Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview (2018)

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

16 As mentioned previously, the risk of driver assault on a given route may be conceptualized as a tripartite function—risk is affected by the potential for an assault (threat), the probability that an assault would be successful (vulnerability), and the severity of an assault (consequences). The risk can be managed using risk reduction techniques, identifying the vulnerabilities of systems through analysis, and eliminating or reducing vulnerabilities and consequences by deployment of countermeasures. A quantitative risk assessment model was developed as part of this research based on the DHS risk guidance that incorporates risk factors for threat and vulnerability.10 In the DHS approach, considering threat, vulnerability, and impact together allows for the development of a risk score. For the purposes of this research project, the impact of operator assault is assumed to be the same for all transit agencies. The vulnerability value is composed of an evaluation of the effectiveness of the counter- measures in place, or, alternatively, as a measure of what countermeasures (or safeguards) are lacking. The two are inversely related. The research team developed a vulnerability self- assessment tool, described in Chapter 6, for transit agencies to assess their vulnerability or, conversely, the strength of their prevention and mitigation approaches based on specific details from countermeasures currently in use. The score provides a basis to evaluate an agency’s overall performance and potential areas for improvement in incorporating operator assault countermeasures. The total countermeasures score represents the overall strength of the countermeasures in terms of their performance in each area, drawn from the literature review and the research team experience. There are no baseline data that can be used to develop and test the assigned weights. In short, the weights represent the consensus estimates of the project team. Should an agency/authority have either data or alternative hypotheses as to the weightings, the weightings can be substituted. The threat value consists of risk factors identified during the course of the research project that may impact the risk of driver assault within a transit system and/or along any route within that system. The CASE™ and TRA research team developed a route factor threat, vulnerability, and consequence matrix to be used as a foundation to support risk management decision-making based on risk factors identified in the literature review. The matrix includes environmental consider- ations such as incident history, population density, and route vehicle capacities and passenger ridership rates; operation factors such as fare structures, delays in schedule, and fleet condition C H A P T E R 4 Risk Methodology 10The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (DHS, 2009) calls for infrastructure risks from any scenario to be considered “as a function of consequence, vulnerability, and threat.” The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (DHS, 2013) recommends that risks should be assessed in terms of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Risk Methodology 17 and maintenance; and response considerations such as police or security response and displace- ment of crime. A rating scale was developed for the route factors encompassing both quantitative and qualita- tive approaches to identifying and analyzing the factors. Both data- and expertise-driven meth- ods, verified where appropriate with literature review sources, were used to create the scale. The objective was to provide the practitioner with a look-up table and a methodology for calculating the risk of bus driver assault along any given route in a system. Research results found that assault risks are often concentrated along particular routes in a wider transportation network. While the vulnerability self-assessment tool is designed to empower agencies seeking a comprehensive assault countermeasure strategy covering an entire system, it can be adapted to suit a single route relatively easily. When applied to a single route, the vulnerability self-assessment tool results may be compared directly against the results of the route-based risk calculator, presenting a more detailed picture of agency preparedness regarding individual assault threats. Risk Factor Rationale Using national data on aggravated and simple assault rates by region and population density as well as data from a variety of sources covering different cities and states, the estimated risk of driver assaults and other behaviors can be identified for various categories of risk factors (e.g., system factors, route factors, and operation factors). This section provides a summary of the Route Factors Environmental Considerations 1. Incident history and escalation 2. Population density along the route 3. Bars and nightclubs 4. Route and vehicle capacities and passenger ridership