topped the list of concerns. Loss of communication was rated as the third most important failure mode. Financial flows (access to capital resources and liquidity of cash) and labor availability were also mentioned, if with less frequency. Based on these responses, the authors identify the following six âfailure modesâ associated with maritime-transportation supply chains: âloss of capacity to supply, financial flows, trans- portation, communication, internal operations/capacity and human resources.â Under each of these modes, they identify failures in the supply chain associated specifically with the loss of functionality at ports, at terminals, at intermodal connections, in navigable waterways, and in vessels (Berle et al., 2011a, Table 3; Rice and Caniato, 2003; Berle et al., 2011b). Capacity to supply refers to the availability of a wide range of different physical assets that support port and terminal activity, including infrastructure; spaces to maneuver in; utilities such as electricity, water and waste treatment; fuel; availability of navigational support and safety vessels; navigable channels and dredging equipment; heavy lift equipment; and the fleet of cargo vessels themselves. Transportation refers to the ability to move goods and people within and through a port, a terminal, an intermodal connection and a navigable waterway, as well as the ability maneuver the maritime vessels themselves. This requires trucks and trains, as well as tugs, lifts, stackers, gantry cranes, chassis, and other port/terminal/navigable channel maintenance vehicles and vessels. Internal operations/capacity refers to the ability to efficiently and safely position, load/unload, process, and document a large volume of goods movements associated with storage, maritime vessels, and ground transportation modes by ensuring sufficient berthing, storage and transloading space, loading gear, pumping capacity, bridge and channel clearances, etc. Problems with financial flows are associated with loss of liquidity (i.e., running out of cash) while credit tightens, and customer payments arrive late. Among their findings, Berle et al. (2011a) conclude that âwhile stakeholders in the [maritime transportation] industry have a solid focus on frequent operational risks, there is a lack of awareness of vulnerabilities, as well as methods for addressing and planning for low-frequency high-impact disruption scenarios,â and that âsupply chain stake- holders in general are focused on prevention and frequencies rather than preparing to respond after incidents have occurred.â
Literature Review 15 Hudgins (2006) reports the results of splitting members of the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) Security Committee into four groups, and asking each group to develop a list of their top areas of concern with respect to emergency preparedness. Common to all four groups were concerns over the following: â¢ Communications (e.g., phone lists for personnel recalls); â¢ Port access control (e.g., letters of authorization); â¢ Port re-entry procedures (e.g., re-entry passes); and â¢ Providing safe accommodations for essential personnel. In looking specifically for ways that local agencies could improve their terrorism response plans at the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports complex, Allen et al. (2003) conducted more than six dozen interviews with elected officials, agency leaders, private stakeholders, and first responders. Their study identified three broad policy problems that may hinder efficient and effective emergency response as follows: 1. Inaccessibility of the port complexâPoor vehicle access may prevent first responders from reaching the facility and assisting victims; 2. Oversight and coordinationâLocal political decisionmakers do not sufficiently oversee emer- gency response planning and key stakeholders are absent from the planning process; and 3. Incompatible communication systemsâDifferences in radio technologies prevent agencies from communicating during a response and from coordinating emergency response efforts. All three issues are identified in other studies. Port Access Issues Bringing additional labor into the port to deal with a disruption to cargo movement, whether this involves longshoremen, law enforcement, fire prevention, hazmat teams, vessel/vehicle repair, or debris removal crews, requires adequate pre-planning as well as agreements between labor unions and port management. It is also important that port and emergency response officials understand the potential dangers associated with bringing labor from outside or from other parts of a port to deal with fires or incidents that may involve exposures to hazardous materials (Ranous, 2012). Poor labor credentialing has been a problem on occasion. Truck drivers entering a port must have a Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) card, and most U.S. ports also have their own local registration system for drivers. In some cases (e.g., Gulfport during Katrina, Houston during Rita), U.S. port officials and laborers who might have speeded up a portâs recovery had difficulty re-entering a Gulf seaport after the 2005 hurricanes because they lacked the creden- tials required by local police and other emergency management officials (GAO, 2007). Where the use of labor during contingencies is concerned, inevitably there are legal and liability issues. The Infrastructure Security Partnership (TISP, 2011, p. 30) provides the following list of workforce policy issues: âcompensation, prolonged absences, social isolation, and removal of potentially contagious employees, safe workplace rules, flexible payroll issues, contractual issues, information from/coordination with regulators; privacy issues; ethical issues; union-related issues; liability associated with vaccine distribution and administering.â Need for Oversight and Coordination among Responding Agencies During a port disruption event, a good deal of importance attaches to the actions of key decisionmakers. This means identifying these people and their roles prior to a disruptive event. Mansouri et al. (2009) point out that these decisionmakers need to have a clear understanding about sources of uncertainty and possible consequences of unprotected vulnerabilities that threaten the port system if they are to respond to incidents in a timely and efficient manner.
