Navigating Multi-Agency NEPA Processes to Advance Multimodal Transportation Projects (2016)

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J-1 A P P E N D I X J Summary Project Description The Columbia River Crossing was a proposed five-mile-long highway, transit, bicycle, and pedestrian project connecting Vancouver, WA, with Portland, OR, across the Columbia River. Key U.S. DOT Agencies • Federal Transit Administration (FTA)—Co-lead • Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)—Co-lead • Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)—Cooperating Key State and Local Agencies • Washington Department of Transportation (WSDOT) • Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) • Tri-County Metropolitan Transit District (TriMet) • Clark County (Washington) Public Transit Benefit Area Authority (C-TRAN) • Cities of Vancouver, WA, and Portland, OR • Metropolitan Planning Organizations—Metro (Portland area) and Southwest Washington Regional Transportation Council (RTC) (Vancouver area) Challenges Faced The Columbia River Crossing project team faced three of the five common challenges related to multi-agency National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) activities (see Table J-1). Strategies, Tactics, and Lessons Learned • Build relationships with federal and sponsor agencies prior to the start of NEPA activities. • Hold frequent in-person meetings with federal and state agencies to review progress and resolve issues promptly. • Maintain regular coordination with other interested part- ners and with state, federal, and local resource agencies. • Become familiar with other agency processes early and seek opportunities to align interests and create a platform for reaching compromise if needed. • Develop and implement a detailed agreement about which procedures will be followed. • Allocate additional time to accommodate multiple agency issues and approaches. • Develop a comprehensive staffing plan and coordinate selec- tion of team members. • Defer processes to specialists, where possible. • Establish a charter, including ground rules and procedures for conflict resolution and facilitation. Case Study Detail Introduction The Columbia River Crossing (CRC) project was initiated in 2005 to address transportation needs in the I-5 Columbia River Crossing Bridge influence area in the Portland, OR, and Vancouver, WA, metropolitan areas. Problems in the corridor— including crashes, congestion, restricted freight mobility, limited transit options, poor bicycle and pedestrian connections, and earthquake risk—had been studied since 1999. In 2006, the proj- ect purpose was adopted and the NEPA process commenced. The project was intended to improve mobility, reliability, acces- sibility, and safety for automobile, freight, transit, bicycle, and pedestrian users of the I-5 corridor from State Route 500 in Vancouver to approximately Columbia Boulevard in Portland. The required NEPA process was an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) was published in 2008 and a Record of Decision was signed in 2011. Following the DEIS, a locally preferred alternative (LPA) was adopted. It included a replacement bridge across the Columbia River, a light rail extension to Clark College in Vancouver, and bicycle and pedestrian facilities (see Figures J-1 and J-2). The bridge height, number of lanes, interchange improvements, and local connections were further Case Study—Interstate 5 Columbia River Crossing, Washington and Oregon

J-2 Unique agency- specific program requirements under the NEPA umbrella Differing agency interpretations of NEPA requirements Anticipating which agencies will have a major federal action Efficient coordination among agencies Securing funding for multimodal NEPA studies Table J-1. Challenges summary. Source: CRC Figure J-1. CRC project area map.

J-3 studied and the LPA was modified after completion of the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS). In 2014, the project was put on hold due to lack of construc- tion funding. Lead, Cooperating, and Participating Agencies FTA and FHWA were co-lead agencies. WSDOT and ODOT were local sponsors and staffed the NEPA effort. WSDOT pro- vided most of the project staff, but ODOT provided the envi- ronmental lead. Both the Washington and Oregon divisions of FHWA were involved; they appointed a project manager to the Oregon office to lead their effort. FTA staffed the project out of its regional office in Seattle. Each agency committed to attend meetings in person. FAA served as a cooperating agency due to the project’s proximity to the flight paths of Portland International Airport and Pearson Field. The bi-state project was characterized by a high degree of involvement from numerous local, regional, state, and federal agencies as well as business and citizen associations. In addi- tion to WSDOT and ODOT, local sponsors included RTC, Metro, TriMet, and C-TRAN. These agencies, together with the governors of both states and the cities of Portland and Vancouver, comprised the Project Sponsors Council (PSC), the main project advisory committee. Cooperating agencies included the U.S. Army Corps of Engi- neers (USACE), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the Federal Avi- ation Administration (FAA), the National Park Service (NPS), the Washington State Department of Archaeology and Historic Preservation, and the U.S. General Services Administration. Staff from FTA, FHWA, and the CRC project office met in person bi-weekly throughout the NEPA process. FHWA and FTA also coordinated directly with each other. FHWA partici- pated in the FTA quarterly meetings regarding the project. In addition, there was periodic involvement from the division and regional administrators and the attorneys of both agencies to resolve higher