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Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series (2022)

Chapter: Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting

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Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
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E

Workshop Series Recap Meeting

After the final workshop of the series concluded, the planning committee met virtually on October 4, 2021. During this meeting, each participant described themes that he or she observed during the workshop series and shared additional thoughts about the Department of the Air Force’s (DAF’s) digital strategy. The following commentaries should not be interpreted as conclusions or recommendations; rather, they are reflections, insights, and ideas for future activities shared by planning committee members and representatives from both the Department of the Air Force and the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’s Air Force Studies Board.

Mr. Alden Munson, senior fellow and member, Board of Regents, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, discussed considerations for and impediments to acquisition. He referenced an article that he published in 2015,1 which presented the systematic barriers to effective acquisition programs: acceptable cost, schedule, and technical performance. He suggested several actions to improve the acquisition process:

  • Do not begin acquisition programs that are not affordable.
  • Do not award contracts at other than the cost, schedule, and performance baseline captured in a credible government “should cost” for the program.
  • Do not run competitions for major development programs unless there are at least two fully qualified candidate suppliers.
  • Depend only on mature technology for major programs or commit to rigorous technology maturation programs (e.g., Apollo).
  • Professionalize the government acquisition workforce and make acquisition personnel decisions consistent with the expected challenges and durations of all programs.
  • Rigorously manage program requirements and fund the program to those requirements.

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1 A. Munson, 2015, “Why Can’t We Get Acquisitions Right?” Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, https://potomacinstitute.org/featured/706-why-can-t-we-get-acquisitions-right-by-alden-munson.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
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  • Conduct regular, thorough, objective reviews on all development programs.
  • Avoid the “conspiracy of hope,” which can lead to several distortions—for example, contracts are sometimes let at a small fraction of an independent cost estimate for the programs; contractors are selected without evidencing the required domain knowledge or experience; leadership personnel are cycled through a challenging program like interchangeable parts of a machine; success is assumed in a critical technology development without commitment of money and time for its maturation; growing execution shortcomings are allowed to linger without being specifically addressed; increasing cost overruns and schedule erosions are played down; and a program is not staffed as indicated by independent estimates.

He next examined the use of commercially produced components in a government system. He explained that defense procurements are conducted under a very specific, scripted business model. When the government bureaucracy directs the business of acquisition, there is no common mediating construct. Although companies in the defense industrial base (DIB) have developed the ability to succeed under this model, the business model used in commercial markets is very different. For instance, economic value is the common medium through which affairs are mediated, profit is based on the economic value the product creates for the customer, intellectual property rights are paramount, formal competition is not used universally, successful suppliers are rarely replaced in the absence of strong market drivers, and bureaucracy or other considerations that do not improve the economic value to the participants are rejected. Firms engaged in business with the U.S. government are pressured to accept government terms: records are open to government auditors; profits can be limited; intellectual property may not be protected; and decision making can be labored, slow, and unpredictable. Many commercial firms, especially those that are opening new markets with new products and are being richly rewarded for the economic value that their customers can create, are not interested in doing business with the U.S. government under these terms. He emphasized the orthogonality between the two business models—the U.S. government cannot abandon its formal procurement system, and commercial firms are not incentivized to accept the terms driven by this system. Therefore, he continued, if the government wants access to products and services produced in response to commercial market forces, it needs to develop mechanisms to “harmonize” these two business models so that neither makes unacceptable concessions.

Mr. Munson shared a list of government best practices for the inclusion of commercial products in government systems: (1) recognize that the choice to include commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)/non-developmental items (NDIs) in government systems cannot be pursued under the assumption that commercial suppliers would be compelled to operate according to the traditional government rules, regulations, and conventions; (2) harmonize the differences between the two diametrically opposed business models to achieve win-win outcomes; (3) recognize that to gain the benefit of COTS/NDIs (i.e., reduced research and development and maintenance over the life of the program), the product would need be used essentially as-is, because major modifications risk erasing the desired economies; (4) add a “go-back step” in the requirements and architecture processes (i.e., after the COTS/NDI components have been selected as the best fit available, the requirements and architecture trades would be revisited); and (5) develop and apply appropriately a new generation of security criteria around cyber defense throughout the commercial software and hardware supply chains.