16 Making U.S. Ports Resilient as Part of Extended Intermodal Supply Chains The topic of interagency coordination is one addressed repeatedly in post-9/11 literature, which recognizes that the complexity of modern port operations has become a major cause of difficulty in implementing effective port security and incident response protocols (Hecker, 2002; Harrald et al., 2004; DOJ, 2006; Robinson, 2006; Barnes and Oloruntoba, 2009; Lane, 2009; GAO, 2012b). Command and control is often fragmented by the legal jurisdiction of the different federal, state, and local government agencies and the often overlapping nature of their responsibilities. For example, the Port of New York and New Jersey is the owner of its port facilities, but it lacks control over the movement of cargo, people, and trucks on the property. âIn most ports, the Port Authority operates the port. Here they are just the landlord and act as a facilitator. Terminal operators here are major playersâ (Hultin et al., 2004, p. 18). Providing supporting evidence, a GAO (2005a) analysis of 85 USCG exercises to test aspects of the Coast Guardâs terrorism response plans revealed four common problem areas: â¢ Communication problems among different agencies, â¢ Inadequate and uncoordinated resources, â¢ A lack of knowledge or training in the incident command structure, and â¢ A lack of knowledge about who has jurisdictional authority. A subsequent GAO (2007) study, drawing on the experiences of officials and other stakeholders at 17 of the U.S. seaports impacted by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005 reported that some port authorities had difficulty accessing both federal and regional FEMA and MARAD resources in their recovery efforts and also ran into problems with filling out the appropriate forms for disaster relief aid. Similar concerns are expressed by Zegart et al. (2006). In interviews with stakeholders associated with the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, several port security officials expressed concern that ambiguities in federal and state guidelines, coupled with natural bureaucratic rivalries, posed a risk of coordination breakdowns during incident response. Several U.S. seaports have responded to these interagency coordination and communication issues. During the post-2005 hurricane season in the Gulf, the Port of Mobile formed a task force that includes the following: â¢ Port authority police chief; â¢ Harbormaster; â¢ Environmental, health, and safety manager; â¢ A member of the county emergency management agency; and â¢ Representatives of the portâs rail, cargo, intermodal, and development divisions. At the Port of Houston, the USCG used its authority to mandate the creation of port coordi- nation teams that include all port stakeholders, with team composition changing to match the nature of the threat. âFor security threats, the teams are organized geographically and do not require that the entire port close down, thereby appropriately matching resources to the threat being faced. For natural disasters, the teams are organized functionally because of the more dispersed nature of the threatâ (GAO, 2007). More recent site visits to the ports of Tacoma, Oakland, Houston, Mobile, Gulf Port, Miami, and Savannah by GAO (2012b, p. 1) found that âefforts to incorporate resilience into these programs and assessments were evolving. . . . However, we also found that program manage- ment could be strengthened. We recommended that [the Office of Infrastructure Protection], IP, develop performance measures to assess the extent to which asset owners and operators are taking actions to resolve resilience gaps, and also update guidance for its Protective Security Advisors (PSA), who serve as liaisons between DHS and security stakeholdersâto include asset owners and operatorsâin local communities.â Ensuring continued and sustained stakeholder enthusiasm and momentum post-incident is an important topic here (TISP, 2011, p. 34).