level issues and procedures. The PSC met approximately once a month throughout the NEPA process to discuss all major aspects of the alternatives, the environmental review, and the design. The CRC project established the Interstate Collaborative Environmental Process (InterCEP), which included most of the state and federal resource agencies. The InterCEP agree- ment, signed by participating agencies, established tenets of participation and included comment, concurrence, and dispute resolution processes. NEPA Process/Approach FHWA and FTA were co-leads throughout the process. The NEPA class of action was an EIS, which began in 2006. Although the proposed project had been studied for several years, the study methods were not geared toward narrowing options into a streamlined list of alternatives to be analyzed in the DEIS. Therefore, the alternative development and review process started anew under NEPA. In addition to roadway and transit improvements, the need for bicycle and pedestrian improvements was identified in the purpose and need. Due to the number of modes under study, more than 70 indi- vidual components were considered. These components were screened, resulting in 31 components being combined into 12 representative alternatives, which were narrowed to five alternatives. After further review, five multimodal alternatives were selected for detailed study in the EIS: a supplemental bridge with bus rapid transit (BRT), a supplemental bridge with light rail transit (LRT), a replacement bridge with BRT, a replacement bridge with LRT, and no build. The project represented a very large investment for both highways and transit. The CRC project is an example of a true co-lead project in every aspect and every element. As a result, the differences between FHWA and FTA processes were accen- tuated. One difference was that FTA does not delegate as much responsibility to the project sponsor as FHWA does. Further, because much of FHWA project funding flows through formula programs, FHWA does not generally evaluate projects from a competitive perspective, as FTA does. In 2006, FHWA and FTA signed a Memorandum of Under- standing that set forth which agency’s process would be followed for major components within environmental, pre- liminary engineering, New Starts, and financial plan work activities. However, the agreement lacked detail for the NEPA process and was difficult to enforce. Ultimately, the methodol- ogy for each activity was negotiated as that phase was beginning. Differences between FTA and FHWA processes introduced challenges during DEIS development. State DOT staff was more accustomed to FHWA procedures and being delegated to, and Source: CRC Figure J-2. Visualization of CRC bridge.

J-4 it took them time to adjust to FTA’s differing procedures and the level of FTA involvement. WSDOT had a stewardship agree- ment with FHWA, but FTA does not sign stewardship agree- ments. Instead, FTA staff referenced a series of white papers which outlined roles that Sound Transit and WSDOT held for Seattle-region projects in which the transit elements were much more significant than the highway elements. On occasion, the FTA regional administrator and the two FHWA division admin- istrators and/or agency attorneys became involved to determine procedures and decide issues. Due to staffing limitations, FTA relied heavily on a Project Management Oversight Contractor (PMOC), which increased the amount and complexity of coordination. Additionally, part way into the NEPA process, FHWA brought on a major proj- ect engineer from another region, whose background was primarily large roadway construction projects and who was less familiar with the NEPA process and FTA’s expectations. These factors added time to the DEIS process. By the time the FEIS was being developed, however, many issues had been resolved, staff had learned to work together, and the process went much more smoothly. In addition to the InterCEP process, the DOTs funded liaisons with several state and local resource agencies. Both of these actions were helpful in keeping resource agencies involved throughout the process. In addition, FHWA engaged a staff biologist for the Endangered Species Act (ESA) activities who had considerable expertise and gained the trust of all parties. Further, the Washington State Tribal Liaison office had a long- term working relationship with many of the 35 federally recog- nized tribes affected by the project and was helpful during the consultation process. Agency Requirements Applied to NEPA While there were differences between the FTA and FHWA interpretations of NEPA requirements, the NEPA processes per se were consistent. The differences between the FTA’s discretionary New Starts program and FHWA program requirements were more substantive and impacted the NEPA process. Concurrent with NEPA, FTA’s New Starts process required approval into New Starts Preliminary Engineer- ing, which involved FTA review of such technical aspects as travel demand forecasting and cost estimates, along with application of statutory project evaluation criteria. FTA’s PMOC reviewed all aspects of the project, including the highway aspects. Some substantive differences related to the financial chapter of the NEPA document. FTA, as a part of the New Starts pro- gram, requires a much more detailed financial plan than does FHWA. FHWA was able to accept WSDOT’s cost-estimating process, which includes analysis of cost, risk, impact, and miti- gation. FTA required its own cost estimate and risk assessment procedure to facilitate comparisons with other FTA projects. There were differences between the FHWA and FTA approaches to mitigating impacts. In terms of noise mitigation, for example, FTA can pay for modifications to buildings (such as improved windows to reduce sound