Summary

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

After two decades of counterinsurgency and nation-building operations, the Army realized that its near-peer competitors had caught up to it in several technology areas. The Army’s technological advantage had been significantly eroded and, in some cases, such asymmetric warfare, unmanned systems, integrated air defense, and hypersonic weapons, it was evenly matched or surpassed. In 2017, Army Secretary Mark Esper led an intense effort to refocus Army science and technology (S&T)¹ work and funding on matching U.S. near-peer competitors and then regaining the U.S.’s historical technological advantage. As part of this effort, cross-functional teams (CFTs) reflecting the Army’s six modernization priorities and two crosscutting supporting capabilities were created to make the process of defining requirements, programming S&T and broader research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) work to meet those requirements, transitioning the results of this work to acquisition programs of record, and sustaining the resulting systems more efficient. The goal was to begin fielding new capabilities in fiscal year (FY) 2022, with an overall modernization objective of fielding

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¹ S&T is defined as comprising Budget Activities 1, 2, and 3, also referred to 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3. 6.1 is Basic Research, 6.2 is Applied Research, and 6.3 is Advanced Technology Development. More recently, some 6.4 funding, which is Advanced Component Development and Prototypes, has been redirected to S&T in the Technology Maturation Initiative to assist in the transition of the results of S&T work into acquisitions programs of record.

modernized systems and capabilities by FY2035. The modernization priorities, crosscutting support capabilities, and their CFTs are as follows:

• Modernization priorities:
  • Long-Range Precision Fires,
  • Air and Missile Defense,
  • Army Network,
  • Future Vertical Lift,
  • Next Generation Combat Vehicles, and
  • Soldier Lethality.
• Crosscutting supporting capabilities:
  • Assured Positioning, Navigation, and Timing/Space and
  • Synthetic Training Environment.

Subsequently, the U.S. Army Futures Command (AFC) was established in 2018 as a 4-star Army command reporting directly to the Headquarters (Chief of Staff) of the Department of the Army to lead the Army’s modernization efforts. U.S. Army General Order 2018-10 specifies that AFC

• Leads the Army’s future force modernization enterprise;
• Assesses and integrates the future operational environment, emerging threats, and technologies to develop and deliver concepts, requirements, future force designs;
• Supports the delivery of modernization solutions; and
• Postures the Army for the future by setting strategic direction, integrating the Army’s future force modernization enterprise, aligning resources to priorities, and maintaining accountability for modernization solutions.

As part of the standup of AFC, several organizations within the Army S&T and requirements communities were reorganized under the new command. This included the Combat Capabilities Development Command (CCDC or DEVCOM), which evolved from the U.S. Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM). DEVCOM houses several Army centers and laboratories, including the Army Research Laboratory, which serves as the Army primary agency for basic research. The requirements generation process, formerly housed in the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), was moved under AFC’s purview within the CFTs. This in turn provides AFC with de facto oversight and control of most of the Army S&T efforts in addition to the modernization priorities.

With the increased focus on modernization and the reorganization of much of the Army S&T portfolio under AFC, the Senate Armed Services Committee became interested in the effects of this focus on the Army

S&T enterprise. In response to this congressional interest, AFC asked the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to evaluate the impact of these changes on Army S&T and capability development. The National Academies Board on Army Research and Development formed an ad hoc committee to review the reorganization, evaluate and assess the impact on Army capabilities development, and recommend any necessary policy or organizational changes to better optimize the Army research enterprise in the near-, mid-, and far-term. The Committee on U.S. Army Futures Command Research Program Realignment was tasked to:

• Review the reorganization of Army research and development programs between the DEVCOM and AFC Headquarters;
• Evaluate the reorganization and assess its impact on the Army’s capabilities development; and
• Recommend any necessary policy or organizational changes to better optimize the Army’s research enterprise in the near-, mid-, and long-time horizons.

The committee did not engage in a line-by-line review of each DEVCOM component or how they were affected by the reorganization. Nor did the committee pass judgement on the decision to standup AFC itself.

