Airport System Capacity (1990)

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Special Report 226 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPA(ITY b-prapeg", 1wooze"r II!1 L.!LR .- ,'-- - -- '-I--- 4 i1_

1990 TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Chairman Wayne Muri, Chief Engineer, Missouri Highway and Transportation Department, Jefferson City Vice Chairman C. Michael Walton, Bess Harris Jones Centennial Professor of Natural Resource Policy Studies and Chairman, College of Engineering, the University of Texas at Austin Executive Director Thomas B. Been, Transportation Research Board Adm. James B. Busey IV, Administrator, Federal AviatiOn Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation (cx officio) Gilbert E. Carmichael, Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department of Trans- portation (ex officio) Brian W. Clymer, Administrator, Urban Mass Transportation Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation (cx officio) Jerry R. Curry, Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation (cx officio) Francis B. Francois, Executive Director, American Association of State Highway and Transporta- tion Officials, Washington, D.C. (cx officio) John Gray, President, National Asphalt Pavement Association, Riverdale, Maryland (cx officio) Thomas H. Hanna, President and Chief Executive Officer, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Associa- tion of the United States, Inc., Detroit, Michigan (cx officio) Lt. Gen. Henry J. Hatch, Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D.C. (cx officio) Thomas U. Larson, Administrator, Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of Transpor- tation (cx officio) George H. Way, Jr., Vice President for Research and Test Department, Association of American Railroads, Washington, D.C. (cx officio) Robert J. Aaronson, President, Air Transport Association of America, Washington, D.C. James M. Beggs, Chairman, Spacelab, Inc., Washington, D.C. Robert N. Bothman, Director, Oregon Department of Transportation, Salem J. Ron Brinson, President and Chief Executive Officer, Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans L. Gary Byrd, Consulting Engineer, Alexandria, Virginia L. Stanley Crane, Suburban Station Building, Philadelphia Randy Doi, Director, IVHS Systems, Motorola Inc., Northbrook, Illinois S. Earl Dove, President, Earl Dove Company, Dothan, Alabama Louis J. Gambaccini, General Manager, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA), Philadelphia (Past Chairman, 1989) Kermit H. Justice, Secretary of Transportation, State of Delaware, Dover Denman K. McNear, Vice Chairman, Rio Grande Industries, San Francisco, California William W. Millar, Executive Director, Port Authority of Allegheny County, Pittsburgh, Pennsylva- nia Charles L. Miller, Director, Arizona Department of Transportation, Phoenix Clifton A. Moore, Executive Director, City of Los Angeles Department of Airports, California Robert E. Paaswell, Professor of Civil Engineering and Director of Transportation Research Consor- tium, City College of New York, New York Ray D. Pethtel, Commissioner, Virginia Department of Transportation, Richmond James P. Pitz, Director, Michigan Department of Transportation, Lansing Herbert H. Richardson, Deputy Chancellor and Dean of Engineering, Texas A&M University Sys- tem, College Station (Past Chairman, 1988) Joe G. Rideoutte, Executive Director, South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Trans- portation, Columbia Carmen E. Thrner, General Manager, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Washing- ton, D.C. Franklin E. White, Commissioner, New York State Department of Transportation, Albany Julian Wolpert, Henry G. Bryant Professor of Geography, Public Affairs and Urban Planning, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University - -- Paul Zia, Distinguished University Professor, Department of Civil Engineering, North Carolina State University, Raleigh

Special Report 226 h6~~ Al RPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY it Ckoice6 bprategic Committee for the Study of Long-Term Airport Capacity Needs TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD National Research Council Washington, D.C. 1990

Transportation Research Board Special Report 226 Subscriber Category V aviation Mode 4 air transportation Subject Areas 12 planning 13 forecasting 14 finance 15 socioeconomics Transportation Research Board publications are available by ordering directly from TRB. They may also be obtained on a regular basis through organizational or individual affiliation with TRB; affiliates or library subscribers are eligible for substantial discounts. For further information, write to the Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, 2101 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 20418. Printed in the United States of America NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competencies and with regard for appropriate balance. This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according to the procedures approved by a Report Review Committee consisting of the members of the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data National Research Council (U.S.). Committee for the Study of Long-Term Airport Capac- ity Needs. Airport system capacity: strategic choices / Committee for the Study of Long-Term Airport Capacity Needs. p. cm. - (Special report / Transportation Research Board, National Research Council ; 226) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-309-04956-3 1. Airports—United States—Planning. I. Title. IL. Series: Special report (National Research Council (U.S.). Transportation Research Board) ; 226. TL725.3.P5N39 1990 387.7'36'0973—dc2O ISSN 0360-859x 90-34787 CIP Cover Design: Karen L. White Photographs on cover and p. iv are courtesy Philippe Jenney. All other photographs are courtesy the Federal Aviation Administration.

Committee for the Study of Long-Term Airport Capacity Needs JOSEPH M. SUSSMAN, Chairman, Massachusetts Institute of Technol- ogy, Cambridge MARILYN R. BLOCK, The Naisbitt Group, Inc., Washington, D.C. JOHN J. CORBETF, Spiegel and McDiarmid, Washington, D.C. JAMES C. DELONG, Airport Business Center, Philadelphia, Pennsyl- vania THOMAS DUFFY, National Center for Municipal Development, Wash- ington, D.C. MICHAEL J. DURHAM, American Airlines, Inc., Fort Worth, Texas NIGEL D. FINNEY, Metropolitan Airports Commission, Minneapolis, Minnesota RICHARD L. HARRIS, JR., Dean Witter Reynolds, San Francisco, California RICHARD L. HAURY, Greiner, Inc., Denver, Colorado JOHN B. HAYHURST, Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., Seattle, Washington ADIB KANAFANI, University of California, Berkeley JOHN D. KASARDA, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill JAMES P. LOOMIS, Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio AMEDEO R. ODONI, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge WILLARD G. PLENTL, JR., North Carolina Department of Transpor- tation, Raleigh RON J. PONDER, Federal Express Corporation, Memphis, Tennessee J. DONALD REILLY, Airport Operators Council International, Wash- ington, D.C. NAWAL K. TANEJA, Ohio State University, Columbus Liaison Representative QUENTIN S. TAYLOR, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D.C. Transportation Research Board Staff ROBERT E. SKINNER, JR., Director for Special Projects LARRY L. JENNEY, Senior Program Officer NANCY A. ACKERMAN, Director of Publications wl

Preface Intercity passenger transportation has undergone sweeping, and perhaps irreversible, changes in the last half century. At the end of World War II passenger railroad networks spanned the country; buses were a mainstay of travel for trips up to 500 miles and to points not served by rail; air was a luxury mode of travel for the few; and a cross-country automobile trip was something of an adventure. Now rail and bus account for a very small and dwindling share of intercity trips, having been replaced by private pas- senger cars using the Interstate highway system and more and more by air transport. The boom in air travel—spurred by larger and faster aircraft, a network of airports serving virtually every city of 50,000 or more and many smaller ones as well, and an industry responding to new freedoms since airline deregulation in 1978—has completely altered the modal distribution of intercity travel. Today, nearly one-fifth of all intercity passenger-miles are by air—twice what it was in 1970. Moving toward the next century, the nation faces troubling prospects and enormous challenges in all parts of the transportation system. One of the areas of greatest concern is the air transport system. Delays in air travel have been mounting and could reach staggering proportions in the coming years. New capacity will be needed at airports, in the airways, and on surface transportation routes that link airports to cities and other centers of activity. Maintaining and enhancing the safety of air travel must be a high priority. The costs to the public for new investments in infra- structure and technology and to the users of the air transport system must be reasonable and fairly distributed. The funds expended must be allo- cated in a prudent and timely fashion. The study reported here deals with one element of overall future air transport systems needs: airport capacity. It was requested by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to assist in a major undertaking by FAA and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) that will lead to a national strategy for meeting long-term airport capacity needs. Although this study concentrates on approaches to making efficient use of existing airport infrastructure and to providing essential new capacity, it must be

vi AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES understood in a larger context of other FAA and DOT efforts related to aviation and, more broadly, to intercity passenger transportation. This study is but one of several through which the Transportation Research Board is providing support to these agencies. Much of the present congestion and delay at airports occurs within terminal buildings and on the landside approaches to airports. A recent TRB study, funded by FAA, addressed this question (Special Report 215: Measuring Airport Landside Capacity, 1987). As a preliminary to the present study of airside capacity, TRB conducted an exploratory effort to sketch the scope and magnitude of future airport system needs and to lay out an overall program of research to be done (Future Development of the U.S. Airport Network, 1988). Now in progress at TRB is a study to examine trends in air passenger service and safety since deregulation. This study addresses some of the same concerns as those dealt with here (airport congestion, allocation of airport resources, air traffic control system workload, and air carrier operations) but from the complementary perspective of their effects on service levels and safety. Publication of a report is planned for 1991. The fundamental issue that the nation faces is not the needs of the air transport system alone, but the broader question of the appropriate technology and infrastructure to serve intercity travel needs into the next century. Automobiles and commercial aviation are currently the primary modes, but there are other possibilities. For example, TRB has recently initiated a major study to assess the potential for high-speed surface transportation systems using advanced rail or magnetically levitated vehi- cles. Another TRB study now under way is exploring the prospects for further evolution of highway transportation through the application of advanced automotive vehicle and highway technologies. Both studies, which are planned for completion by early 1991, will inevitably have to address the tradeoffs and complementary roles of air and surface modes for intercity travel, a subject that is also touched on in this report. Thus the present study of long-term airport capacity needs should be viewed against the backdrop of other DOT initiatives and TRB support- ing studies. The intent here is to provide a close-up of airport capacity needs and to suggest strategic approaches and choices for the first part of the next century. The study committee has been mindful of the linkages between airport infrastructure and other parts of the air transport system and between aviation and other modes of intercity travel but has left exploration of the full ramifications to others now at work. Special appreciation is expressed to Frances E. Holland and Marguerite E. Schneider for typing drafts and the final manuscript and for adminis- trative support throughout the study, and to Nancy A. Ackerman, TRB Director of Publications, and the TRB Publications Office staff for editing and preparing the report for publication.

Contents Executive Summary The Problem, 2 Committee's Charge, 2 Approach, 3 Conclusions, 4 Recommendations, 5 A Final Note, 7 1 Introduction.............................................. 8 Capacity and Delay, 12 Capacity-Demand Dilemma, 15 Study Task, 16 2 Framework for Analysis................................... 18 Options, 20 Scenarios, 21 Development of Strategies, 22 Strategy Evaluation, 23 Conclusions and Recommendations, 23 3 Options for Accommodating Air Travel Demand ............. 24 Infrastructure Options, 24 Demand Management Options, 43 Advanced Vehicle and Control System Technology, 51 4 Alternative Scenarios of Air Travel Growth.................. 61 Scenario Construction, 63 Selection of Scenarios, 68 5 Alternative Strategies for System Development ............... 71 Description and Evaluation of Strategies, 74 Comparison of Strategies, 103

6 Conclusions . 109 Policy Considerations, 109 General Conclusions, 114 Options and Strategies, 115 7 Recommendations ....................................... 120 Strategic Planning Process, 120 Goals, 121 Short-Term Action and Long-Term Planning, 121 Immediate Actions, 122 Research and Development, 123 Appendix: Airport Identification Codes .......................... 125 Study Committee Biographical Information......................129

Executive Summary Air travel is growing at a rate that outstrips the capacity of the air- port and air traffic control system, 1 resulting in mounting congestion and delay. The consequences for the air transport industry and the traveling public are higher cost, greater inconvenience, declining quality of service, and possibly di- minished safety. Development of airport and airway infrastructure to accommodate growing demand is seriously lagging—mired in funding problems, local opposition to airport expansion, lack of direction, inertia, and a predisposition to make do with infrastructure that has not been increased substantially in 20 years or longer. This year the nation's air transport system will carry about 1.3 million domestic and international passengers each day. By some time early in the next century, the number could reach 2.5 million per day—nearly one billion per year. If this growth continues, the system could be carrying 4 to 5 million passengers daily by 2040, more than triple the present volume of traffic. The likelihood that these projections will come to pass depends on several conditions: the state of the national economy, population in- crease, the cost of air service, the value placed by society on business and personal travel, the development of new air and surface transportation and telecommunication technology, and the capacity of the airport and airway network through which air traffic must flow. Of these conditions, one of the most crucial is the adequacy of the airport and airway infra- structure to serve future intercity travel demand. if properly conceived, planned, expanded, and managed, this infra- structure will be able to support a volume of traffic far greater than we

AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES have today. If not, congestion and delay in the aviation system will be a constraint on growth that will profoundly affect the society of the twenty- first century. PROBLEM If we accept the assertion that our economy and society will continue to grow as part of the global economy, we must plan for evolving domestic and international travel needs. To ensure the adequacy and timeliness of measures to meet those needs, whenever and in whatever form they emerge, the nation must develop a policy that is attuned to these needs and a strategic approach that is flexible enough to adjust to unexpected problems and opportunities. The U.S. Department of Transportation has embarked on an effort to establish a long-range national transportation policy and, within it, a strategic plan to achieve policy goals. In announcing his intention to develop such a policy, Secretary of Transportation Skinner stated: Transportation is about to enter a new era, not yet prepared for the challenges confronting it. To ensure our global competitiveness, suc- cessfully provide for the demands of our domestic economy, and main- tain our military defense readiness, our transportation system must be renewed with the future in mind. We must determine where we are, decide where we want to go, and then find ways to get there (U.S. Department of Transportation 1989). As part of the effort to establish and implement national transportation policy, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has recently insti- tuted a strategic planning process. The basic goal of this process is to ensure that the facilities, equipment, and human resources needed for a safe, efficient, and affordable airport and airway network will be available to serve the needs of civil aviation over the long term. COMMITTEE'S CHARGE At the request of FAA, the Transportation Research Board (TRB) of the National Research Council assembled an expert committee to provide advice on alternative strategies that might be adopted to meet long-term airport capacity needs. The committee was charged with four tasks: 1. To examine long-term airport capacity needs and measures to meet these needs;

Executive Summary To formulate alternative strategies reflecting varying assumptions about the growth of air traffic and intercity travel demand, technological development, government roles, and institutional arrangements; To identify the advantages and disadvantages of these strategies; and To recommend strategies for further analysis and evaluation by FAA. APPROACH The committee adopted a systematic approach that began with identifica- tion of an array of actions that could be taken to meet demand. Called options, these actions constituted the building blocks used later to con- struct strategies. They are listed in the accompanying box. Seven strategies, made up of various combinations of options, were devised. (See accompanying box.) These strategies range from an ap- proach consisting solely of incremental improvements at existing facilities to sweeping programs of new airport construction, system management, and application of advanced transportation technology. The ability of these strategies to meet future demand was assessed under three growth scenarios that embraced a range of plausible assump- tions about the state of the economy, the cost of air travel, propensity for travel, and technological innovation in air and surface transportation. These scenarios—designated High Growth, Maturing Economy, and Economic Difficulty—are described in Chapter 4. Evaluation of strate- gies is presented in Chapter 5. OPTIONS—THE BUILDING BLOCKS Infrastructure supply Incremental capacity improvements at existing airports New hubs at presently underused airports New airports in metropolitan areas with high traffic volume New airports dedicated to serving as transfer points Management of demand Administrative and regulatory techniques Economic measures to redistribute demand Advanced vehicle and control system technology New aviation technology High-speed surface transportation technology

AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES Continue on Present Course—extension of programs and meas- ures now being pursued by FAA. Build More Airports—continuation of present programs and measures but with a major effort to build new airports in the largest centers of air travel. Centralize System Management—application of administrative and regulatory measures to allocate demand in relation to capacity. Build an Expanded, Centrally Managed Airpdrt System—the system management approach of Strategy C coupled with a vigorous program to plan and build major new airports. Let the Market Decide—reliance on economic measures and lo- cally imposed pricing schemes to allocate scarce capacity, combined with strong encouragement to local authorities and private industry to build more airport capacity and to develop new technology as dictated by market forces. Reconfigure the Airport System—planned evolution toward a sys- tem of transfer—only airports to replace major metropolitan area airports as connecting hubs. Revolutionize Intercity Transportation Technology—limited ex- pansion of the airport network, coupled with a concerted effort to develop new aircraft and air traffic control technology and advanced high-speed surface transportation systems. In addition to this formal process for developing and evaluating strate- gies, the committee also drew on its diverse backgrounds and experience to examine, in a less formal way, basic underlying questions of system performance, policy issues, and strategic considerations that will affect the success of any approach FAA may adopt. The committee's recom- mendations, therefore, address both the specific strategies for FAA to consider and the general context of national transportation policy into which they must fit. CONCLUSIONS A coherent national policy for transportation in general, and within it for the specific role of aviation, is the essential first ingredient. This policy is needed to establish goals and to set the general framework for a strategic plan that will deal with present capacity problems and guide long-term aviation system development. In addition to charting the direction for

Executive Summary improvement and expansion of the airport and airways system, the plan- ning process must also address issues that are fundamental to any strat- egy: government and industry roles, federal and local funding and financ- ing, aircraft noise, and land banking. Those responsible for strategic planning must also recognize that there is no simple, universal, permanent solution to congestion and delay. A combination of remedies must be applied, each appropriate to a specific part of the problem and none so widely effective and long lasting that it promises to eliminate congestion and delay once and for all. Like friction in mechanical devices, congestion and delay are inherent in the air trans- port system, and the best that can be achieved is a degree of efficiency that holds them to an acceptable level at an affordable cost. A broad systemwide approach is called for to deal effectively with delay and to provide the air transport system capacity necessary to accommo- date long-term growth in travel demand. We cannot simply build, ration, manage, or research our way to a more effective aviation system. The approach must include new infrastructure, improved air traffic control, more efficient use of airspace and airport facilities, advanced air and ground system technology, and the research to make these attainments possible. While the solutions may be technological, the choice cannot be made on purely technical grounds. Consideration must be given to the social, economic, and political context in which technology is put to use. The "best" solution must be more than just the technically superior. It must also conform to social values, be based on sound economics, and find political support locally and nationally. What is needed, above all, is a vision of the future that includes goals, means to attain them, and a sense of the benefits and costs. This vision could take many forms, but for practical purposes it would best be embodied in a national, long-range, strategic plan that looks beyond present difficulties and focuses on measures to sustain a sound, properly managed, and affordable air transport system well into the next century. RECOMMENDATIONS The recommendations presented here deal with strategy at two levels: general insights of the committee into the characteristics of the process of system development and long-range planning and specific recommenda- tions about strategies and options that should be considered. Maintain within FAA a continuing, long-range strategic planning process for evolutionary development of the air transport system. The

AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES planning horizon should extend to the year 2040, with intermediate views at years 2000 and 2020. The planning process should be comprehensive and integrate not only national and regional airport needs but also related development of the air traffic control system, management information systems, aircraft technology, and surface transportation systems that could improve airport landside access or supplement air transport in certain travel corridors. As a part of the strategic planning process, set long-range and short- range goals for aviation. These goals should be tied to national policy and a plan for transportation as a whole. Include both short-range and long-range action elements in the plan. The short-range elements should consist of specific programs to be under- taken within a 10-year time frame, with priorities and expected time of implementation. Long-range elements, though less specific, should iden- tify approaches to be taken, contingency actions, general requirements to be fulfilled, planning and analysis required, and an overall timetable for implementation. To support the strategic planning process, the following actions should be undertaken without delay. —Make incremental capacity improvements at existing airports and associated procedural changes in the ATC system (Option 1) and support development of new secondary hubs at presently underused airports (Option 2). —Initiate study and analysis of Options 3-8 identified by the study committee, with a view toward timely implementation, in some cases as early as 2000. These options are the building blocks of a long-range strategy. —Undertake study and analysis of the strategies outlined in this report, giving particular attention to Strategy D, build an expanded, centrally organized airport system, Strategy E, let the market decide, and Strategy G, revolutionize intercity transportation technology, which appear to offer the greatest promise for the long term because they combine and coordinate new airport infrastructure, system man- agement, and advanced transportation technology. —Take steps to lay the groundwork for possible future actions on (a) establishing improved arrangements for consultation with state and local governments and the aviation industry on prospective system improvements, (b) developing new federal and local financing mecha- nisms and revenue sources, (c) reexamining federal policy and pro- grams related to aircraft noise, and (d) landbanking potential airport sites. Inaugurate a broad and greatly expanded research and development (R&D) program, including the following:

Executive Summary —Improved airport designs, —Dynamic, real-time management of airspace and airport resources, —Advanced aircraft designs, —Measures to reduce aircraft noise or to mitigate its effects, —Advanced ground transportation systems that could serve demand currently satisfied by aviation in some markets, —Ways to integrate air and surface modes of transportation, and —New, more powerful analytic tools and models capable of evaluating the effects of prospective changes in the airport and airways network as a whole. A FINAL NOTE Providing a safe and efficient intercity transportation system with ade- quate capacity to serve future needs should be high on the national agenda. There is a need for a national policy and vigorous leadership by the federal government. However, the federal government cannot (and should not) be expected to shoulder full responsibility for developing and implementing this policy. An effective partnership between the public sector—at all levels of government—and private enterprise is needed. Unless we plan now with vision and enduring commitment to provide for the needs of future generations, the benefits of transportation that we now enjoy will inevitably erode. In the words of Peter Drucker, "long- range planning does not deal with future decisions, but the future of present decisions." REFERENCE U.S. Department of Transportation. 1989. Moving America: New Directions, New Opportunities. Washington, D.C.

I Introduction Between 1980 and 1988, domestic air travel demand, measured in revenue passenger miles (RPM), increased from 205 billion RPM to 330 billion RPM per year. FAA currently forecasts 577 billion k.... RPM annually by 2000. If this level is attained, air travel de- mand will have grown by 180 per- cent over the span of 20 years (Federal Aviation Administration 1989b). Aircraft operations—a better measure of the load on the airport and airway system—have also increased sharply. Since 1980, aircraft opera- tions by major air carrier and regional airlines have increased by 50 percent, reaching 21 million takeoffs and landings per year. Most of this growth has taken place at a relatively few large hub airports. FAA forecasts almost 30 million operations in 2000, more than double the 1980 total. Other indicators of aviation activity (passenger enplanements, fleet size, and hours flown) exhibit similar historical and projected growth rates (Table 1-1). The boom in air travel in this decade has been spurred by several factors: airline deregulation, a robust economy, reduced fares, and an increasing propensity of the public to rely on aviation for trips over 200 miles. During the 1980s, more people flew more often than ever before, and the indications are that the trend will continue. In accommodating the burgeoning demand, the nation's airports and airways have been severely strained. Congestion and delay have mounted in the airspace, on runways, and in airport terminals. In 1987 21 major airports experienced more than 20.000 hours of flight delays in air carrier operations. If some way is not found to accommodate growing demand,

TABLE 1-1 SELECTED AVIATION ACTIVITY INDICATORS (Federal Aviation Administration 1979 1989b) Percentage Average Annual Growth Historical Forecast 1970- 1980- 1988- Aviation Activity 1970 1980 1988 1989 2000 1980 1988 2000 Enplanements (millions) Domestic 156.9 191.1 444.7 464.3 761.4 6.3 5.4 4.6 International 14.5 24.1 34.3 36.6 65.1 5.2 4.5 5.5 Total 171.4 315.2 479.0 500.9 826.5 6.3 5.4 4.7 Revenue passenger miles (billions) Domestic 104.1 204.8 330.3 344.8 577.3 7.0 6.2 4.8 International 24.9 54.2 90.5 97.6 185.4 8.0 6.6 6.2 Total 129.0 259.0 420.8 442.4 762.7 7.2 6.2 5.1 Aircraft operationsb (millions) 10.8 14.7 21.0 22.0 29.7 3.1 4.6 2.9 Hours flown (millions) 5.9 6.5 9.7 10.2 13.4 1.0 5.1 2.7 Fleet (no. of aircraft) Air carrier 2,118 2,394 3,542 3,886 4,791 1.2 5.0 2.6 Regional/commuter 397 1,413 1,684 1,737 2,136 13.5 2.2 2.0 Inc1udes major air carriers and regional/commuter airlines. b1970 figures are for major air carriers only, all other years include major air carriers and regional/commuter airlines Major air carriers only.

10 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES 39 U.S. airports could be so affected by the end of this century. At the largest airports—those that collectively handle almost half of all airline passengers—air carrier delays could reach 50,000 to 100,000 hours annu- ally by 2000 (Federal Aviation Administration 1989a) (Figure 11).1 Passenger travel is not the only element of civil aviation that has grown. Air cargo operations and general aviation (private and business flying) also have placed increasing demand on the airport and airway system. The movement of freight and express mail by all-cargo aircraft has ex- panded rapidly in the past 20 years and is projected to increase at a higher rate than the overall growth of passenger traffic for the next two decades. This growth, however, is from a very small base. In 1970 air cargo accounted for less than 1 percent of all commercial aircraft movements. Today the air cargo share is about 3 percent. By 2010 it might reach 5 percent. At the top ten hub airports, general aviation (GA) makes up a small part of the traffic (typically less than 8 percent). At other commer- cial service airports, the GA share is larger; but the overall pattern is that, as air carrier operations increase at an airport, GA traffic declines. Most GA aircraft avoid large airports, and those that do use them are often professionally piloted business or executive-transport aircraft with perfor- mance characteristics comparable to large jets. Accommodating cargo and GA operations at airports and on the airways is an important concern, but it is separable from the problem of providing capacity for commercial passenger transport. In many cases, GA and cargo aircraft can, and do, make use of alternatives (reliever airports for GA or airports with a low volume of passenger traffic that can serve as cargo hubs). They also have access to busy metropolitan area airports at off-peak hours. Use of airports by these sectors of civil aviation is not a major driver of the airport capacity problem. Recent efforts by FAA and local airport authorities have centered on what they perceive to be the major air transport capacity problem: accommodating the rising volume of airline passengers and air carrier operations. FAA has undertaken a multibillion dollar modernization of air traffic control facilities that will allow the system to handle more traffic—not only additional domestic and international passenger traffic but also cargo operations and expected increase in use of the system by private and business GA aircraft. Airport authorities have concentrated on expanding gate facilities and terminal buildings to accommodate higher passenger volumes. While this has helped ease travel delays on the landside, it has had little effect on airside delays, which are caused primarily by the lack of runway capacity or by operational limits (caps or quotas) imposed for purposes of air 'Airport Identification Codes for airports mentioned in this report are listed in the appendix.

20,000 to 49,999 Hr of Delay FIGURE 1-1 Airports with annual aircraft delay forecasts exceeding 20,000 hrs in 1997 (Federal Aviation Administration 1989a). NoTE: The delay forecast at Denver is for the existing Stapleton Airport. It assumes that the new Denver airport would not yet be in operation.

