Transit Security Preparedness (2020)

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55 C H A P T E R 5 The synthesis literature review, survey results, and input from the review panel identified transit agencies that provide examples of notable security preparedness practices. The case examples included in this section were developed through interviews with agency representa- tives, reports identified in the literature review, and information obtained from media and other public sources of information. The five case examples are as follows: 1. Planned Special Events: Minneapolis–Saint Paul Metro Transit and Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority; 2. Approaches to Address Homelessness: San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit and Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority; 3. Training and Exercises: Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Drills and Exercises Training Program and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; 4. Security Committees: King County Metro Transit Department; and 5. Federal Emergency Management Agency Transit Security Grant Programs. Planned Special Events: Minneapolis–Saint Paul Metro Transit and Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority A planned special event is a public activity with a scheduled time, location, and duration that may affect the normal operation of the surface transportation system because of increased travel demand or reduced capacity attributed to event staging. Special events range from very large events, such as the Olympics or the Super Bowl, to very small events such as a local community parade. They include sporting events, conventions, concerts, and seasonal festivals. The DHS secretary, acting as representative for the president, can designate major federal government events (such as presidential inaugurations) or public events that are considered to be nationally significant (such as political conventions and major sporting events, such as the Super Bowl) as National Special Security Events (NSSEs). The NSSE designation is typi- cally determined by the anticipated attendance by U.S. officials and foreign dignitaries, the size of the event, and the significance of the event. When an event is designated an NSSE, the U.S. Secret Service becomes the lead agency in developing, exercising, and implementing security operations. New Jersey Transit was commended by the U.S. Secret Service for its successful execution of its security plan for the 2004 Republican National Convention, held at Madison Square Garden in New York City. During the convention, transit police, assisted by the New Jersey State Police and other New Jersey law enforcement agencies, inspected every New York–bound train every day of the convention. Other security measures put in place included aerial patrols Case Examples

56 Transit Security Preparedness of railroad infrastructure, K-9 patrols of stations and rail yards, and electronic monitoring of bridges and tunnels. To reduce congestion, one-third of New York–bound trains were rerouted to Hoboken, New Jersey, where extra customer service representatives were deployed to help customers reach their destinations. Customers told the media their experience “exceeded their expectations.” After the Philadelphia Phillies’ World Series parade in 2008, public transit and roadways were overwhelmed in certain locations. Having learned from that event, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority was prepared for a subsequent papal visit and the 2019 Super Bowl parade. A defined quantity of 1-day passes, based on the volume the system could handle, was sold for suburban rail lines for both Pope Francis’s visit and the Super Bowl parade. Trains were put on a special schedule to shuttle passengers as quickly and safely as possible. Minneapolis–Saint Paul Metro Transit: Super Bowl LII (2018) Metro Transit operates one of the largest public transportation systems in the country, span- ning both Minneapolis and Saint Paul. The agency provides an integrated network of buses, light rail, and commuter trains. The Metro Blue Line travels between Mall of America and Target Field. The Red Line provides bus rapid transit between Apple Valley and Mall of America. The Green Line travels between downtown Minneapolis and downtown Saint Paul. Super Bowl LII was held at the U.S. Bank Stadium in Minneapolis on February 4, 2018. Super Bowl festivities began on Friday, January 26, and continued through game day, Sunday, February 4. Transit use was expected to be substantial—“the most transit-reliant Super Bowl ever played,” according to Metro Transit—because the stadium is in the heart of downtown. Metro Transit began planning for the event in 2016 and spent more than a year crafting its Super Bowl plans. Planning security started with learning the lessons from other cities and transit agencies that have hosted the Super Bowl. The experiences of Santa Clara and Houston helped Metro Transit understand “what game day looks like [and] what post-game looks like.” The agency also learned that the Super Bowl is more than game day; it is a “10-day event that descends into celebration across the region.” The scope of the event and number of visitors would require Metro Transit to “prepare our system for something unlike any other major event that we’ve hosted” (Pyzyk 2018). Metro Transit worked closely with other municipal departments and organizations within the Twin Cities to plan for the event. “Dozens of committee meetings and planning groups” helped plan how to provide a “safe and fun atmosphere” in a manner that worked for everybody (Pyzyk 2018). Coordinated planning occurred across jurisdictions and disciplines and included DHS, the National Football League (NFL) and NFL Host Committee, the city of Minneapolis, U.S. Bank Stadium, the Minnesota Department of Transportation, and other advisory groups. Three tabletop exercises and two functional exercises identified likely challenges and contingencies. Contingency planning was critical, because Metro Transit experienced almost every contingency identified during the Super Bowl—a winter weather event, a system power failure, a light rail vehicle failure, and protests that blocked Metro Transit light rail trains. The largest security detail ever deployed in Minnesota—and in Super Bowl history up to that time—was put in place in coordination with Homeland Security and regional law enforcement partners. The force included hundreds of officers from 60 police departments across the state, 40 federal agencies and related offices, 400 members of the Minnesota National Guard, and private contractors. Metro Transit Police had an “army of police” stationed along rail lines to provide security. The department expected the Super Bowl–related security costs to be repaid

