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50 Chapter 3: RISE CONFERENCE Introduction The Transportation Resilience Innovations and Summit Exchange (RISE) was held on October 8-10, 2018 in Denver, Colorado. The Summit was co-sponsored by AASHTO, FHWA, TRB, and the Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT). Over 450 participants attended sessions on a wide range of topics focused on how to make the transportation system more resilient and actions that can be taken to enhance transportation agenciesâ capabilities to make this happen. Besides plenary and breakout sessions, the Summit included a poster session where state DOTs and other transportation agencies highlighted aspects of their resilience program. The posters represented a diverse set of activities across all the agencies that prepared them, illustrating how agency actions can enhance the resilience of the transportation system. In addition, a field trip to the nearby Eisenhower/Johnson Memorial Tunnels occurred one day prior to the opening session. The field trip focused on tunnel fire suppression technologies and featured presentations and participants from Australia and New Zealand. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) also offered a workshop on vehicle ramming. Several AASHTO and TRB committees held meetings either the day before or the day after the Summit. The Summit was structured around three major conference themes that served as the foundation for session tracks, with a plenary session introducing key points of departure for each theme. The three conference themes were: 1) Enhancing an Organizationâs Capacity for Incorporating Resilience into Its Activities, 2) Recognizing Infrastructure Dependencies and Fostering Partnerships, and 3) Making the Case for Resilience. A conference track was also offered for state DOT officials to focus on resilience opportunities and challenges from a state-level transportation perspective. NCHRP provided funds to support two representatives from every state DOT in the country to attend the Summit (see the text box on page 42 for the state DOTs and international transportation agencies that attended). Overarching Observations A number of overarching observations were universally noted by almost all of the speakers and participants. These observations are presented below in no order of priority. Transportation system resilience should be a concern for all transportation agencies and their partners - Although many reasons and examples were offered on why transportation agencies should be concerned about resilience, some of the more salient included the following: ⢠System disruptions and resulting impacts: A transportation system provides levels of mobility and accessibility that act as the foundation of a modern society. When this transportation system is disrupted, potentially serious short-term impacts could affect the economy, environment, and social interactions. If the system is viewed as consistently unreliable, long- term development patterns could also be influenced as industries and companies move to locations that are considered to have a more reliable transportation system. As stewards of the transportation system, transportation agencies are naturally concerned with avoiding such disruptions if possible, or at least mitigating the negative effects.
51 The following 44 state DOTs and transportation agencies from other countries attended the RISE meeting. ⢠Alaska Department of Transportation & Public Facilities ⢠Arizona Department of Transportation ⢠Arkansas Department of Transportation ⢠California Department of Transportation ⢠Colorado Department of Transportation ⢠Connecticut Department of Transportation ⢠Delaware Department of Transportation ⢠D.C. Department of Transportation ⢠Florida Department of Transportation ⢠Georgia Department of Transportation ⢠Hawaii Department of Transportation ⢠Idaho Transportation Department ⢠Illinois Department of Transportation ⢠Iowa Department of Transportation ⢠Kansas Department of Transportation ⢠Kentucky Transportation Cabinet ⢠Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development ⢠Maine Department of Transportation ⢠Maryland Department of Transportation/Maryland State Highway Administration ⢠Massachusetts Department of Transportation ⢠Michigan Department of Transportation ⢠Minnesota Department of Transportation ⢠Missouri Department of Transportation ⢠Montana Department of Transportation ⢠Nebraska Department of Transportation ⢠Nevada Department of Transportation ⢠New Hampshire Department of Transportation ⢠New Jersey Department of Transportation ⢠New Mexico Department of Transportation ⢠New York State Department of Transportation ⢠North Carolina Department of Transportation ⢠North Dakota Department of Transportation ⢠Oregon Department of Transportation ⢠Pennsylvania Department of Transportation ⢠South Carolina Department of Transportation ⢠Tennessee Department of Transportation ⢠Texas Department of Transportation ⢠Utah Department of Transportation ⢠Vermont Agency of Transportation ⢠Virginia Department of Transportation ⢠Wyoming Department of Transportation ⢠Washington State Department of Transportation ⢠West Virginia Department of Transportation ⢠Wisconsin Department of Transportation International Representatives ⢠Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, Rijkswaterstaat, The Netherlands ⢠New Zealand Transport Agency ⢠Transport Canada
