Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview (2018)

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43 The operator assault risk management toolbox was developed to support transit agencies in their efforts to prevent, mitigate, and respond to assaults against operators. The toolbox consists of a series of customizable templates for systematically evaluating and analyzing assault risks, situational factors, technologies, agency efforts, and current countermeasures that assist transit agencies in identifying gaps and improvements that would provide the largest benefits to the agency. The toolbox contains • The vulnerability self-assessment tool that allows an agency to assess the specific strengths and weaknesses of its operator assault posture, • The route-based risk calculator that produces scores identifying assault risks across the system that is also usable to evaluate risk on a route-based level, • The route comparison summary table which brings together vulnerability and risk informa- tion in an easy-to-interpret format, and • Detailed step-by-step examples of usage of the tools in the toolbox (see Volume 2: User Guide). Figure 8 provides an overview of the tools developed in this research project, highlighting their benefits and their relationships with each other and with the countermeasures catalog. The following sections provide details on the toolbox. Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool The vulnerability self-assessment tool allows an agency to assess the strength of its operator assault approach and the agency’s unique vulnerabilities systemwide based on specific details of each of the countermeasures currently in use. Through the use of a self-assessment question- naire, the tool provides straightforward, easy-to-interpret scores which demonstrate vulner- abilities and opportunities for improvement. A transit agency can use these scores, along with information about specific countermeasures, to eliminate vulnerabilities in a systematic and organized manner. Outputs from the analysis can provide guidance on the security measures that an agency should consider for preventing or mitigating incidents of assault. The following steps describe how to use the vulnerability self-assessment tool by using an excerpt from the questionnaire (Figure 9). The complete vulnerability self-assessment tool is found in Appendix D. STEP 1. Each countermeasure is followed by one or more questions worth between 0.5 and 5 points; the maximum number of points available for each countermeasure is 5 points. For each question, enter the allotted number of points in the “score” column if the answer to a question is “yes.” If the answer is “no,” award 0 points. Questions included in Category 1: Policies, Plans, and Protocols are shown in Figure 9. C H A P T E R 6 Operator Assault Risk Management Toolbox Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE Category 1: Policies, Plans, and Protocols Countermeasure Questions Points Available Score Fare Collection Policies Does your agency have a fare collection policy to reduce potential for conflict over payment? 3 Do employees receive training and routine refresher information regarding their responsibilities within the policy? 1 Is the policy strictly enforced (except when enforcing the policy would expose the employee to significant risk)? 1 Total Communication Protocol for Violent Incidents (Incident Command System) Does your agency have a communication protocol for violent incidents? 3 Does the protocol incorporate outside emergency responders and like agencies? 0.5 Are employees trained to their responsibilities within the protocol? 0.5 Has the protocol been tested in an exercise/drill or a live incident within the past 3 years? 0.5 Has an after-action report/improvement plan been developed and implemented based on the results of the exercise/drill or incident? 0.5 Total Operator Assaults Zero Tolerance Workplace Violence Policy Coverage Does your agency have a Zero Tolerance Workplace Violence Policy? 3 Are employees required to sign off on receipt of the policy? 1 Is the policy endorsed by upper management? 0.5 Is the policy enforced? 0.5 Total Figure 9. Excerpt from the self-assessment questionnaire. Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool Route-Based Risk Calculator Countermeasures Catalog Figure 8. Overview of project tools. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Operator Assault Risk Management Toolbox 45 STEP 2. Once each of the questions have been answered, add the point values recorded in the “score” column to produce a total score for each countermeasure. Total scores for each of the countermeasures will range from 0 to 5. STEP 3. After generating a total score for each countermeasure in the vulnerability self- assessment tool, transfer the countermeasure score to the vulnerability self-assessment final scores matrix (Figure 10), also found in Appendix C. Next, multiply each countermeasure score by the countermeasure ranking (from Appendix B) to produce the transit agency’s counter- measure score. This step will empower transit agencies to act on the results of the vulnerability self-assessment score by evaluating overall performance, strengths, and potential areas for improvement in incorporating assault countermeasures. Countermeasure scores can be understood through two basic measures: the total number of countermeasures in use and the average countermeasure score for countermeasures in use. Countermeasure Self Assessment Score x Countermeasure Ranking = Your Countermeasure Score Maximum Possible Score - Your Countermeasure Score = Remaining Points Available Fare Collection Policies x 2 = 10 = Communication Protocol for Violent Incidents x 1.9 = 9.5 - = Operator Assaults Zero Tolerance Workplace Violence Policy Coverage x 1.9 = 9.5 - = Operator Assault Committees/Task Forces x 1.8 = 9 - = Post Incident Action Steps x 1.8 = 9 - = Passenger Code of Conduct x 1.7 = 8.5 - = Violent Incident Emergency Response Plan x 1.7 = 8.5 - = Intelligence Information Sharing Cooperation x 1.6 = 8 - = Assault Legislation x 1.3 = 6.5 - = Passenger Awareness Programs x 1.2 = 6 - = Barring Systems x 1.2 = 6 - = Passenger Screening x 1 = 5 - = Staffing On Board Conveyance x 1.4 = 7 - = Shadowing Vehicles x 1.1 = 5.5 - = Centralized On-Board Alarms, Panic Buttons with x 1 = 5 - = Centralized Surveillance with Immediate Force x 1 = 5 - = Centralized Remote Sensors with Immediate Force x 1 = 5 - = Two way Radio x 1.8 = 9 - = Cellular Telephone - Texting – Email x 1.5 = 7.5 - = Two-way Radio using 3G/4G/LTE/ Satellite Mobile x 1.4 = 7 - = Real-Time Audio x 1.2 = 6 - = Tracking and Monitoring Global Positioning System x 1.6 = 8 - = Vehicle Disabling x 1.6 = 8 - = Anti-Theft – Secure Driver Sign On x 1.6 = 8 - = Anti-Theft –Enroute x 1.6 = 8 - = Mobile Data Terminals (MDT) w/DVRs x 1.4 = 7 - = Electronic Distress Signs x 1.4 = 7 - = Vehicle Locator Systems (AVLs) - Global Positioning x 1.3 = 6.5 - = Visible Surveillance Systems - Cameras in Plain Sight x 1.4 = 7 - = Bus Stop Lighting x 1.2 = 6 - = Video Surveillance Using On-Board Computer/DVR x 1.2 = 6 - = Physical Barriers/Compartment Barriers or Shielding - Full or Partial x 1.5 = 7.5 - = Public Address System and Signage x 1.5 = 7.5 - = Defensive Weapons x 1.4 = 7 - = DNA Swipe Kits x 1.4 = 7 - = Driver- Side Exit Doors x 1.3 = 6.5 - = Driver/Operator Handbook x 2 = 10 - = Driver Operator Security Awareness x 2 = 10 - = Driver Operator Security x 1.5 = 7.5 - = Driver Operator Security Communication x 1.4 = 7 - = Drills, Exercises & Immediate Actions x 1.2 = 6 - = Driver-Operator Self Defense x 1.2 = 6 - = Calculating Your Score Improving Your Score Figure 10. Vulnerability self-assessment final scores matrix. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

46 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators: Research Overview A robust and balanced approach to operator assault risk depends on a combination of these two factors. Transit agencies that deploy a large number of countermeasures are generally more capable of addressing risk than transit agencies that deploy a small number of countermeasures. Likewise, transit agencies that deploy a comprehensive range of countermeasures which incor- porate training, strict enforcement, drills, after-action reviews, and routine updates are more prepared to address assault risk. It should be kept in mind that individual countermeasures may be more costly, labor intensive, or difficult to use than others, which does impact their maximum possible score. These factors, while largely beyond agency control, are captured in the evaluation system. Deployment of low-cost, easy-to-implement countermeasures may con- tribute to a higher average countermeasure score. Route-Based Risk Calculator The route-based risk calculator (Table 9) allows an agency to compare operator assault risks between routes. For each route, the risk of driver assault can be calculated based upon the risk factors along that route, in conjunction with the system factors. The route-based risk calculator provides transit owners and operators with a structured and viable risk management capability that can perform both “what if” and “trade-off” decision-making. The route-based risk calculator includes pre-defined and pre-weighted operator assault spe- cific risk factors in an easy-to-use look-up table that makes it possible to develop sound risk estimates on a route basis. In addition to these factors, there is another characteristic common to all transit systems— terminals. Each route has an origination terminal and a termination terminal. However, the specific characteristics of those terminals will likely be different for each route although, in some instances, several routes may share terminals. Terminals are