Case Examples 57 from security grants. The Metro Transit Police Department received a Gold Award for Rail Security from APTA for its Super Bowl efforts. A “secure perimeter” around the stadium that began on February 2 resulted in road closures and the use of a temporary transit station in place of the usual Mall of America transit station. Additional Metro Transit bus drivers and supervisors were put on regular service lines to address service delays and other issues attributable to the road closures and congestion. Metro sequestered the rail lines, creating the “bubble” to provide direct service to the game from two satellite starting points—the Metro Transit Blue Line station at Mall of America and the Green Line station at Stadium Village. Game ticket holders used a Metro Transit electronic ticket on their smartphones. The fans went through security, a 4-step security check similar to that used for boarding flights, at these two locations, which reduced potential wait times at the stadium. It also allowed for screening, and queuing for screening, to be done inside, out of the likely frigid Minnesota February weather. From there, the fans boarded light rail cars that carried them directly into the secure zone of the stadium. Trains did not stop or open their doors along the route. The travel route and all of the trains being used for the service to the stadium underwent pre–game day security screenings, and received final checks on Sunday, game day morning, along with train operators and other transit agency staff. When U.S. Bank Stadium opened in 2016, Metro Transit riders found long lines, slow trains, and jammed cars after the first two events at the new stadium. Metro Transit put the many lessons learned about crowd dispersal since then to use for the Super Bowl. Metro Transit had trains parked inside the tightly secured perimeter, ready for when the game was over. When one train left, another immediately pulled into the station to load and depart. The goal was to clear the crowd within 90 minutes after the game ended. Buses were ready for fans who chose to leave the game early. Employees at the Metro Transit Rail Control Center watched the movement of every train and were ready to respond to breakdowns or other issues. Metro Transit and the City of Minneapolis worked together on special service routing plans during the event. Replacement buses were run all day, because most of the Blue Line and a por- tion of the Green Line were reserved for Super Bowl fans. The rides on the replacement buses were free to make up for the inconvenience of monopolizing the light rail system for Super Bowl activity. Special express bus trips were offered to and from downtown Minneapolis from area park-and-rides. An effort was made to maximize fleet availability, with buses on standby to be pressed into service if needed. Tailored transit pricing with three fare options was offered for fans attending the Super Bowl festivities, with purchases available only through the Metro Transit app. Metro Transit Ambassadors were in force along the rail lines and replacement bus routes to provide assistance. Transit customer and fan information—road closings, increased transit options, parking spaces, and traffic routes available—were posted on the NFL Host Committee “Know Before You Go” website, and a dedicated Super Bowl information page was posted on the Metro Transit website. Rider alerts were posted on social media. Nearly 6.4 million rides were provided in January, including more than 1 million Green Line rides; nearly 823,000 Blue Line rides; and close to 67,000 Northstar rides. Nearly 210,000 addi- tional rides were taken during the more than a week’s worth of Super Bowl events, leading the Green and Blue lines and the Northstar Commuter Rail Line to their highest-ever January rider- ship totals. Metro Transit found that ridership was boosted in part because of the extra service that was offered during Super Bowl festivities. More than 17,500 rides were provided to and from

58 Transit Security Preparedness downtown Minneapolis from area park-and-rides where special express bus trips were offered. Fares collected during the 10-day period offset the cost of the extra service that was provided. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority: Super Bowl LIII (2019) The Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA), one of the top 10 transpor- tation agencies in the United States, operates a bus and rapid transit system in the Atlanta metropolitan area. The system has 101 bus routes covering 1,439 miles of road, and 48 miles of rail track with 38 train stations. MARTA provided rail service from the venues that held the major events surrounding the Super Bowl, along with service directly to the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. Similar to Metro Transit, MARTA began planning 2 years before the event. MARTA had previous experience in providing service during earlier Super Bowls, along with other sports championship events and other NSSEs, such as the 1996 Olympics, but planning still began by visiting the most recent Super Bowl host cities—Houston and Minneapolis—to learn from their experiences, as was done by Metro Transit. Frequent meetings were held with the federal, local, and law enforcement representatives and other stakeholders to determine MARTA’s Super Bowl plan. The existing relationships with other transportation providers, local and national police agencies, local municipalities, and public safety agencies helped MARTA gain assistance in the effort. MARTA centralized the planning initiatives under a lead program manager who collected all departmental plans into a single playbook that identified the key roles and responsibilities, the forecasted physical and human resource needs, and the resource allocation for critical locations within the system. An extensive threat vulnerability or weaknesses assessment of the infrastruc- ture was conducted that included locating all ingress/egress points that could be used to gain access to the MARTA system and enter the Super Bowl “hot zone.” MARTA analyzed the secu- rity and stability of the train control and SCADA systems. Detailed service planning began a year before the event for the full event duration—the 10 days of pre-event festivities, game day, and the departure of game fans, similar again to Metro Transit. MARTA realized that the plan had to be flexible to accommodate changes in event schedules and crowd sizes and also took into account regular riders and how they would be affected. Reinforced by the Metro Transit experience, MARTA considered every possible service interruption sce- nario. MARTA held numerous tabletop exercises, as Minneapolis had done, with the assistance of almost 30 public safety agencies, to prepare contingency plans for every scenario. On the evening before Super Bowl Sunday, there was a trespasser on the tracks at a MARTA rail station and several small fires on adjacent CSX tracks at another. Both incidents were handled quickly with minimal rail service disruption. Every large event in the year leading up to the Super Bowl was treated as a “dry run” to learn and fine-tune the plan. In addition, MARTA planned and executed the “region’s largest emer- gency preparedness exercise” in October 2018 (MARTA 2018). The full-scale event included theatrical explosions, smoke, and actors to realistically produce scenarios for practicing how to handle a terrorist attack during the Super Bowl—an active shooter on a train who had taken hostages. The exercise helped to demonstrate MARTA’s capabilities and assisted in identifying any gaps. The FBI, the TSA, and the Atlanta police were part of the exercise. MARTA included all employees in the 10-day operational period plan. For example, the exist- ing Transit Ambassador program was expanded to include members of the agency administra- tive staff, who received customer service training, among those who were positioned in rail

