2

Analysis of Army S&T Authorities and Funding

Following the establishment of the U.S. Army Futures Command (AFC), the Army placed substantial portions of its science and technology (S&T) and modernization decision-making apparatus and funding either under AFC’s control or under its strong influence as part of an AFC-led Army S&T decision team. Organizations such as the Army Research Laboratory and the research centers are now under AFC direct control and others, such as Engineer Research and Development Center, while not under its direct control, are still influenced by it through the S&T work that AFC funds.

The element of speed is vital. Peers and adversaries are rapidly reducing the United States’ historical technological advantage and placing U.S. military supremacy at risk through a combination of focused government research and taking advantage of rapid developments in the global S&T ecosystem. This poses a problem to the Army as a result of the famously-slow Department of Defense acquisition system. The Modernization Strategy directs the cross-functional teams (CFTs) to “align requirements developers with acquisition experts and representatives from the testing, logistics, science and technology, and other communities.” and to “dramatically reduce the time span from identification of a capability gap to prototype testing and operational experimentation.” The strategy highlights that, at the time the Army had already “realigned over $33 billion in the fiscal year 2020-2024 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) to ensure adequate funding for CFT signature efforts.” As discussed below, AFC controls a significant portion of this funding.

The committee notes that rarely does a capability development effort proceed stepwise through all of the S&T stages (i.e., 6.1, then 6.2, then 6.3) and directly into 6.4¹ and beyond (i.e., cross the “valley of death”), although it happens at times when promising early results assume great prominence. For example, radar research occurred during the mid-1930s but only became a vital military system in 1940. More often, however, results from 6.1 and 6.2 help envision systems and their components many years in the future. Some early ideas fail in the 6.1 and 6.2 stages, allowing researchers to fail quickly and without spending time and resources on an idea that will only fail later, driving knowledge forward faster. The discovery of new knowledge or the development of a new capability during S&T most often transitions into systems already under development. Such new knowledge and capabilities can form the basis for new concepts of warfare as well as new kinds of systems for future wars. Viable linkages are thus necessary between S&T, the weapon-system development and acquisition community, and the military and political long-term financial planning entities. AFC’s CFTs, which were discussed earlier, illustrate a part of such linkages.

Recognizing the close connection between decisions on S&T funding and the actual funding that results from such decisions, the committee linked its analysis of authorities and responsibilities for S&T decisions with its analysis of S&T funding. After much study, research, interviews, and deliberation, the committee observed several inconsistencies in the way in which Army S&T programs are executed and confusion regarding the roles and responsibilities of AFC vis à vis ASA (ALT). These inconsistencies and lack of clarity over S&T authority and process and their impact on Army S&T are the focus of this chapter. The chapter begins with a definition of S&T and a discussion of S&T roles, responsibilities, and authorities in the Army S&T community, followed by its relationship to S&T funding and, finally, the impact on Army S&T funding over the last decade.

ANALYSIS OF AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR S&T DECISIONS

Background and Context

AFC’s establishment introduced an altered landscape of decision-making for modernization and S&T. Chiefly affected was the ASA (ALT)

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¹ S&T is defined as budget activities 1, 2, and 3, also known as 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3. It is the basic science and early development of new technologies or capabilities before they are transitioned to the acquisition community. 6.1 is Basic Research, 6.2 is Applied Research, 6.3 is Advanced Technology Demonstration, and 6.4 is Advanced Component Development and Prototypes.

and the deputy for research and technology [DASA (R&T)], a position also designated as the Army’s chief scientist. In addition, the ASA (ALT) is the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) having milestone decision authority for acquiring major Army systems. Before AFC, Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM) (within Army Materiel Command [AMC]) defined its reporting responsibilities simply with the following statement: “Through the direction of ASA (ALT) and under the command and leadership of AMC, the RDECOM Enterprise provides integrated research, development, and engineering (RD&E) solutions, while executing technology integration across all aspects of Land Combat Power development.”² Operationally, RDECOM worked with the ASA (ALT)’s office to ensure key programs were supported and an appropriate balance of innovation versus modernization was achieved. Allocations of Army S&T funds were subsequently made by RDECOM, including contracts and grants to extramural performers in industry and academia. With the establishment of AFC, RDECOM, now renamed the Combat Capabilities Development Command (CCDC, more commonly called DEVCOM) was reorganized under AFC, with AFC replacing ASA (ALT) in the role of DEVCOM’s oversight.

In a 2019 report to Congress, the AFC commander was described as having the authorities to “prioritize, direct, integrate, and synchronize science and technology (6.1 through 6.3) efforts, operations, and organizations across the Army’s modernization enterprise” in “consultation with” the ASA (ALT).³ In essence, the altered landscape of decision-making appears to designate the AFC commander (and therefore selected internal elements of AFC, such as the CFTs) as the Army’s lead on S&T. However, the relationship between AFC and ASA (ALT) remains unclear, as statutory authority would indicate that ASA (ALT) retains supervision over all technology development, inclusive of Army S&T, within the Army. The issues stem, largely, from the language in 10 U.S. Code § 7016 which states as follows:

Title 10 U.S. Code § 7016—Assistant Secretaries of the Army

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² U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM), 2014, “Strategic Plan: Enabling Battlefield Dominance Through Technology—FY2015-FY2040,” U.S. Army, https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/358964.pdf.

³ U.S. Army Futures Command, 2019, “Science and Technology: 2019 Accomplishments and Way Ahead,” Report to Congress, U.S. Army.

⁴ 10 U.S. Code § 7016 (b)(5)(A), https://uscode.house.gov.

