Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview (2018)

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25 Based on information obtained from the literature review, survey data of small and medium transit agencies obtained as part of TCRP Report 180: Policing and Security Practices for Small- and Medium-Sized Public Transit Systems and an informal scan of the top 10 transit agencies on the use of countermeasures, the research team compiled a comprehensive and thorough explo- ration of the strategies and countermeasures available to transit providers to reduce or eliminate instances of operator assault and mitigate against potential assault impacts. The research team also contacted the University of Southern Florida Center for Urban Transportation (CUTR) to obtain more detailed information about the results of the 2013 transit agency survey that CUTR conducted as part of the research published in Bus Operator Safety—Critical Issues Examination and Model Practices (2014).17 Agency approaches and effective countermeasures were identified through interactions with transit agencies, transportation and transit organization publications, academic journals, and through transportation research reports and other online sources including agency press releases. There are many measures and approaches which address assault against transit drivers and operators, ranging from policing, personnel, and training to technology, information manage- ment, policy, and legislation. TCRP Synthesis 93 and TCRP Report 180 summarized the survey and literature review results of bus operator protection measures and found that some measures were more appropriate for preventing certain types of attacks. While operator assault countermeasures vary widely in scope, ease of implementation, cost, and other factors, the countermeasures are presented in a format that allows for swift compari- son of the strengths and requirements of each measure. In building a comprehensive strategy toward operator assaults, transit agencies must first consider the purpose and benefits of the various types of countermeasures and categories that are available, as well as the unique causes and contributors to operator assault experienced by the transit system in question. Though certain countermeasures are specific to particular agency assets, others can be swiftly and flexibly deployed in an agencywide setting. The set of counter- measures will enable transit providers to craft a comprehensive assault mitigation strategy that is affordable and appropriate to the scale of each unique transit system. Levels of Security As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Situational Crime Prevention framework, originally devel- oped by Ronald V. Clarke in 1992, is a conceptual model that is applicable to a variety of crime- reduction activities. The framework is designed to organize anti-crime measures toward a C H A P T E R 5 Countermeasures 17Staes, L., Goodwill, J. A., and Yegidis, R. (2014). Bus Operator Safety—Critical Issues Examination and Model Practices. National Center for Transit Research, University of South Florida. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

26 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operator: Research Overview complete strategy that makes crime a less attractive option for potential offenders. By increasing the perceived effort involved in committing a crime, increasing the perceived risks to an assail- ant, and decreasing the potential rewards of a criminal act, transit providers may successfully deter criminals and reduce instances of assault. The framework includes a classification of opportunity-reducing techniques, which has undergone change over time.18 Table 6 illustrates how the countermeasures would fit into the framework by using Clarke’s 16 opportunity-reducing techniques (Clarke and Homel, 1997). Security, in the context of emergency management, includes a broader range of activities than the crime prevention mentioned in the Situational Crime Prevention framework. Security spans the continuum from prevention through response and recovery. Table 7 provides definitions of the levels of security. The following sections contain information on all key security activities that prescribe procedures and methodology that relate to desired outcomes by using the catego- ries and countermeasures defined in this report. 18In the first edition in 1992, Clarke introduced the classification with 12 opportunity-reducing techniques found to prevent a variety of “street” and predatory crimes. The classification addressed three purposes, implicit in the assumptions of situational prevention, of increasing the risks, increasing the difficulties, and reducing the rewards of crime. In 1997, Clarke and Homel modified the classification to include a fourth purpose—to increase shame and guilt or to “remove excuses” for crime. The expansion reflected the additional crimes that situational measures have been applied against where rationalizations about behavior can play a role in excusing the conduct. These types of offenses such as income tax evasion, traffic offenses, sexual harassment, and theft of employer’s property might more effectively be prevented by increasing the incentives or pressures to comply with the law. Perceived Effort 1. Target Hardening Defensive Weapons (Driver Protection Systems) Physical Barriers—Compartment Barriers or Shielding, Full or Partial (Driver Protection Systems) Driver Operator Self-Defense (Training) Drills—Immediate Actions (Training) Driver Operator Security Communications (Training) Driver Operator Security (Training) Driver/Operator Handbook (Training) Driver Operator Security Awareness (Training) Operator Assault Committees/Task Forces (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Operator Assaults Zero Tolerance Workplace Violence Policy Coverage (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) 2. Access Control Barring Systems (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Intelligence Information Sharing Cooperation (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) 3. Deflecting Offenders Bus Stop Placement 4. Controlling Facilitators Mobile Data Terminals (MDTs) with DVRs (Data Communications and Telemetry Systems) Cellular Telephone—Texting and Emailing (Voice Communications Technology) Two-way Radio (Voice Communications Technology) Two-way Radio—3G/4G/LTE/ Satellite Mobile Broadband Least Cost Routing (Voice Communications Technology) Table 6. Opportunity-reducing techniques (based on the Situational Crime Prevention framework). Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Countermeasures 27 Perceived Effort 12. Denying Benefits On-Board Vehicle Fire Suppression Equipment (Driver Protection Systems) DNA Swipe Kits (Driver Protection Systems) Anti-Theft—Secure Driver Sign On (Data Communications and Telemetry Systems) Anti-Theft—Enroute (Data Communications and Telemetry Systems) Vehicle Disabling (Data Communications and Telemetry Systems) Assault Legislation (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Post-Incident Action Steps (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Violent Incident Emergency Response Plan (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Removing Excuses 13. Rule Setting Fare Collection Policy and Procedures (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Passenger Code of Conduct (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) 14. Stimulating Conscience Public Address System and Signage (Driver Protection Systems) Passenger Awareness Programs (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) 15. Controlling Disinhibitors Assault Legislation (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) DNA Swipe Kits (Driver Protection Systems) 16. Facilitating Compliance Fare Collection Policy and Procedures (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Operator Assaults Zero Tolerance Workplace Violence Policy Coverage (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Physical Barriers—Compartment Barriers or Shielding (Driver Protection Systems) 7. Surveillance by Employees Video Surveillance Using On-board Computer/DVR (Surveillance and Observation Systems) Real-Time Audio (Voice Communications Technology) Electronic Distress Signs (Data Communications and Telemetry Systems) Vehicle Locators Systems (AVLs) and Global Positioning System (GPS) (Data Communications and Telemetry Systems) Tracking and Monitoring—Global Positioning System (GPS) (Data Communications and Telemetry Systems) Visible Surveillance Systems—Cameras in Plain Sight (Surveillance and Observation Systems) Passenger Awareness Programs (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) 8. Natural Surveillance Bus Stop Lighting (Surveillance and Observation Systems) Anticipated Rewards 9. Target Removal Driver-Side Exit Doors (Driver Protection Systems) 10. Identifying Property Property Marking Vehicle Marking 11. Reducing Temptation Public Address System and Signage (Driver Protection Systems) Fare Collection Policy and Procedures (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Passenger Code of Conduct (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Perceived Risks 5. Entry/Exit Screening Passenger Screening (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) 6. Formal Surveillance Centralized Remote Sensors with Immediate Force Response (Police or Security Staffing) Centralized Surveillance with Immediate Force Response (Police or Security Staffing) Centralized On-Board Alarms/Panic Buttons with Immediate Force Response (Police or Security Staffing) Shadowing Vehicles (Police or Security Staffing) Staffing On Board Conveyance (Police or Security Staffing) Table 6. (Continued). Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

28 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operator: Research Overview Purpose Definition Source Prevention Those capabilities necessary to avoid, prevent, or stop a threatened or actual act. National Infrastructure Protection Plan (DHS, 2013) Deterrence An activity, procedure, or physical barrier that reduces the likelihood of an incident, attack, or criminal activity. Transit Agency Security and Emergency Management Protective Measures (FTA, 2006) Detection The identification and validation of potential threat or attack that is communicated to an appropriate authority that can act. Transit Agency Security and Emergency Management Protective Measures (FTA, 2006) Mitigation The application of measure or measures to reduce the likelihood of an unwanted occurrence and/or its consequences. Risk Lexicon (DHS, 2008) Response Capabilities necessary to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs after an incident has occurred. National Infrastructure Protection Plan (DHS, 2013) Recovery The development, coordination, and execution of plans for impacted areas and operations. Transit Agency Security and Emergency Management Protective measures (FTA, 2006) Table 7. Levels of security. Prevention There are relatively few security measures available to prevent violence from occurring on board a transit vehicle. Public transit is not reserved; conveyances are public open access vehicles available for use by an unrestricted general population. Transit vehicles are populated by anony- mous riders who present nothing more than cash, a ticket, card, or some form of fare media to get on board. Typically, individuals who represent security risks are not pre-identified or barred from riding because their propensity to violence is generally unknown. There is virtually no screening for weapons or dangerous implements prior to boarding. Riders are placed in close proximity to one other, strangers, friends, and associates alike with on and off access readily available in case a hasty retreat is required. In summary, the openness of public transit systems makes them virtually unprotectable using modern physical security lock down technology. Transit systems, in general, cannot be managed as restricted areas or through access control and vehicles in motion and their occupants including operators are even harder to protect. Fully enclosed barriers that isolate the operator from direct contact with passengers would be an exception. Even fully enclosed barriers that isolate the operator from direct contact with passengers (such as the fixed guideway rail cars on the St. Louis MetroLink which have fully enclosed driver compartments) cannot eliminate all attacks although they may protect from most attack types and certainly would thwart an assault under most circumstances. However, the barriers would need to be bulletproof to ensure the protection of drivers from assaults with weapons, which is not often the case in the currently installed barriers. In the absence of barrier types of technology, the remaining option for preventing violence is the deployment of security forces. Although this response is one of deterrence, it is technically possible to prevent an incident from occurring if security personnel are physically present and able to stop an ongoing attack or criminal assault. Figure 3 provides a summary of the most relevant countermeasures and approaches to pre- vent assaults. Detailed descriptions for each are found in Appendix C. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Countermeasures 29 Deterrence There are security countermeasures available to deter criminals or other would-be attackers from committing violence on-board transit vehicles. Deterrence as a protective measure is largely a matter of reducing exposure to potential harm or influencing how the criminal/offender inter- prets the risk of apprehension or personal loss. For example, the presence of a partially enclosed operator barrier may not prevent many common types of assaults but can deter or reduce the likelihood of an assailant spitting on or physically striking an operator. Similarly, readily evident cameras and CCTVs create a concern for offenders that they would be providing evidence that will lead to their apprehension. “Caught on camera” can have a tremendous deterrent impact. Posted signs and public address announcements can advise otherwise recalcitrant individuals about the presence of security. Displaying notices that persons who commit an assault on an operator will be prosecuted to the full extent the law allows can serve as a tacit reminder that aggressive behavior can result in serious legal consequences. Security forces can also serve as a significant deterrent to violent crime. Security related technologies can greatly reduce both the perceived window of opportunity of individuals and the potential impact of their actions. Figure 4 provides a summary of the most relevant countermeasures and approaches to deter assaults. Detailed descriptions for each are found in Appendix C. Detection There are technology measures such as video surveillance, alarm/panic buttons, and audio surveillance that can support an operator when a potential incident is imminent. However, the very nature of transit operator assaults usually limits efforts to detect aggressive intent. Assault crimes are generally impulsive, emotionally based (typically anger) and can result from conflict occurring between known relations or strangers. In many cases, the aggressive action occurs PREVENTION Uniformed Police Personnel Operator Protective Barriers Barring Systems Figure 3. A selection of prevention counter­ measures with varying visibility, cost, and ease of implementation. Different prevention tools, ranging from technological systems to staffing changes and vehicle modifications, are available to prevent operator assault. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

30 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operator: Research Overview spontaneously with no advanced warning. There are also circumstances when the offender is not making a rational decision in the first place when they commit a violent act. Offenders can be mentally disabled, emotionally wrought, under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or simply pathological. There are also incidents where an aggressor “holds a grudge” or “lies in wait” to attack the victim. These types of occurrences of assault are premeditated in conjunction with some form of preconceived motive including hooliganism or juvenile delinquency, retaliation for “being disrespected,” aggravated robbery, or even innocuous rationale like ritualistic attacks related to gang initiations. Training operators to be aware of unusual behavior or unfavorable conditions can improve their ability to detect aggression in advance. The education program should address what to look for in terms of both impulsive aggression as well as premeditated aggression. For the latter, obtaining constant input from operators about threats, no matter how unlikely they seem, can support the identification of the existence of potentially dangerous con- ditions. Figure 5 provides a summary of the most relevant countermeasures and approaches to detect assaults. Detailed descriptions for each are found in Appendix C. Mitigation Measures to reduce the likelihood of an assault or to minimize the consequences of an inci- dent include policy such as security plans with emergency protocols that identify when to involve a transit supervisor or transit officer or fare payment policies that address fare evasion and how requests for payment are handled. Technology measures such as video and audio surveillance, alarm/panic buttons, and destination sign emergency messages, such as 9-1-1, Deterrence Surveillance Systems Public Address Systems and Signage Operator Awareness Training Assault Legislation Onboard Security Passenger Codes of Conduct Assault Committees and Task Forces Assault Legislation Physical Barriers Figure 4. A selection of procedures, activities, and physical interventions with deterrent effects. Attackers can be deterred via visible systems such as barriers and cameras or via policies, training, and procedures developed well in advance of an incident. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Countermeasures 31 displayed on the outside of the vehicle can be effective in supporting an operator and mitigat- ing the consequences of an incident. Awareness and training, such as training in customer relations and conflict mitigation, can be effective in providing drivers with necessary skills and increased confidence in handling the public and defusing potential situations. Transit agencies are making progress in preparing their operators to respond effectively to escalating engage- ments with passengers through focused training on topics such as defusing a volatile situa- tion and customer service, and some provide training in physical response. Training classes could help increase an operator’s awareness of these factors, how they may impact his or her inter actions with passengers and co-workers, and strategies to minimize or eliminate adverse impacts. Improved communication can greatly reduce the operator’s chance of an escalating threatening or violent situation with a passenger or co-worker. Communication-focused train- ing courses can help mitigate potential situations. Figure 6 provides a summary of the most relevant countermeasures and approaches to mitigate assaults. Detailed descriptions for each are found in Appendix C. Response and Recovery There are numerous types of countermeasures that can support the maintenance of an effective response program for incidents. Many of these measures are low-cost and low-effort, consisting of policy responses, awareness and training, security planning, or coordination with local authorities. For agencies that are experiencing periodic violence on board, additional efforts such as those listed should be undertaken. With respect to on-board violence, from a Detection Violent Incident Response Plan Two-way Radio/ Mobile Broadband Vehicle Shadowing Distress Signs and Remote Sensors On-board Telemetry Systems Anti-theft Devices Panic Buttons Intelligence Sharing Figure 5. A selection of procedures, activities, and physical interventions for detection. Attacks may be prevented via policies, training, and procedures developed well in advance of an incident. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

