1
Perspectives

To accelerate change to control and exploit the air domain, the Advanced Battlefield Management System (ABMS)² is the Department of the Air Force’s

___________________

¹C.Q. Brown, Jr., 2020, Accelerate Change or Lose, https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/2020SAF/ACOL_booklet_FINAL_13_Nov_1006_WEB.pdf, August.

² P. Dunlap, 2020, “ABMS Overview,” Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, October 30. See also J. Eddins, 2021, “Valenzia: ABMS Will Deliver the ‘Decision Advantage,’” Airman Magazine, https://www.airmanmagazine.af.mil/Features/Display/Article/2634972/valenzia-abms-will-deliver-the-decision-advantage/, May 26. D. Mayer. 2021, “ABMS Aims to Revolutionize Data Flow, Speed Decisions,” Air Force News, April 1, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2559022/abms-aims-to-revolutionize-data-flow-speed-decisions/. CRS (Congressional Research Service), 2021, Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), , https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/IF11866.pdf, June 29.

(DAF’s) contribution to the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2)³ concept of seamless joint and multi-national information sharing and operational command and control (C2). These efforts seek to allow current and future sensors, commands, operators, and weapon systems to share appropriate and accurate information at the speeds required to overcome anticipated adversary’s decision-making and actions.⁴ ABMS seeks to share critical operational data across the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) enterprise in both contested high-end and low intensity warfighting environments. Information such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) on the threat, weapons systems availability, and military operational status and actions underpin the ABMS architecture to allow joint and allied commanders to achieve an accurate, real-time understanding of the environment and take action faster than any potential adversary’s observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop.⁵

Owing to the evolving nature of ABMS, there is some confusion as to what it actually is today and promises to be tomorrow.⁶ Originating from other concepts known as Multi-Domain or All-Domain C2 and the Air Force’s cancelled Joint

___________________

³ See J. Garamone, 2020, “Joint All-Domain Command, Control Framework Belongs to Warfighters,” DoD News, November 30, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2427998/joint-all-domain-command-control-framework-belongs-to-warfighters/. CRS, 2021, Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46725/2, March 18. CRS, 2021, Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11493.pdf, July 1.

⁴ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer), Defense Budget Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, 2021, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf, May.

⁵ See “DoD’s Data-Driven Future: Shared Knowledge, Near Real-Time Answers,” 2021, Air Force Magazine, https://www.airforcemag.com/dods-data-driven-future-shared-knowledge-near-real-time-answers/, June 1. G.S. Fein, 2003, “New Meaning for ‘OODA Loop,’” NationalDefense Magazine, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2003/10/1/2003october-new-meaning-for-ooda-loop.

⁶ See T. Hitchens, 2020, “Roper Mulls Name Change for Changing ABMS (Not Skynet!),” Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/09/roper-mulls-name-change-for-changing-abms-not-skynet/, September 4. S. Sirota, 2021, “Roper Caves to Demands, Establishing ABMS as a Traditional Acquisition Program,” Inside Defense, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/roper-caves-demands-establishing-abms-traditional-acquisition-program, January 14. M. Mayfield, 2020, “Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management System Takes New Step,” NDIA Magazine, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/11/24/advanced-battle-management-system-takes-new-step, November 24. T. Hitchens, 2020, “Roper Targets Commercial AI, Data Analytics for Next ABMS Deals,” Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/roper-targets-commercial-ai-data-analytics-for-next-abms-deals/, May 14.

Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) recapitalization program,⁷ ABMS is both a concept and an initiative to field wide-ranging capabilities. ABMS has become synonymous with JADC2, but that misleadingly lacks consideration of other JADC2 efforts in the Army and Navy.⁸ Moreover, ABMS (and JADC2) will require adjustments not only in materiel but across the entire spectrum known as DOTMLPF-P—that is, DoD will have to address doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P)⁹ aspects to successfully implement ABMS. Thus, while ABMS will visibly field capabilities and systems, it is envisioned to impact the totality of military operations across the board. This is why various organizations have a hard time understanding what ABMS is and what it may become. From concept to execution, ABMS seeks to focus not only on C2, networks, and specific weapons systems and platforms, but also on an enterprise-wide solution to connect and integrate all force capabilities. Figure 1.1 depicts the DAF’s vision of ABMS.

To provide perspectives on the potential for ABMS and its evolving efforts, this chapter first offers a foresight of what future air and space operations might entail under ABMS and JADC2, followed by an overview of recent and current activities on what ABMS is, its motivation, expectations, timelines, and relationships with other Service elements of JADC2.

___________________

⁷ See A. McCullough, 2019, “Life After JSTARS,” Air Force Magazine, https://www.airforcemag.com/article/life-after-jstars/, March 21. S.J. Freedberg, Jr., 2019, “Air Force ABMS: One Architecture to Rule Them All?” Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/11/air-force-abms-one-architecture-to-rule-them-all/, November 8.

⁸ A. Abadie, 2021, “Project Convergence Overview,” Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, January 8. D.W. Small, 2021, “Project Overmatch,” Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, March 3. See also K. Underwood and R.K. Ackerman, 2021, “Services Choose Independent Paths for JADC2,” SIGNAL, https://www.afcea.org/content/services-choose-independent-paths-jadc2, April 1. T. Hitchens, 2021, “Combatant Commands Worry About Service JADC2 Stovepipes,” Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/08/combatant-commands-worry-about-service-jadc2-stovepipes/?utm_campaign=Breaking%20News&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=154724449&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_wkEKLecBcHxjyqNV8fxrrXZamBG1AweYP8ls7P6GEAnGBkbZL9XpBOgj5Ks7w7gCxJtCsOKaC9947kj0GT15Y2tliBA&utm_content=154724449&utm_source=hs_email, August 31.

⁹ For a definition on DOTMLPF-P, see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI), 2016, CJCSI 3010.02E, Guidance for Developing and Implementing Joint Concept, pp. A-3–A-5, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%203010.02E.pdf, August 17. For more on the spectrum of ABMS requirements, see D. Allvin, 2021, “Why We Need the Advanced Battle Management System,” DefenseOne, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/05/why-we-need-advanced-battle-management-system/173861/, May 6.

VISION OF FUTURE AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) describes “an increasingly complex global security environment, characterized by overt challenges to the free and open international order and the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition between nations.… We face an ever more lethal and disruptive battlefield, combined across domains, and conducted at increasing speed and reach—from close combat, throughout overseas theaters, and reaching to our homeland. Some competitors and adversaries seek to optimize their targeting of our battle networks and operational concepts, while also using other areas of competition short of open warfare to achieve their ends (e.g., information warfare, ambiguous or denied proxy operations, and subversion).”¹⁰ Notably,

___________________

¹⁰DoD (U.S. Department of Defense), 2018, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

As a result, “It’s really about who can sense and make sense of their environment and take action faster than their opponent. Victories come to the side that can decide quickly and accelerate that kill chain. We call and seek that decision advantage.”¹²

The subsequent issuance of DoD’s Digital Modernization Strategy¹³ in 2019 highlighted the DoD’s recognition that to address these pressing challenges, current technologies need to rapidly advance into a digital future. As modern battlefields shift toward farther, distributed, and progressively complex interconnected warfighting domains, ensuring communication, coordination, and execution becomes increasingly more important. Ensuring that forces in space, cyberspace, air, land, surface, and subsurface can effectively and promptly communicate to support both kinetic and non-kinetic operations is critical. This explosion of the digital era over the past two decades—with particular emphasis on artificial intelligence (AI) and pervasive communication and processing technologies—has already changed and is expected to continue changing the battlespace dramatically.

For example, as stated in the final report from the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI):

___________________

¹¹DoD (U.S. Department of Defense), 2018, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf, p. 3.

¹² J. Valenzia, 2020, “Joint Warfighting Concept: Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) and the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS),” Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, December 18.

