Transit Security Preparedness (2020)

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12 C H A P T E R 3 A comprehensive security preparedness approach includes • Policies, plans, and protocols that specifically describe the agency’s approaches and are inte- grated into the daily business of the agency. • Security staffing decisions that recognize the safety and security needs of the specific transit system, the expectations of customers, and the political environment. • Protection measures and technology that addresses the security of the transit system, either directly or indirectly. • Training for employees, contractors, and partners to cover all aspects of an agency’s security strategy and provide actionable information to better handle emergencies and security events. A security preparedness strategy can be designed only after a risk assessment has been per- formed and a comprehensive security plan has been designed. Security preparedness requires transit agencies to determine which security issues faced by the agency are most critical. Until these have been completed, it is difficult to make good decisions about security strategies. By analyzing the threats, the agency can identify what countermeasures to use to reduce the vulner- abilities associated with those threats. To be eligible for TSGP grants, transit agencies must have developed or updated their security plan based on a security assessment. The security assessment must have been conducted within the 3 years before receiving a TSGP award. Risk Management DHS/FEMA defines risk as the “potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an inci- dent, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security Risk Steering Committee 2010). In terms of security, there are two main categories of risk that transportation agencies face—physical and cyber. Security risk is typically considered to be “threat based,” as opposed to “hazard based,” although in terms of “all hazards,” the words “threat” and “hazard” are considered interchangeable. Risk management, in the context of physical and cybersecurity, consists of the range of activities that a transportation agency can undertake to resolve identified security risks (Frazier et al. 2009). Risk assessment is a systematic process through which assets are identified and evaluated, credible threats to those assets are enumerated, applicable vulnerabilities are documented, potential effects or consequences of a loss event are described, and a qualitative or quantitative analysis of resulting risks is produced. Risk assessment is a function of frequency, or likelihood and probability, and analysis of consequences. A threat and vulnerability assessment (TVA) identifies the sources and types of Preparedness Strategy and Approaches: Literature Review

Preparedness Strategy and Approaches: Literature Review 13 threats and the vulnerabilities within a transit agency’s system. A TVA helps decision-makers evaluate risks, identify priorities, and select solutions. DHS defines the component parts of a risk assessment as follows: • Threat assessment is “a systematic effort to identify and evaluate existing or potential terrorist threats to a jurisdiction and its target assets” (National Research Council 2010). Importantly, in the context of terrorism, in the absence of threat there is no actual risk of loss or injury. But transportation agencies typically consider threat more broadly to include threats of criminal activity as well as terrorist activity. Threat definition has two areas of focus, the first toward threat scenarios based on real events or perceived exposures, and the second toward identifi- cation of likely adversaries, tactics, and capabilities. • Vulnerability assessment is “the identification of weaknesses in physical structures, personnel protection systems, processes, or other areas that may be exploited by terrorists” (General Accounting Office 2001). Such weaknesses can occur in facility characteristics, equipment properties, personnel behavior, locations of people and equipment, or operational and per- sonnel practices. • Consequence assessment is an analysis of the immediate, short- and long-term effects an event or event combination has on an asset. It is an estimate of the amount of loss or damage that can be expected. For both physical and cyber systems security, risk reduction consists of the assessment of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences (TVC analysis) of an event or series of events in an effort to reduce or mitigate losses associated with their occurrence. The National Preparedness System considers the core capabilities of Risk Assessment and Threats and Hazards Identifica- tion as part of the mitigation mission. The FTA adopted safety management systems (SMSs) as the basis for the National Public Transportation Safety Program as part the MAP-21 requirements in 2015. An SMS is a formal, top-down, organization-wide approach to managing safety risks and assuring the effectiveness of safety risk mitigations. An SMS includes a focus on hazard identification across the organiza- tion. It includes systematic procedures, practices, and policies for managing risks and hazards. The Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan Final Rule, effective on July 19, 2019, requires certain operators of public transportation systems that receive federal funds to develop safety plans that include the processes and procedures necessary for implementing an SMS. Hazard identification and analysis are the first two steps in the safety risk management pro- cess, intended to identify and address hazards before they escalate into incidents or accidents. They also provide a foundation for the risk evaluation and mitigation activities that follow. Organizations conduct risk assessments to determine risks that are common to the organiza- tion’s core missions and business functions, mission and business processes, mission and busi- ness segments, common infrastructure and support services, or information systems. There are numerous different approaches and techniques for conducting risk assessments in the transportation sector. Some of the more frequently used methodologies include the Analytical Risk Methodology (ARM), the DHS Terrorism Risk Analysis Methodology (DHS- TRAM), the Maritime Sector Risk Analysis Methodology (MSRAM), and the Criticality, Acces- sibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect and Recognizability (CARVER) method. ARM and DHS-TRAM are approved by DHS/FEMA grant programs. In addition, there are self-directed vulnerability assessment methods and checklists available from various organizations, including DHS, the Department of Energy, and the FBI. As previ- ously noted, the TSA provides direct assistance to transit agencies through the BASE program and through corporate security review programs.

14 Transit Security Preparedness NCHRP Research Report 930: Security 101: A Physical Security and Cybersecurity Primer for Trans- portation Agencies (Frazier, Western, et al., forthcoming) discusses risk management and provides information on security assessments in more detail. Because today’s transportation systems inte- grate cyber and physical components, cyber risks are increasing and include the risk of a cyber incident affecting not only data but the control systems of the physical infrastructure operated by transportation agencies. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-30 (Stoneburner et al. 2002) summarizes the steps associated with cyber risk assessment. Security Incidents and Causes This section provides an overview of the incidents and causes of most concern to transit agencies, based on surveys of transit agencies carried out as part of previous TCRP projects and other research. Terrorism Terrorism in its current form emerged in the late 1960s. The volume of terrorist attacks has increased dramatically since 1970, although much of this increase reflects better reporting and the fact that terrorism has become increasingly routine and terrorists have escalated their vio- lence, with the resulting higher levels of lethality adding to public alarm. Terrorist motives have changed over time, and targets and methods have evolved. Nakanishi (2009) found that transit agencies’ reports of suspicious activities, persons, and items increased in the immediate period after September 11, 2001 (9/11), and then diminished and plateaued in the 2005–2006 time period. According to Jenkins (2017), “Continued terrorist interest in transportation targets was demonstrated in the March 2016 bombing of the metro in Brussels, in which 13 people died; the July 2016 knife and axe attack on train passengers in Wuerzberg, Germany, in which four persons were injured; and the discovery in October 2016 of an improvised explosive device on a London Underground train.” Frazier (2015) found that homeland security- or terrorism-related threats rarely occur on smaller systems. The alarming growth in the use of vehicles—rented, stolen, or easily available large motor vehicles—as ramming instruments in direct attacks on pedestrians and similar gatherings of persons is an emerging terrorism threat. Crimes and Assaults Nakanishi (2009) analyzed transit crime trends for the 2002–2006 period and found that serious crimes were infrequent compared with minor crimes. Theft was the most common and most persistent serious crime found, accounting for 50% to 60% of the serious offenses for every year in the period. Theft remains an issue for transit agencies, according to Frazier (2015), but it has been surpassed by assaults on passengers and operators, trespassing, and drug offenses. In addition, the smaller the system, the less probable it is for the agency to experience significant levels of crime or disorder. Operator Assault Assaults against transit workers and operators are a significant concern in the transit industry. In addition to causing injuries and increased levels of stress for the operators, assaults cause fear and a perception of lack of safety for the public, transit passengers, and transit workers. The TRACs Safety Focus Areas 20191 notes that “both the rate and number of transit worker assaults continue to increase.” Figure 2 provides assault figures over time.

Preparedness Strategy and Approaches: Literature Review 15 The National Transit Database (NTD) defines assault as “an unlawful attack by one person on another.” Assaults are categorized within NTD as personal security events, which are secu- rity events that occur to individuals on transit property. The NTD definition does not provide a complete representation of all types of assaults. Countermeasures Assessment and Security Experts, LLC, and Transportation Resource Associates, Inc. (2017) found verbal threats or intimidation are the most common form of transit workplace violence, with spitting being the next most problematic. TCRP Synthesis 93: Practices to Protect Bus Operators from Passenger Assault (Nakanishi and Fleming 2011) defined assault more broadly as “overt physical and verbal acts of aggression by a passenger that interfere with the mission of a transit operator—to complete his or her scheduled run safely—and that adversely affect the safety of the operator and customers.” Fare Evasion Nakanishi (2009) found that the most frequent of the less serious offenses was fare evasion, which accounted for more than 90% of less serious offenses for every year in the period addressed in the survey. Fare evasion, as defined in the NTD, is “the unlawful use of transit facilities by riding without paying the applicable fare.” Frazier (2015) found that fare evasion continues to be a significant problem with transit agencies. Fare evasion and fare theft are reported as major security problems at many transit systems. Source: FTA 2019. Figure 2. Assault injuries over time.

16 Transit Security Preparedness Community activists have argued that punishments for fare evasion—often three-figure fines and a criminal record—do not fit the crime and that they disproportionately target low- income people of color. Some cities and some transit agencies, in response, have begun to decriminalize fare evasion. Trespassing Frazier (2015) found that trespassing is a significant problem with transit agencies. The details of what constitutes criminal trespass vary greatly by state and even local jurisdic- tion. Likewise, the authority and process of enforcing trespassing rules and regulations vary across transit agencies. Quality of Life Quality of life issues are those behaviors or actions that disturb or disrupt riders and the public and increase their sense of discomfort and fear even though they may not be physically threatened. Quality of life issues include concerns about food, drink, language, clothing, and animals on transit vehicles or at stations; behavior such as panhandling, loitering, disorderly conduct, “manspreading,”2 loud music or noise; and others. The presence of quality of life issues may create the perception that a transit system is not safe. For a transit agency, addressing quality of life issues may divert resources from other security issues. Frazier (2015) found that quality of life issues such as disorderly persons and infractions regarding eating/drinking and loud music were issues of concern with most transit systems. Homeless Boyle (2016) reported that individuals struggling with homelessness often use public transit vehicles or facilities as shelters from weather conditions and as safe places. A survey conducted as part of that synthesis found that 91% of responding agencies perceive people who are expe- riencing homelessness as either a minor or a major issue, with larger agencies more likely to characterize homelessness as a major issue. Security Plans A security plan is a written document that contains information about an organization’s security policies, procedures and countermeasures. The security plan directs personnel toward prevention and mitigation of security incidents by integrating approaches that have proved effective into the operating environment. According to the APTA Recommended Practice on Security Planning for Public Transit (APTA 2013a), the plan needs to include a concise statement of purpose and clear instructions about agency security requirements. The stated objectives of the security plan need to be attainable and easily understood. The plan needs to identify intended users and their assignments, responsibili- ties, and authorities to act pursuant to the plan’s direction. TCRP Report 86, Volume 10: Hazard and Security Plan Workshop: Instructor Guide (AECOM et al. 2006) provides an overview of the transportation security planning process. The document also presents a template for hazard and security plan development. The template is designed to help transportation programs and transit agencies implement four core planning development functions: • Establishing priorities, • Organizing roles and responsibilities, • Selecting countermeasures and strategies, and • Maintaining the plan.