He expressed an additional concern about whether the traditional acquisition system could execute such a program with the speed, agility, and efficiency required by the Air Force’s digitization community. He proposed the following to address this issue: (1) the “thicket-like” system of regulations, approvals, and permissions around the acquisition program could be “pruned,” or programs that need fast, agile, efficient execution could be allowed to waive elements that impede progress; (2) budgeting for such programs could provide multiyear funding, and reprogramming should be permitted more flexibly; (3) organizations could be flattened to shorten the “distance” between those executing the program and those with review and approval authorities; (4) roles of outside organizations could be mediated at the top of a program’s approval chains; and (5) acquisition could become a career specialty, and acquisition assignments could reflect domain knowledge and be for durations credible for the challenges.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
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Dr. Julie Ryan, chief executive officer, Wyndrose Technical Group, championed the suggestions provided by Mr. Munson. Dr. Pamela Drew, former executive vice president and president of information systems, Exelis, reiterated Mr. Munson’s assertion about the benefit of leveraging existing commercial capabilities instead of trying to tailor products. Lt. Gen. Ted Bowlds (USAF, ret.), chief executive officer, IAI North America, remarked that although the use of COTS could enable speed, he cautioned that the security around COTS products may not be as strong as the U.S. government requires. Dr. Marv Langston (USN, ret.), independent consultant, observed a failure in the U.S. Navy’s past two classes of surface ships, likely owing to the fact that program managers are no longer in charge of programs (i.e., legal and contracting lead instead). If the Department of Defense (DoD) does not begin to rely on the use of Other Transaction Authorities and prototypes (similar to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), he said that it will continue to experience failure. Ms. Deborah Westphal, chairman of the board, Toffler Associates, referenced a National Academies report on owning the technical baseline,2 which found that moving program manager responsibility to contractors was a negative inflection point. Lt. Gen. Michael Hamel (USAF, ret.), independent consultant, noted that when program managers are disempowered, accountability and progress lag. He added that accepting COTS as-is is not the only option for the government; he suggested working more closely with the private sector in the development of products. To generate funding for and to gain critical capabilities, he continued, DoD would need to take more risks. Gen. James (Mike) Holmes (USAF, ret.), senior advisor, The Roosevelt Group, commented that the acquisition process suffers without the voice of the warfighter—owing to personnel cuts, operators are no longer part of the Program Executive Offices.

Lt. Gen. Hamel reviewed the purpose of the workshop series and the charge to the workshop planning committee: to examine the operational, technical, programmatic, organizational, and governance challenges, opportunities, and risks facing the DAF’s enterprise-wide digital transformation strategies and plans. Top questions from the workshop sponsors included the following: What is the best sequence/synchronization for digital initiatives? Are there experiences from industry/others that demonstrate which actions achieve the biggest impact across workstreams? Is the vision for digitization on the right track? Are the right investments being made at the right time? He recapped the “Digital Transformation” presentation from the first day of the workshop series: Gen. David Allvin noted that speed is of the essence (“accelerate change or lose”); and Gen. David Thompson said that the Space Force is dependent on the Air Force, intends to be a truly digital, small service; and has a vision for a digital workforce, digital engineering, digital headquarters, and digital operations. Mr. Jay Santee (USAF, ret.), vice president, Strategic Space Operations, Defense Systems Group, The Aerospace Corporation, pointed out that because there are so many parts to sequence in the digital ecosystem, governance will be just as important as investments—thoughtful policy and an overarching orchestrator are needed for this effort.

Col. Scott McKeever, director, Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) Strategic Studies Group, expressed his hope that the observations shared during the workshop series would help move the DAF’s digital transformation efforts forward. He echoed the importance of speed, as well as understanding the risk-reward calculus and the right sequence/synchronization of efforts. Personnel who understand both strategy and underlying technologies are also a key component of the success of the digital transformation. Lt. Gen. Hamel pointed out that the DAF includes three distinct sectors (the Secretaries, the Air Force, and the Space Force) with varying needs, and Col. McKeever replied that this is precisely what makes achieving unity of effort so challenging. Before describing some of the Strategic Studies Group’s activities (see Appendix D), Col. McKeever emphasized the need to focus on the competitive environment (using China’s progress as a guidepost) and highlighted the value of data. Several large data efforts are under way at the headquarters level—for example, Project Brown Heron utilizes a cross-functional team to consider the decisions that need to be made and to pursue relevant data. Because resources are limited, it is critical to prioritize within the framework of the Air Force’s “compounding data asset.” The cross-functional team