12 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES traffic control. Proposals to increase airside capacity by adding new runways or otherwise expanding the ability to accommodate more air- craft operations have met strong community opposition in many cities, primarily on the grounds of noise but also for reasons of cost. Many observers believe that the single greatest constraint on the future growth of air travel will be the lack of adequate airport runway capacity. In the past 20 years only two completely new airports have been opened (Dallas—Fort Worth and Southwest Florida Regional). A new airport to replace Denver Stapleton is now under construction, after extended controversy and several delays, and is expected to open by the early 1990s. New airports are being considered in Los Angeles, Austin, and Farmington (NM), but it is unlikely (if they are built at all) that they will be operational before 2000. Five other cities (Atlanta, Chicago, Min- neapolis—St. Paul, San Diego, and St. Louis) are exploring the possibility of purchasing land or developing presently reserved tracts for future airport sites, but the prospects of new airports in these cities are even more remote. If something is not done to enable airports to handle more traffic, the prospects for the early decades of the next century is bleak. A preliminary study conducted by TRB in 1988 examined possible air travel growth and airport capacity needs into the first half of the next century (Transporta- tion Research Board 1988). Traffic projections made as part of that study indicate that domestic RPM could be double the present level by some- time between 2005 and 2020. RPM could triple or perhaps quadruple by the years 2030 to 2050. Whether this demand materializes will depend in part on the availability of sufficient airport capacity to accommodate increases of such size. Clearly, the present airport system could not safely absorb such a volume of traffic without incurring monumental delays throughout the country. CAPACITY AND DELAY This report is concerned with capacity, demand, congestion, and delay. At the outset it is important to understand the technical meaning of these terms and their relationship. In general, the term capacity refers to the throughput of a facility, i.e., the rate at which users of the facility can be accommodated. Under this definition, any action taken to obtain greater throughput could be called a capacity increase, which may be accomplished in either of two ways: a) enlarging the size of existing facilities or building additional ones or b) making procedural changes in how existing facilities are used. To distin- guish between these two methods the committee elected to use capacity in

Introduction 13 a restricted sense to mean the maximum volume of traffic that could be handled by a facility under optimum conditions. By this definition, the primary way to increase capacity would be to build new or enlarged facilities. To differentiate between infrastructure additions and pro- cedural improvements that would allow a given facility to be used more efficiently (i.e., to bring actual throughput closer to the theoretical maxi- mum), the committee chose to call the latter demand management. The terminology used throughout the report preserves this distinction. The runway capacity of an airport is expressed as the rate at which operations (takeoffs or landings) can be accomplished under given condi- tions. This is not a single fixed value; it varies with weather and visibility, the combination of runways in use, the mix of aircraft using the airport, and the proportion and timing of arrivals and departures. Airport runway capacity is also affected by air traffic control rules, procedures, and safety precautions: required in-trail separation of aircraft in the arrival and departure streams, lateral separation between aircraft using adjacent runways, runway occupancy time, allowance for missed approaches, and so on. Noise abatement procedures required by FAA or by local airport regulations also affect the rate at which operations can be conducted (Federal Aviation Administration 1989a). Because of these complexities, it is not possible to predict capacity directly. Capacity is inferred by comparing throughput (the number of operations actually conducted) with demand (the number of aircraft seeking service) per unit of time. The capacity of an airport is reached when queues of aircraft awaiting service begin to form (i.e., when there is a delay between the time an aircraft requests service and when it can be rendered). This build-up of aircraft in queue is known as congestion, and the time it takes to move aircraft through the queue and complete an operation (in comparison with the time it would take if an aircraft were unimpeded) is the general definition of delay. The relationship of capacity, demand, congestion, and delay is such that as demand increases and approaches the limit of throughput, delays begin to occur more often and to persist longer. For example, if the capacity of an airport is 40 operations per hour under given conditions and 50 aircraft seek to use the airport during this period, some will be delayed. If in the next hour another 50 aircraft require service and only 40 (includ- ing those waiting in queue after the first hour) can be accommodated, even more aircraft will be delayed. This will continue until demand drops below the rate of service and the queue can be dissipated (Office of Aviation Policy and Plans 1981). Delay has many causes. The largest single cause is adverse weather conditions that restrict visibility and reduce the rate at which aircraft can be accommodated. So-called all-weather operation has long been sought

14 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES as a goal in aviation, but it can never be attained fully. With all foreseeable advances in aircraft, airport, and air traffic control technology, there will still be times when operations cannot be conducted safely because of extreme meteorological conditions. Weather-related delay can be re- duced but not eliminated entirely. Another significant cause of delay is in the air traffic control system. Safety requires that aircraft be separated in time and space so that flight paths do not conflict. Efficiency requires that the flow of traffic be managed in a way that produces orderly and balanced movement of aircraft through the airspace to and from airports. This leads inevitably to adjustments of schedule, speed, and flight paths that delay individual aircraft. These "system" delays cannot be avoided completely although they can be reduced by more sophisticated methods of air traffic control. The National Airspace System Plan, now being implemented by FAA, is intended to reduce air traffic control delays, but the full benefits of these improvements, particularly in the airspace around airports, will not be realized for at least 10 years. A major cause of delay is flight scheduling. Certain arrival and depar- tures times are preferred by travellers, and airlines schedule their opera- tions accordingly. This peaking of demand produces overloads, traffic queues, and other forms of congestion that translate into delay not only at the point of incidence but elsewhere in the connecting parts of the airport and airspace network. In the decade since airline deregulation, traffic peaking has increased markedly. This is due partly to the growth in air travel stimulated by lower fares and wider availability of air service. The effects of this traffic increase are aggravated by the airline practice of operating through regional hubs. This is done to achieve more efficient utilization of aircraft, offer wider and more frequent service, and compete more effectively in a deregulated environment. Hubbing requires that airline routes and schedules be arranged to bring flights from several origins together within a short span of time at a single airport, where passengers make connec- tions to continue their journey. Hub-and-spoke route patterns accentuate traffic peaking and can in- crease delay sharply. If peaking coincides with a period of adverse weather, delays can become extreme, and it may take hours to clear traffic queues. The backup may extend far beyond a single airport and affect air routes and airports hundreds of miles away in other parts of the network. The remaining causes of delay are diverse factors, such as construction or repair on the airport surface, outages of air traffic control or navigation and landing aids, and other temporary disruptions of system operation. It is not practical to reduce these miscellaneous causes of delay significantly, nor would doing so have much effect on system operation.

Introduction 15 Thus, no airport can ever be completely free of delay. At low levels of demand, these delays are brief and not of great concern. However, as the level of demand increases, the probability of simultaneous need for service rises rapidly, and both the frequency and average length of delay per aircraft increase exponentially as the limit of capacity is neared. This relationship is shown in Figure 1-2, which shows how delay rises exponen- tially as demand approaches capacity and how excess demand results not only in more aircraft delayed but also in an increasingly longer time to obtain service. CAPACITY-DEMAND DILEMMA There are only two ways to attack the problem of airport delay. One is to increase capacity—be it runway capacity, terminal building and landside capacity, or air traffic control system capacity. The other is to manage demand so that it does not exceed the rate at which service can be provided without unacceptable delay. Each has disadvantages. Experience in aviation and other modes of travel has shown that DEMAND FIGURE 1-2 Conceptual relationship of capacity, demand, and delay,.

16 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES capacity increases usually give rise to more demand, which quickly uses up the new capacity provided and begets the need for still more capacity. Economists disagree about how much of the increase is "latent" demand that materializes when capacity constraints are eased and how much is "new" demand induced by the greater convenience and attractiveness of travel and the added service that new capacity makes possible. The distinction may not be important since the end result, regardless of the cause and effect relationship, is increased economic activity and—pre- sumably—societal benefit. The alternative of managing the demand side of the equation also has drawbacks. By definition, demand management entails shaping and re- straining demand such that it fits within the limits of existing capacity. Inevitably some travelers are denied service at the time and place of their choosing. Some of them will shift to a different time or place or to a different mode of travel, but some persons will be discouraged from traveling altogether. The providers of service in a demand-managed mode of travel argue that the net effect is to stifle demand and to suppress economic activity. Those who are pressured to provide additional capac- ity offer the counterargument that the cost of new capacity would exceed the potential benefit and not serve the overall economic interest of society. In the practical world the dilemma of increasing capacity or reducing (managing) demand is everpresent. Which to adjust, how much, and when are political and economic decisions that are usually dictated more by value judgments than by scientific principles; and the choice is seldom purely a supply-side or demand-side solution. There is almost always a compromise that combines supply and demand actions. The strategies advanced in this report are of this sort. STUDY TASK In 1989 FAA embarked on a strategic planning process to anticipate long- term airport system needs that could emerge during the first part of the next century and to lay the groundwork for meeting these needs. At the request of FAA, TRB assembled an expert committee to advise on alternative strategies that might be adopted and to weigh their advantages and disadvantages. The committee was charged with four tasks: 1. To examine long-term airport capacity needs and options to meet these needs;

Introduction 17 To formulate alternative strategies reflecting varying assumptions about the growth of air traffic and intercity travel demand, technological development, government roles, and institutional arrangements; To identify the advantages and disadvantages of these strategies; and To recommend strategies for further analysis and evaluation by FAA. In carrying out these tasks the committee gave special attention to the following: National aviation goals and FAA missions; FAA managerial and regulatory concerns; The need for a realistic assessment of technological, economic, and political factors; and The importance of a flexible approach in adapting to emerging trends. The framework for analysis adopted by the committee in achieving these tasks is outlined in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 evaluates the options that make up strategies. Chapter 4 develops future demand scenarios. Chap- ter 5 describes and evaluates strategies that are appropriate for each scenario. The committee's conclusions and recommendations, contained in Chapters 6 and 7, are intended to help advance the strategic planning process now under way in FAA and the U.S. Department of Transporta- tion. REFERENCES Federal Aviation Administration. 1979. FAA Aviation Forecasts, Fiscal Years 1980-1991. Report FAA-APO-79-1. U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. Federal Aviation Administration. 1989a. Airport Capacity Enhancement Plan. Report DOT/FAAICP-89-4. U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. Federal Aviation Administration. 1989b. FAA Aviation Forecasts, Fiscal Years 1989-2000. Report FAA-APO-89-1. U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. Office of Aviation Policy and Plans, Federal Aviation Administration. 1981. Airfield and Airspace Capacity/Delay Policy Analysis. Report FAA-APO- 81-14. U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. Transportation Research Board. 1988. Future Development of the U.S. Airport Network. National Research Council, Washington, D.C.

2 Framework for Analysis I I/ ~ / llfllll~ This study addresses one element of overall future air transporta- tion needs—airport airside capac- ity. The committee's approach to \ this study was a sequential proc- ess that began with identifying and evaluating specific actions, called options, that could be adopted to ensure adequate air- port capacity over the long term—initially to 2000 but ultimately through the period 2030 to 2040. In consonance with the broad perspective de- scribed in the Preface, these options were evaluated by several criteria that included capacity benefit, cost, safety, effects on passengers and air carriers, environmental impacts, effect on community growth and devel- opment, and mechanisms for funding and implementation. Next, the committee constructed scenarios of travel demand that might emerge under varying socioeconomic conditions and levels of technological devel- opment. Using the scenarios as a reference, the committee then devised several strategies involving various combinations of options that could be employed in a coordinated program to provide adequate infrastructure and intercity travel service. These strategies were evaluated in terms of effectiveness, cost, feasibility, and acceptability to assist FAA and DOT in identifying those with the most promise. The conclusions and recom- mendations emerging from this process deal with (a) general policy and program issues. (b) evaluation of specific strategies, and (c) areas that require further study and analysis. The steps in this study process are diagrammed in Figure 2-1. A more detailed explanation of the steps is presented below. 18

DE I FINE I OPTIONS 3 ESTABLISH EVALUATE EVALUATION TNCIERIA r 10 5 I DEVELOP I L RY EGIE ,,J 6 EVALUATE L TEGIE ,,J 7 FORMULATE CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS FIGURE 2-1 Diagram of the study process.

20 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES OPTIONS The term option is defined as a possible course of action that could be undertaken (a) to add new airport capacity, (b) to improve the efficiency with which existing capacity is used, or (c) to provide an alternative to accommodating intercity travel demand now served by air transportation. Options should not be thought of as mutually exclusive choices. Rather, they are actions that could be combined within an overall strategy to address present and future airport needs. They are the building blocks from which a strategy could be constructed. Whereas the options selected by the committee were considered practi- cal and realistic, not all could (or should) be implemented immediately. Some might be reserved as contingency measures to be adopted when and if future circumstances warrant. Others require additional study and analysis to determine fully their costs and benefits and, hence, their suitability as part of a long-term strategy. In some cases the appropriate- ness of an option depends on its consistency with other options and with federal policy on transportation in general and aviation in particular. The options considered by the committee are described and evaluated in Chapter 3. Evaluation Criteria The following factors were used to evaluate the primary and secondary effects that would result from implementing each option. Capacity benefit—the extent to which an option would increase local and system capacity or allow existing capacity to be used more efficiently. Capital cost—estimated capital investment in current dollars (per site and/or systemwide) for facilities and equipment, without regard to the source of funds. Operating cost—annual recurring cost of operation and maintenance in current dollars to the airport operator or to airport users if passed on as fees, rents, or surcharges. Safety—the level of assurance that present safety standards would be maintained or surpassed. Passenger effects—the extent to which an option would affect fares, delay, trip time, frequency or reliability of service, and passenger comfort and convenience. Industry effects—the extent to which an option would affect airline industry cost, competition, flexibility of routes, and choice of service points. Environmental effects—principally, effects in terms of noise, air p01- lution, congestion on airport landside access routes, and interference with

Framework for Analysts 21 other community activities, but also taking into account other environ- mental concerns such as intrusion on natural settings, disruption of wild- life, and aesthetic considerations. Local and regional effects—influence on economic growth and com- munity development both in the vicinity of the airport and more widely in the metropolitan region. Funding and financing—possible public and private sources of capital and the availability of financing mechanisms. Implementation—required planning mechanisms, availability of air- port sponsors, methods of implementation, and management and operat- ing concerns. Evaluation of Options The committee evaluated options by making judgments with respect to each criterion on a scale of high, medium, low. To distinguish between positive and negative effects and to allow comparison of advantages and disadvantages, a numerical scale was used: —3 —2 —1 0 +1 +2 +3 H M L Neutral L M H Disadvantages or Advantages or negative effects positive effects In cost-benefit terms, negative ratings were treated as "costs" and posi- tive ratings as "benefits." Thus, airport capacity increases, delay reduc- tion, or stimulation of local economic growth were regarded as benefits and given a positive rating. Capital investment, increased noise, or diffi- culty of implementation were considered costs and, hence, negative. The scores assigned represent a consensus of the committee. Admit- tedly; these ratings are imprecise and perhaps not entirely consistent across all evaluation factors. Fine discriminations based on the numerical ratings alone were avoided, as was any sort of algebraic combination of ratings to achieve a composite score. The principal use of the rating process was simply to articulate pros and cons in a systematic way. Numerical evaluations of each option and an explanation of the basis for individual ratings are contained in Chapter 3. SCENARIOS To capture the range of possible future conditions and events that could affect travel demand, the committee constructed scenarios based on

22 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES economic, social, and technological variables. The scenarios were ex- pressed in terms of future trends in air carrier operations as they would be influenced by the state of the economy (gross national product), airline fares (yield), population growth, future lifestyles and propensity to travel, and technological improvements and innovation. Aircraft operations were used as the basic scenario descriptor because this measure is related directly to the future demand for airport airside capacity. The number of operations to be accommodated can be trans- lated readily into the need for runway capacity and associated airside facilities (taxiways, aprons, gates, and so on). Passenger-related meas- ures (enplanements, trips, or passenger volumes at airports) might have been used as well, but they were not considered to be as direct as aircraft operations in describing airport airside capacity requirements. This is particularly true when a major portion of an airport's capacity is used by all-cargo aircraft or by business and personal aviation. The use of aircraft operations as the basic activity measure had the additional advantage of allowing a fairly direct correlation between airport activity and airspace requirements (airways; air traffic control workload; and communication, navigation, and surveillance facilities). The scenarios constructed represented high, medium, and low growth of air carrier operations. No one scenario was considered more likely than the others. Instead, they bracketed a reasonable range of expectation about future demand and served as one test of the suitability of the strategies that were subsequently examined. Scenarios are described and discussed in Chapter 4. DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIES Strategies are combinations of options. In this report various short-term and long-term options are combined into a broad range of strategies. The basic objectives in devising strategies were as follows: Internal consistency—mutual compatibility of the options making up the strategy. Effectiveness—ability to accommodate demand for at least one sce- nario. Feasibility—implementability under some reasonable set of eco- nomic, political, technical, and environmental constraints. The first two objectives were straightforward. The third required exer- cise of judgment about the degree to which present constraints might change under future circumstances. In other words, feasibility involved

Framework for Analysis 23 some speculation about the future economic, social, and political climate in which certain options might be acceptable or unacceptable. In formulating strategies the committee's aim was to explore a range of possibilities that might be appropriate given various levels of demand, expenditure of public and private funds, technological innovation, and national commitment to achieving effective solutions. Basically, strate- gies were designed to answer this question. What are the most promising avenues for satisfying long-term growth in intercity travel demand? Description of strategies in terms of rationale, the options included, and timetable for implementation is contained in Chapter 5. STRATEGY EVALUATION The committee was unable, because of limited time and resources, to make a complete analysis and evaluation of strategies and to quantify benefits and costs to a degree that would permit selection of a single best strategy. The committee limited its effort to a general appraisal of strate- gies with a view toward estimating their effectiveness, describing their principal advantages and disadvantages, and identifying subsequent anal- ysis and research. The intent was to provide reasoned and balanced advice about avenues for FAA to explore and key questions that must be answered. The results of these deliberations are presented in Chapter 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The final part of the process, reported in Chapters 6 and 7, consisted of developing conclusions and recommendations. Conclusions were reached at two levels: General conclusions about future needs, problems and issues, and broader national transportation goals that would guide any strategy the federal government might adopt; and Specific conclusions about individual options, strategies, and methods of implementation. The committee's recommendations in Chapter 7 are similarly structured. They address the general strategic planning process, recommended strat- egies, questions of implementation and funding, and research and devel- opment needs.

3 Options for Accommodating Air Travel Demand The committee identified eight ivz basic options to provide increased -- airport capacity and to accommo- - date future growth in intercity travel demand. These options are grouped into three classes (Table 3-1). The first four options deal with airport infrastructure and as- sociated air traffic control rules and entail either new construction or expansion of the capacity of existing facilities. These options would increase the absolute capacity of the airport system. The next two options involve managerial techniques to make more efficient use of existing airport facilities. They would not increase capacity per Se, but they would allow more aircraft operations and passenger movements by managing demand so as to make more efficient use of the facilities in place at any given time. The last two options pertain to advanced vehicle and control system technology that would achieve greater throughput by increasing the size, speed, or utility of vehicles; by improving the techniques of controlling vehicle movement; or by diverting some part of air travel demand to other modes. INFRASTRUCTURE OPTIONS 1. Make Incremental Capacity Improvements at Existing Airports Description At many presently congested airports, increases in capacity could be achieved by some combination of new runways or taxiways and associated 24

Options for Accommodating Air Travel Demand 25 TABLE 3-1 OPTIONS FOR ACCOMMODATING AIR TRAVEL DEMAND Advanced Vehicle and Management of Control System Infrastructure Supply Demand Technology 1. Make incremental 5. Apply administrative 7. Promote develop- capacity improve- and regulatory ment of new avia- ments at existing air- techniques tion technology ports 6. Employ economic 8. Develop high-speed 2. Create new hubs at measures to surface transpor- presently underused redistribute demand tation technology airports and allocate airport 3. Add new airports in resources metropolitan areas with high traffic volume 4. Develop new air- ports dedicated to serving as transfer points changes in air traffic control procedures. These measures, which are highly site specific, would either add new operational capacity or allow more operations on existing runways, thus increasing the hourly aircraft service rate of individual airports. In some cases these measures would have the more limited objective of allowing a greater volume of traffic to be handled in adverse weather. The importance of bringing operational capacity under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) closer to capacity under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) should not be overlooked. The reduction of capacity at major hub airports because of adverse weather conditions is a major cause of delay in the airport system at present. If it were possible to achieve the equivalent of the VFR operational rate in all but the most extreme weather conditions, the hourly IFR rate at a typical airport might be 40 to 60 percent greater than it is now. Since IFR conditions occur only part of the time, the annual capacity gain would be somewhat smaller. The value of this option, however, lies not in the size of the annual increase but in the ability to reduce variation in delays and attain an hourly or daily rate that is virtually constant throughout the year. Analysis of this option, conducted by the FAA Airport Capacity Pro- gram Office, identified five kinds of runway improvements that could be made (Table 3-2) (Federal Aviation Administration 1989). The particular improvements and the capacity gains that could be achieved vary consid- erably from airport to airport. At some airports none of these improve- ments is possible; at others gains of up to 100 percent in IFR arrival capacity could result. Of the top 100 airports in the United States (ranked

TABLE 3-2 METHODS TO INCREASE CAPACITY AT EXISTING AIRPORTS (Federal Aviation Administration 1989) Method Description Application Dependent parallel IFR approaches Independent parallel IFR approaches Dependent converging IFR approaches Existing rules require that the separation between parallel run- ways be at least 2,500 ft for depen- dent IFR operations with 2.0 nautical miles (nmi) diagonal separation between landing aircraft. Re- cent studies show that this diagonal separation could be safely changed to 1,5 nmi. Separation between parallel runways must be at least 4,300 ft for simultaneous in- dependent IFR oper- ations, The FAA is actively pursuing ways to change this separation standard to a goal of between 2,500 and 3,000 ft. This may permit an increase of 12 to 17 operations per hour under IFR. The objective is to lower the runway vis- ibility minima for ap- proaches to converg- ing runways. Prelimi- nary studies indicate that dependent ap- proaches to converg- ing runways can be safety conducted in ceilings down to Cat- egory 1 Minimum Decision Height (200 ft). 27 of the top 100 air- ports have or plan to have parallel runways with spacing of 1,000 to 2,499 feet and are candidates for de- pendent parallel IFR approaches. Among the top 100 air- ports, 28 have or plan to have parallel runways with spac- ings between 3,000 and 4,299 ft. Among the top 100 airports, 58 are can- didates for depen- dent converging approaches.

Options for Accommodating Air Travel Demand 27 TABLE 3-2 continued Method Description Application Independent converging IFR approaches Triple IFR approaches Under VFR it is com- mon to use noninter- secting converging runways for indepen- dent streams of arriv- ing aircraft. In IFR this practice is re- stricted to decision heights above 200 ft. Development of new procedures to ensure safety in the event of simultaneous missed approaches would allow independent converging IFR ap- proaches down to Category 1 Minimum Decision Height (200 ft). If IFR approaches to triple runways (using either the current 4,300-ft lateral sep- aration standard or the proposed 3,000-ft standard) were per- mitted, airports could achieve up to a 50 percent increase in IFR arrival capacity. Among the top 100 airports, 33 are can- didates for indepen- dent converging IFR approaches. Among the top 100 air- ports, 10 are candi- dates for triple IFR approaches. in terms of annual aircraft operations), roughly two-thirds are candidates for one or more kinds of runway additions or procedural improvements. They include some of the nation's busiest and most congested airports (Table 3-3). The net capacity gain of applying this option at the top 100 airports is shown in Table 3-4. Note that the projected capacity increase is hypotheti- cal; it assumes that all the improvements listed are, in fact, made and that they are exploited fully by users of the airport. As a practical matter, neither assumption is wholly valid. Some projects might not be approved or receive funding; some added capacity might go unused. Therefore, actual capacity gains would be somewhat less. Gains in capacity at individual airports cannot be translated directly into gains in airport system capacity. The effect on airport system capacity

TABLE 3-3 POTENTIAL CAPACITY INCREASE AT TOP 100 AIRPORTS (IFR ARRIVALS) (Federal Aviation Administration 1989) Rank' Airport' Current IFR Capacity' Type of Improvement' Added IFR Capacity' 1 Chicago (ORD) 52 T 26 2 Atlanta (ATL) 52 T 11 4 Dallas—Fort Worth (DFW) 52 T 26 6 NY—Kennedy (JFK) 36 T 16 7 San Francisco (SF0) 26 DC 8 8 NY—Newark (EWR) 26 T 26 9 NY—LaGuardia (LGA) 26 IC 8 11 Boston (BOS) 26 DP 10 12 St. Louis (STL) 26 IC 26 13 Detroit (DTW) 52 T 11 15 Minneapolis—St. Paul (MSP) 36 DC 16 16 Phoenix (PHX) 26 T 26 18 Washington—National (DCA) 26 DC 8 20 Houston (IAH) 52 T 26 21 Las Vegas (LAS) 26 DC 8 22 Orlando (MCO) 26 T 52 25 Memphis (MEM) 36 IC 16 26 Washington—Dulles (lAD) 52 T 26 28 Salt Lake City (SLC) 36 T 27 30 Kansas City (MCI) 26 IC 26 31 Baltimore—Washington (BWI) 26 DC 10 32 Ft. Lauderdale (FLL) 26 IF 26 34 San Juan (SJU) 26 IC 26 36 Cincinnati (CVG) 26 IP 26 37 Cleveland (CLE) 26 DC 8 38 Nashville (BNA) 26 IC 26 40 Portland (PDX) 36 DC 16 41 San Antonio (SAT) 26 IC 26 42 Dallas (Love) (DAL) 36 IF 16 44 Indianapolis (IND) 26 DP 10 46 Kahului (000) 26 DC 8 49 West Palm Beach (FBI) 26 IC 8 52 Oakland (OAK) 26 T 26 53 Austin (AUS) 26 DC 8 54 Raleigh—Durham (RDU) 36 T 27 58 Milwaukee (MKE) 26 T 10 60 Reno (RNO) 26 DC 8 61 Burbank (BUR) 26 DC 8 62 Syracuse (SYR) 26 IC 26 65 Jacksonville (JAX) 26 IC 26 66 Tulsa (TUL) 52 T 26 67 Anchorage (ANC) 26 IC 26 68 El Paso (ELF) 26 IC 26 69 Rochester (ROC) 26 IC 26 70 Llhue (LIH) 26 IC 26 71 Ft. Myers (RSW) 26 IF 26 72 Omaha (OMA) 26 DP 10 73 Louisville (SDF) 26 IF 26 74 Greensboro (GSO) 26 IF 26

Options for Accommodating Air Travel Demand 29 TABLE 3-3 continued Ranks Airportb Current IFR Capacity Type of Improvementd Added IFR Capacity 75 Albany (ALB) 26 DC 8 76 Providence (P\'D) 26 DP 10 77 Richmond (RIC) 26 IC 26 78 Little Rock (LIT) 26 IP 26 80 Spokane (GEG) 26 IP 26 82 Des Moines (DSM) 26 DC 8 84 Colorado Springs (COS) 26 IC 26 85 Charleston, S.C. (CHS) 26 DC 8 87 Grand Rapids (GRR) 26 IP 26 88 Portland, Maine (PWM) 26 DC 8 89 Columbia, S.C. (CAE) 26 DC 10 90 Long Beach (LGB) 26 IP 26 91 Knoxville (TYS) 26 DP 10 92 Islip (ISP) 26 DC 8 93 Midland (MAF) 26 T 26 95 Hilo (ITO) 26 DC 8 96 Savannah (SAV) 26 IP 26 97 Greer—Greenville (GSP) 26 IP 26 99 Harlingen (HRL) 26 IC 26 ABased on annual aircraft operations. bAirports among the top 100 where no capacity increase can be obtained are not listed. Hourly IFR arrival capacity. dDp dependent parallel approaches; IP, independent parallel approaches; DC, dependent converging approaches; IC, independent converging approaches; T, triple runways. of the proposed improvements included in this option was not and cannot be calculated without a method to determine how the flow of traffic throughout the airport network would be influenced by individual and several improvements at all of the sites involved. Estimates by the Industry Task Force on Airport Capacity Improve- ment and Delay Reduction (1989) and by the TRB Airport Network Study Panel (1988) suggest that all the measures contemplated in this option, if applied throughout the system and fully successful, might allow handling a level of traffic up to perhaps 50 percent greater than today. This would be sufficient to accommodate 10 to 15 years of traffic growth at current and projected rates of annual increase. Only partial estimates of the cost of this option are available. In some cases, such as independent or dependent converging approaches, no new construction is required. All that would be needed is a change in the procedures, aircraft separation rules, or visibility minima governing such operations on runways that already exist. Of the 68 airports that are candidates for capacity enhancements of existing facilities, 50 call for some amount of construction, ranging from extending runways to relocat- ing or realigning runways to building completely new runways. These