32 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operator: Research Overview security standpoint, one of the highest priority actions that should be undertaken by transit agencies is to establish a robust capability and multi-layered capacity to respond immediately to the occurrence of either a threat of violence or a violent incident. Follow-up with the opera- tor after an incident—both in terms of prosecution of assailant and in terms of agency support for the driver’s personal recovery—is an important aspect of recovery measures. Some agen- cies have comprehensive programs to assist bus operators following assault events. This may include follow-up sessions with the employee after the incident and continued outreach by the operator’s direct supervisor on an ongoing basis. Other post-event support programs and policies include employee assistance programs, opportunities for alternate duties and route reassignments, and paid leave during recovery. Legal assistance can be provided to operators wishing to take legal action against their aggressor. An example of a successful, peer driven program is the King County Metro’s “Critical Incident Stress Management” (CISM) system. The structure of the program is established in the King County Metro’s Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with Amalgamated Transportation Union, Local 587. Figure 7 provides a summary of the most relevant countermeasures and approaches to respond to and recover from assaults. Detailed descriptions for each are found in Appendix C. Individually, countermeasures have varying strengths in addressing deterrence, prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery from operator assaults. When deployed together as part of a comprehensive risk reduction strategy, multiple countermeasures represent a thorough approach to the many levels of security. Mitigation Violent Incident Response Plan Physical Barriers Automatic Vehicle Locator Systems Panic Alarm Buttons Electronic Distress Signs Driver Conflict Management Training Real Time Incident Surveillance Defensive Weapons Driver-Side Exit Doors Immediate Police Response Figure 6. A selection of mitigation countermeasures. Strategies from training to defensive response weapons can help to mitigate against the most severe impacts of attacks against operators. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Countermeasures 33 Countermeasures Rating Scale Table 8 presents a rating scale for countermeasures that can be considered by transit agencies as a means to prevent, deter, detect, mitigate, respond to, or recover from an attempt or actual assault upon a transit operator. The table lists the underlying description or definition of each of the rating categories. Implementation costs for many of the countermeasures are difficult to measure because of the variability in costs depending on the size of the transit system, preexist- ing resources, and a variety of other factors. It is also recognized that overly specific equipment/ technology prices for individual countermeasures may quickly become outdated and reduce the usefulness of the guide. For these reasons, costs are presented as relative values. The chart on Page 35 provides a cost estimate with ranges included. Applying the rating scale to the identified operator assault related countermeasures provides transit agencies with a working summary of available options that can be utilized to reduce risks and improve safety. Further detailed infor- mation about each of the countermeasures is also provided below. There are several different categories of countermeasures that are available to protect transit operators from assaults. Some of the more direct methods are through actions such as the instal- lation of driver compartment barriers or shields, or through the deployment of police or security personnel on board vehicles as a deterrent. Other countermeasures are indirect such as the devel- opment of policies for handling priority communications during crisis, or by using automatic vehi- cle locator technology to assure that the location of a conveyance is always known. Finally, there are comprehensive strategies that derive their protective scheme from combining countermeasures together. This final grouping is often the best suited for addressing operator assault incidents. Response and Recovery Driver Operator Litigation Support Assault Legislation Post Incident Action Steps Training, Drills and Exercises Immediate Actions Operator Security Comms Training Operator Assault Committees Task Forces Figure 7. Beyond immediate actions, transit providers can take steps to support operators and manage incident recovery in the days and weeks following an assault. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

EASE OF USE (NOMINAL SCALE OF DIFFICULT-MODERATE-EASY) INDUSTRY USE (NOMINAL SCALE OF HIGH-MED-LOW) TIME TO IMPLEMENT (NOMINAL SCALE OF LONG-MEDIUM-SHORT) LABOR INTENSIVE (SCALE OF UP TO 3 $S) COST TO IMPLEMENT (SCALE OF UP TO 3 $S) EFFECTIVENESS (SCALE OF UP TO 5 STARS) DIFFICULT Requires extensive effort to accomplish HIGH More than two-thirds of transit agencies LONG More than one year $$$ Requires extensive new staff or makes heavy demands on current human resources $$$ Requires extensive new facilities, equipment, or publicity, or makes heavy demands on current resources ($2M+) $$ Requires some additional equipment, facilities, and/or publicity ($450K - $2M) $ Limited costs for equipment, facilities, and/or publicity (<$50K - $450K) Demonstrated to be effective by several high-quality evaluations with consistent results Demonstrated to be effective in certain situations Likely to be effective based on balance of evidence from high-quality evaluations or other sources Effectiveness still undetermined; different methods of implementing this countermeasure produce different results Limited or no high-quality evaluation evidence MODERATE Requires some effort to accomplish MEDIUM Between one-third and two-thirds of transit agencies MEDIUM More than three months but less than one year $$ Requires some additional staff time EASY Requires minimal effort to accomplish LOW Less than one-third of transit agencies SHORT Three months or less $ Can be implemented with current staff, perhaps with training UNKNOWN Data not available UNKNOWN Data not available Table 8. Countermeasure rating scale. T ools and S trategies for E lim inating A ssaults A gainst T ransit O perators, V olum e 1: R esearch O verview C opyright N ational A cadem y of S ciences. A ll rights reserved.