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2 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2016, Owning the Technical Baseline for Acquisition Programs in the U.S. Air Force, The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, https://doi.org/10.17226/23631.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
×

creates ontologies and knowledge graphs, and considers how contracts and finances connect to readiness. He also provided an example of ongoing data challenges faced by the Air Force: it took three Major Commands (MAJCOMs) and 3 weeks of communication with the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) to access data and systems that the Air Force already owns. In this federated system of decision making, connecting multilayered systems can be difficult. He reiterated the need to find people who can think digitally and cross-functionally to serve as “integrators” for these efforts. Dr. Langston noticed that even though enabling technologies are available, military systems never seem to share data—primarily because no one has the power to enforce data sharing. However, he stressed that data sharing is fundamental to digitization. Lt. Gen. Hamel wondered how effective capabilities would be integrated into the mainstream and how this system would become self-sustaining. Col. McKeever said that when resources are available, it is helpful to provide enterprise capabilities that incentivize people to work on these challenges. This creates a bottom-up transformation, which has proven more successful then orders from the top.

Gen. Holmes offered his observations of themes that emerged throughout the workshop series. He said that multiple threat analyses indicate that the DAF faces a growing need to improve information systems and processes for both warfighting (e.g., to improve capability, capacity, and command and control decision speed/tempo) and institutional tasks (i.e., to make decisions required to gain efficiencies/savings and to support recruitment/retention). He emphasized the need to “do better work and make work better” and explained that similar processes have been successfully implemented in civilian and government spaces. The DAF could learn lessons from others’ transitions, allowing them to shape the digital transformation effort instead of beginning from scratch. He noted that the DAF’s most pressing challenge is empowering and maximizing the impact of its people. This transformative level of empowerment aligns with the DAF’s new warfighting and institutional doctrine and processes, which prioritize mission command via centralized control (CC), distributed command (DC), and decentralized execution (DE). Ongoing digital transformation efforts are unlikely to be successful without improved unity of effort that is consistent with this construct, he continued. A unified strategy would (1) appoint an appropriate leader (i.e., the Air Force works best under MAJCOM leadership), (2) provide DAF intent and required direction while empowering innovative approaches to execution, (3) prioritize and apply required resources, (4) measure and reward progress, (5) consider unplanned/unpredicted consequences, (6) direct or allow process and institutional changes required to permit transformation, and (7) be routinely reevaluated and updated. The best results in other organizations’ information transitions were obtained by first improving the current state through agile processes (i.e., DevSecOps approaches and application programming interfaces for universal data visibility and access), and then providing the guidance and resources required to enable expansion of efforts.

Dr. Drew shared her key takeaways from the second workshop in the series. She referenced examples of success and lessons learned across multiple digital transformation application areas that the DAF is pursuing (e.g., mission/operations, acquisition, development, maintenance, and administration or business support). She observed that many of the workshop speakers described the importance of governance, leadership, and critical success factors. For example, Danielle Ullner of the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) noted that it is important to have an appropriate oversight structure with a cross-functional group and the authority to make decisions, as well as integrated management of budgeting decisions and cycles. Dr. Drew also mentioned the BCG study that revealed that 70 percent of digital transformations fail and of those that succeed, 80 percent relied on six critical success factors (i.e., integrated strategy with clearly defined transformational goals, leadership commitment from the chief executive officer through middle management, deployment of high caliber talent, agile governance mindset that drives broad adoption, effective monitoring of progress, and a business-led modular technology and data platform). During Workshop Two, several best practices of “how” to implement digital transformation were presented. The majority of successful cases had quick wins or incremental approaches; fail fast and agile methodologies were preferred over waterfall or other monolithic concepts; change management was key, particularly for the user community; implementation occurred through cross-functional teams; data and logic management capabilities were present; and zero trust was critical for cybersecurity. Speakers also shared key strategies to avoid failure: establish ownership and manage end-to-end processes; reduce barriers such as resistance to process, technical, or operational change; get early buy-in from key stakeholders; determine appropriate

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
×

oversight design (e.g., centralized versus decentralized). In closing, she summarized three overarching themes from the workshop series:

