RESTORING AND IMPROVING

Nuclear Forensics to Support
Attribution and Deterrence

PUBLIC SUMMARY

Committee on Enhancing U.S. Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Support Capabilities

Committee on International Security and Arms Control

Policy and Global Affairs

A Consensus Study Report of

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International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-309-27333-6
International Standard Book Number-10: 0-309-27333-1
Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.17226/26167

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Suggested citation: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2021. Restoring and Improving Nuclear Forensics to Support Attribution and Deterrence: Public Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/26167.

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COMMITTEE ON ENHANCING U.S. NUCLEAR FORENSICS AND ATTRIBUTION SUPPORT CAPABILITIES

Robert Rosner, Chair, William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago

Marvin L. Adams, HTRI Professor of Nuclear Engineering and Director of the Institute for National Security Education and Research, Texas A&M University, College Station

Sue B. Clark, Regents Professor of Chemistry, Washington State University; and Battelle Fellow, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Donald L. Cook, Former Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy

Donald J. DePaolo, Graduate Professor of Geochemistry and Senior Faculty Scientist, University of California, Berkeley

Michael Dunning, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (retired)

Steve Fetter, Associate Provost and Dean of the Graduate School, University of Maryland

Benjamin C. Garrett, Retired, Consultant, Argonne National Laboratory

Laura S. Holgate, Vice President for Materials Risk Management, Nuclear Threat Initiative

William Jeffrey, CEO, SRI International

Jenifer Shafer (until September 10, 2020), Associate Professor, Colorado School of Mines

Study Staff

Benjamin Rusek, Study Director

Jennifer Heimberg, Senior Program Officer

Marie C. Kirkegaard, Program Officer

Micah Lowenthal, Senior Program Director

Hope Hare, Administrative Assistant

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF REVIEWERS

This Consensus Study Report was reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine in making each published report as sound as possible and to ensure that it meets the institutional standards for quality, objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process.

We thank the following individuals for their review of this report:

Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Alton Romig, executive officer of the National Academy of Engineering. He was responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the National Academies.

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Preface

It has been the committee members’ collective experience that studies of this kind are fairly straightforward: the object of study is well defined and the charge tasks can be readily executed. However, this has not been our experience in executing this charge.

Early in our fact-gathering stage, we discerned that the actual organization of the federal nuclear forensics program did not correspond to what the available documentation had led us to expect. It became evident that the nuclear forensics program was undergoing a significant unplanned reorganization because leaders of some components of the previous nuclear forensics organizational structure had disengaged their agencies from active participation and funding, and that an effort to put in place a new organizational structure for the national nuclear forensics program was under way. While this study report was in review, a new National Security Presidential Memorandum on nuclear forensics (NSPM-35) was signed by the President on January 19, 2021. The committee is gratified to see that many of the steps that the committee recommends in the study report are included in the NSPM and its Implementation Plan. Some of the committee's findings and recommendations focus on addressing those issues, and are included to warn against the lapses that led to the observed need for remediation. Furthermore, the committee makes many recommendations that are not in the federal reports or plans.

Chapter 1 of the 2010 National Academies assessment of U.S. nuclear forensics capability, to which this study compared the current state of affairs, begins by proposing a hypothetical scenario (NAS, 2010, p. 14):

The discipline of nuclear forensics plays a key role in answering these questions. This study’s findings and recommendations detail ways to improve U.S. nuclear forensics capabilities that help deter a nuclear device from being used against the United States or its allies and determine who is responsible if one is found or used. They outline a national strategy to ensure that nuclear forensics capability is given high priority and that improvements are sustained over the long term.

For the national strategy to be successful, the President and leaders charged with nuclear forensics must take action. There is no substitute for top-level leadership and for ensuring that departments and agencies fulfill their designated and even legislated responsibilities. With leadership that fosters initiative and invention to meet challenges and fulfill the mission, the program will not only make better progress toward its goals, but it will also provide the excitement that we see in active successful programs, rather than only a concern about how to preserve minimum functionality. Failure to stop an unclaimed nuclear attack or prevent additional attacks would cause

unprecedented harm to the United States. The nation deserves and needs a stronger deterrent against such attacks and the ability to attribute an attack in the event that deterrence fails. The nation deserves and needs stronger and more dedicated support for nuclear forensics.

Robert Rosner, Chair
Committee on Enhancing U.S. Nuclear Forensics
and Attribution Support Capabilities

Acknowledgments

This report could not have been completed without the cooperation of the many present and former federal agency staff members who have played central roles in building and maintaining U.S. nuclear forensics capabilities, as well as the staff members of the Air Force Technical Applications Center, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Energy national laboratories charged with executing the operations and research and development at the heart of the U.S. nuclear forensics program. Randy Weidman, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s point of contact for the project, was especially helpful.

While we were fortunate that our committee’s investigation and interviews were largely complete by February 2020, the severe restrictions on travel and facility access due to the COVID-19 pandemic did substantially delay our ability to finish the study. Simply put, this report could not have been completed were it not for the hard work, dedication, and expertise of this committee’s National Academies staff, Benjamin Rusek, Jennifer Heimberg, Micah Lowenthal, Marie Kirkegaard, and Hope Hare, who persevered despite these difficulties.

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CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1 INTRODUCTION

1.a STATEMENT OF TASK AND CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE

1.a.i Low-Probability, High-Consequence Events

1.a.ii The Committee’s Approach to Addressing Its Charge

1.a.iii Reviewing a Program That Is Undergoing Major Change

2 ASSESSING U.S. NUCLEAR FORENSICS: FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION

2.a THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL NUCLEAR FORENSICS MISSION

2.b THE STATE OF NTNF

2.c WAYS TO IMPROVE NTNF AND A VISION FOR ITS FUTURE

2.d INTERAGENCY FUNCTIONALITY

2.e VISION AND GOALS

2.e.i Biennial Assessment

2.f IMPLEMENTATION

2.g OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

2.g.i Data Sharing

2.g.ii Mission-Driven Routine Work

2.g.iii Exercises and Evaluation

2.g.iv Sample Collection

2.g.v Mission-Driven R&D

2.g.vi Quality Assurance/Quality Control and Uncertainty

2.g.vii Improved Human Resources and Infrastructure

CONCLUSION

REFERENCES

ACRONYMS

APPENDIX COMMITTEE BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

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