Appendix D
Summary of the 2018 Plan for Verification, Detection, and Monitoring of Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material
A 2018 report for Congress titled Plan for Verification, Detection, and Monitoring of Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material briefly outlines the interagency efforts in this space.1
The plan states that the interagency approaches this mission with a “whole-of-government” strategy, with coordination efforts in both cooperative and unilateral contexts. However, details on existing mechanisms are not available in the unclassified report. The unclassified plan does briefly outline the roles and responsibilities of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and the Department of Homeland Security Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
The report outlines a plan for cooperation and transparency through international engagements. Goals include strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization monitoring regimes, strengthening arms control verification capabilities, and improving export controls. The unclassified report stresses the importance of these efforts but does not include significant details on specific efforts planned.
The report also lists the following unilateral U.S. efforts for monitoring, detection, and verification: DOE/NNSA’s Nuclear Compliance Verification Program, the Open Source Enterprise, the U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System, and the U.S. Nuclear Detonation Detection System. Any detail on these efforts is limited to the classified annex.
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1 The report included a classified annex with additional details that the committee will assess in the final report.
The report broadly describes the research and development (R&D) process, focusing on how R&D meets intelligence and operational requirements for monitoring, detection, and verification. The report notes that requirements can come from both individual departments and agencies or centrally coordinated committees. The report also stresses that the interagency and international partners must stay ahead of emerging threats and notes that the interagency is focused on Title 50 and non-Title 50 information sharing as well as leveraging test beds to address emerging threats.