As stated, the ASA (ALT) provides supervision for all of the Army’s technology matters. The committee’s interpretation of this language requires the ASA (ALT) to be the responsible office for S&T policy and budget allocations.⁵ This conflicts with the role of AFC as designated by Army policy. Prior to the establishment of AFC, the ASA (ALT) traditionally managed all aspects of the Army’s S&T program as well as its in-house laboratory system. This re-designation of authorities was executed by the Secretary of the Army in accordance with 10 USC §7014 (b)(8) and (d)(1) to the new Army Futures Command organization. Army doctrine remains unchanged, creating confusion as to who is responsible for what.⁶

Per Army Directive 2020-15, the Army designated the commanding general (CG) of AFC as the Chief Futures Modernization Investment Officer in coordination with the ASA (ALT).⁷ AFC CG assumed the lead on all matters pertaining to R&D for prioritization, direction, integration, and synchronization for the execution of S&T efforts, operations, and impacted organizations across the Army. The designation of AFC to act on behalf of the Secretary of the Army as the manager of the S&T program has created confusion over who has the actual lead for Army S&T prioritization and funding and laboratory management because new roles and responsibilities for ASA (ALT) regarding S&T programs have not been published.

Finding: The committee finds the standup of AFC has caused overlapping roles and responsibilities between ASA (ALT) and the AFC Commander, which invites confusion in matters of S&T prioritization and funding. This appears to stem from confusion over the role and responsibility of ASA (ALT) as outlined in 10 USC § 7016 and the authority over S&T delegated to AFC by the Army Secretary under 10 USC §7014 (d)(2).

Governance of the Capability Requirements Generation and Resourcing Processes

The twin processes for generating capability requirements and allocating resources to them as formal programs were changed from pre-AFC norms. The establishment of CFTs was intended to create a functional

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⁵ 10 US Code 7014 further stipulates that the Office of the Secretary of the Army has “sole responsibility” for all Army R&D.

⁶ 10 U.S. Code § 7014, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelimtitle10-section7014&num=0&edition=prelim.

⁷ R. McCarthy, 2020, Army Directive 2020-15 (Achieving Persistent Modernization), U.S. Army, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN31182-ARMY_DIR_202015-000-WEB-1.pdf.

merger between the S&T and acquisition communities to expedite delivery of new capabilities for the Army. This role had been performed by the ASA (ALT) prior to the stand-up of AFC. The new CFTs’ goal is to more closely align capability requirements and S&T investments with acquisitions, which in turn, would facilitate emergent technology product transition to acquisition programs of record. However, the committee observed a lack of clarity in several gaps in the new process of transitioning technology to acquisition programs of record (PORs), such as the following:

• The synchronization of AFC, the RRCTO, and AFC’s accelerators on spending;
• Funding to accept and integrate Army S&T into PORs; and
• Since the formation of AFC, the Army appears to be engaging with a smaller ecosystem of universities than before, narrowing the expertise available to help the Army solve its problems.

It should also be noted that not all S&T efforts lead directly to an acquisition program.

Discussions with AFC representatives indicated that the eight CFTs were now, in essence, leading both processes—capability requirements generation and S&T budget allocation—as each CFT seeks to execute its responsibilities in accordance with the modernization priorities. Going further, the committee notes that, by virtue of their role in ranking DEVCOM’s budget submissions for investments in S&T technologies and associated resources (i.e., personnel as well as funds) and aligning them with the emphasis on the Army’s modernization priorities—despite ASA (ALT)’s responsibilities to have “overall supervision,”—the CFTs created efficiencies in the process of getting new capabilities into the hands of soldiers. However, caution should be exercised here; while ranking is critical to resource prioritization, this could also lead to long-range S&T efforts to discover new capabilities being under resourced as the focus of S&T efforts are shifted to nearer-term modernization goals. Committee information-gathering consistently revealed no consensus as to the level of cooperation, collaboration, or collegiality between the various stakeholders across the Army S&T enterprise.

The committee is concerned about how technologies are selected, matured, and transferred to acquisition PoRs. Prior to the creation of AFC, requirements were generated from well-defined sources outside of the budget process. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) previously and traditionally served as the responsible command for requirements generation with the additional responsibility for modernization. In turn, the Headquarters of the Department of the Army was responsible for

providing funding needed to meet TRADOC generated requirements. Military requirements are typically presented in the POM (a 5-year program estimate of needs) produced by each military department and defense agency; in the Army case, the POM is developed by the Army Headquarters. Budgets on the other hand are executed by various units of Army. In pre-AFC years, TRADOC presented its requirements to the Army G-3/5/7⁸ prioritization and validation and G-8⁹ for funding (resourcing), similar to the Navy and Air Force’s processes. This previous process was in alignment with established Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition policies. Now, with the creation of the AFC, these responsibilities have been consolidated in AFC and its G-3/5/7 and G-8 organizations, which in the opinion of this committee has eliminated the checks and balances inherent in the previous system. This organizational merging of requirements and resources allocation is unique within DoD and may lead to perceived conflicts in mission, contracting, and acquisition within the Army and with industry.

There are substantial differences between near-, mid- and far-term drivers for technology development. Modernization capabilities typically need a quick transition into the acquisition pipeline, therefore they need to satisfy a set of officially approved requirements and have been appropriately matured by the early (6.1 and 6.2) S&T enterprise. In contrast, early S&T priorities look beyond modernization to capabilities development for mid- and long-term systems that would support future modernization campaigns. The committee debated the abilities of individual CFTs—each laser-focused on a near-term modernization priority—to differentiate between S&T priorities and the current modernization priorities. The committee also debated the wisdom of individual CFTs generating requirements as well as selecting particular S&T developments to fulfill them—processes normally best managed by entities with different interests, priorities, and skill sets. Decisions of such large magnitude would normally be made by an entity having broad oversight of the entire S&T program, including both maturing technologies and those likely to become revolutionary if resourced adequately, as well as having a general understanding of the full list of Army acquisition needs.

It is important to note that, in S&T, not every project is on a linear trajectory that advances it through the entire S&T process to development, procurement, and then to operations. Some S&T projects are small or may be just software updates or new information and may be adopted by a procurement contractor who will embed a new idea into a product

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⁸ The G-3/5/7 is the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training.

⁹ The G-8 is the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management.

delivered to the Army. Other projects may be focused on discovery without a specific known application of the technology at the time.

