Guidance for Planning, Design, and Operations of Airport Communications Centers (2018)

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86 Guidance for Planning, Design, and Operations of Airport Communications Centers should maintain a sufficient number of analog phones in the event the network suffers a major outage. 7.6.6 Airport Safety and Security Systems Perhaps the most common applications found in an ACC are those dealing with security and public safety. Additional information on the operations of the public safety and security function are provided later in this Guidebook. Applications that may be part of the ACC system architecture are as follows: • Command and Control Center (C&C) Systems. The C&C system manages and coordinates an airport’s response to all varieties of incidents. The C&C system is integrated with numer- ous other systems and aggregates data from all of them to provide actionable information to management. When developing the ACC system architecture, special attention should be paid to the interaction between the C&C system and other airport applications. • Mobile Command Post Systems. These field-based mobile sub-units of the C&C Center duplicate the functionality available in the primary C&C Center and are used during emer- gency situations. The mobile command systems provide the ACC with a clearer picture of what is happening in a different geographic part of the airport. • Video Surveillance Systems. The “eyes” of the ACC are typically an integrated video surveil- lance system, using various cameras distributed throughout the airport property. CCTV is an integral part of monitoring physical security for any airport. The CCTV system is a collec- tion of cameras with varying functionality—pan, tilt, and zoom capability, infrared, and high definition. Each of these cameras can provide data to the ACC for security, management, and operational purposes. The ACC may have a separate viewing room for public safety cameras and will likely have large-screen displays for airfield, roadway, and terminal monitoring. From an ACC perspective, a highly functional video management system (VMS) is essen- tial. In larger airports where the number of cameras can easily exceed a thousand, managing them is impossible without a VMS. If an airport operator is considering the purchase of a new VMS, the operator should consider the needs of the ACC when making an acquisition deci- sion. An important tool in the VMS is video analytics. Video analytics can be used for a host of safety, security, and operational situations. The CONOPS is likely to have identified scenarios where video analytics can add considerable value to situational awareness. • Physical Access Control Systems (PACS). The PACS controls staff and vehicle access to secure and sterile areas throughout the airport. PACS are controlled by federal regulations and are a critical component in airport security. The PACS should be operated from the ACC or the ACC should receive all PACS alarms. Some PACS can integrate with CCTV systems to bring up a video feed for a door and geographic location. At larger airports, PACS alarms may sound almost endlessly, especially if there are many doors. PACS configuration in the ACC might be to show only alarms for doors directly onto the airfield or other critical locations. • Badging Systems. Badging systems provide for airport ID cards that integrate with the access control system. Badging systems are not likely to be found in an ACC, but access to the ACC should be carefully monitored so that only authorized personnel are allowed to enter and leave the ACC. Before the ACC is opened, it should be decided who will have access to the system. Typically, this is considered to be role-based access control, permitting only certain personnel in specific functions with the access to enter. • Perimeter Intrusion-Detection Systems (PIDS). These systems detect alarms and initiate responses for breaches of perimeter security. PIDS may include microwave systems, sensors in the fence, CCTV, infrared detection, and other technologies. PIDS, along with fences and walls, are the first line of defense on the airport’s edges. The ACC should be able to monitor all activity that has been registered on the PIDS. Establishing a PIDS workstation in the ACC

ACC Technology 87 is not difficult. If the ACC also contains a security operations center (SOC), this application is certain to be included. 7.6.7 Emergency Response and Notification Systems When an emergency unfolds at an airport, two major streams of communication are likely to occur. The first stream includes the communication to emergency responders; the second includes information and directions to the greater public. Both communications streams are likely to be governed by codes, described in standards, and involve best practices as described in the following sections. 7.6.8 Public Emergency Communications Systems The diverse population and airport environment combine to pose many potential challenges when communicating emergency messages to the public. The population will include the travel- ing public, airport employees, airline employees, tenants, and various vendors and contractors. This varied population will be have different agendas whether individuals are business travelers, international families on vacation, part-time retail employees, or contractors performing work. These individuals will need audible and visual messages in various media and perhaps multiple languages. The airport environment may be unfamiliar to the traveling public who may not understand where to go, particularly for unfamiliar events. Also employees may be familiar with only certain parts of the airport. Although a significant portion of the ACC resources will be devoted a central terminal area, most airports are self-responding with an onsite PSAP which will involve response to all parts of the airport campus. In addition to these challenges, the airport campus will have various types of systems, software and hardware will not all be the same age, and their will be different levels of coverage. Consult ACRP Research Report 170: Guidebook for Preparing Public Notification Programs At Airports for excellent information on this topic. The ACC needs to take a holistic view of signaling and informing the public during emergen- cies so as to ensure accurate, consistent, and timely information is provided. The ACC may have access to the following communications systems or methods: • Fire alarm • Public address • Digital signage • Television • Radio • SMS text messaging • Live audio feeds • Automated voice calls • Faxes • Emails • Web postings • Desktop notifications • Social media alerts Although not always feasible, the ACC should strive to simplify the process to a single stream using a unified emergency communications system. This will allow the airport to more accurately anticipate, plan, and minimize response time based on common or anticipated emergencies. The central part of the unified communications system is an interface to initiate either preprogrammed or ad hoc emergency communications with any of the above systems and methods.

88 Guidance for Planning, Design, and Operations of Airport Communications Centers For example, initiation of a partial or full terminal evacuation, if it does not happen on site via a fire command center, would be initiated to trigger the fire alarm system visual strobes, voice evacuation announcement (through fire alarm or paging, depending on the locality), textual messages through digital signage and television systems. Based on the programming, the same written and spoken message would be distributed to the correct subsystems for the correct por- tions of the buildings. Following the evacuation, the airport operator will need a way to inform the public that it is safe to reenter the terminal, how to do so, and (potentially) why the event occurred. Depending on whether or not an EOC was activated, direction will come to the ACC which can lean on the single interface to initiate a preprogrammed all-clear signal, potentially including ad hoc information. From the system perspective, the keys to design are to understand what could be used for the single interface, applicable code requirements and interfaces to other systems for message distri- bution, including use of text-to-speech conversion and protocol compatibility. Codes related to the application of these systems are typically adopted at the state, local, and airport level and may include NFPA 72, “National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code,” which includes requirements for emergency communications systems (e.g., voice evacuation, distributed recipient systems, wide area systems, and mass communication systems); and NFPA 1221, “Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Emergency Services Communications Systems,” which includes requirements for public emergency services communications systems and facilities. Although the systems allow communication to occur, the airport and emergency response plan may be the greatest inputs to the system. Airport input will involve not only the local authority having jurisdiction, fire department, and public safety, but also management, IT, facilities main- tenance, and, in some cases, public relations and legal departments. All of the groups that may be called to the EOC should have input, because they will rely on the ACC to distribute public communications in an emergency. Methods for public safety-related communication include • CAD. This technology for dispatching law enforcement personnel or emergency services can either be used to send messages to personnel in the field (through a mobile data terminal [MDT]) and/or used to store and retrieve data (e.g., radio logs, field interviews, client infor- mation, and schedules). A dispatcher may also provide call details to field units over a two- way radio. CAD typically consists of a suite of software packages used to initiate public safety calls for service and dispatch and maintain the status of responding resources in the field. An ACC may have a CAD workstation solely for monitoring airport activity. Depending on the airport’s law enforcement arrangement (internal or external), placement of the CAD within the ACC is likely to be based on current guidelines and procedures. • Fire Suppression & Alarm Systems. These systems detect smoke and/or heat and initiate an alarmed response to the airport’s C&C center. Irrespective of where the main alarms are sounded, fire suppression and alarm systems are an important tool for ACC operations to be able to monitor fire and smoke events as such events usually affect other airport opera- tions. In the case of smoke and/or heat detection, these systems should interface with the audio and visual paging notification system. • The Emergency Response System. These methods and systems coordinate an airport’s response to major incidents such as air crashes (both on and off the airport), terrorist and criminal activity, and other incidents such as fatal wrecks or accidents involving staff, passengers, or members of the public. This system should also integrate with natural disaster responses and fires. 7.6.9 Airport Facilities and Maintenance Systems Airport facilities departments play an important role in operational readiness. Facility- and application-related technology can provide important data and situational awareness to the ACC.

ACC Technology 89 7.6.10 Building Management Systems (BMS) Building management is a key component of intelligent building design, where several sub- systems tightly integrate so that they can operate with much greater efficiency, anticipating changes in weather and adjusting for the number of people in a given location, and so forth. Managing the physical environment from the ACC allows airport management to meld facility status with other ongoing operational considerations (e.g., reduced flight activity, weather anomalies, or even emergency situations). BMS manage the electromechanical systems in a facility, including security, lighting, cooling, heating, and ventilation. These are also known sometimes as HVAC systems. Unlike typical business applications, a BMS will rely on embedded sensors and other devices for input to the system. Such devices include thermostats, fire detection sensors, and sprinklers. BMS use IP for data transport so the airport’s campus LAN can be used for inter- connecting building systems. • Electric Power, HVAC, and Lighting. All modern infrastructure technology likely has a control center for its management. For newer systems operated on an IP network, feeding alarm sensors to the ACC provides the ACC with immediate situational awareness on critical events in the airport. In older facilities, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are more likely to be found—these are more difficult to integrate into the ACC sys- tem architecture. SCADA systems are often “hard-wired” directly to a control center, typi- cally in a maintenance facility, and it is difficult to have additional feeds go to other locations. • Computerized Maintenance Management Systems (CMMS). CMMS is software used to schedule and record operation and preventive/planned maintenance activities associated with facility equipment. The CMMS can generate and prioritize work orders and schedules for staff to perform periodic/planned equipment maintenance, as well as to log and schedule “trouble” calls. Upon completion of a work order, performance information, such as the date work was performed, supplies/inventory, and staff-hours expended, typically is loaded into the CMMS for tracking, to support future operations/planning. Integrating a CMMS with a GIS gives the airport and the ACC a spatial view of what maintenance operations are occur- ring in the airport at any one time. The CMMS also can be used to track maintenance trouble spots over time. Having access to this information could be valuable in an ACC as airport management tries to balance a wide range of activities that could be occurring in the same place simultaneously. In some ACCs, the maintenance call takers are part of the ACC, giving even more insight into existing maintenance issues. • Moving Walkways and Elevator Monitoring Systems. Most modern conveyance systems identify problems before they occur. These systems detect deteriorating components and inter- mittent anomalies and note the small issues that might go undetected until they cause service. Typically, diagnostic software monitors elevators and walkways continuously and sends data to a central console in a machine room. These systems are also capable of sending similar infor- mation over a network to off-site locations, which could include an ACC if the ACC needs to manage potential conveyance issues. • Geographic Information System (GIS). A critical function of any ACC is the ability to associ- ate incoming data blocks with a spatial identification. Knowing “where” is as important in an airport environment as knowing “what” and “when.” For this purpose, an airport must con- sider how to fully incorporate its GIS capability into its ACC. A GIS is a computer application designed to capture, store, and display information related to geographic coordinates in or around the airport’s location. GIS is used to depict various data points that are spatially con- nected, on one visual display, so the user can more easily see, analyze, and understand patterns and relationships. With GIS technology, airport management can compare the locations of different activities to discover how they relate to each other. For example, using GIS, the same display could depict ongoing construction activity with the location of active concessionaires

