Committee on Future Air Force Needs for Defense Against
High-Speed Weapon Systems

Air Force Studies Board

Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences

A Report of

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This activity was supported by Contract 2014-14041100003-006 with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the United States Air Force. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the view of any organization or agency that provided support for the project.

Digital Object Identifier: 10.17226/23667

Copyright 2016 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

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Suggested citation: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2016. A Threat to America’s Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power—High-Speed, Maneuvering Weapons: Unclassified Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/23667.

COMMITTEE ON FUTURE AIR FORCE NEEDS FOR DEFENSE AGAINST HIGH-SPEED WEAPON SYSTEMS

MARK J. LEWIS, Institute for Defense Analyses Science and Technology Policy Institute, Chair

THOMAS R. BUSSING, Raytheon Company, Advanced Missile Systems

RICHARD P. HALLION, Air Force Historian (retired)

TERRY J. JAGGERS, Decisive Analytics Corporation

ERIC D. KNUTSON, Lockheed Martin Corporation, Skunk Works

RICHARD W. MIES, The Mies Group, Ltd.

GARY O’CONNELL, Science Applications International Corporation

MALCOLM O’NEILL, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) (retired)

BRIAN R. SHAW, National Intelligence University

SUZANNE VAUTRINOT, Kilovolt Consulting, Inc.

DAVID A. WHELAN, The Boeing Company, Defense, Space, and Security

Staff

JOAN FULLER, Director, Air Force Studies Board

DIONNA C. ALI, Research Assistant

CHRIS JONES, Financial Manager

MARGUERITE E. SCHNEIDER, Administrative Coordinator

TONY FAINBERG, Consultant

AIR FORCE STUDIES BOARD

DOUGLAS M. FRASER, Doug Fraser, LLC, Chair

DONALD C. FRASER, Charles Stark Draper Laboratory (retired), Vice Chair

BRIAN A. ARNOLD, Peachtree City, Georgia

ALLISON ASTORINO-COURTOIS, National Security Innovations, Inc.

TED F. BOWLDS, The Spectrum Group

STEVEN R.J. BRUECK, University of New Mexico

FRANK J. CAPPUCCIO, Cappuccio and Associates, LLC

BLAISE J. DURANTE, U.S. Air Force (retired)

BRENDAN B. GODFREY, University of Maryland, College Park

MICHAEL A. HAMEL, Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company

DANIEL E. HASTINGS, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

RAYMOND E. JOHNS, JR., Flight Safety International

ROBERT H. LATIFF, R. Latiff Associates

NANCY G. LEVESON, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

MARK J. LEWIS, Institute for Defense Analyses Science and Technology Policy Institute

ALEX MILLER, University of Tennessee

OZDEN OCHOA, Texas A&M University

RICHARD V. REYNOLDS, The VanFleet Group, LLC

STARNES E. WALKER, University of Delaware

DEBORAH WESTPHAL, Toffler Associates

DAVID A. WHELAN, The Boeing Company, Defense, Space, and Security

REBECCA WINSTON, Winston Strategic Management Consulting

MICHAEL I. YARYMOVYCH, Sarasota Space Associates

Staff

JOAN FULLER, Director

ALAN H. SHAW, Deputy Director

DIONNA C. ALI, Research Assistant

GEORGE C. COYLE, Senior Program Officer

STEVEN DARBES, Research Assistant

CARTER W. FORD, Program Officer

ADRIANNA HARGROVE, Senior Program Assistant

CHRIS JONES, Financial Manager

ANDREW J. KREEGER, Program Officer

MARGUERITE E. SCHNEIDER, Administrative Coordinator

Preface

In February 1949, a research team led by rocketry pioneer Frank Malina launched a two-stage missile, composed of a captured German V-2 topped by a WAC Corporal sounding rocket, into the skies above the White Sands Proving Ground in New Mexico. On this fifth launch attempt under a project named Bumper, that WAC Corporal rocket became the first manmade propelled object to fly at hypersonic speeds, in excess of five times the speed of sound. That small rocket ushered in the age of hypersonic flight.

By the late 1950s, the United States had established itself as the undisputed leader in high-speed flight. With programs such as the X-15 Rocketplane, the ASSET and PRIME vehicles of the 1960s, and more recently the X-43, HIFiRE, and X-51, in the classroom and in wind tunnels, U.S. researchers have consistently led the world in advancing the science and art of high-speed flight. The expertise that informed those programs pioneered the development of new propulsion systems, aerodynamic concepts, control methodologies, and advanced high-temperature materials. Hard-won knowledge of the hypersonic flight corridor led directly to the successful design of manned and unmanned space vehicles, as well as the warheads of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

Now, six-and-a-half decades after Project Bumper, the U.S. lead in the technologies of high-speed flight is in question, particularly as it pertains to military applications. Several countries around the world have been quite busy establishing their own capabilities, in many cases building directly on work gleaned from the United States. These countries have recognized the military potential of speed and see it as a promising counter to U.S. capabilities. Their investments have

been significant, their advancements notable, and their accomplishments in some cases startling. These countries have made no secret of the fact of their interest in hypersonics, nor of their intentions. They have taken advantage of data and lessons learned from the United States and have been helped by the start-stop approach to technology development (including canceling programs even after major successes) and inefficiencies in the U.S. acquisition processes. As a result, the Committee on Future Air Force Needs for Defense Against High-Speed Weapon Systems has concluded that the United States may be facing a threat from a new class of weapons that will effectively combine speed, maneuverability, and altitude in ways that could challenge this nation’s tenets of global vigilance, reach, and power.