The committee also noted that AFC is engaged in a number of technology demonstrations and prototyping efforts. These show art of the possible but cannot be defined as transitions into acquisition programs until industry is awarded a contract for a capability delivery to the Army that satisfies a documented requirement. After transition, these capabilities are inserted into PORs under the cognizance of program executive offices (PEOs) and program managers (PMs), who work for the ASA (ALT)/AAE. Finally, as defined by DoD budget policy, modernization budgeting needs to occur via spiraling in new technologies when possible in established acquisition programs.¹⁰

Despite the confusion and growing pains associated with CFTs, capability requirements development, and S&T resource allocation, the committee learned during its data gathering that putting all the modernization under AFC was “a very good thing” from the perspective of many in the community. Bringing the requirements-generating process into AFC via the CFTs has resulted in efficiencies and has served to ensure that the Army has a unity of purpose for future concepts and material development.¹¹ It was an important shift for DEVCOM and the Army Research Laboratory (ARL) as they have been able to work more horizontally across the Army enterprise toward a set of unified priorities and are able to work with the Army Research Office (ARO) to align their efforts with ARL. This led to more connections across the S&T community than before the creation of AFC. The CFTs allow focus to be brought to specific technical areas where technology is informing operational concepts and being linked with analytics to make decisions. The director of ARL stated that “scientists are now engaged to help write better concepts.”¹² As an example of a nearer-term focus, Project Convergence was established as a campaign of learning to integrate technologies into Army platforms and enable testing and experimentation in a warfighting environment to understand what is in the realm of the possible and should lead to more refined capability requirements.^13,14

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¹⁰ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2017, “Chapter 5: Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Appropriations,” in DOD Financial Management Regulation, Volume 2B, U.S. Department of Defense, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/fmr/Volume_02b.pdf.

¹¹ P. Baker, U.S Army DEVCOM Army Research Laboratory, 2021, remarks delivered to study committee.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ A. Feickert, 2021, The Army’s Project Convergence, Congressional Research Service, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11654.

¹⁴ J. Willison, U.S Army DEVCOM, 2021, remarks delivered to study committee.

Finding: The eight CFTs, which are primarily modernization focused, have become leading agents within AFC exercising control over the AFC’s S&T program. They bring a clear S&T focus to short- and mid-term modernization priorities. They show less interest in S&T longer-term contributions to the Army after modernization. Despite this short-term view, the committee identified a lack of technology transition or a broader clear connection with Army modernization programs of record.

Conclusion: The committee’s fact finding characterized ASA (ALT) in a variety of ways, from full partner to distant bystander, in this process, depending on with whom the committee was speaking. The committee believes improved clarity of roles and responsibilities, consistent with statutory responsibilities, across the S&T enterprise would alleviate unnecessary bureaucratic struggles and speed execution.

Finding: As defined by DoD budget policy, modernization budgeting needs to occur via spiraling in new technologies when possible in established acquisition programs.

Conclusion: The CFTs have significant influence in both capability requirements generation and resource allocation (funding levels and performer selection); the role of ASA (ALT) in this process is not understood by the committee. However, while the “unity of command” principle is certainly identifiable, the “unity of effort” is degraded due to the confusion and uncertainty as to which entity (ARL or other DEVCOM centers, a CFT, a PM or PEO, the AFC commander, the ASA[ALT]) is responsible for S&T decision-making.

Conclusion: The creation of the CFTs is a move in the right direction for the greater integration of S&T. This would be further strengthened by reinforcing the connection between S&T and development and sustainment.

The committee discovered a plethora of Army directives and associated policy documents describing an extensive bureaucratic framework

between AFC and ASA (ALT) for managing S&T.^{15,16,17,18,19,20} There are many AFC organizational elements and senior officials performing a variety of S&T-related tasks, but their overall functioning and interconnections toward the twin goals of near-term modernization along with maintaining a vigorous S&T program for the longer term were neither obvious nor clear to the committee. Likewise, neither obvious nor clear were the respective roles and responsibilities of ASA (ALT), PEOs and PMs, AFC leadership, CFTs, and DEVCOM, including its ARL component, with respect to managing mid- and long-term S&T investments.

The designation of the CG of AFC as the modernization investment officer implies a focus on near- and mid-term priorities given the length of time required from investment to delivery of new systems for any military system. That, when coupled with the conflicting responsibilities mentioned above, could cause the reprioritization of S&T funds, through the established planning, programming, and budget process, to the acquisition of updated military systems rather than investment into future warfighting capabilities.

Although the DASA (R&T), in the office of the ASA (ALT), is identified as the Army’s chief scientist, the CG of AFC is the investment officer. While consultation with ASA (ALT) is required by AD2020-15, the CG of AFC is authorized to make final budget decisions. Furthermore, ASA (ALT) is directed to work with AFC, jointly establish in writing an S&T plan. These policy directives have assigned S&T responsibilities to two separate offices within the Army. This bifurcation of duties has led to confusion regarding overall responsibility for the S&T program and associated investment priorities. The Army is concerned with this issue as Army Directive 2020-15 directed the ASA (ALT) to conduct a comprehensive

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¹⁵ M. Esper, 2018, General Order 2018-10 (Establishment of the U.S. Army Futures Command), U.S. Army, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN11199_GO1810_FINAL.pdf.

¹⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2018, Army Regulation 70-1 (Army Acquisition Policy), Chapter 15-8a(7)(a-h), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/dr_pubs/dr_a/pdf/web/arn5631_r70_1_final.pdf.

¹⁷ M. Esper, 2018, Army Directive 2018-15 (U.S. Army Futures Command Relationship with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), 4-5, U.S. Army, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN12786_AD2018-15_Web_Final.pdf.

¹⁸ R. McCarthy, 2019, Army Directive 2019-35 (Funding Flow for Future Force Modernization Enterprise), 4(c-d), U.S. Army, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN20029_AD2019_35_FINAL.pdf.

¹⁹ R. McCarthy, 2020, Army Directive 2020-01 (Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters, Department of the Army), 13, U.S. Army, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN21322_AGO2020_01_FINAL.pdf.

²⁰ Ibid.

revision of AR 70-1 no later than January 15, 2021, to define roles and responsibilities between AFC and ASA (ALT), but the committee did not find evidence of the required revision.

Finding: Many AFC organizational elements and senior Army officials perform a variety of S&T-related tasks across the Army, but their functions, ties, and relative positions of authority and responsibility regarding both the near-term modernization efforts and maintaining a vigorous long-term S&T program is not clear.