30 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES TABLE 3-4 NET GAIN IN HOURLY IFR ARRIVAL CAPACITY DUE TO RUNWAY ADDITIONS AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES Present IFR Projected Airports Arrival Capacity' Gain' Top 10 426 121 11-25 566 199 26-50 758 285 51-75 748 365 76-100 676 330 'Ranked in terms of annual aircraft operations. bCombined hourly IFR arrival capacity for all air- ports in the category. 'Additional hourly IFR arrivals that could be accom- modated. Source: Based on Table 3-3. projects are in various stages of planning and implementation, and, for some, cost estimates are not yet available. A summary of project costs, totalling $2 billion, for the 32 sites where data are available is provided in Table 3-5. Assuming that costs at the remaining 18 airports are compara- ble, the total investment for new infrastructure for this option would be on the order of $3 billion in current dollars. The cost of additional equipment to allow certain procedural changes (e.g., fast update radar to enable independent arrivals on parallel runways separated by less than 4,300 ft) is not included in this estimate. Evaluation The chief advantages of this option are that it is relatively low in cost, it uses existing (or soon to be available) technology, and it would provide immediate relief at several severely congested airports. The proposed improvements at many sites have been studied thoroughly, and most are already planned and designed. Several are ready for implementation and await only federal or local funding. This option also has the advantage of forestalling any further increase in delay while longer-term and more substantial capacity increases are being sought. Thus, although the option might be characterized as short- term, this refers only to the time required for implementation. The benefits would be long lasting since they would constitute permanent capacity increases at the sites where they are implemented. The specific improvements contained in this option could not be ap- plied to all airports nationwide. They are local, site-specific improve- ments at individual airports, although there would also be some favorable effect on overall system capacity. In other words, this option should be

Options for Accommodating Air Travel Demand 31 TABLE 3-5 COST ESTIMATES FOR PROPOSED ADDITIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS AT SELECTED AIRPORTS (Federal Aviation Administration 1989) Airports Number of Projects Cost ($ millions) Capacity Increase L Top 10 4 341 37 11-25 8 486 196 26-50 7 436 96 51-75 6 427 104 76-100 7 310 124 Overall 32 2,000 557 1989 dollars. bTotal additional hourly IFR arrival capacity in each airport category. thought of as local in scale but with national effect, especially if the capacity increases are made at the relatively few airports that handle the greatest volume of traffic. Many of the runway additions and improvements included in this option would help reduce the gap between hourly IFR and VFR arrival rates. Since adverse weather is the single largest cause of delay, the benefits in terms of increased arrival throughput at such times would be significant. However, the annual capacity gains at a given site would be rather small and would depend on the prevalence of IFR conditions. Capacity increase at each site could have a beneficial halo effect in reducing delay at airports on connecting routes. At many currently congested airports airlines are scheduling opera- tions at a rate approaching VFR capacity. Increasing IFR arrival capacity will not ease the general problem of congestion and delay at these air- ports, and the only effective solutions would be to add new runways or to lengthen existing runways to accommodate larger aircraft. The beneficial effects on passenger delay, airline schedules, and cost of service, although largely confined to aircraft arrivals, would nevertheless be significant and well worth pursuing in view of the low cost of most improvements. Detailed evaluation of this option is presented in Table 3-6. 2. Create New Hubs at Presently Underused Airports Description The major cause of delay in the airport network is the concentration of traffic at relatively few airports where airline routes converge. The use of

TABLE 3-6 EVALUATION MATRIX FOR OPTION 1—MAKE INCREMENTAL CAPACITY IMPROVEMENTS AT EXISTING AIRPORTS Evaluation Factors Rating Comment Capacity benefit + 1 While come overall capacity increase would be achieved, principal gain would be to increase IFR capacity at selected airports. Capital cost - 1 Very low cost compared to other op- tions—$40 to $60 million per site at about 50 sites. Operating cost —1 Very low, no greater than present op- eration and maintenance costs for existing runways. Safety + 1 Increased safety of IFR operations at some sites. Passenger effects +1 Reduction in traffic delays, both at af- fected airports and at other airports with connecting routes. Industry effects + 1 Reduced delay costs and less schedule disruption owing to adverse weather. Improved aircraft utilization. Environmental effects - 1 Possible increased noise or adverse ef- fect on air quality at some sites. Might be opposed on noise grounds in some cases if new approach and departure patterns are created. Local and regional effects 0 Little effect on local or regional devel- opment except that owing to margi- nal increase in reliability of air service. Funding and financing + 2 Funding available from annual Trust Fund outlays. Uses existing financing mechanisms. Implementation + 2 Uses existing or soon to be available technology. Many improvements al- ready planned and designed. 1990 2000 2010 2020 Later Timetable:

Options for Accommodating Air Travel Demand 33 these airports as transfer points in the hub-and-spoke route patterns that have become common airline practice since deregulation creates periodic high traffic surges during the day as flights arrive, exchange passengers, and depart within an hour or less. Disruption of these "connecting banks" at an airport—from bad weather, late arrivals, or general traffic conges- tion—can cause delays that ripple out to other airports and the airport network as a whole. Since it is the lack of capacity at hubs that creates delay, a possible solution would be to create new hubs at conveniently located points. FAA has identified 28 airports with underused capacity that could relieve some of the congested airports now used as hubs by individual airlines (see Figure 3-1) (Federal Aviation Administration 1989). These potential new hub airports are more than 50 miles from airports that now have or are forecast to have delay problems by 1997. Each has sufficient existing or potential runway capacity to support a significant increase in aircraft operations, and all could accommodate multiple approach streams during instrument meteorological conditions. This option attacks the hub problem by creating more hubs. Two kinds of airports are candidates: those with existing large but underused capac- ity and those with limited existing capacity but with room for expansion. By drawing upon existing underutilized airport capacity within the network as a whole, this option avoids the difficulty and expense of building new airports. Although it would involve realignment of routes for individual airlines, the option is consistent (but on a wider scale) with what some airlines have done already to alleviate problems at crowded hubs. Piedmont's hubs at Dayton and Baltimore—Washington Interna- tional, Delta's at Salt Lake City and Orlando, American's at Raleigh—Durham and Nashville, and America West's at Las Vegas are recent examples. In fact, airlines might seek such a solution voluntarily when operations at their existing hubs become intolerably constrained by inadequate airport capacity. The workability of this option rests upon what is basically an economic decision by airlines (i.e., when the marginal cost of expanding an existing congested hub airport exceeds the cost of opening a new hub, an airline will voluntarily "rehub" even though some inefficiency might result in its route network). This tradeoff of cost against efficiency will be viewed differently by individual airlines based on their fleets, route patterns, major markets, and existing investments at airports. FAA has not published estimates of the cost to upgrade and expand the candidate airports that would serve as new hubs. However, judging from recent examples of airports that have undergone such expansion, the cost might run from $250 to $500 million per site (including aeronautical facilities, terminal building, and landside development). If all 28 candi-

S BOS Delay-Problem Airport A Potential New Hub Airport FIGURE 3-1 Potential new connecting hub airports (Federal Aviation Administration 1989).

Options for Accommodating Air Travel Demand 35 date airports were converted to supplementary connecting hubs, the total cost would run from $7 to $14 billion over the course of 10 to 15 years. Evaluation New secondary hubs would not reduce delay at all congested major airports. However, they would allow for growth that could not be accom- modated at major hubs without severe delay. By making greater use of facilities available at medium-size airports, this option takes advantage of "overcapacity" in the national airport system, particularly in the central and southwestern regions of the United States. Since relatively little new infrastructure would be called for, implementation would be fairly easy. The sites for new hubs are already developed, and the required runways are mostly in place. New construction would consist mainly of expanded aprons or taxiways and enlarged terminal buildings and landside facilities. Airline cooperation and financial support would be needed to help under- write the cost of terminals, gates, and aprons. Overall, investment costs would be rather low compared to building new airports. Because the new hubs would be located at some distance from present large hubs, airspace conflicts would be minimized. Local and regional economic benefits—in the form of improved air service, new employment, and attraction of new business—could be substantial around new hubs. Airlines would benefit from greater avail- ability of hubbing points, offset to some degree by inefficiencies that would result from more circuitous routes and decentralization of their present route structure. On the whole, airlines probably would be suppor- tive and help finance the necessary expansion. Present financing mecha- nisms would probably suffice, but this option could be made more attrac- tive if FAA were to offer preferential funding for airports that are candidates as secondary hubs. Local airport authorities might also be willing to offer reduced fees and rents for airlines considering relocation, if the existing airport-airline use agreements do not preclude such incen- tives. See Table 3-7 for detailed evaluation of this option. 3. Add New Airports in Metropolitan Areas with High Traffic Volume Description In nearly all cases the airports with severest congestion today are in major metropolitan areas. These metropolises are major centers of the national

TABLE 3-7 EVALUATION MATRIX FOR OPTION 2—CREATE NEW HUBS AT PRESENTLY UNDERUSED AIRPORTS Evaluation Factors Rating Comment Capacity benefit +2 Assumes 15 to 30 new hubs by 2000 to 2005, used either as secondary hubs or as new primary hubs. Net effect of up to 33 percent more hubbing capacity; systemwide capacity benefit would be somewhat greater. Capital cost - 1 Relatively low cost compared to build- ing new airports or expanding exist- ing large hubs. In some cases runways already exist, and the major costs would be expansion of aprons, gates, and terminals. Operating cost —1 Although operation and maintenance costs would increase at new hubs in proportion to the increase in opera- tions, the costs would not be Out of line with those at present large hubs. Safety 0 Perhaps some marginal safety benefit because of relief of congestion (or at least no further increase in conges- tion) at existing large hubs. Passenger effects +1 Passengers would benefit from delay reduction and a wider variety of route choices. To the extent that air- lines could reroute traffic quickly through alternate secondary hubs in response to airport slowdowns or clo- sures owing to weather, reliability of service would be increased. Industry effects + 1 Airlines would benefit from greater availability of hubbing points, offset to some extent by inefficiencies from decentralization of present routes and transfer points. Consistent with current airline industry trend toward "rehubbing." Environmental effects —1 Increased noise at new hubs. Perhaps other adverse impacts on neigh- boring communities because of air- port expansion or the increase in operations. Local and regional effects +2 Increased revenue for new hubs. Com- munity and regional benefits from more extensive air service and eco- nomic growth stimulated by new hubs.

Options for Accommodating Air Travel Demand 37 TABLE 3-7 continued Evaluation Factors Rating Comment Funding and financing - 1 May require special federal or local as- sistance owing to lack of an existing large traffic base. Airlines might be willing to pay for a share of develop- ment and expansion costs. Present fi- nancing mechanisms would probably suffice. Implementation + 2 Implementation relatively easy using familiar techniques already applied (e.g., Dayton, Salt Lake City, Raleigh-Durham). Much less difficult than building new airports or ex- panding present large hubs. Can be accomplished in relatively short time (1 to 3 years per site) and as needed. 1990 2000 2010 2020 Later Timetable: economy and constitute the origins or destinations of most air travelers. In fact, airlines favor hubs in these economic centers precisely because they provide the local traffic base that airlines consider vital to a success- ful hub. Thus, given the demonstrated linkage between economic growth and air travel, expanding airport capacity in the metropolitan areas that will be the future centers of business, commerce, and tourism is an option to be considered. This approach has been explored in most major cities but with little success. Only two new major airports (Dallas—Fort Worth and South- west Florida Regional in Fort Myers, FL) have been opened in the past 20 years. The principal barriers to a second (or third or fourth) airport to serve major metropolitan areas are lack of a suitable site, conflict with other potential uses of the land, introduction of noise into sensitive areas, the difficulty of providing adequate landside access, traffic pattern con- flicts and congestion in terminal-area airspace, opposition by incumbent airlines at the existing airport(s), and the large investment required to build a new facility in an already developed area. It is the past failure to achieve community acceptance and support for such projects that has contributed significantly to the lack of adequate airport capacity in our largest cities today.

38 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES Still, these obstacles might be overcome if there is sufficient awareness by all parties that new airports are vital to the continued growth of the metropolitan area and a collective commitment to forge a workable solution. A preliminary survey by the TRB Airport Network Study Panel in 1988 identified 13 locations with high potential for major expansion of an existing site or conversion of a secondary site and 27 others with medium potential. Of these, roughly half were in large cities that now experience severe airport delay or are expected to by the end of the century (Transportation Research Board 1988). This option consists of two major parts: (a) building new airports to serve major cities that are now centers of air travel and (b) reserving sites for cities that are expected to experience large population and economic growth in the future. The approach required for each is different. In present large cities such as Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York, the crux of the problem is to acquire sufficient land appropriately situated within the metropolitan area and served by an adequate (or expandable) surface transportation network. Given this, the next (and so far intract- able) problem is to gain public acceptance of the need and desirability of new airport construction. This will be difficult to do. It has been tried in all these cities in the past and has failed. For cities expected to emerge as major metropolitan centers over the next 10 to 20 years, effort at this time should be concentrated on identify- ing suitable future airport sites (either private land or military property and other federally owned tracts) and landbanking them against antici- pated need. Cities such as Houston and Phoenix have taken such action and are in a good long-term position to develop major new airport capacity. The key for emerging new metropolises is far-sighted planning and immediate action to reserve land (and protect it through zoning and development controls) until such time as it may be needed. Table 3-8 is an illustration of the effect that building major new airports would have for 10 of the largest metropolitan areas. The present airports serving these areas are forecast by 2000 to rank among the leading airports in the United States in terms of aircraft operations or passenger enpianements (Federal Aviation Administration 1989). In most cases these population centers are now served by more than one airport, and three (Los Angeles, New York, and the San Francisco Bay area) are served by three major airports. For each metropolitan area a major new airport capable of handling 900,000 aircraft operations annually is hypothesized. This is slightly greater than the present capacity of Chicago O'Hare or Atlanta Harts- field and slightly smaller than the projected capacity of the new Denver airport. Collectively, these new airports would almost double the airport capacity available in the 10 major population centers.

Options for Accommodating Air Travel Demand 39 TABLE 3-8 NEW HUB AIRPORTS IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS Gain in Forecast Activity-2000 Operational Capacity from Metropolitan Present Enplanements Operations New Airport Area Airport(s) (thousands) (thousands) (percent)b Chicago ORD 41,963 846 70 MDW 4,679 329 Atlanta ATL 31,269 932 100 Los Angeles LAX 25,795 666 50 Basin SNA 3,753 666 LGB 1,713 518 Dallas-Fort DFW 35,072 714 125 Worth Denver" DVX 33,197 817 110 New York JFK 22,490 376 75 LGA 15,484 382 EWR 18,395 446 San Francisco SF0 18,655 494 55 Bay OAK 4,081 548 SJC 6,459 566 Miami MIA 18,293 475 190 Phoenix- PHX 19,514 598 85 Tucson TUS 2,697 457 Boston BOS 16,945 532 170 "Assumes new Denver airport (DVX) in operation. bAssumes that new airport has capacity for 900,000 operations annually. Source: TRE from FAA forecasts. The effect of these new airports on airport system capacity nationwide could not be determined without extensive network modeling. However, some sense of the magnitude of the possible capacity gain can be obtained by considering that the 9 million additional operations that could be handled by these new airports would be equivalent to 30 percent of all commercial air carrier movements in the country in 2000. Further, since these airports would serve cities that are origins or destinations for a very large share of all passengers, they could support a one-third increase in total enplanements in these cities—about 278 million passengers annually. Located in densely populated and highly developed urban areas, these airports would be very costly, perhaps as much as $3 to $6 billion dollars per site. (For reference, the cost of the new Denver airport is estimated to be $2.5 billion and the Osaka airport now under construction in Japan will cost about $6 billion.) Construction of surface transportation systems for landside access and mitigation of noise impacts on surrounding commu- nities could drive these costs even higher.

40 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES Evaluation While capacity gains would be large and provided at precisely the points of highest present traffic concentration, the costs and practical difficulty of implementation would be enormous. This option would have the highest cost-to-capacity ratio of all the airport infrastructure solutions. Community opposition, in view of experience over the past 20 years, is likely to be intense on the grounds of noise, community disruption, competing land use, and cost. The prospects of building 10 major new airports in or near the most populous U.S. metropolitan areas therefore do not appear bright. Even if the new airports are built, they might not achieve their purpose, depending on what would happen to the existing airport or airports serving the metropolitan area. The pressure from the community to close the older airport might be very strong, since the land would have high value for other kinds of development and the proceeds could help defray the costs of constructing the new airport. Incumbent airlines also might press for closing the old airport or downgrading it to a reliever airport for general aviation to prevent this large available capacity from being used by a new competitor seeking to enter the market and threatening their dominant position. See Table 3-9 for evaluation of this option. 4. Develop New Airports Dedicated to Serving as Transfer Points Description In large measure, the congestion at major hub airports today results from the high proportion of flights that use the airport as a transfer point for passengers traveling elsewhere. At airports such as Chicago O'Hare, Atlanta, Denver, Raleigh—Durham, and St. Louis, less than half of the arriving passengers are actually destined for these cities. Since the airline practice of hubbing is likely to continue and probably intensify in coming years, one way to relieve the burden on congested airports would be to separate transfer from origin-destination traffic by providing facilities devoted exclusively to serving the transfer function. This concept, known variously as wayports, remote transfer airports, or superhubs, has received considerable attention in recent months. It has proven controversial, in part because of confusing terminology and in part because of a lack of common definition of how such an airport

TABLE 3-9 EVALUATION MATRIX FOR OPTION 3—ADD NEW AIRPORTS IN METROPOLITAN AREAS WITH HIGH TRAFFIC VOLUME Evaluation Factors Rating Comment Capacity benefit + 2 Could almost double airport capacity in 10 metropolitan areas, with sub- stantial system capacity benefits. Capital cost —3 Very high—$3 to $6 billion per site— owing to land cost, density of urban development, and need for building new surface access routes. Operating cost - 1 Because of their size and complexity, new airports would be expensive to operate but probably no more so than existing major hub airports. Safety - 1 Possible airspace interference between new airports and existing metro- politan airport(s) nearby, with ad- verse effects on safety. Passenger effects + 2 Reduced delay and perhaps wider choice of carriers for service to and from metropolitan areas. Industry effects + 2 Relief from congestion for carriers al- ready serving the metropolitan area. Might increase competition in major markets but also could open new markets as a result of more available capacity. Environmental effects —3 High noise impacts from new airports in densely settled areas. Urban air pollution and intrusion on neighbor- ing communities would increase. Local and regional effects + 1 Some benefit from new airports, but in view of the high level of existing de- velopment in major cities, the net ef- fect would be relatively small. Funding and financing —1 Although capital costs would be high, the location in a major market would make financing relatively easy, espe- cially if the new airport were built by the existing airport authority. Implementation —3 Very difficult because of environmental opposition, the need for extensive land access routes, and potential dis- ruption of established and densely settled communities. 1990 2000 2010 2020 Later Timetable: I I I

42 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES would operate. In essence, the concept of dedicated transfer airports envisages large facilities, located at some distance from major metro- politan areas (but near a city of say 100,000 to 200,000 people), that would serve as nodes for long-distance air travel routes. Except for nonstops between major city pairs, all flights would connect at these nodes to accomplish passenger transfer. A national network of perhaps 4 to 10 such transfer points would form an arterial system of dense long-haul routes. Trunk service between these nodes could be supplied either by large aircraft (400 to 700 seats) or by conventional aircraft operating on a high- frequency schedule. Connection between transfer airports and major cities in the region could be provided by short-haul aircraft or high-speed surface transport (rail, maglev, or highway). The transfer airport thus would be a regional multimodal transportation hub offering connections to surrounding cities by whatever means of transport would be cost- effective. The benefit for the presently congested airports in major cities would be that the existing capacity could be devoted more fully to origin- destination passengers. The concept is also controversial because it has not been tested in practice or even in theoretical models. It is contrary to the widely held airline view that a substantial local traffic base is essential to a hub. Because transfer airports would be located in communities that do not now have a large airport infrastructure in place, the matters of sponsor- ship, financing, and operation are complex and untried. On the other hand, the cost to build such a facility would probably be less than the cost to build a large new airport close by a major metropolis. Land costs would be lower, and the need for extensive landside facilities (such as parking and airport access roads) would not be as great. Airspace congestion would be less for a remote site compared to a site near one or more existing metropolitan airports. Opposition on the grounds of noise or conflicting land use might be less severe in a site that is not already densely built up. To establish the feasibility of this concept it is essential that all these questions be carefully examined and convincingly resolved. This option may not be a separate approach but simply an evolutionary extension of Option 2. The underused airports that would become new hubs for airline operations in Option 2 might, over the span of 20 years or longer, develop into the major connecting points envisioned in Option 4. To some degree, this has been the course of history in cities such as Atlanta, Orlando, and Dallas—Fort Worth, where the existing airports had large surplus capacity initially. These airports attracted airline hub operations that, in turn, led to their expansion into the major complexes that they are today.

Options for Accommodating Air Travel Demand 43 Evaluation The concept has not been tested in practice. Because it is a radical departure from present airport concepts, gaining acceptance and support from airlines, sponsoring authorities, and affected communities might prove difficult. New sponsorship, financing, guaranty mechanisms, and institutional arrangements would have to be developed. Because of the scale and complexity of transfer airport operations, new systems would be needed for movement of passengers, baggage, and cargo on the airport surface. On the other hand, no other approach to construction of new airports appears to be capable of handling the 200 to 300 percent increase in air travel demand that could develop by 2020 or later. The experience of express package and cargo carriers (although not fully comparable) sug- gests that the transfer airport approach could be practical and economi- cally sound. In comparison with developing major new airports in metro- politan centers, the costs and environmental impacts of transfer airports are distinctly more favorable. In comparison with Option 2 (new hubs at presently underused air- ports), transfer airports might not offer clear advantages. The costs of expanding existing facilities to form new hubs would be less than building completely new transfer airports. Airlines appear to have a stronger preference for small, new hubs where they would be the dominant client, than for transfer airports, where they might have to share the facility with major competitors. On the other hand, the capacity of the sites available as secondary hubs is rather limited and unlikely to absorb demand of the magnitude that could materialize by 2020 to 2030. Transfer airports, in theory, could accommodate very high levels of future demand, but the capacity of such airports and their effect on system capacity have yet to be tested and verified. The issue cannot be settled without further study and modeling. The transfer airport option is evaluated in Table 3-10. DEMAND MANAGEMENT OPTIONS The four preceding options entail, to varying degrees, actions to increase capacity at individual points in the network. While some beneficial effects on traffic flow throughout the system would undoubtedly result, these options might not necessarily lead to the best national airport network. In contrast, the options suggested here would involve approaching the prob- lem of congestion and delay as a symptom of fundamental inefficiency of

TABLE 3-10 EVALUATION MATRIX FOR OPTION 4—DEVELOP NEW AIRPORTS DEDICATED TO SERVING AS TRANSFER POINTS Evaluation Factors Rating Comment Capacity benefit + 3 Would increase origin-destination ca- pacity at major hubs. An exclusive transfer airport network could dou- ble the capacity of the system to handle connecting flights. Capital cost —2 $2 to $3 billion per site. Lower than the cost of a facility of comparable size in a major metropolitan area. Operating cost —1 May be somewhat less than the opera- tion and maintenance costs of major metropolitan area airports because fewer landside facilities would be needed. Automated passenger and baggage moving systems could in- crease operation and maintenance costs. Safety +3 Reduced airspace congestion because of distance from major metropolitan airports. Greater availability of land would allow widely spaced runways. Passenger effects +2 Reduced delay and perhaps greater frequency of service. More circuitous routing could be a disadvantage. Transfers (especially interline) would be facilitated. Might result in less nonstop service from some metro- politan areas that are now hubs. Industry effects —2 A single carrier would not be able to control a hub. Increased competition at transfer airports. Might require different fleets for transfer and local service operations. Environmental effects —1 Greatly reduced in comparison with metropolitan area hubs because of location outside densely settled areas. However, noise impacts on presently tranquil areas would be large. Local and regional effects + 2 Could stimulate local and regional eco- nomic development near airport and elsewhere in region because of new employment and greater availability of air service.