90 Guidance for Planning, Design, and Operations of Airport Communications Centers to determine the effect on terminal business. Increasingly, GIS is used to depict the airport environment in 3-dimensional images. This type of display can greatly assist airport manage- ment in understanding its physical environment and how the environment has changed over time. Having GIS information available in the ACC is essential for ensuring that decisions from the center reflect the most accurate and illustrative information possible. 7.7 Airport Technology Infrastructure Systems All of the applications used by the ACC will “ride” on the backbone of the airport’s network. The ACC’s data-at-rest and data-in-motion will reside/flow in the airport’s data centers and telecommunication rooms. The technology infrastructure can easily be overlooked by airport management, because, for the most part, the infrastructure is not visible (except for the data center and telecommunication rooms), but the technology infrastructure is critical. 7.7.1 Passive Infrastructure The airport’s passive infrastructure refers to its physical network, including all of the physical rooms that house network and data processing and storage equipment. The network aspects of the passive infrastructure are the assets referred to in OSI Layer 1, which consists of the basic networking hardware transmission technologies of a network. It is unnecessary to delve deeply into this topic; however without the necessary resources at this level, the ACC has little chance of being a successful initiative and airport management is wise to ensure that the necessary com- ponents are robust, scalable, and redundant. Details follow: • Structured Cabling System (Passive Infrastructure). The primary purpose of this system, also known as the passive infrastructure, is to provide the physical media that allows for the interconnectivity of all airportwide communications systems. More specifically, this inter- connectivity is accomplished through the use of fiber-optic and/or copper cabling routed between each of the communications rooms throughout the airport’s premises and from the telecommunications rooms to the user workstations. The telecommunications rooms, located throughout the airport, serve as the distribution points for the end users of various airport systems. Examples of such airport systems include telephone sets, courtesy phones, pay telephones, security, multi-user flight information display system (MUFIDS) monitors, light-emitting diode (LED) devices, CUPPS, CUSS terminals, building management system control units, administrative network workstations, wireless access points, and information kiosks. All of these systems are served from the telecommuni- cations rooms; therefore, it is good practice to properly account for the co-location of these sys- tems when planning cable routing, component placement, power, cooling, and similar future requirements. The cabling routed between communication rooms is known as “backbone” cabling, whereas the cabling to user workstations is “station” or “horizontal” cabling. • Cable Management System (CMS). Managing the passive infrastructure is an essential compo- nent of the communications infrastructure. A CMS provides a cable asset database for tracking cable terminations and users. Organizations generally move, add, or change at least 30% of communications cabling each year. Eighty percent of the time and cost of such changes is spent in rediscovering cables. Therefore, a CMS provides a return on investment by greatly reducing MAC costs and resource usage. 7.7.2 Network Systems Network Systems provide the bandwidth over which various communication systems dis- tribute and share data. Bandwidth refers to the amount of data that can be transmitted over a

ACC Technology 91 given network segment during a specific period. The advent of reliable, secure Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) technology and gigabit speeds for bandwidth allow airports to provision a single LAN that cost-effectively serves all of its communications systems needs. • LAN. LANs are typically confined to single buildings or small groups of buildings on campuses such as those at airports. The networking technology implemented determines which data transmission methods can be implemented and the upper limit of the speeds available for transmission. Therefore, the choice of networking technologies in a LAN design is critical to developing an overall system that supports existing (legacy) systems, as well as future systems and applications. The current “standard” for backbone applications is 10-GB Ethernet. An ACC can be network-based to operate over a LAN/WAN or over a private network. ACC communications should be scaled for the size and complexity of the system. Operational requirements for voice, data, and video services should be established in the CONOPS well before system design begins. Selection of system architecture and system technologies should ensure that the design will meet current requirements and be scalable for future requirements and will perform reliably over its lifetime and that support will be readily available to diagnose and resolve system problems that may arise. Translating system architecture into a design should address data integrity, data security, full connectivity and security among all system components, appropriate system monitoring and diagnostics, and growth potential. Where system components are supplied by different vendors, the design specifications must provide for proper integration, and post-installation testing must validate that all components are properly integrated and realize the required performance. The system provider should also be contractually bound to support, maintain, and ensure that all components are properly integrated. • Wi-Fi (Multi-Frequency Antenna, Radio Spectrum Management Systems). When airport communications include wireless elements, planning for an ACC must also consider FCC rules and regulations. The FCC’s rules and regulations are in Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regu- lations (CFR). The FCC regulates broadcast stations, amateur radio operators, and repeater stations, as well as commercial broadcasting operators who operate and repair certain radio- telephone, television, radar, and Morse code radio stations. Under FCC rules, certain devices, commonly known as unlicensed devices, are exempt from regulation and may be freely used, so long as they conform to technical standards established in Part 15 by the FCC. For wireless LANs operating in the Wi-Fi bands of 3 GHz and 5 GHz, peak power and radiated signal strength limits have been established that limit wireless coverage. In addition to commercial cellular and wireless LAN services, other types of commercial services widely used for everyday non-critical communications generally fall into one of the following categories: – Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) may provide mobile dispatch and data communications services. Users of SMR systems can communicate between single radios or simultaneously to a group of users. Interoperability within the SMR service falls under the “single system strategy.” Unfortunately, interoperability outside of the service may be limited due to the lack of common standards and protocols, which is further compounded by the fact that SMR systems are licensed across three different frequency bands (220 MHz, 800 MHz, and 900 MHz). – Mobile Satellite Service offers digital broadcast capability, which allows the dispatcher to speak to a single user, a group of users, or all network users. Users can, in turn, communi- cate with members in predefined talk groups. Users within a talk group can communicate via a one-way group call or through standard two-way communication. Interoperability is provided only between users of the system or to individuals connected to the public switch telephone network.

92 Guidance for Planning, Design, and Operations of Airport Communications Centers • Metropolitan Area Network (MAN)/Wide Area Network (WAN). A MAN is a computer network larger than a LAN, covering an area of a few city blocks to the area of an entire city, and possibly including the surrounding areas. The WAN provides the connectivity from the LAN on a campus to points outside the campus, such as data centers in other cities. Typically, today’s WANs use technology similar to LAN-based switches. However, a WAN connection, unless properly configured and managed, could introduce delays and instability, which could affect the user through the reliability or latency of a connection. Airports do not generally have to develop WANs because most of the airport applications and systems will only com- municate at the campus level through the LAN. • Virtual Private Networks (VPN). In virtual private networks, the equivalent of a closed user group, users gather together by virtue of some common characteristics over a common domain. This network can run on dedicated equipment or through a shared infrastructure provider such as a Telco. VPNs provide a secure environment that allows individual groups of users to share data. • Network Management Systems. Network management is a critical function. It is either reac- tive or proactive. Reactive presupposes a user reports a fault and then a technician is dispatched. Proactive means that the IT asset is monitored (for which bandwidth needs to be allocated), and the watching agent intervenes without a user calling in the fault. This requires definition of an operations support model with links to customer and vendor service levels. Many vendors offer network management systems. • Network Security Management. An airport should implement layered security solutions with firewalls and intrusion-detection/intrusion prevention (IDP/IPS) systems at the edge of and inside the network. The airport should also implement industry-recommended practices in virus protection and patch management. Security typically already exists at a device level (e.g., workstation), application level (i.e., log-on password), and at a network level. The most vulnerable parts of a network are the interconnections, whether they be VPN connections or wireless access points. Good network design and careful management will mitigate intrusion and unauthorized entry. Several third-party companies can assist in the intrusion-detection arena. Physical security plays a large part in the overall network security plan. Networking equipment should be in rooms that are physically secure. 7.7.3 Network Design This Guidebook is not intended to provide a full discussion of the network requirements for an ACC. However, the design of the network on which an ACC will conduct its critical functions must have certain attributes, and airport management must ensure that the network meets the following general requirements: • Performance. A well-designed network shows consistently high performance in application response time, the variation in response time, and other performance parameters. • Resilience. The network should provide a resilient platform for the applications it supports. A highly specified network might have to meet an availability target of 99.99% or higher for all applications. Ideally, the failure of any one link or networking device should not result in the loss of sessions or services. Switches and other network devices should have hot-swappable blades and power supplies. Automatic failover to an alternate path should occur within a time interval short enough to minimize the effect on existing sessions. This interval can be defined as the span between when a network topology change (such as the loss of a link) occurs and each device on the network becomes aware of the change. Well-designed networks are char- acterized by consistently low convergence times. • Scalability. A scalable network can support growth to a projected set of functions and/or capacity over a stipulated period without having to be radically redesigned and with minimum