  1. The DAF’s goal for digital transformation is to accelerate decision making in a relevant time frame and to maintain (or regain) the edge against adversaries (via operational/mission decisions, command and control, the Advanced Battle Management System, joint all-domain command and control, internal investments, acquisition, administration, and human capital).
  2. Progress is being made toward digital transformation—for example, the squadron level now has the same data view as the chief of staff; the ties between mission requirement to aircraft availability leading to a funding requirement demonstrates improved planning, spending, and execution; a top-level digital foundation, zero trust, and a data strategy are in progress; integration of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and cyber electronic capabilities are under way; and some level of agile DevOps is being achieved, although barriers remain in true integration with the DIB in digital acquisition.
  3. Potential gaps or barriers include a lack of prioritization that is unique to the Air Force and Space Force (i.e., data priorities against use cases and operation in a contested and energy-constrained environment with interrupted services); a lack of end-to-end process ownership and funding management; and an inadequate risk assessment by role for data access.

Dr. Langston emphasized that the world is on the edge of a massive change, as a result of digitization and advanced technological capabilities. He referenced a 2019 Air Force white paper,3 which stated that “… victory in combat will depend less on individual capabilities, and more on the integrated strengths of a connected network of weapons, sensors, and analytic tools. Today’s Air Force must transform to employ the data, technology, and infrastructure we need to prevail … To compete, deter, and win over our great power adversaries, we are forging a digital Air Force that will field a 21st century IT infrastructure responsive to the demands of modern combat, leverage the power of data as the foundation of artificial intelligence and machine learning to enable faster decision making and improved warfighter support, [and] adopt agile business practices that improve the effectiveness and efficiency of our management enterprise.” He described a response to that white paper from Maj. John P. Biszko,4 which challenged the following four assumptions about the digital Air Force: “The world can best be understood as entering into phases of technological advancement as a coherent whole; the most effective way for a military to win over great-power adversaries is to evolve its own capabilities in lockstep with the changing character of the technological landscape; the best way to attack or defend an increasingly digital entity is with increasingly digital weapons and defenses; and that government-sourced innovation is appropriately equivocal with military technological advances.” He shared Maj. Biszko’s explanation that “whereas the paper assigns technological advancement as the defining characteristic of a global community’s evolution, changes in economics, climate, and politics may be even more salient drivers of how military power is applied to cope with global evolution. … As a force emphasizes its technological edge more than its human edge—its (artificial) reasoning over its will, opportunity, or creativity—it makes the adversary’s problem increasingly scientific and less human. All the adversary has to do is determine how best to undermine something digital, which is relatively easy compared to how best to undermine another’s creativity.” Dr. Langston also highlighted the value of the Workshop Three presentation from Andrew Stricker of the LeMay Center and recapped some of his main assertions: “ … digital transformation is dependent upon underlying architectures, human creativity, and culture to create dynamic opportunities … the digital transformation effort is highly dependent on addressing each of the seven areas [of the Digital Transformation Cycle] …

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3 U.S. Air Force, 2019, “United States Air Force White Paper,” https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/2019%20SAF%20story%20attachments/USAF%20White%20Paper_Digital%20Air%20Force_Final.pdf?ver=2019-07-09-181813-390&timestamp=1562710801965.

4 J. Biszko, 2020, “Understanding and Challenging ‘The Digital Air Force’ USAF White Paper,” https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/07/2002449935/-1/-1/1/BISZKO.PDF.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
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synchronicity of effort by DAF/DoD involving whole of government is critical … clearly communicating purposes that impact not only warfighting capabilities but quality of life and work among personnel will help to motivate/inspire/engage innovation mindsets and effort broadly across DAF.” Dr. Langston observed a dearth of workshop discussion about the following: how the Air Force would synchronize with DoD, other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, or the private sector on digital transformation efforts; competitive offset advantages; infrastructure or an ecosystems approach to improve productivity; the potential of the digital Air Force to displace workers; use of cloud, artificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning (ML), and data analytics (other than for data access); cognitive computing; improved digital services as an outcome (i.e., if it makes jobs easier and gets results, it will be implemented); and joint collaborative/integrative capabilities (i.e., even if the Air Force creates processes, it still has to integrate with the other services to affect the way we fight). He described another relevant article, “Complementary Actions Define New DISA Strategy,”5 which defines information security as paramount to fight against the adversary and command and control as a “no fail priority.” The article also discussed the plan to conduct “a zero-based review of all the C2 requirements needed by Defense Department personnel ranging from senior leaders to warfighters. This entails a revalidation to understand whether these requirements are being met, either from an acquisition standpoint or an operational standpoint. Other criteria include whether a program exists to improve requirements, if the correct resources are aligned, and what the operational team leveraging these capabilities needs. … ” In closing, Dr. Langston articulated his final impressions of the workshop series, first describing the vice chief’s desire to make better decisions as an assigned goal for the IT department, not a strategic objective for the entire Air Force. He added that strategic goals that do not impact funding resources are hollow goals. He expressed concern about “business as usual” continuing with the current digital transformation strategy, owing to a lack of discussion about tying the digital transformation goals to productivity changes aligned with IT infrastructure or industry best-of-breed process changes. He noted that Dr. Stricker’s Digital Transformation Cycle represents a more coherent set of digital transformation objectives coupled with needed IT and process changes, but most of the elements in the cycle are only being partially addressed (if at all) by the Air Force. He underscored that bureaucratic proclamations without a means to quickly improve the jobs of airmen and the civilian workforce will not generate the desired outcome, and distributed budgets ensure that most of the Air Force acquisition and operations will function with little change.