Options for Accommodating Air Travel Demand 45 TABLE 3-10 continued Evaluation Factors Rating Comment Funding and financing —3 Present financing mechanisms probably would not be suitable. New financ- ing, sponsorship, and guaranty ar- rangements would have to be developed. Investment in a new fa- cility without an existing or guaran- teed traffic base could be risky. Implementation —2 Airline cooperation would be difficult to obtain. Site selection and develop- ment of overall transfer airport net- work would have to be coordinated and managed carefully. 1990 2000 2010 2020 Later Timetable: I the air transport system that is due to inappropriate organization and use of the present infrastructure. 5. Manage Demand by Administrative and Regulatory Techniques Description The emphasis here is on managing how system components are used. The solutions would involve managerial actions to assign functional roles for airports, to apply rules governing airport access, and to allocate the use of capacity—all in the interest of achieving a more efficient, safer, and less costly system. This implies some form of centralized system management analogous to that now applied to use of the airspace. The actions that might be taken include assigning different classes of airspace and airport users to sepa- rate facilities and different portions of the airspace. Within each class, individual airports might be designated for specific users, or quotas might be set on operations at airports in high demand. Minimum performance and equipment standards could be set for operation in different parts of the airport and airspace system. Flow control and traffic metering could be applied more extensively to eliminate congestion and smooth demand

46 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES fluctuation in critical parts of the network. Greater use could be made of computers to plan, execute, monitor, and modify traffic flow into and out of airports on a real-time, dynamic basis. All of these measures are now applied to some extent. We have reliever airports, operational caps at some airports, terminal-area airspace rules, and national flow control. This option would expand and extend such techniques to manage demand in a way that is consistent with the capacity of the system at any given time. It could also include planning capacity additions that would be of greatest system benefit. The rationale for this option is that it represents an alternative to the present approach of decentralized planning and management, piecemeal improvements, and the continuing cycle of adding capacity at points of high demand while surplus capacity at other places goes largely unused. For this option to work, some form of national direction and oversight would be necessary. This would not entail actual management or adminis- tration of individual airports by a national authority or infringement on local initiative, responsibility, and authority. What would be needed is an entity capable of viewing the airport system as a whole and charged with responsibility to provide guidelines for balanced and efficient use of airport resources on a nationwide scale. An important part of this na- tional direction would be to encourage and facilitate local airport plan- ning within a strategic federal framework. This option has several constituent parts, some of which do not now exist. As a minimum, it would require the following: Definition of a subset of all public-use airports that would make up a core system of national-interest airports, supported by a dedicated prefer- ential method of capital funding; An organization (perhaps governmental, perhaps quasi-governmen- tal) to oversee the development and utilization of national-interest air- ports; System-based, comprehensive strategic planning of airport expan- sion and new airport construction; An air traffic system capable of real-time, dynamic air traffic manage- ment and flow control (both en route and in terminal areas); and A mechanism for cooperative participation by local airport authori- ties in allocating capacity among airspace users. The key to this option is a clear and broad-reaching transportation policy directed toward achieving national goals for aviation and for inter- city passenger travel in general. This policy, though focused on national interest, would also have to be mindful of local concerns and prerogatives

Options for Accommodating Air Travel Demand 47 and consistent with the present general division of responsibilities among federal, state, and local authorities regarding airports. Evaluation This is an administrative and regulatory solution to accommodating de- mand and allocating capacity. The benefits would be both operational (demand smoothing and redistribution) and managerial (more efficient use of existing facilities and avoidance of costly investment to accommo- date brief, severe demand peaks). Since system management rules would apply to use of both airspace and airports, coordination of these constitu- ents of the air transport system would be essential. This option could be implemented in far less time than it would take to construct new facilities or to develop and install new technology. Administrative demand management would clearly be controversial. Many airspace users would perceive airport and airspace system manage- ment as restrictive of their individual freedom and inhibitive of growth. The equity and appropriateness of managerial actions would be disputed keenly and could lead to extensive adjudication or arbitration. It would be a significant departure from the present practices of first-come, first- served and unrestricted access, and the transition period of gaining user acceptance and devising appropriate management rules that do not lead to market distortions could be protracted and contentious. For passengers, peak-period delay would be decreased and systemwide service reliability would be increased on average. However, there could be adverse effects locally on the schedule, frequency, or routing of flights on high-density routes and at the most heavily used airports. In general, this option would reduce peak-period congestion and increase choices for travel that is not time sensitive. From the standpoint of making efficient use of existing resources and avoiding large new capital investment in the short term, this option is worthy of consideration and experimentation. This option is evaluated in Table 3-11. 6. Employ Economic Measures to Redistribute Demand Description This option seeks the same objective as Option 5 but relies on market forces to redistribute demand and to allocate existing and new airport resources. Economists argue that price is a rational and preferable mech-

TABLE 3-11 EVALUATION MATRIX FOR OPTION 5—MANAGE SYSTEM DEMAND BY ADMINISTRATIVE AND REGULATORY TECHNIQUES Evaluation Factors Rating Comment Capacity benefit +2 Adds no new capacity but helps ensure that existing capacity is used appro- priately and efficiently with respect to system performance. Capital cost 0 No investment required beyond that al- ready programmed in the NAS Plan ATC System upgrade. Avoids some new construction to accommodate peak loads. May help ensure more cost-effective investments in new infrastructure. Operating cost 0 Small operation and maintenance costs for management system. May lead to operation and maintenance cost sav- ings in overall airport and airways system operation. Safety +1 Smoothing demand and avoiding im- balance of load on the airport system will ease congestion and enhance safety. Passenger effects + 2 Reduces peak-period delay and in- creases service reliability systemwide but may have adverse effect on schedule, frequency, or routing of some flights on high-density routes and at congested airports. Facilitates use of airports and increases options for travel that is not time sensitive. Industry effects - 1 Reduces freedom of choice for airlines in selecting routes and times of ser- vice and may inhibit growth at con- gested airports. Increases competition for peak-period slots. The resulting overall system efficiency could be a partially offsetting benefit. Environmental effects - 1 Would increase noise at some times and at some airports but with some offsetting reduction at presently con- gested times and places. Local and regional effects + 1 Increased traffic at presently underused facilities could promote local and re- gional economic benefits as a result of improved air service.

Options for Accommodating Air Travel Demand 49 TABLE 3-11 continued Evaluation Factors Rating Comment Funding and financing +1 Could avoid inappropriate or ineffi- cient investments in airport infra- structure. Greater stability of service patterns would enhance the attrac- tiveness of investments at some airports. Implementation —3 Very controversial. Likely to be op- posed by many classes of airspace users as interference or restriction of freedom of flight. 1990 2000 2010 2020 Later Timetable: , (.. . AS AND WHERE NEEDED anism to influence demand and that it is a more appropriate approach in a climate of airline deregulation. Through economically correct pricing, airports could provide market signals to influence choices of route and times of service based on the relative values that travelers place on air fare, delay, reliability of service, and convenience. At most airports today, price (in the form of landing fees) has a weak influence on the distribution of demand. Landing fees, most often based solely on aircraft weight, constitute a very small fraction of airline operat- ing cost (2 to 3 percent). They do not vary by time of day, level of demand, or number of passengers carried. In many cases, fees are set so that—in the aggregate—they simply make up for the difference between the cost of operating the airport and the revenues received from other sources such as concessions, leases, and automobile parking fees (Office of Tech- nology Assessment 1984a, 116). If the price of airport access were ad- justed to reflect the full cost of providing service or the marginal cost of providing service at peak periods, demand might be distributed in a more economically rational way. Depending on the level at which airport user fees are set, this approach could also provide a source of funds to pay for new capital investments to accommodate additional airport users. The techniques vary, but all entail pricing the use of airport facilities in a way that is consistent either with the cost of providing these facilities or the value that users place on them. Differential charges for access to the airport based on the cost that each user imposes on other users or on the airport operator to provide service are examples of a cost-based ap-

50 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES proach. In a price-based approach, individual users determine the charges they will pay either by an auction for operating rights (slots) or by agreeing to a higher fee for access to the airport at times of high demand. As an alternative to charges imposed on airlines or other aircraft operators as landing or gate-use fees, a levy could be collected directly from passengers as a surcharge for use of the airport at peak periods. This would be, in effect, a passenger facility charge (PFC), but with a variable rate depending on the time of airport use (hour of the day, weekday or weekend, or season of the year) or type of passenger (originating or transfer). The details of the fee structure could be varied according to the local situation, but the essential feature of the PFC approach would be that it provides a direct price signal from the airport to the passenger (the ultimate consumer) about the cost of providing service. Passengers' perceptions are pivotal to the success of the PFC. If they interpret the PFC as a way to express collective opinion about the eco- nomic value of service at particular times and places, they could exert leverage on airline scheduling. If, on the other hand, they believe they can do little to influence airlines, they are likely to regard the PFC as simply a nuisance tax that increases the cost of travel without an offsetting benefit. The market-based approach envisioned here includes any and all eco- nomic measures that might be taken to deal with airport capacity prob- lems. Actions taken by airport authorities (typically local or county governments or operating agencies) are but one form. Pricing by the private sector is also possible—either airlines or private entities operating the airport under contract with local government. Some experts contend that privatization of airport operation has two major advantages. First, it could provide revenue to municipalities and free them from the cost of directly managing airport operations. Second, it could lead to more efficient airport operation and thereby increase effective capacity. Not all would agree with these assertions, but it is not important to the basic concept of market-based solutions, which rest on the premise that eco- nomic allocation of resources through pricing is preferable to regulatory and administrative methods. Evaluation From an economic point of view, this option would create a rational, market-based approach to pricing airport access, leading to greater effi- ciency in the allocation of scarce capacity and providing a source of capital for new capacity. Airport operators would have increased revenue that could be used to cover operating and maintenance costs or to invest in new capacity either at the present airport or at a new site to supplement or

Options for Accommodating Air Travel Demand 51 replace the existing facility. Peak-period and overall delay would be reduced, to the benefit of airport operators, passengers, and airlines. This option might appeal to airline passengers since it would afford wider choices of flight times, airports, routes, and fares. The principal disadvantages would be increased air fares for peak- period travelers, reduced airport access for new entrants and financially weaker carriers unable to afford costly peak-period slots, and complica- tion of airline scheduling. Some loss of regional air service might result, with consequent negative effects for smaller cities in the region. These inequities could be corrected by administrative rules governing the pric- ing system to ensure fairness and reasonable access to airports by all classes of users. It would be politically difficult to implement an acceptable and "fair" pricing policy. One major objection to this approach is that it would be a significant departure from current airport access pricing policy. Another is that it could lead to abuse by airport operators—which are for the most part local monopolies—in setting fees or in the use of revenues. Here, again, rules imposed by law or administrative action might be needed to ensure correct and fair operation of the market. See Table 3-12 for evaluation of this option. ADVANCED VEHICLE AND CONTROL SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY The capacity and efficiency of a transportation system are only partly determined by infrastructure and how it is used. The characteristics of vehicles and the technology employed to control vehicle movement also play important parts in overall system performance. The two options presented here involve either advanced forms of aircraft and air traffic control technology or new types of surface transportation technology that could serve as supplements or substitutes for aviation in future intercity travel. 7. Promote Development of New Aviation Technology Description This option concentrates on new forms of aircraft and air traffic control technology that would allow existing airport infrastructure to be used more efficiently or that would ease certain kinds of restrictions on airport

TABLE 3-12 EVALUATION MATRIX FOR OPTION 6—EMPLOY ECONOMIC MEASURES TO REDISTRIBUTE DEMAND Evaluation Factors Rating Comment Capacity benefit + 2 Leads to more efficient utilization of existing capacity. Reduces traffic peaks and delays. Capital cost —1 Avoids some new construction to ac- commodate peak loads and provides capital for necessary expansion. Operating cost + 2 Reduces operation and maintenance cost because spreads traffic more uniformly and allows relatively flat- ter and perhaps lower overall staffing levels. Safety 0 Marginal safety benefit in some cases because traffic surges are reduced. Passenger effects + 1 Sharply reduces peak-period delay. Fa- cilitates use of airports and increases options for travel that is not time sensitive. Increases cost of peak- period service. May reduce fre- quency or availability of regional feeder service. Industry effects —2 Increased competition among incum- bents for peak-period slots. Compli- cates scheduling of connecting banks. Forces redistribution of flights to what may be unpopular times. May limit airport access for new entrants and fi- nancially weaker carriers. Environmental effects 0 Reduces noise and airport landside congestion at peak periods but spreads it to other, presently less active times of day. Local and regional effects - 1 May lead to loss of frequency or avail- ability of regional feeder service. Could dampen economic growth in smaller satellite cities in the region. Funding and financing +1 Increased airport revenues (in the form of user fees) that could be used to fi- nance new development. Provides closer link between airport use fees and the cost of providing facilities. Implementation —3 Very difficult politically. Likely to re- sult in extensive and costly litigation. Establishing fair basis for pricing and use of revenues by airport operators is likely to be controversial. 1990 2000 2010 2020 Later Timetable: AS AND WHERE NEEDED

Options for Accommodating Air Travel Demand 53 use. Two types of new aircraft offer promise: those of substantially larger size and those capable of operating on much shorter runways. Today's widebody jets have a seating capacity of 350 to 500. Aircraft with 700 to 1,000 seats are technically feasible but have not yet appeared on the market. Such aircraft, if used in the future on the most densely traveled routes, would accommodate an increased number of passengers without an increase in the number of aircraft operations. This would be of significant benefit in terms of runway utilization at airports with the highest air traffic concentration, but it might increase congestion at passenger gates and other facilities in the terminal building or at the curb front. Reduced-takeoff-and-landing (RTOL) aircraft can operate on short runways (2,000 to 3,000 ft) and follow steep approach and departure paths. Vertical-takeoff-and-landing (VTOL) aircraft, such as the tiltro- tor, are under development and might achieve capacities of up to 150 passengers. Both RTOL and VTOL could replace conventional jets and turboprops for short-haul operations (200 to 500 mi), and they would require much less space on the airport surface. By using existing short runways or currently unusable parts of airports, these aircraft would relieve pressure on the main runways used by large jets and effectively increase the overall rate of operations at these airports. Advanced engines, producing less noise on takeoff and landing, are being developed. Aircraft equipped with such engines could operate less obtrusively over heavily populated areas and might allow greater freedom in the choice of routes or hours of operation at airports. They also might make it possible to use sites now denied because of aircraft noise. Some of the congestion and delay at airports today is due not to lack of runway capacity but to limitations of the air traffic control (ATC) system. A program to modernize the ATC system is in progress. One feature of this program is installation of improved surveillance radar that provides greater positional accuracy and faster scanning rates. When fully de- ployed, this radar will allow much closer tracking of aircraft movement, which in turn will allow reduction of separation distances between run- ways used for simultaneous operations and closer in-trail spacing of arriving or departing aircraft in the traffic stream. The net effect will be increased runway utilization and, hence, greater throughput. Another important part of ATC system modernization is the use of faster, more powerful computers. The new computers have been in- stalled, but algorithms have not yet been developed to take full advantage of the possibilities for automation offered by this equipment. Automation of terminal and en-route traffic control functions and integration with the advanced data handling capabilities in newer aircraft would permit more efficient use of airspace. Among the areas of greatest benefit would be en-

54 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES route flow control and flight monitoring, terminal-area traffic manage- ment, and expedited or expanded air-ground communication. These improvements would not only smooth traffic flow, they would also allow traffic planning and anticipatory action to prevent bottlenecks and reduce delays. Evaluation Limitations of present aircraft (noise, size, required runway length, flight characteristics) contribute substantially to airport capacity problems. Promoting the development and encouraging the use of new types of aircraft could be an important part of a long-term airport strategy. Larger aircraft would allow airline passenger growth on some routes to be accom- modated without a corresponding increase in the number of aircraft operations. More versatile RTOL or VTOL aircraft might open up the possibility of using existing airport sites more fully or of creating new airports in places where operating conventional aircraft is not now feasible. In addition, new ATC technology could lead to more efficient and safer use of airspace, reduce delays, help ensure reliability of service in adverse weather, and permit more effective management of air traffic for all airspace users. There are technological risks associated with all these advances, and the research and development and commercialization costs may be very high. On balance, however, the capacity utilization gains available from the application of new aircraft and control technology may be less costly than comparable capacity gains resulting from major additions to airport infrastructure. See Table 3-13 for evaluation of new aircraft and ATC technology. 8. Develop High-Speed Surface Transportation Technology Description In many short, densely traveled corridors, air travel has become the preferred mode because of highway traffic congestion or the lack of rail or bus service affording an attractive combination of speed and convenience. In these markets advanced surface transportation systems—high-speed rail, magnetic levitation (maglev), or advanced superhighways—are thought by some to offer great promise. If surface transportation systems capable of speeds of 150 to 200 mph were to be developed, they could

TABLE 3-13 EVALUATION MATRIX FOR OPTION 7—PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW AIRCRAFT AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TECHNOLOGY Evaluation Factors Rating Capacity benefit + 1 Capital cost —2 Operating cost - 1 Safety +2 Passenger effects + 1 Industry effects + 2 Environmental effects +1 —1 Local and regional effects + 1 Funding and financing - 1 —2 0 Implementation +1 —1 —2 Comment Does not increase capacity but im- proves air service through use of qui- eter, more efficient aircraft, permits use of present or new facilities now unavailable because of noise or flight path restrictions, and could open up new forms of service. Large investments needed for research and development and commercializa- tion. Costs would vary. They would be lowest for advanced subsonic air- craft and higher for tiltrotor and ATC systems. Variable and roughly in the same as- cending order as capital investments. General safety increases owing to ap- plication of advanced aircraft and ATC technology. Safety implications of tiltrotor not yet known. Improvements in the comfort, speed, reliability, and variety of air service. Improved efficiency and utility of fleet. Tiltrotor could open up new routes and points of service. Advanced subsonic would be quieter and have cleaner-burning engines. Tiltrotor would produce noise impacts at new suburban satellite airports. To the extent that new aircraft technol- ogy could provide lower cost and more convenient, more available, or faster service, local and regional economies would benefit. Advanced subsonic—somewhat higher cost, but manageable. Tiltrotor—large development and launch costs. ATC system upgrade already programmed. ATC—enhancements programmed through 2010. Advanced subsonic—continuous with new models at 15- to 20-year intervals. Tiltrotor—joint military-civil develop- ment; civil version by 2010 to 2020.

56 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES TABLE 3-13 continued Timetable: 1990 2000 2010 2020 Later ATC I PROGRAM.MED PLANNED A NAS PLAN AERA I AERA II 1990 2000 2010 2020 Later Advanced Subsonic ..". .. ..... '-... CONTINUOUS UPGRADES A A NEW MODELS NEW MODELS 1990 2000 2010 2020 Later Tiltrotor FIRST COMMERCIAL SERVICE provide an alternative to air for trips of up to 500 miles. In corridors such as Boston—New York—Washington, Milwaukee—Chicago—Detroit, San Francisco—Los Angeles—San Diego, Tampa—Miami, and Dallas— Houston the shift of traffic from air to surface modes could substantially reduce the number of aircraft operations now required to serve these routes. High-speed rail systems are already in operation in Europe and Japan. Maglev systems have been developed and demonstrated in Germany and Japan, and both countries have announced their intention to begin com- mercial service by 2000. At present, however, the cost effectiveness of these technologies for applications in the United States has not been demonstrated. They could become realistic alternatives in the future if capital and operating costs can be reduced and markets of appropriate volume and concentration develop between major U.S. city pairs (Office of Technology Assessment 1984b). Research and development on intelligent vehicle and highway systems (IVHS), so-called smart technology, have begun here and abroad. Proj-

Options for Accommodating Air Travel Demand 57 ects PROMETHEUS in Europe and AMTICS in Japan are exploring dashboard-navigation systems, car trains, automated vehicle guidance, and synchronized traffic control that would enhance highway safety, expedite traffic flow, and increase vehicle speed. In this country the Federal Highway Administration, state highway departments, univer- sities, automobile manufacturers, and several private interests have also initiated study of advanced vehicle and highway technology. Commercial- ization of "smart vehicles and highways" is many decades away, but if it comes into use, one important application could be in intercity travel for distances of 200 to 500 miles, a market now served mainly by air transport (Texas Transportation Institute and Texas State Department of Highways and Public Transportation 1989). Another possible application of high-speed surface transport is to facilitate landside access to airports. This is especially important if sites for new airports in major metropolitan areas can be found only at consid- erable distance from city centers. High-speed surface transport could also help development of large transfer airport complexes (Option 4), since it could provide links to major cities in the region served without imposing a burden on the airspace and runways at the transfer airport. Evaluation As urbanization increases and travel within and between nearby metrop- olises grows more difficult because of surface and air transportation system congestion, new modes of passenger and cargo transport will be needed. The development of advanced surface transportation technology will be prompted by general urban and intercity travel demand and not by air travel alone. Still, the travel market for trips of 200 to 500 miles, now satisfied largely by air, would benefit from the introduction of new high-speed line-haul surface systems that could serve as substitutes for or supplements to air travel, chiefly because they would permit operating vehicles in train or on very short headways and provide much higher throughput than can be accomplished by aircraft (even very large 700 to 1,000 seat aircraft). A second impetus for high-speed surface modes could be the situation of airports in relation to urban activity centers. New airports of the future probably will be farther from city centers and more difficult to reach by highway. Improved surface transportation links will be needed. High-speed rail is already in operation elsewhere in the world and may become economically feasible in this country as the population density increases. Prototype maglev systems are being operated in Japan and West Germany and could serve the same markets as high-speed rail, but

TABLE 3-14 EVALUATION MATRIX FOR OPTION 8—DEVELOP HIGH-SPEED SURFACE TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGY Evaluation Factors Rating Comment Capacity benefit + 2 Could provide alternative for air in dense travel corridors or for certain 200- to 500-mile trips not now well served by air. Would also be useful as links between metropolitan areas and airports 40 miles or more from city centers. Capital cost —3 Vehicle technology costs vary from moderate (high-speed rail) to high (maglev) to very high (IVHS). Right-of-way, infrastructure, and control system costs would be very high for all advanced surface modes. Operating cost —2 Substantially higher than operation and maintenance for conventional rail or interstate highways. Safety +1 All forms would probably be safer than current road and rail systems and perhaps as safe or safer than air. Passenger effects +2 More direct and faster origin-destina- tion service. Greater comfort and convenience. Easier access to the in- tercity transportation system. Inter- modal connections may be easier. Industry effects —1 Airlines would lose some passengers on 200- to 500-mile trips. + 3 Great benefit to operators of surface modes from air passengers attracted to the new systems and from facilita- tion of intermodal transfer. Environmental effects —2 Extensive new rights-of-way could be environmentally harmful and intru- sive on nearby communities. In- crease in noise (especially high-speed rail and IVHS). Local and regional effects + 3 Substantial local and regional benefits and economic growth at terminals and from availability of high-speed surface networks. Funding and financing —3 New mechanisms for multistate, fed- eral, and public-private consortia would be required. Recovery of capi- tal investment from operating reve- nues may be lengthy or impossi- ble. Operating subsidies may be required. Implementation —3 Difficult to acquire rights-of-way. Route alignments and terminal loca- tions will be politically contentious. Research and development for maglev and IVHS may be costly and lengthy.

Options for Accommodating Air Travel Demand 59 TABLE 3-14 continued Timetable: 1990 2000 2010 2020 Later High-Speed Rail INITIAL MULTIPLE FULL LINE LINES NETWORK 1990 2000 2010 2020 Later Maglev / A £ A PROTOTYPES INITIAL FULL & DEMOS LINE NETWORK 1990 2000 2010 2020 Later I\T[-IS I I PROTOTYPE FIRST ROUTE(S) more quietly and perhaps with greater energy efficiency (Center for Transportation Research 1989). The highway system, which is likely to remain the dominant mode of personal transportation for decades to come, could (under the pressure of congestion and the demand for greater speed and throughput) be enhanced with sophisticated elec- tronics that integrate the vehicle, the driver, and the roadway. This sort of advanced highway system, however, is 40 to 50 years away. All of these surface transportation systems will be more complex and costly, but advocates believe they have the potential to be safer and more efficient than their present-day counterparts. If they develop and expand, their speed and range would make them competitors with air travel for trip lengths of 200 to 500 miles, and a substantial portion of what is now the short-haul air travel market could be captured by these advanced surface modes. Paradoxically, the growth in what is now thought to be air travel demand might be accommodated for these short-or medium-range trips by other modes and not by more aircraft and bigger airports. New surface transportation technology is evaluated in Table 3-14.

60 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES REFERENCES Center for Transportation Research. April 1989. Maglev Vehicles and Supercon- ductor Technology: Integration of High-Speed Ground Transportation into the Air Travel System. Report ANL/CMSV-67. Argonne National Laboratory. Argonne, IL. Federal Aviation Administration. 1989. Airport Capacity Enhancement Plan. Report DOTIFAA/CP-89-4. U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. Industry Task Force on Airport Capacity Improvement and Delay Reduction. April 10, 1989. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Transportation of the House Appropriations Committee by J. Donald Reilly, Industry Task Force Chairman. Office of Technology Assessment. 1984a. Airport System Development. Report OTA-STI-231. U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. 1984b. U.S. Passenger Rail Technologies. Report STI-222. U.S. Congress. Texas Transportation Institute and Texas State Department of Highways and Public Transportation. 1989. Intelligent Vehicle/Highway Systems: Mobility 2000 Workshop Proceedings. Transportation Research Board. 1988. Future Development of the U.S. Airport Network. National Research Council, Washington, D.C.

•.\••••. 4 Alternative Scenarios of Air Travel Growth Two major forces that will shape the development of aviation are socioeconomic change and tech- nological innovation. Neither is foreseeable in precise detail even for the short term, and for periods 20 to 50 years hence, only the dimmest outlines are discernible. However, some sense of the fu- ture is needed to provide a context for strategic airport system planning. What follows is a sketch of possible general directions and magnitudes of growth in intercity travel demand. Macroeconomic growth, as measured by gross national product (GNP), has been shown to have a strong correlation with air travel demand, so much so that GNP is a major determinant variable in econo- metric models used by FAA, airlines, and aircraft manufacturers in preparing aviation activity forecasts. Economists foresee two important shifts in the U.S. economy overall and at the regional level. One is the continuing transition from a manufacturing to a service-oriented econ- omy. In this transition some regions will be net gainers and others losers. At the national level this could have an effect on air travel demand. It is not clear, however, whether a service-oriented economy would give rise to more or less long-distance travel and this question deserves careful study. At the regional level the patterns of business-related travel almost cer- tainly would be altered by the shifts in the centers of business activity. The implications for airport system planning are substantial in terms of both how much new capacity might be needed and—more important—where it will be needed.

62 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES The national and regional economies of all parts of the world are becoming more closely linked and interdependent. One implication of the trend toward a global economy is rapid growth of international air travel, where the rates of increase in passenger enplanements, revenue pas- senger miles, and cargo ton-miles are now (and are forecasted to remain through 2000) substantially higher than those for U.S. domestic air trans- port. The areas of most vigorous economic growth—the Pacific Rim nations and the European Economic Community—will almost certainly increase their air commerce with the United States, creating a need for greater capacity at U.S. gateway airports. The pressure for greater ac- commodation of international traffic will be felt not only at the present major points of entry (Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, and Miami) but also at emerging metropolises in the Sun Belt, which are expected to become centers of domestic and international trade, banking, and tourism. A second shift under way is demographic, but it is closely tied to economics. The growth of the U.S. population is slowing, and it is expected to stabilize at 300 million by 2040. This population is expected to be more affluent than today and to have a greater inclination to travel by air (or equivalent long-distance mode of travel) for business and recre- ation. The population in future years will also be relatively older. By the middle of the next century, the cohort aged 65 and over is expected to make up 21 percent of the population (almost twice the present 12 percent in this age group) (Census Bureau 1989). This cohort, if it is like the present over-65 population, largely will be retired, but this does not necessarily imply less travel. The present population age 40 to 50, who will make up the over-65 cohort by 2005-2015, exhibits a high propensity to travel by air—a trait that may well continue into their later years. Demographic studies indicate that they could constitute 22 to 35 percent of air travelers by the early decades of the next century. This travel, however, will probably be chiefly for recreational purposes and not as time-sensitive as business trips (Gallup Organization 1986). Demographers also tell us that shifts in the geographic distribution of the population will take place. The Northeast and Midwest will have population growth much smaller than the national average of 16 percent by 2010. The South and West will grow explosively, with increases of 25 and 32 percent, respectively. (Some of this growth will be at the expense of other parts of the country, and some will be the result of an influx of immigrants from Latin America and Asia). Demographics and eco- nomics are interactive. People will migrate to where there is employment and vice versa. Again, these changes will have a profound influence on both the nature of air travel and the origins and destinations of personal and business trips (Kasarda 1988).

