Freight Transportation Resilience in Response to Supply Chain Disruptions (2019)

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99 Source: USACE Figure A-4: Lock and Dams along the Upper Mississippi River and the Illinois River Figure A-5 shows a cross-section of the Upper Mississippi River, and demonstrates how the lock and dam systems are used to maintain channel depth of nine feet. The USACE is responsible for these locks and dams. Work is underway to repair and upgrade locks and dams because many of them have already surpassed their design life. The USACE publishes lock status reports on their website.18 Scheduled maintenance and failure of locks are forces that can disrupt the supply chain. Disruption Historically, the Mississippi River experiences periods of high water and low water that impact shipping. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) monitors water level conditions at locations all along the river to help local officials, maritime companies and carriers plan for supply chain disruptions. Disruptions on the inland waterway system can have widespread significant economic and societal impacts. For instance, the main lock chamber of Lock 27 on the Mississippi River was closed to navigation traffic for gate repairs between July 26, 2004 and August 10, 2004. The closure resulted in lengthy delays for the carriers.19 In 2011, a historic flood from Tennessee to Louisiana disrupted waterway commerce, delaying barge traffic and forcing some cargo to be trucked. Grain elevators, a crucial link to the nation’s grain exports, were flooded. Early corn and soybean plantings on delta farms were submerged. 18 http://corpslocks.usace.army.mil/lpwb/f?p=121:4:0 19 McLaughlin, T. (2004, August 6). Delay in lock repair forces big backup of barge traffic. St. Louis Post-Dispatch (MO), pp. C02.

100 Source: USACE Figure A-5: Cross Section of Upper Mississippi River Channel Maintained by USACE Low water levels and inadequate channel depths require barges and vessels to be loaded to less than capacity to reduce draft. Inadequate channel widths require that the number of barges in a tow be reduced to match available channel width. One-way or day time only traffic restrictions may also be imposed. These channel restrictions increase the amount of time required to ship grain. In 2012, drought and low water threatened barge operations and created difficulties navigating river sections, particularly in the northern part of the river. Historic draught and excessive heat reduced water levels near Thebes, Illinois, 125 miles south of St. Louis. In response, the USACE used contractors to remove rock formations in certain river sections to help maintain a 9-foot deep channel for navigation. There have been extended periods where low river levels and reduced channel widths impeded grain barge movements and access to shallow draft ports. USACE reports that the UMR-IWW system has over half of the most delayed lock sites in the U.S. inland waterway system. Delays are due to traffic backups caused by congestion as well as closures for operation and maintenance. Problems with the locks are currently creating additional fuel and labor costs to BOs, ultimately increasing transportation costs of grain. A study on the economic impacts of an inland waterway disruption on the transport of corn and soybeans determined that the closure of Lock 25 on the upper Mississippi River could cause a decrease in corn and soybean prices in the regions next to the river of $8.51/metric ton and $16.33 per metric ton respectively, a “reduction of exports of nearly eight million tons, or 13%,” and a “decrease of more than 7,000 jobs, a $1.3 billion loss of labor income, and a reduction of about $2.4 billion of economic activity (total industry output) annually.”20 Several of the lower locks on the Upper Mississippi have been targeted for extension from 600 feet to 1,200 feet to enable larger barge tows top pass through more quickly and reduce the cost of barge transport.21 In addition to the ebb and flow of the Mississippi River and its tributaries and lock closures, other supply chain disruptions include oil spills, damaged bridges, and ice. Earthquakes or terrorist attacks could destroy navigational infrastructure.22 Diversion Alternatives If a segment of waterway infrastructure were out of service, shippers could postpone their deliveries, reroute them to another port or the export port by rail or truck, or find another market (such as ethanol for corn or crushers for soybeans). However, the diversion of grain traffic onto more expensive shipping routes and subsequent lost sales in grain exports could drastically impact the U.S. grain industry. If a supply chain disruption causes shipping costs to increase in the U.S., U.S. grain exports could lose global market share, leaving a surplus of grain in the U.S. market. A surplus would drive prices down significantly, and lower prices of grain would result in a loss in profits by producers. Figure A-6 is a detailed map of the waterway corridor between Illinois and New Orleans including major nodes and links. It also shows the Class I railway corridors between Illinois and New Orleans. The two railroads with the most direct routes are CN and UP. CN railroad connects Illinois with New Orleans east of the Mississippi River, while the UP railroad connects Illinois with New Orleans west of the Mississippi River. 20 Yu, T.E., B.C. English and R.J. Menard. Economic Impacts Analysis of Inland Waterways Disruption on the Transport of Corn and Soybeans. Staff Report #AE16-08. Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Tennessee. September 2016. 21 Lance R. Grenzeback and Andrew T. Lukmann, “Case Study of the Transportation Sector’s Response to and Recovery from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.” 22 Tong, J. (2014). Disruption response support for inland waterway transportation (Doctoral dissertation).

