5
Leveraging the Global S&T Community
As discussed in previous chapters, the science and technology (S&T) enterprise is global. Research and development (R&D) investment increasingly is distributed worldwide, with approximately 25 percent of global R&D funded by the United States, 20 percent by Europe, and 42 percent by Asia, including China, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore.1 Scientists are increasingly attending institutions of higher education, conducting scientific research, and pursuing careers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) in foreign countries. In addition, S&T is increasingly collaborative today; scientists frequently conduct research as part of international teams, and many scientists view themselves as part of a global scientific community. The percentage of scientific publications with authors from more than one country is increasing,2 and such publications have greater impact in field-weighted citation impact analyses.3
It is also well known that U.S. companies engage internationally, locating research and production facilities in foreign markets and selling their products worldwide. Supply chains for products may include contributions and components from many different countries. U.S. companies form strategic R&D alliances by working with foreign companies and academia. Many of these partnerships focus on areas of pre-competitive research, participating in communities of discovery to advance S&T that can then be elaborated upon by participants to compete against each other (and third parties) by developing proprietary products and services.
Given the globalization of S&T, the notion of a “domestic S&T base” does not reflect today’s reality except for few niche applications.
The United States greatly benefits from engaging in global research in many areas, and many scientific discoveries or technological innovations occur outside the United States. The U.S. S&T enterprise recognizes that it must engage in open global research. The U.S. research community is working to engage with G7 and European Union efforts to preserve research openness, objectivity, accountability, and integrity. Security is an important but challenging issue for this effort—one in which the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) should be constructively engaged. The IC must do its best to adapt to that reality and leverage the fullness of the global enterprise. One powerful way for the IC to meet the challenge of assessing and accessing global S&T is to engage with those who are developing R&D. Indirect means, by strengthening the IC’s capabilities for tapping into existing S&T networks,
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1 National Science Foundation (NSF), 2020, “Science and Engineering Indicators,” Washington, DC.
2 NSF, 2020, “Science and Engineering Indicators,” Washington, DC.
3 R.K. Pan, K. Kaski, and S. Fortunato, 2021, “World Citation and Collaboration Networks: Uncovering the Role of Geography in Science,” Scientific Reports 2(1):902.
are probably most promising. Many foreign academic or government academic institutions, such as defense universities or universities with strong S&T departments, have cultivated valuable working relationships with their own country’s intelligence, defense, and government S&T agencies, as well as with their country’s industry and other universities. These academic institutions may be amenable to hosting seminars or symposia that bring together scientific experts from both countries to explore areas of mutual interest for future R&D collaboration.
In its Vision 2030 report, the National Science Board notes the importance of engaging in the international S&T ecosystem—importance heightened by the increasing non-U.S. share of global knowledge production and the rising impact of international collaboration and knowledge- and technology-intensive industries.4 International S&T cooperation is also essential to address global challenges that the IC has shown concern about and which cannot be tackled by one nation alone—such as climate change and pandemics—and to share the cost of constructing and operating large-scale research facilities.
However, as noted in National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America, 2019,5 the IC faces a number of constraints that complicate or preclude its ability to directly engage in the international S&T community, particularly outside the foreign intelligence and national security communities:
- The IC has limited R&D resources—with respect to both R&D funding and human capital—yet it has the mission of understanding (and potentially leveraging) global technical advances in a wide variety of areas.
- As noted already in this report, the IC must always be mindful of security, which is especially critical in the case of international engagements.
- The IC has a constrained ability to interact openly with entities, particularly foreign entities, who may be either unwilling to work with it or who may be too willing to work with it (e.g., who seek to build relationships for the purpose of distorting information flowing to the IC, or extracting information from it). These constraints pose challenges for widespread and overt international engagement.
- The IC may have difficulty obtaining access to certain international business and technology meetings and conferences where invitations are based upon a willingness of attendees to reciprocate in sharing information.
- The IC has legal and policy restrictions on undisclosed participation in U.S. organizations (Executive Order 12333 and agency implementing policies).
- Lack of dedicated funding for international engagement is another obstacle to increased international S&T collaboration. The IC does not currently allocate funding for international S&T cooperation, including funding for international travel. Foreign travel to meet with international counterparts, researchers, and research facilities may not be perceived as a necessary IC mission expense. Interviews the committee held with IC S&T managers brought out the fact that our FVEY partners do not feel as limited as the U.S. IC with respect to international travel, so the extensive paperwork and limited funding for our IC experts to engage in foreign travel impedes the U.S. IC from benefiting from more effective international collaboration.