transmission) while FHWA relies on noise walls constructed alongside the highway. Finally, FTA is authorized to pursue transit-oriented devel- opment, so it is interested in property acquisitions with that potential. By contrast, property acquired by FHWA for a proj- ect cannot be used for transit-oriented development. The more significant differences centered on process and authority. For example, FTA does not typically delegate authority to contact the State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO), whereas FHWA does. There was disagreement over whether the state DOT archaeologist could sign letters to the SHPO during the Section 106 process. There was also a difference related to the locally preferred alternative (LPA) and when to get buy-in from the partner agencies. FTA typically allows selection of an LPA prior to commencement of the DEIS, while FHWA does not. In this case, however, the DEIS was serving as the New Starts Alter- natives Analysis (AA). FHWA was uncomfortable with having a preferred alternative without disclosing it, and wanted to include that in the DEIS. FTA was concerned about selecting an LPA prior to the DEIS since the DEIS was serving as docu- mentation of and inviting input on the New Starts AA. FHWA agreed to select the preferred alternative as part of the public involvement process for the DEIS. FTA also seeks approval of the preferred alternative by all local partners, and while FHWA does not typically do this, they agreed to in this case. Impact of These Requirements Differing requirements added time and costs to the NEPA process. For example, using two cost-estimating processes instead of one—to satisfy FHWA and FTA requirements— added about $1 million to the project cost. The differences in mitigation and TOD approaches did not lead to significant issues or impacts to the project or pro- cess; it was the procedural questions that caused delays. Time spent negotiating approaches on individual activities during the DEIS added several months to the schedule. Additionally, the NEPA process was not conducted in a vacuum. Disagreements between local jurisdictions and the project sponsors led to heightened tensions among the participants. During the LPA decision-making process, for example, local jurisdictions placed a number of conditions on the project. Staff at all agencies worked hard through- out the NEPA process to resolve issues and maintain the schedule.

J-5 Challenges to Multimodal NEPA Studies Relevant to the Project Unique Agency-Specific Program Requirements under the NEPA Umbrella: New Starts grant requirements were the source of continuing differences between the transit and high- way agencies. While accommodation was reached, resolv- ing the differences took time. The FTA did not adopt the WSDOT cost-estimating methodology that FHWA accepted. Using two separate comprehensive cost-estimating processes increased project development costs. Differing Agency Interpretations of NEPA Requirements: The biggest differences in interpretation related to process. Discussions to reach agreement on the approach added time to the project schedule. Anticipating Which Agencies Will Have a Major Federal Action: The project team knew that both FHWA and FTA would have major actions and both agencies accepted their roles as co-leads. Efficient Coordination among Agencies: Constant com- munication and face-to-face meetings were helpful in work- ing through the differences in approach between the agencies. At some points in the project, higher level officials met to negotiate an agreement on procedures. Over time, the project staff developed a productive relationship and the two U.S. DOT agencies coordinated relatively seamlessly on such matters as who would attend meetings with resource agencies. The need for a bridge permit was anticipated from the begin- ning, and the project team coordinated with the USCG. A change of staff at the USCG led to a lack of continuity. After the ROD, as part of the permit process, the USCG requested that the height of the bridge be increased to provide additional clearance over the Columbia River. This led to a re-evaluation under NEPA to determine whether there were new or different impacts. Securing Funding for Multimodal NEPA Studies: The NEPA portion of the project was largely funded by a variety of FHWA funds that flowed to the states. The states provided the local match. Although obtaining the funding for NEPA and associated studies was not challenging, FHWA funded the bulk of the NEPA process, which included addressing both FHWA and FTA requirements. FTA funds were expected to cover a substantial portion of the construction cost. Strategies/Tactics Used to Overcome Challenges The strategy for overcoming challenges during NEPA activities was to maintain constant communication. The sponsor staff worked proactively to develop productive work- ing relationships with federal partners, and this facilitated the ability to compromise when needed. Over time, sponsor staff was able to convene forums and address differences construc- tively. Tactics included talking through each issue, conducting face-to-face meetings whenever possible, and holding separate conversations with the U.S. DOT agencies, as needed, to avoid and resolve conflicts. Another strategy was learning each agency’s procedures and respecting the agency’s positions on issues. As staff members came to better understand each other’s positions, they were able to anticipate and avoid issues. Additionally, it helped to have staff people with recognized expertise in a topic area. For exam- ple, while FTA does not typically delegate the tribal coordina- tion process, it allowed Washington State Tribal Liaison staff to facilitate the coordination process. Similarly, the expertise of the FHWA’s