52 ⢠High visibility of system disruptions - In most cases, transportation disruptions will inconvenience system users and those who rely on what the transportation system delivers; in the worst case, disruptions could result in fatalities and injuries. Thus, when such disruptions occur, political, public, and media attention is given to why the disruption occurred and, just as importantly, how the transportation agency will get the system back to normal and prevent such issues from recurring. The ability of transportation officials to deliver a fast recovery provides credibility to their agencyâs efforts and oversight of the system; alternatively, poor management of a disruption and of the subsequent recovery could invite scrutiny from other branches of government and loss of credibility. ⢠Increasingly interconnected world - Many of the infrastructure systems that states or communities rely on are interconnected such that a failure in one will lead to potential failures in others. The cascading effects of failure thus suggest that transportation agencies need to be aware of their reliance on the reliability of other systems (power, for example). This adds more complexity to developing a plan for agency response when the transportation system is affected by a disruption outside of the control of transportation officials. ⢠Vulnerability of cyber systems - The interconnectivity mentioned above certainly pertains to the reliance of transportation systems on reliable cyber networks. Several recent cyberattacks on public and private transportation organizations were discussed that resulted in loss of productivity and incurred substantial recovery costs. As was presented at the Summit, the transportation sector is considered the third most vulnerable sector to cyberattacks. Several speakers noted the need for transportation agency attention on this very critical part of day-to- day operations. ⢠Human-caused disruptions - Worldwide, transportation systems are some of the top targets of terrorists, not only because of the impacts on the community and economy, but because of how visible the attacks are and how they will be covered by the press. Terrorist attacks in the U.S. against transportation systems are not as common as elsewhere, although there have been several, highly visible attempts (e.g., the New York subway). Because of the vulnerability of the U.S. transportation system, transportation agencies should be continually concerned about protecting transportation infrastructure and system users against foreign and domestic terrorist attacks. ⢠Future climate and extreme weather conditions - Several well-reported extreme weather events over the past 10 years (e.g., hurricanes, superstorms, floods, blizzards, droughts, and wildfires) have shown how vulnerable transportation systems are to natural disruptions. With the vast majority of climate science projections suggesting that such events are likely to get worse in the future, it is important for transportation agencies to consider asset vulnerabilities and risks in their planning, project design, operations/maintenance, and asset management. Most projects put in place today will still be around over the projected timeframe of expected dramatic changes in climatic conditions.
53 Creating a state DOT culture of resilience starts with agency leadership â The fact that 13 state DOT CEOs and over 100 other high-level state DOT officials attended the Summit attests to the interest and concern DOT leaders have for system resilience. As was noted by many speakers and attendees, the path toward a more resilience-oriented DOT starts with agency leadership. This might mean nothing more than expressing interest in the topic and then assigning responsibilities to others to carry it out, or it might mean direct and continual involvement by the CEO in the agencyâs activities. In some cases, the impetus for more concerted efforts at resilience came from within the DOT but did not get more broadly applied or implemented until the CEO or other top leaders supported the initiative. The key observation from all the state DOT CEOs who presented at the Summit was that they personally were supporting the effort as well as taking steps to institutionalize the activities and practices to last beyond their tenure as the head of the agency. Most transportation agencies feel comfortable with their planning and implementing emergency response procedures â Many transportation agencies consider system resiliency solely from the perspective of operations and emergency response. Well-thought-out procedures and guidance have been available from many different sources (e.g., FHWA, FEMA, TSA, and the like) for many years. When asked to identify the state DOT resilience-oriented actions or activities that their agency was most proud of or comfortable with, the vast majority of DOT officials noted their emergency response procedures. However, a concern was voiced that transportation system resilience should be considered in all functional units within a transportation agency âDOT officials were asked what they would like to have more information on. Many responses indicated the need for guidance or information on how resilience concepts can be incorporated into everything the DOT does. Transportation agencies need to look at their own policies, structure, products, services, and capabilities from the perspective of the role of each in fostering a more resilience-oriented