Literature Review 17 Need for Compatibility in Real-Time Communications Technologies Real-time communications are essential to rapid and effective response during a disruption. Coordination between responsible and responding parties is otherwise severely compromised. For example, differences in radio technologies can prevent agencies from communicating during emergency response efforts (see Allen et al., 2003, who identified this as an issue at the Los Angeles/Long Beach port complex). The same comment applies to computer software and the databases it accesses, including both front-line and back-up systems that may be called upon to preserve commercial trading as well as security and safety data. Noting a trend in recent years for many trading firms to coordinate their activities both internally and externally via multi- enterprise supply chains, Carbone and De Martino (2003) refer to such activity as integrated supply chain management (SCM). Where ports are concerned, this means coordinating the movement of products between suppliers, carriers, distributors, and customers and their various brokers. The goal is to get all of these stakeholders to use a âcommon platform of logistics transactions and information systemsâ as they apply to cargo moving through a port. A loss of access to skilled labor can result from an inability to contact the workers needed. During an emergency, getting the necessary responders to the port complex may prove challenging. For example, Allen et al. (2003) and Zegart et al. (2006) noted that between the Los Angeles Port Police, Port of Long Beach Harbor Patrol, Los Angeles Fire Department, Long Beach Fire Department, and USCG, only about 100 sworn law enforcement officers and firefighters were on duty at the port during a typical shift, and that a significant port disruption incident would require considerable additional manpower to be drawn in from, in this case, a rather large, surrounding county. According to GAO (2007), a significant number of the port authorities impacted by the 2005 hurricane season reported problems caused by extensive telephone outages and limited cell phone reception. âFor example, one port [Mobile] was without services for 2 to 4 weeks following Hurricane Katrina.â This loss of communications led, among other problems, to dif- ficulties in contacting those port personnel who had been forced to abandon their homes during the hurricane. Superstorm Sandy also identified that insufficient fuel supplies combined with significantly damaged transit systems can hinder the ability of labor to commute to port terminals (ASW Inc., 2013). Rao et al. (2007) provides an overview of IT benefits and opportunities associated with disaster management. Need for a Back-Up in Case of Cyber System Failures Modern information technology (IT) goes well beyond direct person-to-person communi- cations, and includes a growing list of technologies that can help to identify and subsequently respond to an impending threat (including sensor technologies, identification and authentication technologies, screening technologies, surveillance technologies, anti-tamper technologies, and tracking and inspection technologies [Stowksy, 2006]). IT also includes the day-to-day cargo manifesting and tracking systems used by supply chain participants. The more port authorities become dependent on these automated/semi-automated systems, the greater the potential impacts from a temporary loss in communications/computer power/database access due to incident-induced damage or disruption. Resilience through redundancy, in the form of back-up IT systems can be very expensive, but may be a necessity in todayâs business world. Superstorm Sandy demonstrated the need for such resiliency during the prolonged power and communication grid disruptions following the storm combined with loss of port offices. A scan of the Internet also reveals the response to the superstorm demonstrated the usefulness and effectiveness of social media (e.g., LinkedIn, ConstantContact, Facebook, and Twitter), which was used by both public and private organizations to disseminate information, conditions, and needs (ASW Inc., 2013). Brodeau and Graubart (2011) provide an extensive review of cyber resiliency issues.
18 Making U.S. Ports Resilient as Part of Extended Intermodal Supply Chains 2.4 Promising Practices and Possible Planning Frameworks Bringing the different aspects of the port resiliency and business continuity problem together represents a significant challenge for the individuals and agencies involved. A port authority and its supporting state and local emergency response agencies must be able to utilize the portâs physical/logistical assets (its channels, docks, cranes, ships, trucks, railcars, etc.), transactional/ informational assets (communications systems, computer systems, fuel, water, waste and power control systems, etc.) and its oversight/institutional systems (port emergency points of contact, first responder and other contingency plan protocols and notification systems, command and control procedures, roles and responsibilities) to act effectively prior to, during, and for some time after whenever a significant disruption to cargo movement occurs. Where necessary, addi- tional assets may be requested via federal government sources, creating the need for additional interagency coordination and cooperation. Figure 2.4 summarizes this idea, representing a port as a complex intermodal node within the nationâs multimodal transportation networkâone that draws on a range of institutional responses that need to be communicated via an increasingly sophisticated set of information gathering and processing technologies, into a set of physical actions that cause cargo to pass through the port. A long list of port assets may be impacted or otherwise involved. Table 2.4 provides a sam- ple port asset sensitivity to threat matrix that includes the principal physical/logistical assets discussed in Section 2.3, and the most commonly reported types of physical asset disruption, (from collapsed buildings and flooding to fires and explosions, hazmat releases, backups in truck or railcar traffic within or leading into or out of the port complex; power, fuel and labor shortages; Shippers/ Receivers/ Brokers Shippers/ Receivers/ Brokers/ Other Ports Seaport Authority, Terminal Operators Physical actions Information transfers Institutional responses Land side Carriers (railroads, pipeline, barge and trucking ï¬rms) Water side Carriers (inland waterway and harbor navigation, short sea and ocean shipping ï¬rms) Local, State and Federal Government Agencies (including police, ï¬re, emergency response, transportation, environmental compliance, hazmat response, cargo security and workforce safety agencies ) Application of pre planned command and control protocols and notiï¬cations, event speciï¬c decisions, and post event recovery programs. Internet, intranet, telephone and radio based communications; GPS, cellular, RFID Wi-FI and barcode supported cargo/vehicle/vessel/container/chassis/ loading equipment/personnel tracking; container imaging devices and radiation detectors. Cargo/container/vehicle/vessel reassignments, quarantines and exclusions; terminal/dock/berth/ channel/roadway/oï¬ce closures and re assignments; people evacuations; worker re assignments, re scheduling, slow downs and work stoppages; transportation and cargo handling equipment shut downs, repositionings, reassignments, intermodal shifts, and replacements; security and safety protocol applications; Hazmat and debris removal and clean up activities, â¦. Port Advisory Groups/Councils FeedbackFeedback Figure 2.4. Agents and activities associated with a port-based supply chain disruption.