Lt. Gen. Bowlds described an early release program effort in 2005, the Expeditionary Combat Support System, which was intended to digitize logistics, support, and supply. However, it was cancelled in 2011 after $1 billion had been spent with no results. He defined this cautionary example as a failure in organizational change management (i.e., “culture eating strategy for breakfast”). Reflecting on the three workshops in the series, he championed culture change as the key enabler for digital transformation in the Air Force; everyone has to be on board, especially at the middle management level. Another key tenet of digital transformation is the concept of operations (CONOPS)—using the old CONOPS with new data is not the right approach. Data security, data sharing, and digital operations are becoming increasingly important for the Air Force; data security in particular has to be considered early in system development. He echoed Dr. Langston’s observation that there was not enough discussion during the workshops about how the Air Force plans to modify its infrastructure to support digital transformation and enable data movement. He added that with the amount of data being generated, now and in the future, AI/ML efforts should support decision making. He pointed out that although many of the workshop speakers emphasized the role of digital engineering (i.e., an acquisition tool to iterate the design with requirements input), it is imperative to take the next step of connecting platforms for campaign efforts. In closing, he encouraged the Air Force to move from using “buzz words” to focusing on true digitization, instead of creating modern stovepipes.

Dr. Ryan provided her final thoughts on the workshop series:

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5 R. Ackerman, 2021, “Complementary Actions Define New DISA Strategy,” Signal, October 1, https://www.afcea.org/content/complementary-actions-define-new-disa-strategy.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
×
  • Data writ large as a “big, juicy target” (e.g., advanced persistent attacks, coordinated criminal gangs, physical attacks, and accidents). The Air Force cannot afford this risk, yet it is currently taking the wrong approach toward funding, people, coordination, and security.
  • Evolution versus revolution. Data are claimed to be vitally important to the operational vision of the Air Force, but they are not being treated accordingly. If data are as important to the future battlespace as stated, that warrants data personnel who are uniformed members of the services, and data being treated with the same level of infrastructure attention as a major weapons system with concomitant life cycle support; otherwise, the evolutionary path will lead to extinction.
  • Security. Security is more than just secrecy, and confidentiality is more than just secrecy from bad actors. Integrity is more than just truthiness, and availability is more than just access. Security engineering includes protection, detection, reaction, and correction. Security attributes apply not only to data; transactions should also be protected. Metadata, traffic analysis, emanations, operational patterns, and signatures are also important. People who are not deeply competent in information security aspects should not be allowed to make decisions without competent advice—it is too easy for charlatans to trick smart people into poor choices.

In closing, Dr. Ryan asserted that a true digital strategy requires competent funding, a whole-of-government approach, investment in the growth of personnel capabilities, and treatment as the most important national security issue.