land uses surrounded by other land uses. Thus each terminal has a unique combination of risk factors. For large transit systems with multimodal operations (e.g., light rail, buses, heavy rail), it is also necessary to characterize transfer stations along the route. Similar to terminals, transfer stations are land uses surrounded by other land uses, with unique combinations of risk. The route-based risk RISK FACTOR FACTOR CHARACTERISTICS RISK FACTOR SCORE SYSTEM FACTORS REGION South, Midwest, West, Northeast POPULATION DENSITY Metropolitan area, cities, Nonmetropolitan areas ROUTE FACTORS INCIDENT HISTORY Aggravated and simple assault rates, previous driver incidents NUMBER OF BARS/CRIME PRONE SPOTS Bars, sports venues, gang territories, juvenile crime areas KNOWN THREATS OPERATION FACTORS HOURS OF OPERATION Graveyard, morning/mid-day, school dismissal times, peak traffic, evenings TERMINALS ��� TRANSFER STATIONS TOTAL ROUTE RISK SCORE Table 9. Route-based risk calculator. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Operator Assault Risk Management Toolbox 47 calculator provides a simple framework to prepare risk factor ranks for terminals and transfer stations on each route. How to Use the Route-Comparison Summary Table The route-based risk calculator includes a route comparison summary table that can assist the transit agency in making decisions regarding resource deployment across all sectors with the company providing a means to determine which routes within its system have the greatest risk of bus driver assault. Routes within a system may be compared so that a transit agency can iden- tify routes that may require more immediate attention with regard to implementing counter- measures and those that may be addressed at a later stage. With the route comparison summary table, transit agency staff and decisionmakers can view the risk rate of operator assault by route and type of assault and then use these comparisons for determining which routes should receive what kinds of measures to result in the greatest reduction of assaults with the most efficient and effective implementation of those countermeasures (see Figure 11). The following sections describe in more detail how to use the route-based risk calculator and the rationale behind the risk factors used in the tool. An in-depth discussion of the methodology behind the route-based risk calculator is found in Appendices F, G, and H. How to Use the Route-Based Risk Calculator These steps describe how to use the route-based risk calculator by using data from the look-up table, Table 4. The following section provides information on the derivation of the risk factors and risk factor ranks used in the route-based risk calculator, along with excerpts from Table 4. Step 1: System Factors Enter the system factor risk rank found in Table 4 based on the location of the transit agency and the population density of the region. It is assumed that the transit system using the route- based risk calculator is situated in the South of the United States and within a population density designated as cities. In the region row, enter a value of 5, corresponding to the risk factor rank for the South. In the population density row, enter a value of 3, corresponding to the risk factor rank for cities. System Factor Region and Population Density Risk Factor Rank South • Metropolitan areas • Cities • Nonmetropolitan areas 5 5 3 1 Midwest • Metropolitan areas • Cities • Nonmetropolitan areas 2 3 2 1 West • Metropolitan areas • Cities • Nonmetropolitan areas 3 3 6 2 Northeast • Metropolitan areas • Cities • Nonmetropolitan areas 2 3 5 3 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

48 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators: Research Overview Figure 11. Route-comparison summary table. ROUTE-COMPARISON SUMMARY TABLE—PART A ROUTES REGION SELECT RISK FACTOR RANK FROM LOOK-UP SELECT RISK FACTOR RANK FROM LOOK-UP TABLE (ENTER SAME VALUE FOR ALL ROUTES) TABLE (ENTER SAME VALUE FOR ALL ROUTES) POPULATION DENSITY ROUTE INCIDENT FREQUENCY RANK ROUTE RISK SCORE— PART A AGG ASLT SIMP ASLT MIN INC THR SIMP TO AGG MIN TO SIMP REP AGG REP SIMP REP MIN REP THR THR AGG THR SIMP THR MIN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 .. .. .. n ROUTE-COMPARISON SUMMARY TABLE—PART B ROUTES ROUTE FACTOR OPERATION FACTORS ROUTE RISK SCORE— PART B TOTAL ROUTE RISK SCORE— A + B BARS, NIGHTCLUBS, AND ENTERTAINMENT HIGH INCIDENT VENUES— TAVERNS, BARS, NIGHTCLUBS, AND SPORTS BARS/STADIUMS HIGH INCIDENT GANG AREAS HIGH JUVENILE CRIME AREAS KNOWN THREATS TERMINALS AND TRANSFER STATIONS HOURS OF OPERATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 .. .. .. n SELECT RISK FACTOR RANK FROM LOOK-UP TABLE SELECT RISK FACTOR RANK FROM LOOK-UP TABLE SELECT RISK FACTOR RANK FROM LOOK-UP TABLE Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Operator Assault Risk Management Toolbox 49 Step 2: Route