Literature Review 19 Table 2.4. Example high-level asset sensitivity to threat matrix. Causes of Disrupons: Physical Characteriscs of Disrupons Assets Affected: Collapsed & Damaged Structures* Flooding Land Subsidence Explosions Fires Hazmat Exposures Truck, Rail and/or Water Traffic Back-Ups Power Outages Breaks in the Fuel Supply Workforce Slowdowns & Stoppages Cyber Failures** Within Port Buildings: Terminal Storage Areas Terminal Load/Unload Areas Terminal Approach Areas Port Offices Outside Port Buildings: ConsolidaÂon/Distribn. Centers Temporary Cargo Storage Areas Transport Modes: Rail: Load/Unload Points Outside Port Tracks Within Port Tracks Trains (Engines, Railcars) Highway: Load/Unload Points Port Gates Port Approach Roads Within Port Roads Trucks Water: Docks/Berths Main Channel Side Channels Ships Barges & Tows NavigaÂon Support Vessels Debris Removal Vessels Dredging Equipment Pipelines: Oil/gas pipelines Oil/gas storage tanks Cargo Handling Equipment: Conveyors Cranes ForkliÂs PalleÂes Containers: Boxes (TEUs, FEUs) Chassis Port Security System: Equipment Tracking Systems MoÂon Sensors Early Warning Systems Power/UÂlity Systems: Port LighÂng HeaÂng/Cooling Equip. Water Waste Disposal Equip. Hazmat Containment Equip. CommunicaÂon Systems: Computers/ Internet (Intranets) Telephones Back-Up Systems (e.g., Radios) Port Employees: Port Labor Port Management Hurricanes/High Winds, Tsunamis, Heavy Storms, Earthquakes, Terrorism, Vandalism, Work Accidents, Labor Disputes, Epidemics, Re-directed Freight (from Other Port Closures), Snow/Ice Storms, Very Low Temperatures * including buildings, roads, bridges, tracks and waterways; **including computer and electronic communication, including workforce assignment, cargo billing and cargo tracking system outages.
20 Making U.S. Ports Resilient as Part of Extended Intermodal Supply Chains cyber breakdowns). Past causes of such asset breakdowns are also shown (e.g., severe weather, sabotage, etc.), once again reflecting an all-hazards approach. Similar sensitivity matrices might be developed for the transactional/informational and oversight layers discussed in Section 2.2. The rest of this section looks at some recent efforts to identify actions that need to be taken and planned for to mitigate the effects of port disruptions, and tries to put these actions into a broad order of priority. Whether seen as components of an action plan or more generally as a framework from which to develop such a plan, each of these studies offers useful insights into the disaster pre-planning, response, and recovery process. In particular, the discussion draws on the findings reported by Allen et al. (2003), Breaux (2006), Eldridge (2006), Perrone (2006), GAO (2007), Pate et al. (2007), Mansourri et al. (2009), USCG (2009), ICF International and PB Americas (2011), Loh and Thai (2012), and Ranous (2012). It is useful to begin with the detailed Marine Transportation System (MTS) Recovery Plan produced by the USCG Commander for Long Island Sound (USCG, 2009). This report provides a series of detailed Emergency Recovery Decision Matrices (USCG, 2009, pp. 70â75) under the following headings: â¢ Traffic Management during an MTS Recovery Port Evacuation, â¢ Mass Evacuation of People from the Port area during MTS Recovery, â¢ The Challenges of Controlling Vessel Traffic during a Port Evacuation in MTS Recovery, â¢ Coordination of Emergency Services during a Port Evacuation in MTS Recovery, and â¢ SAFE Port Operations. A series of fishbone diagrams is used to illustrate the main issues and their connections under each of these headings. Stepping back a little from these details, Figure 2.5 illustrates six main topics and associated issues recommended for consideration during the preparation of a port recovery planâto which two additional issues could be addedâfuel supply and debris removal, as most recently evidenced by the 2012 to 2013 aftermath of Superstorm Sandy. Roles and responsibilities should be clearly identified for port stakeholders under the Incident Command System (ICS). Any incident requiring the closure of a port would be run utilizing the ICS, preferably using a unified command structure that brings together all of the incident commanders of the major organizations involved in the incident. Figure 2.5. High-level issues associated with port recovery planning. Source: Based on USCG, 2009, p. 74 Cargo Prioritization SecurityInsurance Concerns Roles and Responsibilities Communications Assessment Example Port Recovery Plan Contents Local govt. State govt. Police Dept. Fire Dept. USGS COTP Public awareness Info. sharing with industry Media relations Transportation Infrastructure Damage Health Safety Facilitate Insurance /Underwriting Efforts Support Center Prioritize commerce ï¬ows Commerce ï¬ow rate Immediate connectivity Vessel Return Strategy May need to preserve crime scene Required to reassure labor return