Alternative Scenarios of Air Travel Growth 63 The patterns of land use and urban settlement are also changing. In contrast with the dense central cities of the North and East, the newer cities of the South and West are characterized by more diffuse distribution of housing and employment centers. In these new cities a much higher proportion of the population lives and works in the suburbs or in exurban satellite activity centers. The origins and destinations of intercity trips for business or personal reasons are becoming more scattered and random in nature and are not well served by transportation systems that are laid out as radial links between suburbs and city centers. In the metropolises of the future, air travel may not be centered at a single large airport but at several smaller airports distributed throughout the metropolitan area. Technology—including transportation, communication, and control systems—could influence air travel demand and airport capacity needs. The introduction of jet aircraft in the 1960s and wide bodies in the late 1970s had profound and disruptive effects on airports. Commercialization of civil supersonic transport aircraft on a large scale by early in the next century would do no less. Short-takeoff-and-landing (STOL) and vertical- takeoff-and-landing (VTOL) aircraft, especially tiltrotor aircraft, may be introduced in commercial air transport by about the same time. VTOL aircraft are thought to offer substantial benefits for short-haul and re- gional air carrier uses, especially at airports serving individual suburban activity centers distributed within a sprawling metropolitan area. New high-speed modes of surface transportation also may develop to the point where they are competitive with air travel for trips of up to 500 miles. A change in modal split between air and surface transport would affect both the markets that airlines serve and the absolute size of air travel demand. Communication is one of the most rapidly evolving areas of technology. Voice, video, and data transmission, in conjunction with widespread new applications of computers, transcend distance and put all parts of the world in almost immediate contact. Some futurists conjecture that world- wide broadband communication will supplant certain kinds of travel. Others argue an opposite conclusion: ready communication will stimulate travel, especially long-distance travel. Probably, the effect will be mixed. The need for some kinds of travel will be reduced; the need for other kinds will grow. But regardless of the outcome, the pattern of air travel demand will change and, with it, the need for airport capacity. SCENARIO CONSTRUCTION Clearly, no single vision of the future could capture the range and diver- sity of outcomes that would be produced by these economic, social, and

64 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES technological forces. The committee, therefore, chose to construct a group of alternate futures to describe air travel demand as it might develop over the coming decades. The scenarios were made up by system- atically combining different assumptions about socioeconomic and tech- nological variables. Socioeconomic Variables Three sets of conditions were assumed for the period 1990 to 2040. High Growth Aircraft operations would increase at an average annual rate of about 3 percent per year throughout the forecast period. At this rate the level of operations (relative to today) would double by 2015 and double again by 2040. In effect, this scenario postulates that historic rates of increase in air carrier and commuter operations since 1974 (about 4 percent annually) would decline slightly but maintain a steady growth trend. The factors that underlie this scenario are sustained economic growth, a slight overall decrease in air fares amounting to 20 percent (in constant dollars) by 2040, an overall population increase of about 28 percent, and an increasing propensity for air travel by age cohort (rising from the present three annual round trips per air traveler to four by 2040). Maturing Economy Aircraft operations would grow at an annual rate of 2.5 percent through 2020 and then gradually level off to a rate that matches population increase by 2040. This scenario postulates a maturing economy and a saturating air travel market that slows from high growth to a stable but prosperous condition where further increase is driven largely by popula- tion increase alone. In terms of aviation demand, aircraft operations would double from their present level by 2020 and then taper off to reach about 2.7 times today's level of activity by 2040. Aside from economic growth, the other factors incorporated in this scenario are (a) a declining propensity to travel by persons 65 and over, who will constitute 22 percent of the population by 2040 (compared to 12 percent today), and (b) no change in cost of air travel (average fare per revenue seat-mile in constant dollars).

Alternative Scenarios of Air Travel Growth 65 Economic Difficulty Because of periodic shocks (such as sharp rises in energy prices, environ- mental problems, cyclic worldwide recessions, growing domestic and foreign debt, and severe political disruptions in the Third World), the economies of the United States and the other major world nations would slow significantly. Decline and growth would alternate, and, on average, economic expansion would occur at a rate roughly half that of the present. These conditions would dampen air travel demand: business travel would fall off, discretionary personal travel would diminish, aviation industry costs would rise, and air fares would increase correspondingly. The net long-term effect on aircraft operations would be a substantially slower rate of growth: an average annual increase of about 1.5 percent per year throughout the period 1990 to 2040. This would be half the rate expected in the high growth condition and only about 40 percent the growth rate of the past 15 years. The effects of these differing assumptions on air travel demand are graphed in Figure 4-1. Technological Variables Three different levels of technological achievement were assumed for the period 1990 to 2040. Limited Improvement Two successive generations of advanced subsonic jet and turboprop air- craft would be introduced in roughly 2010 and 2030. These aircraft would be more fuel efficient and economical to operate than the more advanced aircraft in use today. They would also make use of new engine and airframe technology that would reduce noise below that of present Stage III aircraft, allowing both operation in more noise-sensitive environments and an increase in aircraft operations without exceeding overall noise exposure limits at major airports. Neither supersonic aircraft nor VTOL aircraft such as the tiltrotor would come into commercial use. For surface transportation, improvements would be limited to ad- vanced highway and automotive transportation that reduces congestion or improves traffic flow. This includes new communication and traffic control systems, aids to driver control and navigation, and highway de- signs allowing speeds of up to 100 mph. Intelligent vehicle and highway

66 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES 500 I HIGH GROWTH I - - - - MATURING ECONOMY L .ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY I I / I I / / / / 200 7-, 7-, 100 '••• 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 YEAR FIGURE 4-1 Aviation growth scenarios. systems (IVHS) involving automated vehicle-highway-driver integration and control would not appear. High-speed rail or magnetically levitated systems would not be intro- duced. Significant Advances In addition to the advanced subsonic conventional aircraft described above, tiltrotor aircraft would appear in commercial service by 2020.

Alternative Scenarios of Air Travel Growth 67 These tiltrotors, much improved versions of the V-22 Osprey, would be able to carry 100 to 150 passengers and operate at speeds of 300 kt over ranges of 300 to 500 miles. The reduced takeoff and landing requirements for these aircraft would permit operation from runways shorter than 1,000 ft, either at conventional airports or small sites near suburban activity centers. Supersonic aircraft would not appear in commercial service before 2040. Surface transportation technology would make two major advances. First, high-speed rail systems (advanced versions of the French TGV and the Japanese Shinkansen or magnetically levitated vehicles) would enter service in the period 2010 to 2020. These trains, operating at speeds of up to 200 mph in the case of rail or 300 mph for maglev, would not make up a transcontinental system. Instead, they would serve only the most densely populated travel corridors, such as Boston—New York—Washington, San Francisco—Los Angeles—San Diego, or Miami—Tampa—Orlando— Jacksonville. Second, building upon the highway technology described above, IVHS technology would appear by 2020 to 2030. The first applications would be in the present and new metropolises in the South and West and would provide a substitute for air in linking major metropolitan areas separated by up to 200 miles. High Achievement Here, a very high level of innovation and application of new transporta- tion technology is assumed. In aviation this includes two generations of advanced subsonic aircraft (2010 and 2030), commercialization of tiltro- tor and similar RTOL or VTOL aircraft by 2010, and introduction of supersonic commercial aircraft by 2015. The high-speed commercial transport (HSCT), operating at speeds of up to Mach 3.5 and with a range of 5,000 to 6,000 miles, would allow transoceanic service to all parts of the world, accommodating the growing travel needs of a global economy. Capable of carrying as many as 300 passengers, the HSCT could effec- tively replace subsonic aircraft for intercontinental travel, depending on the fare differential between the two types of service and the willingness of passengers and shippers to pay a premium for high-speed flight. Because of sonic boom, the HSCT would not be used on overland routes (Congressional Research Service 1989). Surface transportation would experience similar rapid advance. IVHS networks, similar to the present interstate highway system, would link all parts of the country by 2030 to 2040. Extensive high-speed rail or maglev systems, concentrated in the most densely traveled intercity corridors,

68 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES would provide alternatives for the markets now served by short-haul air transport. In some locations high-speed highway or rail and maglev systems also would operate to connect urban complexes to major airports situated 50 to 100 miles away. Tables 4-1 and 4-2 summarize the conditions and factors assumed for the socioeconomic and technological variables used to construct sce- narios. SELECTION OF SCENARIOS Treating the socioeconomic and technological variables as coordinate axes yields the 3-by-3 scenario matrix shown in Figure 4-2. Not all of these TABLE 4-1 SCENARIO VARIABLES: SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS Socioeconomic Maturing Economic Factors High Growth Economy Difficulty GNP growth (percent/year) 1991 to 2000 2.7 2.7 2.5 2001 to 2010 2.4 2.3 2.0 2011 to 2020 2.2 2.0 1.5 2021 to 2030 2.0 1.7 1.0 2031 to 2040 2.0 1.4 0.5 Fares (yield in reve- 20 percent de- No change 20 percent flue per seat-mile) crease by increase by 2040 2040 Travel propensity 3, increasing to 3 through 2015, 2 (round trip/year/ 4 by 2040 declining to traveler) 2.5 by 2040 Increase in aircraft 3 2.5 through 1.5 operations 2015, de- (percent/year) dining to 1.5 by 2040 TABLE 4-2 SCENARIO VARIABLES: TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS Technological Limited Factors Improvement Significant Advances High Achievement Air Improved Improved subsonic; Improved subsonic; subsonic tiltrotor by 2020 tiltrotor by 2010; HSCT by 2015 Surface Improved IVHS (limited, 2020 IVHS (full system, highways to 2030); some 2040); extensive high-speed rail or high-speed rail or maglev (2010 to maglev (2020 to -- 2020) 2040)

Alternative Scenarios of Air Travel Growth 69 SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES High Maturing Economic Growth Economy Difficulty TECHNOLOGICAL VARIABLES Limited I-------- Improvement Significant I Advances High s Achievement I I I I I I-------.1 1-------.1 ] Most challenging snarios Scenarios of limited concern FIGURE 4-2 Scenarios of greatest interest in developing strategies. scenarios were considered useful in developing or testing strategies for providing long-term airport capacity. For example, the scenario of high economic growth and limited techno- logical improvement was discarded as internally inconsistent. It seemed unlikely that a future society characterized by a vigorous economy and a mobile population would not invest in the development and deployment of advanced transportation technology suited to its needs. At the opposite corner of the scenario matrix, high technological achievement coupled with a prolonged period of economic difficulty and slow growth seemed to be an equally unlikely combination of circumstances. A sluggish economy would not provide the stimulus and wherewithal for major investment in advanced air and surface transportation systems. Extending this line of

70 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES reasoning, the committee believed that significant technological advances in a time of extended economic difficulty and high technological achieve- ment in a maturing economy did not appear to be fruitful scenarios to explore. The committee therefore concluded that these four outlying cells should be eliminated and that attention should focus on the remaining five (shown in bold outline in Figure 4-2), which represent the severest challenges for strategy development. All of these scenarios are plausible, given the interactions between assumed socioeconomic conditions and rates of technological innovation. The purpose in devising the scenarios was not to predict what will occur but to describe an envelope of future air travel demand that would provide a basis for formulating and evaluating the various strategic ap- proaches to long-term airport system planning that are presented in Chapter 5. REFERENCES Census Bureau. 1989. Series P-25, No. 1018. Congressional Research Service. April 1989. Commercial High Speed Aircraft: Opportunities and Issues. Report 89-163 SPR. Library of Congress, Washing- ton, D.C. Gallup Organization, Inc. 1986. 1986 Air Travel Survey. Princeton, N.J. Kasarda, J. D. 1988. Population and Employment Change in the United States: Past, Present and Future. In Special Report 220: A Look Ahead: Year 2020. Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, Washington, D.C.

5 Alternative Strategies for System Development r7 The committee formulated sev- - _UuIuI era! strategies for meeting future ' ';• - intercity travel demand and air- port capacity needs under a range of possible conditions. These ______ strategies, consisting of various combinations of the basic options for accommodating air travel de- mand presented in Chapter 3, were constructed with the following three considerations in mind: Internal consistency—mutual compatibility of the options utilized. Effectiveness—ability to meet the needs of at least one of the demand scenarios. Feasibility—implementable under some reasonable set of eco- nomic, political, technical, and environmental constraints. No attempt was made to devise a single all-purpose strategy. The committee felt that doing so would be neither practical nor responsive to its charge. The time span to be considered is very long. There is great uncertainty about the nature and magnitude of future demand, and there are important fundamental choices about policy and methods—choices the committee felt should be left open until there has been further study and debate. For these reasons the committee concluded that it should take the more flexible approach of presenting reasonable alternative strategies that could serve as starting points for a long-term planning process within FAA. The strategies proposed by the committee are listed and described briefly as follows: 71

72 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES Continue on Present Course—extension of programs and measures now being pursued by FAA. Build More Airports—continuation of present programs and meas- ures but with a major effort to build new airports in the largest centers of air travel. Centralize System Management—application of administrative and regulatory measures to allocate demand and to manage capacity. Build an Expanded, Centrally Managed Airport System—the sys- tem management approach of Strategy C coupled with a vigorous pro- gram of national planning to build major new airports. Let the Market Decide—reliance on economic measures and locally imposed pricing schemes to allocate scarce capacity, combined with strong encouragement to local authorities and private industry to build more airport capacity and to develop new technology as dictated by market forces. Reconfigure the Airport System—planned evolution toward a sys- tem of transfer-only airports to replace major metropolitan area airports as connecting hubs. Revolutionize Intercity Transportation Technology—limited expan- sion of the airport network, coupled with a concerted effort to develop new aircraft and air traffic control technology and advanced high-speed surface transportation systems. The options that make up these strategies are shown in Figure 5-1. All strategies consist of short-term (up to 20 years) and long-term (20 to 50 years) components. This reflects the committee's basic view that actions that can and should be undertaken now eventually will run their course and that more sweeping measures need to be contemplated for early in the next century. The short-term components consist of actions to increase airport sys- tem capacity or to make more efficient use of existing capacity. They are short term in that they can be implemented within the next 10 to 20 years and will prevent further increase in delay or perhaps reduce it to a more acceptable level. The long-term components will be needed to provide new system capacity that could accommodate possible growth of intercity travel demand to a level three to four times greater than today by 2020 to 2040. The long-term components, although they might not be implemented until some time after 2000, should not simply be shelved for consideration at some indefinite time in the future. They require extensive study and analysis now to determine their feasibility and effectiveness and to lay the groundwork for adoption when and if they are appropriate.

OPTIONS STRATEGIES INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEM MANAGEMENT NEW TECHNOLOGY A. Continue on present 1. Incremental capacity improvements at exist- 5. Administrative and regulatory Air ( Present level of federal course ing airports techniques (limited and temporary) Surface f R&D 2. New hubs at presently underused airports B. Build more airports 1. Incremental capacity improvements at exist- 5. Administrative and regulatory Air 1 Present level of federal ing airports techniques (limited and temporary) Surface f R&D 2. New hubs at presently underused airports 3. New airports in metropolitan areas with high traffic volume C. Centralize system 1. Incremental capacity improvements at exist- 5. Administrative and regulatory Air 1 Ex anded federal R&D management ing airports techniques to manage and allo- Surface f 2. New hubs at presently underused airports cate existing capacity D. Build an expanded, 1. Incremental capacity improvements at exist- 5. Administrative and regulatory Air 1. Ex anded federal R&D centrally managed ing airports techniques to manage existing Ca- Surface J airport system 2. New hubs at presently underused airports pacify and to plan and allocate 3. New airports in metropolitan areas with high new capacity traffic volume E. Let the Market De- 1. Incremental capacity improvements at exist- 6. Economic measures to manage 7. Air Expanded private-sector dde ing airports and allocate existing capacity and 8. Surface R&D New hubs at presently underused airports to plan and allocate new capacity New airports in metropolitan areas with high traffic volume F. Reconfigure the air- 1. Incremental capacity improvements at exist- 5. Administrative and regulatory 7. Air 1 High level of federal R&D port system ing airports techniques to manage existing ca- (including demonstration 2. New hubs at presently underused airports padity and to plan and allocate 8. Surface J projects) 4. New airports dedicated to serving as transfer new capacity points G. Revolutionize inter- 1. Incremental capacity improvements at exis- 5. Administrative and regulatory 7. Air 1 All-out government and in- city transportation ting airports techniques and dustry effort to develop technology 2. New hubs at presently underused airports 6. Economic measures to manage 8. Surface J and deploy new technology existing capacity and to plan and allocate new capacity FIGURE 5-1 Composition of strategies.

74 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES Another important characteristic of the strategies developed by the committee is that they combine three kinds of solutions: enhancements or additions to airport infrastructure, application of some form of system management, and development and application of advanced vehicle and control system technology. The rationale of this approach is that delay is a complex system problem that stems from the interaction of many factors, of which inadequate airport infrastructure is but one. Reducing delay and accommodating long-term growth in air travel will require more than new airport facilities. The facilities we have must be managed efficiently, and we must exploit the potential of advanced vehicle and control system technology for both air and land-based modes of travel. Figure 5-2 depicts the interplay of infrastructural, managerial, and technological solutions in the short and long term. The strategies pro- posed here are designed to show the limits of what can be achieved by various means and, in effect, to define an envelope of actions and pro- grams that might be the point of departure in a strategic planning process. DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF STRATEGIES The strategies developed by the committee are described and discussed below. To facilitate comparison of strategies, a standardized format with the following headings is used. General Approach Important Elements Federal Role Effect on Capacity and Delay Capital Cost Funding Mechanisms Advantages Disadvantages Topics for Study and Analysis Strategy A—Continue on Present Course General Approach This strategy is a continuation of the present FAA airport programs. It involves making incremental capacity enhancements and procedural ad- justments at existing airports and encouraging development of secondary hubs at presently underused facilities. Slot control or operational caps

TIME ___________________ ACTIONS TO EXPAND CAPACITY TO MANAGE SYSTEM TO ADVANCE TECHNOLOGY FRAME SYSTEM CONDITIONS Short Term Increasing demand and Options 1 and 2 to enhance Option 5 for Evolutionary upgrades ot (next 20 worsening congestion at hub present airports operational flow control current air and surface years) airports and major Option 3 to build large, new allocation of federal transportation metropolitan area airports airports funds national system planning OR Option 6 to manage demand and allocate capacity in response to market forces Long Term Continuing growth of Option 4 (act now to plan Option 5 or 6 as above Options 7 and 8 (next 50 domestic and international new airport system and to act now for R&D and years) travel demand, reaching 2 to set aside and protect sites) demonstration of 4 times current levels by revolutionary air and 2040 surface transportation systems plan for later implementation and deployment as technology permits and conditions warrant FIGURE 5-2 General scheme for strategic planning.

76 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES would continue to be applied at certain high-density airports but only as extraordinary measures where delays have become extreme or there is an overriding safety concern. Important Elements Option 1—making incremental capacity improvements at existing airports. Option 2—creating new hubs at presently underused airports. Option 5—implementing regulatory and administrative measures to manage demand and system operation (but only as temporary or last- resort measures). Federal Role As it now does, the federal government would provide partial funding for capacity improvements, but the initiative for undertaking these improve- ments would be left to local airport authorities. Encouragement of local initiative would consist largely of periodic identification of improvement projects eligible for federal support and commitment of the necessary funds. Government-sponsored research and development (R&D) on new aircraft technology, conducted by the National Air and Space Adminis- tration (NASA), would remain at current levels and be confined largely to basic research on aerodynamics, propulsion, materials, and control sys- tems and to identification and validation of new concepts and techniques, with no support for development or commercialization of technology. Effect on Capacity and Delay If the runway improvements and procedural changes of Option 1 were made at all the candidate airports, the combined arrival capacity under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) at the top 100 airports would increase from 3,175 per hour to 4,500 per hour, an aggregate gain of slightly over 40 percent. Adding new runways at existing airports (Option 1) and creating new hubs at underutilized airports (Option 2), if fully exploited, would add 25 to 35 percent more annual capacity for air carrier hub-and-spoke flights. The principal effects on delay would be reduction of weather-related delays at the airports receiving Option 1 improvements and prevention of further increase in delay for all causes at present major hubs, assuming

Alternative Strategies for System Development 77 that new runways are added in some locations and that future increases in traffic would be shifted to new secondary hubs. The systemwide effects of these capacity gains could not be determined within the scope of this study. However it is estimated that Strategy A, which depends almost exclusively on Options 1 and 2 alone, might suffice to accommodate perhaps as much as 10 to 15 years of demand growth at the rates assumed for the high growth and maturing economy scenarios and 20 years of growth in the economic difficulty scenario. Capital Cost Incremental enhancements of existing airports would cost $2 to $3 billion (50 sites, $40 to $60 million each). Developing new hubs would cost $5 to $10 billion (20 sites, $250 to $500 million each).' Funding Mechanisms Existing funding mechanisms could be used, but with some increase in Trust Fund outlays (and perhaps Trust Fund taxes) to accelerate the program of capacity improvements. Present levels of FAA funding for other types of airport programs (general aviation relievers;noise reduc- tion or mitigation, upgrading of smaller airports, and so on) would be unchanged. Advantages These capacity increases have been studied and found feasible, and many are already planned. They make use of available and proven technology. No change would be required in present funding mechanisms and institu- tional arrangements. There would be substantial local and regional eco- nomic benefits from the creation of new hubs. Disadvantages There is no assurance that all potential capacity improvements will be made or that, if made, they will be exploited fully. Community opposition 'Here and elsewhere in this chapter, cost estimates are in 1989 dollars.

78 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES to increased noise might block some of the proposed airport improve- ments or prevent them from being utilized to thefr full extent. The creation of new hubs would depend on active cooperation by the airlines, both in agreeing to shift some of their operations to these sites and in providing funds for airfield and terminal building expansion. Because this strategy relies on local political action for implementation, improve- ments may not be made where the need is the greatest or in a timely manner. Topics for Study and Analysis Determination of the effect of IFR arrival capacity gains on annual system capacity. Analysis (including modelling and experimentation) to determine the effect of new hubs on airport system capacity. Identification and analysis of those improvements that would provide greatest system benefit. Identification of the major economic, environmental, and political barriers to specific airport expansions. Strategy B—Build More Airports General Approach This strategy also would continue presently planned airport improvement programs but add a major effort to build new airports in the largest centers of air travel within the next 10 to 20 years. These new airports, comparable in size and function to those of the largest U.S. airports today, each would be capable of handling up to 900,000 aircraft opera- tions and 30 to 40 million enplaned passengers annually. Some of these airports might be replacements for existing smaller facilities; others might be additional. The rationale of this strategy is to make whatever incremental capacity improvements are possible at existing airports in the short term while preparing for construction of new airports that would double capacity in the present centers of highest aviation activity over the long term. Slot control or other forms of administrative demand management could be applied selectively, but only as temporary or last-resort measures to ease congestion while other solutions are under development.

Alternative Strategies for System Development 79 Important Elements Option 1—making incremental capacity improvements at existing airports. Option 2—creating new hubs at presently underutilized airports. Option 3—adding new airports in metropolitan areas with high traffic volume. Option 5—implementing regulatory and administrative measures to manage demand and system operation (only as temporary or last-resort measures). Federal Role The federal government's role would remain much as it is today with two important exceptions: (a) much more active involvement in identifying specific airport capacity needs and in promoting development of airport sites and (b) substantially higher levels of funding for these activities. Decisions about whether and when to undertake airport expansion proj- ects would remain with local authorities. To further this approach, the federal government could encourage and help fund land banking of potential new airport sites. The federal role in developing new aviation technology would be lim- ited to identification and validation of new concepts and techniques, with no support for development or commercialization. Special funding would be needed for R&D on advanced airport design concepts and improved methods of operation. Effect on Capacity and Delay In addition to the near-term capacity enhancements provided by Options 1 and 2, this strategy would provide for long-term traffic growth in major metropolitan centers of air travel by virtually doubling their airport capacity. Since the top 10 of these travel centers now account for about one-third of all air carrier operations and almost 40 percent of enplaned passengers, increasing the flow at airports serving these points would have a dramatic effect on overall system capacity. The combined effect of all the elements of this strategy might allow the national airport network to handle as much as twice the traffic of today. In the economic difficulty scenario this would meet projected need through 2040. In the high growth scenario these gains would have run their course by 2015, and the nation

80 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES would face again the capacity and delay problems of today, with the prospect that they would steadily worsen if demand continued to grow. Capital Cost The investments needed through 2000 would be between $7 and $13 billion (Options 1 and 2). Building major new airports (Option 3) would cost $30 to $60 billion, assuming 10 sites at $3 to $6 billion each. Some of this investment might occur before 2000 (land cost, preliminary design, and planning), but the bulk would be needed in the period 2000 through 2010. Funding Mechanisms Existing funding mechanisms and sources could be used for the most part. If the federal government were to pick up 50 percent of the costs to implement this strategy, annual outlays of $1 to $2 billion (in 1989 dollars) would be required over the next 20 years, perhaps calling for some increase in the taxes that support the Trust Fund. Local financing might be problematic, and new creative methods of raising funds would be needed in some cases. Advantages Collectively, the options employed in this strategy would increase sub- stantially the capacity of the airport system over the next 20 years, with significant reduction of delay at major hub airports. The capacity increases achievable through Options 1 and 2 have been studied and found feasible, and many are already planned. Option 3 draws on proven airport designs and technology, although some flexibility would be required to obtain greater efficiency, to reduce construction or operating costs, and to adapt to changing technology. There would be important local and regional benefits both from im- proved air service and from economic development stimulated by new aviation facilities. Disadvantages Developing new secondary hubs may be problematical in some places. Building new airports in major metropolitan areas is likely to be very

Alternative Strategies for System Development 81 difficult; it has already been tried without success in several places owing to a combination of environmental concerns, political difficulties, and lack of public support. Active cooperation and financial support from the airlines may be difficult to obtain since they will have large capital requirements for modernization of their fleets during the same period, and some will still be carrying large debts from recent acquisitions and mergers. The cost of Option 3 would be high and might exceed available federal and local funding. New airports in areas that are already densely built could produce severe environmental impacts—increased noise, degrada- tion of air quality, and landside traffic congestion on airport access routes. Situating a major new airport in an area that already has a large amount of aviation activity could worsen airspace congestion in approach and depar- ture corridors. Topics for Study and Analysis Analysis of airspace requirements for new airports in major air traffic centers. Analysis and modelling of the effect of new major airports on airport system capacity. Analysis of environmental impacts and the effect on neighboring communities. General feasibility studies of new major airports on a site-by-site basis (including analysis of economic, social, and political obstacles). Analysis of funding requirements and investigation of new financing mechanisms. Strategy C—Centralize System Management General Approach The federal government would define a core network of airports (about 100 commercial service airports and perhaps 30 to 50 reliever airports) deemed essential to common carrier air transportation. The federal gov- ernment would prepare a national airport system plan to coordinate the implementation of capacity increases at these sites, with emphasis on those that would produce the greatest system benefit. The federal govern- ment also would assume the role of general system manager, applying flow control, slot restrictions, and other administrative demand and ca- pacity management measures where and as often as needed to ensure

82 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES efficient system operation. Finally, the federal government would pro- mote the development and utilization of new aviation and surface trans- portation technology that would contribute to a more efficient system of intercity transportation. Important Elements Option 1—making incremental capacity improvements at existing airports. Option 2—creating new hubs at presently underused airports. Option 5—implementing regulatory and administrative measures to manage demand and make efficient use of system capacity. Options 7 and 8—promoting and supporting R&D of new air and surface transportation technology. Federal Role In the capacity of general airport and airspace system manager, the federal government would assume three major responsibilities. First, it would have a broader and stronger planning role, including not only the present functions of airspace and air traffic control system planning but also development of a national plan for capacity improvements at a core group of commercial service and reliever airports. The purpose of this plan would be to coordinate the evolution of these two major parts of the air transport system in the interest of achieving greater overall efficiency and economic use of resources. Second, the federal government would take responsibility for oversight of system operation and direction of traffic flow and distribution. For the ATC system this would include national and regional flow control, mon- itoring of terminal area traffic, and specific quotas or restrictions on flight operations at critical points. Operational caps, slot allocations, and as- signment of roles and service levels at particular facilities would be uti- lized to balance demand and reduce peak loads. Here also, the aim would be to achieve coordinated and efficient use of airspace and airports to minimize delay and maximize throughput for the system as a whole. Third, in support of these two responsibilities, the federal government would assume a stronger role in R&D. This would involve increased federal funding for NASA on basic aeronautical research and for FAA on airport, ATC, and system management technology. Department of Transportation (DOT) funding to support R&D on surface transportation

Alternative Strategies for System Development 83 technology also would be needed, and DOT programs to support pilot projects, demonstration, and detailed planning of selected surface sys- tems and intermodal air-surface projects would be instituted. Ownership, master planning, development, and operation of individ- ual airports would remain in local hands but subject to federal guidelines and oversight. This would probably entail some realignment of local government relationships with the federal government, but the essential responsibilities and authority of local airport operating agencies would be intact. Effects on Capacity and Delay This strategy employs the same near-term airport enhancement measures as Strategy A (Options 1 and 2) and has the same potential for increasing basic airport system capacity. However, through application of system management techniques, more efficient use would be made of this capac- ity. The principal effect therefore would be a decrease in average and peak delays and not an absolute increase in the number of operations. The reduction in delay would result not only from operational changes in airport utilization (peak spreading, traffic metering, and hourly quotas) but also from exercise of national airport system planning functions and guided development of specific airport improvements. These capacity increases would be coordinated to occur at times and places that would produce the greatest system benefit. Theoretically, the delay reduction and other benefits arising from more efficient utilization of infrastructure resources would be substantial— perhaps 50 percent less delay with no decrease in the total number of operations. These estimates cannot be confirmed at this time. Manage- ment of the airport and air traffic system on this scale has never been tried, and simulation and experimentation would be needed to verify these expectations. Capital Costs Option 1—$2 to $3 billion (50 sites, $40 to $60 million each). Option 2—$5 to $10 billion (20 sites, $250 to $500 million each). Options 7 and 8—Federal government support for research and de- velopment of new transportation technology could amount to $2 to $3 billion over the next 10 years. Subsequent pilot projects and demonstra- tions for air and surface systems might require $10 to $20 billion.