Factors Enter the route factors risk rank from Table 4 for each route factor. For example, for the inci- dent history factor, it is assumed that the transit system using the route-based risk calculator has two routes. For Route 1, the aggravated driver assault rate is less than 1 assault per 60 months and for Route 2, the aggravated driver assault rate is equal to 1 assault per 18 months. For Route 1, if the aggravated driver assault rate is less than 1 assault per 60 months, the risk factor rank is 1. For Route 2, with an aggravated driver assault rate equal to 1 assault per 18 months, the risk factor rank is 6. These values would be entered in the appropriate cells for incident history of the route. Continue for each of the remaining route factors—number of bars/crime prone spots and known threats—until all the appropriate cells have been completed for all the routes being assessed. Route Factor Incident History Factor Risk Factor Rank <1 Aggravated Driver Assault/60 Months 1 1 Aggravated Driver Assault/60 Months 2 1 Aggravated Driver Assault/48 Months 3 1 Aggravated Driver Assault/36 Months 4 1 Aggravated Driver Assault/24 Months 5 1 Aggravated Driver Assault/18 Months 6 1 Aggravated Driver Assault/12 Months 7 Step 3: Operation Factors Enter the operation factors risk rank from Table 4 for the operation factors. It is assumed that Route 1 operates during morning and early afternoon hours and Route 2 operates during evening hours. Route 1 would have a value of 2 (Morning to Midday—5:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.) and Route 2 would have a value of 5 (Evening/Late Night/Early Mornings—7:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m.). Operation Factor Hours of Operation Risk Factor Rank Graveyard Shift—2:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m. 1 Morning to Midday—5:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. 2 School Dismissal Hours—2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. 3 Peak PM Traffic Period—4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. 4 Evening/Late Night/Early Mornings—7:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. 5 Figure 12 illustrates the completed route-based risk calculator for these two hypothetical routes. Step 4: Terminal/Transfer Stations Calculate the terminal and transfer station risks scores for each route, if applicable. It is assumed that both routes in this system have one common origination/destination and three distinct destination/turn-around terminals. In this example, transfer stations are not factored, although, such calculations would simply need to be added to the total route risk score if trans- fer stations were added. There are essentially two calculations that must be done to derive the risk ranks for termi- nals. Derive the rank for each terminal on a route (i.e., Terminal A and B) then sum those ranks to derive the terminal risk ranks which are to be used in the route-based risk calculator (Table 10). Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

50 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators: Research Overview RISK FACTOR ROUTE 1 ROUTE 2 ROUTE CHARACTERISTICS RISK FACTOR RANK ROUTE CHARACTERISTICS RISK FACTOR RANK REGION South 5 South 5 POPULATION DENSITY City 3 City 3 INCIDENT HISTORY <1 Simple Driver/Passenger Assault/60 months 1 1 Aggravated Driver/Passenger Assault/18 Months 6 N����� OF BARS/CRIME PRONE SPOTS 1/block 1 2/block 2 KNOWN THREAT One Known Threat of Aggravated Assault 1 Three Known Threats of Aggravated Assault 3 HOURS OF OPERATION Morning to Midday 5:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. 2 Evening/Late Night/Early Mornings 7:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. 5 TERMINALS AND TRANSFER STATIONS ROUTE 1 RISK SCORE 13 ROUTE 2 RISK SCORE 24 Figure 12. Completed route-based risk calculator. TERMINAL RISK RANK RISK FACTOR TERMINAL A ROUTE TERMINAL CHARACTERISTICS RISK FACTOR RANK REGION POPULATION DENSITY INCIDENT HISTORY NUMBER OF BARS/CRIME PRONE SPOTS KNOWN THREAT HOURS OF OPERATION TERMINAL A RISK SCORE RISK FACTOR TERMINAL B ROUTE TERMINAL CHARACTERISTICS RISK FACTOR RANK REGION POPULATION DENSITY INCIDENT HISTORY NUMBER OF BARS/CRIME PRONE SPOTS KNOWN THREAT HOURS OF OPERATION TERMINAL B RISK SCORE Total Route Terminal Risk Score = A + B Table 10. Terminal risk ranks. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Operator Assault Risk Management Toolbox 51 Step 4A: Determine terminal/transfer station risk factors. Use the centroid of the terminal to create a one-block radius from the terminal (if agency operates in an area where it is more appro- priate for the radius around a terminal to be time-based, then make the radius a 5-minute walk from the terminal in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas and a 10-minute walk in cities) to select the appropriate risk factor rank (incident history, number of bars, etc.) from the look-up table, Table 4. As with the route, the region and population density ranks are constant for all termi- nals in the system. In some large metropolitan areas, the appropriate radius around the terminal may need to be two blocks or more, depending upon the character of the surrounding area. Again, if the radius selected is greater than one block (5 or 10 minutes), the risk factor rank entered is driven by the appropriate rank found for that particular factor. It is assumed that both the routes have one common origination/destination (with a high risk rank of 7 based on Table 4) and two distinct destination/turn-around terminals (Route 1 has a low risk rank of 1 and Route 2 has high risk rank of 7). In these examples, transfer stations are not considered, although, if they were then additional calculations would simply be added to the total route risk score if transfer stations were added. Step 4B: Sum terminal/transfer stations risk rankings. Each terminal or transfer station risk scores (e.g., Terminal A and B) is summed to determine total route terminal/transfer sta- tion risk score to be used in the route-based risk calculator. For Route 1, the total is 7+1 or 8; for Route 2 the total is 7 + 7 or 14. Step 5: Route-Comparison Summary Table For every route in the entire system, a route risk score would be derived and the scores for each route would be entered into a route comparison summary table (see Tables 11 and 12). The summary table will assist the transit agency in making decisions regarding resource deployment across all sectors with the company. The transit agency staff and decision makers can view the risk rate of operator assault by route and type of assault and then use these comparisons for determining which routes should receive what kinds of measures to result in the greatest reduction of assaults with the most efficient and effective implementation of those countermeasures. Pilot Test Results The research team planned an in-depth pilot test of the actual tools developed as part of the project to identify any usability issues. To assist in obtaining transit agency participation in the pilot test effort, the research team approached the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, and Transportation Workers (SMART) Transportation Division (formerly known as the United Transportation Union or UTU) in late November. The research team members went to the SMART’s Cleveland Headquarters and met with their training staff and then subsequently with regional leadership. SMART Transportation Division was very interested in the results of this research project and agreed to help the research team find a transit agency for the pilot test. With SMART’s assistance, the Charlotte Area Transit System (CATS) agreed to work with the research team. The pilot test with CATS (pilot agency) was conducted in two parts. Part 1 consisted of agency wide vulnerability self-assessment and Part 2 consisted of route analysis of three of the agency’s routes. Following are summary descriptions of how the pilot tests of the two parts were conducted and the lessons learned by the pilot agency and the research team. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

19This table can be reproduced to cover as many routes in a transit agency’s system as denoted by n in the last row. Table 11. Route-comparison summary table, Part A. ROUTE-COMPARISON SUMMARY TABLE—PART A19 ROUTES ROUTE INCIDENT FREQUENCY ROUTE RISK SCORE — PART A AGG ASLT SIMP ASLT MIN INC THR SIMP TO AGG MIN TO SIMP REP AGG REP SIMP REP MIN REP THR THR AGG THR SIMP THR MIN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 .. .. .. n REGION SELECT RISK FACTOR RANK FROM LOOK-UP TABLE (ENTER SAME VALUE FOR ALL ROUTES) POPULATION DENSITY SELECT RISK FACTOR RANK FROM LOOK-UP TABLE (ENTER SAME VALUE FOR ALL ROUTES) SELECT RISK FACTOR RANK FROM LOOK-UP TABLE T ools and S trategies for E lim inating A ssaults A gainst T ransit O perators, V olum e 1: R esearch O verview C opyright N ational A cadem y of S ciences. A ll rights reserved.

ROUTE-COMPARISON SUMMARY TABLE—PART B20 ROUTES ROUTE FACTOR SELECT RISK FACTOR RANK FROM LOOK-UP TABLE ROUTE RISK SCORE— PART B TOTAL ROUTE RISK SCORE— A + B BARS, NIGHTCLUBS, ENTERTAINMENT HIGH INCIDENT VENUES – TAVERNS, BARS, NIGHTCLUBS, AND SPORTS BARS/STADIUMS HIGH INCIDENT GANG AREAS HIGH JUVENILE CRIME AREAS KNOWN THREATS TERMINALS AND TRANSFER STATIONS HOURS OF OPERATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 .. .. .. n OPERATION FACTORS SELECT RISK FACTOR RANK FROM LOOK-UP TABLE Table 12. Route-comparison summary table, Part B. 20This table can be reproduced to cover as many routes in a transit agency’s system as denoted by n in the last row. T ools and S trategies for E lim inating A ssaults A gainst T ransit O perators, V olum e 1: R esearch O verview C opyright N ational A cadem y of S ciences. A ll rights reserved.