Literature Review 21 Communications among responders, port stakeholders, media, and the public has been identified as a consistent problem and one that must be addressed in any operational plan. âJust as important, a clear, accurate, and unified message must be presented to the public, media, and most importantly to the port stakeholdersâ (USCG 2009, p. 75). It is also seen as the responsibility of the unified command to convey to the port workers that it is truly safe to begin recovery. Assessments are needed to determine the suitability of the port to restart any of the operations that were shut down by the incident. Typically, these would include assessment of the condition of the transportation assets in the port, its infrastructure, as well as health, safety, and damage assess- ments. The report recommends the use of thresholds to determine when people and businesses can resume operations, and the development of contact checklists for use by assessment teams. Cargo prioritization rules are needed, and an acceptable cargo flow rate possibly targeted. Who should make cargo priority decisions? What roles will the government (local, state, federal) play in this process? How will labor availability affect such planning? Security issues are looked at from two perspectives: how does security affect the actual recovery process, and what is the need to preserve a crime scene? The question of what needs to be in place for the security aspects of the port to be reactivated should also be added. For example, after Superstorm Sandy, security fencing and gates had to be repaired prior to the resumption of port operations. Given the considerable uncertainty and complexity surrounding what have become multi- agency port security operations, Pate et al. (2007), when reporting to the DOJ, used a case study methodology to look for successful security practices associated with terrorist events. Selecting 17 U.S. seaports (San Diego, Los Angeles, and Long Beach, California; Jacksonville, Tampa, Fort Lauderdale, and Miami, Florida; New Orleans, Louisiana; Houston, Galveston, and Texas City, Texas; Charleston, South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; Port of Virginia, Virginia; Boston, Massachusetts; Seattle and Tacoma, Washington), and with a particular focus on the use of inter-governmental and public-private agency partnerships, a number of promising practices based on the expert opinions of port personnel were identified. The study considered each portâs preparedness for, response to, and recovery capabilities after a potential terrorist attack. Specifically, ports were asked to describe their plans to mitigate the effects of a potential attack, to assure continuity of port operations, and to expedite the recovery of maritime infrastructure. As part of a portâs preparedness, three important practices were identified: training, field exercises, and the use of models, simulations, and games. Site visits also identified a number of promising incident response practices, with many of the ports visited using an ICS to deal with the uncertainty and fast collaborative/multi-agency actions required when responding to an attack. Under this system, the agency chosen to oversee emergency operations depends on the nature and location of the event. In particular, it highlights the idea of a unified command approach in which agency managers share decision-making responsibility within a group, while individual agencies maintain operational control over their own assets and personnel. The authors note that âsuch a system allows agencies to adapt to changing situations by avoiding a rigid organizational structure, but it hinges on informal trust, cooperation, and institutional knowledge about which agency leads under what circumstancesâ (Pate et al., 2007, p. 14). Seattleâs Marine Terrorism Response (MTR) Project, Bostonâs Maritime Incident Resources Training Partnership (MIRT), and the local participation in the DHS-developed Port Security Exercise Training Program (PortSTEP) are referred to as good examples of incident response preparedness. Emphasizing the need for response exercises, training courses, and a strong team response, the authors cite promising multi-agency, team-based responses in the ports of Boston, Massachusetts; Charleston, South Carolina; Houston, Texas; and Port of Virginia, Virginia that help to coor- dinate firefighters and hazmat response, establish information centers for collating and dis- tributing emergency information to port stakeholders, and use public-private partnerships
22 Making U.S. Ports Resilient as Part of Extended Intermodal Supply Chains to provide specialized equipment to handle certain types of emergencies (e.g., since the 9/11 attacks, FEMA has been directing grants to fund civilian Community Emergency Response Team programs in all 50 states to educate people about preparedness for disasters and train them in basic disaster response skills). In considering port recovery actions, Pate et al. (2007) concluded that compared to the other four areas already discussed (i.e., port awareness, prevention, preparedness, and response to an attack), âwe did not learn about very many promising practices in the area of recovery on our site visits.