Case Examples 59 stations to provide customer service to riders. The agency recognized that the initiative needed to come in the form of a policy or a procedure to make it an agency priority. The redeployed staff on the front lines was an overwhelming success, according to MARTA. During Super Bowl weekend, 500 sworn officers with the MARTA Police Department and other agencies patrolled the entire rail system. MARTA reached out to other transit agencies to provide police support and crowd control for key slots on platforms, at station entrances, and in parking lots to reduce staff fatigue. The uniform patrol was supplemented by the Special Opera- tions Response Team and K-9 teams trained in explosive detection. Other training conducted in preparation for the event included crowd control training, active shooter training, hazardous device awareness, and sex trafficking detection training. For the entire event, MARTA ran a demand-based rail service during peak ridership periods to clear platforms quickly. Trains were staged at end-of-line stations and in pocket tracks to quickly accommodate growing crowds. From January 30 to February 5, MARTA provided 24-hour continuous rail service. Conclusions and Lessons Learned Plan and exercise the plans. Pre-planning, planning, training, dry runs, and even live runs are important for planned special events. Recognize the full duration of the event period in planning. Most events become multiday events, even without hosted pre-event or post-event activities: visitors may be traveling to and from the events on the days before or after the event. Remember the regular customers. Metro Transit learned from both Santa Clara and Houston that transit authorities need to do as much as possible for loyal customers. As one senior execu- tive noted, “Our regular customers are the people who allow us to keep operating day in and day out.” Keep public transportation moving. Crowd management and metering is vital to provide a safe, positive rider experience. Communicate with customers so they know what to expect and to avoid customer dissatisfaction. Approaches to Address Homelessness: San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit and Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Individuals and families struggling with homelessness often use public transit as shelters, or as alternatives to shelter, and as safe places. These individuals and families sometimes sleep on trains and buses, form encampments on transit property, and use public transit to move from location to location. Most transit agencies—rural and urban—consider homelessness an issue; larger agencies often characterize it as a major issue. The presence of those experiencing homelessness on transit affects the customer experience. Passengers may find that those experiencing homelessness who are sleeping on vehicles and in stations may limit access to seats, restrooms, or elevators. Surveys have found that people will stop taking public transit out of concerns over cleanliness and safety, which they attribute to the presence of those experiencing homelessness on the system (Boyle 2016). Transit agencies take many approaches to address issues related to homelessness to improve the ridership experience and to maintain public safety. Agencies recognize that solutions for addressing issues related to homelessness need to include supportive services to be effective.

60 Transit Security Preparedness Public transit agencies are establishing or joining community partnerships to provide services and outreach programs to address issues related to homelessness. Bay Area Rapid Transit Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) is a rail transit provider in the San Francisco Bay Area, strad- dling four Northern California counties. The system connects the San Francisco Peninsula with Berkeley, Oakland, Fremont, Walnut Creek, Dublin/Pleasanton, and other cities in the East Bay. There are 121 miles of track, with 48 stations comprising surface, elevated, and subway stations in almost equal numbers. Four of the stations are a combination of BART and Muni Metro stations in downtown San Francisco, and one station is a combination of BART and Caltrain in Millbrae. In 2018, BART provided 120.6 million total trips, with an average of more than 414,000 trips on weekdays. BART takes a district-wide approach to addressing the homeless in all four counties, an approach that consists of the following three strategies: • Engage + Support: Develop partnerships with support agencies and connect homeless to services; • Engineer + Maintain: Secure and harden system to reduce homeless access and increase main- tenance and cleaning to improve facilities; and • Enforce + Monitor: Utilize ordinances, citations, arrests, and stay-away orders when necessary. BART developed tailored strategies for stations, trackway, yards, and remnant parcels, as illus- trated in Figure 12. Engage and Support Initiatives The BART Police Department uses an engage-identify-connect model to assist those expe- riencing homelessness. The department implemented a crisis intervention team (CIT) led by a CIT coordinator and established a multidisciplinary forensic team (MDFT) to provide a support system for assisting those experiencing homelessness. In addition, the CIT and MDFT provide a peer support system for law enforcement officers. MDFT is a voluntary coalition of Alameda County law enforcement agencies, Alameda County Behavioral Health Care, and allied service providers who collaboratively assist individuals with mental illness, substance abuse, and other disorders and who are at high risk of involuntary hospitalization or who are arrested for behaviors and activities related to their disabilities. The MDFT identifies individuals who have multiple contacts with law enforcement (“high calls for service”) and are likely to have psychiatric issues. The San Francisco Homeless Outreach Team (SFHOT), a partnership with the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency and the Department of Homelessness and Supportive Hous- ing, was initially launched in downtown San Francisco stations and then expanded to Contra Costa County in 2019. Each SFHOT team has two outreach workers assigned to a station to make contact with the homeless and connect them to housing, mental health care, or drug addiction treatment services. Engineer and Maintain Initiatives To address cleanliness concerns, BART assigned dedicated cleaners at stations and put more resources at the worst stations. A Structures and System Service partnership was established to address platform-level filth and odors. Monthly meetings are conducted with station agents, cleaners, and BART police to develop relationships and establish a “station community.” The Pit Stop program was created in partnership with San Francisco Public Works to provide clean and safe public toilets for BART customers and noncustomers. Pit Stop also

Source: BART Quality of Life Presentation, APTA Sustainability + Multimodal Planning Conference, July 2018. Figure 12. BART homeless targeted strategies.

62 Transit Security Preparedness provides used-needle receptacles and dog waste stations. Handouts were developed for customers and noncustomers to inform them of the Pit Stop facilities, and signage was put on the system elevators. Enforcement and Monitor Initiatives BART and the San Francisco police increased their presence at subway stations and at street- level entrances to disrupt undesirable behavior. Classical music was broadcast through speakers at stations to discourage noncustomers from settling in at stations. An elevator attendants program was established to monitor and discourage undesirable eleva- tor activities. Attendants greet customers at the street and platform elevators at the Civic Center and Powell Street stations daily from 5:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m. After a successful 6-month pilot, the program was fully implemented in 2018 and then extended into 2019. The LEAD (Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion) program was begun in 2017 to address low-level drug offenders in the Tenderloin area. The program provides access to social services through expanded partnerships with the Department of Public Health, the Salvation Army, Syringe Access Services, and the Felton Institute. BART Lessons Learned Leadership is a critical element. Executive leadership commitment is important. If address- ing homelessness is among the board- or executive-level strategic directives, it becomes easier to get the resources necessary to pilot potential programs, increase the security presence, and maintain the partnerships necessary to be successful. Departmental leadership commitment is important too. At BART, the Transit Police Department leader implements and follows through on CIT coordination and outreach, and encourages other law enforcement agencies to participate. Training is important, especially integrated training across agencies and departments. BART recognized that the lack of training in dealing with difficult and challenged individuals was a major problem in its interactions with people who are homeless. Crisis intervention train- ing is provided for all law enforcement personnel at BART, including dispatch, community service officers, and administrative personnel. Mental health first aid is also offered to other agency professionals such as station agents, train operators, system service workers, trainers, and administrative personnel. BART found that integrating the training across agencies and departments is important and effective, because operations personnel and police work together to address homelessness challenges. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority LA Metro is an agency that operates public transportation in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, one of the country’s largest, most populous counties. More than 9.6 million people live or work within the system’s 1,479-square-mile service area. The system has 165 bus routes covering 1,439 miles of road and six LA Metro rail lines (four light rail, two subway) on 98 miles of rail track with 93 stations. In Los Angeles County, those experiencing homelessness and their families use LA Metro for transportation and take shelter in Metro rail, buses, stops, and other properties. While ridership and safety are critical to Metro, the agency recognizes that those experiencing homelessness are in need of resources, services, and support. Metro’s approach to homelessness on transit is to coordinate and partner with those who have direct experience with those experi- encing homelessness and the related delivery system.

