Freight Transportation Resilience in Response to Supply Chain Disruptions (2019)

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9 ILWU International Longshoremen and Warehouse Union IMC Intermodal Marketing Company INT Integrator I-O Input-Output IRRIS Intelligent Road/Railroad Information Server ITIC-ST Intermodal Transportation and Inventory Costing Model State Tool ITV In-Transit Visibility JIT Just-In-Time LEPCs Local Emergency Planning Committees LMS Logistics Management System LMSR Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships LNG Liquefied Natural Gas MACOM Major Army Command MARAD U.S. Maritime Administration MC Motor Carrier MPOs Metropolitan Planning Organizations MSC Military Sealift Command MTO Marine Terminal Operator n.e.c Not Elsewhere Classified NAIS Nationwide Automatic Information System NCFRP National Cooperative Freight Research Program NCHRP National Cooperative Highway Research Report NHS National Highway System NIAC National Infrastructure Advisory Council NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NPMRDS National Performance Management Research Data Set NPRN National Port Readiness Network OD Origin-Destination OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom PMA Pacific Maritime Association PND Ports for National Defense PPE Personal Protective Equipment PPO Port Planning Order PPPs Public Private Partnerships PSA Port Support Activity RDD Required Delivery Date RFID Radio Frequency Identification RND Railroads for National Defense RO/RO Roll-On/Roll-Off RRF Ready Reserve Force SCGE Spatial Computable General Equilibrium SCTG Standard Classification of Transported Goods SCTG2 2-digit Standard Classification of Transported Goods SDDC Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command SPM Single Port Manager

10 SPOE Seaport of Embarkation SSDCTEA SSDC Transportation and Engineering Agency STRACNET Strategic Rail Corridor Network STRAHNET Strategic Highways Network TBN Transportation Battalion TC-AIMS II Automated Information for Movements System II TRB Transportation and Research Board TSA Transportation Security Administration TTI Texas Transportation Institute TTTR Truck Travel Time Reliability TWIC Transportation Worker Identification Credential UK United Kingdom UMR-IWW Upper Mississippi River - Illinois Waterway URCS Uniform Railroad Costing System USACE U.S. Army Corp of Engineers USCG U.S. Coast Guard USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture USDOT U.S. Department of Transportation

11 SUMMARY The purpose of the NCFRP 50 project was to develop guidance for stakeholders to plan for, mitigate, and adapt to disruptions to supply chains with the aim of enhancing freight transportation system resilience. Disruptions are primarily defined as unplanned and unanticipated events that affect the normal flow of goods and operations in supply chains and transportation networks. This definition is, in certain cases, extended to include planned events, such as the planned shutdown of locks for maintenance that affect the normal flow of goods and operations in a supply chain. The project consisted of two research phases. Phase 1 included a robust literature review and the development of supply chain scenarios reflecting a range of market, transportation corridor, and disruption contexts. Phase 2 analyzed each identified commodity corridor scenario, interviewed supply chain stakeholders, and examined the application of analysis tools and freight models for better understanding the dynamics of supply chain responses to system disruptions. A stakeholder guidance document for supply chain disruptions was prepared and is published as a separate document. The literature review identified the characteristics of different types of disruptions and how they affected transportation system performance, the factors that could influence transportation system resiliency, and potential system resiliency mitigation strategies. The key components of the supply chain that were found to contribute to system resiliency included:  Physical Infrastructure – infrastructure that enables the physical movement of goods from origin to destination such as road, rail and pipeline infrastructure; terminals; distribution centers; and warehouses.  Logistical – components of the supply chain that manage and decide logistics arrangements such as network routing, reassigning vehicle/vessel capacity, creating transportation management plans, and risk pooling.  Financial – components such as the capital investment program, potential funding sources, investment decisions for infrastructure improvement, and public private partnerships (PPPs).  Communication / Transactional / Informational – components such as inter-organization or stakeholder communications, exchange of invoices and payments, emergency communications documentation, communication roles and responsibilities, information gathering, employee education, and the like.  Regulatory / Oversight – components such as lobbying, post-event oversight, public policy updates and changes, promoting national programs and policies, and the like.  Institutional – components such as corporate policies, social and political influences, and social capital, which reflects the relationships and institutional structures that establish boundaries for interagency and interpersonal interactions. Of these factors, effective interagency and intergroup communication was identified by many in the literature as being the most important input into effective resiliency strategies. The literature was recorded in a searchable tool that can be filtered based on the type of disruption event, impact severity, and resiliency strategies employed.

12 The research team then identified candidate commodity-specific, supply chain flow corridors based on such factors as tonnage and value moved by origin-destination pair (surrogates for how important particular commodities are in the U.S. national freight system); mode(s) of transportation; geographic location; diverse origination locations (e.g., domestic versus international); and the length of the supply chain. From the candidate list, ten supply chain corridor flows were selected for more detailed analysis. The supply chain paths used key operations centers and/or infrastructure that, if disrupted, could have negative impacts on the operations and cost-effectiveness of the supply chain. Disruptive event scenarios were then developed for each supply chain corridor flow that targeted specific types of disruptions (e.g., extreme weather, labor strikes, pandemics, and the like). The modes/infrastructure and the assumed disruptions included the following: 1. Pipeline - Infrastructure closure/failure due to a weather event or pipeline rupture – Gulf Coast to East Coast petroleum products 2. Marine Terminal/Harbor - Infrastructure closure/failure due to cyber terrorism – International exports of agricultural products from San Joaquin Valley, CA 3. Port/Rail - Failure due to labor activity or pandemic – Imported consumer electronics from Southern California to Illinois 4. Roads/Bridges/Airports - Infrastructure closure/failure due to earthquake – Pacific Northwest exports - computer chips 5. Inland waterway/Locks - Infrastructure closure/failure due to accident (locks) or low water levels – Mississippi River-barged grains from the Midwest to New Orleans 6. Distribution Center/Airports/Highway - Infrastructure closure/failure – Florida to Texas pharmaceutical movement 7. Truck/Border crossing - Infrastructure closure/failure – U.S. to Canada motor vehicles 8. Highway/Airport – Infrastructure closure due to extreme weather – Northeast to Great Lakes precision medical instruments 9. Rail – Rail bridge or track failure – Ethanol movement from the Midwest to California 10. Military- Infrastructure closure/failure due to terrorist activity: Northwest Pennsylvania to Port of Philadelphia; commercial cargo and military equipment/supplies The scenario analysis defined the commodity and its value, the market and supply chain transportation corridor, supply chain operations, the associated disruption and its impacts, potential diversion alternatives, the entities responsible for disruption resiliency and recovery, factors that could affect supply chain performance, and suggestions for enhancing supply chain resiliency. The results of the scenario analysis and case studies aided in the development of a typology of strategies for building partnerships and coordination strategies that were subject to feedback in subsequent stakeholder interviews. These interviews focused on multiple stakeholders having various roles in either managing the supply chain or providing the infrastructure that was used to move the commodity. The intent of the interviews was to identify specific strategies for enhancing supply chain resiliency for each scenario and to obtain lessons learned from interviewee experiences with previous disruptions. The following key observations came from the interviews:  There is a clear distinction between “resilience” as part of incident response and “resilience” as part of a broader network or systems performance perspective. Both public agencies and major transportation firms have in place plans and operational strategies for the former….and thus feel like they are fully prepared to handle incidents and recovery efforts. Most of those interviewed have not been engaged in the second, much broader, perspective of “resilience.”