101 Entities Involved in Ensuring Resiliency BCOs: The BCOs, such as Cargill, Bunge, ADM, etc., are responsible for making routing decisions to deliver the cargo to its destination. State DOTs: State DOTs are responsible for preparing statewide freight and rail plans prioritize freight-related infrastructure improvements to the transportation system, which include Ports along the inland waterway system. USACE: USACE is responsible for maintaining the U.S. Inland Waterway System. The agency uses contractors to maintain the locks, dams, levies and other infrastructure vital to the waterway system. USCG: USCG is responsible for inspecting vessels, facilities and maintaining the Inland Waterway navigational system that guides vessels up and down the rivers and lakes. Sometimes the USCG will close river sections if water levels are too low or too high or if navigational aids are damaged or missing. MARAD: MARAD is an agency within the USDOT that oversees the development and maintenance of waterborne transportation, port operations, vessel operations, environment, safety, and the integration of the waterways with other parts of the transportation system. FMC: FMC is a federal agency responsible for regulating ocean borne transportation system for the benefit of U.S. exporters, importers, and the U.S. consumer. While MARAD works in a promotional role for the performance of the waterway infrastructure, the FMC administers the regulatory provisions of shipping laws.

102 Source: FAF4 Figure A-6: Map of Waterways and Rail Lines between Illinois and New Orleans MTOs: The MTO will be responsible for all operations related to loading and unloading of barges and transfer of grains to rail or trucks. Various Grain Associations and Councils: Grain associations and councils helps in export and production market, along with storage, and policy development and implementation to help U.S. grain industry. A few grain associations include: o US Grain Council o American Soybean Association o Whole Grains Council o National Association of Wheat Growers o National Grain and Feed Association Performance Grains are a necessary agricultural and industrial supplement in domestic and international markets. The grain supply chain is a relatively low cost and slow system in which farmers depend on transportation to get their products to market. Grain transportation demand is a function of:  Weather-related disruptions to transportation,  Variation in annual crop size and location,  The timing of planting and harvesting,  Global trade patterns,  Crop quality concerns,  Competition in production by other countries, and  Commodity price fluctuations23. The performance of the grain supply chain depends on the following factors:  Crop harvest yields.  Country elevator, sub terminal elevator, and farm storage facility storage capacity including ability to handle peak fluctuations in produce.  Product processing times at inland river terminals, export ports, and destination ports.  Transport availability by barge defined by the functionality of supply chain infrastructure, such as locks, and assets such as tug boats and barges.  Lock repair and maintenance durations.  River conditions (and the effective dissemination of this information to vessels).  Availability of enough tug and helper boats to help guide barges.  Compliance with national and international agricultural export regulations.  Provisions to protect the perishability of produce.  Productivity of the transfer of products between facilities and transportation modes. 23 https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/Corn%20Transportation%20Profile.pdf