- The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) implementing the AECA have hindered Five Eyes cooperation in R&D in the past. AECA and ITAR create a regulatory regime that does not differentiate between allies and adversaries, absent the existence of a bilateral treaty. Even if licenses are ultimately issued for transferring controlled-information exports to close allies, the delay and bureaucratic challenges can be significant problems in state-of-the-art programs.
In its report funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF) on fundamental research security, the JASON advisory group concluded that the benefits of international engagement far outweigh the risks.6 In academia, international research engagement includes collaborative research projects between academic researchers of different
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4 National Science Board, 2020, Vision 2030, NSB-2020-15, Washington, DC, p. 24.
5 Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), 2019, National Intelligence Strategy, Washington, DC, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/National_Intelligence_Strategy_2019.pdf.
6 JASON, 2019, Fundamental Research Security, JSR-19-21, December, https://www.nsf.gov/news/special_reports/jasonsecurity/JSR-19-2IFundamentalResearchSecurity_12062019FINAL.pdf.
countries, incoming foreign students and scholars, university/university partnerships, and collaborations between researchers in U.S. universities and researchers working in foreign campuses of U.S. universities.
While it is very important to manage research security risks, it is also important to preserve the open ecosystem for fundamental research that accelerates knowledge and discovery. National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-189, dated September 21, 1985,7 established U.S. policy on the transfer of S&T information. NSDD-189 provides that fundamental research should remain unrestricted to the fullest extent possible, and if protection is needed, classification is the appropriate mechanism. The 2019 JASON report on research security recommended that NSF should support the reaffirmation of NSDD 189.8 Particular risks that the IC faces in engaging globally are discussed below.
As has been pointed out in other reports, this directive is not a favor the United States conveys to the rest of the world, or some blind allegiance to “open science.” Neither is it risk-free. But NSDD-189 is necessary, and those risks are worth accepting, in order for the United States to reap the benefits of fundamental research. As explained in a 2005 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report, “This Directive does not assert that the open dissemination of unclassified research is without risk. Rather, it says that openness in research is so important to our own security—and to other key national objectives—that it warrants the risk that our adversaries may benefit from scientific openness as well.”9
Because the IC’s culture and processes may inhibit successful sharing and eventual adoption of emergent technology, the chief technology and innovation officer (CTIO) office proposed in Recommendation 2.1 could consider what the Office of the Director of National Intelligence might do to increase the willingness of IC technologists and contracting officers to take more risk and be more aggressive. Possible steps might involve training for liaison engagement, more employment of flexible contract vehicles—such as other transaction authorities, Cooperative Research and Development Agreements, and others—and other steps to make better use of existing flexibilities.
EXISTING U.S. GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL S&T COOPERATION
The U.S. government engages in international S&T cooperation through government-to-government programs and bilateral S&T agreements. The Department of State’s Office of Science and Technology Cooperation manages a portfolio of bilateral agreements that provide overarching frameworks for cooperation in S&T across numerous scientific fields. Numerous federal science agencies such as NSF, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Energy (DOE), and NASA have their own agreements to engage in S&T collaboration in certain fields or to work together to construct and operate large-scale scientific facilities. For example, the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate’s International Cooperative Programs Office oversees bilateral S&T agreements to cooperate in research and technology related to homeland security.10
The IC could maximize its awareness of and access to international S&T by making better use of knowledge about international S&T activities already available within other federal agencies. As a starting point, the IC would benefit from developing more connections among the IC S&T international managers within the 18 IC organizations and within other government agencies and offices. In addition, it is worth noting that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Chiefs of Stations in overseas embassies have, as a matter of course, useful insights as well as contacts in S&T areas. There needs to be a concerted effort to take advantage of their knowledge in painting a
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7 See U.S. National Security Council, 1985, “National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information,” National Security Decision Directive-189, September 21, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-189.htm. The policy was reaffirmed in a November 1, 2001, letter from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Harold Brown, Co-Chair of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and again on May 24, 2010, in a memorandum from Undersecretary of Defense Ashton Carter to the Secretaries of the Military Departments.
8 JASON, 2019, Fundamental Research Security.
9 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2005, Security Controls on Scientific Information and the Conduct of Scientific Research, Washington, DC, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/0506_cscans.pdf, p. 2.
