1

Introduction and Background

STUDY CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

The U.S. Army Futures Command (AFC) was established in 2018 as a fourth major Army command and a peer to the Army’s three other long-existing major commands—the Army Materiel Command (AMC), founded in 1962, and the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Forces Command (FORSCOM), both founded in 1973. Headquartered in Austin, Texas, AFC reached full operational capability in July 2019, with approximately 26,000 personnel, spread across the United States and elsewhere, it is focused primarily on major Army modernization priorities.¹ AFC now oversees the Combat Capabilities Development Command (CCDC), also known and used in this report as DEVCOM, and formerly as the Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM) that was previously assigned to AMC. As a result of AFC’s reorganization, certain elements for basic and applied research and advanced technology development were realigned from existing Research and Development Engineering Centers to AFC, and there were additional impacts on other Army laboratories, research and development (R&D) units, and technical activities.

According to Mark Esper, former Army Secretary and Defense Secretary, the rationale for this change was straightforward:

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¹ U.S.ArmyFuturesCommand,“AboutAFC,” https://www.army.mil/futures/?from=org#orgabout.

In response to the portfolio realignment, the Senate Armed Services Committee directed the Army to enter into an agreement with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine “to evaluate these changes and their impact on the Army’s ability to efficiently and effectively develop and deploy needed capabilities and new technologies in the near, mid-, and far terms. The review should also include recommendations for policy and organizational options that would better optimize the Army research enterprise to support Army missions in the near, mid, and far terms.”³ The National Academies Board on Army Research and Development convened the Committee on U.S. Army Futures Command Research Program Realignment for these purposes. The committee’s statement of task is in Box 1.1.

Scope of the Committee’s Analysis and Structure of the Report

The committee was tasked with assessing the reorganization of the CCDC (more commonly known as DEVCOM) and that reorganization’s impact on Army S&T. The reorganization is part of a larger restructuring of Army S&T that includes the establishment of AFC itself; the reorganization of DEVCOM under it; the incorporation of cross-functional teams (CFTs); the establishment of several other subordinate units and formal extramural partnerships; and a shift in funding and authorities and responsibilities. As such, at the outset, the committee focused on trying to understand how AFC is now organized, how it approaches S&T and capability development now and in the mid- and long term; its funding emphases and authorities; and the impact on the workforce and the Army’s ability to innovate to meet future threats.

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² M. Esper, 2018, “Discussion with the Secretaries of the U.S. Military Departments,” U.S Army, in attendance of a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) event, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/03/army-outlines-futures-command-org-chart-in-flux/; https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/event/180312_Discussion_Secretaries_Military_Departments.pdf.

³ Committee on Armed Services, 2019, National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2020 Report,” U.S. Senate Report 116-48, p. 107, https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/srpt48/CRPT-116srpt48.pdf.

As stated in the Summary of this report, the committee did not engage in a line-by-line review of each DEVCOM component or how they were affected by the reorganization. Nor did the committee pass judgement on the decision to standup AFC itself. Instead, the committee sought to highlight the current and potential impact of AFC and the DEVCOM reorganization on the Army S&T enterprise. This report is the result of the committee investigation and its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Following this introductory chapter, the committee’s reviews, assessments, and recommendations follow the outline below.

• Chapter 1 provides background to the establishment of AFC and the reorganization of DEVCOM.
• Chapter 2 contains the committee’s analysis of Army S&T authorities, funding, and capability development.
• Chapter 3 contains the committee’s analysis of the impact on S&T innovation in the Army and its workforce.

Key Term Definitions

Throughout the report, the committee utilizes several terms related to S&T, military R&D, and Department of Defense (DoD) budget and funding terms, among others. The key terms are defined below for clarity.

Innovation—Implementation of novel ideas that introduce new capabilities and/or enable new systems or improve existing systems or capabilities.

Modernization—Incremental developments and improvements to current systems and capabilities with a focus on the near and mid-term.

Science and technology—A subset of DoD RDT&E appropriations that includes funding for basic research (6.1), applied research (6.2), and advanced technology development (6.3)—the earliest stages of the RDT&E process.

Discovery research—Basic research and basic science.

Time horizons—For the purposes of the report the committee defines time horizons loosely as follows:

• Near-term: 1-5 years
• Mid-term: 5-10 years
• Long-term: 10+ years

Budget activity codes:⁴ The definitions are adopted from official DoD definitions.

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⁴ See Appendix E for full definition of these terms.

