Freight Transportation Resilience in Response to Supply Chain Disruptions (2019)

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82 level. ESF 1: Transportation is an essential function to support many other emergency support functions, including mass care, logistics, communication and public safety. This project would examine the roles of MPOs in emergency management planning. 8. Continue to Promote Freight Fluidity Planning and Data Collection Techniques: A thorough understanding of freight fluidity also helps measure the resiliency of the freight transportation system. Freight fluidity describes how well a supply chain performs in a freight transportation network, measuring supply chain performance across multiple jurisdictions using travel time, travel time reliability and cost. Freight modeling tools can be used to help incorporate freight fluidity elements into a freight resiliency analysis. State and local transportation officials should examine selected supply chains to better understand freight performance and identify freight bottlenecks and congested areas that may require transportation system improvements to enhance freight movement. Since data collection from disparate and often proprietary sources can inhibit freight data collection, collaborating with the private sector to collect data to examine candidate supply chains can bring a greater understanding to freight fluidity planning efforts at the local, regional and national level. 9. Research the Use of State Freight Plan Data to Evaluate Supply Chain Disruptions: State Freight Plans use some type of commodity flow data to evaluate how commodities are transported in and out of the state. Most state use the FHWA FAF data from the National Commodity Flow Survey conducted every five years to develop commodity flows. Some states have purchased TRANSEARCH or other commodity flow data source to evaluate commodity flows. By examining FAF data for selected supply chains, it is possible to predict which transportation modes may be needed if a disruption impacts another mode. For example, a flood event or lock closure on the Mississippi River impacting grain shipments may require a mode shift from barge to rail, as illustrated in Appendix A, Corridor 5: Inland Waterway/Locks Scenario. State DOTs can examine State Freight Plans and identify candidate supply chains for future research. This project would provide a methodology for doing so. 10. Incorporate Resiliency into State Freight Plans: The Fix Americas Surface Transportation (FAST) Act requires State DOTs to consider resiliency as part of State Freight Plans. State DOTs already provide transportation emergency support functions during emergency events, emergency management and security protocols. However, this role continues to expand as states are experiencing more and more disruptive events each year. This has occurred in response to ongoing natural disasters requiring highway detours, evacuation routing and road closures as a result of hurricanes, tornados and other major weather events. State DOTs need to consider how to design more resilient transportation systems and infrastructure to prepare for the growing number of disruptive events. This project would examine how resiliency could be incorporated into State Freight Plans. 11. Develop Vulnerability and Adaptive Capacity Assessments: State DOTs should assess the vulnerability of the freight system, based on the defined natural and man-made hazards. This can include conducting vulnerability assessments on freight infrastructure and on key supply chains as part of the State Hazard Mitigation Plan. A key part of the vulnerability assessment can consist of a determination of adaptive capacity – or how well the system or a supply chain responds to or recovers from a disaster or unplanned event. For example, if key freight elements are impacted by flooding or storm surge along the Gulf Coast, GIS data can be used to evaluate areas of impact, alternate routes, ability to prepare and recover from such an event. GIS- based analysis may include key factors like storm surge, sea level rise, wild fires, and tracking weather events. Where possible, data from local and state initiatives can be used, particularly for extreme weather analyses. Other examples might include an industry’s vulnerability to inadequate workforce, changes in international trade (e.g., tariffs, border delays), and travel time reliability. This study would illustrate the methodology for conducting such an assessment.

83 12. Support for Military Deployments: Using a wide range of the latest cargo handling and communications technologies, the US DOD has developed detailed procedures and protocols for moving men and their supporting equipment and supplies to designated deployment seaports. This includes extensive coordination with, and asset management support from, the nation’s civil governments and commercial sectors, including local, regional, state and federal government agencies involved in both land-based and seaport operations. The incorporation of lessons learned by these agencies from past deployments have provided important pointers for successful future activities and are captured within a variety of reports. This includes the need to pay attention to potential traffic bottlenecks where the interaction of military and civilian traffic could cause costly delays to cargo deliveries, notably at DOD designated seaports during high volume cargo handling seasons. As the nation’s cargo volumes continue to increase, and as new freight handling technologies come on line, future deployments can benefit from continued research into several areas, including:  Intra-and Inter-Agency Communications:  use of the latest communications technologies to ensure continuous real time in-transit visibility of the condition and location of both cargos and cargo handling assets,  exercising inter-agency communications protocols: to ensure that appropriate priority is given to military convoys and their cargos, including early communication of modified asset needs (e.g. extended seaport gate opening hours),  simulation exercises of potential cyber-based as well as physical attacks on deployment assets and infrastructures, including procedures to provide backups to inter-agency communications during loss of primary communication methods.  Deployment Assets Management:  procedures for handling large and heavy non-containerized military equipment during seaport vessel loadings, typically under heavy security, and with coordination of activities by experienced military cargo handlers.  methods from rapidly identifying and responding to the location and status of possible backup assets (e.g. alternative modes or routes) in case of lost asset capacity.  cargo handling procedures in support of force package integrity: procedures to ensure the availability of enough staging areas, trained personnel, loading equipment, and vessels for moving complete military units through the nation’s strategic seaports (thereby greatly reducing the time a unit must spend in assembly upon arrival within theater).  Performance Assessments:  development of standardized land corridor-based as well as seaport-based performance measures that can be used to identify and quantify operational concerns: including assessments of the potential for, and possible remedies to, worst-case (e.g. heavy “sea-lift surge”) conditions during periods of joint military-commercial cargo operations both within and on the routes leading to and from a designated seaport.