10 Department of Homeland Security, “International Partnerships,” https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/st-icpo, accessed August 7, 2022.
picture of S&T activities, both open and secret, in relevant countries. Coordination among these officials, and among other IC staff working on international R&D cooperation are often “stovepiped.” IC S&T staff who work with international partners could be drawn together to produce an internal community that shares insights and best practices. The new CTIO position recommended in Chapter 2, or a designee, could establish such a network.
The IC could benefit from the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) extensive international S&T cooperation and situational awareness of global S&T developments. The Air Force Office of Scientific Research’s (AFOSR’s) International Office, the Office of Naval Research’s (ONR’s) Global program, and Army’s Combat Capabilities Development Command actively leverage world-class fundamental research relevant to mission needs. All three operate offices in London, Tokyo, and Santiago to scout out S&T of potential benefit, enable direct interchanges with members of the S&T community across defense, government, academia, and industry, fund researchers abroad, and encourage the establishment of beneficial relationships between scientists and engineers and their foreign counterparts. ONR, AFOSR, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency also provide direct research support to foreign researchers. The Air Force, Army, and Navy international research offices in London moved in 2020 to the Translation and Innovation Hub at Imperial College.11 The Navy also has offices in Argentina and Singapore.12
At one of its information-gathering workshops, the study committee heard from the head of ONR Global, who emphasized the importance of leveraging “smart people across the globe to work together.”13 According to him, the United States needs to focus on building trusted partnerships engaging in global research networks so as to leverage global S&T expertise. In his view, “the secret sauce for building trusted partnerships and networks is to have an enduring presence.” This includes building connections and trust by visiting partners’ laboratories and meeting with their researchers. ONR also travels internationally, to countries such as China and Russia, to understand the state of fundamental research abroad, and ONR publishes an annual prospectus that is publicly available. While 95 percent of ONR researchers are civilians who do not engage directly with the IC, ONR’s military staff keeps IC counterparts informed of relevant information.
In addition to research interactions, ONR assigns domain specialists and regional specialists to various countries to collect knowledge about S&T developments and has created an ONR research network database. ONR, AFOSR, and other DoD entities are collectively exploring multiple network and knowledge management tools to enable sharing of these networks with researchers across DoD.14 Even if some of these DoD activities are not transferable directly to the IC, the IC could leverage greater benefit from these DoD international efforts, including their networks and situational awareness of global S&T.
RECOMMENDATION 5.1: Within its mining of open-source information in general, the Intelligence Community should increase the collection of open-source information on science and technology advances and early stage companies in foreign nations. The chief technology and innovation officer could coordinate these activities and potentially assign and/or post specialists to cover key regions and countries.
The 2021 CSIS Intelligence Edge report15 includes helpful discussions of the value of open-source intelligence and also suggests ways to expand its use.
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11 M. Lachance, 2020, “Tri-Service Partners Join Technology Transfer Ecosystem at Innovative UK University,” Air Force Office of Scientific Research, August 6, https://www.afmc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2243687/international-research-office-embraces-innovation-ecosystem-at-elite-uk-univers.
12 Office of Naval Research, 2022, “Global Locations,” updated March 18, https://www.nre.navy.mil/organization/onr-global/global-locations.
13 Capt. James Borghardt, ONR Global, presentation, June 9, 2021, in Appendix B.
14 See Air Force Research Laboratory, “AFRL/RI International Program Office,” https://www.afrl.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Fact-Sheet-Display/Article/2332507/afrlri-international-program-office, accessed August 7, 2022. International Agreements are in place for Australia, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See Office of Naval Research, “ONR International Engagement Office,” https://www.onr.navy.mil/Science-Technology/ONR-Global/international-engagement, accessed August 7, 2022.
15 CSIS Technology and Intelligence Task Force, 2021, Maintaining the Intelligence Edge: Reimagining and Reinventing Intelligence Through Innovation, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/maintaining-intelligence-edge-reimagining-and-reinventing-intelligence-through-innovation.
EXISTING COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS WITH SELECTED ALLIES
The United States also enters into agreements with like-minded countries such as Japan and the United Kingdom to cooperate in specific scientific fields. For example, in December 2019, the United States and Japan signed the Tokyo Statement on Quantum Cooperation to advance innovation and emerging quantum information science and technology.16 Such agreements include provisions such as promoting specific studies, conducting personnel exchanges, and developing new tools. In September 2020, the United States and the United Kingdom entered into a bilateral agreement to cooperate on R&D of AI technologies.17 DoD has more than 30 bilateral and multilateral International Cooperative Program Framework memorandums of understanding (MOUs) to provide overarching mechanisms for RDT&E cooperation with allied and friendly nations.18
The IC’s own relationships with selected foreign intelligence organizations are described in the next section. Here, a sample of some other national-security relationships that the IC might leverage or emulate is presented.