â Exceptions here included recovery implementation planning in Galveston/Houston, Texas; Los Angeles, California; and Seattle, Washington. In the Houston/Galveston area, officials established Port Coordination Centers (PCCs) to inform and advise on port operational and infrastructure needs, including security concerns that arise in the case of an emergency. These centers can convene functionally in the case of a natural disaster, or geographically in the case of a security incident (another aspect of an all-hazards approach). Each PCC âdesignates a liaison officer to a regional Port Coordination Team (PCT) in order to establish shipping priorities, manage the flow of vessel movements, preserve safety and security, and implement established emergency protocols. The PCTâs role is to disseminate information concerning the nature of the threat, implement protective strategies, continue communication to update the strategies, and reopen the port in an orderly mannerâ (Pate et al., 2007, p. 16). Pate et al. (2007) highlights the use of consequence management (CM) by a number of ports. CM involves a formal process for the restoration function after a catastrophe. Based on their dis- cussions with port officials, the authors recommend, âports should consider adopting a consequence management awareness/training program and a certification process for all levels of response, to avoid disparate approaches that could inhibit communication and coordination. Second, it is important to identify, train, and mentor individuals within organizations on consequence manage- ment. Third, ports should develop a tiered continuum of response.â Noting that local responders will have to carry the burden of the immediate response, and drawing on an article about CM by Seiple (1997), modified slightly here, it was suggested that ports make use of the following actions: â¢ Establish coordination mechanisms to oversee the entire immediate response, â¢ Plan for the use of federal assets to augment the existing response, â¢ Examine the role of the militaryâs reserves as needed in a tiered response between the first responders and the arrival of federal help, â¢ Plan for surge capacities that will be needed for different types of response, â¢ Develop plans for tactical coordination at the incident, â¢ Develop evacuation plans, â¢ Decide who will handle the information campaign, â¢ Plan for the role of medical facilities, and â¢ Ensure that local fire and police departments are prepared to work together. A clear lesson from the literature is the need for sound pre-incident planning or preparedness as it is referred to above. This was a theme for a number of presentations by port officials at a 2006 AAPA Emergency Preparation and Response Seminar in Portland, Oregon (see http://www. aapa-ports.org/Programs/PastDetail.cfm?itemnumber=762), that looked at different aspects of port response and recovery planning. In planning to deal with the financial, administrative, and personnel issues associated with a disruptive event, Eldridge (2006) emphasizes coverage of the 5Msâmoney, manpower, machines, materials, and methods; while McDonough (2006) lists the following steps in recovery planning for container, Ro-Ro, and non-petroleum bulk vessel operations (through New York): 1. Return labor to the port; 2. Complete work on berthed vessels;
Literature Review 23 3. Prepare berthed vessels for departure; 4. Move outbound vessels in order of Vessel Management Plan (VMP) inbound berth require- ments; 5. Move inbound/priority vessels to berths; 6. Rotate all vessels in accordance with VMP until backlog eliminated; 7. Return to normal operations, reposition surge equipment; and 8. Draft the after-action report. Where VMP refers to a Vessel Management Plan, it is based on the following information: â¢ A list of vessels, inbound and outbound; â¢ The order of arrival for inbound vessels; â¢ The designated berths for inbound vessels; â¢ The loading status for outbound vessels; â¢ Required intraport movements; â¢ A listing of priority cargos, inbound and outbound; â¢ The required tugs, pilots, and bunker vessels; â¢ The required number of gangs, mechanics, etc.; â¢ As well as a detailed inventory (vessel frequency requirements; berth availability; terminal capacity; equipment availability and capacity; productivity (vessel and field); estimated cargo/vessel clearance times; off-terminal empty storage capacity; intermodal capacity and road/rail access issues; labor assets; and labor skills inventory) of port or terminal cargo processing assets. Perrone (2006), reflecting on experience with security issues at the Port of Long Beach, identifies the following program management tasks associated with regional business and government continuity planning during significant port disruption events: â¢ Damage and safety assessments; â¢ Structural inspections; â¢ Mitigation and construction activities; â¢ Personnel availability; â¢ Business processes, vendors, suppliers; â¢ Utilities restoration; â¢ Land and water transportation restoration; and â¢ Prioritized restoration of business and government. Perrone also offers a view of business continuity after a disruption event as the outcome of four largely parallel processes: emergency management (people evacuations and recovery of facilities), crisis management (corporate and local command, control, communication, and collaboration), business resumption