54 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators: Research Overview Pilot Test: Part 1 Part 1 was about the vulnerability self-assessment tool and consisted of three steps. 1. Broad-brush overview and review of the tool by the pilot agency, 2. Implementation and use of the tool by the pilot agency, and 3. Review of the completed pilot agency vulnerability self-assessment. The vulnerability self-assessment tool was provided to the pilot agency for an initial review. Following completion of the initial review, the pilot agency team, consisting of the general man- ager and chief operating officer, the pilot agency security team, the local police department, and the Sheriff’s Department participated in a 90-minute conference call with the research team in December to ask questions, provide feedback on their respective overview of the tool, and agree on the next steps in the pilot test. The results of the broad-brush overview were: • Consensus among the team members that the vulnerability self-assessment tool would pro- vide the pilot agency with a good measure of where it stood on countermeasure deployment on the seven dimensions covered in the vulnerability self-assessment tool: – Category 1: Policies, Plans, and Protocols – Category 2: Police or Security Staffing – Category 3: Voice Communications Technology – Category 4: Data Communications and Telemetry Systems – Category 5: Surveillance and Observation Systems – Category 6: Driver Protection Systems – Category 7: Training • Wording changes were suggested by the pilot agency team to improve understanding of some of the items in the vulnerability self-assessment protocol. • The pilot agency did not believe it would be a difficult task to complete the vulnerability self- assessment tool questionnaire. Following the conference call, the pilot agency conducted a full assessment of its deployment of the seven countermeasures. This included rating the pilot agency on each item within each countermeasure category for vulnerability. After completing this task, the pilot agency com- pleted the vulnerability self-assessment final scores matrix and then submitted the completed forms to the research team. The research team evaluated the efficacy of the response and pro- vided the pilot agency with its assessment of the strengths and opportunities for improvement in vulnerability self-assessment and countermeasure deployment. The research team reviewed the pilot agency’s completed documents and provided the pilot agency with its recommendations and observations for the pilot agency’s use going forward. In addition, the research team reviewed the pilot agency’s responses in terms of how well the instru- ments captured the pilot agency’s performance and allowed meaningful insights to be drawn regarding how the pilot agency was addressing the vulnerabilities identified. With regard to recommendations forwarded to the pilot agency, the research team made obser- vations and recommendations regarding all seven categories addressed in the vulnerability self- assessment tool. It should be noted that the pilot agency was attuned to these issues and a high performing agency in the arena of addressing driver assaults. The pilot agency had a team of professionals from both within the pilot agency as well as the relevant law enforcement agencies within its service area that met regularly to discuss bus transit safety issues, and thus the research team expected that it would perform well across many of the vulnerability self-assessment Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Operator Assault Risk Management Toolbox 55 dimensions. However, the information in the completed document identified several areas that could be improved in the pilot agency’s approach. One of the outcomes of this analysis was the clear identification of the necessity to make trade- offs between capital and operating expenses. These are non-trivial decisions that agencies face. This analysis highlighted those areas clearly for the pilot agency. It is well beyond the scope of this project to assist the pilot agency in addressing such trade-offs but, perhaps, this analysis can help clarify for the pilot agency how it should consider these trade-offs going forward. In terms of the research team’s assessment of the efficacy of the instruments to capture how an agency is performing and pointing to opportunities for improvement, the feedback and data from the pilot agency indicate the tool does capture relevant information and there is enough granularity in the data to distinguish how well an agency is performing in the arena of addressing driver assault vulnerabilities. The research team believes there are areas where further instru- mental granularity could be developed that take the various subparts of the current tool and drill into them further should an agency wish to explore those areas further. Investigating those areas and developing a more detailed tool is outside the scope of this project. However, they are certainly areas worth exploring in future research efforts. Related to these observations, the research team suggested that the area of trade-off analyses between capital and operating expenses, risks, costs, and benefits of addressing driver assault risk versus other agency priorities is a fruitful area for further research and begins to get into the issue of agency wide enterprise risk management. Enterprise risk management is well beyond the scope of this project but the information derived from having completed the vulnerability self-assessment tool and the route-based risk calculator can provide support for cost-benefit decisionmaking in the enterprise risk management context. At the very minimum, the results of the pilot test demonstrate that these sorts of rigorous analytical tools can help transit agencies improve their resource allocations between capital, operating, and other expenses to improve their effectiveness in not only driver and passenger safety but also the overall operation of the agency. Pilot Test: Part 2 Part 2 was about the route-based versus systemwide risks and countermeasures and consisted of four steps. 1. Broad-brush overview and review of the tools by the pilot agency, 2. Research team members on-site visit and detailed discussions, 3. Implementation and use of the tools by the pilot agency, and 4. Review of the completed pilot agency route-based risk calculator and route comparison sum- mary table. The route-based risk calculator and the route comparison summary table were provided to the pilot agency for an initial review. Following completion of the initial review, the pilot agency team—consisting of the assistant general manager and director of operations, the pilot agency security team, the local police department, and the Sheriff’s Department—participated in a conference call with the research team to ask questions, provide feedback on their respec- tive overview of the tools, and agree on the next steps in the pilot test. The results of the broad-brush overview were: • There were wording changes suggested by the pilot agency team to improve understanding of some of the items in the route-based risk calculator and the route comparison summary table analysis protocol. These changes have been made in the toolbox and in Volume 2: User Guide. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