¹³DoD, 2019, DoD Digital Modernization Strategy, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/12/2002156622/-1/-1/1/DOD-DIGITAL-MODERNIZATION-STRATEGY-2019.PDF, July 12.

Within Russia, “the development and use of AI is [viewed as] essential to the future success of Russia’s armed forces and key to its military power.… Russian military strategists have placed a premium on establishing what they refer to as ‘information dominance on the battlefield,’ and AI-enhanced technologies promise to take advantage of the data available on the modern battlefield to protect Russia’s own forces and deny that advantage to the adversary.”¹⁵

Similarly, “Chinese military initiatives in AI are motivated by an acute awareness of global trends in military technology and operations … and recognition of potential opportunities inherent in this military and technological transformation.”¹⁶ For this reason, Chinese military and China’s defense industry have been pursuing significant investments in robotics, autonomy, and other applications of AI.¹⁷DoD’s 2020 Annual Report to Congress on China’s Military and Security Developments quotes from China’s own Next Generation AI Plan that the country seeks to gain parity with global leaders in AI by 2020, achieving major breakthroughs in AI by 2025, and establishing China as the global leader in AI by 2030. “The PRC [People’s Republic of China] is pursuing a whole-of-society effort to become a global leader in AI, which includes designating select private AI companies in China as ‘AI champions’ to emphasize research and development (R&D) in specific dual-use technologies.”¹⁸

Compounding to the use of AI, adversaries also seek to undermine U.S. dominance in all domains through the use of hybrid warfare. While not a new concept, hybrid warfare, in which an adversary “simultaneously and adaptively employs a tailored mix of conventional, irregular, terrorism, and criminal means or activities in the operational battle space,” including the use of non-kinetic tools to destabilize nations, has expanded the implements needed to manage the spectrum of warfare

___________________

¹⁴NSCAI (National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence), 2021, National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence Final Report, p. 7, https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf, March.

¹⁵ J. Edmonds, S. Bendett, A. Fink, et al., 2021, “Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy in Russia,” Center for Naval Analyses, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/centers/CNA/sppp/rsp/russia-ai/Russia-Artificial-Intelligence-Autonomy-Putin-Military.pdf, May.

¹⁶ E.B. Kania, 2020, “‘AI Weapons’ in China’s Military Innovation,” Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200427_ai_weapons_kania_v2.pdf, April.

¹⁷ E.B. Kania, 2020, “‘AI Weapons’ in China’s Military Innovation,” Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200427_ai_weapons_kania_v2.pdf, April, p. 1.

¹⁸DoD, 2020, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF.

beyond conventional forces.¹⁹ “Our strategic competitors have studied how we fight and they have taken asymmetric steps to exploit our vulnerabilities and to defeat us. We have to respond with a sense of urgency, but we also have to take the time necessary to make smart choices about our future and our investments.”²⁰ As noted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine:

Additionally, command and control (C2) timelines for protection against, and delivery of, “fast” weapons (e.g., hypersonic missiles) have also altered actionable timelines, cutting down not only on available timelines to conduct decisions, but also on the ability to calculate optimal options for defense. Technology and operational changes (e.g., AI, unmanned platforms, and the new “battlefield” of contested space) have driven the military Services (both individually and jointly) to reconsider what the operational C2 concept—and associated technological means to achieve it—should be for the future. Coupled with the new reality that the United States will be a smaller force, the nation will no longer have the luxury afforded by having both the largest and most technically advanced force in the field. All of these collective challenges undermine U.S. information dominance, which ABMS seeks to overcome. For the joint community, the new approach is JADC2 serving the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC).²²

___________________

¹⁹ R.W. Glenn, 2009, “Thoughts on ‘Hybrid’ Conflict,” Small Wars Journal, p. 2, https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/188-glenn.pdf, March 2. See also B.P. Fleming, 2011, The Hybrid Threat Concept: Contemporary War, Military Planning and the Advent of Unrestricted Operational Art. School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll3/id/2752/.

²⁰ J. Tirpak, 2021, “Kendall: Modernize Now to Counter China,” Air Force Magazine, https://www.airforcemag.com/kendall-modernize-now-to-counter-china/, September 20.

²¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 2019, “Ten Facts You Should Know About Russian Military Aggression Against Ukraine,” https://mfa.gov.ua/en/10-facts-you-should-know-about-russian-military-aggression-against-ukraine, December 19.

²² See T. Greenwood and P. Savage, 2019, “In Search of a 21st Century Joint Warfighting Concept,” War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/in-search-of-a-21st-century-joint-warfighting-concept/, September 12. DoD, 2020, “Mission Engineering: Ensuring Key Technologies Drive the Joint Warfighting Concept,” https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2391597/mission-engineering-ensuring-key-technologies-drive-the-joint-warfighting-conce/, October 22.

JOINT ALL-DOMAIN COMMAND AND CONTROL (JADC2)

JADC2 is the “warfighting capability to sense, make sense, and act at all levels and phases of war, across all domains, and with partners, to deliver information advantage at the speed of relevance.”²³ It is DoD’s solution to connect sensors from all of the military services—Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Space Force—into a single network.²⁴ JADC2 is “about creating a resilient, adaptable line of communication (e.g., mesh network) across the entire Joint Force, at every echelon, from the strategic level to the tactical edge. That protected and hardened network will power the ubiquitous flow of relevant information across all domains around the globe, enabling our warfighting commanders and senior leaders to make decisions and direct actions better and faster than our adversaries—to deter their actions and intents, if at all possible, and defeat them outright when necessary.”²⁵Figure 1.2 depicts the Foundations of JADC2.

Traditionally, each military Service has developed its own C2 network that is unique and generally incompatible across weapons systems, platforms, and operating domains. As a result, decision time cycles and the transmission of time-sensitive data to inform decisions were slow, at times duplicative, and organizationally stove-piped. JADC2 is DoD’s enterprise-solution to this technical and operational challenge and “envisions providing a cloud-like environment for the Joint Force to share intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data, transmitting across many communications networks, to enable faster decision-making.”²⁶ Furthermore, it seeks to reimagine headquarter elements such as Air Operations Centers (AOCs) that are commonly removed from the operating battlespace, and empower forward-deployed combat commanders with the same situational awareness and decision-making as operations HQ. “This concept enables force management that is responsive to, even out in front of, enemy or adversary generated effects, decision-making, and maneuvering.”²⁷

Throughout history, victory often goes to the entity with an ability to make decisions faster than its adversary and thus act more appropriately to capitalize on

___________________

²³ DoD, 2021, “Fact Sheet on JADC2.” https://insidedefense.com/sites/insidedefense.com/files/documents/2021/jun/06042021_jadc2.pdf, June 4.

²⁴CRS, 2021, “Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2),” https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11493, July 1.

²⁵ DoD, 2021, “Fact Sheet on JADC2.”

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ B.M. Pirolo, 2020, “Information Warfare and Joint All-Domain Operations,” Air & Space Power Journal, 34(4):104.

previous decisions.²⁸ Moreover, the force with better situational awareness often dominates.²⁹ The quantity and fighting capability of forces are other major factors, but superior awareness and responsiveness are proven force multipliers. That does not mean such awareness will be perfect at all times, but a force with a superior ability to continue seeing, deciding, and fighting in degraded environments has a

___________________

²⁸ See J. Dransfield, 2020, “How Relevant Is the Speed of Relevance?: Unity of Effort Towards Decision Superiority Is Critical to Future U.S. Military Dominance,” The Bridge, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/1/13/how-relevant-is-the-speed-of-relevance-unity-of-effort-towards-decision-superiority-is-critical-to-future-us-military-dominance, January 13. “Giving Airmen the Edge: The Promise of JADC2,” 2020, Air Force Magazine, https://www.airforcemag.com/giving-airmen-theedge-the-promise-of-jadc2/, October 28.