For example, DoD actively engages in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) S&T activities. NATO’s Science and Technology Organization (STO) leverages S&T cooperation among NATO Allies and partners to maintain NATO’s military and technological advantage. With a community of more than 6,000 scientists, and a network that draws on the expertise of more than 200,000 people in Allied and partner countries, STO is the world’s largest collaborative research forum in the field of defense and security. Its annual work program includes more than 300 projects with a value of 300 million euros that cover a wide range of fields such as autonomous systems, sensors and electronic technology, information systems technology, hypersonic vehicles, and quantum radar.19
These facts are cited only to point out the large scale of this cooperation, which the IC may want to leverage more intensely. In fact, Congress, in a 2020 report regarding innovation within the IC,20 suggested that the IC consider greater involvement in one particular program, NATO’s Innovation Hub at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia.21 That Hub is an open innovation platform that brings the NATO end user, S&T experts from academia and industry, and a broad community of experts and innovators together to collaborate on design solutions to NATO challenges.
In recognition of the widespread availability of new technologies and the rapid pace at which they are developing, NATO has undertaken several steps to enhance understanding of the role of emerging and disruptive technologies and accelerate NATO’s adoption of these technologies. In 2019, NATO’s Defense Ministers approved an Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Roadmap to structure NATO’s work in these areas.22 In 2020, NATO’s secretary general created a NATO advisory group on emerging and disruptive technologies composed of 12 experts from academia and industry to advise NATO on adoption of new technologies.23 And recognizing that most new disruptive technologies are being developed by the civil sector, NATO partners with industry though the NATO Industrial Advisory Group comprising more than 5,000 companies, including small- and medium-size businesses.
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16 Department of State, 2019, “Tokyo Statement on Quantum Cooperation,” December 19, https://www.state.gov/tokyo-statement-on-quantum-cooperation.
17 Department of State, 2020, Declaration of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Cooperation in Artificial Intelligence Research and Development: A Shared Vision for Driving Technological Breakthroughs in Artificial Intelligence, September 25, https://www.state.gov/declaration-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-united-kingdom-of-great-britain-and-northern-ireland-on-cooperation-in-artificial-intelligence-research-and-development-a-shared-vision-for-driving.
18 One example is the Department of State, 2019, “Memorandum of Understanding Among the Department of Defence of Australia, the Department of National Defence of Canada, the New Zealand Defence Force, the Secretary of State for Defense of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Department of Defense of the United States of America Concerning Quintilateral Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Projects,” December 17.
19 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 2021, “Maintaining NATO’s Technological Edge,” updated April 13, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_182871.htm.
20 U.S. House of Representatives House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 2020, “Rightly Scaled, Carefully Open, Infinitely Agile: Reconfiguring to Win the Innovation Race in the Intelligence Community,” Washington, DC, October, p. 31.
21 The Innovation Hub is part of the NATO Innovation Network, a federation of nodes from NATO and nations leveraging open innovation and agile development.
22 D.F. Reding and J. Eaton, 2020, Science & Technology Trends, 2020-2040: Exploring the S&T Edge, Brussels, Belgium: NATO Science and Technology Organization, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/4/pdf/190422-ST_Tech_Trends_Report_2020-2040.pdf, p. 114.
23 NATO, 2020, Secretary General’s 2020 Report, Brussels, Belgium, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_182236.htm, p. 63.
Beyond NATO, other multilateral fora for S&T collaboration include the G7 Technology Ministers. An example of one of their multilateral cooperative initiatives is the 2020 launch of the G7 Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI). The GPAI brings together worldwide experts from industry, civil society, academia, and governments to advance research on AI technical topics including trustworthiness and explainability. It will also explore AI workforce development and approaches to spur AI innovation and commercialization.24 The G7 also adopted a Research Compact at its 2021 Summit in Cornwall, England, to collaborate on research to respond to global challenges, increase the transparency and integrity of research, and facilitate data free flow with trust to drive innovation and advance knowledge.25
EXISTING IC S&T COOPERATION WITH FIVE EYES AND ALLIES
The IC currently partners with allies and foreign intelligence and security services to leverage collective capability, data, expertise, and insights, which it considers to be force multipliers.26 In particular, the IC works closely within the Five Eyes (FVEY) framework. The Five Eyes countries (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are parties to the multilateral UK–U.S. Agreement, a treaty for joint cooperation in signals intelligence dating from World War II.27 FVEY shares signals intelligence, including methods related to signal intelligence operations. FVEY also shares human and geospatial intelligence and engages in signals intelligence cooperation with other allies, including Japan and South Korea. Collaborative arrangements include assignment of foreign liaisons to partner intelligence agencies.