56 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators: Research Overview • The research team clarified some procedural issues with the pilot agency team. • The pilot agency team would select three routes for pilot testing the tools. Following the conference call, the pilot agency selected three routes for the pilot test that would provide a good evaluation of the tools to distinguish between the perceived route risk levels (basically high, low and medium risk routes). Following the choice of the three routes, the pilot agency proceeded with implementation by gathering the data required to complete the pilot test. Following these initial steps by the pilot agency team, two members of the research team made an on-site visit with the assistant general manager and director of operations, the director of the security team, and a data analyst to go through the protocol in detail, talking through each worksheet and reviewing the pilot agency’s data files and procedures for data col- lection and analysis. The results of the on-site visit were: • Further clarification of some of the terms in the route-based risk calculator and the route comparison summary table (these clarifications have been made in Volume 2: User Guide). • Detailed discussions of future data collection and analysis that can be considered by the pilot agency. • Insights into the pilot agency’s concerns regarding how these data could be used against them in the press, court cases, etc. • Detailed discussions of how the results from these analyses could be used by the pilot agency in decisions regarding countermeasure deployment, investment, and policy and procedures. Following the site visit, based upon the research team’s input, the pilot agency used the Part 2 worksheets, look-up table, etc. to complete the pilot test on the three selected routes. The task took approximately 2 weeks elapsed time because of other work commitments, as well compiling the data necessary for the analyses. The results of this pilot test were: • If an agency has not been routinely collecting the data required for the worksheets and analy- ses or if the data have been collected but not compiled in a manner consistent with what is required to complete the worksheets and analyses, there is additional work required outside of the normal daily flow to do the route risk analysis and the route comparisons. This was not an unexpected result and the pilot agency anticipated it as well. • The pilot agency did not find the additional data collection to be onerous and understood that if it were to adopt these tools, then some data collection and compiling changes would occur. However, once those were in place, there would not be an additional burden from an operations and management perspective. • The pilot agency obtained some insights regarding the countermeasures currently in use and possible directions to go in future decisions in terms of additional countermeasures, modify- ing existing countermeasures, and deployment. The research team reviewed the completed route-based risk calculator and route comparison summary for the three pilot routes. The research team provided the pilot agency with its recom- mendations and observations for the pilot agency’s use going forward. In addition, the research team reviewed the pilot agency’s responses in terms of how well the instruments captured the pilot agency’s performance and allowed meaningful insights to be drawn regarding how well the pilot agency’s current countermeasure deployment is addressing the risks identified in the instruments. With regard to recommendations forwarded to the pilot agency, the research team made observations and recommendations regarding possible ways to introduce additional Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Operator Assault Risk Management Toolbox 57 countermeasures, particularly in the areas of training and other “soft” interventions. In addition, the research team suggested changes in data collection and analysis practices as well as other pos- sible changes as new buses were added to its fleet and new video technologies and data storage and retrieval capacity became available. However, as noted above, this pilot agency is a high performing agency in the arena of addressing bus driver assaults. The pilot agency was much attuned to the issues and acted aggressively to both address incidents as they arose as well as being pro active regarding community support and searching for improved ways to mitigate the risks of bus driver assaults across its entire system. Thus, the research team expected to find that the route-based risk calculator and the route risk summary would confirm many of the pilot agency’s assumptions regarding risks on the selected routes, which occurred. However, the information in the completed instruments did identify possible risks on the three pilot routes that could be addressed by additional countermeasures and modifications of existing counter measures to address those route-specific risks. Further, as the pilot agency has adopted a systemwide counter- measures deployment strategy/policy, the analyses raised questions about how to address route- specific risks when not all countermeasures are needed systemwide. One of the outcomes of these analyses is the clear identification of the necessity to make trade-offs between capital and operating expenses, and in this case, trade-offs between system- wide decisions and route-specific decisions regarding countermeasure deployment. These are non-trivial decisions that agencies face. What these analyses did was to highlight those areas clearly for the pilot agency. It is well beyond the scope of this project to assist the pilot agency in addressing such trade-offs, but perhaps these analyses can help clarify for the pilot agency how it should consider these trade-offs going forward. These types of issues were discussed during the research team’s site visit. In terms of the research team’s assessment of the efficacy of the instruments to capture route- specific risks, the feedback and data from