84 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES Funding Mechanisms Present federal, local, and private funding mechanisms would be em- ployed. However, an increase in Trust Fund outlays (and probably taxes) might be needed to support the program of needed capacity improve- ments and to carry out an expanded R&D effort in aviation. R&D budgets for aeronautical programs by NASA and surface transportation programs by DOT would need to be increased. Advantages The chief operational advantage of this strategy would be reduction of system delay. This, coupled with the capacity increases provided by exercise of Options 1 and 2, would allow new growth to be accommodated more easily. There would be benefits for air carriers in the form of lower operating costs and more efficient fleet utilization. For passengers the convenience and reliability of air travel would be improved. National airport system planning to coordinate air traffic control sys- tem development and infrastructure improvements and additions would give greater assurance that the capacity gains achieved would be of benefit to the airport and airways network as a whole. These benefits would derive both from establishing priorities for the time and place of airport improvements and from synchronizing infrastructure development with enhancements in airspace management made possible by improved ATC technology. Advances in aircraft and surface vehicle technology, brought about through increased R&D, would have a multiplier effect on airport and ATC system improvements. Disadvantages The shifts in airline schedules and airport utilization as a result of demand management would decrease the availability of flights at the most popular travel times and points of service. For passengers this could mean that not all those wishing to travel at peak periods would be accommodated. Peak spreading might lead to a longer waiting time between connecting flights. Depending on how peak-hour capacity is allocated, regional and com- muter airlines might have reduced access to major airports at these times. Business and general aviation might be inconvenienced by shift of their operations from major airports to reliever facilities.

Alternative Strategies for System Development 85 Implementation of airport and airspace management could be ex- tremely controversial and might not be practical on political grounds. Airport and airspace users, denied access at the time and place of their choice, could oppose demand management on the grounds that it inhibits their freedom of action. Passengers might object to the inconvenience and loss of service at the most popular times, and airport operators might view the stronger role of the federal government in planning and operations as infringements of their prerogatives. Topics for Study and Analysis Identification, analysis, and modelling of those improvements that would provide greatest system benefit. Network modeling to quantify delay reduction and gains in system efficiency attainable through demand management and capacity alloca- tion. Analysis of management strategies and rules. For new aircraft technology: —roles and operating methods; —airport and airspace requirements; —noise rules and abatement procedures; and —acquisition cost and operating economics. For ATC technology: —enroute and terminal-area flow-control methods; —techniques for terminal area metering, sequencing, and spacing; —procedures for area navigation (RNAV) and 4-D navigation; and —studies of automation and Mode S data link. For new surface transportation technology: —corridor studies for high-speed rail and maglev (engineering, eco- nomic, social, environmental, political); —research on superconductor technology; and —control and communication system requirements. Strategy D—Build an Expanded, Centrally Managed Airport System General Approach This strategy (an extension of Strategy C) seeks not only to make the best use of existing airport infrastructure and make incremental improvements at selected sites but also to make major additions to airport capacity at the

86 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES points of greatest present or expected future traffic concentration. This would involve a long-term program to build 10 or more new major airports of a capacity equivalent to the largest U.S. airports today. The federal government would adopt a strong leadership role in planning, promoting, funding, and overseeing the creation and expansion of a national airport system that would serve as the basis for a national air transportation network. The federal government also would promote the development and utilization of new aircraft and surface transportation technology that would contribute to a more efficient system of intercity transportation. Important Elements Option 1—making incremental capacity improvements at existing airports. Option 2—creating new hubs at presently underused airports. Option 3—adding new airports in metropolitan areas with high traffic volume. Option 5—implementing regulatory and administrative measures to manage demand, to make efficient use of existing airports, and to plan and allocate new system capacity. Options 7 and 8—promoting and supporting development of new air and surface transportation technology. Federal Role Under this strategy the scope and authority of the federal government in planning, developing, and overseeing operation of the airport network would be expanded greatly. General oversight of development and utili- zation of present and future Primary Airports and those general aviation airports deemed necessary as relievers for Primary Airports would be assumed by the federal government.2 This would not necessarily imply creation of a special government agency; it could be accomplished by setting up a quasi-public authority operating under a federal charter and subject to congressional oversight. Whatever its form, this authority would have responsibility for strategic planning of the national airport system, allocating funds for development, and exercising supervisory control of airport and airspace utilization. 2 Primary Airports are commercial service airports enplaning at least 0.01 percent of total airline passengers each year. Currently, there are about 280 such airports.

Alternative Strategies for System Development 87 Individual airports still would be owned and operated locally but as cooperating parts of a national system and not as autonomous local enterprises. While this might entail some subordination of local proposals for airport expansion to federal review and approval, the basic powers of local agencies in operating airports or in making capital improvements without federal aid would not be substantially altered. The rationale of this strategy is that airports and airspace are national resources that should be organized and supervised centrally to ensure equitable, efficient, and economic use in the public interest. The pro- viders of air service (airlines) would not be regulated economically; they would remain free with respect to choice of routes, fares, and types of service. However, their use of airspace and airport resources would be subject to rules established by a central national management authority. In addition to oversight of airport and airspace system planning, devel- opment, and operation, the federal government would assume (as in Strategy C) a stronger and more active role in R&D. This would include increased funding for basic aeronautical research by NASA and for R&D on airport, ATC, and system management technology by FAA. Compan- ion R&D by DOT on surface transportation technology also would be needed, extending eventually to funding support for pilot projects and demonstration programs for selected surface and intermodal air/surface systems. Effect on Capacity and Delay Over the long term this strategy would provide an airport system of greatly increased capacity, initially through incremental improvement of existing airports and development of secondary hubs (Options 1 and 2) and eventually through building new hub airports in major cities (Option 3). Through system management and strategic planning, the evolution of the airport network would keep pace with demand growth, and the use of airport resources would be enhanced in terms of balance and efficiency, thereby minimizing delay. Because we have no experience with system management of this scope and degree, the operational benefits in terms of capacity and delay cannot be quantified. If this strategy were to prove reasonably successful, it could accommodate growth of air travel demand that is projected to 2040 under the maturing economy scenario and perhaps even the high growth sce- nario. It appears to be more than adequate for the economic difficulty scenario. If, as a result of increased R&D on surface transportation technology, advanced fixed-guideway or highway systems are placed in

88 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES service in the early decades of the next century, the adequacy of this strategy as a long-term solution would be enhanced greatly. Capital Cost Option 1—$2 to $3 billion (50 sites, $40 to $60 million each). Option 2—$5 to $10 billion (20 sites, $250 to $500 million each). Option 3—$30 to $60 billion (10 sites, $3 to $6 billion each). Option 5—The cost of system management cannot be estimated. It certainly would be greater than the O&M budget for FAA today because of the added responsibility of overseeing airport system operation and managing the allocation of capacity. Moreover, the federal share of air- port capital costs would be likely to increase in proportion to the greater authority assumed by the government for implementation and investment decisions. Options 7 and 8—Federal government support for R&D of new transportation technology could amount to $2 to $3 billion over the next 10 years. Subsequent pilot projects and demonstration for air and surface systems might require $10 to $20 billion. Funding Mechanisms Present federal, local, and private funding mechanisms could be em- ployed, but they might not prove adequate for the capital needs of this strategy. An increase in Trust Fund outlays (and probably taxes) would be needed to operate a central management authority and to finance an accelerated program of airport capacity improvements and aviation R&D. Additional income for the Trust Fund, in the form of increased taxes, might be needed to support these outlays. Other options to be considered include a system of fees for ATC services and allowing individ- ual airports scheduled for major expansion to levy a passenger facility charge (PFC) or some other kind of local tax to provide necessary capital. Government-issued national transportation bonds also might be em- ployed. Advantages Collectively, the additional airport infrastructure created by this strategy could double the capacity of the airport system over the next 20 years and lead to substantial reduction of delay at most congested airports.

Alternative Strategies for System Development 89 Centralized management could give greater assurance that the capacity gains achieved would have the most beneficial effect on airport system utilization. Through exercise of a central national planning function, development of infrastructure and application of new air and surface transportation technology would be coordinated. New air and surface vehicle technology would have a multiplier effect on infrastructure improvements. Disadvantages This strategy has even greater disadvantages than Strategy C with respect to the federal role in system management. Whereas Strategy D stops well short of establishing a federalized airport system, it would place the federal government in a dominant position on matters of planning, devel- opment, and operation of airport facilities. Installing a management structure of such broad authority would call for a fundamental change of aviation policy. There are some parallels to be found in present policy on ATC and federal-aid highways (notably the interstate highway system), but the net effect of creating a centrally managed and supervised national air transportation system would involve the federal government deeply and pervasively in what has long been the province of local government and private industry. This degree of government presence might be resisted strongly by the aviation community. Airlines could regard it as a form of reregulation, even though their basic economic freedoms would not be specifically' abridged. Airlines might contend that managerial oversight of airport utilization and investment decisions at specific airports by the federal government would inhibit competition and freedom of choice about how air service is to be provided. Other airport and airspace users—business and personal aviation and perhaps regional and commuter airlines—might fear that their access to the system would be unjustly limited either by a management philosophy that defines efficiency in terms of the number of passengers accommo- dated per flight or by a management policy biased toward the interests and economic power of major air carriers. Local airport authorities would be likely to see this strategy as a threat to their autonomy. Even though they would retain responsibility for individual airport planning, funding, development, and operation, the basic decisions about when and where new investment occurs would be largely in the hands of the federal managers who would establish the national airport plan, set priorities, and control the distribution of federal monies.

90 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES The general public might oppose such a strategy, since it would alter service schedules and perhaps routes, leading to inconvenience or restric- tion of travel choices at particular times or from particular airports. The public also might oppose system management on the more general grounds that it would be interference in private concerns by "big govern- ment." Topics for Study and Analysis The overriding need in the case of this strategy is for economic and policy studies of how a centrally managed system could be established and what its economic, social, and political impacts would be. Technical studies, including modelling and experimentation, to quantify the effects on air- port capacity utilization and delay also would be needed, but they could not be undertaken without a clearer understanding of how the policy issues could be resolved and what specific form that managerial philoso- phy would take. Strategy E—Let the Market Decide General Approach This strategy would place primary responsibility for providing airport capacity in the hands of local airport authorities, municipal and state governments, and private-sector investors. In addition to near-term in- cremental capacity improvements and development of new secondary hubs at underused airports, this strategy envisages construction of very large new airports in 10 or so metropolitan areas that are or will be the major centers of air traffic. Federal policy would still encourage new capacity development and provide some technical support for planning and implementation; but decisions about sites, type of development, timing, and utilization of facilities would be made by state and local agencies and private parties, acting in response to market forces. As compensation for assuming greater responsibility for airport devel- opment, state and local governments would be given a freer hand in using economic measures to redistribute demand, allocate scarce resources, and raise funds needed for capital development. In effect, this strategy would extend to airport operators the same degree of freedom in the marketplace as accorded to airlines under economic deregulation.

Alternative Strategies for System Development 91 The federal government would continue to conduct research on new air and surface transportation technology but would leave to the private sector all responsibility for development and deployment of this technology. Important Elements Option 1—making incremental improvements at existing airports. Option 2—creating new hubs at presently underused airports. Option 3—adding new airports in metropolitan areas with high traffic volume. Option 6—employing economic measures to manage and distribute demand and to create new capacity. Options 7 and 8—promoting and supporting development of new air and surface transportation technology would be left largely to private- sector initiative and funding. Federal Role The federal government would retain its present regulatory authority over safety, ATC, certification (carriers, aircraft, airports, and aircrew), and antitrust matters. Some federal funding for airport development would still be available, but both the overall amount and the federal share of new airport capacity investments would be reduced. FAA would retain its present role in R&D on ATC and related commu- nication and navigation technology. Federal funding for other R&D on air and surface transportation technology would be limited to basic research, proof of concept, and technology validation. Beyond this all development and commercializa- tion would be solely the concern of private industry. Effect on Capacity and Delay The capacity gains that could be realized by this strategy are equivalent to those under Strategy B or D and would come about through a combina- tion of improving existing facilities, establishing new secondary hubs, and ultimately building major new airports in the largest centers of air travel.

92 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES In addition, substantial delay reductions could be achieved by locally imposed pricing measures to redistribute demand or to reallocate capac- ity among various types of airport users. In theory, the effects on capacity utilization would be equivalent to those of the administrative manage- ment approach employed in Strategy D. In practice, however, market- based measures might not be fully effective for several reasons. First, they might not be applied universally at all airports, or there might be differ- ences between one form of access pricing and another. Second, price, in and of itself, may not be as powerful as regulation in promoting efficient use. Pricing approaches favor those willing and able to pay, not neces- sarily those who would put the system to best use. Third, economic measures to allocate airport access, which depend on market considera- tions, are unrelated to airspace management, which relies on regulation and administrative techniques. Economic measures might work against ATC procedures or limit their effectiveness. Finally, economic measures would be locally instituted actions designed to suit the needs of a given airport. The results might not be in the best interests of other airports in connecting parts of the network. Optimization of individual sites would not necessarily produce optimization of the whole airport network. Capital Cost Option 1—$2 to $3 billion (50 sites, $40 to $60 million each). Option 2—$5 to $10 billion (20 sites, $250 to $500 million each). Option 3—$30 to $60 billion (10 sites, $3 to $6 billion each). Option 6—no estimate. Research and validation of new technology, $1 to $1.5 billion. Private sector investment in development, implementation, and de- ployment of new technology could amount to $20 to $40 billion over 20 years, offset to some degree with tax credits or other incentives. Funding Mechanisms For federal funding the present mechanisms and sources would be em- ployed. In addition to the present funding from airline tenants and revenue bonds, local airport authorities could have increased revenues at their disposal through the freedom to impose local levies to finance capital projects. In some circumstances access pricing to allocate demand might prove to be revenue neutral, but schemes could be devised to yield revenue for capital development.

Alternative Strategies for System Development 93 Advantages Economic approaches to demand management appear to be more consis- tent with the general policy of seeking market-based solutions to capacity problems. Pricing approaches would provide airport operators with additional sources of revenue directly related to the use made of airport facilities. They might also help avoid some capital investment in airport infrastruc- ture by redistribution of demand and reduction of peak loads. Airport access pricing, particularly peak-period pricing, would provide passengers a wider choice of flight times, airports, and routes based on the relative values they place on air fare, delay, reliability of service, and convenience. This strategy would place decisions about airport capacity improve- ments in the hands of local authorities and private interests who are most directly affected. It would allow greater freedom for market forces and economic considerations to dictate the direction of future airport develop- ment, and it would also allow and encourage local initiative with mini- mum federal government involvement and oversight. Disadvantages Imposition of new airport access pricing formulas and facility charges might be strongly opposed by many airport users and could lead to lengthy and costly litigation. This strategy would balkanize the airport planning and development process and might encourage undesirable competition among airports or duplicate investment in new facilities. The result could be an aggregate set of airports that do not operate effectively as a system. Major airlines, because of their greater economic power, might capture effective control of slots at an airport, crowding out financially weaker competitors and private users. This could strengthen airline control of airport access and allow airlines to dictate decisions about investment in new capacity. Local authorities are not driven solely by market forces and economics; political considerations are also motivating factors. Depending on local priorities, this might cause rejection or deferral of needed airport invest- ments. Without strong government push or market pull, private industry may not make investments in new air or surface transportation technology.

94 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES Topics for Study and Analysis Modeling and analysis of the effect on capacity utilization as a result of differential access pricing, both on a national basis and experimentally at specific sites to provide data that could be used as the basis for implementation. Economic studies and experiments to refine pricing techniques and to define appropriate and equitable fee structures for pricing airport access. Examination of political feasibility and possible barriers to accep- tance by passengers, shippers, airlines, and airport operators. Strategy F—Reconfigure the Airport System General Approach The most severe congestion occurs at major metropolitan area airports that serve both origin-destination (O-D) passengers and transferring passengers bound for elsewhere. This strategy seeks to alleviate conges- tion by separating these two kinds of traffic. This would be accomplished by creating a network of transfer-only airports situated outside major metropolitan centers and arranged to provide a system of arterial routes for domestic and international traffic flow. This transfer airport system would ease the burden on congested major-city airports and allow them to serve more O-D passengers. It could also help avoid the cost of expensive new airport construction in heavily built-up areas and provide capacity sufficient to accommodate the very high levels of demand that might materialize by 2020 to 2040. Planning and development of a transfer airport network would require strong central direction, probably by the federal government. Manage- ment of the transfer airport network once it is put in operation also would need to be centralized, either as a government agency or a quasi-govern- mental body or public corporation. This strategy is an extension of the centralized system management strategy (Strategy C) in which incremental capacity improvements and creation of new secondary hubs at underused airports (Options 1 and 2) would make up the initial phases, with the building of a transfer airport network as a long-range solution to be implemented sometime after the year 2000 as demand increases and overtakes the capacity gains achieved by Options 1 and 2. As a companion measure, the federal government would undertake a major R&D program to develop the advanced air and surface transporta-

Alternative Strategies for System Development 95 tion technology that would be needed to provide links between transfer airports and the major metropolitan areas in the region served. Important Elements Option 1—making incremental capacity improvements at existing airports. Option 2—creating new hubs at presently underused airports. Option 4—developing a system of transfer-only airports. Option 5—implementing regulatory and administrative measures to manage demand and make efficient use of capacity. Options 7 and 8—promoting and supporting development of new air and surface transportation technology. Federal Role As in Strategy C, the federal government would assume a stronger, more directive role in managing the national airport and airspace system. This would include top-level planning functions, overall strategic management of operations, and R&D programs to promote the application of ad- vanced transportation technology. In this expanded managerial role, special emphasis would be placed on planning and development of a system of transfer airports. In the near term this would involve technical studies and network modeling and analysis to define the operational characteristics of the transfer airport concept, the number and location of sites making up a transfer airport network, technological requirements, and identification of candidate sites. Economic studies also would be required to determine costs, fund- ing mechanisms, sponsorship arrangements, and a general approach to implementation. Over the longer term, assuming that the concept proves to be attractive and feasible, the federal role would evolve into overseeing the develop- ment of transfer airports and bringing them on line as elements of the national airport and airspace system. As in Strategy C, there would be some latitude in how these responsibilities might be exercised. The man- aging authority could be a government agency charged with operating both the airport and ATC system. Alternatively, it could be a quasi-govern- mental body (like Comsat) or a specially chartered private corporation. An expanded program of federally funded R&D would be necessary. This would include increased federal funding for NASA on basic aero-

96 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES nautical research and for FAA on airport, ATC, and system manage- ment. DOT funding to support R&D on surface transportation technol- ogy, pilot and demonstration projects, and planning of selected surface systems and intermodal air/surface projects also would be needed. Special emphasis would be placed on R&D for transfer airports. This would include advanced air and surface transportation technology needed to connect transfer airports to the major regional population centers. R&D on new people-mover and baggage-handling systems also would be needed to accommodate a high volume of transfer passengers. The design of the airport itself (runways, taxiways, ramps, aprons, and terminal facilities) and the terminal-area ATC system would be major subjects of research since the operation of a facility of such complexity and size would be an uncharted area. Effects on Capacity and Delay In the initial stages the effects of this strategy would be identical to those of Strategy C. Both consist of the same options in the period up to 2000: incremental capacity improvements at existing airports, new secondary hubs, and centralized management to make efficient use of airport and airspace resources. In the long term, as a network of transfer airports is put into place, the effects would be substantially different. Large metropolitan area airports would no longer serve as transfer points, and they would handle primarily O-D traffic. In fact, most of the local airports making up the core system, regardless of the role they have now or might assume over the next 10 to 15 years, ultimately would make the transition to serving as collection and distribution points for long-haul traffic handled by the transfer airport network or as origins and destinations for direct point-to-point service between major cities. The capacity of such a reconfigured network has not been calculated. In theory it appears to be enormous. The 100 largest airports today, with enhancements to increase their IFR capacity or with additional runways on some existing sites, could accommodate two or three times the present number of O-D passengers if all persons using these airports were O-D passengers and transfers to connecting flights were made elsewhere. Shift- ing the transfer function to airports specially designed for this purpose (and adding more such transfer points as the need might arise) could provide an airport system capable of meeting the highest levels of demand assumed in the high growth and maturing economy scenarios through 2040.

Alternative Strategies for System Development 97 Capital Costs Option 1—$2 to $3 billion (50 sites, $40 to $60 million each). Option 2—$5 to $10 billion (20 sites, $250 to $500 million each). Option 4—$25 to $30 billion (up to 10 sites, $2.5 to $3 billion each) in the period 2000 to 2020. Options 7 and 8—Federal government support for R&D of new technology could amount to $2 to $3 billion over the next 10 years. Subsequent pilot projects and demonstrations for air and surface systems might require $10 to $20 billion. Funding Mechanisms In the initial stages, while Options 1 and 2 are being implemented, present financing mechanisms and funding sources would be sufficient, although some increase in Trust Fund outlays (and perhaps Trust Fund taxes) would be needed to cover accelerated expenditures for needed capacity improvements. For implementing the transfer airport network, the present mecha- nisms probably would not suffice. Because of the unique and untried chaiacter of the transfer airport concept, conventional financing mecha- nisms would not work, and new schemes of federal, state, local, and private-sector cooperation would have to be devised. A transfer airport network composed of 10 sites would require between $25 and $30 billion in the period 2010 to 2030. Advanced air and surface transportation technology and intra-airport transfer systems might cost $15 to $25 billion more. Although these capital requirements are not overwhelming, the lack of an established traffic base and the uncertainty of airline support for the transfer airport concept could make funding and financing extremely difficult issues. Creative approaches would be required. Advantages This strategy builds on the near-term capacity gains of Options 1 and 2 and could provide the capacity to accommodate high rates of growth over the long term. It avoids the cost and difficulty of building major new airports in large metropolitan areas. Transfer airports located near small cities could provide larger capacity at lower cost than building new major airports in large metropolitan areas. Location of transfer airports away

98 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES from major metropolitan centers would avoid the airspace congestion that now hampers aircraft operations in these areas. Transfer airports might encounter less opposition on environmental grounds and be less intrusive on neighboring communities than compara- ble facilities located in densely built-up areas. Transfer airports located in coastal regions could serve as centralized ports of entry for international flights. International passengers make up a large share of the traffic at airports in New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Miami. Moving international operations to transfer air- port facilities nearby would free airport capacity in these cities for more O-D traffic and would have much the same effect as shifting domestic transfer operations away from large airports such as Chicago, Atlanta, or Denver. Transfer airports would be particularly well suited to handle supersonic commercial transports if these aircraft come into service by 2020 to 2040. Disadvantages The transfer airport concept is untried. The costs, benefits, and system effects have not been analyzed and are no more than conjecture at this time. New airport sponsorship and funding sources would have to be developed. It could be very difficult to obtain airline support and cooper- ation in building and utilizing the transfer airport network. For some flights, particularly those over longer distances, the transfer airport concept could lengthen trip time or involve more circuitous rout- ing. A long-distance flight that now involves transfer at a major hub midway enroute might entail two transfers (e.g., short-haul to transfer Airport 1, long-haul to transfer Airport 2, and short-haul to destination). Initially, a transfer airport network would lead to'ia loss of traffic at major metropolitan airports that now serve as hubs. It might take these airports several years to recover traffic (and lost revenue) through growth of O-D passengers. Depending on location, it might be difficult to obtain a work force to operate transfer airports. There might not be potential employees of sufficient number and with appropriate skills in communities near the transfer airport, and the present labor force at large metropolitan hubs may be unwilling to relocate. Advanced air and surface transportation technology to provide connec- ting links to and from transfer airports and nearby major cities would have to be developed. Some of this technology may not be available for 30 years or longer.

Alternative Strategies for System Development 99 Topics for Study and Analysis Modeling of various transfer airport configurations to determine capacity benefits. Modeling of transfer airport operations. Analysis of requirements and techniques for moving people, cargo, and baggage on the airport surface. Analysis of methods to link transfer airports to major metropolitan areas (air versus surface transport). Analyses of capital and O&M costs and funding sources. Study of the economic, social, and political impacts of transfer air- ports on potential host communities. Strategy C—Revolutionize Intercity Transportation Technology General Approach This strategy starts from the premise that airport capacity increases in future years will be limited almost exclusively to incremental improve- ments at existing sites (Option 1) and formation of new hubs at underused airports (Option 2). Building new major airports in the largest cities may not be practical or politically feasible, and the transfer airport concept is too uncertain as to its benefits, costs, and workability to be relied upon. To deal with this impasse, the strategy is to seek accommodation of growth in future intercity travel demand through improved air and sur- face transportation technology. For aviation the goal would be to foster development of new aircraft and ATC systems that are best suited to a mature and largely unexpand- able airport network. The aircraft would include larger (800 to 1,000 seats) subsonic jets for densely traveled routes, versatile short-haul air- craft (conventional turboprop or tiltrotor models) capable of serving smaller centers and perhaps using "miniports" located in suburban activ- ity centers, and supersonic high-speed commercial transport (HSCT) aircraft on long overseas routes. Each of these aircraft, along with im- proved version of the medium-size jets in service today, would be tailored to fill specific niches in the travel market and to be well adapted to the existing airport network. At the same time, there would be a major national effort to develop new surface transportation systems capable of absorbing some of the 200- to 500-mile intercity travel now carried by air—a category of trip likely to grow rapidly as major cities agglomerate into extended strip megapolises.