rates 5. Entertainment venues along the route (stations, events, places of congregation) 6. Proximity to crime hot spots 7. Temporal effects 8. Juvenile crime 9. Gang activity 10. Prostitution and vice 11. Drug trade Operational Considerations 12. Known threats 13. Measures in place to address apparent security risks—vehicle security countermeasures 14. Measures in place to address apparent security risks—operator assault security countermeasures 15. Training and skill level of operators and crew/development 16. Delays in schedule 17. Fleet condition and maintenance 18. Incident reporting and management systems 19. Fare structure and disputes 20. Workplace violence policy and procedure Resources Available for Response Considerations 21. Measures in place to address apparent security risks—security personnel 22. Police or security response capability along the route 23. Relationship with local law enforcement 24. Passenger security inspections, random searches, presence of uniformed personnel 25. Displacement of crime Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

18 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators: Research Overview 11Tools and Strategies For Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Interim Report 1, November 2014. 12These categories are based upon U.S. Census Bureau definitions and contain metropolitan areas, cities outside metropolitan areas, and nonmetropolitan counties. See Appendix E for detailed explanation of how these categories were derived for this project. methodology that can be used to calculate the risk factors for the likelihood of assault of a driver for any given route within a transit agency’s domain of responsibility. The bases for the follow- ing discussion and tables lie in Appendices F, G, and H included with this report. For readers interested in the underlying calculations and assumptions, data from the pertinent appendices are noted in the footnotes. The following sections discuss how the risk factors and the risk ranks used in the route-based risk calculator are derived. As noted in the Transit Agency Operator Assault Route Factor Rating Sheet and Weighting Methodology in Interim Report 1, 20 factors that may impact the risk of driver assault within a transit system or along any route within that system were identified.11 These 20 factors can be categorized as “system factors,” “route factors,” and “operation factors.” • System factors are superordinate factors that potentially impact the risk of driver assault on any route within a given system and include whether the transit operation is within a metro- politan area, a city, or a nonmetropolitan area and in what geographic section of the country the system resides. • Route factors are tied to a specific route and potentially impact the risk of driver assault on the route. Route factors include the presence of bars, sports venues, and gang territories along any given route within a system. • Operation factors are within the purview of the transit company to manage and change in a system or on a specific route. The vulnerability self-assessment tool focuses on operation factors such as fare collection policies, monitoring equipment or driver protection barriers, driver training practices, and incident reporting and management practices. The route-based risk calculator includes the hours of operation along a route as a risk factor. Methodology for Calculating Risk Factor and Risk Rank The research team operationalized these factors for use in the operator assault risk manage- ment toolbox. The objective was to provide the practitioner with a look-up table and a method- ology for calculating the risk of driver assault within a transit system along any route. There are some challenges in operationalizing these risk factors: (1) data availability for each risk factor, (2) assigning a numerical rating to each risk factor and, (3) understanding which factors affect the probability (and consequence) of an assault. In fact, the latter two challenges are a direct consequence of data availability regarding risk factors along a route. Any countermeasure may positively or negatively affect at least one of these risk components. The methodology for calculating the risk of driver assault is detailed in Appendices F and G. The appendices show how the various risk factors—system, route, and operation—may be com- bined to estimate the potential for an assault, the probability that an assault would be successful, and the severity of an assault. The region where a transit system operates and the population density of the region have been found to have a relationship with the level of assaults that occur for the general popula- tion and bus drivers. Four geographic regions of the United States were used as indicators to account for these differences—South, Midwest, West, and Northeast. Similarly, population density was categorized by three sizes—metropolitan areas, cities outside metropolitan areas, and nonmetropolitan areas.12 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Risk