Preparedness Strategy and Approaches: Literature Review 17 With resource constraints it is difficult, if not impossible, to do all that could be done to protect all transit assets at all times. Therefore, establishing priorities is critical. The results of a risk assessment can assist in this prioritization. For cyber assets, the APTA Recommended Prac- tice Securing Control and Communications Systems in Rail Transit Environments, Part II (APTA 2013d) suggests another method to assist in prioritization based on security zone classifications. By identifying the different zones, ranging from external zones (the most public systems that include communications with the public, vendors, and others) through enterprise, operationally critical, fire/life-safety, and the most critical—safety-critical security (external with a focus on the most critical safety and security zones), it is possible to put more focus on the most critical zones. The FTA Safety and Security Certification Handbook (FTA 2002) supports the efforts of the transit industry to achieve continuous improvement in safety and security performance and has been used as a resource for developing transit security plans. The handbook provides a guide “for establishing a certification program to address safety and security that identifies the key activities; incorporates safety and security more fully into transit projects; highlights resources necessary to develop and implement a certification program for safety and security; and provides tools and sample forms to promote implementation of the safety and security certification process.” Creating a sound security plan is often as much a management issue as it is a technical one. It involves motivating and educating managers and employees to understand the need for security and their role in developing and implementing an effective and workable security process. By undertaking the development of a comprehensive security plan, based on the analysis obtained in the agency’s vulnerability assessment, an agency can be assured that it is prepared and that security is integrated into its daily business, according to Frazier, Western, et al. (forthcoming). Key Elements of Transit Security APTA (2013e) identified the key elements of transit system security: • Protection of assets; • Use of visible, unpredictable deterrence; • Targeted training for key staff; • Preparedness drills and exercises; and • Awareness campaigns for public and transit employees. The following sections provide an overview of each of these key elements in terms of security preparedness. Protection of Assets Assets to be protected at transit agencies include physical assets (e.g., infrastructure and vehi- cles), cyber assets (e.g., communications and data), and human assets (employees, passengers, community). The following sections discuss the protection of assets in the context of transit security preparedness using the framework of the National Preparedness System core capabili- ties for prevention and protection (see Figure 3). Intelligence and Information Sharing Local, regional, and national intelligence and information sharing is a critical aspect of secu- rity preparedness. Through collaboration and coordination, transit agencies are better able to understand current threats and become aware of emerging threats and how best to address those threats.

18 Transit Security Preparedness Intelligence- and information-sharing partnerships are common to most transit agencies. Security information is shared among transit and railroad industry personnel, local and state law enforcement agencies, DHS, and the FBI via the Surface Transportation and Public Transit Information Sharing and Analysis Centers. The centers, in collaboration with APTA, the Asso- ciation of American Railroads, and the TSA, also disseminate awareness reports on potential vulnerabilities, threats, and risks to security. The TSA also conducts transit policing and security peer advisor group monthly conference calls. Current practice throughout the industry includes participating in local Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) groups and the Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center, collaborating with other transit agency police and security programs, and staying involved with the APTA security program. The JTTF is a partnership among various federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. According to the FBI website, the 175 JTTFs in cities around the country are “one-stop shopping for information regarding terrorist activities.” In addition to collecting and sharing information, JTTFs investigate terrorism, provide security for special events, conduct training, and respond to threats and incidents. State and local governments, supported by federal investments from DHS, the Department of Justice, Health and Human Services, and other federal agencies, established the National Network of Fusion Centers (79 state and major urban area fusion centers) that collaborate and share information with partners from all levels of government and the private sector, as well as other field-based information-sharing partners. These fusion centers identify, collect, analyze, and share information based on unique sources of information within their jurisdictions and maintain partnerships with local communities that cannot be replicated by federal agencies. Fusion centers participate in the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative, which enables them to receive and analyze suspicious activity reporting and ensure the sharing of SAR with the FBI’s JTTFs for further investigation. Prevention Protection Intelligence and Information Sharing Interdiction and Disruption Access Control Screening, Search, and Detection Physical Protection Measures Risk Management Cybersecurity Figure 3. Preparedness System core capabilities for prevention and protection. Spotlight: New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center The New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC) is responsible for maintaining statewide situational awareness for response to current and future security issues in the state. The ROIC collects, analyzes, and disseminates criminal intelligence and other information to support the efforts of law enforcement and public safety agencies in New Jersey. ROIC analysts produce intelligence and information products based on requests from homeland security stakeholders in the state, in response to specific events with consequences to the state’s security and on a regular schedule such as a monthly bulletin that describes all the events in the coming month that require a unique public safety response.

Preparedness Strategy and Approaches: Literature Review 19 Interdiction and Disruption Interdiction is both the action of prohibiting and the action of intercepting and preventing. In terms of protective measures, this is largely influencing how the criminal or offender interprets the risk of apprehension or personal loss. For example, “caught on camera” can have a tremen- dous deterrent effect. Posted signs and public address announcements stating that the offenders will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law can serve as a reminder that actions can result in serious legal consequences. Most public transportation agencies have developed written codes of conduct for passengers that define expected behavior to control the safety, security, and quality of life of people while using the transit system. These are typically posted on system vehicles, stops, platforms, and transit facilities. The codes can be backed by a civil penalty or arrest where state or local laws or ordinances are in place, or through warning, citation, removal, and banning as part of transit agency regulations. They are enforced by transit security, transit police, or specific security staff, such as code compliance inspectors. Most agencies have rules about smoking, alcohol, and drug use; food and drink restric- tions; loud music and noises; and disruptive or unsafe behavior in their codes of conduct. Other rules included are agency specific, based on common issues experienced by the transit agency. Disruption is to “delay, divert, intercept, halt, apprehend, or secure threats and/or hazards” according to the National Preparedness System (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2015). Transit agencies typically use a visible security presence that includes random counterterrorism measures such as deploying surge teams (mobile teams of uniformed officers who flood a given area) or conducting random screening of passengers and inspection of their carry-on items to deter possible attacks (APTA 2011a). These security measures can create uncertainty in the plan- ning processes used by potential terrorists. Live video viewing of closed-circuit television (CCTV) from platforms, stations, and passen- ger vehicles can be a cost-effective crime deterrence approach by providing a security presence without the cost of security patrols. Employee and customer awareness programs also play a role. These are discussed in more detail in subsequent sections. Intelligence sharing, previously discussed, plays a role in interdiction and disruption. Spotlight: New York and New Jersey Memorandum of Understanding In September 2014, the governors of New York and New Jersey signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to coordinate intelligence gathering and information sharing to defend their residents and bi-state transit infra- structures against acts of terrorism. The bi-state agreement, substantially increasing security at transportation hubs and critical infrastructure in the metropolitan area, was effective immediately. Over the 100 days after the signing of the MOU, a surge in law enforcement and military personnel jointly engaged in counterterrorism operations by increasing visibility, inspections, and surveillance on and at trains and train stations, airports, landmarks, and bridges and tunnels. Additionally, New York and New Jersey participated in a joint emergency exercise and continue to evaluate methods for increased intelligence and emergency coordination.

20 Transit Security Preparedness Screening, Search, and Detection Passenger security inspections (PSIs) are suspicionless inspections of transit passengers by transit security or staff that can deter and detect terrorist activity. PSIs include manual, visual, and technology-based inspections; canine inspections; and behavioral assessments. According to Countermeasures Assessment and Security Experts, LLC, et al. (2007), to be legally permissible, PSIs have to be justified under established exceptions to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. They need to apply to all passengers or be done on an objectively random basis. When individualized suspicion exists, inspections are subject to normal policing procedures. Legal and other issues need to be carefully considered by transit agencies before implementation of passenger screening. In contrast, dogs are one of the best tools available to screen passengers and their bags for explosives, primarily because dogs can move easily through crowds and can be moved quickly from one location to another. Dogs are also an important complement to explosives detection technologies that may be too cumbersome, less mobile, and more costly to use. Agencies have reported that the presence of canine or K-9 units in the field have been shown to deter many types of criminal activity. K-9 teams, with their unobtrusiveness and adaptability, are a viable approach for broad-based implementation. In terms of technology, screening and detection equipment that does not affect operations, cause customer delays, or require a large number of personnel is highly desirable. Portable and handheld technologies are seen as being more amenable to transit use. Emerging Technology: Portable Scanning Technology. The TSA has been testing por- table scanning technology, using the portable devices to secure large-scale events such as the Super Bowl and the pope’s visit to the United States in 2015. The TSA tested the technology at New York City’s Penn Station and Washington, D.C.’s Union Station before clearing it for transit agencies to purchase. The technology is designed to detect both metallic and nonmetallic threats by identifying items that block the naturally occurring emissions given off by a person’s body. The technology screens for weapons that have the potential to create mass casualties. The technology scans can capture images as far as 40 feet away. Some transit systems are interested in the new TSA technology. A few, such as LA Metro, are pursuing testing and potential use in the future. For many agencies the cost is prohibitive, and it is not currently under consideration. Detection Countermeasures. In terms of detection, there is an array of different security countermeasures to defend the organization’s assets, including line of sight observation, video surveillance, motion detection, or other intrusion detection technologies. Intrusion detection alarm systems are an important countermeasure. They work as a force multiplier that allows for the more efficient use of staffing by reducing the number of security personnel required to patrol or monitor a protected area, according to Frazier et al. (2009). The versatility of alarm systems also facilitates their use as a substitute for other security countermeasures that are not viable because of safety concerns or operational requirements. They can be used as a supplemental security measure capable of adding an additional layer of security to protect critical assets. Video Surveillance and CCTV. Schulz and Gilbert (2011) found that video surveillance sys- tems are in widespread use on buses, trains, and stations. TCRP Synthesis 123: Onboard Camera Applications for Buses (Thomson, Matos, and Previdi 2016) explores the technologies, research, and opportunities for use on buses. It also provides examples of how surveillance systems are used to improve operations, safety, security, training, and customer satisfaction.