The Value of Science and Technology for National Security

It is worth noting the value of S&T to the national security.² S&T’s greatest value is not in the focus on the current threat and operational environments, although it is often called upon to develop solutions to critical near-term needs, such as the analysis of recovered chemical munitions, and immediate solution issues in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as the MRAP Expedient Armor Program (MEAP) and CIED capabilities (Crew, Duke, etc.).³ S&T’s greatest value is as the incubator of innovation of the technologies and capabilities that will give the United States a disruptive and revolutionary technological edge over competitors and adversaries. S&T innovation work, or discovery science, is what gave the United States stealth technology, the Global Positioning System (GPS), lasers, and radar. It is vitally important that, in the midst of the urgent drive to regain our

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² By national security, the committee means beyond just that which is under the purview of the Department of Defense to include the Intelligence Community and other security agencies across the federal government.

³ It is worth noting that despite the general long-term focus of S&T, organizations like the Army Research Laboratory and DEVCOM are often essential to solving emergent technology problems.

near-term technological parity and edge with U.S. competitors and adversaries, that S&T discovery science be adequately funded so that the Army beyond the current modernization horizon will have the technological edge it needs to protect the nation and its interests.

Army S&T Authorities and Funding

Chapter 2 of this report examines how the recent changes to the Army S&T enterprise have altered the landscape of decision-making, responsibilities, and funding for modernization and S&T. Given this shift, the committee devoted extensive time to deliberating on these issues and—recognizing the close connection between S&T decision-making and funding and its broadly felt impact on the S&T enterprise and capability developed—it devoted ample space to the subject in the report. The committee’s analysis focused on authorities and responsibilities within the S&T enterprise, the requirements generation process, funding trends in S&T, and the need for clear S&T leadership within the Army.

Army Science and Technology Roles and Responsibilities

The creation of AFC appears to put modernization and S&T decision-making and funding under AFC’s purview and control. This altered the landscape for decision-making in modernization and S&T, creating confusion about authorities, roles, and responsibilities, primarily affecting the role of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology [ASA (ALT)] and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology [DASA(R&T)]. Despite the stated intent of AFC, confusion remains regarding the role of ASA (ALT) vis a vis AFC. This stems largely from 10 U.S. Code § 7016 which designates the principal duty of the ASA (ALT) as having “overall supervision of acquisition, technology, and logistics matters of the Department of the Army” and thus assigning the office of the ASA (ALT) as having primary responsibility over S&T policy and budget allocations. This changed with the re-designation of authorities to AFC under 10 USC §7014 (b)(8) and (d)(1).

A 2019 Army report to Congress described the AFC commander as having authority to “prioritize, direct, integrate, and synchronize science and technology efforts, operations, and organizations across the Army’s modernization enterprise” in “consultation with” the ASA (ALT).⁴ While the language above does specify that AFC will lead S&T across the “modernization enterprise,” without specifying the whole of S&T efforts,

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⁴ U.S. Army Futures Command, 2019, Science and Technology: 2019 Accomplishments and Way Ahead, Report to Congress, U.S. Army.

the reorganization of DEVCOM under AFC places the majority of the Army’s S&T apparatus under AFC’s supervision and responsibility—effectively giving it control over most of Army S&T decision-making and funding. This is in contrast to ASA (ALT)’s historic and currently stated role as the lead on S&T across the Army. While the committee does not comment on the efficacy of this shift, the implementation of it and lack of clarity over the new arrangement is catalyzing a confusion within the Army S&T community.

Given the apparently conflicting and seemingly overlapping authorities discussed above, combined with the lack of clarity in Army directives and statutory authorities, the aforementioned report to Congress emphasizes the need for the Army to clarify the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of AFC vis a vis ASA (ALT) and clearly delineate and deconflict its relationship across the whole of the Army S&T enterprise.⁵

Requirements Generation

The establishment of the CFTs was intended to serve as a mechanism to connect the S&T, acquisition, and requirements communities—a role originally performed by the ASA (ALT). While the committee applauds the establishment of clear priorities across the Army, the role of the CFTs appears to be driving most S&T to near-term focus. This presents some gaps for accomplishing the goal set for Army modernization. That is, the CFTs appear to be driving requirements to align capability requirements and S&T investments with acquisition of new systems and transition technology to programs of record (PORs).