agency. It was, in fact, a major purpose of the Summit to foster this broader perspective on how resilience could be considered across a typical agency (see Figure 5). The guide for this project provides DOT officials with information on how to do this. Incorporating resilience concerns into decision-making processes is a key step for success â In discussing how one knows if resilience is being considered successfully by an organization, Summit participants offered many different ideas on how success could be measured (e.g., use of resilience performance metrics, implementation of resiliency projects or project characteristics, and the like). Most noted that even though system resilience is an important (and becoming increasingly more important over time) concern to transportation officials, the reality is that it will compete with many other goals and objectives. It was suggested that the most important step in institutionalizing resilience in agency efforts was to integrate such concerns into agency decision making and to make the case for why it deserves to be considered (see next observation). Decision making in this context included all agency decisions that could affect system condition and performance (e.g., policy formulation, planning, project development, operations and maintenance, asset management, and the like). One of the Donât be limited by what you do in resilience by not having enough data or analysis toolsâ¦.it is better to do something than nothing at all. -- Debra Nelson, New York Metropolitan Transportation Council
54 foundational âpillarsâ of including resilience into decision making was understanding how âriskâ can be considered in a decision-making context. Doing so necessarily requires an understanding of the types of threats and hazards that will likely be faced and the vulnerability of system assets to such threats/hazards. Figure 5: Resilience Considerations Should be Part of All DOT Functional Areas Many executive-level transportation officials recommended that the transportation planning process be one of the most important areas where risk and resilience needs to be included. Many of the Summit participants, especially those in very senior agency positions, felt that transportation planning was one of the most important functional responsibilities of their agency where risk and resilience concepts should be addressed. There were many reasons for this: 1. Planning provides the future context for decisions today and for those that will be made in future years. With a growing concern for system disruptions, planning is an obvious function where such considerations should occur. 2. Planning is often the source of much data and information describing what is happening on the transportation system. Adding additional requests for resiliency information would not be outside the norm for a transportation planning unit.
55 3. Many of the vulnerability assessments that have been conducted in the Nation follow a systematic process that is very similar to the usual steps in transportation planning, and thus the process steps will not be unfamiliar. 4. Planning is often the unit within an agency that leads interactions with other stakeholders (e.g., regional and local planning agencies, port authorities, transit agencies, transportation system users and with the general public). Planners are thus comfortable with the process of including others into transportation agency processes. 5. Federal requirements for performance-based program management have often led to the planning unit being responsible for identifying appropriate performance measures. To the extent that system resilience is to be part of these metrics, planners are probably best situated to do so. 6. Transportation plans are undertaken at various scales --- statewide, regional, corridor and site- specific. Transportation planners would thus be in the best position to incorporate risk and resiliency into all of these efforts whose primary intent is to inform decision making (see Figure 6 for an example from the Utah DOT at the corridor planning level). Figure 6: Incorporating Risk and Resilience into Corridor Studies, Utah DOT There is an important need for developing information, tools, and data to âmake the caseâ for resilience â In order to compete with other goals and objectives, transportation officials need to have information on the benefits of investing in resilience projects or in project characteristics that provide enhanced resilience for minimal costs. The desire was not only for information on benefits and costs for
56 individual strategies and actions, but also on methods for comparing across different projects (it is interesting to note that the session on benefit/cost methods was one of the most attended of the Summit). This need also included increasing the understanding of how resilience and other performance characteristics could be viewed from a co-benefit perspective, and the types of metrics (system and system users) that should be included in the analysis. Transportation agencies cannot do it alone â Transportation system resilience, in all its manifestations, affects many different groups and organizations. Summit participants emphasized the importance of collaboration, coordination, and communication among all the parties involved in enhancing system resilience. One session, for example, talked about supply chain disruptions and how both public agencies