²⁹ See National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2021, Adapting to Shorter Time Cycles in the United States Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series, The National Academies Press, Washington, DC. M.C. Libicki and S.E. Johnson, editors, 1995, Dominant Battlespace Knowledge. National Defense University, http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Libicki_Dominant.pdf, October. M.W. Jones, 2020, “Strategic Decision Making—A Case Study,” Military Strategy Magazine, 7(2):20–24, https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/strategic-decision-making-a-case-study.

greater advantage toward achieving success. JADC2 is presented as the joint solution that would “synchronize the prosecution of thousands of potential targets across a federated resource set of the combat arms inherent to the task force and across domains”³⁰ and thus “provide the U.S. military with decision advantage in a future conflict with China or Russia by enabling U.S. forces to understand better, decide smarter, and act faster than adversaries.”³¹

For the DAF, ABMS is the DAF’s contribution to JADC2. “As a new approach toward information sharing and decision management, ABMS enables compressed decision-making and converging effects without domain or geographic boundaries … this speed matters to the decision maker and the warfighter. And, with the proliferation of technology, future warfighters will have the ability to observe, orient, decide, and act within minutes—as opposed to hours and days.”³²

The C2 functions that the DAF must perform—currently centralized in the AOC—must equally adapt to this accelerated decision-making environment with technologies that meet these demands. Because ABMS is presented as the new AOC materiel solution to highlight this change, the following provides a brief overview of the current AOC along with a possible view of what the AOC may become, given the promise of ABMS and its associated technologies.

AIR OPERATIONS CENTER (AOC)

Current AOC

The current AOC—with its current basic architecture originally designed at the beginning of the 21st century—is “both an Air Force unit and a Weapon System.… [It] is the [Joint or Combined Forces Air Component Commander’s (JFACC)] C2 center that provides the capability to plan, direct, and assess activities of assigned and attached forces … and provides operational-level C2 of air, space, cyberspace and [information operations] IO to meet JFACC operational objectives and

___________________

³⁰ B.M. Pirolo, 2020, “Information Warfare and Joint All-Domain Operations,” p. 104.

³¹ Govini, 2021, Department of Defense Investments in Joint All-Domain Command & Control Taxonomy, https://govini.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/DoD-Investments-in-JADC2-Taxonomy.pdf.

³² J.P. Roth and C.Q. Brown, Jr., 2021, “Department of the Air Force Posture Statement Fiscal Year 2022,” Presentation to the Committees and Subcommittees of the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives, 1st Session, 117th Congress, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FY22%20DAF%20Posture%20Statement%20-%20Final%20(v23.1)1.pdf.

guidance.”³³ The AOC serves “as the focal point for designing, planning, executing, and assessing air component operations.”³⁴

The primary functions of the AOC are:

• Develop air component operations strategy and planning documents that integrate air, space, and cyberspace operations to meet air component commander objectives and guidance the Joint Force Commander (JFC) designates.
• Task, execute, and assess day-to-day air component operations; provide rapid reaction, positive airspace control, and coordinate and de-conflict weapons employment as well as integrate the total air component effort.
• Receive, assemble, analyze, filter, and disseminate all-source intelligence and weather information to support air component operations planning, execution, and assessment.
• Integrate space capabilities and coordinate space activities for the air component commander when designated as space coordinating authority.
• Issue airspace control procedures and coordinate airspace control activities for the airspace control authority (ACA) when designated.
• Provide overall direction of air defense, including theater missile defense (TMD), for the Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) when designated.
• Plan, task, and execute the theater air component intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) mission.
• Conduct component-level assessment to determine mission and overall air component operations effectiveness as required by the JFC to support the theater assessment effort.
• Plan and task air mobility operations according to the theater priorities.³⁵

As a weapon system, the current Air Operations Center—Weapon System (AOC-WS), known as the AN/USQ-163 Falconer, is “a system of systems that incorporates numerous third-party software applications and commercial off-the-shelf products. Each third-party system integrated into the AOC-WS provides its

___________________

³³DAF (Department of the Air Force), 2020, Department of the Air Force Manual 13-1AOC, Volume 3, Nuclear Space, Missile Command and Control Operational Procedures—Air Operations Center (AOC) Operations Center (OC), https://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3/publication/dafman13-1aocv3/dafman13-1aocv3.pdf, December 18.

³⁴ Curtin E. LeMay Center, 2020, Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFPD) 3-30: Appendix B: The Air Operations Center, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-30/3-30-D70-C2-Appendix-AOC.pdf, January 7.

³⁵ Ibid.

own programmatic documentation. AOC-WS capabilities include command and control (C2) of joint theater air and missile defense; preplanned, dynamic, and time-sensitive multi-domain target engagement operations; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations management.”³⁶ Additionally, the AOC-WS consists of:

• Commercial off-the-shelf software and hardware for voice, digital, and data communications infrastructure.
• Government software applications developed specifically for the AOC-WS to enable planning, monitoring, and directing the execution of air, space, and cyber operations, to include:
  • Additional third-party systems that accept, process, correlate, and fuse C2 data from multiple sources and share them through multiple communications systems.
• When required, the AOC-WS operates on several different networks, including the secret Internet protocol router network (SIPRNET), Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System, and coalition networks. The networks connect the core operating system and primary applications to joint and coalition partners.³⁷

Currently, the Air Force’s Kessel Run Experimentation Lab (KREL) is responsible for developing and deploying the AOC-WS Block 20 software to the field.³⁸ The goal is to modernize the AOC to enable a distributed AOC weapon system and to deprecate the existing 10.1 Falconer Weapon System.³⁹ As an integrated partner with operators, Kessel Run developers understand user needs and are able to develop and test software to meet those operational needs. If successful, this model of embedding software developers with end users should be adopted more broadly.

While progress is being made, notable challenges remain with the current AOC design and construct. Specifically, the underlying architecture of the DAF C2 functions in the AOC is not adequately designed to meet current operational and technological threats or support an accelerated pace of planning. As noted in a recent RAND study on JADC2, “the cancellation of the AOC 10.2 moderniza-

___________________

³⁶ R.F. Behler, 2020, Director, DoD Operational Test and Evaluation Fiscal Year 2020 Annual Report, https://www.dote.osd.mil/Publications/Annual-Reports/2020-Annual-Report, January.

³⁷ R.F. Behler, 2020, Director, DoD Operational Test and Evaluation Fiscal Year 2020 Annual Report, https://www.dote.osd.mil/Publications/Annual-Reports/2020-Annual-Report, January, p. 179.

³⁸ The AOC-WS Block 20 is a middle tier of acquisition (MTA) program intended to replace AOC-WS 10.1 with modernized, integrated, automated, and redundant capabilities to meet valid requirements defined for the previously canceled AOC-WS 10.2 program. Reference: see note 31.

³⁹ B. Katz and P. Ising, 2021, “Kessel Run Deploys KRADOS to Air Operations Center,” Kessel Run News, https://kesselrun.af.mil/news/Kessel-Run-Deploys-KRADOS.html, January 12.

tion effort has delayed the delivery of critical hardware and software upgrades to the AOC … [and] growing emphasis on improved cyber and space integration has placed new functional and technical demands on the AOC and increased interest in multidomain operations.”⁴⁰ As a result, “the Air Force AOC 72-hour air-tasking cycle is incongruent with the current digital world.”⁴¹

The current AOC-WS program has also been historically challenged in the prioritization for funding. It has been impacted by the absence of a Joint Architecture and AI policy guideline toward which to build. The testimonies the committee received from operators and acquisition personnel highlighted the concerns of the current AOC not being aligned to the new JADC2, JWC, and threat needs. It was clear that the AOC system of systems architecture (as currently constructed) would not support a transformation over time, because the inherently outdated technology and architecture utilized by the current system is unable to be restructured.⁴²

It is moreover evident—even without a JADC2 or JWC—that the Air Force requires an innovative and revamped AOC to interoperate with the new U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) and U.S. Space Force (USSF) operating systems and to meet broad operational challenges from adversaries seeking to counter U.S. military advantages through anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) from electronic warfare, cyber weapons, long-range missiles, advanced air defenses, and potentially even GPS-denial.⁴³ All these increase the need for faster decisions that leverage and integrate all U.S. military capabilities.