ACC Technology 93 obsolescence of core equipment. A scalable network can handle the addition of users, network nodes, and sites, as well as new applications with increased bandwidth needs. Vendors should be required to describe how the projected functions and/or capacity levels will be achieved and the resulting effect on any proposed systems. The network design should permit the addition of new nodes and users with the addition of a new section or block to an existing structure that serves as the core or backbone of the network. 7.7.4 Network Standards Standards are essential for communication systems and computer networks to function prop- erly. In the United States, the following standards are applicable for airports (the appendixes provide a more detailed list): • The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) publishes standards for network- ing architectures, such as Ethernet networks; for network devices, such as a network switch or a wireless access point; and for various electrical power, communications, and other equip- ment and systems. • The Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) publishes standards for telecommuni- cation facilities and the cable plants that serve them, in addition to other standards. • The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) publishes standards for protocols and devices that operate over the Internet, including protocols for routing datagrams and VoIP. • The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) publishes a wide range of standards and often jointly publishes telecommunication standards with the TIA. ANSI and its largely European counterpart, the International Standards Organization (ISO), also publish com- plementary standards or cross reference their standards. • The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) publishes standards and guide- lines, known as Special Publications, for facility, communication, and network security that are mandatory for federal agencies, unless exempted in PL 107-296, The Homeland Security Act. U.S. airports are generally not obligated to follow NIST standards, but these documents are a significant resource for airports in modeling their own security programs, especially for wireless network security. 7.7.5 Performance The operating environment must ensure that existing systems maintain their access security for the local environment while they are interconnected to the central or regional center. Provi- sions for the networking environment must include local, regional, and/or centralized manage- ment and control of the ACC via the network infrastructure. Prioritization of traffic, preferably developed from an operational analysis prepared during the CONOPS, must be designed into the proposed network infrastructure. Mission-critical traffic should be identified and afforded the highest level of availability, redundancy, and resiliency in network resources. The ACC availability goal in a shared IT network environment should be at least 99.9%. For most ACC applications, this will require IT network availability of 99.99% or higher, depending on the network architecture and the network resources required to support the ACC. When this level of network availability is not possible, the ACC design should focus on ways of attaining close to zero downtime for critical security functions, including information flow to incident responders. Average, minimum, and maximum response time goals, to be determined during the require- ments process, must be maintained throughout the operations period of the network, including periods of moves, adds, and changes which affect database records.

94 Guidance for Planning, Design, and Operations of Airport Communications Centers The network should be sized to have enough excess operating capacity to maintain the initial operating traffic parameters (to be determined) and accommodate sustained peak loads during download/upload of information without effect on operational response times. In addition, there must be reserved capacity for traffic reroutes during the failure of an interconnecting node within the network. Priority reserved capacity (outside of the excess capacity for peak operations) is required for emergencies to allow multiple locations to be accessed from a central command center to coordinate database lookup and updates. When services are provided by common carriers, such as telephone service, arrangements should be made for priority access during emergencies, par- ticularly for cellular services. Access to a WAN by a commercial telecommunications and network service provider should include both guaranteed minimum bandwidth and guaranteed surge bandwidth. The guaran- tees of bandwidth should be set forth in a written Service Level Agreement (SLA) with the service provider to ensure sufficient bandwidth, network availability, and a secure data transfer. 7.7.6 Bandwidth Management Issues When airport video surveillance systems are networked, special design consideration must be given to such issues as transmission bandwidth over the network, network headroom allow- ances, and video storage (including imagery resolution and frame rate, storage duration, and permissions for accessing and viewing stored imagery). Network architecture may involve both centralized and edge-based assets. Determining the bandwidth requirements for the ACC is essential in technology planning during the design phase. CCTV is a heavy user of bandwidth—today’s CCTV systems support hi-definition visual images at frames-per-second speeds, which generate large files. These images can seriously affect network throughput if the network architecture has not been designed properly. An equally critical aspect of CCTV image size relates to the amount of storage needed to maintain images to meet airport, local, and state requirements for data retention. Most large CCTV systems require petabytes of storage—often exceeding the amount of storage needed for all other airport systems. 7.7.7 Mobility Remote or mobile communications technology should be part of the integrated command center concept. Incidents often happen in the absence of key personnel, during holidays, late at night, or when a person with critical skills is on vacation. During an incident, key personnel may not be able to respond to the emergency command center. When response time is critical for reducing risk or preventing an incident from becoming a major disruption, remote communica- tions can provide access by key decisionmakers. 7.8 Workstation Design Section 5.7 of this Guidebook discussed the ergonomic and furniture requirements of func- tional workstations. This section provides further recommendations on the most appropriate ACC configurations. The workstation is the most important aspect of ACC design and special care must be given its layout. ACC personnel are likely to be seated at a workstation for most of their working hours, and comfort and utility are critical to ensuring that personnel can focus on the subject matter, rather than their surroundings. Recommendations for the workstation configuration follow.

ACC Technology 95 7.8.1 Proper Work Surface Setup • The work surface should be installed/adjusted to be approximately 25″ to 34″ high for seated work and to fit a range of operator sizes (ensure that adjustments can be made easily). • The space beneath the work surface should have sufficient room above the legs to allow for a range of body postures. The knee well should be at least 30″ wide by 19″ deep. • The work surface should have adequate space for equipment (e.g., monitor, telephone, sta- pler, and tape dispenser) to be close to the user so as to minimize bending, flexing, or twisting of arms, wrists, or hands. • A matte finish on the work surface is ideal to reduce light reflection. • The keyboard and mouse should be placed together on a platform at least 28″ wide, directly in front of the user and directly beneath the monitor. • The keyboard and mouse platform should move easily (i.e., side to side, up and down, and in and out) and lock securely in place. • The height of the keyboard/mouse platform should allow the user’s hands to rest lightly on the keyboard and mouse with forearms using the chair armrests for support. 7.8.2 Keyboard & Mouse Adjustments • The keyboard height should allow straight wrists and a 90-degree angle between the upper arm and the forearm (angle should adjust by 20 degrees up or down for individual preference and periodic adjustment). • The keyboard height and angle should be adjustable (reverse slope). • The keyboard and mouse should have a wrist rest and/or mouse rest available for support when taking mini-breaks. • The standard keyboard should be replaced with an alternative keyboard (split-key) and alter- native mouse (trackball or touchpad) if personnel develop musculoskeletal disorders. • The keyboard should be able to support “short-cut software” (macros). 7.8.3 Peripheral Items • Peripheral items that are used most frequently should be placed closest to the user so that these items can be conveniently and comfortably reached. • In-line document holders should be used and should sit between the keyboard/keyboard tray and screen and be aligned with users’ body midlines so that operators can look down to see documents and raise their eyes to see their screens. • Screen-mounted document holders should be used. Each holder should be positioned to the same side of the screen as the dominant eye of the user. • Freestanding document holders should be used. Each holder should be positioned next to the side of the screen and angled slightly so that it follows a curve from the side of the screen. • To reduce the stress in an operator’s neck, a headset may help reduce stretching and improp- erly holding of the phone. • Materials should be stored in accessible areas (between 15″ and 48″ above floor). • Storage areas should allow 30″ × 48″ clear maneuvering space and accommodate right or left-hand access. • Deep storage should have “lazy susan” carousels and pull-out shelves or drawers with full- extension ball-bearing slides. • Stored materials should have labels facing out with instructions, symbols, or color coding. • It may also be beneficial for each user to have their own keyboard and mouse to prevent the spread of germs in shared workstations. At the least, cleansing wipes should be available.

96 Guidance for Planning, Design, and Operations of Airport Communications Centers 7.9 Managing ACC Video Output There are many ways to display information in an ACC, and all available options should be evaluated for the particular requirements of the ACC during the design phase of the project. Depending on the physical size and layout, the ACC may have a video wall, separate video dis- play screens arrayed throughout the facility, video monitors on each workstation (in some cases multiple monitors), or, more likely, some combination of all three. How best to position monitors depends on ACC functions, personnel, and the organizations represented within the ACC. 7.9.1 Workstation Monitors A detailed evaluation of the configuration of operator workstations is essential in designing the ACC. The final configuration will vary depending on the functions assigned to each station, as well as displays for groups within the ACC who perform supervisory functions or who are present as third-party participants or as observers. A typical operator workstation will have multiple monitors capable of displaying information based on schedules of permissions. At least two monitors should be provided—one for the dis- play of real-time information and one for event or incident assessment. When several cameras are to be monitored, a third display will enable an operator to access cameras from a schedule and/or to monitor event and incident logs. Regardless of the display selection, all monitors should be equally capable of fulfilling all assigned functions to provide redundancy. Choose monitors with appropriate resolution, dot pitch, brightness, and contrast to reduce eye strain and increase comprehension. Carefully consider the design of large-format visual dis- plays, such as multi-panel video walls, including sightlines from operator stations, lighting, and screen resolution and flicker. Designing for large-format displays requires a cross-disciplinary approach that includes an understanding of technology and ergonomics as well as traditional architectural/engineering concepts. Video wall panels should be individually addressable so that multiple feeds can be displayed simultaneously, including streaming video. The following factors are relevant to selecting the number, placement, and quality of monitors: • Size. The cost for large flat panel monitors has dropped dramatically in recent years, allow- ing ACCs to provide larger and higher quality monitors. Consider investing in large units that will help reduce eye strain and provide greater detail when viewing video. • Number of screens. Place primary work screens directly in front of users, with secondary screens to the sides. If possible, use dedicated screens for primary systems, which allows oper- ators to use secondary applications (e.g., email and word processors) while keeping primary systems displayed. • Image quality. Size is not the only attribute that makes a monitor easy to view. An ACC should have monitors with above-average dot pitch (smaller is better), brightness, and contrast ratio of monitors. These characteristics affect image quality, reduce eye strain, and make details appear more pronounced when viewing video surveillance feeds. • Viewing angle. According to the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society ANSI/HFES 100-20073, the center of the visual display screen should be 15 to 25 degrees below hori- zontal eye level. During work periods, display screens should not be more than 35 degrees off axis (i.e., from the user’s predominant line of sight) while the user is gazing straight ahead. Also, the entire visual area of a visual display terminal workstation, including items other than the display (such as the keyboard), should be between 0 degrees (horizontal eye height) and 60 degrees below eye height.