and private organizations could improve system resilience in the context of goods and freight movement. Others noted the importance of collaborative arrangements among different levels of government and with relevant agencies at the same level for specific activities and responsibilities (such as emergency response). Analysis frameworks existâ¦and are being used â Several Summit presentations focused on structured analysis frameworks that are being developed and/or used to provide transportation officials with a step-by-step process for considering resilience. In some cases, these frameworks were examining one particular function within a transportation agency (e.g., traffic incident response) whereas another was developed as a self-assessment tool for agencies to determine where they are today with respect to resilience activities and what they can do to enhance their capabilities. As additional frameworks are developed and existing ones are refined over time, transportation officials will have better information as part of their decision-making process to gauge the relative value of resilience actions. As climate science evolves and better and more cost-effective databases and models become available, transportation agencies will have to keep abreast of what these advances mean to their own capabilities. Sharing best practices is one of the most effective means of enhancing professional capacity in resilience efforts â Summit participants viewed peer exchanges, case studies, and other means of sharing best practices as the best forms of learning about the state-of-practice. This is especially true in the U.S. where there is wide ranging applications of agency-wide resilience practices. Some states are proceeding across agency functional areas; others are focusing on only one area (in most cases, emergency response). The sense was that transportation agencies can learn a lot from what others are doing. Training and professional development opportunities are critical resources to a resilience-oriented agency â Many DOT officials recognized that a greater consideration for resilience is not just a matter of having guides, design criteria, or analysis tools for doing so. It also requires staff who understand how to use this informationâ¦and perhaps as importantly, why they are doing so. The observation of the need for staff training and professional development in resilience topics cut across all four conference tracks. Leaders establish the resiliency culture in an agencyâ¦it is all about risk and resilience â¦. we are in it for the long game. -- Paula Hammond, WSP, Inc.
57 The consequences of system disruptions often have greater impacts on disadvantaged populations and thus transportation agencies need to consider such impacts in resilience efforts â Studies have shown that, in many major disasters, those living in poverty or who have no way of leaving an impacted area often face much higher consequences (and thus risks) than other population groups. This includes not only the immediate impacts on the livelihood and survival of low income and disadvantaged population groups, but also the long-term impacts of the economic dislocations that follow a disaster. Some states (e.g., California and Colorado) described how social impacts are being considered when priorities are set for resilience-oriented projects. This is an important and growing concern for state DOTs. The focus should be on what transportation systems enable, not on the transportation system itself --- Several sessions examined the challenges of incorporating resilience concepts into agency practice. In some cases, this was discussed in the context of how to convince legislators or other key stakeholders that funding should be allocated for such a purpose. In others, the context was how do you show the general public that the transportation agency is serving them. The message was clear----focus on what transportation systems do for a state, community, or society at large. Then show what will happen when transportation systems are disrupted. Focusing solely on transportation systems can miss the bigger picture of why a reliable, resilient, and effective transportation system is so important for a modern society. Keynote Presentation, Mike Lewis, Executive Director, Colorado Department of Transportation Mike Lewis, Executive Director of the CDOT, provided an overview of the challenges facing state DOTs with respect to system disruptions. He noted that since 1953 there has been a significant growth in the number of declared disasters in the U.S. In fact, the top five most expensive storms in U.S. history have occurred since 2012, with these top five causing more than $300 billion in damage. In Colorado, the 2013 flood disaster resulted in over $700 million in repair and reconstruction costs, projects which in a few cases CDOT is still in the process of delivering (in 2018). One of CDOTâs regional offices had to suspend all work in its planned capital program for one year just so it could focus on flood-related repair work. Mr. Lewis also noted that although state DOT officials have focused on natural disasters, cyberattacks represent an ever-growing threat as well. CDOT faced such a serious cyberattack in early 2018 that caused significant disruption. Mr. Lewis emphasized that effective state DOTs learn from their experiences. He compared the northeastern U.S. blizzard of 1978 to a similar storm in 2013 that also hit the northeastern U.S. High winds and 30â to 40â of snow in both instances had very different outcomes. The âBlizzard of â78â Creating a culture of resilience means planning our transportation systems to be more resilient, designing our projects to be more adaptive to change, constructing our projects to withstand more challenging stresses, and operating and maintaining our system to operate more reliably ----Mike Lewis, Colorado DOT