___________________

⁴⁰ S. Lingel, J. Hagen, E. Hastings, et al., 2020, “Joint All-Domain Command and Control for Modern Warfare,” RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR4400/RR4408z1/RAND_RR4408z1.pdf. See also S. Lingel, 2021, “ABMS and JADC2,” Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, April 21.

⁴¹ S. Lingel, J. Hagen, E. Hastings, et al., 2020, “Joint All-Domain Command and Control for Modern Warfare,” RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR4400/RR4408z1/RAND_RR4408z1.pdf, p. viii. See also DoD, 2019, Joint Publication 3-30, Joint Air Operations, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_30.pdf, July 25.

⁴² Anthologized from various presentations given by DAF representatives to the Air Force ABMS Committee from March 30 to March 31, 2021. See also CRS, 2021, “Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2).”

⁴³ See C. Dougherty, 2020, “Moving Beyond A2/AD,” Center for New American Security, https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/moving-beyond-a2-ad, December 3. N. Impson, 2020, “The Next Warm War: How History’s Anti-Access/Area Denial Campaigns Inform the Future of War,” Small Wars Journal, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/next-warm-war-how-historys-anti-accessarea-denial-campaigns-inform-future-war, January 14. A. Krepinevich, B. Watts, and R. Work, 2003, “Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2003.05.20-Anti-Access-Area-Denial-A2-AD.pdf.

An Alternative Future AOC

Rapid advancements in technology have dramatically altered operational requirements and shortened response times in confronting adversarial threats. The 2018 National Defense Strategy states, “This increasingly complex security environment is defined by rapid technological change, challenges from adversaries in every operating domain, and the impact on current readiness from the longest continuous stretch of armed conflict in our Nation’s history. In this environment, there can be no complacency—we must make difficult choices and prioritize what is most important to field a lethal, resilient, and rapidly adapting Joint Force. America’s military has no preordained right to victory on the battlefield.”⁴⁴ The Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, echoed this view when he stated, “While the Nation was focused on countering violent extremist organizations, our competitors focused on defeating us. They have studied, resourced, and introduced systems specifically designed to defeat the U.S. Air Force capabilities that have underpinned the American way of war for a generation.… In an environment that includes, but is not limited to, declining resources, aggressive global competitors, and rapid technology development and diffusion, the U.S. Air Force must accelerate change to control and exploit the air domain.”⁴⁵ Technological advances and emerging adversarial challenges to DAF C2 functions thus necessitate a redesign of the current AOC architecture and the supporting technologies employed to meet the demands of the new digital era.

The net desired result is an evolved AOC that is capable of executing an OODA loop faster than that of the adversary and not constrained by the traditional, relatively fixed 44- to 96-hour Air Tasking Order (ATO) processing cycles. Enabled by ABMS, the AOC needs to accelerate data collection from all relevant sources, compress its processing and routing in both time and complexity, inform planning and decision-making in faster, unfixed cycles, and rapid engagement of forces to carry out the plans and bring forces to bear on the threat despite constraints imposed by force generation and logistics associated with sustained operations tempo. This must involve not only the DAF (USAF and USSF) and joint U.S. military assets, but also those of multi-national allies and partners to provide decision superiority across tactical, operational, and strategic levels of planning, command, and engagement.

___________________

⁴⁴DoD, 2018, Summary of the 2018 National Defense.

⁴⁵C.Q. Brown, Jr., 2020, Accelerate Change or Lose, p. 3.

ADVANCED BATTLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (ABMS)

What exactly is ABMS and what does it seek to do? Is ABMS a single acquisition system or a strategic concept involving multiple systems? What can it be expected to produce today and what are the challenges for realizing the full concepts behind ABMS and JADC2? The following sections provide introductory answers, supported by further details in subsequent chapters.

Evolution of ABMS

ABMS has evolved from its original inception as a C2 and surveillance system to its current construct as an enterprise-wide family of systems. As a platform, ABMS was originally introduced in 2017 as the “Airborne Battle Management and Surveillance” system, a traditional acquisition program to replace and modernize the aging Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) platform and a retiring fleet of E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS).⁴⁶ In light of the NDS, however, the Air Force determined that its original plans for ABMS were no longer compatible with the objectives outlined in the NDS. DAF leaders reassessed requirements for ABMS, seeking new options for developing more robust and survivable systems that could operate within contested environments.⁴⁷ The Air Force concluded that “no single platform, such as an aircraft, would be the right solution to providing C2 capabilities across multiple domains.”⁴⁸

In April 2019, the DAF announced that the Airborne Battle Management System would become the Advanced Battle Management System—a multi-domain layered C2 family of systems (rather than a single modernization program) to strive “for the capability where any sensor can talk to any shooter whether in space, on land, at sea, in the air, or in cyberspace … [and] to perform the mission sets associated with both the JSTARS and AWACS platforms and possibly assume other roles

___________________

⁴⁶ See K. Osborn, 2018, “The Air Force Is Creating a System to Manage the Military’s Forces in War,” The National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-air-force-creating-system-manage-the-militarys-forces-24701, March 1, and B.W. Everstine, 2019, “USAF Selects ‘Architect’ for Airborne Battle Management System Program,” Air Force Magazine, https://www.airforcemag.com/usaf-selects-architect-for-airborne-battle-management-system-program/, February 6. S.J. Freedberg, Jr., 2019, “Air Force ABMS: One Architecture to Rule Them All?” Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/11/air-force-abms-one-architecture-to-rule-them-all, November 8.

⁴⁷GAO (Government Accountability Office), 2020, Defense Acquisitions: Action Is Needed to Provide Clarity and Mitigate Risks of the Air Force’s Planned Advanced Battle Management System, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-389.pdf, April.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

of the Theater Air Control System [and] Ground Moving Target Indicator.”⁴⁹ This shift promoted a “radically new acquisition model for the Air Force” that “envisions multiple contributing programs, such as ABMS space, ABMS air, and ABMS networking and communications—each with its own funding, its own program manager, and its own schedule.”⁵⁰ It also involved hiring a “Chief Architect … to oversee the ABMS architecture design, enterprise communications and integration across programs [as well as] identify technologies to enable horizontal and vertical integration across operating environments and warfighting domains.”⁵¹

Most recently, however, the new Secretary of the Air Force, Frank Kendall, has scrutinized the focus of ABMS. Specifically, he views ABMS as “not [having] been adequately focused on achieving and fielding specific measurable improvements in operational outcomes,” and advocates instead on “developing specific, practical military technologies within a defined time.”⁵² He believes that the DAF needs to first determine what specific types of data and information ABMS should transmit and under which operational contexts. He also asked for performance metrics to be established to determine if ABMS is making marked improvements to current C2 capabilities, which the committee fully supports. Although the Secretary has directed a recalibration of ABMS, the committee’s subsequent analysis is based on the information presented during the data gathering phase of the study conducted from late 2020 to spring 2021. So, many of the details outlined below are based on the earlier ABMS approach. However, many of the findings and recommendations remain relevant as ABMS continues on its evolutionary journey.