Dr. Paul Nielsen (USAF, ret.), director and chief executive officer, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, asserted that balance is needed in the digital transformation. For example, although putting all of the Air Force’s data in one place creates an attractive cyber target, that is not an excuse to avoid modernization; new strategies to protect the data have to be developed. He observed that the vision for digital transformation presented by the vice chief of the Air Force was understood and echoed by other workshop presenters. Digital transformation could enhance all aspects of Air Force operations (e.g., warfighting, intelligence, acquisition, logistics, and business operations); however, he expressed concern that there appears to be no next-level plan for how to achieve this—no priorities, no architecture, and no funding. The Air Force has introduced some efforts that will enable this transformation (e.g., DevSecOps, software factories, containerization, cloud services), but he noted that there is something unfortunately familiar about this initiative with respect to previous Air Force initiatives—great vision without execution. This is especially discouraging for new Air Force recruits, who are digital natives but are expected to use 20th century tools to complete their missions. Reflecting on the vice chief’s statement that the Air Force seeks improved decision-making capabilities, Dr. Nielsen pointed out that digitizing current processes may not improve decision making and, in fact, could make it worse. He stressed that the Air Force should understand how it makes decisions now, what the issues are, and how it would like to make decisions in the future, not just with speed but with quality. One fundamental requirement for digital transformation is a supportive 21st century infrastructure (i.e., hardware, software, and technical talent), and the Air Force will have to grapple with its legacy infrastructure, culture, and policies to achieve true digital transformation. He posited that most of the success stories from industry are directly applicable to the Air Force. The talent that the Air Force needs to make this transformation will require support from academia and industry (both defense and non-defense). He emphasized that agile governance and continuous development, integration, and deployment will be important to early and continuous progress.

Dr. Rama Chellappa, Bloomberg Distinguished Professor of electrical and computer engineering and biomedical engineering, Johns Hopkins University, underscored that digital transformation is 25 years old; he wondered what took the Air Force so long to reach this point and why it is not catching up at a fundamental level. He proposed that the Air Force integrate with other branches of DoD as well as with Silicon Valley and non-DoD entities in this transformation effort. He stressed that the Air Force cannot spend 20 years trying to achieve its vision; digital transformation is swift and changing. A 5-year master plan with well-defined metrics for measuring progress is needed. Most importantly, the technology talent base has to be developed. He explained that 60–70 percent of graduate students who specialize in technologies such as data science, AI, and ML are foreign nationals who are unable to work for DoD

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
×

(although they can work in Silicon Valley and earn a $300,000 entry-level salary). He added that, as a result, there is a need to enhance the participation of U.S. citizens in these technologies.

Dr. Annie Green, data governance specialist, George Mason University, reiterated that structure, content, and competent people are critical to transformation.6 In the first workshop of the series, she observed a saturation of topics (e.g., although AI was discussed, it was not discussed in the context of how it could be used in the Air Force environment). Initiatives and projects seem to be based on intriguing innovation and new technology opportunities; however, the Air Force is situated in a complex, adaptive system and has to think about refocusing its direction. Engineering and management are critical, she continued, but the Air Force has failed at engineering. For example, if the architecture is not yet established, it is not possible to determine how the pieces fit together and there is no way to drive strategy. And if there are no metrics to measure success, it is not appropriate to claim success. Representation, data integration, data valuation, and governance are also critical but not apparent in the Air Force’s plan. She emphasized that a holistic structure is needed; it is crucial to be able to sustain processes and renew them when they have decayed.

Col. Douglas DeMaio, 187th Fighter Wing Commander, Alabama Air National Guard, posited that if the Air Force involves its people in the right way and creates the right messaging, digitization is achievable. He emphasized the following requirements for digital transformation, from an operational perspective: an enterprise vision, mission, and objectives; technology; culture change; and a method. He described the current state of digital transformation in the Air Force as nascent, including several enterprise initiatives without a comprehensive effort. He said that the Air Force lacks mature strategy, doctrine, CONOPS, method, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); has little emphasis on culture change; focuses primarily on technology; and searches for perfect, centralized connectivity in the cyber domain. Although airmen want to digitize, they are not involved in the process of digitization. He noted that the Space Force has effective digitization efforts, with a comprehensive move toward culture change and technology; however, China also has impressive efforts in digitization, networking, and machine intelligence. He shared several observations from the workshop series: culture is critical in digital transformation; adversaries will likely focus on centralized decision making; the Air Force will fight for connectivity in peer-level combat; there is a new Air Force mission command (CC, DC, DE); and decision making may be focused at the tactical edge. To achieve an enterprise-level transformation effort, he suggested the following steps:

  • Create a CSAF-driven culture change with digital Air Force doctrine notes and by developing and publishing a digitization doctrine.
  • Implement digitization, networking, and machine intelligence across the entire electromagnetic spectrum, and develop a related CONOPS.
  • Focus and empower people at tactical levels, via agile combat employment (ACE). For example, he described an upcoming ACE exercise in which airmen will have the opportunity to innovate with connectivity and logistics to identify unique solutions.