100 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES The travel demand in such dense and enormous centers probably could not be served efficiently by systems made up of individual air or surface vehicles, and it would be necessary to operate vehicles in train to provide the needed line-haul capacity. Creation and implementation of such a surface transportation network would have to be centrally directed, strongly promoted, and heavily financed by the federal government work- ing in cooperation with state and local governments, much like the Inter- state Highway Program. The technology to be developed does not change from that of Strategies C, D, and E, but it is pressed into service in a much shorter time span (20 to 25 years). Clearly, a crash program such as this would elevate costs, but the rationale is that the need is so great and other solutions so lacking in promise that an all-out national revolution of intercity transportation must be accomplished. Important Elements Option 1—making incremental capacity improvements at existing airports. Option 2—creating new hubs at presently underused airports. Option 5—implementing a strong, centralized national agency to plan, manage development, and support implementation of intercity and intracity high-speed travel networks. Option 6—employing economic measures to manage and distribute demand. Option 7—extensively, vigorously, and amply funding R&D on air- craft and ATC technology, with subsequent federal financial support for commercialization and deployment. Option 8—a comprehensive national program (involving federal, state, and local governments in partnership with private industry) creat- ing high-speed intercity transportation systems capable of serving half or more of the demand for 200- to 500-mile trips. Federal Role The federal government would continue to provide funding for improve- ment and expansion of existing airports and for construction of new facilities in places where there is strong local support for such undertak- ings. However, this would not be the central feature of federal aviation policy. Instead, attention would concentrate on large-scale R&D pro- grams for new vehicle and control system technology.

Alternative Strategies for System Development 101 These programs would include NASA-sponsored R&D on new aircraft technology, FAA-sponsored R&D on ATC systems, and special develop- ment programs (with joint government-industry funding) for tiltrotor and HSCT technology. For surface transportation DOT would sponsor R&D on high-speed rail, maglev, and highway systems—including intelligent vehicle and highway systems (IVHS). For promising technologies the government would provide partial but substantial funding for commercialization and deployment, including support of prototype and demonstration systems and operating subsidies where needed during start-up periods. Federal agencies would be responsible for planning, direction, and general management of network development and operation. State or local authorities and possibly licensed public or private corporations would operate and manage local or regional components, but as in avia- tion today, the federal government would supervise and control traffic flow (much like FAA). Effect on Capacity and Delay The capacity gains from new air and surface transportation systems cannot be estimated without further study, but the goal would be to accommodate a demand 200 to 300 percent greater than today by 2030. Capital Cost Option 1—$2 to $3 billion (50 sites, $40 to $60 million each). Option 2—$5 to $10 billion (20 sites, $250 to $500 million each). Option 7—R&D, $3 to $5 billion. The federal share for commercial- ization could run $20 to $40 billion and for deployment $20 to $40 billion, all over a period of 30 years. Option 8—R&D, $5 to $7 billion. The federal share for commercial- ization could be as much as $40 to $60 billion. To support deployment the federal government might have to provide $80 to $100 billion in the period 2010 to 2040. Funding Mechanisms New funding mechanisms and sources would have to be devised. The possibilities include increased taxes for the Airport & Airways and the

102 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES Highway Trust Funds, a national transportation surtax levied on sales or income, and government-backed transportation development bonds. Advantages Development of aircraft specifically tailored to available airport infra- structure and to the travel needs of a highly urbanized population would make more economical use of resources. These new types of aircraft would lead to a more efficient air transport system, especially if their design were coordinated with that of advanced ATC technology. For aviation this strategy would require relatively little new infrastruc- ture to accommodate increased travel demand. Through development of quieter aircraft, airport operations in urban areas would be less objectionable, and communities might place fewer restrictions on airport activity, such as curfews, noise budgets, or prohibi- tion of increase in operations. High-speed surface transportation systems providing line-haul service in heavily traveled intercity corridors up to 300 miles in length would be more efficient than air service where vehicle size is limited to about 800 to 1,000 passengers. Rail and highway systems utilizing vehicles in train could provide much greater hourly traffic flows. If intercity transportation were planned, developed, and operated as an integrated multimodal system, improved service could be provided at lower overall cost than in the present system, where modes are competi- tive and investments often duplicative. Integration of intracity and intercity travel modes could shorten trip times and reduce highway congestion. New forms of air and surface technology would be energy efficient and less polluting of the atmosphere, especially those that rely on electrical power from a central source rather than on-board combustion engines. Disadvantages In the long term this strategy relies on vehicular technology that is not yet proven. It requires large federal investments to develop and deploy new air and surface transportation technology. The infrastructure required for new surface technology may be very difficult to put in place since it could call for new rights-of-way in densely settled areas and would be likely to encounter the same opposition as new airports on the grounds of noise, community disruption, competing land use, and cost.

Alternative Strategies for System Development 103 Operating subsidies may be required for new systems until they have established a market niche and become fully supported by their own revenues. Topics for Study and Analysis Although some elements of this strategy have been studied (e.g. maglev, high-speed rail, tiltrotors, and HSCT), the concept of combining these and other types of advanced technology to form an intercity transporta- tion system for the twenty-first century is visionary in the extreme. Refining the concept, examining its details, assessing costs and benefits, and estimating technical feasibility and examining economic, social, and political impacts would require a major national study effort. COMPARISON OF STRATEGIES Strategy-Scenario Relationships One criterion used in developing strategies was the ability to satisfy capacity needs under at least one set of scenario conditions. Figure 5-3 shows the degree to which the various strategies meet this test. As explained in Chapter 4, the scenarios are defined by a matrix of socioeconomic and technological conditions that reflect differing assump- tions about future travel demand and the availability of advanced forms of air and surface transportation. Figure 5-3 highlights those cells of the matrix that constitute the severest challenges for strategy development. The strategies listed within each cell are those that appear to be feasible under the scenario conditions and capable of satisfying projected travel demand. The notation (?) is used where there is doubt about the effec- tiveness of the strategy or where the strategy may be only marginally successful in meeting scenario conditions. Relationships Among Strategies All strategies start from a common base of short-term actions to increase the capacity of existing airports (Option 1) and to exploit capacity avail- able at presently underused airports (Option 2). These options could have an immediate effect in reducing delay and relieving pressure on major airports with the highest concentration of operations. They are vital for accommodating short-term demand growth.

SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES TECHNOLOGICAL VARIABLES Limited Improvement High Maturing Economic Growth Economy Difficulty 2 MH B FA Significant Advances High Achievement (?) = doubtful or marginal KEY TO STRATEGIES A - Continue on Present Course B - Build More Airports C - Centralize System Management D - Build an Expanded, Centrally Managed Airport System E - Let the Market Decide F - Reconfigure the Airport System G - Revolutionize Intercity Transportation Technology Most challenging scenarios Scenarios of limited concern FIGURE 5-3 Application of strategies to scenarios

Alternative Strategies for System Development 105 Strategy A, continue on present course, which consists primarily of these options, would not be adequate for any scenario involving more than very limited long-term growth. The capacity gains achievable by Strategy A, even under the most optimistic assumptions, would be suffi- cient only for the next 10 years or so at currently forecasted rates of traffic growth. To accommodate the levels of demand that could materialize by the early decades of the next century under any scenario, the capacity of the airport system would have to be increased substantially. Strategy B, build more airports, foresees this need and postulates the construction of 10 to 15 new airports to serve major metropolitan areas by 2010. These airports would be equivalent in size to the largest airports in the United States today. Relying on this approach or on any strategy that depends on infrastruc- ture alone for the long term would be highly risky. Building large new airports in or near major cities could be very costly and difficult, judging from recent experience. Land costs would be enormous, the environmen- tal impacts severe, and community opposition intense. Airspace conflicts between existing and proposed new airports might, in and of themselves, preclude such an undertaking. Even if a way could be found to build several new large airports over the next 20 years, Strategy B probably could not provide the capacity re- quired to absorb the levels of demand that could materialize after 2020 in the high growth or perhaps even the maturing economy scenario. In this event a different strategic approach would be needed. Strategy C, centralize system management, is predicated on the as- sumption that building large new airport infrastructure cannot be ex- pected because of cost, community opposition, or other practical diffi- culties. Through administrative and regulatory measures to manage demand and redistribute traffic flow, Strategy C seeks to accommodate growth by making more efficient use of the airport infrastructure avail- able at any given time. In the long run this system management approach, although it has attractive features, might not be entirely adequate. Even if the theoretical benefits could be fully realized in practice, they probably would not be great enough to allow the present air transport system to accommodate the level of demand anticipated in the high growth scenario or even in the out years of the maturing economy scenario. It appears unlikely that the present infrastructure, albeit managed with great efficiency and supple- mented here and there with new facilities, would be able to handle more than twice the current level of demand. Three strategies (D, E, and F) are tailored specifically to dealing with very large long-term increases in demand. All involve development of

106 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES new transportation technology in addition to new airport infrastructure and some form of managing system demand. Strategy D, build an expanded, centrally managed airport system, includes building new airports in major cities; a concerted program to develop advanced air and surface transportation technology; and central- ized management to supervise the planning, development, and operation of locally owned and operated facilities. Strategy E, let the market decide, is a compound strategy relying on pricing mechanisms to allocate capacity and to provide funds for investment in new infrastructure and transporta- tion technology. It involves the same three-pronged approach as Strategy D but relies on differential pricing of airport access by time and place to redistribute demand and allocate scarce capacity. It also depends on private and local public initiative to build new airports and develop the needed technology with only minimal federal involvement. Strategy F, reconfigure the airport system, utilizes the same government-directed approach as Strategy D but would create a new system of transfer airports located in less populous areas and forming a trunk-line network similar to the interstate highway system. In all these strategies the development of new airports and transporta- tion technology is viewed as a long-range undertaking that should be studied, tested, evaluated, and planned now if it is to be ready for implementation by 2000 to 2010. For the short term these strategies rely on incremental improvements to existing airports and economic or ad- ministrative measures to make more efficient use of the facilities now in place. All three strategies have certain common advantages and disadvan- tages. They ration the use of a scarce resource (airport capacity) and avoid or postpone costly investments in new infrastructure when there is excess capacity available at other times and places. All impose some inconvenience on travelers, shippers, air carriers, and private users of airports and airspace. All inhibit demand to some degree. All would represent significant departures from current policy and custom. None has ever been practiced on a national scale. Of these system management approaches, the economic measures of Strategy E are judged to be preferable to the administrative and regula- tory techniques of Strategy D or Strategy F. Administrative and regula- tory methods of system management, although they might lead to high operational efficiency, tend to be rigid when applied over a long period of time and may distort the air travel market. Airport users, in a centrally managed system, cannot adequately express the value they place on airport access since the essential economic signal of price is missing. Administratively managing demand creates an artificial market situation

Alternative Strategies for System Development 107 that does not fully take into account the nature, quality, and cost of air transportation service demanded by the public. On the other hand, the air travel market is not "ideal." It is a unique mixture of private enterprise (the providers of air service), publicly owned and operated infrastructure (airports), and federal government management (ATC, air regulations, and certification of airspace users). Free market mechanisms may not work in a setting where all actors do not have equal degrees of freedom. There may be no satisfactory way to deal with issues of equity and the national interest in an industry governed solely by economic considerations and market mechanisms. If economic demand management and pricing approaches to allocate airport capacity prove inadequate, or if they fail to be applied because of controversy, legislative or administrative measures might have to be applied to correct the operation of the market or to prevent inequities. Ultimately, some mechanism must be found to manage the airport system more efficiently. Decentralized planning, uncoordinated develop- ment, and responses to growth dictated solely by individual interest will not lead to a rationally conceived and efficiently operated air transport system. Each of these strategies (D, E, and F), in a different way, envisions a transition from the present air transport system to one that is capable of handling two to four times the present traffic volume (the high growth scenario and the later years of the maturing economy scenario). All entail risk because they make use of methods and technology that have not been proven. At this point, none is clearly superior. All require careful study and assessment not only of their technical merits but also of their eco- nomic and political feasibility, environmental effects, and acceptability to the aviation community and the public at large. However, if any of these strategies is thought to have promise, the groundwork of study and preliminary planning would have to be laid now since implementation would require at least 20 years. The final strategy, G, revolutionize intercity transportation technology, is an extreme solution. It assumes that building any significant number of new airports will not be politically or economically feasible and that relief of present and future capacity problems can be found only through better system management and advanced vehicle and control technology for both air and surface modes. The technology required in this case is the same as that for Strategies D, E, and F above, but it is to be developed at an accelerated pace through an all-out effort directed and funded by the federal government with major contributions from private industry. For this strategy to work, there would have to be strong market pull and public support. The required investments would dwarf the combined expenditures on highways, airports, aircraft, and ATC that have been

108 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES made over the past 40 years. Strong federal government leadership and financial support would be needed for research, development, and de- ployment. Federal guidance and oversight would be essential to ensure appropriate coordination and integration of the various streams of tech- nology into a balanced national transportation system. An effort of this scope and duration is not beyond imagination, but it would call for a degree of national commitment that is without peacetime precedent.

6 Conclusions Providing a safe and efficient air transport system with adequate capacity to serve future needs should be high on the national agenda. This conclusion derives from the committee's view that systemwide congestion and delay problems are critical today and may reach even graver propor- tions by the end of this century. Unless effective and sustained action is begun now, the short-term outlook through 2000 and the long-term prospect for the early decades of the next century will be a steadily deteriorating air transport system beset by congestion, worsening delay, and possibly diminished safety. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS This prospect strongly indicates the need for a national policy to guide future development of the air transport system. This policy must address the immediate question of how to assure the safety and adequacy of the national network of facilities and equipment that make up the airport and air traffic control system. But it must go further. It must also define the role of aviation in relation to other modes of transport for people and goods. The policy for aviation and the policy for transportation as a whole must be coordinated and mutually supporting. The search for solutions must extend beyond matters of technical feasibility and operational effects. The technology to improve intercity transport of people and goods by air must also be weighed in economic, 109

110 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES social, environmental, and political terms to determine the solutions that make the most sense and fit best within the larger context of national transportation goals. Leadership and vigorous action at the federal level are appropriate and necessary, but the federal government cannot and should not be expected to shoulder the full responsibility for developing and implementing this policy. An effective partnership of the public sector at all levels of govern- ment and private enterprise will be needed. Policy and Planning To further this policy, a continuing long-term planning process on a national scale needs to be instituted. The horizon of this planning process should extend as far into the future as practical. As a minimum, it should embody short-range objectives to be realized within 10 years, alternatives for periods 10 to 20 years beyond, and long-range goals to be met by 2030 to 2040. The particulars of national policy and strategy need to be fashioned with great care. In seeking to meet national needs, explicit consideration must be given to regional differences and to emerging new patterns of economic development and population growth. An uncertain future dictates a need for flexibility and keeping options open. The rate of air travel demand growth and the distributional effects of this growth on different parts of the airport and airways network cannot be predicted accurately over a span of time measured in decades. We cannot foresee when—if ever—some of the actions described in this report will be needed or whether they will prove feasible. While awaiting developments, the nation must not remain idle. Choices need to be studied, evaluated, and refined. The necessary groundwork must be laid. And, above all, care must be taken in the short term to avoid action (or inaction) that would foreclose choices that may not need to be exercised until sometime in the next century. Flexibility is needed for another reason. The air transport system is complex and involves many parties: airlines; airport authorities; trav- elers; shippers of air cargo; and federal, state, and local governments. Their responses will be highly interactive. Whatever the strategy, actors will react and adjust in their self-interest. The selection and implementa- tion of any strategy must account for these dynamics. The concept of a time-phased strategy is critical. Many prospective actions with respect to airport and air traffic control system may take many years to accomplish. Failing to plan sufficiently far in advance or

Conclusions 111 deferring implementation beyond the appropriate time reduces choices and restricts freedom of action over the long term. Critical Issues In dealing with the direct concerns of making appropriate use of the facilities and equipment now in place and providing for expansion in anticipation of future growth, national aviation policy and planning will need to address several critical issues. Chief among these are issues of government and private industry roles, funding and financing, aircraft noise, and land banking. Government and Industry Roles An essential element of any long-term strategy for meeting airport and ATC system needs and accommodating intercity travel demand is an appropriate division of roles and responsibilities among federal, state, and local government agencies and between government and private industry. For the federal government these roles include leadership; setting priorities based on the national interest; establishing an appropri- ate framework of rules and regulations; providing funding support and technical assistance; and providing general encouragement of state, local, and private initiatives. In assuming these roles, the federal government also must recognize that state and local governments, as the sponsors of airport development, have individual (and perhaps conflicting) responsibilities and obligations that they must fulfill. Private parties—airlines, airport concessionaires, developers, and others who may have a stake in airports—also have legitimate interests. No single, uniform national strategy can be devised to fit all circumstances. Regional and local needs and realities will prevail in determining what can be done and how it is to be accomplished. The federal posture should be to encourage, even to promote, new forms of partnership and cooperative agreements with local governments and private industry that will lead to timely and appropriate development of new capacity or more efficient use of the airport facilities already in place. Funding and Financing Funding of airport capital improvements is largely a local matter. Federal assistance in the form of grants from the Airport and Airways Trust Fund

112 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES is available, chiefly for those projects affecting safety, airfield capacity, and noise mitigation. Of all capital investments by local authorities (in- cluding those eligible for federal aid and those financed locally), the federal contribution varies by airport size. For large airports federal monies make up about 20 percent of all investment; for medium-size commercial airports, up to 30 percent; and for small commercial airports, 50 to 70 percent (Congressional Budget Office 1984). The revenues available to the airport proprietor (landing fees, conces- sionaire rents, airline lease payments, and the like) are used mainly for operating expenses and debt service and not for building up a reserve for capital investment. To raise needed capital, airport authorities make use of either general obligation bonds (backed by the full faith and credit of the state or local government) or revenue bonds (backed by pledge of future user fees or lease revenues). These financing mechanisms, which have been adequate in the past, may not meet future needs, and airport managers and local governments are exploring new approaches to financ- ing and seeking additional sources of revenue. An issue to be addressed in devising a policy and strategy for meeting long-term aviation system capacity needs is the latitude that local authori- ties will have in generating the additional revenue needed for capacity- related investments. New forms of local taxation and user fees are one avenue. Private-sector participation is another. A third involves creation of new types of loan funds and investment banks specializing in support- ing infrastructure development. Aircraft Noise Responsibility for controlling aircraft noise is shared. FAA is charged with setting and implementing noise standards for aircraft. FAA is also responsible for carrying out the FAR Part 150 Noise Compatibility Pro- gram, which establishes noise measurement standards and procedures, supports noise-compatibility studies by airport authorities, and funds noise-mitigation projects. As the agency responsible for air traffic con- trol, FAA has sole authority to prescribe in-flight noise abatement pro- cedures. The airport operator has the authority to implement other noise- control measures, such as prescribing maximum aircraft noise levels permitted at the airport or setting full or partial curfews. Local governments, seeking to provide relief for communities affected by aircraft noise, have sought to impose restrictions on aircraft opera- tions. FAA has stated its general disapproval of local noise-control meas- ures that reduce airport capacity and has acted to block them in some cases. Airport operators are pressured from three sides—airlines and

Conclusions 113 other airport users wanting to expand facilities to relieve congestion, local citizenry opposing expansion because of noise, and FAA exercising pre- emptive authority over control of aircraft operations. Community con- cern about aircraft noise is perhaps the greatest single issue to be resolved in any effort to expand airport facilities. Any strategy adopted by the federal government to ensure adequate increase in airport capacity for the long term must address the aircraft noise issue squarely and deal with it in a way that will support and assist airport users, local airport authorities, and surrounding communities to find a balance between the needs of aviation and environmental protection. Land Banking A critical factor in development of new airport facilities is reservation and protection of sites for future airports. Here, federal, state, local, and private sector cooperation is particularly important. A large modern airport may require 20,000 acres of land for runways and other aeronauti- cal facilities, terminal building complexes, and landside roads and park- ing. To this must be added additional acreage for a surrounding noise buffer zone. Tracts of this size are not easily assembled even in the outer reaches of most metropolitan areas. If new large airports are to be built, it will be necessary to identify candidate sites and to set this property aside against future need. Some of these potential airport sites may be on land that is federally owned (military bases or other federal reserves); others may be state-owned or private holdings. As part of a strategic planning process, the federal government should identify prospective airport sites as early as possible and take steps to ensure their long-term availability. For federally owned property, site preservation can be accomplished by designating the land for possible future use as an airport and precluding its development or sale for other purposes. State governments could act similarly for lands they own. Privately owned lands require a different type of action. If earmarked as a future airport site, the land would have to be acquired outright by a public agency, or at least an option of first refusal would have to be negotiated with the owner(s). Federal and state governments could assist in this process by providing funds for land acquisition, by assisting in the process of assessing environmental impacts, and by ensuring that appropriate measures are taken (probably by municipal or county governments) to protect landbanked sites and their environs from development that would be incompatible with future aviation activity.

114 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES GENERAL CONCLUSIONS Causes of Congestion and Delay Since much of the congestion and delay is experienced at airports, it is widely perceived that the root cause is insufficient airport infrastructure. Although it is true that the runways, taxiways, aprons, and gates at many of the most heavily used airports cannot always accommodate the grow- ing number of aircraft seeking to use them, it is not correct to ascribe all congestion and delay to a lack of airport facilities. Congestion and delay are complex system problems that stem from the interaction of many factors, of which insufficient airport infrastructure is but one. Adverse weather, traffic peaking as a result of airline hubbing practice, airspace congestion, and inadequacy of the air traffic control system are also important causes of delay. There is no simple, universal, permanent solution to congestion and delay. A combination of remedies must be applied, each appropriate to a specific part of the problem and none so widely effective and long lasting that it promises to eliminate congestion and delay once and for all. Like friction in mechanical devices, congestion and delay are inherent in the air transport system, and the best that can be achieved is a higher degree of efficiency that reduces them to an acceptable level at an affordable cost. System Problem—System Solution A broad systemwide approach is called for to deal effectively with delay and to provide the air transport system capacity necessary to accommo- date long-term growth in travel demand. We cannot simply build, ration, manage, or research our way to greater aviation system capacity. The approach must include new infrastructure, improved air traffic control, more efficient use of airspace and airport facilities, advanced air and ground vehicle technology, and the research to make these attainments possible. In concentrating on airports, as this report does, the intent is to focus on a part of the system where many of the prospective solutions come into play. The issues to be addressed include more than how to upgrade and expand airport infrastructure. There is the fundamental question of whether (and under what circumstances) new airport infrastructure is the appropriate solution. Attention also must be given to how present and future infrastructure is to be used; how market mechanisms and system management methods can be employed; how improvements are to be funded; and how a national policy and strategic approach that harnesses

Conclusions 115 the cooperative efforts of federal, state, and local government and private industry can be implemented. What is needed, above all, is a vision of the future that includes goals, means to attain them, and a sense of the benefits and costs. This vision could take many forms, but for practical purposes it would best be embodied in a national, long-range, strategic plan that looks beyond present difficulties and focuses on measures to sustain a sound, properly managed, and affordable air transport system well into the next century. OPTIONS AND STRATEGIES Options The options presented in this report are building blocks that could be used in various combinations to devise a long-term strategy for ensuring ade- quate airport capacity. They include measures to upgrade or add airport infrastructure, to manage system use, and to develop new transportation technology. Option 1, make incremental capacity improvements at existing air- ports, is a practical, relatively low-cost, short-term measure that could be undertaken to alleviate capacity problems at specific sites. A major benefit of this option would be to reduce the gap between IFR and VFR capacity and thereby to mitigate the disruptive effect of adverse weather. Option 2, create new hubs at presently underused airports, would take advantage of the excess capacity available at these sites. By utilizing these airports as new secondary hubs for airline operations, it would be possible to accommodate growth in air travel demand over the short term (up to 10 years) without adding appreciably to the congestion and delay now expe- rienced at large hub airports in major metropolitan areas. Option 3, add new airports in metropolitan areas with high traffic volume, would provide capacity increases at the points of highest present traffic concentration. The problems of implementation could be very great, and such projects are likely to encounter strong local opposition on the grounds of noise, community disruption, competing land use, and cost. Option 4, develop new airports dedicated to serving as transfer points, would involve restructuring the present airport network in order to sepa- rate transfer traffic from origin-destination traffic at major metropolitan airports. In theory the transfer airport would be an approach to accom- modating very large increases in air travel demand that might materialize in the early decades of the next century. This concept is untried, and it has

116 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES not yet been studied and analyzed adequately to determine its feasibility and practical effect on airport system capacity. Option 5, manage demand by administrative and regulatory tech- niques, is a method to accommodate growing demand without necessarily increasing airport capacity. The purpose of this option is to distribute demand and allocate airport access in a way that makes most efficient use of the capacity available at any given time. While it might be effective, this approach is likely to be controversial since it could restrict airport access for some users at particular times and places and inhibit the free choice of routes, service points, and time of operation. The committee has reserva- tions about the practicality and public acceptance of this approach. Option 6, employ economic measures to redistribute demand, is a market-based approach to allocating scarce capacity. Although prefer- able in the committee's view to administrative methods of demand man- agement because of its consistency with the policy of a deregulated airline industry, the market-based approach could lead to increased air fares for peak-period travel, reduced airport access for new entrants and finan- cially weaker carriers, and some loss of regional air service for smaller cities. Like administrative methods of demand management and capacity allocation, the market-based approach could prove very controversial. Option 7, promote development of new aviation technology, would lead to introduction of new aircraft and air traffic control technology that could improve operating efficiency, reduce operating cost, and allow new forms of service. Although there are technological risks associated with this option, the gains in capacity utilization available from new aircraft designs and air traffic control systems may be less costly than comparable gains achieved by building new airport infrastructure. Option 8, develop high-speed surface transportation technology, could lead to the introduction of new high-speed line-haul surface transporta- tion systems to serve as substitutes or supplements for air travel, espe- cially in the range of 200 to 400 miles.' The barriers to such systems now are not only technical but also social and political (noise, land use, community disruption, cost), but this could change as technology ad- vances and as the patterns of urbanization and population growth cause major metropolitan areas to expand and the volume of intercity travel to increase. It appears likely that the development of advanced surface transportation technology (rail, magnetic levitation, or highway) will be driven by general urban and intercity travel demand and not by air travel alone. Two related studies are now in progress at TRB: one assessing the potential of high-speed rail and magneticaly levitated vehicles, the other the prospects of advanced automotive vehicle and highway technologies.