84 CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION This research has examined the impacts and institutional roles of those involved when supply chains are disrupted. As noted, the major focus of most of the participants in such efforts is in incident response and emergency management, certainly a key effort. However, the implications of supply chain disruptions as they potentially reverberate throughout the economy cannot be overlooked in such efforts. The key components of the supply chain that were found to contribute to system resiliency included:  Physical Infrastructure – infrastructure that enables the physical movement of goods from origin to destination such as road, rail and pipeline infrastructure; terminals; distribution centers; and warehouses.  Logistical – components of the supply chain that manage and decide logistics arrangements such as network routing, reassigning vehicle/vessel capacity, creating transportation management plans, and risk pooling.  Financial – components such as the capital investment program, potential funding sources, investment decisions for infrastructure improvement, and public private partnerships (PPPs).  Communication / Transactional / Informational – components such as inter-organization or stakeholder communications, exchange of invoices and payments, emergency communications documentation, communication roles and responsibilities, information gathering, employee education, and the like.  Regulatory / Oversight – components such as lobbying, post-event oversight, public policy updates and changes, promoting national programs and policies, and the like.  Institutional – components such as corporate policies, social and political influences, and social capital, which reflects the relationships and institutional structures that establish boundaries for interagency and interpersonal interactions. The following key observations came from the interviews:  There is a clear distinction between “resilience” as part of incident response and “resilience” as part of a broader network or systems performance perspective. Both public agencies and major transportation firms have in place plans and operational strategies for the former….and thus feel like they are fully prepared to handle incidents and recovery efforts. Most of those interviewed have not been engaged in the second, much broader, perspective of “resilience.”  Public agencies focus on disruptions to the transportation systems for which they are responsible. Although they are concerned about how to handle traffic after a disruption, they often do not think about how that disruption is affecting activities outside their jurisdiction such as supply chains. Hence, the resiliency of the freight network during times of disruption typically defaults to the private sector with some localized support from federal, state and local governments in times of need.  Business continuity dictates that companies strategically manage freight movements along their supply chain and invest in strategies to protect their business from risks. From a system resiliency perspective, it is thus important to understand each supply chain stakeholder’s priorities before, during, and after a disruption.  The competitive market environment makes it difficult for public agencies to coordinate and support disaster preparation and recovery actions for freight movements (because of a reluctance to show perceived preference to one industry or firm over another). While the increasing number of natural disasters and other disruptive events has led, in some cases, to enhanced collaboration with the private sector, there are still few examples where this has occurred outside the context of emergency response.

85  The degree to which an organization, whether public or private, is actively engaged in preparing for system disruptions is largely driven by the perceived likelihood of future hazards, their experiences with previous events, and by association the geographic scale of their market. For example, global companies have more exposure to the multitude of disturbances and stresses that impact their activities around the world and have more resources to address resiliency challenges.  At their core, successful resiliency efforts are carried forward by trained and experienced individuals. An important strategy for enhancing organizational capacity for addressing resiliency is to mentor and train employees so they can make decisions at the local level in real-time response to issues that arise during a disruption. For example, several of those interviewed noted that they have faced situations where communications and information exchange was not working after a major disaster and thus centralized command and control for the company response was greatly hindered.  Ensuring infrastructure resilience cannot be accomplished solely by restoring a system to its previous state after a disruption, particularly in circumstances in which essential transportation assets are already vulnerable from lack of maintenance. Interviewees emphasized the importance of redundant infrastructure for critical transportation assets, and if necessary, plan for cargo diversion alternatives that help maintain business continuity.  The freight transportation system is an interdependent network of organizations with different missions, operations and programs, and assets exposed to varying degrees of risks and vulnerabilities. Because the responsibility for improving freight transportation resiliency does not fall to a particular sector or specific agency, all stakeholders must work together collaboratively, which for public agencies means under an umbrella of a regulatory framework and a range of funding programs. The research has provided guidance that can go a long way in preparing supply chain participants to reduce the impacts of disruptions. The challenge will be, given the different motivations and responsibilities of both public agencies and private firms, getting the different groups involved to recognize the important roles that each have in minimizing supply chain disruptions.

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