Digitization requires both top-down and bottom-up approaches with the embodiment of CSAF’s mission command culture and joint all-domain operations, he continued. Headquarters Air Force (HAF) A3 is developing an operational method and TTPs to enable prioritization of data access at the tactical edge.

Mr. Santee recapped the Space Force’s vision for an interconnected, innovative, digitally dominant force via digital headquarters, digital engineering, digital operations, and digital workforce. He expressed his support for this approach but still questioned how to achieve it. The Space Force described the vision for the digital ecosystem as a cloud-based, MLS domain that is remotely accessible and secure (with containerization and infrastructure as code as well as common, portable, and scalable tools and applications). The goal is to integrate seamlessly with other Air Force and DoD efforts and link integrated,

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6 A. Green, 2018, “Structure, Content, & Humans: Critical ‘Planks’ When Building Artificial Intelligence into a Business,” Georgetown University School of Continuing Studies, https://scs.georgetown.edu/news-andevents/article/7282/structure-content-humans-critical-planks-when-building-artificial-intelligence-business.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
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authoritative data to engineer all domain capabilities. He emphasized that the services use funding, requirements, and program offices to govern and procure capabilities like the digital ecosystem. He wondered what the digital ecosystem would look like as a minimum viable product to support digital headquarters, digital engineering, and digital operations. He asserted that the Space Force needs data and thus needs to incentivize data sharing and penalize those who do not share data, and it needs to rely on policy and governance for collection and protection of these data. He cited an example of a 2002 mandate from Jeff Bezos that said that any employee not using select interfaces would be fired. The next question for the Space Force is what a minimum viable set of data would look like hosted in the digital ecosystem minimum viable product. Once the workforce has access to the minimum viable products, interconnection, innovation, and digital fluency, cognizance, and dominance become possible. The resulting change in the culture and CONOPS could be significant.

Mr. Charles Brooks, adjunct faculty, Georgetown University, offered several key takeaways (via Ms. Westphal) from the workshop series: there is a need for a larger digital transformation with a budget behind authority to demonstrate commitment; legacy systems embedded in both procurement and operations are adversarial to digital transformation; layers of bureaucracy in decision making impact agility; there is a need to be more tech-savvy, especially in AI, 5G, and computing; turnover of leadership is an issue as are siloes in the Air Force culture, which make it difficult to share information; investment in digital automation tools is necessary; and it is not easy to scale transformation among different programs in missions. He described the requirements for successful transformation, including a data-centric and digitized user experience; coordinated data flow and access management; security and transparency throughout supply chains; unified training; understanding of digital governance; and adoption of models, strategies, and best practices that have already proven effective in other agencies and the private sector.

Ms. Westphal emphasized that culture change starts with leadership and underscored that culture will not change if the Air Force does not change what it does on a daily basis. She expressed that although the Air Force talks about a sense of urgency, it has not created a sense of urgency for change. Because synchronization becomes desynchronization when leadership rotates every few years, creating a sense of urgency for transformation is even more important. To increase speed, different and bold actions have to be taken by leadership to signal urgency. For example, the right leader is one who is truly committed to bold change instead of committed only to the actions that will lead to a promotion. She supported the creation of a temporary transformation office as a centralized location for programs and activities. She stressed the need for this office to direct the vision, communicate the future state, celebrate quick wins, and signal urgency. A unity of effort is needed to sequence plans for transformation, she continued.

Mr. Munson communicated his takeaways from the workshop series. He described a “recipe” for success, from the perspective of a program manager: pursue a set of actions that will resonate with people and stimulate more action, consider how budgeting and oversight will occur, define the level of centralization required to scale, and position to be scalable and extendable. He emphasized the need for security and suggested an approach based on the activities already under way to create use cases for future pilots. It is possible to distill from these use cases basic elements of the architecture and implementation, and evolve the use cases to better reflect implementation in a digital world. He proposed creating an architecture framework, derived from the analyses of the use cases and the pilots, that includes a data strategy. He then suggested using the pilot with the most support to build the architecture that supports the use case. The current level of security, even with zero trust, is not sufficient to allow everything to be connected: difficult decisions need to be made about partitioning. He presented the goal to build an infrastructure that can accommodate new technologies—implement based on commercial infrastructure with the flexibility to change TTPs as necessary, and reserve custom Air Force development for the areas in which there are no commercial analogues.