NGA and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) represent the United States on the FVEY Allied System for Geospatial Intelligence (ASG). An MOU, known as “Square Dance,” establishes a valuable framework for collaborative R&D and test and evaluation (RDT&E) activities among FVEY partners up to the Top Secret/SCI level. The IC primarily engages in RDT&E cooperation with FVEY through Square Dance. Square Dance meets bi-monthly to discuss selected topics, and interested members enter into cooperative project arrangements (PAs) and equipment and material transfer arrangements.28 Through interviews with senior S&T personnel, the study committee learned that NGA has approximately two dozen cooperative project arrangements in R&D with FVEY members, and that NRO also actively participates in Square Dance activities, including a federated architecture program of small satellites that harden the satellite network. NRO also operates a classified virtual laboratory where technologies can be shared among the FVEY. The IC is also establishing an open laboratory that will allow the FVEY, academia, and industry to participate. Non-U.S. FVEY partners are frequently from foreign defense agencies (as opposed to intelligence agencies) engaging in R&D. FVEY also engages in personnel exchanges under Square Dance: the FVEY assigns employees to serve at foreign partner research laboratories. Assignments typically span 2 years, with the possibility of renewal for a third year.
The IC also engages in international R&D partnerships with FVEY to draw from allied innovation bases supportive of IC needs. For example, CIA has numerous joint projects with Australia and the United Kingdom, some focused on development of next-generation communications equipment. Partnership with Australia enables the United States to leverage Australia’s expertise in unmanned aircraft systems, while the partnership with the United Kingdom draws on strong British expertise in material science and clothing fabrication. CIA modeled these international collaborations on NSA’s successful working relationship with the FVEY.29
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24 M. Kratsios, 2020, “Artificial Intelligence Can Serve Democracy” The Wall Street Journal, May 27, https://www.wsj.com/articles/artificial-intelligence-can-serve-democracy-11590618319.
25 United Kingdom Publishing Service, 2021, “G7 Research Compact,” https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1001133/G7_2021_Research_Compact__PDF__356KB__2_pages_.pdf.
26 See footnote 5, National Intelligence Strategy, p. 23.
27 National Security Agency, “UKUSA Agreement Release,” https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/ukusa, accessed August 7, 2022.
28 Government of Canada, 2018, “Five Eyes Collaborative Environment,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-defence-acquisition-guide-2016/joint-and-other-systems-825.page, accessed August 7, 2022; Australian Government, Department of Defence, 2017, “Science and Technology Portfolio,” https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DST_Capability_Portfolio_170217_0.pdf, accessed August 7, 2022.
29 Interviews conducted by National Academies staff with IC S&T managers between March 19 and June 12, 2021.
The United States would benefit from greater engagement with FVEY. For example, because of their relatively scarce resources and limited access to classified intelligence, some of the FVEY partners have developed strong competency in leveraging open-source information, and the IC has the opportunity to learn more about their successful practices. The IC could also benefit from continuing to get FVEY perceptions of threats from common adversaries. At present, international S&T collaboration between FVEY partners is often ad hoc.30 FVEY collaboration should consider developing a more systematic approach, strategically matching U.S. and FVEY partners’ expertise and facilities.
The 2021 CSIS report, Reinventing and Reimagining Intelligence, provided several recommendations for the IC to increase its collaboration with FVEY on joint innovation, sharing of algorithms and data, real-time intelligence sharing, and joint development of technologies.31 These could include the development of talent pools and engagement with commercial entities to tap global expertise and technologies.
WAYS FOR THE IC TO ENHANCE ITS ACCESS TO, AND AWARENESS OF, INTERNATIONAL S&T
There are numerous ways for the IC to enhance its awareness of, and access to, the global S&T landscape. These involve both enhanced direct engagement and indirect engagement. Some options available to the IC include directly participating in research projects with foreign allies and partners, including FVEY and NATO, Federal agencies conducting collaborative international research, foreign universities, and multinational companies. As noted in Chapter 2, several national strategy documents note the force multiplier effect of working with allies and partners.
