2

Today’s Operating Environment

The 2018 National Defense Strategy¹ and the subsequent 2021 Interim National Security Guidance² outline two changes to the U.S. strategic environment. The first is “the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition” and names China and Russia as those with the goal of “gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.” The second change is a “resilient, but weakening, post-WWII [World War II] international order” where “rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran are destabilizing regions through their pursuit of nuclear weapons or sponsorship of terrorism.” These changes challenge the U.S. traditional military advantage. The U.S. strategic approaches to counter these changes are to

• Be strategically predictable, but operationally unpredictable;
• Integrate with U.S. interagency;
• Counter coercion and subversion; and
• Foster a competitive mindset.³

To meet the Department of Defense (DoD) objectives in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, “[The U.S.] will expand the competitive space while pursuing three distinct lines of effort:

• First, rebuilding military readiness as we build a more lethal Joint Force;
• Second, strengthening alliances as we attract new partners; and
• Third, reforming the Department’s business practices for greater performance and affordability.”⁴

DoD and the Army plan to support rebuilding military readiness and the lethal joint force through a comprehensive modernization program that includes hypersonic weapons and the Strategic Long Range Cannon (SLRC).

___________________

¹ Department of Defense (DoD), 2018, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

² President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., 2021, “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” Washington, DC: The White House, March, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

The Army will employ the modernized platforms through Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), outlined in the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1.⁵ It describes “how the Army contributes to the Joint Force’s principal task as defined in the unclassified Summary of the National Defense Strategy: Deter and defeat Chinese and Russian aggression in both competition and conflict.”

2.1 MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATIONS

The United States is at a continuum of war at all times. The Army’s MDO concept deals with great-power and peer competition and with war.⁶ A challenge to U.S. military advantage includes “rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war,”⁷ The advent of the Information Age, 21st-century science and technology advances and other enhanced adversary concepts have been designed to reduce U.S. advantages on the battlefield. These types of advancements have reduced the disparities between peace and war for future conflicts.⁸

MDO focuses on areas of the world where there are significant numbers of relatively modern militaries capable of operating effectively in the five domains of military operations: land, maritime, air, space, and cyber. The MDO concept is broader in scope than previous Army concepts to address this changed security landscape.⁹

2.1.1 A Summary of the MDO Concept

The MDO concept addresses competition before, during and after war as well as armed conflict between the United States and a peer military.¹⁰ MDO identifies four interrelated trends within the operational environment for which the U.S. Army and joint force currently do not have an adequate solution:

1. Peer states are investing to contest the United States in all domains;
2. Recognizing American advantage in the close fight, adversaries have adopted strategies that employ multiple layers and types of standoff;
3. Recognizing Western nations’ high threshold for conflict, adversaries have leveraged innovative use of the competition space to achieve objectives contrary to U.S. national security interests; and
4. Taken together and combined with geographic retrenchment, these trends have diluted U.S. operational deterrence.

Faced with this environment and these associated problems, the Army developed an operational concept. The concept envisions “Army forces, as an element of the Joint Force, conducts Multi-Domain Operations to prevail in competition; when necessary, Army forces penetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and aerial denial systems and exploit the resultant freedom of maneuver to achieve strategic objectives (win) and force a return to competition on favorable terms.”¹¹ Unfortunately, Army forces lack the capability and capacity to achieve this now. The MDO concept intends to enable the U.S. military to provide political leaders with two additional options that are relevant to current constraints and can address adversary opportunism. They are as follows:

___________________

⁵ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 2018, “The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations in 2028,” TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, Fort Eustis, VA, https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets/TP525-3-1.pdf.

⁶ Lt. Gen. E.J. Wesley and Col. R.H. Simpson (retired), 2020, “Expanding the Battlefield: An Important Fundamental of Multi-Domain Operations,” Land Warfare Paper 131, Association of the United States Army, https://www.ausa.org/publications/expanding-battlefieldimportant-fundamental-multi-domain-operations.

⁷ DoD, 2018, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.

⁸ Wesley and Simpson, 2020, “Expanding the Battlefield.”

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ TRADOC, 2018, “The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations in 2028.”

1. Expanding the competition space, thereby incentivizing peers to re-calculate intentions; and
2. Enabling a rapid response to deny a fait accompli attack and achieve an operational position of advantage from which favorable negotiations can result in a return to competition.