BACKGROUND

The Security Environment

The U.S. military has, over the better part of the past decade, drawn down its major counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. The international security environment has shifted back to great-power competition, now with China and Russia, as well as to significant threats from North Korea and Iran. The United States is experiencing a range of challenges, such as cyber-attacks on civilian and government infrastructures; a resurgence of nuclear and conventional threats, including hypersonic delivery vehicles; and potential threats to space assets; along with advancements in technologies like artificial intelligence, machine learning, and quantum computing. These challenges have refocused national attention over the past several years to modernizing U.S. strategic and conventional forces, as Joint Chiefs’ Chairman Milley recognized in his fiscal year (FY) 2022 budget testimony:

In late 2017, the Acting Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army established priorities to focus future modernization investments.⁶ Army senior leaders redirected $1.1 billion, constituting 80 percent of total available science and technology funding, to these priorities.⁷ On March 26, 2018, the Army announced the pending activation of AFC. Army top civilian and military leadership realigned S&T, other RDT&E, and procurement accounts in 2017 to bring critical funding to the six modernization priorities it selected. Subsequently, in 2018, AFC was formed and commenced controlling, or otherwise strongly influencing, Army investments in the “Big Six” modernization priorities, including decisions regarding S&T funding.⁸ The Big Six became eight modernization thrusts, as follows: Long Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift, Army Network (with one subset), Air and Missile Defense, and Soldier Lethality (with one subset). See Box 1.2.

Eight CFTs⁹ were created to address each of the modernization priorities listed in Box 1.2, with two of the priorities, Army Network and Soldier Lethality, being further divided to address critical enablers (assured positioning, navigation, timing, space, and synthetic training environment). The CFT concept is to “develop a requirement, informed in appropriate cases by experimentation and technical demonstrations, through teaming, agility, and rapid feedback to enable the development of a capability document and improve the decision making for a potential program of

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⁵ M. Milley, 2021, “Defense Department Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request,” U.S. Department of Defense, https://www.c-span.org/video/?512340-1/defense-department-fiscalyear-2022-budget-request&live.

⁶ R. McCarthy, 2017, “Army Directive 2017-24 (Cross-Functional Team Pilot In Support of Materiel Development),” U.S. Army, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN6101_AD2017-24_Web_Final.pdf.

⁷ U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), 2018, “U.S. Army Modernization Strategy. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC),” https://www.army.mil/standto/archive/2018/06/06/.

⁸ M. Esper, 2018, General Order 2018-10 (Establishment of the U.S. Army Futures Command), U.S. Army, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN11199_GO1810_FINAL.pdf.

⁹ In AFC’s FY2024-FY2028 programming guidance, there is mention of a “ninth thrust” associated with the CFTs, the Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO), this is not a CFT in and of itself but a new office to execute rapid prototyping.

record.”¹⁰ CFTs are meant to bring together the major stakeholders spanning requirements generation, S&T, testing, acquisition, and logistics to more efficiently develop the capabilities that the Army will need to support Multi-Domain Operations.

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¹⁰ Ibid.

A CFT was characterized as a team of teams, led by a requirements leader, program manager, technical lead, sustainer, and tester. Specifically, “Each CFT will be led by a Director (Brigadier General) who reports directly to the Under Secretary of the Army (USA) at the direction of the Secretary of the Army and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) at the direction of the CSA.”¹¹ CFTs serve to align DEVCOM center S&T funding proposals to the annual AFC program build with the Army’s modernization priorities.

Creation of Army Futures Command

AFC was established to consolidate the Army modernization efforts under a single command and to solve a core problem outlined in a memorandum from the Army Secretary: “The Army’s current requirements and capabilities development practices take too long.” According to the Army’s own assessment, the system took anywhere from “3 to 5 years” to approve requirements, and generally another decade to design, build, and test new weapon systems. The Army assessed that is was losing near-peer competitive advantage in many areas, “we are outranged, outgunned, and increasingly outdated.” The Army noted that private industry and some potential adversaries are “fielding new capabilities much faster than we are. The speed of change in warfighting concepts, threats, and technology is outpacing current Army modernization constructs and processes.”¹² Army General Order 2018-10 established AFC with the following leadership, reporting, and coordination roles:

AFC was established as a peer command to FORSCOM, AMC, and TRADOC, as shown in Figure 1.1.

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¹¹ While the CFTs now are now associated with AFC, they predate the establishment of the command by more than a year.

¹² R. McCarthy, 2017, Army Directive 2017-33 (Enabling the Army Modernization Task Force), U.S. Army, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN6391_AD2017-33_Web_Final.pdf.

¹³ Ibid.

As outlined in Army General Order 2018-10, the Commanding General, AFC reports through the Chief of Staff of the Army to the Secretary of the Army. In addition, the general order directs the AFC Commander to “coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) [ASA (ALT)] on all matters pertaining to research, development, and acquisition.”