Preparedness Strategy and Approaches: Literature Review 21 CCTV can be a powerful tool for transit agencies when its design, technology, and implementa- tion matches the intended use. A number of studies carried out in the United Kingdom, which prob- ably has the highest number of cameras per capita of any nation, conclude that CCTV does make a modest but significant contribution to crime reduction. It appears to have some deterrent effect in specific areas, such as enclosed environments, public transport, and, most of all, parking lots. Video systems do not provide any form of denial of attack or delay in response to aggressor tactics or actions, according to Frazier et al. (2009). CCTV systems are passive countermeasures. They deter through an increase in the perceived risk of capture or belief in the successful inter- diction and prevention of an attack. In recognition of this, for effective deployment of CCTV, the system must be visible or announced through signage to provide knowledge of the presence of the system. In addition, potential aggressors must believe that the CCTV system will indeed prevent or reduce the likelihood of success. The problem of monitoring thousands of cameras has been eased by the development of ana- lytics built into the software. Alarms on perimeters or at portals immediately bring images from those cameras onto the display panel. Cameras can be programmed to watch for movement where there is supposed to be none, or the absence of movement (e.g., abandoned packages) where there is supposed to be some. As the analytics improve, cameras become smarter and can train themselves to identify patterns and report anomalies. The most recent systems embed the analytical capability in the camera itself, making it, in effect, a computer with a lens. CCTV also facilitates rapid analysis of situations and interventions. For example, the deploy- ment of CCTV cameras in Japan has proved extremely helpful in identifying and apprehending criminals. It becomes less effective when an agency attempts to use a CCTV system for transit security when it was originally installed for operational purposes only. For this reason, it is important for an agency to clearly define how it intends to use CCTV before it identifies which best practices apply. CCTV can be used for a single purpose or multiple purposes, such as opera- tional, responsive, investigative, monitoring, or deterrence. When used for security, CCTV is often paired with other technologies such as radio communications, silent alarms, and covert microphones to create an effective security system. CCTV serves a second, almost equally important, role as a security tool capable of greatly improving the performance and responsiveness of intrusion detection systems, including alarm and access control. By adding video surveillance to these systems an agency can remotely monitor and assess security conditions during a security incident. In fact, currently available advanced video surveillance technologies can further expand the effectiveness of video monitor- ing. Switches that permit operators to select between video images, multiplexers that facilitate simultaneous viewing, and new video analytic capabilities in use can aid operators by directing their attention to priority images. Technology, such as facial recognition software (discussed in a subsequent section) and thermal imaging systems, can further increase the value of video surveillance. In 2011, APTA updated its report The Selection of Cameras, Digital Recording Systems, Digital High-Speed Networks and Trainlines for Use in Transit-Related CCTV Systems (APTA 2011b), which was originally published in 2007 as a part of its Information Technology (IT) Standards Program Recommended Practice series. This document is a valuable technical resource that covers the selection and use of cameras for CCTV at stations as well as on buses or train cars. Legal and Other Issues The widespread use of such video surveillance systems has generated numerous legal issues, which are discussed in TCRP Legal Research Digest 52: Legal Implications of Video Surveillance on Transit Systems (Thomas 2018). Among the issues included are safety issues associated with use,

22 Transit Security Preparedness public access to surveillance video, and retention policies regarding video. This digest explores federal and state laws to address these issues, along with the current practices employed by tran- sit agencies to comply with those laws. To address these issues, a transit agency that uses CCTV must establish with whom camera data will be shared. CCTV access needs to be shared with the appropriate law enforcement agency that works in conjunction with the transit agency security office. It is important that there be command and control over who has access to recorded and live video, and a privacy policy must be considered for managing the use of images and sounds recorded by the system. Live video viewing from plat- forms, stations, and passenger vehicles can be a cost-effective customer service and crime deterrence tool by providing a security presence without the cost and randomness of security patrols. A transit agency must have a policy for video viewing, hard-copy sharing, and retention. Video for police investigations demands a strict chain of custody to ensure the integrity of any prosecution. Agencies must be proactive with proper education, reference material, ethical vendors, and technology staff. Agencies must also keep up with future additions and technology updates to the system. Nonproprietary equipment, warranties, and service agreements also need to be looked at closely to keep the CCTV system reliable and up to date. APTA’s Recommended Practice for use in transit-related CCTV systems covers camera specifications, system design, recording, transmission and storage (APTA 2011b). Spotlight: Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority and Atlanta Police Department CCTV MOU Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA), which owns more than 1,200 surveillance cameras, decided to share its cameras with the Atlanta Police Department’s (APD) Video Integration Center—a facility that ties together thou- sands of public and private cameras across the city. Although it required a “lot of legal wrangling” to conclude the MOU that MARTA entered into with the APD to share its camera assets with the city, MARTA recognized that it enabled an incredible amount of interagency cooperation. For example, if a crime happens downtown and police see the potential perpetrator walking toward the MARTA rail station, Atlanta police can now pull up the transit system’s cameras to aid them in tracking and apprehending the suspect. The reverse is also true of a crime that happens on MARTA property when officers need to track a suspect using the city’s cameras. Spotlight: Sacramento Regional Transit District “Voice of God” In December 2017, the Sacramento Regional Transit District (SacRT) implemented a public address (PA) system as a security enhancement tool and to improve customer service. The SacRT security staff members remotely monitor the surveil- lance cameras from the Security Operations Center in downtown Sacramento. When passengers violate basic station rules such as no smoking or drinking alcohol, SacRT security staff members use the PA system to communicate with the rule breaker. For example, they issue a simple and direct statement such as: “Excuse me, to the man wearing a red baseball cap, there is no smoking allowed at the light rail station. Please extinguish the cigarette immediately.” If passen- gers do not acquiesce, a sworn officer or transit agent will be dispatched to the station to issue a citation. The PA sends a loud and clear message that stations are under constant surveillance, and the rules are being enforced.

Preparedness Strategy and Approaches: Literature Review 23 Audio/Video Recording. The ability to record sight and sound comes standard on most new bus fleets bought by city and state transit agencies. Some transit agencies use this capability to record video and audio. For example, the Maryland Transit Administration has been record- ing sound and video since 2013 in the name of safety and customer service. Other agencies, such as the Connecticut Transportation Department, have not turned on the microphones, determining that the risk of violating riders’ privacy outweighs the benefit of collecting audio. In addition, issues have arisen with drivers over the use of audio recording. For example, in Nevada, bus drivers came to a standoff with the Washoe County Regional Transportation Com- mission in Reno over the use of the microphones. The local union representing the drivers, Teamsters Local 533, filed suit claiming that the use of microphones violated a collective bar- gaining agreement in place. Spotlight: Maryland Transit Administration Audio/Video Recording Starting in 2013, the Maryland Transit Administration has been recording sound, as well as video, on its buses in the name of safety and customer service. When passengers board a public bus in Maryland, their conversations may be recorded. The recording is justified by transit and law enforcement officials as an investiga- tive tool to help prosecute crimes and as a way to check the quality of driver and customer service. The agency does not believe listening devices are intrusive or in violation of riders’ privacy. The audio recordings have been essential in prosecut- ing about a half-dozen criminal cases over 3 years. Emerging Technology: Video/Facial Recognition. Video analytics tools and facial recogni- tion technology are beginning to play a more significant role in transit security. Security infor- mation management systems, originally designed to monitor physical alarms and fixed sensors, can be enhanced to include video analytics. The analytics tools can detect out-of-the-ordinary activity picked up by video surveillance cameras and alert security personnel in real time when a potential threat occurs, such as someone entering a rail station through an exit-only door or a person leaving behind a backpack on a train platform. The software also helps address a major challenge in the use of surveillance technology: constant monitoring of the video images. An armed robber was caught in 2013 and later convicted after police used facial recognition software to identify him in video images captured by Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) surveil- lance cameras. This was Chicago’s first conviction of a crime suspect whose identity was deter- mined in part by facial recognition software. Some larger agencies use, or are considering using, facial recognition technology as a tool in their security arsenal. CTA was awarded a $5.4 million TSA grant to integrate its surveillance program together with facial recognition software. The Regional Transportation District–Denver (RTD) is piloting a new type of software that uses next-generation, real-time video analytics to locate and track a specific individual, sometimes in a matter of seconds. The software goes beyond what existing facial-recognition technology can currently do. Legal and Other Issues Privacy and civil rights concerns have been raised about the use of facial recognition software. The technology has also been criticized for its potential to reinforce police bias. Researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology found that, overall, the software returned worse