103 The grain supply chain depends on keeping the costs of transportation low. Without low shipping prices, the U.S. would not be able to compete on the world market for exports of grain, and the financial well-being of U.S. grain producers would be in jeopardy. Domestically, low shipping prices keep food costs low for consumers, and market prices higher for producers. An important consideration in a grain supply chain is the chain of custody and the way grain is sold. Grain producers can be corporations or individual farmers. Farmers may be members of a cooperative, which markets grain on the farmer’s behalf, or the farmer may sell grain to a marketing company, which will then market the grain on the farmer’s behalf. Since the production and marketing of grain are often separate, it is important that the exporter and producer establish communication protocols prior to a disruption. Boosting Resiliency  Invest in infrastructure improvements that enhance resiliency along the waterway system. Potential improvements include existing and redundant lock structures, dredging, and upgrading transshipment facilities to enable transfer of cargo under extreme low water conditions.  Provide regularly scheduled maintenance of infrastructure to include replacement and repair of assets prior to end of its useful life. Maintenance scheduling should be closely coordinated with BOs, so that it does not occur during peak periods. Work with agencies that have local jurisdiction over the maintenance of infrastructure.  Protect mobile assets against inclement weather in advance by positioning them in safe locations. Barges that are not tied up properly can get loose and sink or strike infrastructure, causing further damage and delays.  Identify roads on which spring seasonal load limits can be waived. Create and implement a set of procedures and guidelines for doing so during a disruption.  Improve rural “grain corridors” and designated alternative corridors by focusing on eradicating or refurbishing abandoned railroad branch lines.  Increase warehouse capacities to improve seasonal logistics buffers and additional value-added services for logistics chain modifications.  Use information technology to improve vessel and port communications, and the dissemination of up-to-date, online information on current and expected water depths in the navigation channels.  Install vibration sensors and cameras to monitor the condition of important infrastructure, e.g., locks and dams.  Coordinate disruption planning efforts with the River Industries Task Force as well as the USACE.  Include local fire departments, and lock masters in contingency planning efforts especially for incidents involving hazardous or flammable materials.  Pre-ship or defer shipment of loaded barges prior to a scheduled maintenance or disruption.  Devise a plan for how to prioritize barge processing and travel during a disruption.  Establish a helper boat system to guide barges through locks when conditions are adverse.  Work with the USACE to determine where dredging is required to remove shoaling following a flood event.  Store spare lock components in centralized locations to expedite the lock repair process.  Acquire more buoy and buoy tenders for the USCG. Where possible, supplement physical buoys with electronic buoys. This should be done thoughtfully so that captains and pilots still have visual navigation aids and are not dependent on digital ones.

104  Use Automatic Identification System information to quantify barge delays after the disruption. Use this data to calculate the total cost of a delay and to disperse real time data to users. Knowing the actual cost of a delay may encourage lawmakers to appropriate resources towards lock and dam upgrades.  Refer to the Notices of Navigation Interest documents published by the USACE, and the Notice to Mariners documents published by the USCG. Additionally, refer to the Marine Safety Information Bulletins published by the USCG, and NOAA announcements on new charts.  Promote multiyear funding for USACE projects, so that large projects can be guaranteed for completion and avoid costly and inefficient start/stops.

105 APPENDIX B: RESPONDING TO SURGE IN FREIGHT TRAFFIC CAUSED BY MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS Using information from published reports and regulations, journal articles and conference presentations, the team was able to summarize the nature of past military cargo deployments through U.S. seaports. To capture current thinking on this issue, this material was supplemented by several expert interviews with selected agencies involved in the deployment supply chain. The goal in each case was to identify the main issues and possible actions that have or might be taken to maintain a reliable rate of cargo throughput for both civilian and military agencies during cargo surges. Following this study’s emphasis on understanding disruption impacts on complete product supply chains, a loss of access to the highways, railways or waterways serving seaports, as well to the cargo-handling facilities and operations within the ports themselves, was considered in assessing the resiliency to disruption of a port’s cargo- handling capacity. Physical Aspects of Supply Chain Resilience In describing the physical components of seaport operations involving the military mobilization and deployment process it is useful to view a seaport of embarkation as a major cargo collection and transfer node, within what can be a complex, time-sensitive, and enterprise-specific supply chain. The impacting enterprise here is the U.S. military, and its goal is to deliver active duty military units, with all their support equipment and materials, to one or more locations abroad. This often includes large vehicles or other forms of heavy or bulky equipment (tanks, helicopters, ‘high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles, etc.), as well as ammunition, and a variety of both break-bulk and containerized cargos. Error! Reference source not found. shows the major steps in this process, highlighting the role of U.S. seaports. The focus of this case study is on the disruption to supply chain activities taking place within the shaded CONUS box. Figure B- 1: Multi-stage Military Deployment Process and Role of U.S. Seaports Port‐to‐Foxhole  Pre‐Deployment  Activities Fort‐to‐Port  Port‐to‐Port  CONUS Land‐Side Water‐Side   Access/Egress Access/Egress  (Truck, rail,  (Deep sea,  inland water) Great Lakes) Shipper(s)/ Receivers Shipping/ Receiving Port(s) = Important Intermodal  Co‐Ordination & Transfer Points SPOE = Seaport of Embarkation SPOD = Seaport of Debarkation Intermodal Transfers, Within‐Terminal and  On‐Dock Operations Within SPOE Within SPOD SEAPORT