ACC Technology 97 7.9.2 Video Walls Although some ACCs may choose to use large wall-mounted displays, the trend is to use a video wall. A video wall consists of multiple panels arranged according to the dimensions of the ACC and associated viewing distances. Available monitor technologies include liquid crystal dis- play (LCD) panels, LED arrays, digital light processing (DLP) tiles, and rear-projection displays. Each technology has advantages and disadvantages (related to panel size, resolution, brightness, contrast, flicker, glare, power consumption, reliability and maintenance, and life cycle cost). Video wall configurations typically begin with 2-ft-vertical by 3-ft-horizontal monitors and can expand to many times these numbers, subject to wall area, power and cooling, aesthetics, and budgetary constraints. Video walls provide a degree of flexibility that cannot be achieved with individual monitors, provided that such flexibility is included in their design. For example, each panel or segment could be individually addressable, from any operator workstation, to permit one event to be stitched across the entire video wall, or multiple events to be displayed on individual panels simultaneously. 7.9.3 Display Options The selection of a display format is driven by the application. A 4:3 aspect ratio display will generally show more area in the vertical dimension than a 16:9 aspect ratio display. An indoor application, such as hallway monitoring, may benefit from a 4:3 display. An outdoor area, where horizontal coverage may drive the application, might benefit from a 16:9 display. The term “display resolution” is usually understood to mean pixel dimensions (i.e., the num- ber of pixels in each dimension). This is not the same as pixel density (i.e., the number of pixels per unit distance or area), which is a proper indication of display resolution. In digital video, display resolution is generally given in pixels per inch. In analog video, if the screen is 10 inches high, then the horizontal resolution is measured across a square 10 inches wide and is expressed as lines per picture height (e.g., NTSC TVs can typically display 486 lines of “per picture height” horizontal resolution, which is equivalent to 648 total lines of actual picture information from left edge to right edge). Considerations related to large-format video displays include the following: • Large-format video displays are invaluable in communicating information to a large group of people quickly and effectively. Rather than needing to get attention by making an announce- ment in the ACC, messages, images, documents, and video can easily be distributed to the group by using large-format video displays. This allows effective communication without disruption of disparate activities. • ACCs are increasingly using large video walls composed of multiple display units arranged as a single display. The question of using LCD screens vs. video cubes when building a video wall has a large effect on cost and visual accuracy. With the drop in cost of LCD screens in recent years, it is sometimes compelling to use them to reduce costs, but their drawbacks may make them unacceptable in mission-critical video walls. LCD screens have a border (also known as a bezel) around each screen. When multiple LCDs are tiled together to form a single large display, the bezels present issues. The bezels are a “dead space” in the wall and cause issues when displaying an image that spans multiple screens. • Video cubes provide a near-seamless video wall (with tiny borders as small as 1 mm) and can be serviced in place by replacing parts. LCDs, by contrast, are rarely serviceable in place and ordinarily need to be removed and either replaced or sent for servicing, either of which considerably disturb activities in the ACC for lengthy periods. Video cubes offer the highest possible quality and are the preferred choice if the budget permits.

98 Guidance for Planning, Design, and Operations of Airport Communications Centers • Whether the ACC has a video wall or LCDs scattered around the space, the ACC will need a control system to feed imagery to the displays. Ideally, the video control system will be able to display video from various sources, including – Video feeds from the video management system. The video wall should be able to display video feeds, both live and recorded. – Video from television feeds. News and other information from broadcast, cable, and satel- lite television is often crucial for achieving situational awareness of remote situations. – Documents. Staff should be able to share documents electronically instead of printing them. – Computer screens. Staff should be able to share views of software applications. • Determining where a large-format video display should be located is not as simple as finding empty wall space. It is crucial to understand sight lines, refraction, light levels, and acoustic attributes (e.g., sound transmission and ambient noise management). For example, placing a display in the wrong location could result in glare and reflection from windows or inability for some staff to see details on the screen. • Traditional design techniques, such as floor plans, elevations, and sketched renderings, have proven ineffective in understanding all of these aspects, thus requiring the use of more advanced techniques like 3D digital modeling and full-scale mockups/simulations to assess the effect of display placement adequately. 7.10 External Communications The ACC will have direct connections to various systems external to the airport. These vital communication links provide critical information to airport management and the ACC. These links are likely to flow into the ACC through the Internet, so the ACC needs a strong, redundant Internet connection. If the ACC is relying on the existing airport connection, airport manage- ment must ensure that the existing connection will meet the needs of the ACC, both during regular operations and emergency situations. 7.10.1 Internet Access and the World Wide Web Broadband Internet access to the World Wide Web and email is vital for ACC participants, especially during emergencies, for communicating with external agencies when traditional wire or radio links are unavailable. Internet access will be essential for participants in the EOC, who in many instances will be representing other agencies in remote locations and will need to access their home networks. The Internet is a massively redundant network and proved its worth during the events of September 11, 2001, and during major hurricanes, tornadoes, and other weather phenomena in recent years. There are several ways to provide Internet service in the ACC. The ACC is expected to be a node on the airport IT network and network routers can be provisioned for accessing the Internet. It is also possible to connect the ACC to the Internet independently of the airport IT network. Internet security and network protection are major concerns. Both local and remote access will be involved for non-airport persons participating in the ACC. 7.10.2 News/Weather Feeds Satellite and CATV cable feeds should be provided to allow news and weather TV channels to be displayed on the wall display monitors in the ACC and the EOC. Each console position will be able to listen to selected audio on their headsets. If satellite and/or cable feeds are provided,

ACC Technology 99 the potential to include broadband access (at least on the cable feed), which would be routed differently from the telephone lines into the ACC, should be examined. 7.10.3 Interoperability ACC links to other agencies may involve local, regional, and state assets (e.g., EOCs, police and fire, and fusion centers) as well as federal agencies (e.g., TSA, CBP, and FEMA) with whom interoperable communications will be necessary. The extent of voice, data, and video streaming interfacing will vary with each organization. Typically, wired and wireless modes of communi- cations will be involved, including trunked radio systems for regional interoperability. Some of these modes may be secured by encryption. 7.10.4 Social Media and Social Network Monitoring Technology can be used to track smart phone locations at an airport and, via each phone’s unique address, to analyze social media messages in real time. Airport use cases include assessing traveler satisfaction and providing retail alerts that may be relevant to travelers based on their social media messages. 7.11 Organizations Operating in the ACC Although any airport organization may be located in the ACC, the most common are public safety, airport operations (including landside and terminals), facilities management, and the IT department. Each of these entities will have special technology considerations if included in the ACC organization. 7.11.1 Public Safety Operations Some ACCs double as Security Operations Centers (SOCs). The configuration and function- ality of the SOC will depend on (1) how its roles and relationship with responder dispatch and incident management functions are defined in the CONOPS, and (2) how the SOC is staffed and trained to perform these functions. At many airports, and particularly when incident response is primarily the duty of municipal or county police departments, dispatch and incident manage- ment may be performed in a separate Police Dispatch Center. Either arrangement is workable with the proper information flow, but proper information flow should be a primary objective of the SOC system design. Figure 7-3 depicts the interrelationships between an SOC and critical security functions, such as identity management, access control, intrusion detection, and video surveillance. The SOC general design considerations include sufficient space and support facilities for per- sonnel and IT equipment to facilitate rapid access and dispatch to all physical points of the property. Secondary, or backup, SOC facilities may only require mission-critical capabilities and need not be configured with video walls and other full-service equipment. Additional services generally associated with public safety and first response (e.g., first aid stations, lost-and-found departments, public announcement [PA] systems, and paging services) are often supported via public access facilities. When an ACC includes an airport Police or security operation (e.g., a SOC or a PSAP), a CAD system will often be necessary. The CAD assists operators in responding to an incident and dispatching the correct resources to its location, especially when the volume of activity can easily overwhelm even the best operators. An event that occurs anywhere on the airport will cause

100 Guidance for Planning, Design, and Operations of Airport Communications Centers Figure 7-3. Integrated communications for airport security system.

ACC Technology 101 some form of notification to a call taker and/or dispatcher. This notification may be a telephone call via 911 from any telephone on the airport, from the security system indicating a perimeter breach, a fire alarm from any building on airport, or from airport operations. The CAD system should be designed to provide prompt transaction response time, so that even during times of maximum load on the system there will be no user-discernible degra- dation of response time or the system’s ability to process data. The CAD system should also provide online, real-time support to enhance the operational environment for the police, fire, and EMS services. Operator interfaces should allow dispatchers to access remote data and systems (even when they are on separate systems located at the airport or at another state or federal location) and should support VCIN, NCIC, E911, voice radio, mapping, CCTV, videocamera and digital video recording systems, access control systems, and entry and fire alarm systems. CAD workstations should support the following operational functions: • Call Taker • Police Dispatch • Fire Dispatch • Supervisory Functions • Fire Supervisor • Police Station • Fire Station • System Manager 7.11.2 Airport Operations Airport operations may be conducted directly from the ACC. Operations and communica- tions have a natural nexus and airports may find that their ACC will take on far more than simply communications and will eventually be the central management point for the entire airport. This is especially important when the airport is either totally or partially common use. Airport managers and airline tenants are constantly searching for ways to improve the effi- ciency of their operations and the services they deliver to customers. Airport operators focus on adding flights (and airlines) and maximizing the use of their facilities. For terminal facilities, the metrics are passengers per gate per day (i.e., utilization) and revenue per gate per day. The concept of the common use facilities that has evolved to satisfy these metrics is described in detail in ACRP Synthesis 8: Common Use Facilities and Equipment at Airports (2008). Common use facilities may include • Passenger paging systems—both audible and visual. • Multi-user flight information display systems (MUFIDS). • Multi-user baggage information display systems (MUBIDS). • Gate management systems (GMS), including common use terminal equipment (CUTE). • Ticket counters, including common use self-service (CUSS) kiosks. • Local departure control systems (LDCS). • Airport operational database (AODB) systems. • Common use baggage sorting systems. • Baggage reconciliation systems, including the use of radio-frequency ID (RFID) devices. This list is not exhaustive, but it demonstrates the effect that technology has on implementing airport common use policies and programs and the challenges introduced when each tenant may have different non-standard legacy systems and unique data requirements.