Finding: The revision to AR 70-1 as directed by AD2020-15 to clearly define roles and responsibilities between AFC and ASA (ALT) has not been released.

Army General Order 2018-10 assigned the ARL and the engineering centers as subordinate organizations to AFC. The committee is concerned that this Army in-house technical base is not permitted to exercise statutory authorities granted to each laboratory and engineering center’s executive director for expedited hiring of technical personnel, investment into minor construction, and spending authority over discretionary budgets.^21,22

Conclusion: The committee is concerned that, while center executive directors have statutory authorities for the expedited hiring of technical personnel, investment into minor construction, and spending authority over discretionary budgets, practical and cultural factors prevent them from exercising these authorities as broadly as they might to the detriment of the centers. This might be mitigated by a clear policy statement that reinforces the executive directors’ statutory authorities to provide adequate resources to the ARL and the engineering centers to ensure technical health of the workforce and infrastructure.

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²¹ 10 U.S. Code 2363, https://uscode.house.gov.

²² U.S. Department of Defense, 2020, “Department of Defense Science & Technology Reinvention Laboratory Personnel Demonstration Project Program (85 FR 78829),” Federal Register Notice, December 7, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/12/07/2020-26775/department-of-defense-science-and-technologyreinvention-laboratory-personnel-demonstration-project.

ANALYSIS OF ARMY S&T FUNDING

AFC, DEVCOM, and Army S&T Funding—Background and Context

The allocation of S&T funding became an AFC responsibility in 2018. This authority is different from pre-AFC, when the key S&T decision makers were the RDECOM units and the ASA (ALT)/DASA (R&T). Nonetheless, the Army-provided 5-year programming guidance depicts opportunities for DEVCOM and ASA (ALT) to join the decision-making process as the members of a multi-member team clearly lead by AFC.²³

While AFC may influence or control billions of dollars covering several appropriation categories and budget activities, the congressional tasking and the terms of reference for this study focus only on Army S&T (approximately $3 billion per year) that helps enable and leverage the important work that AFC carries out. This report, therefore, only focuses on basic research (Budget Activity 1 (BA1)), applied research (BA2), and advanced technology development (BA3) within the Army research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation category.²⁴ These budget categories are more often referred to as 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 respectively. Together, basic research, applied research, and advanced technology development altogether are designated S&T. Of these, the committee defines 6.1 and 6.2 together as the Tech Base.²⁵

The committee learned that there is considerable S&T research ongoing in AFC, especially within DEVCOM. Figure 2.1 shows two 5-year snapshots of requested funding for S&T work within AFC units (the Army programming notation “PB20” covers FY 2020-2024; “PB21” covers FY 2021-2025). DEVCOM’s S&T work was to consume approximately $9 billion out of each $12 billion and $13 billion 5-year PB20 and PB21 Army S&T totals in Figure 2.1, a bit less than $2 billion per year. As seen in Table 2.1, Congress has historically added an average of $0.5 billion to the Army S&T request.

The committee did not address authorities and funding related to the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command, the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, or the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command because, at the time the committee was engaged in information gathering, these commands did not fall under AFC.

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²³ J. Murray, 2018, “Supplemental Guidance for Army Science and Technology Preparation of Program Objective Memorandum 2021-2025, para. 3, U.S. Army Futures Command.

²⁴ A portion of 6.4 funding, known as the Technology Maturation Initiative, is included in S&T funding. Given the committee’s charge of assessing the reorganization of S&T work between AFC headquarters and DEVCOM, the committee chose to focus on 6.1-6.3 funding.

²⁵ There are other definitions of “Tech Base,” such as ARL (6.1 and 6.2) and the engineering centers (mostly 6.2 and 6.3) being described as the Tech Base.

TABLE 2.1 Army Budget Requests and Actual Appropriations, 6.1-6.4, FY 2015-2022 (Constant FY21 Dollars)

* Not published as of August 2021.

SOURCE: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “FY2015-2022 RDT&E Programs (R-1),” U.S. Department of Defense; Committee on Appropriations, “Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2015-2022 Reports,” U.S. House of Representatives; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2021, “Table 5-5: Department of Defense Deflators—TOA by Category,” p. 61 in National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2021, U.S. Department of Defense, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/FY21_Green_Book.pdf.

Figure 2.2 depicts the full scope of DEVCOM’s work, which was funded at a total of $13.4 billion for the single year FY 2021. Numbers in the lower right-hand corner illustrate portions of the annual Army S&T amounts reviewed and assessed by this committee, a total of $1.8 billion for the 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 accounts appropriated by Congress. That amount is about half of the entire Army S&T appropriation for FY 2021. In addition to this, DEVCOM’s performing organizations (ARL and the applied Research and Development Engineering Centers (RDECs) propose to and receive PEO and PM funding for in-house work or to administer contracts with extramural performers. Therefore, the DEVCOM centers engage in both innovation and more applied, reimbursable work; a valuable combination.

The committee did not scrutinize the remaining large amount of reimbursable DEVCOM work (approximately $10 billion in FY 2021), which is from sources other than AFC. This chapter, below, discusses DEVCOM core funding, which is important to maintaining the skills of researchers and technologists. As shown in Figure 2.1, AFC has other subordinate units that receive smaller amounts of S&T funding.

While AFC may strongly influence development and acquisition work separate from the S&T account (6.4 and other RDT&E and procurement

accounts) directly, that large amount of activity and funding still belongs to the PEOs and PMs who are in the dual-hatted ASA (ALT)/AAE funding-authority chain. In this regard, unlike AFC’s reach through its influence, the committee found that AFC’s actual control of funding was more like several billions of dollars rather than tens of billions. The committee was mindful, however, that decisions on S&T allocations and technology priorities can have relatively small S&T funding implications early on, but later they often result in possibly large financial as well as national-defense implications.