24 Transit Security Preparedness results (i.e., false matches) for women and darker-skinned individuals. The American Civil Liberties Union ran a test of facial recognition software and found it misidentified 28 black members of Congress as criminals. In May 2019, San Francisco supervisors voted to ban the use of facial recognition software by police and other city departments. With the move, San Francisco became the first U.S. city to outlaw the technology. In June 2019, Somerville, Massachusetts, and Oakland, California, did the same. Other cities may follow in the future. Access Control Access control involves maintaining secure access to physical and cyber assets and asso- ciated facilities; limiting access to authorized users, processes, or devices; and allowing only authorized activities and transactions. Access control measures are designed to ensure that only authorized individuals enter a transit facility or premises, or, for cyber assets, that only authorized users have access to agency cyber systems or networks. Cybersecurity access control cannot be easily separated from physical security. Inadequate physical security can put cyber assets in jeopardy. Physical damage can compromise cyber assets. Common access control measures in use at transit agencies include signs, fences, key con- trols and locks, and electronic access control devices. NCHRP Research Report 930: Security 101: A Physical Security and Cybersecurity Primer for Transportation Agencies (Frazier, Western, et al., forthcoming) provides detailed information on these access control measures. Physical Protection Measures Physical protection measures are measures that protect personnel and property from damage or harm. APTA Recommended Practice Physical Security for Public Transit (APTA 2013b) pro- vides basic physical security strategy background information and an overview and descriptions of the applicability of physical security. Elements include target-hardening components such as security lighting; fencing and gates; exterior doors; industrial doors; windows and glazing; heating, ventilating, and air conditioning; mail rooms; utility openings and culverts; perimeter roads; lock and key control; standoff distance; and clear zones. The APTA Security Standards Program offers a series of documents that address aspects of physical security in more detail. The series includes • APTA SS-SIS-RP-001-10 “Security Lighting for Transit Passenger Facilities.” • APTA SS-SIS-RP-002-10 “Security Lighting for Nonrevenue Transit Passenger Facilities.” • APTA SS-SIS-RP-003-10 “Fencing Systems to Control Access to Transit Facilities.” • APTA SS-SIS-RP-004-10 “Chain Link, Mesh, or Woven Metal Fencing Systems to Control Access to Transit Facilities.” • APTA SS-SIS-RP-005-10 “Gates to Control Access to Transit Facilities.” • APTA SS-SIS-RP-006-10 “Ornamental Fencing Systems to Control Access to Transit Facilities.” • APTA SS-SIS-RP-007-10 “Crime Prevention through Environmental Design for Transit Facilities.” • APTA SS-SIS-RP-008-10 “Bus Stop Design and Placement Security Considerations.” • APTA IT-CCTV-RP-001-11 “Closed Circuit Television System (CCTV).” • APTA SS-SIS-RP-009-12 “Anti-Vehicle Barriers for Public Transit.” • APTA SS-SIS-RP-10-12 “Security Program Considerations for Public Transit.” NCHRP Report 525: Surface Transportation Security, Volume 14: Security 101: A Physical Secu- rity Primer for Transportation Agencies (Frazier et al. 2009) provides an in–depth summary of physical security countermeasures and approaches, such as access control, perimeter security,

Preparedness Strategy and Approaches: Literature Review 25 alarm and intrusion detection systems, lighting, and surveillance systems and monitoring. A forthcoming update to Security 101 (Frazier, Western, et al., forthcoming) addresses both physical and cybersecurity. TCRP Research Report 193: Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators (Countermeasures Assessment and Security Experts, LLC, and Transportation Resource Associates, Inc. 2017) includes a countermeasures catalog that lists countermeasures that are available to protect transit operators from assaults, some of which also may be effective for other security issues. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. CPTED (pronounced sep-ted) is a crime prevention philosophy based on the theory that proper design and the effective use of the built environment can lead to a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime, as well as provide an improvement in the quality of life. CPTED takes advantage of opportunities for natural access control, surveillance, and territorial reinforcement. The goal is to create safe places through limited access to properties, good surveillance, and a sense of ownership and responsibility. Before 9/11, public surface transportation operators gave little attention to CPTED, but a TCRP survey conducted in 2005 indicated that 80% of operators believe that CPTED could play a useful role. Nakanishi (2009) found that 30 of 33 responding transit agencies indicated a moderate to high investment in CPTED. In 2010, APTA published a Recommended Practice, Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) for Transit Facilities (APTA 2010) to provide guidance on use of CPTED in transit agencies. It includes a checklist for determining which principles may be applicable to a specific transit agency. Research on Effectiveness. There is limited research considering CPTED for transit facilities (Cozens et al. 2002; Cozens et al. 2003a; Cozens et al. 2003b; Cozens et al. 2004). In addition, the approaches taken in the studies done were qualitative. Given these limitations, evaluations of lighting, fencing, design changes to improve surveillance, electronic access control, road closures/ street changes, and target removal or modification did find positive effects on crime reduction. A review of CPTED case examples found that CPTED typically reduces crime. The design quality of the public transit facilities is one of the major factors cited by the studies to reduce crime and heighten the perception of safety. The design quality includes various measures to enhance surveillance, control offenders’ intrusions, restrict illegitimate access to the station area, and provide for routine maintenance and permitted activities. Studies on the design of train stations found that reducing the number of entrances and exits, widening staircases, closing off areas behind staircases and passageways, locating surveillance booths to overlook fare entry points and the platform level, increasing surveillance by other passengers or passers-by, allowing passengers wider lines of sight, providing wide platforms, installing see-through fencing on the periphery of the station, locating waiting rooms closer to retailers, putting in corner mirrors, eliminating nooks, and improving lighting were effective. (Falanga 1989; Felson et al. 1990; Felson et al. 1996). Agency Practices. Nakanishi (2009) found agencies used CPTED strategies such as enhanc- ing visibility of passenger terminals and rail stations by using bright lighting and mirrors, elimi- nating hiding places such as dark corners, eliminating unnecessary columns, and strategically placing vendors such as newsstands. New train station construction in the United States and Europe features open spaces that facilitate surveillance, reduces the effects of explosions, and eliminates sources of shrapnel. Newer rail cars are designed with CPTED principles to enhance visibility within the train cars.

26 Transit Security Preparedness Use of Visible, Unpredictable Deterrence. APTA (2013a) notes that visible, random, and unpredictable security patrols have proved to be very successful in deterring attacks and for instilling confidence in the riding public. These security patrols can range from the targeted deployments of specialized teams to the day-to-day operations of transit agency security person- nel and local police. Staffing is one of the important factors for improving safety, according to transit passengers (Uzzel et al. 2003). Station staff members were found to be very effective in increasing the per- ception of safety and cited in research (Smith 2008, Vilalta 2011) as an important factor for passengers. Spotlight: Dallas Area Rapid Transit CPTED Practices Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART) designs and assesses the transit agency’s facilities in coordination with DART police using CPTED practices. The police department’s Office of Emergency Management and the Transit Planning Department refer to DART CPTED guidelines to determine appropriate lighting levels and locations, develop safe sight lines through facilities, and minimize hiding places and other site design elements that may lead to unsafe situations. All police sergeants are trained and certified as CPTED inspectors and regularly inspect DART park-and- ride facilities to ensure continued application of CPTED practices. Every 3 years, facilities are reviewed and given new CPTED plans. Facilities are checked annually by sergeants via a CPTED inspection report checklist that was designed in house. Annual inspection reports and a memorandum documenting the findings and suggested mitigations are shared with DART’s maintenance and transportation departments so that issues can be corrected as needed. Spotlight: Edmonton Light Rail Transit Stations CPTED Study Brown (2013) conducted a study to determine how the city of Edmonton, Alberta, could better address women’s safety in suburban stations through expanding their existing design guidelines to incorporate CPTED guidelines. The findings emphasized the importance of natural surveillance and territorial definition (maintenance and defensibility of space) in creating feelings of safety in transit users. In particular, the study recommended the following: • Emphasize transparency in station design. Natural surveillance is strongly emphasized in the CPTED literature as one of the key elements in reducing both crime and the fear of crime. The use of glass at Century Park station greatly improved levels of natural surveillance and contributed to feelings of security. • Install real-time displays of train arrival and other information at all Light Rail Transit (LRT) stations. This is a relatively inexpensive yet highly visible way to improve feelings of security and satisfaction among LRT passengers. • Carry out regular and adequate maintenance and repair of all LRT stations, particularly those in less central locations. Disrepair, poor maintenance, and signs of vandalism can have a greater effect on passengers in more isolated stations in noncentral areas. Clean stations in good condition can contribute greatly to feelings of security even in isolated areas, as they indicate that due care and attention are being paid to these spaces.

Preparedness Strategy and Approaches: Literature Review 27 Deployment Strategies The deployment of security personnel is ideally based on a detailed analysis of safety and security needs of the specific transit system. Through identification of various risks that exist in the transit system, followed by evaluations of risk mitigation strategies, security personnel can be deployed to implement these strategies. Along with risk, there are other considerations to be taken into account, such as total ridership by line or by station, crime within a certain distance of a line or station, location of a station itself (for example, near a hospital, a tourist attraction, a large business, a historical landmark, etc.), and political or customer input. Other external factors also affect security personnel decisions, such as the availability of public safety response personnel in the operating area, what users or customers expect to see in terms of security, or whether other organizations in the industry use security personnel. Internal factors such as the agency’s history of deploying security forces or whether the organizational culture is tolerant of security restrictions will also have a bearing. TCRP Web-Only Document 15: Guidelines for the Effective Use of Uniformed Transit Police and Security Personnel (Schulz et al. 1997) includes more than 25 different deployment security strat- egies and functions. The contractor’s final report for the guidelines includes examples of police deployment programs at some of the larger transit agencies in the United States. Although the Spotlight: Random, Visible Deployments TSA Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams are “targeted and customized deployments of department personnel and assets with varying capa- bilities to provide a visible presence” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2012). VIPR teams screen passengers, look for suspicious behavior, and act as a visible deterrent for potential terrorist acts. VIPR teams often include transporta- tion security officers, surface transportation security inspectors, canine detection teams, explosives detection specialists, behavior detection officers, and federal, state, and local law enforcement officers. As an example, RTD makes use of the DHS VIPR teams, which regularly patrol, sometimes with a canine team, trains and stations to increase a security presence. Maryland Transit Authority Police Force Operation ZEUS exercises involve an unannounced large show of force, conducting security sweeps and emergency drills to target-harden the transit system and help guard against terrorism and criminal activity. Operation ZEUS exercises are commonly done in conjunction with other agencies, such as TSA, the Amtrak Police Department, and local police. Officers can be rapidly deployed in significant numbers at any time to any place. In response to the growing threat of random attacks, officials in London launched a program called “Project Servator” in 2014. The program consists of policing tactics involving a highly visible but unpredictable police presence, behavioral detection techniques, and random checks to deter and detect criminal and terrorist activity and to reassure the general public. Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) Employee Station Teams are teams of BART employees who are trained in advance to staff trains and stations while wearing high-visibility vests to provide an additional layer of visibility. These teams are deployed temporarily at times of greatest need.