102 Guidance for Planning, Design, and Operations of Airport Communications Centers Airports that operate preferential or exclusive use gates may also benefit from placing airport operations in the ACC, though interaction with the airline will be far less routine. 7.11.3 Facilities Management Facilities management/maintenance is a likely candidate for inclusion in an ACC because so much of the daily activity in an airport is either conducted by the facility group or their actions affect other airport operations. ACC information gathering is often incomplete if the data pro- vided from this airport organization is not included. The most likely facility management function for inclusion in an ACC is the maintenance call center. Using the ACC as a one-stop call center for maintenance issues, IT concerns, general public inquiries, and so forth provides valuable insight into and situational awareness of the airport’s most important activities. The maintenance call center will likely feed the information received via calls into a CMMS and, as a result, provides the ACC with valuable information on airport issues, activities, potential bottlenecks, complaints, and so forth. 7.11.4 IT Organization Locating some elements of the IT department in the ACC is prudent and potentially prescient, especially in case of a major emergency. IT services can range from simple desktop support (if the ACC is large enough to warrant dedicated staff) to placement of a network operations center (NOC) or an information security operations center (ISOC). If simple desktop support is provided, help desk technicians/desktop support should under- stand that ACC calls take priority and need to be handled immediately whenever possible. Additionally, helpdesk technicians should report immediately to the ACC in any emergency situation. A small cache of emergency IT supplies (e.g., replacement PCs, boards, drives, cables, keyboards, pointing devices (mice), monitors and a printer) should be located near IT helpdesk personnel. It may be useful to have additional VoIP handsets and headsets available. An air- port is most vulnerable to an IT failure during an irregular operation or an emergency—when additional stress or unanticipated usage is put on communications technology, a critical failure is more likely. Having IT personnel available during these situations may make the difference between a minute of downtime and several hours. A more extensive involvement of the IT department in the ACC is having the airport’s NOC or SOC physically housed in the ACC. At first, the concept may seem foreign to most airport managers, but almost every aspect of airport operations relies on the IT infrastructure. Having an understanding of network or IT security issues as they are happening is important to having total situational awareness at an airport. Moreover, as cybersecurity incidences continue to increase in all sectors, including the air transport industry, it is prudent to consider how an airport operator will handle such an incident. There are many parallels between handling a phys- ical security incident and a cybersecurity incident and the airport operator needs to be aware of those areas where the similarities can facilitate response. (Further discussion on cybersecurity is provided later in this Guidebook.) A NOC (also known as a network management center) is one or more locations from which network monitoring and control, or network management, is exercised over a LAN. NOCs can be a simple workstation for small networks or extensive monitoring locations for more complex networks. So as to avoid degraded service, NOC personnel monitor the airport’s networks for conditions that may require special attention. Having a NOC in an ACC can enhance situational awareness and response to network or system outages.

ACC Technology 103 In addition to monitoring internal and external networks, NOCs can monitor social networks to get an early awareness of disruptive events. Like an ACC, large NOCs are designed with several rows of desks facing a video wall that shows details of general network performance, alarms, and outages. If airport management decides to include a NOC in its ACC, the NOC could double as the ACC’s data center and telecommunications facility. An ISOC is a dedicated site where enterprise information systems (e.g., websites, applications, databases, data centers and servers, networks, desktops, and other endpoints) are monitored, assessed, and defended. A help desk is a resource intended to provide the customer or end user with information and support related to an airport’s products and services, usually by troubleshooting problems and providing guidance about desktop computers, airport applications, phone issues, and mobile devices. The IT help desk can be located in an ACC. Given that IT issues often are first discovered through help desk calls or inquiries, having that information resident in the ACC could enhance airport situational awareness. 7.12 Situational Awareness Software Situational awareness involves understanding the relationships of events and information relative to an airport’s point of view in both time and space. In an emergency, data develops in real time, and data that is not available when a decision needs to be made is not of any use at all. An airport operator may want to consider situational awareness software that can continually monitor multiple events and coordinate, categorize, assess, track, prioritize, and assign appro- priate response resources while simultaneously reviewing developing events for relevant patterns, trends, and correlations so that any resulting information can be consistently modified to sup- port regulatory requirements and forensic analysis. The resulting analysis can be used to guide adjustments in policies and procedures. Selecting sensor systems with standard interface proto- cols will enable evolving predictive algorithms to be deployed to assist operators in preventing incidents. In seeking to attain situational awareness, remember that detection is not meaningful without assessment; assessment is not meaningful without response; and response is not mean- ingful without resolution. Ultimately, prevention is the desired goal, which may be achieved at any point during the awareness cycle. The ACC should facilitate an optimal level of situational awareness. ACC design must bal- ance operational processes and procedures, technological capabilities, budget and space limita- tions, regulatory guidelines, and other considerations into a cohesive utility that can include command and control functions for activities in various operations centers (e.g., AOCs, EOCs, and ICPs). Even for small airports, operators who are removed from the scene in an ACC may have difficulty quickly understanding where an event is happening—this is true for several reasons. One reason is that multiple systems often have different naming conventions. Few airports have implemented all their technology at one time—Many airports have technologies from multiple eras, implemented over decades. One effect of this multi-generation implementation is that locations, alarms, and other assets can have different names in different systems. Another chal- lenge is that being able to mentally correlate information and visualize it in a geospatial context varies widely from person to person. To address these challenges, many ACCs use technology to correlate information from mul- tiple systems to create a single “incident package” of data that is normalized for the alarm. For example, since the 1990s, O’Hare International Airport has combined alarms with maps and

104 Guidance for Planning, Design, and Operations of Airport Communications Centers video feeds to provide ACC operators with a clear picture of the location and the incident. By combining these resources into an information-rich incident package, operators have the best possible view of the event, which helps them assess what is happening and respond faster and more effectively. 7.13 System Test, Verification, and Validation The ACC should be considered as a system and all best practices for system design, acquisi- tion, development, and implementation should be followed. One of the most critical aspects of the system lifecycle is proper testing before the ACC goes “live.” ACC testing activities may take various forms and include system test plan development, system test procedure development, system qualification testing (SQT) and/or factory acceptance testing (FAT), site installation test- ing (SIT), and operational testing (OT). ACC acquisition and installation should include a system test plan that should describe the approach to verifying all system requirements, including the test scenarios to be executed. ACC testing should • Ensure that the new ACC meets specified operational and functional needs and capabilities, and • Verify that the ACC is operationally ready to be handed over to and operated by the users. An overall system test method should include the following steps: • Determine the overall goal(s) of the test, including the device(s) to be evaluated and the test location(s). • Identify the operational, functional, environmental, and measurable parameters that need to be evaluated to define the success or failure of the devices. • Prepare, for the user’s approval, a test plan that sets forth measurable parameters for scenarios of operational conditions and that scales the testing according to the available resources and time. The operational conditions to be tested should include – Conditions representing the normal range of operating parameters, – Abnormal conditions, and – Deliberate attempts to fool and/or defeat the system. • Develop a baseline of relevant operational and functional data on existing test site(s) prior to the installation of new device(s). • Install the new device(s), verify their continuity and, if appropriate, include their network connectivity, and verify that all devices are set in the appropriate mode and are to be operated in the appropriate conditions for testing. • Conduct the tests in accordance with the approved test plan. • Analyze the results, particularly with respect to the baseline data and to the specified perfor- mance and functional requirements, across the range of test conditions. 7.14 Technology Security Securing the technology used in the ACC is of critical importance. As the airport operator becomes more reliant on the ACC, the corresponding systems that provide the ACC with data become more important. These systems’ continued confidentiality, integrity, and availability (the CIA triad often cited in cybersecurity discussions) is of paramount importance and every step necessary to ensure the successful operation of the systems and applications should be taken. There are some basic steps an airport operator can take to help ensure the highest level

ACC Technology 105 of security possible. Section 8.7 of this Guidebook discusses creating a Facility Security Plan focused on the security of the ACC’s physical presence. A similar approach to system and appli- cation security is also highly recommended. Even for small and medium-sized airports, security begins with security governance. As either a component of the Facility Security Plan or as a standalone initiative, ensuring proper security controls is an essential element in system security. The intent of security governance is to guarantee that the appropriate information secu- rity activities are being performed to ensure that risks are appropriately reduced, system security investments are appropriately directed, and airport management has visibility into the security program. (Technology security will likely be part of a larger airport technology security effort so this Guidebook primarily touches on those elements related directly to an ACC and provide a few best practices.) For both physical and cybersecurity, IT security governance begins with a risk assessment where threats, vulnerabilities, effects, likelihood, and mitigation efforts are considered and doc- umented. Without a thorough risk assessment, applying security measures is often ineffective and misplaced. Once the risk assessment is completed, the ACC, or the airport, will have carried out its due diligence and due care in providing for technology security. 7.14.1 Physical Security The physical security for ACC systems and applications should already be in place; however, the following points should be considered while the ACC is being planned and designed: • The data center and telecommunications rooms where ACC systems and applications reside must be protected. These areas must be physically secure with limited access and in environ- mentally conducive settings. • There should be a plan for replacing hardware before it fails so that disruption of availability is reduced as much as possible. • External third parties should have limited access to airport hardware and software resources and, where appropriate, such resources should be tightly controlled. • Camera equipment, access control mechanisms, radio antennas, and other data gathering endpoints must be maintained, protected, and upgraded as necessary. 7.14.2 Cybersecurity Because of the computer-based architecture of today’s security systems and the intercon- nected nature of the Web-based world, all systems must be secured against cyber threats. Cyber- security is far too complex to cover in detail in this document; however, ACC facility designers should create a plan for cybersecurity that addresses design challenges such as firewalls, virus detection, intrusion detection, and identity management. A trusted outside organization or another airport team should test the cyber defenses established by the airport security team. A major flaw in testing your own network security is a tendency to limit the test to the new systems and not consider other major vulnerabilities. The extent of threats to communication systems is illustrated by techniques exploited by the Stuxnet attack on the SCADA systems that controlled some nuclear centrifuges in the Middle East. The attacking software used multidisciplinary exploitation techniques to achieve a specific result on a particular target. By their nature, ACCs communicate with numerous external sys- tems, each of which may be exposed to different cyber threats, so cyber threats can come from multiple sources.