Financial Relationships: Before and After AFC

RDECOM

In the pre-AFC period, Army S&T funding was allocated to RDECOM for execution. RDECOM worked with the S&T portfolio managers in the Office of the DASA (R&T), the Army’s principal official overseeing S&T, to ensure key programs were supported and appropriate balances of innovation versus modernization work and intramural versus extramural work were maintained.^26,27

RDECOM would subsequently direct funding to ARL and the applied RDECs to support intramural work. Further, the contracting authorities within the centers would also execute contracts and grants to extramural performers in industry and academia (including federally funded research and development centers [FFRDCs] and University Affiliated Research Centers [UARCs]). During this period, on average, RDECOM executed ~33 percent of 6.1 in-house and ~53 percent of 6.2 in house, but only ~28 percent of 6.3 in-house. RDECOM would execute, intramurally or extramurally, the majority of the Army S&T funding each year. See Figure 2.3.

The RDECOM activities would also make proposals to other funding sponsors, PEOs, PMs, and other Army organizations, other Services and other Agencies) for reimbursable work at more applied levels of RDT&E.

DEVCOM

In the current era of relatively flat S&T budgets, funds are still sent to DEVCOM for intramural and extramural execution, but some S&T allocation decisions are made by the AFC headquarters or by other subordinate

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²⁶ T, Killion and C. Nash, 2007, “An Overview of the Army Science and Technology (S&T) Program,” Army AL&T Magazine, https://asc.army.mil/docs/pubs/alt/2007/4_OctNovDec/articles/04_An_Overview_of_the_Army_Science_and_Technology_(S&T)_Program_200710.pdf.

²⁷ U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM), 2014, “Strategic Plan: Enabling Battlefield Dominance Through Technology—FY2015-FY2040,” Appendix D—Prioritized Core Functions, U.S. Army, https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/358964.pdf.

AFC units funded by AFC. For example, the CFTs rank order S&T projects in alignment with the Army’s modernization priorities, informing AFC funding requests. Figure 2.2, above, shows an example of DEVCOM funding.

S&T Funding Trends

Comparison of RDECOM and DEVCOM S&T Funding Structures

Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show a snapshot of funding before (FY 2016) and after (FY 2021) the formation of AFC, leading to the following conclusions relevant to the committee’s tasking:

• Basic Research (BA1/6.1) funding grows nominally by about $34 million, a bit less than 10 percent (a 0.689 percent decrease when adjusted for inflation (constant FY21 dollars). While a small percentage of 6.1 is performed intramurally within DEVCOM centers, the majority supports academia, UARCS, and FFRDCs through grants or contracts from ARL’s ARO, which is to DEVCOM.

• Applied Research (BA2/6.2) is essentially unchanged, growing $20 million from FY2016 to FY2021, approximately 3 percent. However, this represents a 6.66 percent loss in real dollars when adjusted for inflation.
• Advanced Technology Demonstration (BA3/6.3) grows by nearly $203 million, approximately 57 percent nominally, and 23.6 percent when adjusted for inflation.²⁸

The committee notes that reimbursable work increased substantially over the same period. The DEVCOM G-8 staff explains that as the byproduct of implementing additional oversight in the reimbursable world where partner organizations are using DEVCOM contractual vehicles under a “Direct Citation” of funds.²⁹

Conclusion: While DEVCOM core S&T funding seems stable overall, the character of its work seems more applied technology (integration of existing technology) than innovative new technologies as 6.2 loses buying power and 6.3 (the S&T funding category most closely aligned to the modernization priorities) is growing. 6.2 dollars have historically been the financial source of the majority of the DEVCOM centers’ innovation work.

Overall Army S&T Funding

The committee also looked at overall Army S&T funding trends. The committee’s review and analysis of S&T requests and appropriations (Table 2.1) indicated that, on average over the past 5 years (FY 2017-FY 2021), the president’s budget request for Army S&T has ranged between $2.4 billion to $2.6 billion (in real, inflation-adjusted dollars). Congress has appropriated between $2.6 billion to $3.4 billion and has added on average approximately $0.5 billion more than requested annually. When reviewing the S&T request for the Army in the FY 2022 President’s Budget, the committee notes that Congress will have to add $0.75 billion to the Army S&T account just to stay level with the Army S&T funding appropriated for FY 2021.

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²⁸ Inflation calculated using the following recommended DoD inflation table for RDT&E: “Table 5-5: Department of Defense Deflators—TOA by Category. National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2021, in Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2021, FY21 Green Book,” U.S. Department of Defense, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/FY21_Green_Book.pdf, p. 61; U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command HQ G8 Office, 2021, remarks delivered to the committee.

²⁹ U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command HQ G8 Office, 2021, remarks delivered to the committee.

Table 2.1 also depicts budget requests and actual appropriations for Army RDT&E funds in the next development category beyond S&T, 6.4 (Advanced Component Development and Prototypes). For the years FY 2017–FY 2021, the focus on the modernization priorities required additional RDT&E development funding. The committee especially noted an increase in 6.4 requests by nearly six times, while S&T requests increased only modestly, although Congress boosted the S&T requests with significant additional appropriations.

Finding: Even with continual additional congressional funding, overall Army S&T budgets are losing ground to inflation at an accelerating rate. The amount of funding directed toward 6.1 and particularly 6.2, the heart of innovative work, has declined due to inflation in real terms while 6.3 and 6.4 funding, what funds modernization, has seen significant increases.

Conclusion: The definitive focus on the Army’s modernization priorities has driven a reallocation of funding within the Army. Of note in Table 2.1 is a jump in 6.4 budget requests by nearly six times, while S&T remained relatively flat. This implies a strong focus on near-term modernization and less on longer-term S&T work.

Looking more broadly at the growth and size of development funding for 6.4 plus two more categories, 6.5 (System Development and Demonstration) and 6.7 (Operational Systems Development), relative to the growth and size of S&T funding, Figure 2.4 shows, for requests, the large growth in development and magnitude relative to the very modest S&T growth and magnitude over the FY 2017–FY 2021 period, with FY 2022 showing a slight dip.

Conclusion: While S&T was not a bill-payer, in a financial sense, it did not receive the same growth priority as did development accounts since formation of AFC. A viable S&T base needs a commensurate increase in funding to prevent a widening disparity between modernization and innovation and to keep pace with future needs.