Case Examples 63 In 2016, LA Metro formed the Homeless Task Force and launched a homeless strategic plan- ning process with involvement from community and other stakeholders. A comprehensive survey of Metro employees (with 1,100 respondents) provided feedback on their experiences with homelessness in Metro’s transit system. Community engagement sessions, interviews with individual stakeholders, and focus groups involving people who have experienced homelessness were conducted. These efforts led to the development of the Metro Transit Homeless Action Plan, which “focused on enhancing ridership by improving the experience of passengers daily through implementing a coordinated and comprehensive outreach and engagement plan that will be dedicated to the homeless individuals throughout Metro’s Transit system.” Participants in the planning process included Metro staff, the Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority, the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services, the City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County, law enforcement, city prosecutors, homeless outreach providers, elected officials, and the faith-based community. The action plan is summarized in Figure 13. LA Metro’s Transit Homeless Action Plan received APTA’s 2017 Rail Safety & Security Gold Award. The action plan included an investment in transit homeless outreach teams specifically assigned to Metro, along with partnership and coordination with Los Angeles County and the City of Los Angeles to ensure that those experiencing homelessness and their families are con- nected to the resources and services they need. In October 2016, the task force received $1.2 million to create special outreach teams—city, county, community (C3) teams—to respond exclusively to homelessness on Metro as a pilot program. LA Metro contracted with the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services and a homeless support organization, People Assisting the Homeless, to conduct the pilot. Two Source: Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Metro Transit Homeless Action Plan, February 2017. Figure 13. LA Metro Homeless Action Plan.

64 Transit Security Preparedness outreach teams of medical and mental health providers, substance abuse counselors, and former homeless—now advocates—from various county, city, and community groups, began reaching out in targeted locations, such as the Red Line, during the peak hours of 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. At the conclusion of Metro’s 1-year pilot, the teams had interacted with around 1,500 individuals. Because of the pilot’s success, Metro approved a $4.9 million extension to keep the teams on Metro lines, including during off-peak hours through May 2021. The initial two teams were expanded to eight teams system wide. Additional outreach with C3 teams led by Metro staff at other Metro lines and encampments is conducted in partnership with the LA County Sheriff Mental Evaluation Team (MET) and the LA Police Department Homeless Outreach and Pro- active Engagement (HOPE) Team. LA Metro has also established a collaboration with Los Angeles County Measure H Strategies, which provides homeless outreach staff for government properties. These staff members are shared among Metro, parks, libraries, beaches, and harbors throughout Los Angeles County. In addition to the expansion of outreach, Metro is working with service providers to create new shelters that can be accessible 24 hours a day to reduce the use of the trains, buses, and stations as shelters. The agency wants to partner with local homeless shelters and services to have a network that is near transit locations. In 2018, a Metro director and a Los Angeles County supervisor proposed mobile restrooms, complete with shower facilities, at certain Metro stations. At the time of the proposal, LA Metro had only one public restroom in the entire 93-station system. A feasibility study was approved by the board. The Department of Public Works, the Department of Public Health, and the Los Angeles County Office of Homeless Initiatives and other county organizations were involved in the process. At the time, Los Angeles had a mobile public shower pilot initiative under way, the County Mobile Showers Program, that provides mobile restrooms with shower facilities. Since 2017, LA Metro has doubled its police presence on all six rail lines and bus routes to increase passenger safety and address security and homelessness. The agency goal is to get those experiencing homelessness into housing, not just remove them from the trains and buses. LA Metro Lessons Learned Understand the homeless population. Critical to Metro’s success in responding to transit homelessness is a better understanding of those experiencing homelessness in and around the transit system. The homeless population has a diverse set of experiences and needs. Gaining a deeper understanding of their needs allows an agency to better target resources, coordinate resources and services, and improve transit outreach and engagement approaches. Conclusions and Lessons Learned Coordination and partnerships is essential to effectively addressing safety and security issues related to homelessness on the transit system. Transit agencies, together with local government agencies, agencies serving those experiencing homelessness, and other stakeholders, can better leverage and coordinate services and create opportunities to align strategies. While ridership concerns and safety are critical to a public transportation system, transit agencies have to recognize homelessness-related needs for services and support. It is impor- tant to recognize the tradeoffs being made when homeless initiatives are being planned, before they are put in place. Criminalizing people for experiencing homelessness does little to solve the problem and victimizes already vulnerable individuals. LA Metro realized that it “cannot arrest our way out of