106 The USDOT works closely with the USTRANSCOM notably its Military SDDC, to support the overland and sea components of military mobilizations. Such plans require input and action by additional public and private agencies, which depend on the type, size (cargo volumes), and temporal (possibly multi-staged, and sustained) nature of the military deployment. U.S. highways and railways play an important role in these deployments, and both infrastructures are supported by the designation, maintenance, and monitoring of the following strategically significant national subnetworks: Highways for National Defense (HND) The key component of the federal government’s HND Program for both wartime and peacetime military deployments is the Strategic Highways Network (STRAHNET). The STRAHNET is comprised of over 61,000 miles of public highways, including over 45,000 miles on the nation’s Interstate System. The purpose of the network is to provide “defense access, continuity, and emergency capabilities for movements of personnel and equipment in both peace and war” (Cowin, 2013). The network also includes over 200 “STRAHNET Connectors”, some 1,800 miles of highways that link important military installations and ports to these high capacity, inter-regional highways. Many of these connectors end for deployment purposes at a port’s or other intermodal facility’s boundary or installation gate. If priority is given to a mobilization unit’s multi-vehicle convoy movements, regular over-the-road commercial traffic could experience delays, notably where lower capacity local roads are used. Recognizing this, the designation of a STRAHNET connector route to a military installation or port allows individual state DOTs to fund improvements and upgrades using National Highway System (NHS) assigned resources.24 Such modifications and upgrades, especially “first and last mile” connections to the Interstate System, are worked out with state and local authorities (see North Florida TPO, 2016 for an example). Broadening the geographic scope somewhat, a recent study by the Hampton Roads Transportation Planning Organization (HRTPO) mapped the results of a possible sea level rise of 1.5 feet (occurring sometime between years 2032 and 2065), with a second scenario adding a further 3-foot storm surge rise, to determine how these climate change-initiated conditions would impact existing, including STRAHNET, highways serving the port. The report concluded that “25 of the 38 Military and Supporting Sites” identified…were located within Hampton Roads’ jurisdictions most vulnerable to flooding” (Belfield, 2013). Railroads for National Defense (RND) Rail transport is essential for the deployment of oversize and overweight equipment within CONUS, especially for equipment transported farther than 400 miles. However, there are maximum limits and restrictions to the transport of these larger and heavier loads by rail, requiring special permits during contingencies. To ensure that the commercial rail infrastructure in the U.S. meets DOD requirements for force deployment the SDDC’s Transportation Engineering Agency (SDDCTEA) works closely with the FRA to monitor, examine, and improve the tracks providing access to military installations, seaports, and other militarily important intermodal transfer facilities, as part of its Strategic Rail Corridor Network (STRACNET). Mirroring the concept adopted for strategic highways, this network includes some 32,500 miles of mainline track, plus an additional 5,000 or so miles of track necessary to connect these routes to over 190 military installations and seaports. The Ports for National Defense (PND) Program The PND program identifies, maintains, and activates the necessary port infrastructure in peacetime, wartime, and during other military emergencies. U.S. forces often deploy through seaports to respond to conflicts overseas, with more than 90% of U.S. warfighters' equipment and supplies traveling by sea during major ground operations. During military contingencies, commercial seaports designated by the military as “strategic ports” are issued a Port Planning Order (PPO) by the U.S. DOT’s MARAD at the request of the SDDC. These orders specify which port facilities, staging areas, and berthing space DOD will require, and they establish timelines for access. As of March 1st, 2017, 24 https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/Planning/national_highway_system/