Executing MDO requires changing how the Army postures the force physically and virtually with increased authorities, organizes its formations, and employs its new capabilities and emerging technologies such as the SLRC, which is what this study is designed to assess.

The intent of MDO, which extends AirLand Battle concepts developed during the 1980s, is to “dis-integrate” enemy standoff capabilities in order to exploit freedom of maneuver.¹² Evolving Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO) concepts further challenge traditional Service roles and responsibilities. The Army has used conventional field artillery to provide both operational fires to shape the battlefield for joint and Army operations and especially tactical suppressive fires to constrain enemy action. However, “strategic precision fires” using cannon artillery platforms is a non-traditional method. These changes expand opportunities to enable and exploit maneuver.

These future desired capabilities should be truly integrative, not merely duplicative, to achieve “converging” effects. MDO seeks to present the enemy with multiple dilemmas, attacking and overwhelming the adversary technologically and operationally, forcing the enemy to defend against U.S. forces in multiple domains and directions. The goal, to obtain “converging effects” from multiple domains, requires synchronization which today remains episodic.¹³

Flexibility in “ways” that existing systems are used can permit those systems to adapt to different conditions in order to achieve desired “ends,” thus enabling innovation. Achieving this flexibility requires both conceptual re-imagination and technical re-engineering. The science and technology development question is if the SLRC initiative can adapt traditional tactical cannon artillery employment to a strategic, long-range (hypersonic) precision strike capability traditionally associated with guided missiles. The re-imagination component for the potential innovation is provided by the MDO and JADO “convergence” of effects concept. Re-engineering a cannon to approximate a missile, using a hypersonic boost-glide projectile, is the technological challenge the SLRC confronts.

2.1.2 The Expanded Battlefield

The Expanded Battlefield is a relatively new concept and describes “the full potential we must realize from our acquisition, targeting and weapon systems.”¹⁴ The Expanded Battlefield describes the general responsibilities of commanders from corps through battalion in the fight in terms of

• Extended time (how far ahead each commander should look and think) and
• Extended space (the size of the space an organization occupies and/or influences).

Weapons systems with improved ranges, lethality, and mobility have extended the battlefield in both time and distance. Additionally, this extension created an opportunity to leverage the larger battlefield to maximize capacity and capability against peer and near-peer competitors. Visualizing and describing the extended battlefield requires the Army to develop tasks, purposes, and echelons. Defining the extended battlefield also pushes the Army to design the forces required, such as the Strategic Fires Battalion. All of this leads to the operational problem statement of how the SLRC fits into the “extended battlefield” to better develop and define battlefield

___________________

¹² J. Anderson, 2020, “The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028,” presentation to the committee, September 22, Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

¹³ J. Rafferty, Army Futures Command, 2020, “Long Range Precision Fires Cross-Functional Team Brief,” presentation to the committee, September 24, Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

¹⁴ D.A. Starry, 1981, “Extending the Battlefield,” Military Review March:32–50, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/onlinepublications/documents/1981-mr-donn-starry-extending-the-battlefield.pdf.

tasks and purposes, determine assignment to appropriate echelon(s), allocate capabilities and inform future force design and capability development.

DoD and the Army have prioritized hypersonic weapons to expand the battlefield, particularly long-range fires¹⁵ (Figure 2-1). The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&E)) identifies a hypersonic weapons portfolio that fills a crucial need for long-range fires and is pursuing a suite of capabilities and technologies for the warfighter including tactical systems, multiple launch platforms (land, sea, and air), rocket-based boost-glide systems, and powered cruise missile systems.¹⁶ The Army has made hypersonics a priority research topic¹⁷ and is pursuing hypersonics research in two Army directorates.

1. The first, the U.S. Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) is developing the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW).¹⁸ LRHW is an experimental prototype with residual combat capability no later than fiscal year (FY) 2023 at the Battery Level as part of the Strategic Fires Battalion in support of MDO.
2. The second is Army Futures Command (AFC), responsible for six modernization programs and managed by the respective cross-functional teams (CFTs). The Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF) CFT manages the SLRC.¹⁹

___________________

¹⁵ J. Anderson, 2020, “The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028,” presentation to the committee, September 22, Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

¹⁶ Congressional Research Service, 2020, “Defense Primer: RDT&E,” IN FOCUS IF10553, November 25, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2020-11-25_IF10553_bda4424f3402bf06cba856f1fa87a8606152a7ab.pdf.