Impacts of Funding Trends on Army S&T

Impacts on DEVCOM Centers and the Army Research Laboratory

Maintaining the viability of the DEVCOM’s centers is critical. The committee addresses core funding, trends in funding intramural and extramural work, and the balance between S&T and modernization. The

core technical skill base enabled by core S&T innovation investments, typically, 6.1 and 6.2 funding together (the Tech Base), is key to laboratory and center viability and utility.

Core Funding

If a center can expect a reasonable amount of core funding, then it can better plan its work, investments in instrumentation/laboratories, workforce, and key partnerships with industry and academia. If AFC controls the execution of S&T funding, then the centers may perceive (or in fact experience) less confidence in its resource planning.

Since the formation of AFC and the re-designation of RDECOM to DEVCOM, the amount of core S&T funding (funding that a center director can count on each year for planning) has been in question. AFC-provided information shows a decrease in the percentage of 6.1 and 6.2 funding, which funds the majority of innovative work, destined for DEVCOM centers—a few percentage points.³⁰ The same AFC briefing slide asserts that “Army innovation” will increase by 37 percent, cumulatively, from the FY 2020-based Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to the FY 2021-based FYDP. The committee was not able to study the FYDP because the information is not publicly releasable. It thus had to rely on the DoD budget reported numbers. An interesting note found throughout the FY 2021 R2 exhibits (exhibits that explain the Defense RDT&E by budget activity and line item) that justify the S&T budget states that “adjustments align program financial structure to Army Modernization Priorities”³¹ [emphasis added] or other similar statements. Despite uncertain core S&T funding levels at the centers, the committee was informed by the former DASA(R&T) that the proportion of S&T funding directed toward innovation will be 40 percent, and the portion directed toward modernization will be 60 percent.³²

A result is that the DEVCOM centers and laboratories may perceive that they now need to compete more with other AFC centers and with those outside of AFC, thereby introducing uncertainty. Further, they may perceive that their mission is to focus more on the acquisition of the modernization priorities, losing focus on their role (perhaps losing their capability) in creating future knowledge and providing peripheral vision of developments in the broader scientific community for a future Army. Such balance decisions can affect hiring decisions and physical plant

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³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ U.S. Army, 2019, “Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification: PB 2020 Army (R-1 Line #44),” https://apps.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2020/Army/stamped/U_0603004A_3_PB_2020.pdf.

³² P. Perconti, former DASA(R&T), 2021, remarks delivered to committee.

investments and have long-term effects. When core innovation funding shrinks as a percentage of overall funding, the centers are in jeopardy of losing technical skill; can tend to look more at the near term; and may miss opportunities to find, mature, and introduce new technologies.

Finding: The Army is sending a mixed signal to DEVCOM. The Army asserts that while a decreased percentage of funding is being sent to the DEVCOM centers, there has been an increase in innovation, but with budget requests for the Tech Base (6.1 and 6.2) losing buying power since the formation of AFC.

Conclusion: A greater emphasis on the Army’s modernization priorities could lead to perceptions that core funding for innovation is at risk, despite assertions of the opposite.

On the other hand, the committee is not endorsing a guaranteed level of funding to the centers each year. Entitlements without close review and opportunity for redirection can invite a laissez-faire attitude toward pursuing science and thereby negate the very reason that federal agencies have in-house laboratories and development centers. Appropriate oversight and the justification of budgets is vital to ensure that work remains focused on the mission. Active and intelligent oversight can also be a tool for maintaining and ensuring a healthy culture of innovation.

To AFC’s credit, the committee learned that its programming guidance for FY 2022-2026 did mention inherent Army technology capabilities, although not specifically Army-center viability, as follows: “build and maintain a core competency that is inherent to the Army that industry or universities cannot/will not do.”³³

Conclusion: There appears to be a desire to maintain core competency in AFC’s technology centers—that is, DEVCOM, but AFC reallocations of S&T funds to new AFC extramural partners raise concerns about DEVCOM’s long-term viability.

Trends in Funding and Intramural versus Extramural Work

AFC has other subordinate units that receive S&T funding, but they are generally not bench performers or technology program managers like those in the DEVCOM organizations. These include, for example, the Army Applications Laboratory (AAL) and the Army Artificial Intelligence

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³³ J. Murray and B. Jette, 2019, Program Objective Memorandum 2022-2026, Guidance for Army Science and Technology, U.S. Army.

Integration Center (AI2C; originally called the AI Task Force (AITF)). S&T allocation decisions to support DEVCOM and various subordinate units extramural to DEVCOM, such as AFC’s University Technology Development Division (UTDD), AAL, AI2C, the Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences, Project Convergence, etc. are no longer made by technology program managers in the centers, but rather by AFC and some of its other subordinate units.

Data gathering revealed an increasing reliance upon extramural organizations for decision support on technology investments. This has led to perceptions of restrictions on laboratory leadership to develop necessary resident scientific and engineering skills to support Army acquisition and development into next generation warfighting systems. In AFC briefing material provided to the committee, AFC showed that it realigned (reallocated) funding from DEVCOM to other programs. Examples include the following:³⁴

• In FY 2020 $3.5 million was realigned from DEVCOM to UTDD; $6.3 million realigned in FY 2021.
• In FY 2020 $4.4 million was realigned within DEVCOM for Project Convergence; $26.9 million realigned in FY 2021.
• In FY 2020 $15.1 million was realigned from DEVCOM to AITF (now AI2C); $4.4 million realigned in FY 2021.
• In FY 2020 $4.4 million was realigned from DEVCOM to AAL; $6.33 million realigned in FY 2021.

Further, AFC programming guidance for the year FY 2024-2025 discusses allocation to other centers (viz., convergent manufacturing and quantum information); the funding, grants, and contracts for which are administered by ARO.³⁵ These examples show both a diversion of funding away from DEVCOM to other AFC projects or a reallocation of priorities inside DEVCOM.

The committee cannot conclude whether such realignments out of, or within, DEVCOM by AFC are better or worse than the methods used to allocate funding pre-AFC; they are only different.