planning (involving both people and business processes), and IT disaster recovery planning (leading to the availability of a working IT system). Mansourri et al. (2009) propose a three-stage risk management (RM) approach to increase port resilience based on (1) assessing vulnerabilities, (2) devising resilience strategies, and (3) valuing alternative investment strategies. Assessing vulnerabilities includes identifying critical risks, selecting one or more of these risks for further attention, and creating a probability-based risk profile for each of the risks (disruptions) identified. Devising resilience strategies for these risks then involves brainstorming response strategies among stakeholders and identifying the costs associated with each strategy. Under devising resilience strategies, the authors distinguish between identifying resiliency barriers to external shocks, notably the creation of redundancy, such as the provision of extra wharfs, and developing Resiliency Contingencies applied to the support of internal port operating practices, such as the use of more effective container tracking systems. A third stage (of less immediate interest to the present paper) then involves using formal decision
24 Making U.S. Ports Resilient as Part of Extended Intermodal Supply Chains analysis tools such as Decision Tree Analysis and Options Analysis to place a cost and value on these different response strategies. Prioritizing Response and Recovery Actions Following Hurricane Katrina, the USCG conducted efforts to identify additional recovery- related elements and incorporate them within its AMS Plans, to help ensure a consistent approach to MTS recovery and trade resumption. AMS Plan guidance provides general priorities for waterway/port area recovery, which are intended to be used as an initial planning guide and adjusted as needed for individual port areas, as follows (GAO, 2012a, p. 9): 1. Major transportation routes needed for first response and emergency services including evacuation routes, tunnels, bridges, and key waterways; 2. Main shipping channels critical for homeland security and homeland defense operations; 3. Port areas and channels critical for military traffic or out-loads; 4. Main shipping channels critical to major commercial operations; 5. Other maritime infrastructure, operations, and structures critical to the operation of the port/waterway identified by the AMS assessment; 6. Secondary bridges and tunnels; 7. Secondary commercial waterways; and 8. Public/recreational waterways. The federal Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (the âSAFE Port Actâ) also required that AMS Plans include a Salvage Response Plan that identifies available equipment and other resources necessary for clearing waterways, to enable resumption of port commerce âas quickly as possible following a TSI.â The Infrastructure Security Partnership publishes a regional disaster resilience (RDR) guide to developing an action plan, in the form of a roadmap that describes âa step-by-step process that can be customized to develop a cross-sector, multi-jurisdiction strategy to improve capabilities to deal with any major incident or disasterâ (TISP, 2011). Although not port focused, the guide targets, and suggests prioritizing, actions by local and state officials (among others), while pro- moting an all-hazards approach that emphasizes information sharing, public-private-sector partnering, and multi-jurisdictional collaborations. As part of a high-level, 14-focus area guide to resiliency planning, Focus Area 8 addresses the following continuity of operations and business priority issues: â¢ Pre-event preparedness, mitigation (remote siting, back-up systems and built-in redundancies, preservation of vital records, etc.); â¢ Identify operational challenges associated with loss of services/damage to assets; â¢ Ensure essential staff, including technical experts and general workforce; â¢ Ensure access to information and situational awareness; â¢ Address challenges for small and medium businesses; â¢ Identify essential operations and business activities; â¢ Assess potential disruptions to operational and business services, including logistics, suppliers, customers, availability of truck drivers, warehouses, etc.; â¢ Set up business liaison with Emergency Operations Center; â¢ Address administrative, budget issues; â¢ Address workforce policy issues (compensation, absences, isolation, and removal of potentially contagious employees, safe workplace rules, flexible payroll issues, etc.); â¢ Assist small businesses for contingency planning/continuity of operations; â¢ Involve businesses in unconventional threat preparedness activities; â¢ Notify and provide employee information;