¹⁷ U.S. Army, 2019, “Army Modernization Strategy: Investing in the Future,” Arlington, VA, https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/2019_army_modernization_strategy_final.pdf.

¹⁸ N. Thurgood, Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office, 2020, “RCCTO 101 for Board of Army Research and Development Report: Assessing the Feasibility of the Strategic Long Range Cannon,” presentation to the committee, September 24, Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

¹⁹ J. Anderson, 2020, “The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028,” presentation to the committee, September 22, Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

The SLRC, originally conceived to overcome Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) limitations, is envisioned by the Army to provide long-range, lethal effects against light material targets to penetrate and disintegrate enemy anti-access and aerial denial (A2/AD) systems, using a cannon with a range greater than 500 miles. Where the SLRC fits within the Joint and Army fires enterprise, including long-range hypersonic weapons, is discussed in the Phase 2 classified report.

2.2 STRATEGIC LONG RANGE CANNON OVERVIEW

The U.S. Army is working on a major science and technology development program to build a SLRC that can shoot a projectile 1,000 miles. Its goal is to demonstrate capability in FY 2025 after which a decision will be made on whether to begin a program of record.²⁰ This surface-to-surface capability is based on two complementary systems—a hypersonic missile and the strategic cannon. The platform consists of a weapon, prime mover and trailer, projectile, and propellant charge capable of delivering massed fires at strategic ranges for MDO.²¹

As of September 2020, the estimated cost of the round ranges from $500,000 to $1 million each depending on the volume of production. The AFC LRPF CFT director explained the SLRC provides the Army with a new capability to deliver massed fires at ranges never before considered for cannon-launched artillery. The SLRC operational and technical goals include the following:²²

• The SLRC will provide precision, lethal effects against light materiel targets, including A2/AD networks.
• The armament will leverage critical components and technologies developed under the Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) but will break new ground in terms of the scale of the weapon system, firing a larger projectile significantly farther than conventional artillery.
• The ammunition will employ the latest component technologies as well as advanced materials that can survive the rigors of flight as well as gun launch.

The following are the SLRC program goals:

• Range: >500 miles,
• Crew: 8 personnel per platform (threshold),
• Quantity: 4 platforms per battery,
• Attacks enemy soft materiel; A2/AD targets at strategic ranges, and
• Transportability: Sea (Threshold); Air (Objective).

2.2.1 How Long Range or Strategic Fires Will Expand the Battlefield

The SLRC weapon in development is a surface-to-surface capability based on two complementary systems—a hypersonic missile and the strategic cannon. The application of strategic fires is to penetrate and dis-integrate (Figure 2-1) adversary A2/AD complexes to open windows of opportunity for exploitation by the Joint Force. The SLRC program can provide precision, lethal effects against light material targets including (A2/AD) networks.

___________________

²⁰ J. Rafferty, Army Futures Command, 2020, “Long Range Precision Fires Cross-Functional Team Brief,” presentation to the committee, September 24, Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

The goal of greater than 500 miles not arbitrary, but rather was selected based on the geographical realities in the two possible theaters of peer-conflict, Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific.²³

The Army envisions the SLRC as a complement to a limited number of long-range hypersonics weapons. Adversarial A2/AD complexes offer a wide range of targets such as hardened infrastructure and soft command and control (C2) nodes. A comprehensive approach to addressing these targets is important. A way to overwhelm enemy decision making, their C2, and the overall effectiveness of A2/AD is by delivering a combination of hypersonic, supersonic, and subsonic munitions from a variety of ranges with a variety of trajectories. Overwhelming A2/AD is the key to defeating it. This necessitates a limited number of exquisite hypersonic munitions directed against the hardened infrastructure targets complimented by volume of fire against area target sets. The AFC LRPF CFT offers the SLRC as the right platform to develop, because the Army should not be guaranteeing obsolescence by trying to achieve important short-term objectives through existing capabilities that will be overcome by adversarial countermeasures.²⁴

This concept of operations was developed with diplomatic limitations. The Army started the SLRC program when the United States was part of the INF Treaty, which limited the use of short- and intermediate-range land-based ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and missile launchers.²⁵ The SLRC was initially envisioned as an INF-compliant precision artillery tool, which is why it is shot from an artillery round, has a booster motor, and why particular technologies were chosen to achieve the desired ranges. The diplomatic landscape may change with the new administration.