28 Transit Security Preparedness information is somewhat dated, the activities referenced remain consistent with transit policing problems and issues today. In fact, many of the programs, or similar approaches to those listed, continue to be used. The FTA’s Security Manpower Planning Model (SMPM; Blake and Uccardi 2008) is a tool available to small and medium-sized transit agencies to assist in making staffing and deployment decisions. SMPM is an easy-to-use “what if” spreadsheet workbook available online. Because one ideal model does not exist, each transit system needs to develop policing strategy based on risk, staffing, and a deployment analysis influenced “by historical precedence and the political environment at any given time” (BCA Watson Rice LLP et al. 2015). The goal is an appropriate deployment consistent with the agency’s operational strategies and with the local community policing strategy. Security Personnel Types and Roles There are a variety of types of security presence used at transit agencies, ranging from sworn security officers to nonsworn ticket checkers, each playing a different role in security. At one end of the available options is the deployment of unarmed, part-time security officers with no arrest authority. At the other end is the fielding of a full-time, armed police department with powers of arrest. Where the agency falls along this spectrum will affect the capabilities of not just the security labor force but also the performance and effectiveness of all other integrated system security countermeasures. Security officers provide visible deterrence and can observe and report any unlawful activ- ity to law enforcement. To be effective, security officers need to be empowered with some sort of enforcement authority—which typically requires administrative action (legislation, board approval, union negotiations, etc.). Transit agencies in the United States use both sworn police and nonsworn security, and often a combination of both to provide needed security presence: • Sworn or certified law enforcement officers have the authority to detain or arrest. • Nonsworn, civilian personnel can perform some of the security duties, such as fare inspection work, but they cannot detain or arrest, so they cannot be responsible for responding to law enforcement incidents. It is important for nonsworn personnel to be trained in a manner that clearly indicates the limits of their authority to avoid liability issues. Few large systems utilize only a nonsworn security unit to provide their system policing. More frequently, transit agencies use nonsworn security to address temporary or short-term security needs, such as for large events, new asset acquisition, or other changes while a permanent solu- tion is still being considered. For most permanent security solutions, the more common choice is a combination force that provides a solid transit police presence supplemented by a security force. This combination optimizes the strength of both options. The police force can be allocated where their expertise and training will provide the most benefit, while the security unit provides presence and feed- back throughout the system at a lower cost. An in-house transit police department is used by several transportation agencies in the United States, including the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) in Washington, D.C., Metro Transit in Minneapolis–Saint Paul, the Metropolitan Transit Author- ity (MTA) in New York and New Jersey, and Port Authority in Pittsburgh. This model is espe- cially effective on systems that traverse multiple jurisdictions, as it allows for consistent policing across a system. An in-house transit police force allows complete control by the transit agency over policing the system and has the capacity for good coverage, as there are no competing loyal- ties, such as transit agency versus local law enforcement priorities. The agency can define police

Preparedness Strategy and Approaches: Literature Review 29 policies and processes that completely fit the agency’s goals and objectives. There are challenges with this model, as it is costly, legislation may be required to be recognized as law enforce- ment, and it takes time to develop the capacity and the relationships with other law enforce- ment jurisdictions and security entities to make it effective. Other challenges include attracting and maintaining officers in a competitive market. Smaller transit police forces may be challenged to provide a competitive job market environment, keep officers trained, and allow for growth opportunities. Few small and medium-sized transit agencies use this approach because of need and cost. This model is most often found in large transit systems that require a large security staff. Specialized units such as tactical teams, explosive detection teams, and others exist at some transit agencies. For example, many transit agencies use security detection dogs or K-9 teams. Other special units at some transit agencies include ticket checkers, bicycle officers, and others. The Sacramento Regional Transit District (SaRT) uses an in-house staff of transit agents that provides coverage of trains and stations for both fare inspection and staff coverage. Metro Vancouver Transit Police launched a bike patrol program to provide high- visibility patrols around the hubs and generate dialogue with individuals and groups in the surrounding community. Spotlight: Metro Vancouver Neighborhood Transit Police Officers Metro Vancouver Neighborhood Police Officers (NPOs) engage the local communi- ties around their respective hub stations, both in person and with the assistance of social media. Community outreach events provide the opportunity for the NPO team to educate members of the public on the many safety features available to them when using public transit. Attendance is often done in partnership with community groups, local government representatives, and jurisdictional police partners. Key messages communicated at the events include the See Something, Say Something campaign and the Metro text reporting service, which can be used to discreetly communicate incident details. In addition to attending commu- nity events in person, each of the NPOs is active in using social media; all are on Twitter and some are also on Instagram. Spotlight: CTA Transit Rider Interaction Program Pilot The Transit Rider Interaction Program pilot, an outgrowth of CTA Rules of Conduct, is an effort by the CTA police department to further enforce rules on the CTA and create a comfortable and safe environment for customers. The pilot, which launched in March 2017, included uniformed officers at various rail station plat- forms. Officers boarded arriving trains, both to serve as a deterrent to crime and to respond to any incidents or inquiries from customers. The effort did not affect service and was designed to increase visibility and awareness of ongoing safety and security efforts on the system. Contracting Security Staff Contracting for security staff, sworn or nonsworn, is a current practice for many transit and rail properties. The contracted model is used to take advantage of cost savings for security/ policing, to reduce agency liability, or both. Transit agencies contract with existing local law enforcement jurisdictions to provide services, typically under an MOU. Depending on the number of jurisdictions involved in the alignment or system, agencies may utilize a single entity

30 Transit Security Preparedness or multiple entities joined together to provide transit policing services. There are multiple transit agencies that employ this model: Caltrain contracts with the San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office; TriMet contracts with approximately 15 Portland-area law enforcement agencies. A challenge with contracted policing is developing the coordination or command structure, as well as developing and managing the contractual details to ensure appropriate dedication and response to the transit system. Processes need to address whether and how the home law enforcement agency can temporarily “recall” or “borrow back” the seconded staff members in times of need, so that the transit system is not left without coverage. Success with this model is contingent upon good contract management to keep the transit priorities and expectations clearly communicated and agreed upon by all parties. If these conditions do not exist, the con- tracted model will not produce the results needed and may become burdensome and ineffective. In Minneapolis, the transit system began with a contracted model, but developed an in-house transit police when the contracted service did not provide the needed coverage. One of the critical considerations surrounding contracted policing is the nature of the agreements with local law enforcement. Small and medium-sized agencies depend to a much higher degree on obtaining assistance from local area police and occasionally contract secu- rity forces. Local law enforcement officers have the responsibility to provide basic services to transit agencies within their jurisdictions consistent with service provided to others within their jurisdictions. When working with local law enforcement, research has found that it is important for transit agencies to • Understand what basic services can be provided. • Establish agreements that define what will be done. MOUs or contracts can define how law enforcement augments and improves the security of the transit system—for example, the response to incidents on the system, since local law officers may be first responders. The contract or MOU must provide the basis for the provision of coordinated, adequate, and appropriate services. Without an adequate contract that has appropriate controls in place, secu- rity may be controlled by others, with as little or as much coverage provided as those entities deem necessary. There may be little or no control to match the coverage with security considerations, policing services may or may not match the customer environment or provide for operational concerns, and officers responding to events may not have training that would allow for safe response on the system. Agencies with contracted law enforcement advise that strong, collaborative contracts that provide clear expectations, roles, and responsibilities provide the best outcome for the transit agency. Emerging Technology: Body Cameras Body-worn cameras are small video cameras—typically attached to an officer’s clothing, helmet, or sunglasses—that can capture, from an officer’s point of view, video and audio record- ings of activities and critical incidents such as officer-involved shootings. Body cameras for secu- rity personnel are an emerging technology intended to aid incident investigations, clarify police testimony, and deter corrupt practices. Body cameras can potentially help ensure that security personnel behave professionally and without escalating security events, aid in investigations and police testimony when concerns about an event are raised, and deter police officers or offenders from uncompliant behavior due to the threat of their actions being recorded on camera. The effectiveness of body cameras was evaluated by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). With support from the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented

Preparedness Strategy and Approaches: Literature Review 31 Policing Services, PERF conducted research (Miller et al. 2014) on the use of body-worn cameras through surveys and interviews with police departments nationwide. Among the police executives whose departments use body-worn cameras, there was an over- all perception that the cameras provide a useful tool for law enforcement. For these agencies, the perceived benefits that body-worn cameras offer—capturing a video recording of critical incidents and encounters with the public, strengthening police accountability, and providing a valuable new type of evidence—largely outweighed the potential drawbacks. However, the PERF study found that the use of body-worn cameras can have significant implications in terms of privacy and community relationships, internal departmental affairs (as a result of potential concerns for frontline officers), the expectations that cameras create in terms of court proceedings and officer credibility, and the financial considerations that purchasing and supporting cameras present. To mitigate privacy and community concerns, the PERF study recommended engaging the community before rolling out camera programs and factoring privacy considerations into deci- sions about when to record, where and how long to store data, and how to respond to public requests for video footage. To address officer concerns, the PERF study recommends efforts by agency leaders to engage officers on the topic, explain the goals and benefits of the initiative, and address any concerns officers may have. In addition, creating an implementation team that includes representatives from across the department can help strengthen program legitimacy and ease implementation. A study conducted with the British police force found the odds of use of force were cut in half when body cameras are present (Henstock and Ariel 2017). However, another study released in the same year found a nonstatistically relevant difference in use of force and civilian complaints when body cameras are present versus not present (Yokum et al. 2017). Similarly to other security technology, body cameras are not a “silver bullet” and therefore must not be deployed in isolation but as part of a layered, multipronged approach to transit security and security technology. Targeted Training for Key Staff Training is a critical component of security preparedness that provides employees with the tools necessary to deal with unexpected or emergency situations. The 9/11 Act (Implement- ing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007)3 established requirements for security training for employees of public transportation agencies, passenger railroad carriers, over-the-road bus (OTRB) companies, and higher-risk freight railroads. Acting on the 9/11 Act mandate, the TSA issued regulations requiring security training for public transportation systems, railroads, and OTRB operations. The federal requirements identify minimum training requirements for transit agency employees that include training in security threats and aware- ness and in handling of emergencies and security threats. It is important for a transit agency’s security plan to outline its training program and requirements, including qualification, requalification, familiarization, and refresher training programs, to ensure that employees demonstrate an understanding of and proficiency in the application of rules, procedures, and equipment (APTA 2014; Frazier et al. 2009). Training programs need to cover all aspects of an agency’s security strategy, from planning and design to operations and security awareness. Baseline security awareness training objectives for all transit employees need to be established and include behavioral awareness, surveillance, response pro- cedures, and self-protection. Additional training needs to cover how to deal with the various