106 Guidance for Planning, Design, and Operations of Airport Communications Centers Modern operating systems contain some countermeasures for cyber threats running at ele- vated privilege levels, including requiring that digital signatures on software must be checked before the software is loaded for execution. Cyber-attack authors subvert this countermeasure by obtaining (most likely through physical exploitation) digital certificates that contain valid credentials used to sign software that can then be loaded onto the operating system. Making the necessary information available to the appropriate people—and only to those people—involves cultural, technological, and operational changes in a dynamic environment. Airports should recognize that such an approach is likely to challenge some cultural barriers to trust and data sharing within an organization. NIST’s Special Publication SP 800-37, “Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems,” addresses changing risk identification and system certification from a static, procedural activity to a more dynamic activity that promotes effective management of information security risks in the face of increasingly complex threats, vulnerabilities, and mission objectives. 7.14.3 Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities Common cyber threats include • Authorized individuals failing to log off or re-secure their access points or computers, making undetectable unauthorized access available by others. • Authorized individuals gaining access to portions of the network they are not authorized to access. • Unauthorized individuals gaining access to the network from computers or systems that nor- mally allow access only to authorized individuals, either by “hacking” or by using an autho- rized individual’s passwords or access codes (which, in turn, suggests a need for stronger password protocols). • Unauthorized individuals gaining access to the network from computers or systems on prem- ises or in restricted areas that normally do not allow access. • Unauthorized individuals gaining access through external connections such as Wi-Fi modems or wire-taps. • Cat-5 access ports available for local use that are not disconnected when authorized use is concluded, thus exposing the network to external access. Similar to physical security, network/data/information security is based on understanding these and other vulnerabilities and agreeing which of them can be mitigated. Regardless of what the threats are, there are at least three levels of control: • Administrative Control. The security system applications and network should support the airport’s own security standards, policies, and procedures, including password policies. • Logical Control. Use software and data (e.g., passwords, network- and host-based firewalls, network intrusion systems, access control lists, and data encryption techniques) to monitor and control access to information and computing systems. • Physical Control. Monitor and control the telecommunications rooms where equipment and infrastructure are located. Use access control systems to secure areas critical to the airport network. Use of metal keys to access telecom rooms does not (1) offer accountability of who entered or when, (2) track key assignments, or (3) validate the person’s permissions. Although there is significant flexibility in selecting requirements from the NIST SP 800-53 Security Catalog, IT technology makes it challenging to select suitable measures and imple- ment them cost-effectively in a way that is also compatible with staff resources and skills. For example, netcentric architectures (e.g., user-oriented architectures and cloud computing) can introduce subsystems that may not be part of the larger system throughout all stages of the life

ACC Technology 107 cycle. Including a subsystem may require reassessment of the security risks to an airport’s IT network using the designated controls—this is a continuing process driven by the need to cope with evolving threats. 7.15 Privacy and Other Legal Considerations Some elements of the ACC, such as video surveillance and the massive amount of data that it generates, raise legal considerations that affect system planning, design, and operational use patterns. From the placement of cameras, to the safeguarding and retention of the data collected, to the access, use, and dissemination of that data, security system planners and designers must satisfy requirements imposed by federal, state, and local laws. These require- ments can vary significantly by jurisdiction, so airport counsel perform a legal review of the planned systems. Legal considerations generally address the following questions: • What information can be collected? • Who has access to data once it is collected and how is the data being shared/used? 7.15.1 Data Collection The principal concern is privacy protection. As a general rule, under both federal and state law (although some state privacy protection law is becoming more restrictive), there is little or no protection against observation of conduct that occurs in a public place. For surveillance systems configured for surveillance of only public areas, it is unlikely there will be any significant legal concerns. Where surveillance systems are in areas that adjoin private areas (e.g., private property adjoin- ing an airport perimeter) or near public areas where there is some expectation of privacy (e.g., in a terminal concourse near a restroom), efforts should be made to restrict the ability of CCTV operators to observe those areas by means such as restrictions on video camera coverage or using software that blocks the views of concern. 7.15.2 Data Storage and Use Data storage and use of data issues that might affect ACC planning and design include privacy protections; records retention requirements; Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requirements; and Sensitive Security Information (SSI) regulations: • Privacy Protection. A growing body of law suggests that data compilations may have unique requirements for protection for which systems are necessary to ensure that data is safeguarded and only used for appropriate purposes. ACC design should provide for the control of internal permissions and authorizations for access to data and permission for activities such as copying and disseminating data. • Records Retention. In most jurisdictions, state and local laws regulate a public body’s activities with respect to disposition of public records; some treat surveillance data as constituting a public record required to be retained in accordance with an established schedule. Therefore legal retention requirements for video data may be substantially longer (or shorter) than called for in the airport’s CONOPS. Planners and designers should be mindful that retention requirements can be changed by the external body setting the retention schedule, so system design and storage requirements may have to be modified to accommodate such change.

108 Guidance for Planning, Design, and Operations of Airport Communications Centers • FOIA Requirements. As with record retention requirements, FOIA requirements may be imposed through state and local laws that require the airport operator to make certain data that is not governed by exemptions accessible. The existence of FOIA provisions has impli- cations for system design with respect to what data is recorded and stored, how it can be retrieved, and the length of its retention. • SSI Regulations. TSA regulation of SSI concerning airports under the provisions of 49 CFR 1520 raises significant issues with respect to safeguarding video information. Some, if not all, video data raises potential security concerns, and video systems must be configured to ensure that such data is properly identified and safeguarded. This includes permissions and authori- zations with respect to access, use, and dissemination of video data. ACC personnel training should include awareness and handling of SSI issues.

109 The primary mission of an airport staff is to ensure continuous, safe, secure, and efficient operation of everything within the physical boundaries of the airport, including runways, terminals, roadways, support facilities, perimeters, and critical infrastructure. A good work- ing environment is critical to bringing about the clear, direct, and coherent communica- tions necessary to achieve this goal. The function of an ACC (and its personnel) is to collect, record, transmit, log, identify, analyze, and communicate information to facilitate smooth operations. ACC staff must do so through various circumstances and situations, from normal everyday functions to periodic irregular operations, to catastrophes that may occur only a few times in a career. For ACC personnel, knowledge of the airport’s rules, regulations, and standard operat- ing procedures, coupled with a deep understanding of the systemic ability to transmit and receive information effectively through various means, is the key to successful communica- tions. An operational understanding of the language and unique terminology/jargon used by all airport departments is essential to ensure that everyone communicates in a consistent manner. Staff is routinely tasked to pull together systems, equipment, personnel, resources, and material to resolve unusual situations, and to test, drill, and exercise skills so as to be prepared for almost anything. When an operational anomaly occurs, effective communica- tions often makes the difference between a successfully concluded incident and one with a negative effect. 8.1 Management Oversight A critical element in maintaining the effectiveness of the ACC (once it is implemented) is to ensure that ACC evolves with changes in the airport organization, structure, and mission. Major changes in the airport’s operations (e.g., a shift to a fully common use airport or the opening of a new runway or terminal) will seriously affect the ACC. Even the smallest change can affect systems, processes, and procedures, so ACC management must make appropriate modifications to ensure that changing conditions have been properly reflected in all of the ACC’s supporting documentation (including the CONOPS, situational awareness templates, policies, and stan- dard operating procedures). Depending on the structure that the airport director has chosen for ACC management, responsibility for management oversight falls on the shoulders of the ACC manager or a com- mittee of those organizations represented in the ACC. Whatever the management structure, changes must be accurately reflected in a timely and accurate manner consistent with the opera- tional change. S E C T I O N 8 Operations

110 Guidance for Planning, Design, and Operations of Airport Communications Centers 8.2 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) The CONOPS embodies the intended mission and functionality of the ACC. As the number of systems increases and the complexity of the systems grow, it is more important than ever for all ACC personnel to fully understand the CONOPS. The CONOPS provides the operational guid- ance that dictates how the systems should be used, the information that will be provided, proper maintenance of the system, and how the system will complement their own skills and expertise. This operational guidance is also outlined in the Airport Certification Manual (ACM), which is required as part of the airport’s governmental operating certification under Part 139. The ACM provides a guide for an organized and orderly approach to all operational matters at the airport, as well as a consistent training tool for ACC personnel in all the areas of operational knowledge and situational awareness in which they will be expected to function. Although each ACM will be unique to its airport, ACMs will address the physical layout and function of all facilities, the terminal and airfield, signals and markings, emergency and security programs, lighting, NAVAIDS, air traffic and meteorological services, and cargo and general aviation, among other topics. Once the entire airport physical and operational environment is documented, the airport must develop SOPs for normal daily activity as well as anomalies and irregular operations that may occur. The basic outline for the SOPs will be established during the development of the CONOPS, during which stakeholders determined each ACC function, the information needed for that function, the decision-making process, and the parameters available on which to make decisions and achieve the desired outcome. Two sets of operational guidance will evolve as the airport’s decision-making process matures. The first will address the larger and broader issue of how management operates the airport; the second will address how to operate the ACC most effi- ciently and effectively to support the smooth operation of the entire airport. The latter supports the former by demonstrating how all the facets interact and providing the means of communica- tions to facilitate the flow of information among them. The ACC SOPs are based on the CONOPS. Virtually every function listed in the CONOPS will have at least one (and likely many) corresponding SOPs. The ACC SOP document will consist of step-by-step information on executing specific ACC tasks. The airport operator probably already has a comprehensive document or at least a number of policies and procedures. It may be that the airport’s primary goal is to compile all the existing procedures, re-write them in a common format, and publish this as its SOP document. The three essential steps in the SOP process are developing a format, writing individual SOPs, and reviewing and testing draft SOPs before they are formally issued. It is important to develop a format standard that is routinely followed. No SOP format is better than any other (Appendix E provides a sample template that an airport can use if it has not already adopted one). If the airport operator wants to create its own template, the following options should be considered: • A simple step format works well for routine procedures that are short and have few possible outcomes. This type of SOP is really just a bullet list of simple sentences telling ACC person- nel exactly what to do (although the SOP should include necessary documentation and safety guidelines). This format is usually used when little or no discretion is allowed. • A hierarchical step format can be useful for long procedures (i.e., with more than ten steps, involving multiple decisions, clarifications, and terminology). This is usually a list of main steps all with sub-steps in a particular order. • A flowchart format. If the procedure is particularly complex with multiple possible decisions, a flowchart will likely be necessary.