2.2.2 SLRC Technology Development Status

The Army made it clear that this is a science and technology program and must be assessed from that perspective. This committee agrees that given the current state of technology and challenges to meeting its goals, the Army has placed the SLRC program in the correct program phase. Prior to entering into the next phase of development (perhaps Milestone A), the committee makes observations in this chapter (Chapter 2) and recommendations regarding the operational concept.

Because the SLRC program is a science and technology development program, it is being developed under Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Title IV funding, specifically 6.2 (Applied Research) and 6.3 (Advanced Technology Development).

The SLRC program is a science and technology program developing a future military system, not yet in the acquisition process. See Section 2.6.1, “SLRC Program Funding” for SLRC program funding details.

2.3 STRATEGIC LONG RANGE CANON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERATIONS

As the SLRC program executes its development and test plans, the program should concurrently assess the capability development attributes for operational effectiveness and Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,

___________________

²³ Congressional Research Service, 2020, “Defense Primer: RDT&E,” IN FOCUS IF10553, November 25, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2020-11-25_IF10553_bda4424f3402bf06cba856f1fa87a8606152a7ab.pdf.

²⁴ J. Rafferty, Army Futures Command, 2020, “Long Range Precision Fires Cross-Functional Team Brief,” presentation to the committee, September 24, Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

²⁵ C.T. Lopez, 2019, “U.S. Withdraws from Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,” Department of Defense, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1924779/us-withdraws-from-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-treaty.

²⁶ Congressional Research Service, 2020, “Defense Primer: RDT&E,” IN FOCUS IF10553, November 25, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2020-11-25_IF10553_bda4424f3402bf06cba856f1fa87a8606152a7ab.pdf.

Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P). These include mobility, transportability, and survivability; targets and lethality effectiveness; and supportability and sustainability. These “ilities” should all be examined, and then supported by a cost-effectiveness analysis. If expanding the battlefield is the goal, these assessments cannot occur sequentially after technology improvements are gained.

2.3.1 Operational Employment Considerations

Based on operational use, the Army should consider if the size and weight of the SLRC platform would limit in-theater operations, particularly mobility and rapid deployment. Transportability considerations are discussed in Section 3.2.1, “Gun Design, Material, and Manufacturing.”

The advantage of hypersonics is “enhanced maneuverability and smooth flight path, which is much harder to track than that of traditional missiles.” Even if the projectile can “bypass modern layered missile defenses” and “evade missile defense tracking systems and interceptors,”²⁷ the emplaced system still has to be survivable after detection, by some means through maneuver and mobility.

2.3.2 Targets and Lethality

The rate of fire will likely be a key enabler. This rate of fire needs to be assessed within the context of several high-resolution, threat- and physics-based scenarios to ensure it is operationally relevant. What needs to be answered is how many cannons would be required to provide sufficient coverage given classified target analysis and threat definition from target acquisition to endgame, to target effect. Mission modeling efforts are discussed in Section 3.4.2, “Operational Integration.”

2.4 COST PER EFFECT

2.4.1 Development Costs and Cost Effectiveness

In addition to operational effectiveness and DOTMLPF-P implications, cost should be a critical consideration for the SLRC project. The Army assesses that the SLRC will provide a more effective cost exchange than other hypersonic weapons. Hypersonic weapons are in the tens of millions of dollars while SLRC projectiles are estimated to cost $500,000 to $1 million each for a comparable effective range.²⁸ Early estimates based on commercial equipment put the gun system between $7 million and $12 million each.²⁹

The unique technology development challenges for the SLRC in contrast to other hypersonic weapons of this range stems from the new combination of artillery (gun-launch) and a hypersonic projectile. A major challenge is to survive launch stresses at a force to reach hypersonic flight and deliver weapons effects. One advantage of developing the SLRC, and its technical challenges, is if they yield a weapon system that costs significantly less than other available options. On the surface, this appears to be a favorable cost exchange compared to other weapons, which are an order of magnitude more expensive. Since a formal cost-benefit analysis has not yet been

___________________

²⁷ Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, 2018, “Hypersonic Weapons Basics,” https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-andproliferation/missile-basics/hypersonic-missiles/#_edn1.