107 the SDDCTEA25 listed 22 strategic seaports currently within the CONUS, 17 of which are commercial ports and 5 are military (see Blower, 2009; GAO, 2013). In addition, it lists 27 “alternate” or back-up seaports: offering a form of response resilience that may benefit both military and commercial cargo movement during major, including multiport, disruptions. These ports provide both staging areas and berthing facilities for military operations, typically requiring the use of non-military contracted labor for large scale deployments, including the supply of common-user sealift through the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), the DOD’s primary sealift mobilization program.26 During a major mobilization these “surge sealift” forces include various types of ships, notably roll-on/roll-off ships (RO/ROs) such as large, medium-speed RO/ROs (LMSRs) designed to handle the loading and unloading of vehicular cargo, as well as other dry-cargo ships including container, heavy-lift, auxiliary crane, break-bulk, and specialty support vessels, tankers, and hospital ships (CBO, 2005). Past Performance Studies Several efforts have been made to address reported/anticipated shortcomings associated with future commercially- supported deployments. For the military, this includes several studies to ensure the readiness and resilience of the nation’s strategic seaports. Some of the issues identified in these studies remain relevant today. Trucking Issues: Truckers entering a port require a Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) card---a tamper-resistant, biometric credential to maritime workers requiring unescorted access to secure areas within port facilities and vessels, regulated under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. DOD policy (DTM 09-012, 2009) authorizes truck drivers with a TWIC and a bill of lading unescorted access to DOD installations without additional background checks at the port gate. However, bills of lading may not always be available when going for a pickup, and long lines at port gates are not uncommon at many of the nation’s seaports during heavy shipping periods or periods of raised threat level. The arrival of military convoys can add considerably to such delays for commercial traffic. Permits are required for vehicles and vehicle combinations using public highways that exceed a state’s legal width, length, height and weight limits. Height and weight limits are usually of most concern to state DOTs, with many states reluctant to grant highway permits for overweight cargo vehicles, especially if their loads can be divided among more than one vehicle. However, during military emergencies the Major Army Command (MACOM) Commander may get a waiver if a load is certified as essential to national defense, and SDDCTEA has been successful in obtaining permissions to allow "marked military equipment or materiel" to be transported on the Interstate System without the need for re-assembly of loads to more than one vehicle, as long as state bridge restrictions are not violated.27 The larger these vehicles are, and the longer the convoys they are part of, the more the impact on other highway traffic. And the heavier they are, the more possible pavement damage. Rail Transportation Issues: Railcar transport can also experience challenges during military deployments, notably in the transport of very large or heavy military equipment. The STRACNET connects major Army installations, depots and ports of embarkation by rail. But while the network accommodates some 86% of DOD equipment types and 99% of individual pieces of equipment in the DOD inventory, these clearances are only valid for selected routes and sometimes only at severely 25 https://www.sddc.army.mil/sites/TEA/Functions/SpecialAssistant/Pages/PortsNationalDefense.aspx 26 All major US flag carriers are enrolled and more than 90 percent of the US flag dry cargo fleet is covered under its contingency commitments through which the DOD requests a percentage of a commercial company’s fleet capacity. 27 https://www.sddc.army.mil/sites/TEA/Functions/Deployability/TransportabilityEngineering/MODES/HighwayTransport/Pages /CONUS.aspx

108 restricted speeds. The height and width of a loaded railcar during deployments is generally limited to the AAR- developed dimensions. However, a load wider than a flatcar or a combined load plus flatcar height greater than 15 feet, 1 inch above the top of the rails is considered a "dimensional load", requiring the railroad companies involved to perform clearance checks for the entire distance of a shipment before it begins its journey. Such clearance checks may delay transport if, as is usual, they are performed during normal working hours.28 Military rail car movements are most efficient if moved as part of dedicated unit trains, which may take some time to put together if suitable cars are poorly positioned. For example, according to Pint et al (2017), Fort Drum in New York (the origination point for freight corridor #10 described in this report) has two infantry brigade combat teams which typically require four 65-car trains to deploy to a port, necessitating a request for CSX-operated trains two weeks in advance. While commercial cars can handle most of a combat team’s equipment, DODX rail cars are necessary for transporting Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTTs) and Palletized Load System (PLS) equipment. Mixed car convoy construction can be a challenge. Pint et al (2017) report a 40-car minimum is required to get equipment moved by dedicated unit train. If there is less equipment to be moved truck transport is often preferable, as it can take two to three times longer for the equipment to be delivered “manifest”, i.e. as part of a larger rail move assembled along with cars from other customers. Military moves by rail typically occur in unit trains. An interview with a Class I railroad indicated it typically would like two weeks’ notice to arrange empty railcar availability for such military equipment transport. Prior to the movement, track inspectors go out to make sure the rail route is ready to handle the shipment. The railcars used may be specialty cars provided by US DODX29 (e.g., to transport tanks using 6 axle specialty cars)30, or by commercial cars (open top cars and gondolas, box cars, TOFC/COFC, and specialty cars)31 arranged via the TTX railcar pooling company. A request for a rail shipment comes after a bid is placed with the SDDC, which establishes a Required Delivery Date (RDD) with the railroad. Daily communications occur between the SDDC and the railroad leading up to and during these unit train moves. Communication between the railroad and the military contact at the seaport is also needed to ensure availability of stevedore labor to unload trains. Military moves are given priority by the railroad when requested. The level of within route congestion, if any, often depends on seasonality. Navigable Waterway Issues: For seaports with lengthy navigation channels, safely navigating deployed or returning vessels amongst large volumes of commercial traffic, like petroleum and chemical tankers transporting hazardous cargos to shore-side facilities, and small commercial traffic such as fishing vessels, could be challenging. If the steady growth in international trade projected through U.S. ports comes to pass this represents a considerable cargo-handling challenge for the nation’s marine transportation system during military traffic surges. An example is the busy, and in places confined, 42-mile Sabine-Neches waterway serving the Port of Beaumont, TX, where the U.S. Army’s 842nd Transportation Battalion has worked closely with its federal partners, including the Coast Guard and the FBI as well as with state and local security partners, to coordinate the safe navigation of military cargo to and from the ocean (Kramek, 2013). 28https://www.sddc.army.mil/sites/TEA/Functions/Deployability/TransportabilityEngineering/MODES/RailTransport/Pages/default. aspx 29 DODX is the reporting mark for the United States Department of Defense Military Traffic Management Command. 30 Defense Transportation Regulation – Part II 28 October 2016: Chapter 202. Cargo Routing and Movement: ‘Defense Freight Railway Interchange Fleet (DFRIF)’. 31 Defense Transportation Regulation – Part III. Mobility. Appendix AA. Rail Operations. June 2016: ‘multi-level, caboose, heavy- duty, and trailer/container on flatcar’.