Each CFT is aligned to a modernization priority and heavily influences both requirements generation and budget allocation. While the exact reporting structure for the CFTs remains unclear, the role in driving and leading the modernization efforts—including influencing decision-making on S&T technology investments—has made them instrumental in prioritizing and allocating S&T investments across the Army. The primary concern of the committee in this regard is on how technologies are selected, matured, and inserted into acquisition PORs. Prior to the establishment of AFC, requirements were generated separately from the budgetary process, with TRADOC traditionally serving as lead command for requirements generation. The committee is concerned that the consolidation

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⁵ In November of 2021, after this report was completed and undergoing peer review, the Secretary of the Army issued Army Directive 2021-35, which “reassigns co-chairs, and clarifies responsibilities for the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) Program Evaluation Groups (PEG).” This directive further outlines the roles and relationships between key stakeholder groups in the POM process, including ASA (ALT) and AFC and may partially address some of the recommendations in this report.

under AFC of the requirements process related to the modernization priorities—generation, validation, and resourcing—reduce the opportunities for the cross-pollination of ideas and the optimization of resources across the Army that existed prior to this consolidation where multiple Army organizations were involved. Furthermore, AFC’s and CFTs’ focus on modernization, combined with control over S&T resource allocation, could lead to a conflict between the near-term needs of modernization and long-term needs of S&T to drive capability development.

The committee notes that the consolidation and focus provided by the CFTs has in turn provided a focus on modernization needs and greater unity of effort across DEVCOM. This focus has allowed DEVCOM and its subordinate component ARL to work more horizontally across the Army enterprise. However, the committee’s examination of documents and interactions with key Army personnel reveals a lack of leadership emphasis on S&T’s responsibility beyond those systems currently envisioned in the modernization program. The committee observed a need for the Army to clarify the roles of the CFTs, remain conscious of important checks and balances between near- and long-term investments, and ensure that near-term modernization does not come at the cost of long-term capability development.

Army S&T Funding Trends

In addition to the changes in roles and responsibilities and budgetary authority, the committee reviewed S&T funding trends to assess any potential or existing impacts on S&T spending. The committee found that inflation-adjusted (constant FY 2021 dollar) 6.1 and 6.2 funding has decreased in recent years, while inflation-adjusted 6.3 funding and—while not properly S&T—6.4 funding has increased. The decreases in 6.1 and 6.2 funding would have been larger but for congressional budgetary plus-ups. The plus-ups have also driven the increases in 6.3 and 6.4 funding. The Army has focused additional resources toward Advanced Technology Development (6.3) and Advanced Component Development and Prototypes (6.4) funding, which more closely aligns with modernization. The observations about funding levels lead the committee to surmise that the innovation piece of S&T—the efforts for which 6.1 and 6.2 funding is primarily intended—is not seen as being as important as modernization.

The committee noted a perception among the S&T community, based on conversations with the laboratory and center personnel within DEVCOM, regarding core funding. AFC has provided mixed signals regarding the amount of S&T funding allocated to core discovery or innovation funding to the DEVCOM laboratories or centers versus modernization efforts. Although AFC has signaled support and desire to maintain

core competencies at the laboratories and centers, greater clarity over prioritization in future budgets is needed, otherwise the laboratories and centers may continue to hold a perception that they are in competition with each other—extramural partners for S&T funds. In addition, the reliance on extramural organizations has notably and appropriately increased since AFC’s establishment, yet, at the same time, a sense of stability needs to be considered for important in-house laboratories and centers.

Given the increased reliance on modernization, with a stated goal of a 60/40 split between modernization and innovation focused spending within Army S&T, the committee is concerned that too much focus on near-term modernization, focused on evolutionary incremental change, will create gaps in future capability development by underfunding long-term and revolutionary S&T programs. While the committee believes that a 60/40 split of S&T is prudent (see finding in Chapter 2), mechanisms are needed to ensure that S&T funding remains secure moving forward and that the Army should adopt the recommendation of the Defense Science Board to increase S&T funding to 3.4 percent of the Army topline budget.

The Need for Clear S&T Leadership

Each of the above concerns could be addressed by the establishment of a clear leader and “champion” for S&T within the Army. The committee is recommending the establishment of an S&T executive within the Secretariat to serve as an expert and advocate to oversee S&T policy and review its execution. This role would be able to simultaneously resolve disputes among various parts of the Army and ensure advocacy for S&T resource allocation within the Army S&T enterprise.