Literature Review 25 â¢ Train employees; and â¢ Test continuity plans and procedures. These issues overlap with issues dealing with ensuring resiliency in energy, transportation, cyber security and information systems, and water and waste water, and supporting medical and healthcare systems. ICF International and PB Americasâ (2011) assessment of the impacts of climate change and variability on port assets in 61 marine terminals in Mobile County, Alabama, led them to suggest the following criteria be used to prioritize the criticality of the countyâs marine network assets: â¢ Socioeconomic â Part of national and international commerce systems â Important multimodal linkages â Functions as community connection â No system redundancy â Serves (Mobile area) economic centers â¢ Operational â Use of, and demand for, a facility â Port capacity â Port cargo value â Operations â Channel berth and depth â Maximum vessel size â¢ Health and Safety â Identified in evacuation plans â Component of disaster relief and recovery plan â Identified hazardous materials transfer point â Component of national defense system â Provides materials to health facilities 2.5 Summary Based on the literature reviewed, disaster planning and the actions that result from it involve solutions that include a combination of physical/logistical, informational/transactional, and regulatory actions. They also involve significant investments of financial, physical, and manpower resources in each of the three stages of pre-event preparedness, incident response, and port recovery. Actions taken during each of these stages, while generic at a reasonably high level of abstraction, need to be tailored to a particular port event based on the following specifics: â¢ The type (cause) of the disruption â Natural disaster (hurricane/tsunami/severe storm/earthquake) â Labor strike (port, railroad, or trucking industry strike) â Terrorist acts (bombing, arson, or sabotage) â¢ The speed of onset and severity of the disruption â Geographic extentâfrom a single terminal or port connector to an entire seaport or region â Extent of prior warning â Likely economic (trade) impact â Durationâfrom loss of operations lasting a few days to many weeks â Seasonalityâwhether the disruption occurs during a peak shipping season â¢ The classes and volumes of freight to be moved â Container freight â Break bulk cargo
26 Making U.S. Ports Resilient as Part of Extended Intermodal Supply Chains â Dry bulk â Liquid bulk (petroleum and non-petroleum) â Special freight â Roll on-roll off â Military cargo â¢ The modes of transportation affected and involved in cargo transfers â Water (deep sea, intra-coastal, Great Lakes, inland) â Truck â Rail â Pipeline â Air cargo â¢ The institutional (public/private sector) nature of a portâs operations â Command and control authority during contingencies (who decides, lines of command and communication, use of prepared action plans) â Asset ownership (terminals, land, vessels, intermodal equipment and facilities, cargo, communication and IT systems, etc.) â Control over asset utilization (navigation, loading/unloading, cargo screening, cargo storage, utilities, and water supply, etc.) â Port (longshoremen, management, etc.) and local authority (fire, police, medical, etc.) labor and their availability and work arrangements â Financial resources (availability and authority to use) â Legal and insurance issues as they affect workers, responders, cargo, equipment, and facilities â¢ The involvement of local, regional, and federal government â Safety compliance â Environmental compliance â Security compliance â Credentialing â Cargo clearance and inspection â¢ The response of freight shippers, carriers, and brokers to the disruption, and notably with respect to extent, timing, and duration of cargo rerouting and diversion to other ports. The challenge is to capture the practicalities implied by the many different dimensions of a port disruption event, in both an orderly and repeatable manner. The extent to which this is feasible will determine the level of abstraction, and therefore ultimate usefulness, of any high-level ârules of thumbâ for responding to port disruption and recovery (see Chapter 6). 2.6 Literature Review References AAPA (2009) Emergency Preparedness & Continuity of Operations Planning Manual for Best Practices. AAPA. http://www.aapa-ports.org/Issues/IssueDetail.cfm?itemnumber=1161 Accessed 1/24/2013. Abt Associates (2003) The Economic Impact of Nuclear Terrorist Attacks on Freight Transport Systems in an Age of Seaport Vulnerability. DTRS57-03-P080130. Report prepared for U.S. DOT/RSPA/Volpe National Transportation Center, Cambridge, MA. Allen II, W. T., Clampitt, A., Hipp, M. and Jacobson, S. (2003) Port Security Applied Policy Project: Recommendations to Improve Emergency Response Capabilities at the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach. University of California, Los Angeles, CA. http://www.belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/psapp_042103.pdf Accessed 1/23/2013. Arntzen, B. (2011) âGlobal Differences in Supply Chain Attitudes,â in Global SCALE Risk Initiative. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Transportation and Logistics: Cambridge, MA. ASW, Inc. (2013) Superstorm Sandy: Framing the Discussion of a Supply Chain Disruption and Transportation Outlooks. A. Strauss-Wieder Inc. FHWA Talking Freight Seminar, January 23, 2013. ASW, Inc. (2010) Economic Impact of the New York-New Jersey Port/Maritime Industry, Prepared by A. Strauss- Wieder, Inc. for the New York Shipping Association.
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