109 Within-Port Cargo Staging Areas: The availability of within-port cargo staging areas was seen by those interviewed as a “critical infrastructure impediment” to rapid cargo throughput of either military or commercial cargo during the early build-up to OIF deployment. Adding new staging capacity is difficult because competition for waterfront real estate is intense and suitable new land acquisition problematic. In some cases, empty containers must be stored on needed terminal space for staging cargo. In recent years a variety of approaches have been used by ports, including stacking containers, using off-port storage centers, and moving port business offices outside the port area to make more room. Other options include extending port gate opening hours and using information technology to signal that an alternative port could accept additional cargo. And congestion caused by a lack of on-dock and staging area space is likely to get worse as economies of scale cause the size of modern container ships to increase, with vessel-carrying capacities now well in excess of 10,000 TEUs. Logistical Aspects of Supply Chain Resilience Prior to any actual movement of a commodity or product, a good deal of cargo identification, allocation, loading and documentation, as well as the sourcing of movement assets (of trucks, trains, inland barges, and ships), takes place. Resilience issues include concerns for the best location(s) from which to source and match up specific supplies or equipment with specific unit requirements, and where to go for these supplies should one or more planned resource locations or inventories become inaccessible or insufficient for any reason. A specific SDDC Transportation Battalion (TBN) is responsible for assisting the military units being deployed by ensuring that the equipment to be transported to a seaport is best configured for loading onto the ships that will transport it. There are five such TBNs located within CONUS, each sending personnel to assist at both the military installations and the SPOEs within its jurisdiction, as well as coordinating with multiple seaports involved in large military deployments. During a contingency, this activity leads to the creation of PPOs that ensure both enough space for arriving military equipment dockside, and a sufficient number of vessel berths for the outbound ships receiving this equipment. Among the lessons learned from deployments associated with OIF are those reported in a short 2004 article in the Army Logistician, emphasizing the importance of both strong inter-agency communication as well as the value of training exercises and supporting material: “The 842nd Transportation Battalion takes a proactive role in ensuring that units know what they are doing when they deploy. Before a deployment begins, the 842d visits the units to help them plan and prepare. They conduct seminars and training and participate in exercises and conferences. They consult with unit commanders, division transportation officers, unit movement officers, representatives of installation transportation offices, prospective liaison officers, and port operators in order to begin the process of matching unit requirements with port capabilities. The battalion has developed a briefing that focuses on the requirements a unit must meet when preparing its cargo for vessel transport and highlights lessons learned from previous missions. This briefing often stimulates a two-way information exchange, which serves as a foundation for planning and minimizes problems later in the mission. The 842d also has developed a Deployment Handbook, complete with visual aids, that is small enough to fit into a soldier’s cargo pocket and contains guidance on preparing cargo for movement to a port.” (Army Logistician, 2004: page 21). Cargo Scheduling and Tracking Software As with most of today’s freight movement, moving military materials and equipment requires the latest in freight planning and scheduling software, using high speed computing and associated information, notably asset location and tracking, technology. The U.S. Army’s Transportation Coordinators - Automated Information for Movements System II (TC-AIMS II)32 software system is used for scheduling convoy movements over the U.S. highway system, 32 http://www.usarmyamis.army.mil/Systems/TC-AIMS/tcaimsii_system.html