Operations 111 Three main factors to consider before writing an SOP: • The terminology used should be consistent with the terminology used in the airport. For example, if the physical access control system has been given a local name, such as ACAMS (access control and monitoring system) rather than the more commonly used PACS (physical access control system), the local name should be used. • If the SOPs will be used by non-airport personnel, who may not be familiar with airport terms, the SOPs should use little or no jargon. • If the SOP is used outside of the ACC elsewhere in the airport, ensure that it is consistent with operations in both places. The SOP should have a specific function in mind, and that function should be reflected clearly in the language used. To achieve this, answer these questions: • Is there a specific reason why this SOP is necessary? • Will this SOP be mandated as a strict policy or will there be discretion available to those using it? • How does it relate to the ACM? • Does it need to stress safety measures and should it be coordinated with the airport’s public safety organization? • Are there specific compliance measures that govern this SOP, such as Part 139? • Is it used for training or on a daily basis? The second step is actually writing the individual SOP. In general, SOPs will consist of the following elements: • The Title Page, which will include (1) the title of the procedure, (2) an SOP identification number, (3) date of issue or revision, (4) the name of the airport/division/branch the SOP applies to, and (5) the signatures of those who prepared and approved the SOP. • A Table of Contents, which is only necessary to ensure ease of reference if the SOP is long. • Authorization. Quality assurance/quality control for each SOP is essential. A through vetting of the SOP is essential if you expect everyone in the organization to follow the requirements. Authorization of the SOP by an authorizing official is critical, as well as the concurrence of any airport department to which the SOP applies, should be included on the SOP. • References. All cited or significant references must be listed. If other SOPs are referenced, include the full SOP reference information. For each SOP, at a minimum, address the following: • Scope and applicability. Describe the purpose of the SOP, its limits, and how it is used. Include standards, regulatory requirements, roles and responsibilities, and inputs and outputs. • Method and procedures. List all the steps with necessary details, including references to sys- tems and equipment as needed. Cover sequential procedures and decision factors. Address the “what ifs” and the possible interferences or safety considerations. • Clarification of terminology. Identify acronyms, abbreviations, and all phrases that may not be common for the airport. • Public safety considerations. This should be its own section and relevant items should be provided alongside the steps where such items may be an issue. • Equipment and supplies. Provide a complete list of what is needed and when, where to find equipment, standards of equipment, and so forth. • Risk assessment. Identify potential issues that may affect the successful completion of the SOP. Develop mitigating steps for each possible risk. • Writing that is concise and easy to read. Because an SOP may be referred to in emergency or crisis situations, the SOP should be clear, to the point, and easy to read. Unless great detail is essential, an SOP should be considered a quick reference.

112 Guidance for Planning, Design, and Operations of Airport Communications Centers • Control document notation. The SOP is one of many SOPs; therefore, each SOP must be accurately cataloged using a taxonomy system similar to the guidance provided in Section 2.1 of this Guidebook. Each page should have a short title or ID #, a revision number, date, and “page # of #” in the upper right-hand corner (for most formats). The third step is reviewing and testing the draft SOP. Involving personnel in developing the SOP will make it more likely that they will accept the SOP. The review process before the SOP is formally issued is as important as writing the SOP. Every SOP must be thoroughly vetted by management and especially by the staff who will execute the SOP. The SOP must be tested. Ideally, have someone with a limited knowledge or even no knowledge of the process use the SOP to guide them through the steps. Look for inaccuracies, areas that are ambiguous, and especially anything that could affect the safety of the public or airport personnel. It is a best practice to have multiple personnel test the SOP because different individuals will have different issues, thereby ensuring a wider variety of comments. 8.3 Human Resource Management Managing ACC personnel is a big challenge in the airport environment. Depending on the functionality of the ACC, the size of the staff, the number of systems, and the level of activity in the airport, the stress level of ACC personnel can be high, especially during irregular operations and emergency conditions. Airport management must strive to eliminate unnecessary stress so that personnel can focus on the issues at hand without distraction. This Guidebook presents recommendations for airport management to consider in its efforts to alleviate stress. 8.3.1 Stress Management Airport management needs to understand that working in the ACC, especially soon after it is established, will increase the stress levels of the personnel. New procedures, new physical work- ing environment, new coworkers, and, especially, new lines of communications will all increase the level of stress in the environment. Furthermore, as the ACC moves into an operational state, some systems will not work exactly as planned and will need to be adjusted and SOPs may have some flaws. Job stress results from the interaction of the personnel and the conditions of work. Each employee will respond to the new working environment differently. What is stressful for one person may not bother someone else. Airport management must be sensitive that the “one-size- fits-all” approach may not be effective for a highly active ACC. Conditions that may lead to stress include the following: • Poor task design (e.g., heavy workload, infrequent breaks, long work hours, hectic and/or routine tasks with little inherent meaning) • Ineffective management style (e.g., lack of participation by staff in decision-making, poor communication in the organization, and lack of employee-friendly policies) • Poor interpersonal relationships (e.g., poor social environment and lack of support or help from coworkers and supervisors) • Unclear and/or inappropriate work roles (e.g., conflicting or uncertain job expectations, too much responsibility, too many “hats to wear”) • Environmental issues (e.g., unpleasant or dangerous physical conditions, such as crowding, noise, air pollution, or ergonomic conditions) • Technology overload. (e.g., the number of communication systems present—cell phones, email, the Internet, and all of the airport systems that converge in the ACC make it increas- ingly difficult to focus).

Operations 113 8.3.2 Management Role Airport management plays an important role in ensuring that the ACC environment is as stress-free as possible by engaging in employee-friendly activities that promote an atmosphere conducive to carrying out the mission of the airport, as well as attending to the needs of the personnel. Examples of employee-friendly policies and approaches include • Mandated breaks and desk-side exercises. Mandated breaks and desk-side stretching exer- cises have been shown to reduce strain and fatigue when practiced regularly. Breaks allow the operator to “reboot” mentally, and simple activities like standing, stretching, and bending to touch toes for a few minutes can reinvigorate the body, which also helps to refocus the mind and prevent fatigue. • Employee recognition activities. Rewards for positive behavior encourage employees to find new approaches to difficult tasks. • Employee social activities. Social activities help to create a community feeling in the ACC. This is especially important where the ACC is composed of organizations that formerly did not work in the same physical location. • Developing a sense of community. Use of ACC polo shirts, jackets, hats, and so forth help to convey the ACC’s importance in the airport structure. One of the more effective tools is to create an intra-organizational group within the ACC of employees from each function or organization who can discuss issues and provide recommen- dations to management. Although typically non-binding, these groups can be used to channel employee concerns into positive results. 8.3.3 Pandemic Planning Because ACC personnel play a critical role in ongoing airport operations, the ACC must be fully staffed at all times. A pandemic plan should detail how the airport ACC will continue to operate through a sustained period with significant employee absenteeism. The plan should also specify measures for “non-pharmaceutical intervention,” which means, essentially, how the airport will minimize the risk of contagion among employees. One of the simplest ways for an airport operator to reduce the spread of contagions is by supplying hand disinfectant and wipes at every workstation in the ACC. It may even be advantageous to allow each employee to have their own keyboards which they can store solely for their use. If the airport has already established a pandemic plan, then the plan simply needs to be modified to include the ACC and any additional provisions for the ACC. 8.4 Staff Training All ACC personnel should be familiar with and trained on all aspects of the ACC’s operations, including the CONOPS, SOPs, and the Facility Security Plan (FSP) (Section 8.7). All airport per- sonnel should receive refresher training in their assigned duties annually. Tabletop exercises are an effective and cost-efficient method of validating the CONOPs, SOPs, and FSP and will help in identifying areas for improvement and soliciting feedback from those who regularly execute these documents. At a minimum, training should be conducted with participation of the ACC and all levels of the airport’s security and facility operations. Additional training should be scheduled whenever there are significant changes to the ACC mission, personnel, or function as identified in the CONOPS. Training of airport staff should be equipment and system specific. Cross-training should be considered whenever possible, especially in medium and small air- ports where a single individual has more than one role.

114 Guidance for Planning, Design, and Operations of Airport Communications Centers 8.5 Facility Operations and Management Ensuring that the ACC maintains a comfortable working environment is critical. Every aspect of the working conditions—from lighting to temperature control to physical space—must be maintained in the most pleasant condition possible. Typically, the airport’s facility management staff will be responsible for the physical nature of the ACC. The following topics should be given special consideration: Environmental issues that need to be addressed include the following: • Temperature and Humidity. Suitable temperature and humidity are extremely important for human comfort and efficiency and to protect equipment. Temperature control is one of the most impactful aspects for an ACC, because temperature can make operators uncomfortable, thus lowering their information absorption and situational awareness and distracting them from their duties. The number one complaint received by facility management (both in ACCs and in general office space) is that temperatures in the space are too low or too high. Temperatures in the ACC need to be controlled effectively, despite the presence of heat- generating equipment that varies in intensity and hours of operation—this can be difficult if the ACC shares HVAC systems and controls with adjacent spaces. Ideally, the ACC will have dedicated HVAC units and controls. The latest advance in environmental control in ACCs is the installation of heating and cool- ing ducts in consoles. This allows each operator to adjust temperatures to their specific require- ments. This is the most comfortable system for ACC staff, but it also entails a significant cost and requires a raised floor to allow duct distribution. Although it is possible to run ducting from the ceiling to each console, this introduces a “forest” of ducts that would block sightlines. Humidity control is important to staff comfort and to prevent low humidity (which can cause excessive build-up of static electricity that can damage sensitive electronics) and high humidity (which can cause condensation inside equipment). • Lighting. Lighting is an important physical consideration in an ACC. Lighting must be appro- priate for both monitoring large-screen displays, perhaps from as far away as across a room, as well as for individual workstations. Enabling each employee to manage the lighting at their own individual workstation is important for ergonomic reasons and for increasing employee satisfaction. 8.5.1 Facility Management The ACC facility is an important part of the operational structure of most airports and will vary depending on the size and complexity of the airport and the user requirements as developed in the CONOPS. The ACC may combine several different facility operations with somewhat different functions, built on a common integrated infrastructure to leverage multiple commu- nication links throughout the airport. These functions may include police, fire/rescue, airport operations, and mutual-aid assistance—all of which may need secure communication chan- nels to federal, state, and local agencies. These communication links may be used for allocating resources, gathering of information, and/or coordinating action. Operational space considerations include the following: In most ACCs, different missions have different profile requirements. Having different func- tions in the ACC will require consideration of how the functions operate in parallel. The most common functions are • The AOC, which focuses mainly on daily airport operations. The AOC manages routine daily work, with occasional emergency response activities. AOCs may also include monitoring building functions such as building automation and asset and maintenance management.