Finding: AFC has directed reallocations of S&T funding out of the DEVCOM centers to other AFC organizational units or to extramural institutions. This has caused uncertainty about future workforce and investment requirements within DEVCOM and in-house

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³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ J. Murray, 2021, “Preliminary Army Science and Technology Program Guidance Memorandum for the Program Objective Memorandum 2024-2028,” U.S. Army Futures Command.

scientists are unclear about AFC’s long-term strategy regarding in-house capabilities, which are intended to be improved between now and 2035.

The Balance between S&T (Long-Term) and Modernization (Near-Term) Work

An S&T pipeline that allows us to adapt to future threats is vital. Federal research and development (R&D) funding has been declining in real dollars and as a percent of Gross Domestic Product.^36,37 Yet at the same time, our major adversary China has increasing R&D funding. National Science Foundation data indicate that U.S. R&D funding had a 4.3 percent growth rate from 2000 to 2017. China has a more than 17 percent growth rate. The gap between U.S. and Chinese R&D funding has been rapidly closing. Preliminary data from 2020 suggests that China now exceeds the United States in total R&D spending (see Figure 2.5).

The internal composition of Army S&T funding was of considerable interest to the committee because of the balance between the sum of 6.1 and 6.2, versus 6.3 (advanced component development and prototypes). Figure 2.6 shows that balance graphically. The committee was very attentive to the funding level of the Tech Base because that is the prime source of innovations for the mid- and long-term which is well past the current 2035 modernization objectives.

Overall, the Tech Base has been exceeding 6.3 and exhibiting some growth during the FY 2017-FY 2021 period. However, in FY 2021, 6.3 grew in size and approached Tech Base. At that time the percentage of Tech Base funding out of the S&T total was about 53 percent.

Finding: Within the S&T account, Tech Base has held its own relative to 6.3, but in FY 2021 with only a small margin over a growing 6.3 (53 percent Tech Base versus 47 percent 6.3). The committee notes that congressional additions to the budget have bolstered Army S&T for years.

The committee was surprised to learn that the Army’s budget summary for the FY 2022 RDT&E request to Congress contained the following quote: “Transforming for Tomorrow: Aligns 74% of S&T funding to the

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³⁶ M. Hourihan, 2021, “A Primer on Federal R&D Budget Trends,” American Association for the Advancement of Science, https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/AAAS%20R%26D%20Primer%20Update%202021.pdf.

³⁷ J. Sargent, 2020, “Defense Science and Technology Funding,” Congressional Research Service, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R45110.pdf.

Army’s six Modernization Priorities to deliver concepts and capabilities at the Speed of Innovation.”³⁸

As the Army’s corporate research laboratory, the increasing alignment of ARL’s 6.1 and 6.2 funded programs with the established modernization priorities could pose a potential risk to discover, innovate, and transition new and unanticipated technologies that could be powerful and even disruptive beyond the immediate planning horizon—for example, human, informational, and computational sciences to sciences for materials, lethality, protection and maneuver, assessment and analysis, and extramural basic research. The central issue for ARL is the alignment of its

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³⁸ P. Chamberlain, 2021, “Army Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Overview,” U.S. Army, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/pbr/FY22_PB_brief_28MAY21.pdf.

6.2 funding, which is likely to rank low in the CFT prioritization process, since ARL’s applied research is typically performed below technology readiness level 4. The committee is concerned that the focus on near-term modernization, which represents incremental change, will create gaps in the future out-years (10-15 years) due to the loss of opportunities for revolutionary change.

In light of planned modernization-oriented percentages like 74 percent, statements made to the committee by a retired senior Army officer and a former DASA (R&T) indicate that Army S&T funding would be moving toward a goal of 60 percent of S&T funding aimed at modernization priorities and 40 percent focused on 6.1 and 6.2 funding. This goal is set for the FY 2024-2028 timeframe to achieve a better balance between the two. In considering possible outcomes under a 60/40 arrangement, and assuming most 6.2 is sent to DEVCOM, then—using the Army’s FY 2021 S&T request as a base—the committee could reasonably expect (1) no 6.1 funding to go to modernization (all to discovery science), (2) about a third of 6.2 funding to go to modernization (two-thirds to innovation), or (3) all 6.3 funding to go to modernization (none to innovation). Even focusing about 60 percent of S&T funding on the modernization priorities

would leave less than 1 percent of the total Army budget to hedge against modernization priority changes or to bring forth innovation. Whether the 60/40 outcome or the 74/26 outcome cited in the quote above will happen is unknown; neither is it known what the final composition of the innovation component will be nor whether innovation funding will be aimed at the DEVCOM centers or elsewhere.

As important as the split of S&T funding between innovation and modernization efforts is the absolute funding level applied to S&T. The 60/40 split needs to be made among an adequate level of funding. In 2020 the House Armed Services Committee released a report addressing, among other things, the level of S&T funding necessary to maintain the preeminence of the United States in S&T and the associated military advantages that accrue to U.S. forces. The committee refers to a figure of DoD S&T funding that had previously been recommended by the Defense Science Board of 3.4 percent of the overall defense budget. The committee feels that this would be an appropriate funding level for Army S&T as a proportion of the overall Army budget.³⁹

Finding: There are no clear mechanisms in place to ensure the appropriate balance and consideration of near-, mid-, and long-term S&T competing priorities across the Army S&T enterprise. Moreover, there does not appear to be tracking of the longer-term S&T funding for emerging and promising technologies that are high-priority and need continued investment. There is also concern that the level of S&T funding is inadequate to maintain U.S. global preeminence in S&T.

Conclusion: The committee is concerned that emphasis on modernization implies a near-term emphasis on technology investments thereby minimizing opportunities for “leap-ahead” science and engineering investment. The committee is also concerned by the overall level of Army S&T funding. Unfortunately, other than during discussions with DEVCOM officials (cited above; 60/40), the committee found little direct evidence of strong Army advocacy for the Tech Base or S&T relative to the strong advocacy for modernization. The tracking of, or metrics to measure, the balance of S&T funding, especially for maturing high-priority technologies might help to address these concerns.

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³⁹ House Armed Services Committee, Future of Defense Task Force Report 2020, https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/2/6/26129500-d208-47ba-a9f7-25a8f82828b0/424EB2008281A3C79BA8C7EA71890AE9.future-of-defense-task-force-report.pdf, accessed September 30, 2021.