AFC was established to lead Army modernization to meet future threats and capability needs. Its introduction to the Army S&T enterprise was part of a larger restructuring effort to prepare the Army to deter and defeat near peer adversaries in the future operating environment. As part of the overall restructuring, RDECOM and its subordinate laboratory and centers were moved from AMC and reorganized under AFC as the CCDC (more frequently called DEVCOM) with its core of Army S&T assets. Figure 1.2 depicts the internal structure of AFC.

DEVCOM maintains eight major blocks of competency and “is the Army’s technology leader and largest technology developer.” The command focused on “fundamental scientific research, technology development, engineering, and analysis” to the support the Army and its modernization needs.¹⁴ Within DEVCOM is the Army Research Laboratory (ARL), which was established to “operationalize science for transformational overmatch. DEVCOM’s ARL is also the Army’s fundamental research laboratory “focused on cutting-edge scientific discovery, technological innovation, and transition of knowledge products”¹⁵ and is responsible for performing “Army-unique foundational research and cultivating critically important knowledge and insight that can enable future Army force modernization capabilities.”¹⁶ ARL serves as the Army’s primary laboratory for S&T, operates, through its subordinate Army Research Office, the deployment of basic research funding to extramural performers and provides support to the other Army branches through reimbursable agreements. See Figures 1.3 and 1.4 for organizational charts of RDECOM and DEVCOM.

Army General Order 2018-10 also reassigned to AFC several other organizations formerly with different commands, as shown in Box 1.3. This was done to align the Army capability development and assessment organizations under one organization.

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¹⁴ U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command, 2019, “Combat Capabilities Development Command—Overview. U.S. Army,” https://www.army.mil/article/217033/combat_capabilities_development_command_overview.

¹⁵ Combat Capabilities Development Command Army Research Laboratory (DEVCOM ARL), Undated, “Who We Are,” U.S. Army Futures Command, https://www.arl.army.mil/who-we-are/.

¹⁶ DEVCOM ARL, Undated, “Essential Research Programs,” U.S. Army Futures Command, https://www.arl.army.mil/what-we-do/essential-research-programs/.

Army Modernization

AFC was designed to support the Army’s modernization vision, which was to “build the next generation of combat vehicles, aerial platforms, and weapons systems, and start fielding them by 2028.”¹⁷ These platforms and weapons systems are envisioned to be “more agile, lethal, resilient, and sustainable” on a future battlefield in which the Army will find itself under near constant surveillance and potential attack.¹⁸

The Army’s focus is expected to shift strongly to modernization in FY2022 when new technologies are ready for transition into programs of record. The Army also plans to develop new operational concepts to

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¹⁷ The Army has subsequently changed the outlook date to 2035.

¹⁸ M. Milley and M. Esper, 2018, “The Army Strategy,” U.S. Army, https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/the_army_strategy_2018.pdf.

“holistically drive modernization throughout [Army] doctrine, organizations, training, leader development, and facilities in concert with equipment modernization to balance [Army] capabilities.”¹⁹

In addition to AFC, key Army stakeholders of the modernization enterprise include the following:

• Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA)—to provide strategic guidance and direction, develop Army policies, prioritize resources, and set the strategic direction for the Army, namely the Army G3/5/7 and Army G8.
• ASA (ALT)—to lead Army acquisition efforts while “working closely with AFC.”

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¹⁹ Ibid.

• TRADOC—to serve as lead for doctrine development, organizational updates, training, leader development and education, and acquiring and developing people.
• AMC—to execute the modernization of facilities—the Army’s power projection platforms—to meet requirements for training, sustaining, projecting, and maintaining the future force.
• FORSCOM—to play “a key role as the service force provider” and enable the Army to test, experiment, draw on the insights of the operational force, and balance readiness requirements for current operations and contingencies.”²⁰

With respect to S&T, the modernization strategy directs the Army to “execute an investment strategy that delivers underpinning knowledge

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²⁰ M. Grinston, J. McConville, and R. McCarthy, 2019, “2019 Army Modernization Strategy: Investing in the Future,” U.S. Army, https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/2019_army_modernization_strategy_final.pdf.

and technology which addresses the elements of force modernization.” To support the modernization effort, the Army is aligning its laboratories to prioritize modernization efforts.²¹

The Value of Science and Technology for National Security

S&T is a critical enabler of military capabilities. S&T often serves to secure not just the nation’s security now, but into the (indefinite) future. At the same time, it is often undervalued, as its results are not always perceived as being immediately relevant to current needs. Indeed, if done properly, S&T results always seem to be disconnected from current events, because they are not aimed at the “now,” but rather the “what could be.” S&T investments primarily support long-term capabilities and technology development, rather than near-term modernization. As a result, S&T and modernization are often at odds for limited resources.