²⁸ J. Rafferty, Army Futures Command, 2020, “Long Range Precision Fires Cross-Functional Team Brief,” presentation to the committee, September 24, Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

²⁹ U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Armaments Center, 2021 “Strategic Long Range Cannon (SLRC) Phase 2 Overview to NASEM Classified Breakout Session,” August 12, Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

initiated, cost-estimating relationships, production cost curves, life-cycle costs, and the overall cost-effectiveness of the system have not yet been officially determined.³⁰

Although the total life-cycle cost to integrate and sustain the SLRC program within the force structure is not yet known, differing cost estimates have been provided for the hypersonic-glide projectile. Initial round investments will also be high. LTG Thurgood, RCCTO Commanding General, estimated the initial SLRC round cost is greater than $8 million each; then $800,000 per round after 1,000 are purchased;³¹ the OUSD estimate was $85,000 per round at 10,000 rounds.³² As one basis for comparison, the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile is $6 million to $8 million per missile.³³ The Navy’s Electromagnetic Rail Gun program experienced similar high investments in the initial rounds.³⁴

In contrast to traditional DoD practice when considering future investments, cost should focus less on individual systems and more on the enterprise resources required to achieve mission goals. This perspective suggests implementing a “cost per effect” (CpE) metric to measure the sum of what it takes to obtain a desired mission result rather than a particular combat system’s acquisition and support costs. Context regarding capability delivered and effects achieved is needed, otherwise cheapest per-unit acquisition cost may actually drive more expensive (overall) and less capable solutions. CpE is a measure to assess comparative technologies through an operational view of mission effectiveness and fiscal efficiency, not just lowest up-front per-unit cost for a weapon that may only address one facet of the kill chain.³⁵

___________________

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Congressional Research Service, 2020, “Defense Primer: RDT&E,” IN FOCUS IF10553, November 25, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2020-11-25_IF10553_bda4424f3402bf06cba856f1fa87a8606152a7ab.pdf.

³² Ibid.

³³ Maj. Gen. K. Kamper, 2020, “U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence,” presentation to the committee, October 27, Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

³⁴ T. Boucher, Office of Naval Research Science and Technology, 2020, “Railgun Weapon System Program Overview,” presentation to the committee, September 23, Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

³⁵ Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, “Resolving America’s Defense Strategy-Resource Mismatch: The Case for Cost-per-Effect Analysis,” Policy Paper 23(July), https://mitchellaerospacepower.org/resolving-americas-defense-strategy-resource-mismatch-the-case-forcost-per-effect-analysis.

2.4.2 Cost per Effect Framework

The committee defines CpE as the sum of what it takes to obtain a desired mission result. This includes the cost of the entire system (with the SLRC, this includes the cannon, heating, cooling, C2, supporting sensors, transportation, etc.), rather than just the cost of the projectile. The committee recommends that the Army should include the following:

• Mission factors, such as the rate of fire, which will dictate how many cannons will be required and ultimately drive the overall operational life-cycle cost, and
• Quantifying the manufacturing capacity in the United States to produce the SLRC production at scale.

2.4.3 DoD Hypersonics Development

The U.S. hypersonics programs are developing quickly and demanding resources that put stresses on funding sources, research and testing facilities and personnel, and the manufacturing infrastructure. A Congressional Research Service report estimates that FY 2020 program budgets were $1,714 million and the President’s budget PB2021 estimated budget is $2,355 million.³⁶

Gillian Bussey, director of the OUSD (R&E) Joint Hypersonics Transition Office, stated that the SLRC currently has limited technical merit due to the following five competing challenging requirements: miniaturization, thermal load, G loads, muzzle velocity, and mobility logistics. At the time of the OUSD presentation, OUSD and LRPF CFT had not engaged within a year regarding program advances and statuses, but have subsequently discussed the SLRC program advances.³⁷ The Phase 1 controlled unclassified information (CUI) report and the Phase 2 classified report address these OUSD concerns.

Hypersonics development within the Army is not centrally managed. The RCCTO reports to a board of directors led by the Secretary of the Army. That board includes the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Under Secretary of the Army, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the Army Acquisition Executive, and the Commander of AFC.³⁸

• AFC LRPF CFT is delivering the SLRC. AFC LRPF CFT is responsible for “a comprehensive modernization effort to deliver cutting-edge surface-to-surface fires systems that will significantly increase range and effects over currently fielded U.S. and adversary systems.”³⁹
• RCCTO is delivering an experimental prototype LRHW as part of the Strategic Fires Battalion in support of MDO.⁴⁰

___________________

³⁶ Congressional Research Service, 2022, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report R45811, updated July 20, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45811.