Case Examples 65 the problem” (Scauzillo 2018) and chose to address the issue in “a socially responsible and caring manner” (LA Metro 2019). Agencies need to understand legal rights of those who are experienc- ing homelessness and ensure that those rights are not infringed by security programs put in place. Incorporating success measures and performance standards is important. The LA Metro Homeless Action Plan included a quality assurance guide with a system to measure progress and act as a template for evaluation of the action plan. Results are reviewed and reported on a quarterly basis to ensure accountability. Outreach evaluations are conducted on a regular basis, including measuring whether the homeless population on the system is increasing or decreas- ing. As of June 2019, 4,800 individuals experiencing homelessness were contacted by a C3 team, with about 1,200 linked to permanent housing solutions and 88 permanently housed. Communication to employees, customers, and transit service area communities, espe- cially education of staff and agency riders, is important. To ensure that their passengers knew LA Metro was trying to make their experience “the most positive possible,” the agency con- ducted an awareness campaign to improve communication and educate passengers and staff about the homeless population encountered and observed. Training and Exercises: Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Drills and Exercises Training Program: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority The WMATA Transit Police Department has long been using DHS’s HSEEP to further efforts to ensure the safety and security of transit system users. HSEEP was originally developed by the DHS Office of Domestic Preparedness. It is a four-part, detailed how-to guide for con- ducting and evaluating emergency preparedness training. • HSEEP Volume I: Overview and Doctrine provides requirements and guidance for the estab- lishment and maintenance of a homeland security exercise program. • HSEEP Volume II: Exercise Evaluation and Improvement offers a proven methodology for evaluating homeland security exercises and implementing improvement programs. • HSEEP Volume III: Exercise Program Management and Exercise Planning Process helps plan- ners establish an exercise program and outlines a standardized design, development, conduct, and evaluation process adaptable to any type of exercise. • HSEEP Volume IV: Sample Exercise Documents and Formats provides sample exercise materi- als referenced in HSEEP Volumes I through III. These materials are available via a secure web-based portal. WMATA’s use of HSEEP is highlighted in the deployment of the drills and exercise training program in conjunction with the largest expansion in route miles ever undertaken in WMATA’s 44-year history. The Silver Line expansion is adding transit station stops and route miles to the system in two phases. Dulles Corridor Metrorail Project Phase 1 was completed in July 2014. Phase II, currently under construction, is scheduled for completion in 2020. In total, the two phases of the expansion project will add 22 route miles and six stations to the system. During Phase I, the Metro Transit Police Department conducted a series of exercises, includ- ing four tabletop exercises and two full-scale exercises: • Silver Line Full-Scale Exercise—Active Shooter, IED-VBIED (vehicle-borne improvised explosive device), • Silver Line Full-Scale Exercise—Aerial Structure Evacuation, • Silver Line Tabletop Exercise—Power 1, • Silver Line Tabletop Exercise—Power 2,

66 Transit Security Preparedness • Silver Line Tabletop Exercise—Bus Bridge, and • Silver Line Tabletop Exercise—Elevator/Escalator. Incredibly, WMATA was able to conduct two full-scale exercises within a single month, a feat that depicts the effectiveness of the agency’s HSEEP deployment. HSEEP supports WMATA’s interaction with the many jurisdictions through which the transit service operates. An attendee roster maintained by the agency for its Phase I Silver Line safety and security initiatives listed participation by the following agencies: • Metropolitan Police Department • Fairfax County Police Department, Fire and Rescue Department, and Office of Emergency Management • Virginia State Police • Virginia Department of Transportation When HSEEP was originally designed, the main goal of the program was to address the dif- ference between “all hazards” emergency response requirements and the threats to public safety from terrorism involving the use of chemical, biological, nuclear, or explosive weapons or cyber or agricultural hostility. Since that time, the HSEEP program has been expanded to cover all manner of events, including the more recent threats of vehicle ramming and an active shooter, as illustrated in the WMATA HSEEP initiative. HSEEP Elements The component parts of the HSEEP program include • Situation manuals, • Exercise lists and rosters, • Exercise descriptions and objectives, • Controller/evaluator handbook, • After-action reports and hot washes, • Exercise series agenda, • Training lesson plan and roster, • Emergency operations manual, and • Improvement plan matrix. WMATA’s development and use of situation manuals and after-action reports (AARs) in particular are consistent with leading industry practices. Situation Manuals Typically, well-constructed situation manuals (SitMans) describe (1) the role of the participants—player, observer, or facilitator; (2) the top three issues or areas that need improve- ment; (3) action steps that need to be considered; and (4) policies, plans, and procedures that need to be reviewed, revised, or developed. The training is technical and must be aimed at improving skills. The fundamental design seeks to move the learner from training to real-life application as quickly as possible. WMATA’s SitMan reports consist of the following sections: • Exercise name, • Exercise date, • Scope, • Mission areas, • Core capabilities,

Case Examples 67 • Objectives, • Threat or hazard, • Scenario, • Participating organizations, • Points of contact, and • Exercise director and support team. After Action Reports and Hot Washes The AAR is the tool used to provide feedback to the participating individuals and jurisdictions on their performance during the exercise. The AAR summarizes what happens and analyzes the performance of the tasks identified through the planning process. WMATA’s AAR format facilitates the exchange of important information between exercise participants that is then used for the development of response plans and mutual aid. The AAR includes the following sections: • Executive summary, • Exercise overview, • Exercise goals and objectives, • Exercise synopsis, • Analysis of mission outcomes, • Analysis of critical task performance, and • Conclusion. Conclusion WMATA has developed a drills and exercise training program that effectively adopts the stan- dards and guidance of the NIMS preparedness cycle. HSEEP is uniquely capable of supporting this. Action words associated with the cycle include training, equipping, planning, exercising, mitigating, and evaluating. By training and interacting directly with area first responders, WMATA has improved the familiarity, the emergency response, and the emergency management of its operations. By con- ducting a continued and consistent deployment of an HSEEP-compliant training program in conjunction with the major expansion of the Metro system, WMATA has leveraged the full capabilities of the surrounding communities to ensure the safety and security of its riders. Security Committees: King County Metro Transit Department Transit agencies have safety and security review committees to oversee the safety and security efforts of the agency. The committees discuss ongoing safety and security concerns and help to resolve issues identified. The King County Metro Transit Department (King County Metro) is the public transit authority of King County, Washington, which includes the city of Seattle. King County Metro is the region’s largest bus network, which operates Sound Transit’s regional express bus ser- vice, Link light rail in King County, water taxis, and the Seattle Streetcar. The agency provides 400,000 rides per weekday. King County Metro first established a security committee (SC) in the 1980s, primarily to address the issue of operator assaults. Led by the operation manager, the committee members were selected by the manager and the union president. Today, each operating base of Metro