Providing S&T Leadership and Direction

After thorough investigation and deliberation on the impact of the AFC and DEVCOM reorganization on Army S&T authorities and budgets, the committee has reached the following several key insights:

• Overlapping roles and responsibilities with regards to S&T and the lack of clarity over authorities is catalyzing several problems within and across the Army S&T enterprise.
• Standing up AFC resulted in a better understanding of Army S&T by Army leadership. It was not well known or understood before, and resulted in a better appreciation of the value and purpose of S&T. Although there remains opportunity for improvement.⁴⁰
• The formation of the CFTs brought key stakeholders in the capability development process together and has the potential to identify capabilities but seemed to focus on near-term capability gaps vice longer-term capability developments
• RDT&E budget trends have favored modernization and development over S&T—while S&T funding has not declined in absolute terms, the lion’s share of new funding has been directed towards modernization. This could create a situation where the S&T budget is consumed in supporting the modernization priorities, giving short shrift to future-looking innovations and developing revolutionary capabilities.
• If the Army is staking its future on modernization fueled by S&T funds, then it needs to advocate for S&T resources greater that 2 percent of the Army budget and also clearly invest in longer-term technology development in order to ensure the Army does not sacrifice long-term capability development for short-term operational needs.

As detailed above, the confusion of roles and responsibilities has left S&T efforts without a clear vision or guidance and is creating unnecessary hurdles for technology development. The Army has designated AFC as lead for S&T as it relates to “modernization efforts” and placed a large portion of the institutional bodies that conduct S&T under AFC. However they have left the remaining S&T and some institutional bodies that conduct it under ASA (ALT). This has resulted in split leadership over the S&T enterprise that needs to be addressed.

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⁴⁰ Committee discussion with MG (ret.) Cedric Wins, former Commanding General of U.S. Army DEVCOM.

Conclusion: Recognizing that the Army Secretariat will likely always retain a role in S&T, the committee concluded that the division of labor between AFC and ASA (ALT) needs to be clarified. Leadership is critical to the success of the Army S&T enterprise. Leadership is needed to clarify roles and responsibilities, to ensure a proper balance of near-term modernization and long-term S&T investments, and to champion the value of S&T in the Army. With this notion in mind, the identification of a clear S&T leader within the Army is needed. The designation of such an individual would be a clear message from Army leadership that they are committed to a healthy S&T enterprise within the Army.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In this chapter, the committee has considered the topics of statutory authorities and responsibilities; how the establishment of AFC and the associated Army regulation has confused the division of authorities and responsibilities between AFC and ASA (ALT); trends in Army S&T funding; a shift from more far-term exploratory S&T in favor of the nearer-term Army modernization priorities; and the balance between intramural and extramural S&T funding and the related impacts on the Army’s corporate laboratories. In the course of drafting the report, the committee initially took the more conventional approach of placing findings where they naturally occurred in the text. This normally has the effect of allowing the reader to better associate a given recommendation with the part of the report that supports and leads to it. In this case, however, the topics of this chapter are so interdependent that taking the more conventional approach led to a scattering of recommendations that addressed a smaller piece of the overall picture, but were challenging to understand as part of the whole.

As a result, the committee elected to present three recommendations here, at the close of the chapter, to tie together the various threads discussed above and clearly present its recommendations. Because these recommendations address what the committee sees as the most pressing challenges resulting from the Army’s execution in the establishment of AFC, these recommendations are the key recommendations of the report.

As discussed at length above, the committee has found confusion and possibly conflict in the authorities and responsibilities of AFC and ASA (ALT), the two organizations that direct the totality of Army S&T. This confusion serves as an impediment to the effective conduct of Army S&T.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff should clearly delineate and deconflict the roles and

responsibilities for the Army’s science and technology program between AFC and ASA (ALT) in accordance with the FY 2019 National Defense Authorization Act §1068 (b)(3) and as directed by Army Directive 2020-15 (Achieving Persistent Modernization) dated November 16, 2020. The Army should also clearly delineate the role and responsibilities of the cross-functional teams in relation to AFC, DEVCOM, and ASA (ALT).

The committee also noted a shift in the focus of S&T funding away from longer-term discovery science to nearer-term modernization efforts. This is apparent to the committee due to the loss of 6.1 and 6.2 buying power to inflation, while 6.3 and, while not properly S&T, 6.4 funding has seen large increases.

Recommendation: To ensure effective transition of science and technology (S&T) to support Army modernization priorities, demonstrate leadership support for future Army capabilities, support a robust Army innovation and technology discovery effort, and guarantee a viable intramural RDT&E capability where it is most critical, the Army should program for and request S&T (6.1, 6.2, and 6.3) budget levels that are increased by at least as much as Congress annually increases Army S&T and reflect real growth throughout the Army Modernization period. Further, the S&T allocation should be 40 percent for innovation and discovery research (6.1 and some 6.2) and 60 percent directed to the Army’s modernization priorities (some 6.2 and 6.3). This allocation should be reassessed periodically to ensure that it continues to address the Army’s intersecting needs of modernization, innovation, and technology discovery.

To address the confusion in authorities and responsibilities discussed above; to ensure that longer-term S&T Army discovery S&T funding receives appropriate attention to provide the revolutionary capabilities that it will need; and to ensure an appropriate balance of intramural and extramural research to maximize access to innovative and discovery research conducted by non-Army entities while protecting the Army’s intramural corporate laboratories, the committee believes that a high-level individual needs to be responsible for coordinating the various, sometimes conflicting, demands on Army S&T.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Army should designate a science and technology (S&T) executive within the Secretariat to serve as an expert and advocate to oversee S&T policy and review its execution. The Secretary of the Army should seek the joint advice

of AFC and ASA (ALT) to define and codify the executive’s authorities and responsibilities. This empowered S&T leader should help navigate any lack of clarity in the roles and responsibilities of AFC and ASA (ALT) and ensure the balance of near-, mid-, and long-term priorities and between intramural and extramural S&T performance. This executive should be a senior civilian (SES/SL level) with a strong technical background in S&T and experience working within the S&T community and be accountable for the success of S&T within the Army.