32 Transit Security Preparedness situations that may arise on systems, especially those that involve individuals with mental ill- ness or disorderly conduct. The ASIS International Private Security Officer Selection and Training (PSO) Guideline (ASIS International 2019) provides a framework for private security officer job descriptions and rec- ommended minimum selection criteria, as well as an outline for the design and delivery of private security officer training by employers and other agencies. Public Transportation Safety Certification Training Program The Transit Safety and Security Program (TSSP) certificate provides a broad-based knowledge of the safety and security principles applicable to transit system safety, operations, and manage- ment. The certificate indicates that the individual has the necessary information to develop and implement system safety, security, and emergency management program plans. Figure 4 identi- fies the courses in the TSSP. Individuals can choose the rail or bus path, or both. The FTA issued a rule for the Public Transportation Safety Certification Training Program (PTSCTP),4 effective August 2018, that established federal requirements for the certification and training of State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) personnel and contractors who conduct safety audits and examinations of rail transit systems, and rail transit agency personnel and contractors who are directly responsible for safety oversight. The PTSCTP provides a uniform curriculum for safety training that consists of minimum requirements to enhance the technical proficiency of rail transit safety personnel. Bus safety personnel and other safety personnel are encouraged to voluntarily participate in the training program. The courses provided online and in an e-learning format include the following: • SMS Awareness; • SMS Safety Assurance; • SMS Principles for Transit; • TSSP courses—Transit Rail (or Bus) System Safety, Effectively Managing Transit Emergen- cies, Transit Rail Incident Investigation (or Fundamentals of Bus Collision Investigation); and • SMS for SSO Programs (for SSOA personnel and contractor support personnel only). Security Training Approaches Assessment of Surface Transportation Security Training Needs and Delivery Preferences (Lowrie et al. 2011) identified security training content needs and effective approaches by audi- ence. The study, conducted through focus groups and interviews with representatives of major Source: U.S. DOT Transportation Safety Institute 2017. Figure 4. TSSP certificate courses.

Preparedness Strategy and Approaches: Literature Review 33 surface transportation or security organizations, identified training content needs that are summarized in Table 1. The study found retraining and targeted retraining with performance monitoring were best practices. In addition, if contracted security staff members, sworn or nonsworn, are used by a transit agency, specific training needs to be provided to inform them of the transit environment. NCHRP Research Report 931: A Guide to Emergency Management at State Transportation Agencies, Second Edition (Frazier, Bye, et al., forthcoming), identifies the following training and exercise capabilities as minimum capabilities: • Ensure that employees receive training to prepare them for their roles and that they are able to practice what they have been taught to increase the effectiveness of the training; • Incorporate security awareness into existing training, such as in new or existing employee training, including position-specific training where relevant; • Keep training, drills, and contact lists up to date; and • Identify lessons learned through after-action report and incorporate recommendations into existing plans and procedures. TCRP Research Report 199: Transit Technical Training Volume 2: Guide to Overcoming Barriers to Implementing Best and Innovative Training (Cronin et al. 2018) provides best practices, strategies, and resources to assist with the implementation of effective and innovative training Table 1. Security training content needs, by audience. Audience Content Needs Frontline • Situational assessment of threats and incidents • Observational skills and reporting dangerous substances, suspicious packages, and situations • Appropriately reacting to all threats • Proper use of security equipment or technology There was clear concern that training for frontline personnel does not need to be too in-depth or technical. Transportation professionals Mid- to high-level managers and executives in operations, planning, safety, security, maintenance, and other related fields. Aside from the same basic security awareness training for frontline employees, this audience has special high-level training and education needs in the area of security risk assessment and management, vulnerability assessment, and planning for resiliency. This audience may need to understand more clearly the difference between safety and security. Contractors and vendors • Similar to frontline employee awareness training • Reporting suspicious activity Emergency responders • Transportation system operations, hazards, and vulnerabilities • Integrated communications and response practices/procedures • Integrated incident management Needs for this group will not be much different from those of frontline employees in terms of emphasis on reporting suspicious and dangerous activities, but would vary in priority according to proximity and access to critical infrastructure and operations (for maintenance workers) and to public areas. Source: Lowrie et al. 2011.

34 Transit Security Preparedness programs and techniques for frontline employees. The report includes an overview of types of innovative training strategies, including simulations, gaming, adaptive learning and intelligent tutoring, transmedia, web-based training, mobile, and social media. Examples of each training strategy in the transit and nontransit industries are included, as well as potential ways the strategy could be implemented in the transit industry. The APTA Recommended Practice Security Awareness Training for Transit Employees (APTA 2012) emphasizes that all transit employees, including contractors, contribute to security by their very presence and their alertness. Because of their varied responsibilities and work loca- tions, transit agency employees are often the first to notice or learn about suspicious activity and are best positioned to recognize threats or security concerns. Preparedness Drills and Exercises Well designed and regularly practiced drills and exercises are fundamental to security pre- paredness. DHS recognizes that exercises are a good way to demonstrate and validate skills learned in training and to identify gaps in capabilities, in particular by the development and maintenance of a progressive exercise program consistent with the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). TCRP Report 86, Volume 9: Guidelines for Transportation Emergency Training Exercises (McCormick Taylor, Inc. 2006) and Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), Volume 1: HSEEP Overview and Exercise Program Manage- ment (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2006) provide guidance to assist transportation agencies in developing drills and exercises in alignment with the National Incident Management System. The reports describe the process of emergency exercise development, implementation, and evaluation. In addition, the available literature and materials to support transportation agencies, such as state departments of transportation, traffic management centers, and public transportation systems, are described. The fundamental principles of HSEEP include a focus on capability-based objectives and exercise priorities informed by risk, leadership of the exercise program and individual exercises by elected and appointed officials, integration of the whole community where appropriate, and use of common methodology. The two major categories of exercises described in HSEEP are discussion-based exercises and operations-based exercises. • Discussion-based exercises—seminars, workshops, tabletop exercises, and games—are less costly and time-consuming than operations-based exercises. Discussion-based exercises use a facilitator to direct discussions. They help familiarize and train participants on, or to develop, plans, policies, agreements, procedures, and training. • Operations-based exercises—drills, facilitated exercises, and full-scale exercises—are more realistic; are conducted in real time; and help assess plans, procedures, personnel, technologies, and equipment. The key difference between discussion- and operations-based exercises is size and scope. For example, a tabletop exercise is a facilitated desktop discussion during which key personnel dis- cuss scripted hypothetical scenarios in a classroom or other fixed setting. Full-scale exercises, on the other hand, are multidisciplinary, multiagency field simulations that use role players, controllers, and other forms of logistical support to actively work through mock hypotheticals designed to resemble one or more real-life conditions. Security Operations for Public Transit (APTA 2013e) includes the recommendation that transit agencies develop meaningful exercises, including covert testing, that test their response effectiveness and how well they coordinate with first responders. In addition to large regional

Preparedness Strategy and Approaches: Literature Review 35 drills, transit systems need to also conduct regular, transit-focused drills. It is important that such drills test response and recovery to both natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Train- ing resources from APTA include Recommended Practice Transit Incident Drill and Exercises (APTA 2013c). Scenario development requires careful planning since the effective use of scenario-developed data sets can help the agency to develop policy and procedures and even make staffing-level deployment decisions. Scenarios are narratives or timelines and are used in operations-based exercises and tabletop exercises. Sources of scenarios include DHS’s National Planning Scenarios (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2019) and the Public Transportation System Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide (FTA 2003). The Mineta Transportation Institute Report 12-08 Exercise Handbook annex (Edwards and Goodrich 2014) includes an example scenario for a SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) failure for a mass transit system. TCRP Web-Only Document 60/NCHRP Web-Only Document 200: Command-Level Deci- sion Making for Transit Emergency Managers (Pigora 2013) describes the development and implementation of the Transit Emergency Response Application (TERA). TERA is a simula- tion used to respond to and visualize the effect of transportation agency actions in an event or disaster that may affect normal operations. TERA is a web-based facilitated exercise that is anticipated to have at least 18 scenarios available. There are roles for transit agencies, depart- ments of transportation, rail, and airports. Currently, six training scenarios are available with transit roles: 1. Active shooter, 2. Power outage, 3. Earthquake, 4. Hazardous material, 5. Hurricane, and 6. Flood. Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program The Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP) is designed to improve the intermodal transportation industry’s ability to prepare for and respond to transporta- tion security incidents by increasing awareness, improving processes, creating partnerships, and delivering training exercises to mass transit and passenger rail stakeholders. Through I-STEP, TSA employs multiphased workshops, tabletop exercises, and working groups to inte- grate mass transit and passenger rail agencies with regional law enforcement and emergency response partners to expand and enhance coordinated deterrent and incident management capabilities. Spotlight: Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority Full-Scale Active Shooter Exercise The Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (GCRTA) recognized the poten- tial for active shooters on the system and decided to take proactive action by partnering with the TSA to conduct a full-scale active shooter exercise. The exercise gave GCRTA employees an understanding of the best actions to under- take should an active shooter incident occur on the GCRTA system.