A Non-Traditional Acquisition Approach

As an overarching system of systems concept and visionary construct for integrating sensor-to-shooter all-domain joint command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR) and warfighting, ABMS is composed of “a network of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

___________________

⁴⁹ W.B. Roper, Jr., J.M. Holmes, and D.S. Nahom, 2019, “Department of the Air Force Acquisition and Modernization Programs in the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization President’s Budget Request.” Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, U.S. House of Representatives, May 2.

⁵⁰ A. McCullough, 2019, “ABMS Expected to Pick Up Speed with New Chief Architect in Place,” Air Force Magazine, https://www.airforcemag.com/abms-expected-to-pick-up-speed-with-new-chief-architect-in-place/, March 10.

⁵¹ W.B. Roper, Jr., J.M. Holmes, and D.S. Nahom, 2019, “Department of the Air Force Acquisition and Modernization Programs in the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization President’s Budget Request,” p. 26.

⁵² G. Reim, 2021, “USAF Secretary Asks ‘Hard Questions’ of Advanced Battle Management System,” Flight Global, https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/usaf-secretary-asks-hard-questions-of-advanced-battle-management-system/145548.article, September 20.

sensors and will utilize cloud-based data sharing to provide warfighters with battlespace awareness for the air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains.”⁵³ The Air Force envisions developing ABMS as an evolving “family of multiple systems”⁵⁴ and not as a single acquisition program in the traditional sense (with a set of well-defined or fixed requirements, a full cost estimate, and a single delivery schedule). Instead, ABMS seeks to leverage commercial and integrated defense capabilities—a program-of-programs or an operational concept and architecture within which individual programs will acquire specific capabilities.

Capabilities have been explored on a large scale in prior “on-ramps” or technical evaluations and demonstrations to prototype and test opportunities for leveraging commercial technologies.⁵⁵ Examples include cloud computing⁵⁶ and communication infrastructures with AI and machine learning (ML) capabilities to process and route information to commanders, decision-makers, and operators who need the information together with decision-support aids. Customized

___________________

⁵³ See CRS, 2021, Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/IF11866.pdf, June 29. GAO, 2020, Defense Acquisitions: Action Is Needed to Provide Clarity and Mitigate Risks of the Air Force’s Planned Advanced Battle Management System.

⁵⁴GAO, 2020, Defense Acquisitions: Action Is Needed to Provide Clarity and Mitigate Risks of the Air Force’s Planned Advanced Battle Management System.

⁵⁵ M.D. Strohmeyer, 2021, “United States Northern Command Support to ABMS,” Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, February 24. See also C. Pope, 2020, “Advanced Battle Management System Field Test Brings Joint Force Together Across All Domains During Second Onramp,” Air Force News, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2336618/advanced-battle-management-system-field-test-brings-joint-force-together-across/, September 3. B.W. Everstine, 2021, “USAFE’s ABMS On-Ramp Included Partner Nations, Base Defense Scenario,” Air Force Magazine, https://www.airforcemag.com/usafes-abms-on-ramp-included-partner-nations-base-defense-scenario/, March 1. “ABMS Signs More Companies Post Onramp,” 2020, Air Force News, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2359938/abms-signs-more-companies-post-onramp/, September 24. D. Henley, 2020, “Advanced Battle Management System OnRamp #2, Accelerating Data-Sharing and Decision-Making,” Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/378396/advanced-battle-management-system-onramp-2-accelerating-data-sharing-and-decision-making, September 22.

⁵⁶ While the concept is evolving, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines cloud computing as “a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.” See P. Mell and T. Grance, 2011, NIST Special Publication 800-145, “The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, September. Similarly, D. Mishra, Test Maintenance and Development Engineering lead at Ericcson India Private Limited, defines cloud computing as “a set of framework that provides on demand, scalable, customized, quality services in Software, platform and also provides sharable infrastructure through internet that are accessible and available everywhere.” See D. Mishra, 2014, “Cloud Computing: The Era of Virtual World Opportunities and Risks Involved,” International Journal of Computer Science Engineering, 3(4, July).

applications and hardware are being tested to interconnect sensors and systems that could not previously share information, and last mile tactical edge communications are being expanded to improve access to sensors and shooters.⁵⁷ To date, the Air Force has conducted five large-scale on-ramps to demonstrate the new C2 capabilities that it seeks to eventually field; it cancelled a sixth demonstration in March 2021 owing to budget constraints.⁵⁸

ABMS is intended to continue leveraging evolving (primarily commercial) technologies over time rather than instantiate a static system of systems with a snapshot of extant technology. This, together with ABMS being an overarching DAF-level activity rather than a traditional C2 program, means that there is no single set of fixed requirements to build to, no single cost to estimate, and no single set of operational capabilities to field.⁵⁹ Instead, the focus has largely been on designing an enterprise-scale architecture and developing requirements to ensure that “they are met throughout the menu of systems that will comprise [ABMS].”⁶⁰ Overarching strategic requirements that lay out the JWC through JADC2 are being developed by the Joint Staff’s J6 Command, Control, Communications and Computers/Cyber organization, within which specific instances of requirements, system design, and cost estimates are established for particular elements to be acquired over time.⁶¹

The DAF’s strategic and non-traditional acquisition approach, coupled with the sizable funding requests to Congress ($136.5 million in FY 2020; $302.3 million in FY 2021; $203.8 million in FY 2022), have led to questions concerning the accounting for costs to acquire, develop, and fully integrate elements of ABMS across multiple programs and the strategy for transitioning developing technologies

___________________

⁵⁷ Anthologized from various presentations given by DAF representatives to the Air Force ABMS Committee from March 30 to March 31, 2021.

⁵⁸ See T. Hitchens, 2021, “Air Force Culls ABMS Experiment After Budget Cut,” Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/03/abms-hones-focus-culls-planned-experiments-in-budget-cut-wake/, March 17. V. Insinna, 2021, “Air Force curtails ABMS demos after budget slashed by Congress,” C4ISRNet, https://www.c4isrnet.com/it-networks/2021/03/17/air-force-curtails-abms-demos-after-budget-slashed-by-congress/, March 17.

⁵⁹ P. Dunlap, 2020, Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, October 30. R.G. Walden, 2021, “ABMS Perspectives from the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office,” Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, January 22. See also V. Insinna, 2019, “Here’s the No. 1 Rule for US Air Force’s New Advanced Battle Management System,” Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/paris-air-show/2019/07/09/rule-no1-for-air-forces-new-advanced-battle-management-system-we-dont-start-talking-platforms-until-the-end/, July 9.

⁶⁰ V. Insinna, 2019, “Here’s the No. 1 Rule for US Air Force’s New Advanced Battle Management System.”

⁶¹ S.A. Whitehead and J.S. Wellman, 2021, “Joint All Domain Command and Control,” Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, February 5. D.A. Crall, 2021, “Joint All Domain Command and Control,” Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, March 3.

into existing weapon systems.⁶² The committee considers the funding requests to be appropriate based on the technical data provided by the DAF, but is concerned that the absence of clearer and more detailed program planning would challenge ABMS’s ability to meet operational requirements. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), “weapon systems without a sound business case are at greater risk for schedule delays, cost growth, and integration issues.”⁶³ They cited several examples of related DoD programs such as the Army’s Future Combat System, the Joint Tactical Radio System, and the Transformational Satellite Communications System as evidence of cancelled programs owing to immature and under-proven technologies.⁶⁴

Because the Air Force has not established fixed requirements nor conducted an affordability analysis for ABMS, Congress opted to slash the Air Force 2021 ABMS budget in half, allocating only $159 million of the Air Force’s $302.3 million request.⁶⁵ The Secretary of the Air Force also expressed skepticism and asked for a “meaningful military capability, not just a demonstration where you show what cool thing you could do.”⁶⁶ This has led to the Air Force’s prioritization to shift from large-scale, on-ramp experimentations to focusing on delivering specific capabilities by allocating more than one-half of its $204 million FY 2022 budget request toward acquiring airborne datalink pods that will enable the KC-46 tanker to improve data flows between the F-35s and F-22s.⁶⁷ The DAF has also provided more details and specificity in its FY 2022 budget submission than in previous years

___________________

⁶² Y. Tadjdeh, 2020, “Advanced Battle Management System Faces Headwinds,” National Defense Magazine, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/9/11/advanced-battle-management, September 11. R.S. Cohen, 2020, “Air Force Bets on ABMS in Fiscal 2021,” Air Force Magazine, https://www.airforcemag.com/air-force-bets-on-abms-success-in-fiscal-2021/, February 11.