³⁷ G. Bussey, Joint Hypersonics Transition Office, 2020, “Strategic Long Range Cannon—An OUSD (R&E) Perspective,” presentation to the committee, September 23, Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

³⁸ Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office, “Experiment, Evolve, and Deliver,” https://rapidcapabilitiesoffice.army.mil, accessed November 10, 2020.

³⁹ Army Futures Command, Long Range Precision Fires Cross-Functional Team, “Who We Are,” https://armyfuturescommand.com/lrpf, accessed November 10, 2020.

⁴⁰ N. Thurgood, Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office, 2020, “RCCTO 101 for Board of Army Research and Development Report: Assessing the Feasibility of the Strategic Long Range Cannon,” presentation to the committee, September 24, Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

The committee asked other Service and Department of the Army program representatives about their level of engagement with the Army on applicable technology developments. The programs reported technology collaboration at varying levels with the Army organizations, to include none at all. They could not describe a formal mechanism for sharing hypersonics advances applicable to each program.

2.5 ARMY OFFICES AND DEVELOPMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

There are multiple Army directorates responsible for an aspect of SLRC development, including technology development, programmatic and portfolio management, operational employment development, and technology transition. These offices are stewards of the technology and are responsible to field the strategic fire capability for MDO. The SLRC program directorate functions and specific responsibilities are outlined in Table 2-1.

2.5.1 Army Futures Command Long Range Precision Fires

The AFC LRPF CFT focuses on three modernization areas: Strategic Fires (SLRC), Operational Fires (Precision Strike Missile [PrSM]), and Tactical Fires (ERCA) (Figure 2-2).

For operational fires, the PrSM is a long-range missile (>500 km) fired from existing launcher platforms with greater range, lethality, and survivability all at a lower cost than the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). It is already a program of record. There will be three flight tests in 2021, one of which will be a maximum range shot. For tactical fires, the ERCA system is an extended range 155-mm self-propelled artillery system that includes a supercharge propellant, course correcting fuse, and ammunition upgrades. In 2023, 18 ERCAs will be delivered to an existing battalion to test the operational concept.

2.5.2 Combat Capabilities Development Command Armaments Center

DEVCOM AC is the technology development partner to the LRPF CFT programmatic management for the SLRC. DEVCOM AC’s role is the technology program lead. In addition to the commands technology development and testing capabilities at Picatinny Arsenal, they are the primary coordinators with other Army laboratories, other DoD and government agency technology development commands, federally funded research and development centers, and industry.

2.5.3 Fires Center of Excellence

The Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) creates and develops capabilities and trains and provides a Fires Force to the joint warfighting commander across the spectrum of operations in Joint and multinational environments. The SLRC DOTMLPF-P employment assessment responsibility is the FCoE purview. MG Kamper, FCoE Commanding General, stated DOTMLPF-P development is on hold until a program of record decision is made.⁴¹ This sequential development of the technology then DOTMLPF-P employment is a concern. If the tactics and employment development are not in parallel, the potential lag will be too late to place the SLRC in the employment integration

___________________

⁴¹ Maj. Gen. K. Kamper, 2020, “U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence,” presentation to the committee, October 27, Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

TABLE 2-1 Army Directorates and Relationship to the Strategic Long Range Cannon (SLRC)

___________________

^a The division of ASA(ALT) and Army Futures Command technology development responsibilities is outlined in Army Directive 2020-15.

^b Army Futures Command, Long Range Precision Fires Cross-Functional Team, “Who We Are,” https://armyfuturescommand.com/lrpf, accessed November 10, 2020.

^c Army Futures Command, U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command, “Who We Are,” https://armyfuturescommand.com/ccdc, accessed November 10, 2020.

^d U.S. Army, 2017, “Research, Development, and Acquisition: Army Acquisition Policy,” Army Regulation 70-1, Washington, DC: Headquarters of the Department of the Army, https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ccap/cc/jcchb/Files/FormsPubsRegs/Pubs/Army%20Regulation%2070-1.pdf.