Methodology 19 On any given route within a system, there are various types of incidents that may occur. In general, the risk of such incidents occurring is related to the historical frequency of such inci- dents occurring along the route. In Table 4, these are categorized as occurring less than 1 inci- dent within 60 months (5 years), 1 incident occurring within 60 months, 1 incident occurring in 48 months, 1 incident occurring in 36 months, 1 incident occurring in 24 months, and 1 incident occurring within 12 months. When the frequency of an incident is at 2 or more incidents occur- ring within 12 months, the risk of such incidents occurring within 12 months is as high as it can get. Thus, in Table 4, the risk factors and risk factor ranks are shown according to the frequency. In addition to the frequency of incidents along a particular route, there are certain risk factors that are geographically specific, such as bars, entertainment venues, high incident venues,13 high incident gang areas, and high juvenile crime areas. These are given risk factor rankings in Table 4. Further, there is a relationship between known threats14 and the frequency of incidents as well as the hours of operation of buses along a route. These risk factors are also reflected in Table 4. Finally, in addition to the above geographically specific risk factors along a route, there are two route characteristics that are common to all routes—terminals. Each route has an origina- tion terminal and a termination terminal. However, while each route will have terminals, the specific characteristics of those terminals will likely be different for each route, although in some instances several routes may share one terminal—the origination terminal. For some routes the origination and termination terminals may be the same. However, for those routes, there will be a turn-terminal at one end of the route. Further, terminals are land uses surrounded by other land uses. Thus each terminal will have a unique combination of risk factors that are also drawn from Table 4. For example, a terminal and surrounding area may have assault incidents, liquor-licensed establishments, or known threats. For large transit systems with multimodal operations (e.g., light rail, buses, heavy rail), it is also necessary to characterize transfer stations along the route. Similar to terminals, transfer stations are land uses surrounded by other land uses. So, each of these transfer stations will also have a unique combination of risk factors that are drawn from Table 4. For example, a transfer station and surrounding area may also have assault incidents, liquor-licensed establishments, and known threats. To address these route characteristics, Table 5 provides a simple framework to prepare risk factor ranks for terminals and transfer stations on each route.15 Information to support the formulation of route factor threats and vulnerabilities was obtained through a literature review and an examination of environmental and operating information. In practice, these data that have been attributed to specific sources and vetted for consistency will be augmented by internal operating profiles and reports of individual transit agencies to conduct vulnerability self-assessment. Trip reports that describe the type of vehicle in use, operator, time of day, day of week, route of travel, or unusual occurrences during a trip will supply significant information. Other information includes (1) actual incidents of assaults, threats, or threatening behavior; (2) input from transit agency representatives and operators; 13A high incident venue is one in which there is a large number of criminal acts. Generally, assaults of one type or another keep occurring. In short, the likelihood of assaults occurring in these venues increases. Such venues are certain kinds of dance clubs/bars, sports bars, sport stadiums where alcohol is permitted and consumed, and concentrations of liquor stores. These are defined in Appendix F. 14The most common “known threat” that precedes aggravated assault is verbal threat—84% of aggravated assaults have been preceded by verbal threats. These are defined and explained in Appendix F. 15Terminals and transfer stations may not present significantly different route characteristics in nonmetropolitan areas or smaller cities; however, in major metropolitan areas, terminals and transfer stations can represent significant differentiators for route risks. For example, in some large metropolitan areas, terminals have particularly dense combinations of land uses and activities not found elsewhere in those metropolitan areas except around those terminals. Further, in some metropolitan areas, transit stops and transfer points in some neighborhoods have higher incidents of assaults and passengers waiting for buses are particularly likely to be victims of assault. Frequently, these stops or transfer points are also associated with nearby bars or liquor-selling establishments such as convenience stores. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