⁶³GAO, 2020, Defense Acquisitions: Action Is Needed to Provide Clarity and Mitigate Risks of the Air Force’s Planned Advanced Battle Management System.

⁶⁴GAO, 2020, Defense Acquisitions: Action Is Needed to Provide Clarity and Mitigate Risks of the Air Force’s Planned Advanced Battle Management System, p. 11.

⁶⁵ J. Keller, 2021, “Congress Cuts in Half an Air Force Battle Management System with Data Links to Join Sensors and Shooters,” Military & Aerospace Electronics, https://www.militaryaerospace.com/communications/article/14200364/battle-management-data-links-sensors-to-shooters, March 31.

⁶⁶ V. Insinna, 2021, “New US Air Force Secretary to Shake Up Advanced Battle Management Program,” Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/08/19/new-us-air-force-secretary-to-shake-up-advanced-battle-management-program/, August 19.

⁶⁷ See B.W. Everstine, 2021, “Air Force’s New Plan for ABMS: Smaller Budget, Clearer Schedule,” Air Force Magazine, https://www.airforcemag.com/air-forces-new-plan-for-abms-smaller-budget-clearer-schedule/, June 25. C. Albon, 2021, “Air Force Finalizing First ABMS Capability Release AQ Strategy, Shaping Plans for Next Release,” Inside Defense, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/air-force-finalizing-first-abms-capability-release-aq-strategy-shaping-plans-next-release, June 25.

and reduced their original planned budget request by more than one-half (from $449.3 million to $203.8 million).⁶⁸

Concerns are also raised regarding the technological underpinnings of ABMS.⁶⁹ For example, what is the maturity of technology being considered, how will technology be prioritized given expected threats, uncertainties, and warfighter needs, how will legacy technologies and platforms be incorporated into newer technologies? Technology employment for its own sake does not provide value; it is how the technology addresses operational priorities against threats that matters. ABMS on-ramps (demonstrations) may be useful, but “what information will be transmitted and why, what results it is aiming to achieve and how those results will be an improvement on current command-and-control capabilities” will need to be addressed.⁷⁰

From Demonstrations to Capabilities Releases

After nearly 2 years of on-ramp demonstrations, the former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics directed in November 2020 the transfer of ABMS from the DAF’s Chief Architect’s Office to the DAF’s Rapid Capabilities Office (DAF RCO) as the integration program executive office (PEO).⁷¹ In so doing, he aimed to shift the emphasis from demonstrations and

___________________

⁶⁸ N. Strout, 2021, “Congress Dealt ABMS a Blow, But Experts See Progress That Could Help at Budget Time,” C4ISRNet, https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/c2-comms/2021/06/15/part-2-congress-dealt-abms-a-blow-but-experts-see-progress/, June 15.

⁶⁹ See GAO, 2020, Defense Acquisitions: Action Is Needed to Provide Clarity and Mitigate Risks of the Air Force’s Planned Advanced Battle Management System. B. Reilly, 2021, “House Panel Praises Components of ABMS But Warns ‘Questions Remain’ Over Program’s Direction,” Inside Defense, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/house-panel-praises-components-abms-warns-questions-remain-over-programs-direction, August 26. S. Sirota, 2019, “Holmes: Air Force to Accelerate ABMS Schedule to Inform FY-21, FY-22 Budget Planning,” Inside Defense, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/holmes-air-force-accelerate-abms-schedule-inform-fy-21-fy-22-budget-planning, June 20. S. Sirota, 2020, “Defense Spending Bill Slashes ABMS Budget Nearly in Half,” Inside Defense, https://insidedefense.com/insider/defense-spending-bill-slashes-abms-budget-nearly-half, December 21. B. Reilly. 2021, “Air Force in ‘Much Better’ Place with Lawmakers Surrounding ABMS, Hinote Says,” Inside Defense, https://insidedefense.com/insider/air-force-much-better-place-lawmakers-surrounding-abms-hinote-says, July 12.

⁷⁰ V. Insinna, 2021, “New US Air Force Secretary to Shake Up Advanced Battle Management Program.”

⁷¹W. Roper, 2020, “Advanced Battle Management System Management Construct,” Memorandum for Record, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, https://insidedefense.com/sites/insidedefense.com/files/documents/2020/nov/11242020_abms.pdf, November 24. See also Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, 2020, “Air and Space Force’s Acquisition Chief Appoints Rapid Capabilities Office as Integrating PEO for ABMS, Expanding from Startup Toward Rapidly Scaling Delivery Phases,” Air Force News, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2426286/air-and-space-forces-acquisition-chief-appoints-rapid-capabilities-office-as-in/, November 24.

experimentation to fielding and operationalizing ABMS capabilities. While the DAF’s Chief Architect would codify ABMS technical requirements, facilitate an integrating enterprise digital architecture and standards across the DAF, establish and provide model-based systems engineering tools across the DAF, and continue directing future on-ramp demonstrations, the DAF RCO, as the chief integrating PEO, would lead in the drafting of an ABMS acquisition strategy and business case, deliver and integrate all ABMS capabilities for inclusion in architecture evaluation on-ramps, and direct the development of capability releases.⁷²

In May 2021, the Air Force Chief of Staff declared that the DAF is moving to the next phase of ABMS. “Nearly two years of rigorous development and experimentation have shown beyond doubt the promise of ABMS. We’ve demonstrated that our ABMS efforts can collect vast amounts of data from air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains, process that information and share it in a way that allows for faster and better decisions.”⁷³ The DAF announced the first capability release (CR1) of ABMS: fielding between 4 to 10 new datalink pods on the KC-46 Pegasus tanker to facilitate communication between the incompatible radio systems on the F-22 and the F-35 fighter jets.⁷⁴ The pods would serve as airborne hotspots connecting the two fighter jets to enable real-time communications. “The end goal isn’t just ‘translation’ software for the fifth-generation fighters, but to continue building out the capabilities the Air Force needs to manage future All Domain Operations—from connectivity to machine-speed decision-making to real-time data sharing among commanders in far flung [headquarters] HQs.”⁷⁵ Furthermore, the Air Force Chief of Staff seeks not only to push information to tactical edge command centers, but also to bring data back. “Each one of our platforms has some level of data on it … but sometimes, it’s tied to that platform and doesn’t get off the platform until you get it back on the ground. Why wait several hours to get it back … when you can

___________________

⁷² Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, 2020, “Air and Space Force’s Acquisition Chief Appoints Rapid Capabilities Office as Integrating PEO for ABMS, Expanding from Startup Toward Rapidly Scaling Delivery Phases,” Air Force News, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2426286/air-and-space-forces-acquisition-chief-appoints-rapid-capabilities-office-as-in/, November 24.

⁷³ C. Pope, 2021, “With Its Promise and Performance Confirmed, ABMS Moves to a New Phase,” Air Force News, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2627008/with-its-promise-and-performance-confirmed-abms-moves-to-a-new-phase/, May 21.

⁷⁴ N. Miknev, 2021, “ABMS Capability Release 1,” Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, March 30. See also T. Hitchens, 2021, “First ABMS Buy: KC-46 Pods to Link F-22, F-35,” Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/06/first-abms-buy-kc-46-pods-to-link-f-22-f-35/, June 25, and A. McCullough, 2021, “ABMS, in New Phase, Prepares to Start Fielding,” Air Force Magazine, https://www.airforcemag.com/abms-in-new-phase-prepares-to-start-fielding/, May 21.