^e Fort Sill Fires Center of Excellence, “Fort Sill Values,” https://sill-www.army.mil, accessed November 10, 2020.

^f U.S. Army Publishing Directorate, 2020, Achieving Persistent Modernization, Army Directive 2020-15, Associated Army Regulation 5-22, “Management: The Army Force Modernization Proponent System,” effective November 28, 2015, https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=1021321.

^g Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, 2019, Prototyping Guidebook, Arlington, VA, https://www.dau.edu/tools/Lists/DAUTools/Attachments/329/DoD%20Prototyping%20Guidebook,%20v2.0.pdf.

UNCLASSIFIED//APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

LRPF CFT Scope and Objectives

chain. The committee asked LRPF CFT and DEVCOM AC about operational plans⁴² and the recently released DEVCOM Data and Analysis Center study concerning future long-range strategic fires.⁴³ These discussions are part of the Phase 2 classified report.

___________________

⁴² E. Halinski, U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command – Armaments Center (DEVCOM AC), 2020, “Strategic Long Range Cannon Study (SLRC) Meeting 4 Follow-Up Response,” presentation to the committee, January 25, Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

⁴³ E. Sterenfeld, 2020, “Army Announces Classified Briefing on Strategic Fires Study,” Inside Defense, December 17, https://insidedefense.com/insider/army-announces-classified-briefing-strategic-fires-study.

2.5.4 Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA(ALT)) supervises and evaluates the SLRC program and materiel developers for the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY). ASA(ALT) is responsible for transitioning the SLRC to a viable capability on the battlefield. This technology transition is often described as the “valley of death,” the gap between technology development and production where promising technologies often “die” due to inappropriate or insufficient funding.⁴⁴ The ASA(ALT) research and technology office, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Army for Research and Technology office, is the study sponsor.

2.5.5 SLRC Program Technology Transition Plan and Status

The committee requested insight into the technology transition plan from LRPF CFT and DEVCOM AC. The joint response provided follows.

2.6 STRATEGIC LONG RANGE CANON TECHNOLOGY MATURATION ROADMAP

Part four of the statement of task asked the committee to provide a technology maturation roadmap. The roadmap was to include an estimated funding profile over time, needed to achieve an effective operational SLRC that describes both the critical and associated supporting technologies, systems integration, prototyping and experimentation, and test and evaluation.

In order to achieve its demonstration goals, DEVCOM AC has developed a comprehensive Integrated Test and Evaluation Plan (ITEP). The ITEP reflects the SLRC systems, with test development for both complementary systems, a hypersonic projectile and the strategic cannon. With the ITEP, the SLRC project is executing an ambitious and comprehensive test and evaluation campaign plan supported by several organizations and facilities. DEVCOM AC has worked to lower demonstration risk in several areas.⁴⁶

The committee judged the ITEP will suitably serve as the roadmap baseline to incorporate the committee recommendations. Further cost analysis will depend on the results of the DOTMLPF-P analysis.

___________________

⁴⁴ U.S. Army, 2020, “Achieving Persistent Modernization,” Army Directive 2020-15, November 16, https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx.

⁴⁵ E. Halinski, U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command – Armaments Center (DEVCOM AC), 2020, email to the Board on Army Research and Development, December 18.

⁴⁶ U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Armaments Center, 2021, “Strategic Long Range Cannon (SLRC) Phase 2 Overview to NASEM Classified Breakout Session,” August 12, Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

2.6.1 SLRC Program Funding

The lack of dependable multi-year resourcing is the key risk factor in determining program feasibility to the point that BG Rafferty, Director, LRPF CFT, believes that funding uncertainty is the single largest risk to SLRC development. The SLRC is not a program of record and has no specific Program Objective Memorandum funding allocated toward its development. In August 2021, DEVCOM AC noted that the FY 2022 funding decision had been paused until pending re-briefs are complete. It is estimated program funding may be reduced by up to one third in the FY 2022 budget cycle (Table 2-2). Undependable funding amounts, coupled with large annual fluctuations in program resourcing, are negatively impacting several aspects of SLRC development. This has been exacerbated by decoupling of funds specifically directed to the SLRC program. The AFC has retracted and is now holding SLRC funds in a “general tech R&D” account (Table 2-3). This is having a direct negative effect on research and development testing and development timelines. Without dedicated funding, it is unclear when funds will be allocated.