S&T Innovation and Workforce

The committee, recognizing the connection between S&T and innovation and the critical need for innovation to outpace near-peer adversaries and the core role played by the S&T workforce in driving innovation, investigated the state of innovation in Army S&T. This included the impact of the reorganization on innovation in S&T and the associated S&T workforce. Innovations may be discrete improvements to capabilities within a priority weapons system (e.g., new stealth coatings or hypersonic structural materials manufacturability) or entirely new revolutionary capabilities (e.g., stealth, GPS, or 5G). The freedom to explore new concepts, even without a clear transition in mind, is critical to innovation and driven by S&T investments that lead to new capabilities and an empowered S&T workforce. Chapter 3 of this report focuses on innovation and the S&T workforce and outlines steps to clarify engagement with external

groups, connect the Army and S&T community, manage and sustain the S&T workforce, and balance modernization with innovation.

Clarifying Engagement with External Groups

Despite increased extramural engagement by AFC, the pathways and mechanisms for engaging with and performing research for the Army can be confusing to much of the S&T community. While information on AFC’s website is available, it could clarify points of contact, existing opportunities for engagement, and explanations for how research works within AFC. This can be especially challenging for small businesses and research organizations that are not already familiar with working for the Army or lack the specialized personnel for government and Army relations.

Nevertheless, the committee notes that AFC is still a new organization. There are examples or best practices among some of AFC’s component organizations, such as the Army Applications Laboratory, which uses non-traditional partners. The committee recommends that AFC develop a central Army resource website to allow partnerships with external organizations that provides information and points of engagement.

Connecting to the Broader Army S&T Community

The U.S. S&T community outside the Army and the Department of Defense (DoD) and its funded activities is extensive; industry far outspends the government in technology development. While the internal S&T pipeline within the Army is strong, Army connections to this broader community will allow it to take advantage of and leverage this research. The Army has only a few University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs). They have specific charters and enjoy strong reputations across the full range of RDT&E budget categories. While the Army Research Office has the principal Army responsibility for sponsoring academic research, when UARCs see opportunities within their specific charters to partner with academic institutions, it should be encouraged. Further, UARCs may also find natural partners in the Research and Development Engineering Centers and with other institutions.

Awareness of operator needs is also critical in aligning S&T to meet future capability needs. The committee saw strong evidence that the Army is actively seeking operator input to the S&T community for requirements identification and capability development. Project Convergence and Team Ignite initiatives are excellent examples of this interaction. The committee encourages these interactions and their expansion, while balancing near-term needs perceptions with S&T’s research and innovation responsibilities. The committee also encourages continued engagement between

AFC/DEVCOM and the DoD communities of interest for greater cross-collaboration to share ideas and develop partnerships to aid in minimizing duplication of effort.

Managing the Workforce

In order for the Army to maintain an edge in innovation and S&T, a strong technical workforce is imperative for translating field requirements into technologies and holding strong ties to academia and industry to leverage expertise to fill critical gaps; in other words, maintaining a “smart buyer” of technology capability for the Army. Recruitment and retention of technical personnel have been critical issues for the Army and DoD for some time, and there is a need for a clear workforce development plan to build and sustain the workforce. AFC should develop and clearly articulate a workforce development plan and structure for highly technical careers. This workforce development plan should clearly define technical career paths, from undergraduates through senior civilian technical leadership. Further, it should allow for that workforce to meaningfully engage, collaborate, and not only learn from industry and academic partners, but use that new-found knowledge to instantiate meaningful change that allows the S&T enterprise to thrive for the long term. Army laboratory directors have many authorities as a Science and Technology Reinvention Laboratory, and they need to be empowered to utilize all of these authorities to maintain and grow the S&T workforce.

Balancing Modernization and Innovation

Chapter 3 reiterates the importance of balancing modernization and innovation, first highlighted in Chapter 2, but from the perspective of innovation in the Army S&T enterprise. The Army cannot fully predict future threats, so S&T investments need to be broad enough to hedge against an uncertain future. Modernization focuses principally engineering improvements to specific systems, while S&T primarily focuses on discovery and exploration that is so critical to the innovation that drives long-term capability development. Clear delineation between S&T programs for modernization and innovation is critical to the success of both. Direct connections between S&T and capability development are not always clear at the outset, but the Army needs to allow the S&T workforce to pursue these innovations.