68 Transit Security Preparedness has its own security committee, led by the base operating chief. Today the transit agency advertises for members and potential participants—drivers and other agency employees— selected from those who express interest by submitting interest letters. Along with the base chief, law enforcement (a sheriff’s office representative), drivers and representatives, and representatives from other sections who are stakeholders, such as operators who take calls, attend the meeting. The security committees typically meet once a month or every other month, dependent on resources available to attend the meeting. Though a major problem in the past, the resource issue has improved over time. One of the challenges of the King County Metro SC approach is that there are many security committee meetings taking place, including those for the service base committees and the state safety committee. The agency is considering merging the state SC and the agency SC to reduce the time demand on participants. The SC discusses security incidents and issues and approaches to address or resolve those issues. The way each SC approaches its activities depends on the base chief leading the commit- tee. All SCs review all incident reports for the base service. Some SCs will ride with operators who are having a number of issues to better understand the situations and to provide recommenda- tions. The King County Metro Safety Section uses a hazard log to document and track safety issues that come up. The security committees are discussing creating a similar log, a security log, to track security issues. To address security issues, an optimal security committee is focused and project driven—the SC selects what is important for the committee to work on and then finds the resources to do it. For example, a sticker to place in vehicles with information on what operators need to do in a hazard emergency was developed and found to be an effective tool, and ways to improve it are now being considered. Some King County Metro security committees have developed informa- tion guides for drivers and operators, on such topics as how to prepare incident reports and where to get answers to questions. The SC also addressed improving the communication between the operators in the control center and the communication coordinators who received the operators’ calls about security issues. Operators needed to be more comfortable calling the coordinators with issues and to understand what information the communication coordinators needed to have. The SC helped operators understand how the system is set up to work and how to transmit the urgency of situ- ations. This allowed coordinators to get better information to police dispatchers. Overall, the initiative increased the willingness of operators to make calls and improved the timeliness and effectiveness of the response to the call. Other King County Metro SC success stories were • Including a height measurement marker on vehicle stanchions to assist operators in more accurately estimating the heights of passengers involved in incidents. • Developing a seminar for operators to train them to write more effective incident reports to better help transit police. • Establishing a night focus group that brings together full-time operators working nights and security stakeholders. The stakeholders give presentations for an hour or so on issues relevant to operators, and then leave. For the rest of the session, the operators interact with more seasoned operators for tips and mentoring to aid in dealing with issues experienced by the night operators. • Developing a “Security Tips for Operators” pamphlet, a security incident standard operating procedure on how to react to different types of scenarios. The pamphlet was designed for new operators and distributed by the SC, but it is now included in the operator’s manual given to all new hires. Recently the tips pamphlet was updated to include sexual assault and sexual harassment situations.

Case Examples 69 King County Metro has an unusual asset on its security committees, an operations security liaison in the Transit Security and Emergency Management Department with a background in law and justice who also was a driver in transit. In addition, before joining King County, the liaison had worked as victim’s advocate with the Seattle police department for a number of years. Recognizing the important of courts, the liaison works to makes sure the operators understand the courts’ authority and why operators need to show up in court when incidents demand. The operators, in turn, appreciate the liaison’s advocacy for the operators in court cases. It is unlikely that there are many people with a background similar to that of the King County liaison. Suggestions on what skills and qualifications are important include the following: • A person with a well-rounded, multidisciplined education is ideal. Look for bachelor’s programs in the social sciences or pre-law education, with some college if not a completed degree. • Driver or operator experience is crucial. • The individual must have participated in committee work at the driver level—for example, as shop steward or as a volunteer working with operator committees. • Previous involvement in security may not be germane: the current liaison’s background is in law and justice. • The ability to work across all sections of the agency is critical, as is a willingness to learn how all the different sections work together to provide service. • Extensive writing experience is ideal. It is important to be able to communicate well. Lessons Learned • Successful security committees are active in contacting operators on a regular basis. This frequent contact keeps issues forward, and is a reminder that this is something the operators need to pay attention to. Provide a “constant barrage” of “good” information—tips, mentoring, effective approaches to take, etc., and avoid “harping on the negative.” • Pay attention to security incident reports submitted, and follow up. Following up is impor- tant because it reinforces that is worthwhile to fill out a report. The King County liaison estab- lished a process to make sure all incident reports were read and were followed up. • Encourage operators who are participating in the SC to talk to the other operators about what would help improve security, such as the importance of writing incident reports. Federal Emergency Management Agency Transit Security Grant Programs Transit agencies throughout the United States are familiar with the Department of Homeland Security preparedness grant program. Managed through FEMA, DHS’s $50 billion program includes funding specifically authorized for transit through the TSGP. The TSGP has provided more than $2.1 billion in preparedness grant funding to transit agencies since 2002. DHS’s current strategic priorities for the preparedness grant program and the TSGP are contained in the FEMA 2018–2022 Strategic Plan. Built upon the experiences of 16 years of engagement with transit agencies, along with an ever-broadening array of threat types, incidents, and disasters, the TSGP supports the DHS FEMA goals to • Build a culture of preparedness. FEMA defines “resilience” as the back- bone of emergency management and identifies preparedness as the most “While FEMA plays an essential role in achieving this vision of a prepared and resilient Nation, meaningful improvements will occur only when we work in concert across Federal departments and agencies, as well as with lead- ers from state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, non- governmental organizations, and the private sector” (FEMA 2018b).