Operations 115 • The EOC focuses on managing emergencies. An EOC is generally not occupied until it is “activated” by an incident. Technology infrastructure should be designed to accommodate unfamiliar outside users from multiple organizations and should be scalable for the sudden influx of people when emergencies occur. • The Security Operations Center (SOC) manages video surveillance, alarms, access control, and other daily security systems. SOCs support routine work and frequent coordination with emergency response activities. SOCs often use large-format video displays for showing multiple video surveillance feeds. • Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) are charged with managing public safety personnel, (e.g., police, fire, and EMS). • Fusion Centers are designed to support the interaction of multiple organizations in a facility that encourages collaboration. Fusion Centers are typically used by government agencies to collaborate on intelligence issues and exchange knowledge not easily communicated via more formal channels of communication. At an airport, Fusion Centers may not be staffed full time. When multiple types of operations occupy the same space, there may be advantages during emergencies, allowing easier communications among emergency managers and representatives of other outside groups who have been called in to coordinate multi-jurisdictional response teams. However, there may be a negative effect if dealing with an emergency is allowed to affect normal daily functions. If properly designed, the ACC should be able to accommodate these emergency management functions without disruption. However, once operational, if the ACC experiences difficulties in housing various functions, some architectural changes may be neces- sary. For example, glass walls and/or doors or movable walls are a simple way to maintain the integrity of each operation, while allowing collaboration when appropriate. Glass walls or doors can also allow visual communications between EOC and AOC/SOC staff and enable sharing of visual resources (e.g., video walls). 8.5.2 System Maintenance Plan System maintenance (e.g., repair, spare parts, technical support, and maintenance) for the installed ACC will depend on whether the procuring authority or a contractor is responsible. In either case, a system sustainment plan should be developed that describes the approach, includ- ing the personnel, equipment, and facility resources required. 8.6 Facility Security The safety and security of the ACC are of critical importance. As the nerve center of the airport operation, the ACC must be able to operate without interruption in the event of any natural or human-made occurrence. The risk assessment (recommended during the project management phase of the project implementation) should thoroughly cover any potential risk that the ACC could face. Revisit the risk assessment regularly, but at least annually, to ensure that risks are correctly listed and mitigation activities remain relevant to the risk. An airport should prepare for the unthinkable when planning the security of its ACC. For example, on April 19, 1995, the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, OK, was destroyed by a massive terrorist attack, killing 168 people. In addition to the tragic loss of life, the regional offices of six federal agencies housed in that building lost the ability to operate for as long as 2 years after the bombing because of the loss of records, systems, documentation, and other operational tools. Although it is hoped that there will never again be an attack of that magnitude on U.S. soil, some of the lessons learned from that tragic day and the measures later prescribed by the federal government for its buildings are relevant to an airport ACC.

116 Guidance for Planning, Design, and Operations of Airport Communications Centers Perhaps the most important recommendation is the creation of an FSP. The FSP need not be a large document, but it should provide the necessary guidance to ensure that the ACC is pro- tected. An FSP is a critical component of the airport’s overall security program and should be stored in both an electronic format, as well as hard copy for ease of access. Depending on the airport organization, a unit may already be in place which is responsible for ensuring the physical safety and security of all airport facilities. However, where such a group does not exist, the airport may want to create an ACC Facility Security Committee (FSC) respon- sible for addressing ACC-specific security issues and approving the implementation of protective measures and practices. It is a best practice for each FSC to have one individual designated to manage the FSC. That person is most likely to come from the airport organization managing the ACC. Alternatively, a designee may be selected by mutual agreement of all ACC organizations. The selected person is responsible to the airport director for any issues regarding the FSP. Different airport organizations (some even external) are responsible for physical security at an ACC. Each of these organizations should be represented on the FSC. 8.6.1 Facility Security Assessment The FSC is responsible for performing a facility security assessment (FSA) and presenting it to airport management for review and approval. The assessment will include an evaluation of the facility to determine whether the baseline level of protection anticipated for the ACC is adequate or if additional levels of protection are necessary. The assessment will also include a written plan for proposed countermeasures and identify how risks associated with specific, credible threats will be mitigated. This will include developing SOPs for countermeasures where appropriate. The FSA should also include a technology-specific disaster recovery plan and technology busi- ness continuity plan. The airport’s Chief Information Officer or IT Director is responsible for the management, implementation, and usability of information and computer technologies and for contributing the technology portion of the FSA. 8.6.2 Development of the FSP Developing and implementing an effective FSP requires understanding events that could threaten the ACC’s personnel, operations, and information. Assessing and categorizing the consequences of these events is the basic function of a risk management process. Once risks to a facility are accurately assessed, the FSC can determine whether countermeasures in place are adequate to address or mitigate those risks or if additional procedural, programmatic, or physi- cal security countermeasures must be implemented. A step-by-step process to identify key security risks and necessary measures and options to mitigate those risks includes the following: • Perform a threat assessment. A threat assessment is the process of identifying or evaluating entities, actions, or occurrences (natural or human-made) that possess or indicate the poten- tial to interfere with the ongoing operations of the ACC. A threat assessment considers the full spectrum of threats (e.g., natural, criminal, terrorist, and accidental) for the ACC. Threat data has likely already been developed for the airport as a whole. Special consideration for the ACC must be given using this data. • Perform an impact assessment. An impact assessment is the process of identifying or evaluat- ing the potential or actual effects of an event, incident, or occurrence on the ACC’s functional- ity. The results of the impact assessment can also be used to prioritize resources. • Perform a vulnerability assessment. A vulnerability assessment is the process of identifying physical features or operational attributes that may render the ACC susceptible or exposed to identified threats.

Operations 117 • Perform a risk assessment. A risk assessment is the process of collecting information and assigning values to risks for the purpose of informing priorities, developing or comparing courses of action, and informing airport management. A simple approach is to define risk with descriptions ranging from Level I (Low Risk) to Level V (Very High Risk). 8.6.3 Security Countermeasures Security countermeasures identify and describe in detail all current and planned security countermeasures (including floor plans when available) to address all identified threats. A test- ing schedule performed by the airport security team and an SOP for responding to security incidents and emergencies are necessary. 8.7 ACC Backup Site In the event of a catastrophic occurrence that disables the primary ACC site, airport manage- ment should have a business continuity plan in place that enables the ACC to continue operating in an alternate site until the primary ACC has been restored to working condition. For planning, an ACC can be considered in the same manner as a data center and many of the main concepts in data center redundancy planning can be followed. The backup ACC site decision will affect the airport’s ability to communicate in adverse scenarios. Factors to consider include the following: 1. Hot, Warm, or Cold Site. Using terminology typically found in data center backup site selec- tion, an airport needs to decide what level of readiness to seek to maintain, with cost being the primary determining factor. When doing a risk assessment, an airport operator must decide on the likelihood of a major disruptive event and choose an appropriate level of backup. – A hot site is a recovery site that is basically a replica of the primary site. All of the systems, equipment, and functionality are available at a moment’s notice and all that is necessary is a transfer of personnel from the disabled primary site to the backup. Although the most effective when in a recovery mode, this is the most expensive approach because every aspect of the primary ACC must be acquired in duplicate. – A warm site has most of the equipment found in the primary ACC, but requires a short start-up time to be up and running. Activity during this time may include re-directing network resources and phone systems to the new physical location. A warm site is less expensive, but still requires a substantial initial investment. – A cold site is little more than a space identified as a backup site. It will have little to no equipment, will take the longest time to get up and running in an emergency, and is the least expensive option. 2. Distance from the Primary ACC and the Airport. Another factor in selecting a site for a backup facility is the distance between the primary ACC and the backup site, given that dis- tance will affect various factors (e.g., access by personnel, potential for the same issue to affect both the primary and the secondary sites, and the latency and performance of applications). The goal is to locate the backup site far enough from the primary site so that both are not affected by the same event, but near enough to mitigate other potential issues. 3. Seismic Zone Details. A seismic zone is a region where seismic activity is usually constant. An airport probably cannot locate its backup ACC in a different seismic zone, but assessing the likelihood of an event is important for determining the level of investment needed for the type of backup site developed. 4. Environmental Details. Environmental details (e.g., weather) should be assessed for like- lihood and risks should be considered when determining the level of investment needed for the type of backup site developed. 5. Network Latency. For the backup strategy to work, the redundant ACC must be capable of communicating the same way as the primary site. The same level of network communication throughput must be made available at both sites.

118 S E C T I O N 9 This section of the Guidebook can be used by any size airport and by airports seeking to expand an existing ACC (rather than developing a new facility) and summarizes the optimal process and best practices. It can also be used as a checklist of critical ACC implementation steps. There is no one best approach. Each airport operator should determine what is needed for their particular initiative. By following all (or even some) of the guidance provided here, a successful initiative is more likely. (Note: the most critical recommendations are in bold face and numbered sequentially.) 9.1 Section 1, Introduction Section 1 defined an ACC as “a central physical location in an airport where one or multiple internal (and potentially external) organizations work together to develop a comprehensive picture of one, many, or all aspects of airport operations. The ACC gathers data from various sources using various methods and produces information to portray an accurate picture of airport conditions on which informed management decisions can be made. The ACC is an integral focal point for airport operation through normal conditions, irregular operations, and emergency situations.” Throughout the following recommendations, the information and best practices provided are intended to achieve a facility that strives to meet this definition. Some initial questions should be answered, beginning with “Why is the airport management initiating an ACC project?” • Why is this an important project for the airport at this particular time? • Why does this airport need a communications center? • Why should the airport operator invest the resources necessary to complete a successful airport project? After it has been determined that initiating an ACC project is justified, what the new facility would do should be addressed. Related to this are the following questions: • What array of services is the facility expected to offer? • What information does the airport operator believe is necessary for obtaining the situational awareness it is seeking? • What are the potential constraints on developing an ACC? • What are measurements for success in the ACC effort? Recommendations