58 caused major interstates to be shut down for many days, closed schools and government offices for up to three weeks, and resulted in major economic losses. The 2013 blizzard, on the other hand, saw major interstates closed for up to 12 hours unlike in 1978. Economic losses were minimal. Why was there such a difference? According to Mr. Lewis, the National Weather Service did a post-mortem on both events and concluded that there were two major reasons for the different outcomes, 1) weather forecasting had improved over that time period, and 2) there was a much more coordinated and stronger government response. In other words, according to Mr. Lewis, the respective DOTs had learned their lesson from the 1978 storm and put in place coordination and communication strategies that resulted in a much less disruptive storm in 2013 â¦. greater coordination reduced the impact of a major storm. Mr. Lewis introduced the concept of a âcircle of lifeâ to explain how he sees resilience incorporated into what state DOTs do. As shown in Figure 7, state DOT responsibilities include planning, design, building, operations, and maintenance---the typical functions within a DOT. DOTs do their jobs wellâ¦they have many years of experience in knowing how to produce transportation projects. Then some form of disruption occurs to the transportation system that, similar to the CDOT experience with the 2013 flooding, refocuses the energies of the agency. Mr. Lewis suggested that to minimize the disruption to the DOT, and to the state and its communities, the DOT needs to know how to plan transportation systems to be more resilient; how to design projects more appropriately for unforeseen events and actions; how to construct resilient projects; and how to operate and maintain transportation systems that promote resilient performance. In other words, âhow do we develop a culture of resilience in our agency?â Figure 7: State DOT's Circle of Life and Disruption Response
59 Mr. Lewis described CDOTâs efforts to âchange mindsets,â of thinking of system resilience as a key outcome of all the DOTâs activities. CDOT has created institutional structures within the agency to act as continual champions for resilience. The agency has conducted resilience-oriented corridor studies to better understand where the risks are and the associated consequences of failure. It has incorporated system resilience into the statewide transportation plan. And it has developed a middle management staff that are committed to thinking creatively on what their unit can do to improve system resilience. Mr. Lewis closed by noting that of all the risks to I-70, one of Coloradoâs most important interstates, winter storms is the one that closes the road most. He noted every year CDOT closes the road for some winter-related reason (130 times in 2017). CDOT has managed through operational strategies to reduce the number of 90+ minute closures from 30 five years ago to zero today. Thus, CDOT has learned from experience how it can reduce the impact of winter closures. However, even with this progress, given the importance of the tourist industry to Colorado and winter travel along I-70, Mr. Lewis noted that CDOT still needs to identify a long-term plan to avoid road closures in the future. This can only be done if CDOT has a good idea of where the high-risk locations are. Research Topics Session participants were asked to identify potential research topics that would be beneficial to enhancing transportation agency efforts at system resilience. The following were suggested topics; they are not presented in any order of priority. There is a need for: 1. Changing mindsets â what steps can be taken to support scientists or engineers become more conscious about integrating social issues into their work (the âwhyâ and âhowâ are social issues going to be addressed by planners, etc.)? The distinction might be a focus on process (social science) vs. outcome (technical). Research needs to help broaden viewpoints to more holistically inform transportation resilience. 2. Best practices â how was community resilience effectively built up within the transportation organization and why was it effective? How did they organize the effort? 3. Methodologies and simulations that capture network interdependencies, cascading impacts, and failure points, with sufficient granular detail to enable targeted adaptation strategy development. 4. Investment models for adaptation strategy implementation: Are financial and technical resources being pooled to address shared risks? 5. Guidance/research on tools that can be used to justify betterments as part of the Federal ER programs. 6. Examination of best practices in communicating to different population groups and stakeholders during and after disruptions. 7. How to best include user costs and benefits into project selection processes? 8. How to best include social impacts into project selection? How to best use social impact indices for this purpose?