S&T is inherently a form of discovery and experimentation, while modernization is focused on solving clearly identified near-term needs. This creates an inherent tension in an organization that needs to be prepared to fight and win a war both tonight and a decade from now. Both near-term modernization and long-term capability development and discovery are critical and need to be balanced to ensure continued U.S. military leadership in the coming decades. Otherwise, the Army risks “mortgaging its future”; that is, sacrificing the development of capabilities to dominate and win in the future to achieve near-term engineering advances.

20 years of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq drove the Army’s focus to the “problems of the day”—that is, the immediate needs of two wars’ counterinsurgency efforts. This is understandable because leaders needed to improve current capabilities to reduce casualties and keep the warfighter, to whom they are responsible, as safe as could be. Yet, by around 2015, it became apparent that U.S. adversaries, mainly Russia and China, had closed the gap in several technology areas such as long-range precision fires, unmanned and autonomous systems, and hypersonic weapons. While the United States focused on ongoing operations in the War on Terror, its near-peer adversaries engaged in intensive modernization efforts. As a result, the Secretary of the Army at that time engaged in a radical yet clear-eyed reprioritization of Army spending to engage in its own intensive modernization to regain and maintain the lead over near-peer adversaries. Although the committee notes that while the funding in S&T has increased, it still only constitutes approximately 2 percent of the total Army budget.

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²¹ Ibid.

While the renewed focus on modernization to overmatch recent developments in near-peer adversary capabilities is vital, it also risks a repetition of the last two decades. The military’s focus on the War on Terror diverted resources and attention from long-term capabilities development, providing adversaries the opportunity to close technology and capability gaps. This was prudent at the time; however, in retrospect it created the conditions the military finds itself in today. Too much focus on modernization over S&T investment risks history repeating itself by drawing resources away from S&T and long-term capability development to support modernization.

Effective S&T requires a focused and free-ranging exploration of what is possible in the technology space rather than on clearly defined requirements—discovery, which is an essential part of S&T, cannot be programmed. Historically, this has provided the military with emblematic weapons systems such precision munitions, Global Positioning System, stealth technology, unmanned and autonomous systems, and many other technological revolutions that have formed the backbone of our technological and military lead over adversaries. S&T, properly understood, is not about modernizing to meet a threat, but innovating disruptively to be the threat. An active, flexible, well-resourced S&T effort also provides greater “peripheral vision”—that is, a view of what else is happening in various scientific fields that might be beneficial to military capabilities as well as insights into what adversaries might be doing. Every technological capability that the United States has developed and fielded since the beginning of the Cold War—capabilities that have allowed it to maintain a large technology and capability gap over its adversaries—has been the result of innovative S&T efforts.²² If the United Sates does not adequately resource a free-ranging exploration of what might be possible—S&T properly conceived and conducted—it invites a future in which its adversaries possess the revolutionary, disruptive technology lead.²³ With this in mind, the committee approached the study from the perspective that a well-resourced S&T community and infrastructure is not only a critical military asset on par with the needs of modernization, but is a vital national resource to defend the nation, its allies, and its interests.

Conclusion: S&T has responsibilities beyond the near term, such as the following: looking beyond and peripherally wider than the

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²² W. Chin, 2019, “Technology, War and the State: Past, Present and Future,” International Affairs 95(4): 765–783, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz106.

²³ P. Tucker, 2020, “US Defense R&D Funding Falls As China’s Keeps Growing,” Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/02/us-defense-rd-funding-falls-chinaskeeps-growing/163021/.

eight modernization priorities; protecting against surprise; preparing for future threats and unanticipated adversary advancements; identifying and adapting new ideas not yet envisioned; and ensuring a capable in-house technology capability. In the standup of AFC, these equally important S&T responsibilities were not emphasized.

Key Features of the Realignments—A Change in Army S&T Authorities and Funding

Decision-making for modernization activities include procurement as well as RDT&E investments. Chiefly affected by the realignment were the following:

• The authorities of the ASA (ALT)—also the Army Acquisition Executive;
• The creation of an AFC commander; and
• AFC’s relatively new and very influential reporting units, such as the CFTs, and the realigned DEVCOM.

Changes in funding have also occurred since AFC’s establishment. Historical RDT&E funding patterns, in constant (real dollars, accounting for inflation) FY 2020 dollars are shown in Figure 1.5, which shows funding increases in response to conflicts or a need to maintain an advantage over an adversary, along with key systems or capabilities developed. Most recently, a small peak occurred just as AFC was being formed, showing an increased investment in the Army’s modernization priorities. It is noteworthy to mention that during these rises and falls, the S&T portion of RDT&E mostly remains flat or decreased in constant dollars. Authorities and funding are analyzed in more depth in Chapter 2.