⁷⁵ T. Hitchens, 2021, “First ABMS Buy: KC-46 Pods to Link F-22, F-35.”

actually push that information and data around real time to drive decisions?”⁷⁶ The DAF plans to invest $170 million this fiscal year to execute CR1.⁷⁷

While not official, capability release two (CR2) will likely “use cloud-computing, fiber-optic networks, AI, and other new technologies” to accelerate homeland defense missions and decision-making in support of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).⁷⁸ Many of these largely commercial capabilities were tested and demonstrated during the large-scale demonstration, ABMS on-ramp 2, conducted in fall 2020. The exercise, known as Shadow Operations Center-Nellis (ShOC-N), established a virtual environment for commercial vendors and DoD participants to operate in and connect with homeland defense agencies to provide a common operating picture (COP). Vendors tested their connectivity and ability to provide real-time situation awareness within the USNORTHCOM battlespace.⁷⁹

Moving forward, the DAF RCO anticipates building on successful capability demonstrations in future on-ramps and introducing new digital capabilities in upcoming capability releases. According to its director, “To build ABMS, you must first build the digital structures and pathways over which critical data is stored, computed, and moved. The DAF needs a smart, fast, and resilient ‘system of systems’ to establish information and decision superiority, and ABMS will be that solution.”⁸⁰

ABMS as a Contributor to JADC2

As the DAF’s contribution to JADC2, ABMS is designed to be “an ecosystem of sensors, fusion, and data-transfer networks aided by cloud-based processing power and AI that will empower modern C2.”⁸¹ The goal is to enable disjointed

___________________

⁷⁶ M. Jasper, 2021, “The Advanced Battle Management System Is Ready for Real-World Testing, the Service Announced,” NextGov, https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2021/05/air-forces-jadc2-contribution-shifting-operational-status/174291/, May 25.

⁷⁷ N. Miknev, 2021, “ABMS Capability Release 1,” Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, March 30.

⁷⁸ B.W. Everstine, 2021, “Air Force’s New Plan for ABMS: Smaller Budget, Clearer Schedule,” Air Force Magazine, https://www.airforcemag.com/air-forces-new-plan-for-abms-smaller-budget-clearer-schedule/, June 25.

⁷⁹ M.D. Strohmeyer, 2021, “United States Northern Command Support to ABMS,” Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, February 24.

⁸⁰ A. McCullough, 2021, “ABMS, in New Phase, Prepares to Start Fielding.” R.G. Walden, 2021, “ABMS Perspectives from the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office,” Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, January 22.

⁸¹ D.A. Birkey, 2021, “The Battle for the Soul of JADC2,” Air Force Magazine, https://www.airforcemag.com/article/the-battle-for-the-soul-of-jadc2/, April 23.

and often incompatible equipment to seamlessly and securely communicate across all domains.

As a technical solution, ABMS provides a connection and understanding across all battlespaces and domains without consideration to seams to ensure that “all 11 combatant commands, can be operating off of this same level of understanding. They can plan together and then they can execute together.”⁸² Technical capabilities are advanced via a DevSecOps rapid development approach that refreshes every 4 months. According to DAF leaders, ABMS will enable JADC2 by “simultaneously sensing, making sense of and acting upon a vast array of data and information from [all] domains, fusing and analyzing the data with the help of ML and AI and providing warfighters with preferred options at speeds not seen before.”⁸³

While DoD strives for network connectivity across all domains, much of the near-term focus has been on establishing training and doctrine related to JADC2. At the 2021 DAF Command and Control Summit led by the Commander of Air Combat Command (ACC), discussions centered on “the need to look at how to leverage advanced technology and AI through innovations in doctrine and training that optimize the speed of decision-making, organizational structures scaled to leverage technological innovation and efficiencies toward winning across the spectrum of competition and conflict, and continuing to develop the all-domain skills and decision-focused leaders needed to plan and execute JADC2.”⁸⁴ To address these requirements, the Air Force’s cross-functional lead for joint warfighting integration recently announced the completion of a JADC2 Supporting Concept that guides the DAF’s “concept-driven, threat-informed JADC2 capability development to include doctrine, training materiel, and personnel.”⁸⁵ Furthermore, the Air Force established a new 13O Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) designed to secure continued dominance in the air, space, and cyberspace domains. Individuals who are coded as 13O are trained to plan and execute multi-domain operations at the operational level across multiple warfighting domains. The goal of these collective efforts is to “build our people into informed, decisive leaders who can plan and

___________________

⁸² J. Eddins, 2021, “Valenzia: ABMS Will Deliver the ‘Decision Advantage,’” Airman Magazine, https://www.macdill.af.mil/News/Features/Display/Article/2647112/valenzia-abms-will-deliver-the-decision-advantage/, May 26.

⁸³ C. Pope, 2021, “With Its Promise and Performance Confirmed, ABMS Moves to a New Phase,” Air Force News, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2627008/with-its-promise-and-performance-confirmed-abms-moves-to-a-new-phase/, May 21.

⁸⁴ N.E. Mathison, 2021, “2021 C2 Summit Enhances Air Force Contribution to Joint All-Domain Command and Control,” Air Force News, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2476713/2021-c2-summit-enhances-air-force-contribution-to-joint-all-domain-command-and/, January 20.

⁸⁵ J. Barnett, 2021, “Air Force Inks New ABMS Concept Document,” FedScoop, https://www.fedscoop.com/air-force-abms-concept-document-signed-jadc2/, July 21.

execute in a joint, high-tech environment where AI and ML are also contributing to the fight alongside them.”⁸⁶

To further direct ABMS and its support to JADC2, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, Gen. Charles Q. Brown, Jr., signed the ABMS Campaign Plan in May 2021. The plan includes eight warfighting capabilities that the DAF seeks to accomplish to achieve decision superiority: (1) data sharing; (2) human capital development; (3) distributed decision-making; (4) advanced communications; (5) advanced sensing; (6) integrated planning; (7) C2 of convergence of effects; and (8) accelerated decision-making.⁸⁷ Together, these capabilities would enable ABMS to securely collect and transmit volumes of data from air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains, as well as process information and share it amongst the Joint Force and multi-national partners—the cornerstone of the JADC2 mission.

Other Contributors to JADC2 and Complicating Factors

Originally advanced by DAF leaders as the chief JADC2 solution for the DoD, other military Services and DoD agencies have since proposed their own inputs to JADC2. Both the Army and the U.S. Department of the Navy (DoN) have launched similar efforts that parallel ABMS. Each seeks to prototype and experiment with technologies and operational approaches to support the all-domain JWC. The Army is enabling joint and combined overmatch and addressing the demands of the Joint Operating Environment through Project Convergence (PC),⁸⁸ and the DoN is pursuing Project Overmatch to develop the network, infrastructure, data

___________________

⁸⁶ N.E. Mathison, 2021, “2021 C2 Summit Enhances Air Force Contribution to Joint All-Domain Command and Control.”

⁸⁷ J. Valenzia, 2021, “The Ability to Share Data Could Prove Key to Deterring and Defeating Adversaries,” C4ISRNet, https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2021/05/29/the-ability-to-share-data-could-prove-key-to-deterring-and-defeating-adversaries/, May 29.