20 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators: Research Overview System Factor Region and Population Density Risk Factor Rank South • Metropolitan areas • Cities • Nonmetropolitan areas 5 5 3 1 Midwest • Metropolitan areas • Cities • Nonmetropolitan areas 2 3 2 1 West • Metropolitan areas • Cities • Nonmetropolitan areas 3 3 6 2 Northeast • Metropolitan areas • Cities • Nonmetropolitan areas 2 3 5 3 Route Factor Incident History Factor Risk Factor Rank <1 Aggravated Driver Assault/60 Months 116 1 Aggravated Driver Assault/60 Months 2 1 Aggravated Driver Assault/48 Months 3 1 Aggravated Driver Assault/36 Months 4 1 Aggravated Driver Assault/24 Months 5 1 Aggravated Driver Assault/18 Months 6 1 Aggravated Driver Assault/12 Months 7 <1 Simple Driver Assault/60 Months 1 1 Simple Driver Assault/60 Months 2 1 Simple Driver Assault/48 Months 3 1 Simple Driver Assault/36 Months 4 1 Simple Driver Assault/24 Months 5 1 Simple Driver Assault/18 Months 6 1 Simple Driver Assault/12 Months 7 <1 Minor Driver Incident/60 Months 1 1 Minor Driver Incident/60 Months 2 1 Minor Driver Incident/48 Months 3 1 Minor Driver Incident/36 Months 4 1 Minor Driver Incident/24 Months 5 1 Minor Driver Incident/18 Months 6 1 Minor Driver Incident/12 Months 7 <1 Generalized Driver Threat/60 Months 1 1 Generalized Driver Threat/60 Months 2 1 Generalized Driver Threat/48 Months 3 1 Generalized Driver Threat/36 Months 4 1 Generalized Driver Threat/24 Months 5 1 Generalized Driver Threat/18 Months 6 1 Generalized Driver Threat/12 Months 7 Table 4. Look-up table: risk factor and risk factor rank. 16It is important to keep in mind that these ranks simply identify the likelihood of a particular type of event, not the con- sequence of that event. For example, 1 means a low likelihood of occurrence and 7 means a high likelihood of occurrence. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Risk Methodology 21 1 Simple to Aggravated Driver Assault/18 Months 7 1 Simple to Aggravated Driver Assault /12 Months 7 <1 Minor Incident to Simple Driver Assault/60 Months 1 1 Minor Incident to Simple Driver Assault/60 Months 3 1 Minor Incident to Simple Driver Assault/48 Months 4 1 Minor Incident to Simple Driver Assault/36 Months 5 1 Minor Incident to Simple Driver Assault/24 Months 6 1 Minor Incident to Simple Driver Assault/18 Months 7 1 Minor Incident to Simple Driver Assault/12 Months 7 <1 Repeat Aggravated Driver Assault/60 Months 1 1 Repeat Aggravated Driver Assault/60 Months 3 1 Repeat Aggravated Driver Assault/48 Months 4 1 Repeat Aggravated Driver Assault/36 Months 5 1 Repeat Aggravated Driver Assault/24 Months 6 1 Repeat Aggravated Driver Assault/18 Months 7 1 Repeat Aggravated Driver Assault/12 Months 7 <1 Repeat Simple Driver Assault/60 Months 1 1 Repeat Simple Driver Assault/60 Months 3 1 Repeat Simple Driver Assault/48 Months 4 1 Repeat Simple Driver Assault/36 Months 5 1 Repeat Simple Driver Assault/24 Months 6 1 Repeat Simple Driver Assault/18 Months 7 1 Repeat Simple Driver Assault/12 Months 7 <1 Repeat Minor Driver Incident/60 Months 1 1 Repeat Minor Driver Incident/60 Months 3 1 Repeat Minor Driver Incident/48 Months 4 1 Repeat Minor Driver Incident/36 Months 5 1 Repeat Minor Driver Incident/24 Months 6 1 Repeat Minor Driver Incident/18 Months 7 1 Repeat Minor Driver Incident/12 Months 7 <1 Repeat Generalized Driver Threat/60 Months 1 1 Repeat Generalized Driver Threat/60 Months 3 1 Repeat Generalized Driver Threat/48 Months 4 1 Repeat Generalized Driver Threat/36 Months 5 1 Repeat Generalized Driver Threat/24 Months 6 1 Repeat Generalized Driver Threat/18 Months 7 1 Repeat Generalized Driver Threat/12 Months 7 Route Factor Incident History Factor Risk Factor Rank <1 Simple to Aggravated Driver Assault/60 Months 1 1 Simple to Aggravated Driver Assault/60 Months 3 1 Simple to Aggravated Driver Assault/48 Months 4 1 Simple to Aggravated Driver Assault/36 Months 5 1 Simple to Aggravated Driver Assault/24 Months 6 Table 4. (Continued). (continued on next page) Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

22 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators: Research Overview 1 Repeat Simple Assault Threat of Driver/18 Months 7 1 Repeat Simple Assault Threat of Driver/12 Months 7 <1 Repeat Minor Incident Threat of Driver/60 Months 1 1 Repeat Minor Incident Threat of Driver/60 Months 3 1 Repeat Minor Incident Threat of Driver/48 Months 4 1 Repeat Minor Incident Threat of Driver/36 Months 5 1 Repeat Minor Incident Threat of Driver/24 Months 6 1 Repeat Minor Incident Threat of Driver/18 Months 7 1 Repeat Minor Incident Threat of Driver/12 Months 7 Number of Bars/Crime Prone Spots Risk Factor Rank Bars, Nightclubs, and Entertainment: 1/block 1 Bars, Nightclubs, and Entertainment: 2/block 2 Bars, Nightclubs, and Entertainment: 3/block 3 Bars, Nightclubs, and Entertainment: 4/block 4 Bars, Nightclubs, and Entertainment: 5/block 5 Bars, Nightclubs, and Entertainment: 2 blocks with 5/block 6 Bars, Nightclubs, and Entertainment: 3 blocks