36 Transit Security Preparedness TSA I-STEP Active Shooter Training and Exercise The TSA I-STEP conducted an active shooter training and exercise at a transportation conference in Arizona in 2016. The training and exercise addressed FEMA’s Prevention, Protection, and Response mission areas— specifically the Interdiction and Disruption, Physical Protective Measures, and Environmental Response/ Health and Safety core capabilities. The purpose was “to provide insight into how law enforcement may respond to an active shooter incident (e.g., priorities, capabilities, actions) as well as expectations law enforcement may have of transportation agency employees and how those employees may be able to assist them in their response” (TSA Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program 2016). In addition to trans- portation agency members, participating stakeholders included the DHS Southern Border Joint Task Force– West, the TSA, the Northwest Fire District, the Pima County Sheriff’s Office, and the Pima County Regional Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team. The exercise included the following components: 1. A TSA presentation on industry security efforts, ongoing initiatives, and active shooter resources/tools; 2. An active shooter training presented by the Pima County Sheriff’s Office; and 3. A live active shooter drill put on by the Pima County Regional SWAT Team. More specifically, the training and exercise addressed the following three components: 1. Law enforcement and transportation agency employee actions, considerations, and expectations that could help prevent, protect against, or mitigate an active shooter situation; 2. Countermeasures and policies that transportation agencies could implement to prevent, protect against, or mitigate an active shooter situation in/on their facilities/infrastructure; and 3. Methods to protect the health and safety of transportation agency employees facing an active shooter situation. Component 1 consisted of presentations on the following topics: • Ongoing TSA and Industry Security Initiatives, • Securing Transportation Assets and Operations—Mitigation Strategies for Surface Transportation Modes, and • Active Shooter Resources and Tools (www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-preparedness). Component 2 was delivered by the Pima County Sheriff’s Office. The key points emphasized in Component 2 were the mentality of active shooters and their desire to kill as many as possible, and that active shooter events are unpredictable and dynamic and typically end before the arrival of law enforcement. Recommended transportation agency personnel actions included • What to do prior to an incident—create a flexible plan to reach safety, be aware of the surroundings. • Actions to take if the active shooter is outside the facilities. • Actions to take if the active shooter is inside the facilities. • Information to provide 911. • What to expect and do when police arrive. • Emergency care tips. Exercise Drill Scenario The drill scenario for Component 3 was described as follows: Transportation agency employees are attending a public hearing on the reconstruction project to address safety and other issues; the potential consequences for

Preparedness Strategy and Approaches: Literature Review 37 Awareness Campaigns for Public and Transit Employees Today employee and public awareness programs are widely viewed as a core component of a transit agency’s system security plan. The 9/11 Act recognized that security awareness training—how to observe, assess and respond to threats and incidents—is an important and effective part of security preparedness. Public awareness campaigns in transit have existed for some time. Faced with Irish Repub- lican Army attacks on public transportation in the 1990s, British authorities sought the assis- tance of transit staff and passengers in identifying suspicious objects. Signage and repeated public announcements kept the public alert to the terrorist threat and reminded them to remain vigilant for abandoned packages and immediately report suspicious activity or arti- cles to staff. After 9/11 and a series of attacks on international transit systems, U.S. transit agencies, with the support of the FTA and DHS/TSA and relevant legislation, implemented awareness training programs and campaigns. Transit Watch was started in 2002. By 2005, more than 200 agencies had implemented some form of public awareness materials (Shaw 2011). An updated version of Transit Watch was released in 2006. private residential and commercial property and for protected wetlands, waters, and animals has made opposi- tion strong; threats to disrupt the public hearing have been made. Live Exercise Drill The drill proceeded as follows: Exercise observers are placed inside the building. A disgruntled individual enters the building with an assault rifle and starts firing. Observers are moved outside the building and view the SWAT team arriving and entering the building. Observers reenter the building and view the actions of the shooter and SWAT team. The active shooter proceeds from room to room until he reaches the hearing room. The SWAT team searches for the active shooter. Observers are placed in the hearing room to view the resolu- tion of the conflict (the SWAT team kills the shooter). Observers are then moved outside to view fire and EMS responders arrive, evacuate occupants, and treat injuries as the SWAT team provides protection. A final Q&A session is held with the observers. Exercise Results/Analysis and Next Steps For each objective, strengths including best practices and areas for improvement were identified. For the first objective, a best practice was for transportation agencies to have emergency action plans for active shooter situations; an area for improvement was that mass transit is a “soft target” for active shooters. For the second objective, a best practice was awareness that creating chaos can distract the shooter; an area for improvement was that attendees were uncertain regarding what arms-bearing individuals might do during an active shooter situation. For the third objective, a best practice was outreach to local law enforcement agencies, which are typically willing to help provide transportation agencies with active shooter prepared- ness and training; an area for improvement was that transportation agency employees believed there were no hiding areas in their facilities. Areas for improvement included root cause analyses and options for consideration. TSA I-STEP Active Shooter Training and Exercise (Continued)

38 Transit Security Preparedness In 2010, DHS licensed the use of the MTA’s “If You See Something, Say Something” slogan for its anti-terrorism efforts in surface transportation and other key sectors. Employee Awareness Programs The APTA Recommended Practice Security Awareness Training for Transit Employees (APTA 2012) emphasized that all transit employees, including contractors, contribute to security by their very presence and their alertness. The Recommended Practice provides the minimum guideline for security awareness training for all transit employees, including contract employees, to strengthen transit system security. The First Observer Plus™ Program5 trains surface trans- portation professionals (highway, mass transit, over-the-road bus, school bus, trucking, truck rental, pipelines, parking workers, and transit police) to recognize and assess suspicious activity and report their observations. NCHRP Report 793: Incorporating Transportation Security Awareness into Routine State DOT Operations and Training (Frazier et. al. 2014) included the core components of an effective secu- rity employee awareness program: • Communicating general messages—promoting security awareness with such messages as “Security begins with you!” and “Be alert and be aware—you are the eyes, ears, and mouths of the DOT.” • Knowing the risks—informing employees about the risks within the agency and the poten- tial consequences. Messages can include a general overview of the risks to transportation agency systems, as well as specific, job-related messages—for example, alerting maintenance employees about the risks involving vehicles, equipment, and facilities. • Recognizing and observing security risks—providing practical tips on how to detect and identify potential security risks—for example, “Note suspicious activities and objects and report things that do not seem right” and “Know your coworkers, your community, and your work environment. Be aware of unusual changes in your surroundings.” • Reporting a security threat—clarify ways to respond to and report a security threat. Specify the contact, how to contact, and what information to provide. Posters, employee handouts, and wallet cards are effective ways to communicate the reporting guidelines throughout the agency. Public Awareness Programs Transit agencies around the world have conducted courtesy-focused public awareness campaigns for almost as long as security-related campaigns. The CTA launched a “Don’t Be Jack” campaign in 2002—referring to Jack, an inconsiderate rider—to encourage riders to be more considerate of other passengers. The New York MTA made national news with its 2014 campaign against manspreading. Since the launch of the initial awareness programs focused on terrorism and safety, transit agencies have implemented programs focused on other issues such as enforcing their codes of conduct, encouraging courteous customer behavior, and preventing sexual harassment and human trafficking. Engaging Transit Riders in Public Awareness Programs (Haider and Martinez 2014) identified strategies and tactics to engage transit riders in public security awareness programs by conduct- ing interviews with transit agency representatives, analyzing transit rider survey data, and hosting transit rider focus groups. To resonate with transit riders, public awareness campaign messages need to communicate the following: • What to look for—The research clearly indicates the importance of educating transit riders on what could be considered suspicious.

Preparedness Strategy and Approaches: Literature Review 39 • What to do when they see it—Straightforward and simple directions (i.e., call or text a certain number, inform a transit employee, etc.) regarding what to do when a suspicious activity or package is spotted are critical. To better promote the Metro Vancouver text reporting service in 2017, the agency printed new See Something, Say Something posters and refreshed its contact cards. To complement the campaign, a former shop at the Broadway-Commercial SkyTrain station was converted into a Metro Vancouver Transit Police suboffice for officers working in the hub. The kiosk was periodically opened for pop-up events and to distribute information to passengers. • What’s in it for them—The research found that riders responded to the message that “we’re all in this together.” Recognizing this, it is important to stress the idea that reporting a suspi- cious activity or package is for self-preservation, as well as the safety of others. • Not to hesitate—Public awareness campaigns need to be responsive to the natural behavior of riders to “second guess” their instincts as to whether a certain situation is suspicious. London Metropolitan Police launched a security awareness campaign in February 2012 that included radio advertisements, posters, and flyers with the tag line “It’s probably nothing but . . .” and encouraged the public to give specially trained police officers the opportunity to be the judge. The Rural Transit Assistance Program (RTAP) developed a marketing toolkit, Strategies for Building Awareness, Image, and Support6 that includes effective methods for promoting aware- ness, image, and support using both nonpaid communications channels and paid advertising. It includes the basics of social media and the other national RTAP resources. Evaluation of Effectiveness There is little formal evaluation of transit security awareness programs. Efforts to assess whether the messages are reaching transit riders and to identify obstacles to participation have been limited. A Mineta Transportation Institute study (Edwards, Haas, and Rohlich 2010) attempted to explore the effectiveness of transit security awareness campaigns in the San Francisco Bay Area. However, researchers found that none of the agencies interviewed actively sought to measure the effectiveness of their security awareness efforts. Jenkins and Butterworth (2018) found that enlisting the public in security does work. Using the Mineta Transportation Institute database, researchers looked at worldwide patterns in attacks aimed against buses, trains, and passenger ferries and found that in 300 incidents, alert citizens, passengers, or staff have prevented just under 9% of incidents by notifying authorities of suspicious objects. Other research findings indicate that existing security awareness campaigns were reaching transit riders. However, additional strategies could be implemented to enhance the effect of campaign materials, remove obstacles to reporting, and build positive relationships between an agency and all its customers (Haider et al. 2011). In a 2012 study conducted at the MTA, more than 70% of transit riders attributed their increased awareness of how to respond if they see something suspicious to posters and signs they had seen while riding transit and other informa- tion provided at MTA locations (Greenberg et al. 2012). Feedback from the focus groups indicated that transit riders’ daily experiences dealing with the transit system, individual employees, and other riders had the most significant effect on their likelihood to report suspicious activity. For the most part, these experiences varied by rider- ship patterns such as mode, frequency, and time of day rather than race, age, gender, etc. This research revealed the reasons why people cannot or do not make reports. They include • Lack of trust in the transit agency and its employees, • A reluctance to report something that could be nothing, • Anticipated inconvenience, and • Communication challenges.