biology staff was critical to the timely completion of the ESA consultation process. Involving higher level officials or staff attorneys to mediate certain challenging issues was helpful. Senior management and legal staff from all agencies were able to focus on com- pliance with NEPA law and were less concerned about dif- ferences in process, making them relatively neutral arbiters. Another important asset was the expertise and experience of the environmental lead, whose productive relationships with FHWA and FTA enabled successful facilitation of agreements and resolution of disputes. The InterCEP agreement and process were useful in engag- ing the participating state and federal resource agencies. Con- versations were held at the headquarters level to resolve issues with both the USACE and the USCG after the ROD. Lessons Learned Build relationships with federal and sponsor agencies prior to the start of NEPA activities. It takes time to develop trusting, productive working relationships and build a collab- orative project environment. Encouraging a new team to work together under tight deadlines and stressful conditions is less successful than building on established relationships. Hold frequent in-person meetings with federal and state agencies to review progress and resolve issues promptly. Frequent meetings allowed the staff from each agency to get to know each other’s perspective and work through the many issues on this complex project. Face-to-face meetings resulted in more complete communication and less disagreement. Over time, the team members got to know each other and individ- uals developed trusting relationships that were fundamental to effective partnering. Maintain regular coordination with interested partners and with state, federal, and local resource agencies. The

J-6 InterCEP group was quite effective. It, along with the FHWA biology staff, significantly accelerated resolution of ESA issues. The extensive tribal coordination process, which included quarterly staff level meetings and annual leader- ship meetings with the DOT heads, allowed for successful coordination with the 35 federally recognized tribes affected by the project. Become familiar with other agency processes early and seek opportunities to align interests and create a platform for reaching compromise if needed. All key project members on joint projects should become familiar with other agency processes, and should be respectful and open to compromise in order to move all interests forward. Sponsor agency staff was able to move the project forward more quickly as they became more knowledgeable about FTA and proposed solutions that were acceptable to both FTA and FHWA. Develop and implement a detailed agreement about which procedures will be followed. The initial MOU between FHWA and FTA had limited benefit: it was not specific enough to rely on throughout the NEPA process. Developing a more detailed agreement up front might have brought issues to the surface earlier. Allocate additional time to accommodate multiple agency issues and approaches. Agency coordination issues on this large and complex project added at least six months to the NEPA process—between the DEIS and the ROD—as compared to the process each would have used for its single mode. Develop a comprehensive staffing plan and coordinate selection of team members. The team initially lacked suf- ficient collective knowledge of both FHWA and FTA proce- dures. Earlier agreement on needed skills, both technical and “soft,” for key staff on the project team and developing a staff- ing plan for the entire project up front could have limited the need to supplement staff later in the process. Defer processes to specialists, where possible. Having a project team with significant expertise in the various techni- cal issues enabled FHWA and FTA to delegate some of their responsibilities. The tribal coordination and the ESA consul- tation processes were considered to be success stories. Establish a charter, including ground rules and pro- cedures for conflict resolution and facilitation. Large, com- plex projects may need the involvement of senior and executive staff to resolve conflicts in a timely manner. At times, the Columbia River Crossing project relied on the FHWA and FTA division and regional administrators and their staff attorneys to facilitate conflict resolution. Bibliography Columbia River Crossing Project. January 25, 2006. “Interstate Collabora- tive Environmental Process Agreement.” Federal Highway Administration and Federal Transit Administration. December 18, 2006. “Columbia River Crossing Memorandum of Understanding.” Federal Highway Administration and Federal Transit Administration. December 2011. “Record of Decision, Interstate 5 Columbia River Crossing Project.” Federal Highway Administration, Federal Transit Administration, Ore- gon Department of Transportation, Southwest Washington Regional Transportation Council, Tri-County Metropolitan Transit District, and Clark County (Washington) Public Transit Benefit Area Author- ity. April 2008. Project Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Inter- state 5 Columbia River Crossing. Federal Highway Administration, Federal Transit Administration, Oregon Department of Transportation, Southwest Washington Regional Transportation Council, Tri-County Metropolitan Transit District, and Clark County (Washington) Public Transit Benefit Area Authority. September 2011. Final Environmental Impact State- ment and Final Section 4(f) Evaluation, Interstate 5 Columbia River Crossing Project. http://www.columbiarivercrossing.org/ProjectInformation/Research AndResults/AlternativesConsidered.aspx. (As of May 15, 2014). http://www.columbiarivercrossing.org/FileLibrary/ConcepMaps/Project AreaIllustratedMap.pdf. (As of May 5, 2014).