This National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report was commissioned by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) to address the question of what, if any, response would be possible to defend against the threat of high-speed weapons. The committee quickly realized that while responding to high speed is challenging in its own right, the combination of high speed and the unpredictability of high maneuverability poses an even greater hurdle. A lifting-body hypersonic weapon, operating at high altitude but in the sensible atmosphere, could use aerodynamic forces to make its trajectory difficult to predict and even more difficult to interdict. As a result, this report highlights some of the challenges to providing a defensive capability against the combination of speed and maneuverability.

When this study began, the committee hoped to identify a class of technology, or suite of technologies, perhaps even currently in development, for employment against high-speed maneuvering threats. The committee saw many concepts and heard about many different possible approaches, but in the end it concluded that there are no “silver bullets.” Stopping a maneuvering hypersonic weapon will be difficult, which is precisely why potential adversaries may be pursuing such systems. More importantly, the committee found that while methods might be developed to defend against one or two incoming threats, traditional approaches in employing defensive measures may be less effective against multiple high-speed maneuvering weapons. As such, the reader of this report will find relatively few concrete recommendations for specific technologies to pursue; rather, the report offers the observation that sustained research and development is needed that considers a range of approaches, and those must be pursued in a coordinated and timely manner.

The committee’s charter was to focus on defense—how the United States could respond when the pointy end is heading toward us. And indeed, the bulk of our analysis has explored defense from both a technology and a roles-and-missions standpoint. But the report also ventures into discussions of developing offensive capabilities as well, for both a counter and a defensive response. The committee considers this topic to be within the study’s statement of task, for it was made clear in several thoughtful briefings and associated discussions that the best defense, per-

haps the only defense, against an opponent’s high-speed maneuvering weapon may be another high-speed maneuvering weapon. Offense and defense are two sides of the same coin; as in the days of the Cold War, the only reliable deterrent to the use of a hypersonic weapon may in fact be the threat of a corresponding hypersonic countermeasure that might hold at risk the very sites from which the adversaries’ hypersonic strike would originate. To better understand the potential operational capabilities and technical characteristics of such weapons, as well as their potential vulnerabilities, it will be important for the United States to make its own timely investments in this area. To this end, the United States’ relatively leisurely pace of disjointed hypersonics technology developments, the lack of diversity in concepts, and the absence of a clear acquisition pathway appear to stand in stark contrast to potential adversaries’ feverish pace of research and development and test and evaluation, as well as their broadly cast net of technology options.

Although it was the USAF that asked the National Academies to examine this subject, this report touches on multiple services and organizations within the Department of Defense (DoD). In the committee’s view, a future commander may not have the time to debate whether an incoming threat should be addressed by the Army or the Air Force, nor the leisure to deliberate on whether an incoming warhead is technically a ballistic missile or a hypersonic cruise missile. Rather, the organizational roles and missions may need to make the resulting response seamless. To that end, and as this report makes clear, the solution to the high-speed maneuvering weapon threat may depend on a coordinated DoD-wide effort. The committee leaves the specific details of that coordination to others, but offers the view within these pages that potential adversaries are already designing systems that exploit both organizational disconnects and current defensive technical limitations within the United States.

The committee is convinced that the USAF has a critical role to play in developing and employing the possible options to address the challenge of high-speed maneuvering weapons, as well as in providing the intellectual leadership for the DoD and the nation in this field.

Mark J. Lewis, Chair
Committee on Future Air Force Needs for Defense Against High-Speed Weapon Systems

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Statement of Task and Study Approach

The Air Force Studies Board (AFSB) of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine was asked by the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology and Engineering to assess the threat of high-speed weapons and recommendations to counter the threat. The National Academies approved the original statement of task for this study in April 2015 and its revision in January 2016 and appointed the Committee on Future Air Force Needs for Defense Against High-Speed Weapon Systems in October 2015.¹ The committee was asked to address the following topics:

1. Review the current and evolving threats and the current and planned U.S. efforts and capabilities to counter these threats.
2. Identify current gaps and future opportunities where the USAF could provide significant contribution to the U.S. effort to counter high-speed threats.
3. Recommend actions the USAF could take in terms of materiel, nonmateriel, and technology development to address the identified opportunities and gaps in U.S. efforts to address these threats.

To address these topics, the committee held four data-gathering meetings, which included face-to-face and telephone interviews, from December 2015 to April 2016 to review, independently research the topic, conduct interviews with

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¹ The appendix provides short biographies of the committee members.

experts, identify key findings, and develop recommendations. A fifth meeting was held in May 2016 for the committee to write a classified report of its findings and recommendations. Throughout the course of the study, the committee met with the Air Force Air Combat Command (ACC), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Missile Defense Agency (MDA), U.S. State Department, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Air University, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), Sandia National Laboratories, and RAND.

The committee received briefings and reviewed data up to the TS/SCI level in responding to the study statement of task and made every attempt to provide a balanced and fair assessment using the data provided. The following is an unclassified executive summary report.

Acknowledgment of Reviewers

This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this report:

Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommenda-

tions, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Anita Jones, University of Virginia (emerita), who was responsible for making certain that independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution.

Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

APPENDIX: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members

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