Countermeasures 35 Least Cost to Implement (<$50K–$450K) Communication Protocol for Violent Incidents (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Fare Collection Policy and Procedures (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Operator Assault Committees/Task Forces (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Post-Incident Action Steps (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Operator Assaults Zero Tolerance Workplace Violence Policy Coverage (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Passenger Code of Conduct (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Violent Incident Emergency Response Plan (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Intelligence Information Sharing Cooperation (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Assault Legislation (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Cellular Telephone—Texting and Emailing (Voice Communications Technology) Real-Time Audio (Voice Communications Technology) On-Board Vehicle Fire Suppression Equipment (Driver Protection Systems) DNA Swipe Kits (Driver Protection Systems) Driver/Operator Handbook (Training) Driver Operator Security Awareness (Training) Moderate Cost to Implement ($450K–$2M) Barring Systems (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Passenger Awareness Programs (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Two-way Radio (Voice Communications Technology) Two-way Radio—3G/4G/LTE/ Satellite Mobile Broadband Least Cost Routing (Voice Communications Technology) Vehicle Locator Systems (AVLs) and Global Positioning System (GPS) (Data Communications and Telemetry Systems) Tracking and Monitoring—Global Positioning System (GPS) (Data Communications and Telemetry Systems) Vehicle Disabling (Data Communications and Telemetry Systems) Anti-Theft—Secure Driver Sign On (Data Communications and Telemetry Systems) Anti-Theft—Enroute (Data Communications and Telemetry Systems) Electronic Distress Signs (Data Communications and Telemetry Systems) Visible Surveillance Systems—Cameras in Plain Sight (Surveillance and Observation Systems) Bus Stop Lighting (Surveillance and Observation Systems) Video Surveillance Using On-board Computer/DVR (Surveillance and Observation Systems) Physical Barriers—Compartment Barriers or Shielding, Full or Partial (Driver Protection Systems) Public Address System and Signage (Driver Protection Systems) Defensive Weapons (Driver Protection Systems) Driver Operator Security (Training) Driver Operator Security Communications (Training) Drills—Immediate Actions (Training) Driver Operator Self-Defense (Training) Greatest Cost to Implement ($2M+) Passenger Screening (Policies, Plans, and Protocols) Staffing On Board Conveyance (Police or Security Staffing) Centralized On-Board Alarms, Panic Buttons with Immediate Force Response (Police or Security Staffing) Centralized Surveillance with Immediate Force Response (Police or Security Staffing) Shadowing Vehicles (Police or Security Staffing) Centralized Remote Sensors with Immediate Force Response (Police or Security Staffing) Mobile Data Terminals (MDTs) with DVRs (Data Communications and Telemetry Systems) Driver-Side Exit Doors (Driver Protection Systems) LO W C O ST H IG H C O ST Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

36 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operator: Research Overview While the countermeasures are organized in order of overall effectiveness, the suitability of each countermeasure is ultimately dependent on the unique operational parameters of the end user. Transit providers must consider the cost, time to implement, and ease of use of each strategy, as well as the interplay between multiple countermeasures during complex incidents. Imbedded within all the countermeasures are categories that are the components of the measure representing capabilities and resources that can be deployed. When used within the countermeasure they give the agency a comprehensive profile of how best to address the identi- fied issue. Agency approaches and effective countermeasures were identified in various ways, including through interactions with transit agencies, transportation and transit organization publications, academic journals, and through transportation research reports and other online sources including agency press releases. Countermeasures and Categories Category 1: Policies, Plans, and Protocols These are written documents and working protocols that specifically describe the agency’s security approach for preventing, reducing or mitigating operator assaults. Security documenta- tion should confirm that issues associated with operator assaults are considered and integrated into the daily business of the agency. These policies/plans/protocols should: • Establish action steps for employees in response to an operator assault incident, • Identify information requirements for operator assault incidents, • Define resource requirements for staffing and equipment, • Coordinate the activity of different departments or functions, • Ensure clear division of safety and security tasks and responsibilities, • Promote understanding of the issues involved during an incident, • Promote inclusion and participation by employees, and • Identify training requirements. Countermeasures for Policies, Plans, and Protocols • Communication Protocol for Violent Incidents. This countermeasure allows on-scene and off-scene personnel to have the same information, provides coordination between responders both internal and external, provides status of assets and requests for assets, assists with resil- iency and recovery, details who puts out information for public consumption and what is released. Personnel should be trained. • Fare Collection Policy and Procedures. These are unique methods to reduce the potential for conflict that can be associated with fare collection such as cashless fare collection, no change systems, collection upon vehicle exit, use of pre-printed transfers, smart cards for payment. • Operator Assault Committees/Task Forces. It has been seen that groups are more effective at solving problems than individuals. Committees produce an assessable outcome for which members have collective responsibility. Management, frontline employees, and union repre- sentatives should be included. • Passenger Screening. This eliminates or reduces the use of dangerous weapons or other implements and adds another layer of security but requires extensive training and protocols. • Post-Incident Action Steps. These steps identify protocols establishing how the agency will provide support for an assaulted operator, lists who is responsible for care and follow-up with the employee and/or family member, identifies follow-up with other employees/operators who are affected by the incident, and guides the employee/operator through the legal process. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Countermeasures 37 • Operator Assaults Zero Tolerance Workplace Violence Policy Coverage. This provides a clear policy regarding how the transit agency will respond to assaults. However, the policy needs to be endorsed by senior management and requires enforceable, tangible results. • Passenger Code of Conduct. This is developed to create a safe environment for passengers and operators and needs to be enforced. It should be posted on vehicles and in facilities stating that violators will be subject to the issuance of a notice of violation and the imposition of an administrative penalty. The code creates an environment of compliance. • Violent Incident Emergency Response Plan. Pre-emergency planning and coordination identifies resources for response, possible emergency scenarios and mitigation strategies, and personnel roles and lines of authority; promotes emergency recognition and preven- tion; reinforces evacuation procedures and shelter in place protocols; simplifies procedures for alerting proper personnel and their response; and outlines site security and control. • Intelligence Information Sharing Cooperation. This countermeasure adopts common pro- cesses for gathering and sharing vital information and statistics; identifies common informa- tion sharing standards; develops clear policies for making information available to approved individuals; focuses on identifying, preventing, and mitigating incidents; requires designation of a primary point of contact; and dedication of significant time to maintain effective liaison. • Assault Legislation. This indicates a commitment to thwart assaults and establishes punish- ment parameters. Cooperation with local, judicial, and legislative authorities is required to enact operator assault legislation. • Barring Systems. Encompasses technology that identifies known aggressors who are then refused access to vehicles. Low-tech options include providing operators with photos of habit- ual offenders. • Passenger Awareness Programs. Public awareness campaigns are integral components of security for transportation agencies by enlisting the support of passengers which acts as a force multiplier. It has been proven that these programs can reduce crime and other inci- dents. Examples of these campaigns are Transit Watch Programs such as “See Something, Say Something” or “When it comes to safety, we can always use an extra pair of eyes.” These programs should include clear direction on how to report incidents. Category 2: Police or Security Staffing Decisions about the deployment of security forces can be difficult for transit agencies expe- riencing security related problems on board conveyances or along their routes because adding personnel for any purpose is often the costliest operating expenditure that the agency will face. It is therefore prudent for transit agencies to be thorough and diligent in determining security personnel requirements. But clearly, in the context of prevention or deterrence of assaults against transit operators, security personnel on board are a significant resource available to reduce security related inci- dents. Unlike other security countermeasure or technology, personnel provide the one vital capability for which there is no substitution—the ability to comprehend and apply reason. Security personnel bring the capacity to perceive the true nature of a threat and to recognize ongoing aggressor tactics. When adequately armed or reinforced they can repel or overcome the use of deadly force by responding with equal or greater force to neutralize the threat or activity. Determining the necessity for security personnel or the extent to which forces should be deployed on board transit vehicles can be loosely estimated based primarily on issues such as size, the population served, and the operating locale. Statistics support a view that transit systems operating in high density population areas are likely at a higher risk of crime or disorder than more rural systems. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

38 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operator: Research Overview Countermeasures for Police or Security Staffing • Staffing On Board Conveyance. Security personnel have the capacity to perceive the true nature of a threat and to recognize ongoing aggressor tactics. Interdiction is deemed successful if the intruder is prevented from deploying his/her weapon or the people who were the target of an attack are moved to safety before the attack occurs. Officer visibility is essential for an effective security strategy as well as a key practice to create an environment of compliance. • Centralized On-Board Alarms, Panic Buttons with Immediate Force Response. This includes on-board vehicle emergency event notification technology coupled with immediate notifica- tion and response by security forces. Agencies may deploy vehicles with silent communications capabilities such as panic buttons and other flashing lights or “need help” variable messages. • Centralized Surveillance with Immediate Force Response. Real-time watching for suspicious activity on board vehicles, coupled with rapid response to incidents, can create an observable omnipresent impact. • Shadowing Vehicles. High visibility security patrols or bus field supervision in fully marked vehicles provide immediate response capability and act as a deterrent. • Centralized Remote Sensors with Immediate Force Response. These are sensor/pager systems installed to detect dangerous substances, such as radioactive or biohazardous material, and alert the operator or dispatch personnel when the vehicle has been contaminated. Category 3: Voice Communications Technology Communication is the transfer of information and some means of ensuring that what is sent is also received. New technology increases the ways in which information can be communi- cated. Typically radios have been deployed to enable two-way communications about operating conditions. Advanced communications covers digital video and voice, computer graphics, and systems and applications. Newer systems require some infrastructure and cover network-based, web-based, and wireless-based control and monitoring functions. Countermeasures for Voice Communications Technology • Two-Way Radio. This method is often in use as the primary method of communication between operators. It requires a central control point. • Two-Way Radio using 3G/4G/LTE/Satellite Mobile Broadband Least Cost Routing. This method is typically deployed in regional or intercity operations as opposed to local transit operations. “G” stands for generation, as in the next generation of wireless technologies. Each generation is supposedly faster, more secure, and more reliable. “LTE” stands for long-term evolution. The “G” and “LTE” were major jumps in the technology when the wireless net- works went from analog to digital. • Cellular Telephone—Texting and Emailing. The justification for cellular telephone service which includes texting (short message service/SMS) and emailing should have a clear con- nection to the user’s job responsibilities and