⁸⁸ For more on Project Convergence, see A. Abadie, 2021, “Project Convergence Overview,” Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, January 8, and Army Futures Command, “Project Convergence,” https://armyfuturescommand.com/convergence/. See also J. Lacdan, 2021, “Project Convergence 21 to Showcase Abilities of the Joint Force,” Army News Service, https://www.army.mil/article/249422/project_convergence_21_to_showcase_abilities_of_the_joint_force, August 15. T. South, 2021, “New in 2021: The Army’s Project Convergence Scales Up,” Army Times, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2021/01/04/new-in-2021-the-armys-project-convergence-scales-up/, January 4. J. Judson, 2020, “Inside Project Convergence: How the US Army Is Preparing for War in the Next Decade,” Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/smr/defense-news-conference/2020/09/10/army-conducting-digital-louisiana-maneuvers-in-arizona-desert/, September 10.

architecture, tool, and analytics to support maritime dominance and interoperability in JADC2.⁸⁹

While the objective of supporting JADC2 is central to each development, each Service is adopting considerably different approaches. For example, PC is proposed as “a campaign of learning to aggressively pursue an AI and ML-enabled battlefield management system”⁹⁰ and is designed around five core elements: people, weapons systems, C2, information and terrain.⁹¹ PC emphasizes building lethality at scale by leveraging a mix of AI, robotics, and autonomy.⁹² The organization responsible for leading the effort, the Army Futures Command (AFC), plans to run PC on an annual cycle “achieving objectives from frequent experiments with technology, equipment, and solder feedback throughout the year and culminating in an annual exercise or demonstration.”⁹³

In contrast, the Navy “envisions a future fleet with manned and unmanned ships, submarines and aircraft operating in a dispersed manner and collecting a ton of data to fill in a COP—which operational commanders could then use to, if ever needed, have the best sensor platform send targeting data to the best shooter to attack an enemy.”⁹⁴ Project Overmatch is the “Navy’s effort to create a ‘Naval Operational Architecture’ to link ships to Army and Air Force assets,”⁹⁵ and employs an engineering development approach to “enable a Navy that swarms the sea, delivering synchronized lethal and nonlethal effects from near-and-far, every

___________________

⁸⁹ For more on Project Overmatch, see D.W. Small, 2021, “Project Overmatch,” Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, March 3. M. Shelbourne, 2020, “Navy’s ‘Project Overmatch’ Structure Aims to Accelerate Creating Naval Battle Network,” USNI News, https://news.usni.org/2020/10/29/navys-project-overmatch-structure-aims-to-accelerate-creating-naval-battle-network, October 29. J. Barnett, 2021, “Top Navy Officer Says Project Overmatch Work ‘Headed in the Right Direction,’” FedScoop, https://www.fedscoop.com/top-naval-officer-not-satisfied-with-progress-on-project-overmatch/, August 2. A. Eversden and D. Larter, 2021, “Exclusive: Navy Transfers Network Authorities to Project Overmatch Office,” C4ISRNet, https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/it-networks/2021/03/05/exclusive-navy-transfers-network-authorities-to-project-overmatch-office/, March 4. L.C. Williams, 2021, “Navy Aims to Tackle Cross-Domain Data Sharing in Project Overmatch,” FCW, https://fcw.com/articles/2021/08/03/sas-overmatch-data-sharing-navy.aspx, August 3.

⁹⁰ Army Futures Command Project Convergence website, https://armyfuturescommand.com/convergence/, accessed August 6, 2021.

⁹¹ A. Abadie, 2021, “Project Convergence Overview,” Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, January 8.

⁹² T. South, 2021, “New in 2021: The Army’s Project Convergence Scales Up,” Army Times, January 4.

⁹³CRS (Congressional Research Service), 2020, The Army’s Project Convergence, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/IF11654.pdf, October 8.

⁹⁴ M. Eckstein and M. Shelbourne, 2021, “Navy to Field Early ‘Project Overmatch’ Battle Network on Theodore Roosevelt CSG in 2023,” USNI News, https://news.usni.org/2021/02/08/navy-to-field-early-project-overmatch-battle-network-on-theodore-roosevelt-csg-in-2023, February 10.

⁹⁵CRS, 2021, Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress.

axis, and every domain.”⁹⁶ The goal is to “develop the networks, infrastructure, data architecture, tools, and analytics that support the operational and developmental environment that will enable our sustained maritime dominance.”⁹⁷ According to the Commander, Naval Information Warfare Systems Command and the Director of Project Overmatch, the DoN will leverage and integrate the latest in digital technologies to include AI, ML, and information and networking technologies into existing DoN networks and platforms for achieving improved global fleet readiness.⁹⁸ This goal is not necessarily to solely acquire new solutions, but to capitalize on improving the operational effectiveness of existing C2 networks and platforms.

Beyond the military Services, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has established Mosaic Warfare⁹⁹ and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) has established fully networked command, control, and communications (FNC3), as their contributions to JADC2.¹⁰⁰ The U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is also developing its own Special Operations Forces (SOF)-specific data management environment (data fabric) with a set of common standards and tools that will enable SOF systems to communicate with one another.¹⁰¹ Each seeks to enable key commercial technologies to improve and enhance C2 operations; but again, little to no coordination is being executed to ensure an enterprise-wide solution.

The challenge, of course, is that each of these efforts is experimenting with joint interoperability involving capabilities and assets outside of their respective services and agencies, so eventual control and jurisdictional questions will arise. Moreover, while all of these efforts are loosely coordinating, there has been little to no reconciliation to understand exactly whose approach will apply, using which system, operating in which battlespace domain, and projecting against which adversary threatening which Joint and Service C2 posture. This challenge is further complicated in that JADC2 is designed to involve multi-national allied partners in planning (rather than as an afterthought once fielded), but those considerations

___________________

⁹⁶ M. Gilday, 2020, “Memorandum to Rear Admiral Douglas W. Small, United States Navy on Project Overmatch,” U.S. Department of the Navy, https://insidedefense.com/sites/insidedefense.com/files/documents/2020/oct/10192020_overmatch.pdf, October 1.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ D.W. Small, “Project Overmatch,” 2021, Presentation to the Air Force ABMS Committee, March 3.

⁹⁹ For more on Mosaic Warfare, see “DARPA Tiles Together a Vision of Mosaic Warfare,” https://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/darpa-tiles-together-a-vision-of-mosiac-warfare.

¹⁰⁰CRS, 2021, Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress.

¹⁰¹ A. Eversden, 2021, “SOCOM Data Official: Build Interoperability into New Systems for Joint War Fighting,” C4ISRNet, https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/it-networks/2021/05/26/socom-data-official-build-interoperability-into-new-systems-for-joint-war-fighting/, May 26. See also S. Magnuson, 2021, “SOFIC NEWS: SOCOM Looking to Break Barriers to Deliver Data Globally,” National Defense Magazine, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/5/20/socom-looking-to-break-barriers-to-deliver-data-globally, May 20.

are largely nascent compared to the unresolved differences between the concepts and systems from the military Services and supporting agencies.¹⁰² Accordingly, without proper coordination, a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities, and common operating standards, the risk is that “each service, COCOM [combatant command], or agency goes in its own direction and develops multiple stove-piped networks that do not allow the kind of interoperability and resilience that would be possible with a more coordinated approach.”¹⁰³

In the following chapters, the committee examines in detail planned ABMS data and communications architecture, reviews the proposed governance approach and supporting processes and recommends a path to address the identified technical gaps and process improvements to achieve ABMS capabilities more effectively. The final chapter will summarize the committee’s major findings and recommendations.

___________________

¹⁰² See J. Garamone, 2021, “Joint All-Domain Command, Control Framework Belongs to Warfighters,” DoD News, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2427998/joint-all-domain-command-control-framework-belongs-to-warfighters/, November 30. G.I. Seffers, 2020, “Army Suggests Adding Five Eyes Nation Allies in JADC2,” SIGNAL, https://www.afcea.org/content/army-suggests-adding-five-eyes-nation-allies-jadc2, July 14.

¹⁰³ T. Harrison, 2021, “Battle Networks and the Future Force,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/battle-networks-and-future-force, August 5.