As the meeting drew to a close, Dr. Richard Hallion, senior advisor, Science and Technology Policy Institute, submitted a written summary of his meeting commentary (see Box E.1), and Lt. Gen. Hamel provided the following list of general observations and themes from the workshop series:

  • Digital transformation touches the Air Force’s organization, operations, and activities—an
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
×
  • extremely complex and challenging, but imperative, enterprise-wide effort.
  • The workshop series engaged participants from a broad cross-section of the Air Force—not comprehensive but representative of the range of issues and challenges. The workshops benefited from diverse participants and dialogue but were limited by time, participants, protocols, and synthesis.
  • There is a growing recognition that information capabilities will be a vital “center of gravity” in all future international competition and conflict—and may become the leading (decisive) edge of combat.
  • Many good things are occurring within the Air Force, from doctrine, to technology, to innovation, to processes/application, to systems, to people, to partnering—but transformation has not reached a “tipping point,” nor is the rate of change at the pace of the broader information advances in private sectors and by adversaries.
  • Speed, agility, innovation, and resilience are essential attributes in digital capabilities and methods—increasingly being led by industry, commercial, and academia—that the Air Force needs to harness.
  • There is an ample supply of information technologies and proven practices. The challenge is to adapt and scale across the services and truly commit to, resource, and implement needed capabilities—particularly enterprise infrastructure, data management, and security.
  • Cybersecurity needs to be a top priority—“zero trust” appears to be the accepted methodology but should be designed in and based on “risk management” principles and practices. A top-level chief information security official is important.
  • Rigid DoD processes present big impediments to digital transformation—requirements; planning, programming, budget, and execution; and acquisition. New tools, authorities, practices, and processes could be applied to digital transformation.
  • There are many new authorities and tools that could assist the definition, design, fielding, and use of modern information/digital capabilities—the Air Force should aggressively push to define its preferred models and practices to leverage them.
  • The Air Force’s shift to CC, DC, and DE has profound and far-reaching implications—affecting all “organize, train, and equip” functions. Digital transformation is essential to enabling it but should also be a top practitioner.
  • Hierarchical organizations and processes are the antithesis of modern information systems—federated, loosely coupled, open systems and “action teams” serving diverse communities of use are essential.
  • Resourcing (i.e., dollars, talent, and leadership engagement) is critical to driving organization and culture change. It is not clear that the Air Force knows what it is spending or how best to shift resourcing from legacy capabilities to future desired capabilities.
  • Stovepiped programs and efforts are widespread—new forums and regularized engagement/collaboration, organized around and within traditional lines of effort (e.g., operations, mission support, business activities) and new critical capabilities (e.g., infrastructure, data, security), are needed to create connections.
  • The classical purpose of strategy is to link “ways and means to achieve desired ends”—there does not appear to be an articulated, department-wide strategy guiding its digital transformation. A deliberate strategy could be an important tool to capture, communicate, and evolve through learning.
  • There is much room to improve “unity of effort” in the digital transformation across the Air Force.
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
×
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
×
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
×

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Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
×
Page 128
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: Workshop Series Recap Meeting." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Digital Strategy for the Department of the Air Force: Proceedings of a Workshop Series. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26531.
×
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The Air Force Studies Board of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine hosted a three-part workshop series to examine the risks associated with the technical, programmatic, organizational, and governance challenges facing the Department of the Air Force (DAF) in its pursuit of enterprise-wide digital transformation strategies. Senior representatives from government, military, industry, and academia considered the DAF's strategic-level decision-making process as well as how it could achieve unity of effort across all of its digital agencies. Workshop participants discussed organizational and management gaps and weaknesses, as well as technical shortfalls associated with the DAF's digital transformation strategies - for example, the issue of cybersecurity within the context of the DAF's proposed digital strategies. Organizational and management practices from both the public and private sectors were also discussed in light of their potential for adaptation and adoption within the DAF.

Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense, the three 2-day workshops of the series were held virtually on September 1-2, 2021, September 8-9, 2021, and September 23-24. Panelists at the first workshop explained and discussed the DAF's digital transformation strategy - in particular, the proposed digital architectures and the systems, programs, organizations, and missions to be supported. The second workshop featured panels of information systems experts and managers from industry and other government agencies who discussed their experiences with digital transformations and shared their views of best practices. The third workshop focused on the potential applicability of these lessons learned to the DAF's digital transformation strategy and architecture. This proceedings is a factual summary of what occurred during the workshop series.

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