60 9. Organizational strategies for incorporating resilience concepts throughout the agency. What can we learn from each other? 10. How to best quantify risk and uncertainty into planning and decision making? 11. Continual collection of data on damage to assets for different types of threats and hazards so that over time we have developed a comprehensive database on damage curves. Especially important would be monitoring the effectiveness of mitigation strategies already put in place when incidents occur. Did the mitigation strategy work? 12. What changes in design standards and protocols are necessary to implement a more adaptive design process? 13. What are the best approaches for adopting a phased implementation strategy so that projects can be made more adaptive when more information is known about environmental conditions? 14. How can advances in technology be helpful in fostering a more resilient agency and transportation system? 15. How can resilience be best included in performance measures? 16. What are some the best ways of âmaking the caseâ for system resilience? 17. What can we learn from other countries on best practices? What can we learn from other sectors (e.g., utilities)? Final Session The final session summarized the key points from the Summit tracks. Key observations included: Paula Hammond (WSP) ⢠Agency leadership in fostering a resilience-oriented agency culture is critical. ⢠More state DOTs are starting to consider risk and system resilience. This has occurred in a variety of ways---understanding enterprise risk, using a systems approach, and using asset management as platform for doing so. ⢠It is very important to consider system resilience at the planning level; this is where future risks and vulnerabilities would be logically considered in a systematic way. ⢠A serious concern expressed by agency CEOs was how to fund resilience projects and/or resilience-oriented project add-ons. ⢠State DOT officials noted the importance of partnerships with a range of agencies and organizations â¦. emergency responders, utility companies, health departments, Tribal Nations, key system users (e.g., freight carriers), media, local government, and many more. ⢠For large-scale disruptions, there is often a need to coordinate with other states. This might have to do with the logistics of bringing in relief supplies and personnel for recovery, or because detour routes extend into other states.
61 Cris Liban (LA County Metropolitan Transportation Commission) ⢠The focus of many efforts has been on planning----not much implementation. It is time to get proactive! ⢠Many resilience strategies and actions come from state and local government. Funding does not have to be a constraint if leaders are creative. Resilience champions can come from all levels of government and from many other groups as well. ⢠Network cascading effects and telecommunications are critical concerns at the local level where much of the interconnection of infrastructure systems occurs. Addressing such concerns often requires the participation of many agencies and companies that are not often involved in transportation decisions. Effective risk mitigation, however, will depend on such participation. ⢠The success of preparing for a very different future than what trends would suggest means many of us need to question the approaches and tools we use today. Engineering, in particular, needs to be more adaptive when designing a project in an area that is likely to be vulnerable to more intense environmental conditions. ⢠Disadvantaged populations should be part of the process in identifying resilience strategies for their communities. For example, evacuation plans need to consider the fact that many households do not have access to an automobile. Debra Nelson (New York Metropolitan Transportation Commission) ⢠Coordination and inclusiveness in the process for identifying potential threats and hazards, and strategies for dealing with them, are critical for success. This means interaction with key decision makers, those who influence transportation policy, and those from sectors outside of transportation but whose own infrastructure influences transportation system performance. ⢠Many believe we need to be talking about a âsystem of systemsâ that recognizes the interdependencies among relevant infrastructure and services. This might entail shared responsibilities. ⢠Decisions should be supported with credible analysis that acknowledges uncertainties in projections and assumptions. However, decisions should not be paralyzed because data is not available or expected impacts are not known with great certainty. ⢠From an agency perspective, creating a more resilient culture does not necessarily depend on a âbig win.â Many small victories can add up to a significant change in an agencyâs approach toward system resilience. Be bold!
62 Using Technology to Enhance Tunnel Resilience This session summarized the key points from the tunnel field trip that occurred on the first day of the Summit. As context, a CDOT official noted that on average there is one fire per year in the tunnels, which handle approximately 12 million cars per year. Any use of water to put out fires must collect the left-over water so that it does not pollute the water supply for the Denver metropolitan area. Because the tunnels have been declared an historic site, there are limitations to what CDOT can do to change the physical nature of the facility. A water deluge system was selected was based on simplicity in operation, ease of installation, costs, water supply quality from a nearby creek, degree of meeting the performance specifications, applicability for a variety of fire conditions, satisfying Buy America regulations, and nonproprietary. Lessons learned included: ⢠Performance-based specifications and procurement were successful, but CDOT chose to spend more to test the system rather than rely on information already provided through research. ⢠Linear heat detectors are slower than visual inspection given that operators are on duty 24/7. ⢠Buying non-proprietary equipment makes repairs easier; local contractors can work on the system. ⢠Boiler and circulation systems keep hot water in pipes, rather than using heat tape. This keeps the pipes from freezing, far more effective, cheaper and off-the-shelf availability. Presentations at the Summit from Australia, New Zealand, Maryland, and the FHWA showed the importance of thinking through the approaches and technologies that can be used to protect assets and the users of the facilities. Control Center for the Eisenhower/Johnson Memorial Tunnels