40 Transit Security Preparedness If riders believe an agency and its employees are concerned for their welfare and are trying to meet their needs, they are more likely to respond to requests for support and cooperation. Planning and implementing public awareness activities in isolation from other agency issues and operations limits their potential to effect real change. Evidence on the effectiveness of etiquette-related campaigns is mixed. Some transit advocates and officials say they can at least raise awareness, even if they can’t fix the worst behavior. The MTA “manspreading” campaign turned something people grumbled about privately into a topic of widespread discussion. Others, such as the Toronto Transit Commission, have not found courtesy campaigns to be very effective. Most agree that courtesy campaigns are not effective if they are not enforced by staff or the public. Spotlight: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority Look Up. Speak Up. The Philadelphia Regional Transit Partners wanted to raise awareness of the role commuters can play in keeping transit systems safe through a program funded by a multiphase grant from the Department of Homeland Security. A public awareness campaign was created that would raise transit safety awareness, educate riders on what constitutes suspicious activity, and provide them with the tools necessary to report suspicious activity on regional transit systems. The campaign included • A compelling message—The “Look Up. Speak Up.” slogan was created to provide a clear call to action that spurs transit riders to stay vigilant. • An abbreviated calling code—#1776 was established for instant reporting of suspicious activity. Calls to #1776 went to the 24/7 staffed transit desk at the Delaware Valley Intelligence Center. • A campaign landing page—www.lookupspeakup.com was launched to offer consumers tips for identifying suspicious activity as well as a way to email about potential threats. A Facebook page and a Twitter account were also set up to further engage transit riders and regional residents in the program. • Radio, billboards, signage, print, and digital display were added to the campaign to reach the diverse target audiences. In 2015–2016, additional phases were implemented. Law enforcement testi- monials were added to the messaging. The website was expanded to include a #1776 app download section along with a media center with a series of edu- cational video vignettes that visually showcased potential suspicious activity categories using law officers. An SMS text-to-tip program was launched in the spring of 2016. As a result of the campaign, more than 2,000 tips were submitted, and the #1776 app had more than 1,000 app downloads across all platforms (Apple, Amazon, and Google Play) in 2015. A November 2015 survey showed that since the campaign launch there has been a steady increase in the public’s awareness and likelihood of reporting suspicious activity.

Preparedness Strategy and Approaches: Literature Review 41 Spotlight: MTA, NJ Transit, and Amtrak Joint Program The MTA, NJ Transit, and Amtrak launched a public safety campaign, “Let’s Travel Safely, Together” in 2015, offering safety tips for customers traveling through New York City’s Penn Station. The campaign includes posters, videos, handout maps, public address announcements, and advertisements using the animated green and red “bubble people” already made famous in courtesy campaigns on New York City subways and buses, the Long Island Rail Road, and the Metro-North Railroad. Officials were in Penn Station from 7:30 a.m. to 7:30 p.m. on the day of the launch to draw attention to the message and to distribute foldout maps with floor plans of Penn Station. With many first-time customers traveling through Penn Station to partake in holiday shopping and related activities, a security awareness message accompanied the station safety tips. Customers were reminded that if they “See Something”—any suspicious activity on platforms or trains—to “Say Something.” Customers were told to call 1-888-NYC-SAFE or visit one of the several police posts located within Penn Station. Handouts were distributed highlighting the post locations of security personnel, making it easy for even infrequent travelers to know where to find assistance. Spotlight: The Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority LA Metro realized that dealing with bad rider behavior is one reason people say they don’t use the system. For the “Metro Manners” campaign, LA Metro used original characters, “Rude Dude” and “Super Kind,” in fun, lighthearted music videos, outdoor ads, and social media postings, to draw attention to the most pervasive etiquette problems on the system. The “Metro Manners” campaign videos have been viewed more than 5 million times across YouTube, Facebook, Instagram and Twitter, including more than 1.5 million views by likely riders. Sentiment analysis by LA Metro has shown a universally positive response, with more than 78% of social reaction characterized as “joyous,” encouraging an ongoing conversation about rider behavior.

Spotlight: WMATA “STOP Harassment” WMATA launched a public awareness campaign to STOP harassment, with ads running in D.C. Metro stations in conjunction with Sexual Assault Awareness Month and Stop Street Harassment Week in 2019. The ads, developed in partnership with Stop Street Harassment and Collective Action for Safe Spaces, empowered riders to report and intervene if they witness or experience an incident of harassment. The campaign features the message “You can help STOP harassment” with four simple strategies that spell out STOP—Sidetrack, Tell, Observe, and Postpone. WMATA developed a variety of tools to provide a safe, convenient way to report incidents of harassment. Customers can text Metro Transit Police at MyMTPD or call 202-962-2121, tell a WMATA employee, or go to wmata.com/harassment. The latest campaign was part of an ongoing effort that began in 2012 to raise awareness and combat sexual harassment in the transit system. In a 2018 report, Understanding Sexual Harassment on Public Transportation, WMATA found that familiarity with the campaign increased the likelihood of reporting incidents of harassment (WMATA 2018). Spotlight: Golden Gate Bridge District “Respect Your Ride” The Golden Gate Bridge District rolled out a colorful code of conduct campaign, “Respect Your Ride,” to ensure safety for all transit cus- tomers and to remind customers of appropriate behavior when riding the buses and ferries. The campaign used humor and playful images to communicate the rights and expectations of passengers and pro- vided an improved means for passengers to communicate with the district in the event of an incident.

Preparedness Strategy and Approaches: Literature Review 43 Technology: Mobile Applications A recent technology in use for transit security is mobile software applications (apps) that allow passengers to use their mobile devices—phone, tablet, or watch—to safely get involved and easily interact with the transit agency to report an issue to transit agency authorities such as suspicious activity, people, or objects; disruptive behavior; and safety or maintenance issues. The apps are designed in an easy-to-use format that makes it easier for passengers to report their concerns in real time. The software helps them determine their location when reporting an incident and allows them to quickly send information and often photos to the agency security. A common app used by many transit agencies in the United States and Canada allows transit riders to instantly report safety or security concerns. App users can click a button to either directly contact transit security personnel or discreetly submit a report with photo or video, a description of the potentially threatening situation, and GPS coordinates. Reports may also be submitted anonymously through the app, and the app automatically disables the camera flash when in use so as not to draw undue attention to the rider. Security personnel can follow up on a report immediately and directly. Spotlight: LYNX See & Say App The LYNX See & Say app allows customers to initiate a real-time, two-way com- munication through the mobile application to 911 (using their phones) or to communicate with LYNX Security by sending a report through the app or a text (407-449-7550). A 5-second video or photos can be attached to a report to pro- vide a better understanding of the situation. Customers will be able to submit the report with their location and contact information, or they can choose to submit anonymously. Users are still encouraged to use the “Call 911” button to report immediate emergency concerns. Once the report is submitted, LYNX can provide updates back to the customer on the status of their report. Incoming reports will be monitored 24 hours a day. Another feature allows LYNX to send out advisories and “be on the lookout” alerts. Report categories available in the app have been limited to safety and security concerns. The list includes, but is not limited to, the following: • Assault or fighting, • Comments, • Damage to LYNX bus shelters or bus stops, • Disruptive behavior, • Graffiti or vandalism, • Other, • Suspicious activity, • Theft, • Unattended bag or package, • Unsafe operation of a LYNX vehicle, and • Unsafe waiting area. Most apps in use are for passengers on the transit system. Some transit systems are reaching into the community and partnering with existing app software companies to promote interac- tion between those who live in close proximity to transit system lines, stations, and bus terminals.

44 Transit Security Preparedness Some transit agencies are providing another option to report suspicious or unwanted behavior—texting. Agencies have found that people may not call or get involved, but they will send a text. Spotlight: Minneapolis–Saint Paul Metro Transit “Text for Safety” Metro Transit customers can now discreetly report suspicious or unwanted behavior through text messages. Using the “Text for Safety” feature, customers are put in direct contact with trained Metro Transit staff members who can respond by text and send transit police if needed. The service was introduced so individuals can seek help even if they don’t feel safe making a phone call. It is expected to be especially useful in harassment situations. The Text for Safety service also benefits individuals who are deaf, blind, or hard of hearing. Translation services for multiple languages will also be available through the service. Spotlight: New Jersey Transit Neighborhood Social Network Partnership The New Jersey Transit Police Department partnered with a global private social network for neighborhoods in an effort to help increase active “eyes and ears’’ surrounding the agency’s infrastructure. The New Jersey Transit Police Department is not able to access residents’ network information or content on the social network. This partnership is intended to help decrease rail line crime and accidents and promote interaction between those who live in close proximity to NJ Transit rail and light rail lines and stations and bus terminals and the New Jersey Transit Police Department. The New Jersey Transit Police Department can geo-target residents who live within a 1-mile radius of rail and light rail lines and stations, as well as bus terminals, and use the social network to • Inform nearby residents of criminal activity such as theft and vandalism. • Educate residents on how to report suspicious activity. • Provide educational information on how to teach children about the dangers of railroad tracks. • Increase the number of residents who interact with New Jersey Transit Police officers who patrol nearby stations and terminals. The New Jersey Transit Police Department conducted a pilot test of the platform for neighborhoods along the Hudson-Bergen Light Rail and Morris & Essex stations. Feedback indicated that neighbors were overwhelmingly in favor of the partnership.