Conclusions 117 Strategies A total of seven strategies were examined in the course of this study. These strategies, composed of the options outlined above, were formu- lated to provide different approaches to accommodating both short-term increases in intercity travel and demand for airport capacity (through 2000) and long-term growth that could materialize by 2040. The composi- tion of these strategies is shown in Figure 6-1. Individual assessments and comparisons of these strategies are presented in Chapter 5. All strategies are based, at least for the short term, on incremental capacity improvements at existing airports (Option 1) and establishment of new secondary hubs at presently underused airports (Option 2). The committee concluded that these two options are the only practical and effective courses of action for the next few years while longer-term solu- tions are being considered and implemented. Strategy A, continue on present course, consists solely of Options 1 and 2, supplemented on a local and highly selective basis by administrative management of demand (Option 5) as a measure of last resort at ex- tremely congested airports where no other form of relief is available. This strategy, although adequate for the short term, probably would not be sufficient to accommodate even the lowest rate of demand growth as- sumed for the period 2000 to 2040. Strategy B, build more airports, includes, in addition to Options 1 and 2, building 10 or so large new airports to serve the centers of heaviest traffic concentration in the next century (Option 3). As in the previous strategy, administrative demand management would be applied in very limited fashion as a stopgap or measure of last resort. This strategy might prove adequate to handle levels of future demand perhaps double that of today, but it depends heavily on achieving community acceptance and support for building new facilities equivalent in size to the largest airports in this country today. The success of this approach appears problematical at best, given the experience of the past 20 years. To rely on this as a long- term strategy would be very risky, but it should not be rejected out of hand since it is the strategy that is most consistent with the historical course of airport system evolution in this country. The remaining five strategies (C through G) represent long-term ap- proaches that include a balance of several options. The committee consid- ered these strategies more likely to be effective because they do not rely exclusively on any single type of solution. They address congestion and delay as system problems to be dealt with by a coordinated program of airport construction, system management, and new air and surface

OPTIONS LEVEL OF EFFORT a 9 8. Surface Transportation w(high-speed rail, maglev, highway) ZI WO 7. Aviation 1— (aircraft and air traffic control) E E 6. Economic Measures (00 El El El- W (OZ 5. Administrative and Regulatory a cr 4. Transfer Airports 3. New Airports in Major Cities 2. New Hubs at Underused Airports cr U. 1. Incremental Capacity Improvements I I I I I I I I I Level of Effort Limited Medium High Maximum Manage and a allocate existing capacity b Plan and allocate new capacity FIGURE 6-1 Composition of strategies. STRATEGIES A B C D E F G Continue Build more Centralize Build Let the Recon- Revolu- on present airports system expanded market tigure air- tionize course manage. centrally decide port sys- - intercity ment managed tern transpor- system tation technology

Conclusions 119 transportation technology. The strategies differ primarily in the rela- tive emphasis placed on these three kinds of solutions. Strategy C relies on centralized system management through adminis- trative and regulatory methods to attain efficient use of existing facilities and to promote research on new transportation technology. Strategy D extends the centralized management approach beyond allocation of scarce capacity to include a lead role for the federal government in planning the development of new airport infrastructure and in promoting development and deployment of new transportation technology. Strategy E employs a market-based approach to achieve the same objectives as Strategy D. Strategy F involves restructuring the airport network to segregate transfer from origin-destination traffic and promoting the de- velopment of technology appropriate to operation of this kind of system. Strategy G emphasizes development and deployment of revolutionary new air and surface transportation technology. What Strategies C—G have in common is that they all involve broad new approaches to meeting long-term airport capacity needs and intercity travel demand. Each entails a departure from present policy and the traditional role of the federal government with respect to airport develop- ment and overall system planning and management. Within the time and resources available, the committee could not assemble evidence to conclude that any one of these strategies is clearly superior. Strategies D, E, and 0 appear most promising because they contain short-term elements that could be implemented immediately as well as measures to deal with long-term problems. All require more extensive study and analysis to refine the details, to assess advantages and disadvantages, and to consider the policy implications. The committee did reach the general agreement that a strategy no less proactive and far reaching than those advanced in this report will be needed to ensure the adequacy of the nation's air transport system into the early decades of the next century. REFERENCE Congressional Budget Office. April 1984. Financing U.S. Airports in the 1980s. Washington, D.C.

7 Recommendations The committee's direct response to the charge from the Federal Aviation Administration was to 1ff 1t adopt a formal, systematic pro- - - cedure for reviewing and evaluat- t lug options,formiihting a wtdc variety of strategies based on - - these options and expectations about future demand growth, and win flowing the strategies to a few that—in the committee's judgment— offer the greatest promise over the long term. During its deliberations, the committee also addressed, in a less formal way, basic underlying questions of system performance, policy issues, and strategic considera- tions that will condition whatever approach FAA may choose to adopt. The recommendations presented here deal, therefore, with strategy at two levels: general insights of the committee into the characteristics of the process of system development and long-range planning and specific recommendations about strategies and options that should be considered. The intent is to offer FAA, the Department of Transportation, the aviation community, and ultimately the public at large the views of the Transportation Research Board study committee on the direction and scope that planning for the future of civil aviation should take. STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS Main(n .vithin FAA a continuing long-range strategic planning process for evolutionary development of the air transport system. This process should integrate present, somewhat separate, planning activities for air- 120

Recommendations 121 port development and ATC system modernization that FAA has con- ducted for several years. The plan for aviation should also be coordinated with broader efforts being conducted in the DOT to formulate a national policy embracing all modes of intercity transportation. The planning horizon should extend to 2040, with intermediate views at 2000 and 2020. The planning process should be comprehensive, addressing not only national and regional airport needs but also related developments in air traffic control, management information systems, aircraft technology, and surface transportation systems to provide airport landside access or to supplement air transport in certain travel corridors. GOALS As part of the strategic planning process, set long-range and short-range goals for aviation. These goals should be tied to national policy and a plan for transportation as a whole, explicitly recognizing that broader concerns of national and public interest entail balancing solutions that increase the supply of airport capacity with those that manage the growth and distribu- tion of demand. As a minimum, the aviation goals should include the following: Airport system capacity needed in future years. Subgoals for capacity by region and at selected major airports, spe- cified either in terms of aircraft operations to be accommodated or acceptable levels of delay experienced. Targets for development of airports other than major commercial airports that are part of the national airport system, especially those that serve business and private aviation. Specification of the degree of access to airports and the services to be afforded to all types of airspace users. Advances in aircraft, airport, and air traffic control technology to be sought. Funding levels by type of improvement or intended purpose. SHORT-TERM ACTION AND LONG-TERM PLANNING Include both short-range and long-range action elements in the plan. The short-range elements should consist of specific programs to be under- taken within a 10-year time frame, with priorities and expected time of implementation. Long-range elements, though less specific, should iden- tify approaches to be taken, contingency actions, general requirements to

122 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES be fulfilled, planning and analysis required, and an overall timetable for implementation. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS To support the strategic planning process, the following actions should be undertaken without delay: Make incremental capacity improvements at existing airports and associated procedural changes in the ATC system (Option 1) and support the development of new secondary hubs at presently underused airports (Option 2). These are basic short-term actions that will be necessary regardless of whatever long-range strategy is adopted, and they will help keep congestion and delay from worsening while other actions are being evaluated and planned. Initiate study and analysis of the remaining options identified by the study committee. It may take several years to assess some of these options fully, and it is important to begin the process as soon as possible so that implementation can begin in a timely fashion, in some cases as early as 2000. Undertake study and analysis of the strategies outlined by the TRB committee, giving particular attention to those that combine and coordi- nate new infrastructure, system management, and advanced transporta- tion technology. Specifically, the strategies that the committee considers to have the greatest promise for the long term are the following: Strategy D, build an expanded, centrally planned and managed airport system—an approach that couples system management by administra- tive, regulatory, and procedural methods with a vigorous program to plan and build major new airports and to conduct research in new transporta- tion technology. Strategy E, let the market decide—reliance on economic measures and locally imposed pricing,schemes to allocate scarce capacity, combined with strong encouragement to local authorities and private industry to build more airport capacity and to develop new technology as dictated by market forces. Strategy G. revolutionize intercity transportation technology—limited expansion of the airport network, along with a concerted effort by the federal government to develop new aircraft and air traffic control technol- ogy and advanced high-speed surface transportation systems. Strategy C, centralize system management, and Strategy F, recon- figure the airport system, also merit attention. However, the committee is less certain that either of these strategies will prove practical and accept-

Recommendations 123 able to the aviation community. Strategy C depends largely on adminis- trative and regulatory methods to allocate capacity, an approach that the committee is not sanguine about since it lacks provision for substantial addition of new airport capacity in the long term. Strategy F is built on the transfer airport concept, which the committee views with skepticism until it has been adequately studied and evaluated. Take steps to lay the groundwork for possible future actions and to keep open options that may be exercised later, including: —landbanking potential airport sites, —developing stable and reliable federal funding mechanisms to sup- port future airport and air traffic control system improvements, and —exploring new revenue streams (from aviation and non-aviation sources) that could be tapped and devising new financing methods. Develop improved arrangements by which the views of the aviation community on prospective airport and ATC system improvements can be obtained and cooperative agreements reached. Reexamine federal policy and programs related to airport noise. As a minimum this review should include —establishing an appropriate division of responsibility between the federal government, local governments, and airport operators; —examining the feasibility and desirability of establishing federal airport noise standards and a procedure for federal review and approval of locally proposed airport noise restrictions; and —creating incentives for acquisition and use of quieter aircraft. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT In view of the technology-intensive nature of the problem, institute a broad and greatly expanded research and development program on airport capacity needs and solutions. The areas requiring attention include the following: Improved airport designs that will provide greater operational effi- ciency, lower cost, more flexibility in accommodating changing patterns of demand, and less vulnerability to adverse weather and other conditions that disrupt traffic flow. Traffic handling, flow-control, and related procedures that will per- mit dynamic, real-time management of airspace and airport resources. Advanced aircraft designs that are tailored to future operational needs and market requirements and to the capabilities of the air traffic control system.

124 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES Measures to reduce aircraft noise or to mitigate its effects. Development of advanced high-speed modes of ground transporta- tion that could serve as supplements or substitutes for aviation in satisfy- ing future intercity travel demand. New, more powerful modeling and analytic techniques to assess the performance of the airport and airways network as a whole and to permit evaluation of prospective capacity improvements on a systemwide basis.

APPENDIX Airport Identification Codes U.S. commercial service airports are identified by a three-letter code assigned by the International Air Transport Association. Codes for the airports mentioned in this report are listed below. ABQ Albuquerque International Airport, Albuquerque, New Mex- ico ALB Albany County Airport, Albany, New York AMA Amarillo International Airport, Amarillo, Texas ANC Anchorage International Airport, Anchorage, Alaska ATL William B. Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia AUS Austin Robert Mueller Municipal Airport, Austin, Texas BDL Hartford/Springfield Bradley International Airport, Windsor Locks, Connecticut BHM Birmingham Airport, Birmingham, Alabama BIL Billings Logan International Airport, Billings, Montana BNA Nashville Metropolitan Airport, Nashville, Tennessee BOl Boise Air Terminal (Gowen Field), Boise, Idaho BOS Boston General Edward Lawrence Logan International Air- port, East Boston, Massachusetts BUF Buffalo International Airport, Buffalo, New York BUR Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport, Burbank, California BWI Baltimore-Washington International Airport, BWI Airport, Maryland CAE Columbia Metropolitan Airport, West Columbia, South Caro- lina CHS Charleston International Airport, Charleston, South Carolina CLE Cleveland Hopkins International Airport, Cleveland, Ohio CLT Charlotte/Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina 125

126 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES CMH Columbus International Airport, Columbus, Ohio COS Colorado Springs Municipal Airport, Colorado Springs, Colo- rado CRP Corpus Christi International Airport, Corpus Christi, Texas CVG Cincinnati International Airport, Covington, Kentucky DAL Dallas Love Field, Dallas, Texas DAY Dayton (James M. Cox) International Airport, Dayton, Ohio DCA Washington National Airport, Washington, District of Columbia DEN Denver Stapleton International Airport, Denver, Colorado DFW DallasfFort Worth International Airport, Dallas/Ft. Worth, Texas DSM Des Moines International Airport, Des Moines, Iowa DTW Detroit Metropolitan (Wayne County) Airport, Detroit, Michi- gan ELP El Paso International Airport, El Paso, Texas EWR Newark International Airport, Newark, New Jersey FLL Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, Ft. Lauder- dale, Florida FMY Southwest Florida Regional Airport, Fort Myers, Florida GEG Spokane International Airport, Spokane, Washington GFK Grand Forks Mark Andrews International Airport, Grand Forks, North Dakota GRR Grand Rapids (Kent County) International Airport, Grand Rapids, Michigan GSO Piedmont Triad International Airport, Greensboro, North Car- olina GSP Greenville-Spartanburg Airport, Greer, South Carolina HNL Honolulu International Airport, Honolulu, Hawaii HOU Houston William P. Hobby Airport, Houston, Texas HRL Harlingen Valley International Airport, Harlingen, Texas lAD Washington Dulles International Airport, Washington, District of Columbia lAG Niagara Falls International Airport, Niagara Falls, New York IAH Houston Intercontinental Airport, Houston, Texas ICT Wichita Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas IND Indianapolis International Airport, Indianapolis, Indiana ISP Ronkonkoma (Long Island) MacArthur Airport, Islip, New York ITO Hilo General Lyman Field, Hilo, Hawaii JAX Jacksonville International Airport, Jacksonville, Florida JFK New York John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York

Appendix: Airport Identification Codes 127 KOA Kailua-Kona Keahole Airport, Kailua-Kona, Hawaii LAS Las Vegas McCarran International Airport, Las Vegas, Nevada LAX Los Angeles International Airport, Los Angeles, California LBB Lubbock International Airport, Lubbock, Texas LGA New York LaGuardia Airport, Flushing, New York LGB Long Beach Airport (Daugherty Field), Long Beach, Califor- nia LIH Lihue Airport, Lihue, Hawaii LIT Little Rock Regional Airport, Little Rock, Arkansas MAF Midland International Airport, Midland, Texas MCI Kansas City International Airport, Kansas City, Missouri MCO Orlando International Airport, Orlando, Florida MDW Chicago Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois MEM Memphis International Airport, Memphis, Tennessee MIA Miami International Airport, Miami, Florida MKE Milwaukee General Mitchell International Airport, Mil- waukee, Wisconsin MSN Madison (Dane County) Regional Airport (Truax Field), Mad- ison, Wisconsin MSP Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (Wold-Chamber- lain Field), St. Paul, Minnesota MSY New Orleans International Airport, New Orleans, Louisiana OAK Oakland International Airport, Oakland, California OGG Kahului Airport, Kahului, Maui, Hawaii OKC Oklahoma City Will Rogers World Airport, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma OMA Omaha Eppley Airfield, Omaha, Nebraska ONT Ontario International Airport, Ontario, California ORD Chicago-O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois ORF Norfolk International Airport, Norfolk, Virginia PBI Palm Beach International Airport, West Palm Beach, Florida PDX Portland International Airport, Portland, Oregon PHL Philadelphia International Airport, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania PHX Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport, Phoenix, Arizona PIT Pittsburgh International Airport, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania PVD Providence Theodore Francis Green State Airport, Warwick, Rhode Island PWM Portland International Jetport, Portland, Maine RDU Raleigh-Durham Airport, Morrisville, North Carolina RIC Richmond International Airport (Byrd Field), Richmond, Vir- ginia RNO Reno Cannon International Airport, Reno, Nevada ROC Rochester International Airport, Rochester, New York

128 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES SAN San Diego International Airport (Lindbergh Field), San Diego, California SAT San Antonio International Airport, San Antonio, Texas SAV Savannah International Airport, Savannah, Georgia SDF Louisville Standiford Field, Louisville, Kentucky SEA Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, Seattle, Washington SF0 San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California SJC San Jose International Airport, San Jose, California SJU San Juan Luis Munoz Mann International Airport, San Juan, Puerto Rico SLC Salt Lake City International Airport, Salt Lake City, Utah SMF Sacramento Metropolitan Airport, Sacramento, California SNA Santa Ana (Orange County) John Wayne Airport, Santa Ana, California SRQ Sarasota-Bradenton Airport, Sarasota, Florida STL St. Louis-Lambert International Airport, St. Louis, Missouri SYR Syracuse Hancock International Airport, Syracuse, New York TPA Tampa International Airport, Tampa, Florida TUL Tulsa International Airport, Tulsa, Oklahoma TUS Tucson International Airport, Tucson, Arizona TYS Knoxville McGhee Tyson Airport, Alcoa, Tennessee

Study Committee Biographical Information Joseph M. Sussman, Chairman, is Director of the Center for Transporta- tion Studies and Professor of Civil Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. Sussman has specialized in the planning, investment analysis, operation, management, and maintenance of large- scale transportation infrastructure systems, and he has worked with a number of government agencies and commissions in the United States and abroad. He has been involved in the application of computers to engineering problem-solving, specializing in the application of simulation and network methods in transportation. Dr. Sussman earned a B.C.E from City College of New York and a Ph.D. in Civil Engineering Systems from MIT. He is a member of the American Society of Civil Engineers, Transportation Research Forum, Transportation Research Board, and American Society of Engineering Education. Marilyn R. Block is Executive Vice President of the Naisbitt Group and Vice President of ICF Consulting Associates. She is responsible for the data collection and analysis that form the foundation of the Naisbitt Group approach to trend analysis. Before joining the Naisbitt Group, Dr. Block was executive director of the National Policy Center on Women and Aging. She also has conducted extensive research and authored books and reports on such diverse topics as health, education, employment, retirement, aging, energy, and transportation. Dr. Block has served on various advisory boards, including The Carnegie Commission, the Con- ference on the United Nations Decade for Women, and the White House Task Force on Aging. Dr. Block has a B.S., M.Ed., and Ph.D. from the University of Maryland. 129

130 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES John J. Corbett is a partner in the law firm of Spiegel and McDiarmid in Washington, D.C., with a practice in transportation law before the United States Congress and the U.S. Department of Transportation on behalf of state and local governments. Mr. Corbett is also General Coun- sel for the Airline Passengers of America. Before joining Spiegel and McDiarmid, Mr. Corbett was associated with the Airport Operators Council International for 20 years, rising to the position of Vice Presi- dent—Federal Affairs. He holds an A.B. from Catholic University of America and a J.D. from Georgetown University. Mr. Corbett is a member of the Federal Bar Association, the American Bar Association, and the Federal Energy Bar Association. He has been admitted to prac- tice before the Supreme Court of the United States, the U.S. District Court (D.C.), and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. James C. DeLong, Director of Aviation for the City of Philadelphia, is responsible for planning, directing, and coordinating all activities relating to development, construction, operation, and maintenance of Phila- delphia's airport system. Before assuming this position he was Deputy Director of the Houston City Department of Aviation and before that Manager of Houston Intercontinental Airport. Mr. DeLong served as a pilot in the U.S. Air Force for eight years. He has a B.A. in Economics from Colgate University and an M.A. in Aerospace Management from the University of Southern California. Thomas Duffy, is Executive Director of the National Organization to Insure a Sound-Controlled Environment (N.O.I.S.E), an organization of cities affected by aviation noise that works for legislative and regulatory changes to reduce aircraft noise and its impact on "noise consumer" cities. N.O.I.S.E. offers technical assistance to member cities, commu- nity groups, and airport proprietors. Mr. Duffy's previous employment includes service as County Administrator for Calaveras County, Califor- nia, and Director of Intergovernmental Relations for the State of Califor- nia. Mr. Duffy received a B.S from the University of San Francisco. Michael J. Durham is Vice President, Corporate Planning and Finance, for American Airlines. He has been with American Airlines for over 10 years and has held several positions in the area of corporate finance. Mr. Durham has a B.A. in economics from the University of Rochester and an M.B.A. from Cornell. Nigel D. Finney is Deputy Executive Director for Operations of the Metropolitan Airports Commission, Minneapolis-St. Paul. He has been

Study Committee Biographical Information 131 with the Metropolitan Airports Commission since 1977, having previ- ously served as Director of Airport Development, Director of Planning and Engineering, and Planning-Construction Engineer. Mr. Finney is a licensed pilot with multiengine and instrument ratings and has over 5,000 hours of flying experience as pilot-in-command. He is a member of the American Association of Airport Executives and the American Institute of Planners. He received a B.A. from Dartmouth College and master's degrees in city planning and civil engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology. Richard L. Harris, Jr., is Managing Director of Dean Witter Reynolds Public Finance in San Francisco, California. He has structured financing programs for many major airports, transit systems, and highway pro- grams across the country. He has also performed financial advisory services for the U.S. Department of Transportation, the Urban Mass Transit Administration, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Transport Canada, and the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assess- ment. Mr. Harris has a B.S. from New York University and an M.B.A. from Bernard Baruch School of Business. Richard L. Haury is Program Manager for the Greiner/MKE Team, which serves as the program management support consultant for the new Denver International Airport. He has served in similar capacities for several other major airport projects, including Orlando International Airport, Tampa International Airport, Tocumen International Airport in Panama, Harry S. Truman Airport in the Virgin Islands, and the Space Shuttle Landing Facilities complex at the Kennedy Space Center. Mr. Haury received a B.E. in civil engineering from Auburn University. John B. Hayhurst is Vice President-Marketing for the Boeing Commer- cial Airplanes Group. In this capacity he is responsible for market re- search, future product strategy, aircraft sales promotion and support, and advertising. Mr. Hayhurst has been associated with Boeing for over 20 years and has held several positions in the area of marketing, sales, and customer training. He has a B.E. in aeronautical engineering from Pur- due University and an M.B.E. from the University of Washington. Adib Kanafani is Professor of Transportation Engineering and Director of the Institute of Transportation Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. He received his B.S. in engineering at the American University in Beirut and his M.S. and Ph.D. in civil engineering and transportation at the University of California, Berkeley. Over the past 20 years Dr. Kanafani has been involved in many aspects of transportation research

132 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES with a special expertise in aviation issues, including aviation demand, airport feasibility studies, capacity analysis, and airline economics. Dr. Kanafani has also consulted directly with airports all over the world. He is Associate Editor of Transportation Research and two other transportation journals and has authored or coauthored numerous articles on aviation. He received the Walter Huber Research Prize from the American Society of Civil Engineers in 1984. John D. Kasarda is Chairman of the Department of Sociology at the University of North Carolina and Director of the Center for Competitive- ness and Employment Growth in the Graduate School of Business Ad- ministration. He has published extensively on issues in population growth, sociological trends, urbanization, economic growth, and occupa- tional changes; and he has recently completed a study on the relationship between airports and economic growth. He serves on the editorial board of several scholarly journals in the fields of sociology and economic development. Dr. Kasarda has a B.S. in economics and an M.B.A in organizational theory from Cornell University and a Ph.D. in sociology from the University of North Carolina. James P. Loomis is Director of the Center for High-Speed Commercial Flight at the Battelle Columbus Division. He has over 30 years' experi- ence in transportation research, including aviation safety, airport and airway technology, and aircraft operations. For 12 of these years he has also had responsibility for studies in other modes of transportation— marine, rail, transit, and highway. He has served on numerous technical committees, among which are American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics committees on aircraft operations and air transportation systems and the TRB Committee on Airfield and Airspace Capacity and Delay. He is currently Vice Chairman of the Columbus Metropolitan Airport and Aviation Commission. Mr. Loomis holds B.S. in aeronautical engineering from The Ohio State University. Amedeo R. Odoni is Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and of Civil Engineering as well as Co-Director of the Operations Research Center at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He holds a B.S. and M.S. in electrical engineering and a Ph.D. in operations research from M.I.T. His research has been in the areas of operations research, applied probability, and mathematical modeling, and he has worked extensively on airport capacity and delay issues and on computer-aided approaches to airport and air traffic control system planning. Dr. Odoni has been a consultant for many airport authorities, including New York (LGA and JFK), Boston, Cleveland, Amsterdam, Athens, Milan, Munich, Stock-

Study Committee Biographical Information 133 hoim, and Sydney. The author or coauthor of three books and more than 35 technical papers, Dr. Odoni is currently the Editor-in-Chief of Trans- portation Science and a member of the TRB Committee on Airfield and Airspace Capacity and Delay. Willard G. PlentI, Jr., is Director of the Division of Aviation of the North Carolina Department of Transportation, the state agency designated to carry out functions related to development and funding of a statewide system of public airports. He is past President of the National Association of State Aviation Officials and currently Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee on Aviation of the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials. Mr. Plentl received the AASHTO Air Transportation Award for Outstanding Achievement in Aviation in 1988. He is a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute and has pursued advanced study in management and transportation at North Carolina State University and the University of Pennsylvania. He is a registered Professional Engineer in North Carolina, Florida, and Virginia. Ron J. Ponder is Senior Vice President in charge of the Information and Telecommunications Division of the Federal Express Corporation. In this capacity he is responsible for planning and integrating strategic informa- tion systems processing, systems engineering and design, and operational research for Federal Express operations worldwide. He has been with Federal Express for nearly 25 years, holding various positions in opera- tions planning and information systems. His professional experience also includes 10 years of consulting, university teaching, and research. Dr. Ponder holds an M.B.A. from Louisiana Polytechnic University and a Ph.D. in business administration from Mississippi State University. He is a member of the Transportation Research Board, the American Manage- ment Association Advisory Council, and several other professional and academic boards and commissions. J. Donald Reilly recently retired as Executive Director and Secretary General of the Airport Operators Council International, a position he held for over 20 years. He is currently Chairman of the Industry Task Force on Airport Capacity Improvement and Delay Reduction, which reports to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration on operating procedures, airport development, and research needs to im- prove air transportation capacity. Mr. Reilly has served on special com- mittees appointed by the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assess- ment and the Transportation Research Board to study airport and airspace capacity problems. He received a B.S. in economics from Frank-

134 AIRPORT SYSTEM CAPACITY: STRATEGIC CHOICES un and Marshall College and an LL.B. from George Washington Univer- sity Law School. Nawal K. Taneja is a Professor in the Department of Aviation at The Ohio State University. His career in aviation spans 20 years, during which time he has been president of a commuter airline, an aviation consultant, a faculty member at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and an economic analyst for Trans World Airlines. He has authored nine books and numerous journal articles on U.S. and international civil aviation. Dr. Taneja holds a B.Sc. in aeronautical engineering from London Uni- versity; two M.S. degrees from MIT, one in management science and one in aeronautics and astronautics; and a Ph.D. from London University in air transportation.

The Transportation Research Board is a unit of the National Research Council, which serves the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering. The Board's purpose is to stimulate research concerning the nature and performance of transportation systems, to disseminate the information pro- duced by the research, and to encourage the application of appropriate research findings. The Board's program is carried out by more than 300 committees, task forces, and panels composed of more than 3,500 administrators, engineers, social scientists, attorneys, educators, and others concerned with transportation; they serve without compensation. The program is supported by state transportation and highway departments, the modal administrations of the U.S. Department of Transportation, and other organizations and individuals interested in the develop- ment of transportation. The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal govern- ment on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Frank Press is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of out- standing engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Robert M. White is president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Samuel 0. Thier is president of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal govern- ment. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Acad- emy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering commu- nities. The Council is administered jointly by both the Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Frank Press and Dr. Robert M. White are chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council.

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