Be the Threat

Innovation and a leading S&T workforce have been essential to the ability of the U.S. military to outpace adversary capabilities since the end of World War II. Stealth, GPS, precision munitions, autonomous and unmanned systems, and several other defining military technologies of the late 20th and early 21st centuries are the long-term result of early S&T and the fruits of a workforce given the latitude and resources to seek out innovations to ensure U.S. military overmatch. In essence, innovation and S&T investments enabled the U.S. military, and by extension the Army, to become the threat that U.S. adversaries were forced to adapt to.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff should clearly delineate and deconflict the roles and responsibilities for the Army’s science and technology program between AFC and ASA (ALT) in accordance with the FY 2019 National Defense Authorization Act §1068 (b)(3) and as directed by Army Directive 2020-15 (Achieving Persistent Modernization) dated November 16, 2020. The Army should also clearly delineate the role and responsibilities of the cross-functional teams in relation to AFC, DEVCOM, and ASA (ALT).

Recommendation: To ensure effective transition of science and technology (S&T) to support Army modernization priorities, demonstrate leadership support for future Army capabilities, support a robust Army innovation and technology discovery effort, and guarantee a viable intramural RDT&E capability where it is most critical, the Army should program for and request S&T (6.1, 6.2, and 6.3) budget levels that are increased by at least as much as Congress annually increases Army S&T and reflect real growth throughout the Army Modernization period. Further, the S&T allocation should be 40 percent for innovation and discovery research (6.1 and some 6.2) and 60 percent directed to the Army’s modernization priorities (some 6.2 and 6.3). This allocation should be reassessed periodically to ensure that it continues to address the Army’s intersecting needs of modernization, innovation, and technology discovery.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Army should designate an science and technology (S&T) executive within the Secretariat to serve as an expert and advocate to oversee S&T policy and review its execution. The Secretary of the Army should seek the joint advice of AFC and ASA (ALT) to define and codify the executive’s

authorities and responsibilities. This empowered S&T leader should help navigate any lack of clarity in the roles and responsibilities of AFC and ASA (ALT) and ensure the balance of near-, mid-, and long-term priorities and between intramural and extramural S&T performance. This executive should be a senior civilian (SES/SL level) with a strong technical background in S&T and experience working within the S&T community and be accountable for the success of S&T within the Army.

Recommendation: While a “one-stop shop” may not be a practical solution, AFC should strengthen its efforts to ensure the consistency and simplicity in its strategic messaging when describing opportunities for basic research, as well as the transition of new technologies needed to fill its modernization and research gaps. AFC should look for methods to make it easier for those not familiar with the Army to do work with them. ERDCWERX, a partnership between DEFENSEWERX and the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, is a prime example of this sort of initiative.

Recommendation: The committee emphasizes the critical role played by the communities of interest (CoIs) in Department of Defense-wide science and technology. While some engagement with CoIs is ongoing (i.e., through engagement with subject-matter experts from across the S&T enterprise), the committee encourages the Army to recommit to CoI engagement via AFC and DEVCOM.

Recommendation: AFC should make greater connections within the U.S. science and technology (S&T) ecosystem to leverage investments and technology innovations with the industrial, academic, and other Department of Defense organizations in order to avoid redundant investments and maximize utilization of nongovernmental developments. It should consider greater use of competitions akin to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Grand Challenges as a mechanism to engage industry, academia, and the rest of the S&T community.

Recommendation: The Army leadership should ensure that the laboratory directors are empowered and effectively resourced to cultivate their workforce and are empowered to utilize all Science and Technology Reinvention Laboratory (STRL) authorities given to them. Army leadership should establish metrics to measure the effectiveness of STRL funding and ensure that laboratory directors are fully utilizing their resources to manage their respective workforces.

Recommendation: AFC should ensure that its leadership not only provides consistent guidance to modernization and research priorities, but that it actively encourages appropriately delegated and decentralized execution at all levels of its science and technology (S&T) workforce to reduce confusion and ensure a clear vision for Army S&T and to ensure delivery of capabilities at higher quality and lower cost.

Recommendation: To not only encourage the culture of innovation that will allow the Army to “be the threat,” but also improve its ability to measure it, AFC should investigate and implement industry-proven best practices to drive innovation, including leadership commitment to innovation,⁶ incentives for implementing novel methods to solve problems, and clear lines of responsibility and accountability beyond simply the allocation of more funds.

The findings and conclusions that support these recommendations can be found in the body of the report.

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⁶ It is worth noting here that the private sector companies with reputations for innovation (Apple, Google, and Tesla) are also well known for their strong leadership (Steven Jobs, Eric Schmidt, and Elon Musk) and that leadership’s commitments to innovation.