with 5/block 7 Bars, Nightclubs, and Entertainment: 4 blocks with 5/block 8 High Incident Aggravated Assault Venues—Taverns, Bars, Nightclubs, and Sports Bars/Stadiums High concentrations of liquor-licensed establishments within a one- block area (>17/one-block radius) 7 High Incident Aggravated Assault Gang Areas 5 High Juvenile Crime Aggravated Assault Areas 1 Known Threats Risk Factor Rank 1 Known Threat of Aggravated Assault 1 2 Known Threats of Aggravated Assault 2 3 Known Threats of Aggravated Assault 3 4 Known Threats of Aggravated Assault 4 5 Known Threats of Aggravated Assault 5 Operation Factor Hours of Operation Risk Factor Rank Graveyard Shift—2:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m. 1 Morning to Midday—5:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. 2 School Dismissal Hours—2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. 3 Peak PM Traffic Period—4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. 4 Evening/Late Night/Early Mornings—7:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. 5 Route Factor Incident History Factor Risk Factor Rank 1 Repeat Simple Assault Threat of Driver/24 Months 6 <1 Repeat Aggravated Assault Threat of Driver/60 Months 1 1 Repeat Aggravated Assault Threat of Driver/60 Months 3 1 Repeat Aggravated Assault Threat of Driver/48 Months 4 1 Repeat Aggravated Assault Threat of Driver/36 Months 5 1 Repeat Aggravated Assault Threat of Driver/24 Months 6 1 Repeat Aggravated Assault Threat of Driver/18 Months 7 1 Repeat Aggravated Assault Threat of Driver/12 Months 7 <1 Repeat Simple Assault Threat of Driver/60 Months 1 1 Repeat Simple Assault Threat of Driver/60 Months 3 1 Repeat Simple Assault Threat of Driver/48 Months 4 1 Repeat Simple Assault Threat of Driver/36 Months 5 Table 4. (Continued). Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Risk Methodology 23 Table 5. Terminal and transfer station risk rank template. TERMINAL RISK RANK RISK FACTOR TERMINAL A ROUTE TERMINAL CHARACTERISTICS RISK FACTOR RANK REGION P OPULATION DENSITY INCIDENT HISTORY NUMBER OF BARS/CRIME PRONE SPOTS KNOWN THREAT HOURS OF OPERATION TERMINAL A RISK FACTOR TERMINAL B ROUTE TERMINAL CHARACTERISTICS RISK FACTOR RANK REGION POPULATION DENSITY INCIDENT HISTORY NUMBER OF BARS/CRIME PRONE SPOTS KNOWN THREAT HOURS OF OPERATION TERMINAL B RISK SCORE Total Route Terminal Risk Score = A + B TRANSFER STATION RISK RANK RISK FACTOR TRANSFER STATION 1 ROUTE TRANSFER STATION CHARACTERISTICS RISK FACTOR RANK REGION POPULATION DENSITY INCIDENT HISTORY NUMBER OF BARS/CRIME PRONE SPOTS KNOWN THREAT HOURS OF OPERATION TRANSFER STATION 1 RISK SCORE RISK FACTOR TRANSFER STATION N ROUTE TRANSFER STATION CHARACTERISTICS RISK FACTOR RANK REGION POPULATION DENSITY INCIDENT HISTORY NUMBER OF BARS/CRIME PRONE SPOTS KNOWN THREAT HOURS OF OPERATION TRANSFER STATION N RISK SCORE RISK SCORE Total Route Transfer Station Risk Score = 1 + 2 + … + n Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

24 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators: Research Overview (3) open source geographical scan information covering categories such as business districts, schools, neighborhoods, and populations; (4) crime statistics; and (5) outreach to the public to acquire information about known trouble spots as well as perceptions about the security on a given transit route. To complete Table 5, two more calculations need to be done to derive the risk factor ranks for terminals. First, derive the risk rank for each terminal on a route (Terminal A and Terminal B) and, second, sum those risk ranks to derive the terminal risk rank which is to be used in the route-based risk calculator (see Table 9). To determine the risk factors to be used from Table 4 in Table 5, use the centroid of the terminal to create a one-block radius from the terminal. If the transit agency operates in an area where it is more appropriate for the radius around a terminal to be time-based, then make the radius a 5-minute walk from the terminal in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas and a 10-minute walk in cities. As with the route factors, system factors such as the region and population density ranks are constant for all terminals in the system. In some large metropolitan areas, the appropriate radius around the terminal may need to be two blocks or more, depending upon the character of the surrounding area. Again, if the radius selected is greater than one block (5- or 10-minute walk), the risk factor rank entered is driven by the appropriate rank found in Table 4 for that particular factor. The same approach is to be taken for transfer stations, although, in general, transfer stations will not require a greater than one-block radius calculation. When several transfer stations are on a route, the total transfer station risk rank is determined by summing the ranks for each transfer station to derive the total transfer station risk rank. This rank is then utilized in the route-based risk calculator. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.