70 Transit Security Preparedness successful way to achieve disaster resiliency. A “Culture of Preparedness is a national effort to be ready for the worst disasters at the individual, family, community, state, local, tribal, territorial, and Federal levels” (FEMA 2018b). • Ready the nation for catastrophic disasters. The collective readiness of FEMA and its part- ners is considered critical for ensuring that response and recovery missions are appropriately executed and successful. • Reduce the complexity of FEMA. A modernization and simplification of processes and infor- mation to increase the capabilities of all citizens to effectively participate in national emer- gency preparedness actions and initiatives. FEMA’s approach to the goals is to emphasize partnership with state and local authorities. Building the most successful preparedness system requires federal support, state management, and local execution. FEMA considers each of the goals to be a major undertaking that can be accomplished only through the engagement of the entire community. FY 2019 Transit Security Grant Program Overview The TSGP is one of the DHS/FEMA grant programs that directly support transportation infrastructure security activities, as appropriated by the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, Public Law 116-6, and authorized by Section 1406 of the Imple- menting Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Public Law 110-53 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 1135). The FY 2019 TSGP provides funds to owners and operators of transit systems (which include intracity buses, commuter buses, ferries, and all forms of passenger rail) to protect and increase the resilience of critical surface transportation infrastructure and the traveling public from acts of terrorism.7 Funding In FY 2019, the funds available under the TSGP grant program total $88 million. FY 2019 funds are awarded to support the creation of sustainable, risk-based efforts to protect criti- cal surface transportation infrastructure and the traveling public from acts of terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies. Eligibility Eligible transit agencies are determined on the basis of daily unlinked passenger trips (rider- ship) and transit systems that serve historically eligible UASI-designated urban areas. Certain ferry systems are eligible to participate in the FY 2019 TSGP. Ferry systems that elect to partici- pate under the FY 2019 TSGP are not considered for funding under the FY 2019 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP). Likewise, any ferry system that elects to participate in the FY 2019 PSGP is not considered for funding under the FY 2019 TSGP. Funding Guidelines The FY 2019 TSGP focuses on operational activities, operational packages, and capital proj- ects, including the Top Transit Asset List and critical infrastructure vulnerability remediation. The period of performance for the TSGP is 3 months. Application Process and Evaluation Criteria TSGP applications are reviewed by federal representatives from FEMA and other DHS agency partners. Panelists review applications and, where possible, score applications independently before joint panel deliberations. During panel sessions, panelists discuss projects and agree on individual final scores and comments, and recommend funding levels. The panel provides fund- ing recommendations to an executive committee made up of FEMA and TSA leadership. This

Case Examples 71 committee makes recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security, who reviews the recommendations and makes final award decisions. Grants Management Toolkit—Promising Practices Grantees from state and local agencies, including state administrative agencies, UASI, port security agencies, and transit security agencies that have previously used the preparedness grant program and TSGP have consented to the sharing of promising practices. These promising prac- tices are available on the FEMA website (https://www.fema.gov/grants-management-toolkit).8 The information is posted by category, linked to the FEMA Grant Business Process Chart, also called the grant life cycle. In Table 4, the grant life cycle is depicted along with references to some of the promising practices associated with the individual categories. Preparedness Grant Case Examples This section provides summaries of selected security investments and improvements of state and local agency grantees9 funded through the DHS Preparedness Program.10 Grant Life Cycle Category Examples of Promising Practices Agency Funding acquisition Grants Manuals/Policies and Procedures (Programmatic and Financial) Alaska, South Carolina, West Virginia, Alabama, Illinois, Kentucky Program establishment Position Descriptions—e.g., Grant Program Manager (Program Coordinator II)/Homeland Security Planner I/ (Program Coordinator I), Senior Accountant (Accountant/Fiscal Analyst III)/Program Coordinator II, Accounting Technician (Accountant/Fiscal Analyst II), Administrative Specialist II Delaware, Alabama, Maryland, South Carolina Application Homeland Security Grant Program application (blank workbook), Peer Reviewer Information Sheet Arizona, Kentucky Amendments Project Modification Request Form and Instruction Sheet Arizona Monitoring Compliance Monitoring Program Protocol Compliance Field Visit/Technical Assistance Form Wisconsin Award Special Conditions and Reporting Requirements for Sub- Recipients, Conditional Grant Award, Port Security Grant Program Letter Templates, Sub-Award Agreement Transmittal Letter Template, Sub-Award Notification Letter Template, Sub-Grantee Award Agreement Template Massachusetts, South Carolina, Oregon Reporting GMTA Fundamentals of Grants Management—Acronym List, Policy Statement Regarding Food and/or Beverages Provided for Homeland Security Training/Exercise Sessions, Electronic Grants Management Systems, Homeland Security & Preparedness Grants Tracking System (GTS) Summary Presentation FEMA, Illinois, New Jersey Closeouts Equipment/Project Request Form Equipment Request Transmittal/Tracking Form State Administrative Agency Asset List Template Requirements for Grant Closeout Property and Equipment Inventory Report Instructions Jurisdiction Grant Closeout Review Checklist Manual Grant Closeout Checklist Grant Closeout Form Letters Non-Compliant Closeout Form Letter Cost Share Register Sub-Grantee Closeout Acknowledgement Letter Template Property Control Record Reportable Equipment Inventory Report Equipment Inventory Reporting Policy Pittsburgh, Vermont, Oregon, Hawaii Table 4. Promising practices by grant life cycle category.