the pilot agency indicate that the tools do capture relevant information and there is enough granularity in the data to distinguish which routes pose the highest risks for bus driver assaults. Moreover, these data-driven analyses confirmed some of the assumptions held by the pilot agency and, at the same time, illuminated areas not visible to the pilot agency prior to the analyses. The research team believes there are areas for future tool development that relate to automating data collection and analyses. Such auto- mation can lead to timely incident reporting as well as allow drivers to easily note changing conditions along their routes. Automation can also reduce an agency’s time for conducting route-specific analyses. This can increase the likelihood that an agency can identify shifting risk levels along different routes as conditions along those routes change, or as is the case in areas where new development is occurring or redevelopments are occurring, the ability to predict likely risk levels and prepare and deploy appropriate countermeasures prior to when the risks materialize. Automation can also be linked with other data gathering devices, e.g., video feeds, and fed into more sophisticated data analytic tools for merging different data types to develop more refined estimates of route risks, etc. Further, the introduction of social media into the risk mix is an area that warrants further research. Investigating those areas and developing the auto- mated instruments are well outside the scope of this project. However, they are certainly areas worth exploring in future research efforts. Related to these observations, the research team, as previously mentioned, suggests that the area of trade-off analyses between capital and operating expenses, risks, costs, and benefits of addressing bus driver assault risk versus other agency priorities is a fruitful area for further research and begins to get into the issue of agencywide enterprise risk management. These topics are also well beyond the scope of this project, but certainly have manifested themselves clearly in the kinds of recommendations that flowed from the pilot agency completing the pilot tests of vulnerability self-assessment and route-based versus systemwide risks analyses. This project Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

58 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators: Research Overview very clearly raised the issue of these types of trade-offs. At the very minimum, the results of the pilot test demonstrate that these sorts of rigorous analytical tools can help transit agencies improve their resource allocations between capital, operating and other expenses to improve their effectiveness in not only bus driver (and passenger) safety, but also the overall operation of the agency. User Guide Overview The research team developed a user guide, published as TCRP Research Report 193: Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 2: User Guide, to provide transit agencies with concise guidance on how to use the operator assault risk management toolbox—principally the vulnerability self-assessment tool and the route-based risk calculator as well as supportive checklists, guidelines, and methodologies that were developed during the project. The User Guide is designed for use by transit professionals to improve the safety and security of the operators of transit agency revenue service vehicles within existing resource and budgetary constraints. It has been prepared with an understanding that the needs and available resources of these agencies are often very different depending on their size and scope of operations. The introduction provides background information on operator assault and risk management for transit agencies. It also includes an overview of how transit agencies can use the approaches provided in the User Guide to address operator assault. Chapter 1 provides a framework for operator assault risk management with an overview of risk management and risk mitigation strategies. This chapter outlines the key elements of an effective operator assault risk reduction program: the assessment of threats, vulnerabilities and consequences (TVC analysis) in an effort to reduce the number of incidents or mitigate the impacts associated with an assault event. The framework will help transit agencies understand the role of the various components of the operator assault risk management toolbox described in the User Guide. Chapter 2 addresses the operator assault risk management toolbox along with a series of customizable templates for systematically evaluating and analyzing assault risks, situational factors, technologies, agency efforts, and current countermeasures to assist transit agencies in identifying gaps and improvements that would provide the largest benefits and the greatest risk reductions. The toolbox includes the • Vulnerability self-assessment tool that allows an agency to assess the specific strengths and weaknesses of its operator assault posture, • Route-based risk calculator that produces scores identifying assault risks across the system that is also usable to evaluate risk on a route-based level, • Route comparison summary table which brings together vulnerability and risk information in an easy-to-interpret format, and • Detailed step-by-step examples of usage of the tools in the toolbox (see Volume 2: User Guide). Chapter 3 provides a detailed listing of security countermeasures and strategies to combat operator assaults to support the decision-making risk management tools in the toolbox. Chapter 4 outlines an “incident-based” threat assessment response protocol and evaluation process based on effective practices found in transit agencies and literature review. It assists tran- sit agencies in (1) identifying and reporting threats and threatening behavior, (2) conducting Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Operator Assault Risk Management Toolbox 59 the threat assessment of specific incidents, and (3) managing specific threats of violence against individual transit operators. Key elements of the protocol and evaluation process include • Policy and standard operating procedures, • Reporting process and procedures, • Threat assessment and response protocols, and • Follow-up and feedback procedures. Chapter 5 discusses the importance of reporting and tracking incidents as well as threats to provide data for use during hazard identification and the determination of risk control strate- gies. Methods for identifying and collecting data related to employee assaults both for internal risk analysis and for FTA national trend analysis are included. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.