should always be for official use only. This does introduce significant safety concerns because of the risk of distracted driving. Most agencies prohibit cellular telephones, texting, or emailing by operators during vehicle operation. • Real-Time Audio. One or more video cameras deployed on a vehicle can be audio microphone equipped to record both audio and video. The camera enabled for audio should be the one facing the driver so that any interaction between the driver and the passengers can be recorded. Category 4: Data Communications and Telemetry Systems More advanced technologies now exist that can be used to enable better communications between drivers and their station. These technologies include mobile data terminals, automatic Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Countermeasures 39 vehicle locators, GPS units, and emergency alert buttons. Each of these technologies has its own set of benefits and limitations. Mobile data terminals are being used more frequently for com- munication purposes and are present on many buses. Some vehicles are equipped with AVL sys- tems, which can provide constant and accurate vehicle locations to the terminal control center. Alternatively, GPS units may be installed on vehicles to provide location updates. In the event of emergency, many buses are also equipped with an emergency alert button that, when depressed, sends a silent distress call to bus operations and/or directly to the police. In situations where the driver does not want to alert a potential assailant of the police notification, an emergency alert button is often the only means by which a call for help can be placed. Countermeasures for Data Communications and Telemetry Systems • Mobile Data Terminals (MDTs) with DVRs. MDTs on-board conveyances are essential for communications and information capture. They can support internal storage of information as well as GPS units, automatic vehicle locators, live video and audio, alarms, and transmis- sion of data from vehicles to control centers. • Vehicle Locator Systems (AVLs) and Global Positioning System (GPS). GPS positional infor- mation is provided at regular timed intervals. Newer AVLs provide “real” time information and can also go back in time to see where the vehicle came from. Data are normally transmit- ted via cellular network connectivity. More advanced systems will use satellite connections. • Tracking and Monitoring Global Positioning System (GPS). This measure includes a central- ized graphical map tracking all fleet activity. Alerts and notifications can be configured for automatic e-mail or via text messages to designated personnel as needed. • Vehicle Disabling. On-board computer devices can be interfaced with the vehicle’s ignition and electronic control module to accomplish controlled remote shut down of the vehicle. • Anti-Theft—Secure Driver Sign On. A secured startup mode can be enabled that will require a unique driver ID number to be entered into a driver display device before the vehicle can even be started. • Anti-Theft—Enroute. “Idling security” can be configured so that whenever the parking brake has been engaged the driver must re-enter his unique driver ID number. If that ID is not entered once the vehicle begins moving, the system can be shut down. • Electronic Distress Signs. This measure includes emergency “Call Police” signs observable from the exterior of the vehicle. Interfacing can be accomplished with messaging signs on the vehicle (typically the “head sign”) but requires adherence to specific sign manufacturer specifications. Category 5: Surveillance and Observation Systems Surveillance systems are generally designed to attain complete or nearly complete coverage of identified space in a defined area using CCTV. Digital video surveillance is an appliance that enables embedded image capture capabilities that allows video images or extracted information to be compressed, stored, or transmitted over communication networks or digital data link. Transit agencies are moving away from older analog surveillance systems and methods that are capable solely of recording information for later after-the-fact review. Federal grants all stipulate that systems must support real-time incident capture thereby providing public safety responders with actionable information. Countermeasures for Surveillance and Observation Systems • Visible Surveillance Systems—Cameras in Plain Sight. Readily evident CCTV creates a con- cern for offenders that they would be providing evidence that will lead to their apprehension. “Caught on camera” can have a tremendous deterrent impact. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

40 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operator: Research Overview • Bus Stop Lighting. Good lighting can create a perception of security and allow operators to scan for trouble prior to stopping the conveyance. • Video Surveillance Using On-board Computer/DVR. This measure employs event recording of incidents for later download. It does not include live or incident-based monitoring. Category 6: Driver Protection Systems Driver Protection Systems are physical (engineering) controls that are aimed at making it dif- ficult or impossible for an attacker to inflict harm on an operator and are incorporated into the design of the bus or added later as an upgrade. Countermeasures for Driver Protection Systems • Physical Barriers/Compartment Barriers or Shielding, Full or Partial. Bus driver barriers can be installed on existing mass transit bus fleets or can be built to satisfy the specific original equipment manufacturer requirement on new mass transit buses. • On-Board Vehicle Fire Suppression Equipment. This is used in events involving fire and mandated in most system safety plans. Suppression equipment may mitigate or control the impact of an event in progress. • Driver-Side Exit Doors. Exit doors can facilitate a means of escape for an operator who is being assaulted. • Public Address System and Signage. Signage may educate passengers and the public about safe actions they can take and advise would-be criminals of the presence of security. Noted signage would cover the code of conduct stipulations. Public address systems can prevent actions from progressing and assist with passenger control issues during an incident. • Defensive Weapons. This countermeasure includes operator issued defensive weapons such as pepper spray. It requires policy and procedure promulgation as well as defensive tactics training. Liability issues may be predominant. • DNA Swipe Kits. These kits are used to collect evidence of a crime, especially assaults like spit- ting on an operator. Several large urban transit providers are deploying swipe kits to collect evidence for such incidents. Category 7: Training Training, for purposes of this report, is an organized activity aimed at imparting information and/or instructions to improve performance or to help attain a required level of knowledge or skill. Giving workers the training they need will help them handle many situations when they arise. This will improve performance by giving the operator confidence after learning a new method of providing a service. Countermeasures for Training • Driver/Operator Handbook. This is a manual that helps operators understand agency safety and security related policy, rules, and procedures. • Driver/Operator Security Awareness. Employees may be trained to monitor and observe people, events, activities, and items and take careful note of irregular or suspicious behavior. This also includes training on how to report their observations. • Driver/Operator Security. This is conflict mitigation, self-defense, or assault prevention training. Training may be provided to all operators about de-escalation processes and man- agement of hostile passengers. • Driver/Operator Security Communication. Training should cover the use of radios, incident codes, phones, overt communication tactics, and alarm buttons. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Countermeasures 41 • Drills, Exercises, and Immediate Actions. This includes training using tabletops and full-scale exercises with first responders on how to respond to and mitigate on-board vehicle violent incidents. • Driver/Operator Self-Defense. Agency sponsored self-defense training provides operators with hands-on instruction in how to defend themselves from aggressive attacks. Examples of Countermeasure Deployment Strategies Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority When the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LA Metro) observed a 35% increase in bus operator assaults from 2012 to 2014, it began a multipronged and comprehen- sive effort to counter the problem. Broadly, LA Metro’s efforts were categorized in areas that it termed the “Three Es”—engineering, education, and enforcement. • Engineering relates to the physical features of the bus, including on-board technology. LA Metro retrofitted their buses with a steel and polycarbonate barrier enclosing the bus operator. The barrier could be closed or left open at the operator’s discretion. • LA Metro utilizes CCTVs with live monitors on board, which display the feeds from the CCTVs. One monitor is positioned above the operator’s head such that boarding passengers could see themselves and the other reflects a view of the passenger seating area. These moni- tors build off of the belief that making potential criminals aware that they are under surveil- lance has a deterrent effect as well as aiding in the apprehension and prosecution of assailants. • A significant portion of bus operator assaults arise from disputes over fare collection. LA Metro is attempting to obviate those disputes through the use of automated fare announcements that passengers hear when boarding an LA Metro bus. • The education component of LA Metro’s efforts centered around training bus operators on the best methods for diffusing rather than escalating confrontations with passengers. The agency currently employs a program for this type of training through the use of a curriculum from Transit Ambassador, a transit-focused customer service product from the Canadian Urban Transit Association. LA Metro is still working to determine whether this program had a significant impact on operator assault rates. • The enforcement aspect of LA Metro’s program emphasizes efforts to work with legislators to increase criminal penalties for assaulting a bus operator. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) is an example of an agency that has made significant gains in reducing the number of bus operator assaults in their system using several different classes of countermeasures. Assaults on SEPTA bus operators dropped by nearly 60% between 2011 and 2015. The agency attributes its success to improved surveil- lance, public awareness campaigns related to surveillance and enforcement, and new training programs. • SEPTA’s police officers use incident data to inform where they will be performing the approx- imately 7,000 vehicle checks they execute each month. • On-board cameras are indispensable in the prosecution of bus operator assault cases, which SEPTA police follow closely. The agency also believes that publicizing the presence of on-board cameras helps to enhance their deterrent effect, a tactic that SEPTA has employed through signage. • The agency employed a signage campaign to bring awareness to the crime of operator assault and the severity of punishment. The signs include a quote from the Philadelphia District Attor- ney indicating that these types of assaults will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

42 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operator: Research Overview • SEPTA provides operators with situational training for many types of customer interactions, including the diffusion of confrontational situations. Hampton Roads Transit Hampton Roads Transit (HRT), a smaller system in Virginia, has also begun to make efforts to address operator assaults. • The agency first attempted unsuccessfully to lobby the state’s general assembly to mandate jail time for individuals convicted of assaulting an HRT operator. Despite this setback, HRT has been able to get all state representatives from the areas that HRT serves to sign a letter to prosecutors in those areas encouraging robust prosecutions and systematic cooperation between prosecutors and HRT. • The agency has begun to employ partitions in some of its newest buses. Additionally, HRT has installed both cameras and video screens in most of its bus fleet to record passengers as they enter. Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County The Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County in Houston has been looking at ways to reduce what it sees as an unacceptable number of bus operator assaults, with incidents rising 73% between 2014 and 2015. • The agency introduced a code of conduct for riders in November of 2015, after which transit police officers began issuing citations. • Like other transit agencies, the Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County plans to implement training to help bus operators learn how to best avoid escalating conflicts with passengers. Kansas City Area Transportation Authority In January of 2016, the Kansas City Area Transportation Authority (ATA) began efforts to reduce the incidence of bus operator assaults in their system. • The agency assigned full-time officers to ride city buses in an attempt to improve safety for both operators and passengers. • ATA has begun employing protective partitions for bus operators, which it describes as a “plexiglass door.” The agency states that most of the assaults involve spitting or throwing of objects. • ATA also announced plans to send all of its drivers to an assault prevention program devel- oped by Rutgers University’s National Transit Institute, which emphasizes methods for diffusing situations before they become violent. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.