72 Transit Security Preparedness California Virtual Port System: The Port of Long Beach (POLB) is the second busiest port in the United States, with more than $180 billion in trade moving through the port annually and covering 3,500 acres of land and 4,600 acres of water. To enhance port security opera- tions, the POLB developed Virtual Port, a customized mapping and monitoring platform that integrates real-time data from multiple sources. It provides situational awareness of port operations and facilitates rapid incident response across multiple agencies and jurisdictions. California Common Operating Picture for Threat Awareness: Developed through the Statewide Risk Management Program in collaboration with the California Governor’s Office of Emer- gency Services and eight California UASI regions, the California Common Operating Picture for Threat Awareness addresses the statewide need for storing and sharing critical infrastructure information and enhances situational threat awareness. County of San Diego Cyber Disruption Response Team: In 2013, the County of San Diego Office of Emergency Services (San Diego OES) convened cybersecurity, law enforcement, and emer- gency management subject matter experts to establish a regional Cyber Disruption Response Team (CDRT). The CDRT is responsible for managing the region’s response to cyber disrup- tions, as defined in the San Diego OES’s cyber disruption response plans. In a 2015 full-scale cybersecurity exercise, the CDRT successfully responded to a cyber disruption that affected regional power infrastructure. Colorado Terrorism Liaison Officer Program and the Community Awareness Program: Through the Terrorism Liaison Officer Program and the Community Awareness Program, the Colorado Information Analysis Center trains local law enforcement officers, private-sector partners, and the general public to recognize and report terrorism-related information. Regional Explosives Unit Protecting Police Officers: The South Central Regional Explosives Unit responds to hundreds of explosive-related calls in 33 Colorado counties each year, including for IEDs, active shooters, booby-trapped drug facilities, and suspicious packages. Florida All-Hazard Incident Management Teams: All-Hazard Incident Management Teams (AHIMTs) provide situational awareness and support to the State Emergency Response Team and the state coordinating officer. The Florida Department of Emergency Management deployed all six AHIMTs at least once in response to Hurricane Irma. Before Hurricane Irma, Florida used grant funds in 2015 to develop the All-Hazards Incident Management Qualification Program, which helps to ensure both that resources are allocated efficiently and that emergency responders are supported effectively during an incident. Operation Heat Shield: The Operation Heat Shield full-scale exercises were conducted in response to the threat of complex, coordinated terrorist attacks at unique venues such as stadi- ums and airports. WebEOC: The Florida Department of Emergency Management (FDEM) used Emergency Management Performance Grant funds to expand its WebEOC crisis management system, a shared, statewide communication software platform that can implement standard emergency management processes to maintain a common operating picture during large-scale events. FDEM tested WebEOC integration during the 2018 hurricane exercise, which was based on a Hurricane Irma–type scenario. Exercise participants used WebEOC to create and update

Case Examples 73 missions, train new employees, and test the execution of emergency operations procedures consistent with the hurricane scenario. Louisiana Greater Lafourche Port Commission Uses Grants to Integrate Maritime Domain Awareness: The Greater Lafourche Port Commission created an integrated Maritime Domain Awareness System to protect against threats to the port and to assist in emergency response operations. Maine Multi-Assault Counter Terrorism Action Capabilities (MACTAC) Training Program: In 2014, the police department in Brewer, Maine, used State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) funds to establish the MACTAC training program to enhance regional response to complex coordinated terrorist attacks and active shooter events. Michigan Unmanned Aircraft System: Unmanned aircraft system (UAS) technology enhances Michigan’s abilities to conduct real-time assessments during an incident and collect detailed post-incident information for recovery activities. The Michigan State Police purchased the UAS with $162,000 in Homeland Security Grant Program funds and have used the UAS during real-world incidents, exercises, and trainings. Michigan Cyber Initiatives: Michigan’s emergency managers and state officials are build- ing public-private partnerships and using grant funding to enhance the state’s cyber response capabilities. Minnesota Statewide Security Monitoring Initiative: Recognizing the vulnerability of government infor- mation technology networks to threats from malicious actors, MNIT, the state’s IT agency, created the Statewide Security Monitoring Initiative to increase IT network security for counties and cities across Minnesota. Montana Situation Analyst Montana (SAM): In 2013, Montana Disaster and Emergency Services and the Montana Fire Wardens Association invested SHSP funds to develop SAM, a web-based platform that enables emergency managers and public health, fire, and law enforcement stake- holders to access a common operating picture of ongoing statewide incidents in real time. This project addressed a capability gap in maintaining operational coordination of wildfire response efforts. New York City Bio Isolation Transfer Cards: Following the March 2014 outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in West Africa, New York City agencies began developing plans and protocols for handling potential EVD cases. As part of this effort, the New York City Fire Department collaborated with city hospitals and the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to develop Bio Isolation Transfer cards, documents embodying standard operating procedures for safely trans- porting and handing off individuals suspected of having contracted EVD (known as “persons under investigation”). New York City Community Outreach Teams: When the Centers for Disease Control and Pre- vention confirmed the first-ever case of EVD in the United States, New York City quickly acted

74 Transit Security Preparedness to educate the public about EVD and its associated risks. In support of this effort, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene deployed community outreach teams to distrib- ute informational materials and engage the public in discussions about EVD. Active Monitoring System and Call Center: New York City began monitoring individuals returning from countries affected by EVD in the fall of 2014 in response to a directive from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Using almost $1.7 million in Public Health Emergency Preparedness funds (including the EVD supplemental) and $3.5 million in UASI funds, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene quickly adapted existing structures to stand up an active monitoring system. Ohio Mass Casualty Deployment: Informed by lessons learned from the Boston Marathon bomb- ing in 2013, Cuyahoga County invested SHSP funding to create more than 100 deployable mass casualty supply kits. Cuyahoga County deployed these kits in support of the 2016 Republican National Convention in Cleveland, Ohio. Washington Northwest Regional Aviation Unit—Protecting the Puget Sound: The Seattle UASI established Northwest Regional Aviation (NWRA), an aviation consortium that protects the Puget Sound area from terrorism and responds to large-scale disasters. NWRA saved 12 survivors during the first 3 hours of the Snohomish County mudslide on March 22, 2014. Regional Collaboration—Interoperable Communications in Eastern Washington: Since 2004, Washington State Homeland Security Region 9 has prioritized investments in interoperable radio communications for all first responders, regardless of discipline. Regional partners col- laborated to establish an interoperable communications system with increased coverage that has improved incident response across all levels of government for the region. Conclusion The TSGP presents a viable method for transit agencies to take advantage of federal funding to improve the security of public transit systems. The TSGP process is a mature one that has been improved over time. Using the program effectively requires transit systems to comply with grant application requirements and deadlines. Agencies of all sizes can qualify, although preference over the years has been given to funding projects at larger, more complex urban area transit systems whose operations are inherently riskier from a security and terrorism threat standpoint.