The committee recognizes that international engagement poses both opportunities and risks for the IC. There is increasing concern about Chinese talent recruitment programs, which encourage scientists based outside China to form affiliations with, or to take positions with, Chinese research institutions, often while concealing their participation.32 In addition, some countries engage in unlawful or unethical activities in order to gain unauthorized access to U.S. technology and intellectual property. Numerous lines of effort are under way to address these concerns, including the January 2021 issuance of National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM)-33, and a January 2021 report from the National Science and Technology Council.33 These documents prescribe research security and integrity requirements for federal agencies and researchers receiving federal funding, including disclosure of participation in foreign talent recruitment programs; other funding sources; conflicts-of-commitment; and conflicts-of-interest and research security training. In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2021 contains provisions requiring federal agencies to implement disclosure requirements for grantees on all sources of research funding support.
In recognition of the benefits of leveraging the S&T expertise of allies, the National Intelligence Strategy encourages the IC to cooperate with international partners and allies.34 In its report, “Rightly Scaled, Carefully Open, Infinitely Agile: Reconfiguring to Win the Innovation Race in the Intelligence Community,” the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Strategic Technologies and Advance Research Subcommittee35 recommended that the IC continue to use foreign intelligence relationships as a force multiplier in developing emerging technologies and engage in greater scientific and technological R&D collaboration with the FVEY, NATO, and allies. The study committee believes that, although proposed collaborative activities should be examined closely
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30 National Academies staff interviews with IC S&T managers between March 19 and June 12, 2021.
31 CSIS, 2021, Maintaining the Intelligence Edge, p. 32.
32 U.S. Senate, 2019, Threats to U.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment Plans, Staff Report, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, November 19, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2019-11-18%20PSI%20Staff%20Report%20-%20China’s%20Talent%20Recruitment%20Plans.pdf.
33 U.S. National Science and Technology Council, 2021, Recommended Practices for Strengthening the Security and Integrity of America’s Science and Technology Research Enterprise, Joint Committee on the Research Environment, Washington, DC: Office of Science and Technology Policy.
34 See ODNI, 2019, National Intelligence Strategy, p. 4.
35 U.S. House of Representatives House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 2020, “Rightly Scaled, Carefully Open, Infinitely Agile: Reconfiguring to Win the Innovation Race in the Intelligence Community,” Washington, DC, October, p. 31.
and individually to make sure that the benefits outweigh the risks, on balance, the IC would likely benefit from enhanced engagements with like-minded allies and partners and the global S&T community.
In some cases, it will be better for the IC to work with its foreign intelligence and security counterparts with whom it may have trusted relationships, and not engage directly outside its international partners. A more public face, however, would enable the IC to increase engagement in open global R&D activities. Many of today’s technologies of interest are widely available to individuals, organizations, and countries beyond the United States, creating a more equitable arena for engagement, and less need for secrecy.
In addition, active participation in collaborative R&D projects would enable the IC to participate in “communities of discovery,” a paradigm in which scientists from government, industry, non-profits, or academia form open collaborations that share knowledge and coordinate resources to advance scientific discoveries of collective interest.36 The IC’s active participation in research collaboration of this sort would give it a seat at the table, gaining access and insight into scientific discoveries and technologies from the outset, rather than waiting until research or project results are shared publicly with non-participants.
Overall, a more systematic approach to evaluate capability gaps and to evaluate how FVEY, NATO, and other multilateral and bilateral R&D partnerships could fill them, would enable both the United States and our partners to leverage comparative advantages in S&T. Based on its interviews and workshops, the study committee makes the following recommendation for how the IC could increase the benefits it gains from international S&T.
RECOMMENDATION 5.2: The Intelligence Community (IC) should increase its interactions with FVEY (Five Eyes, the intelligence partnership among the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand) and other allies through four steps:
- Create a more systemic approach to cooperation, which could include having the chief technology and innovation officer develop a multi-year allied science and technology cooperation plan.
- Set aside funding for international cooperative activities (e.g., personnel exchanges, joint research and development).
- Support travel abroad to deepen foreign partnerships and build trusted relationships.
- Develop common talent pools and facilitate commercial cooperation opportunities.
More funding for these activities would incentivize and enhance collaboration with FVEY members and other allies. The CTIO office proposed in Recommendation 2.1 should include an international S&T position that reports to the CTIO. The international officer could coordinate, leverage, and integrate international activities across the IC, make international S&T a higher priority, and implement a more systematic approach to cooperation with the FVEY and other allies.
INCREASED USE OF INTERNATIONAL OPEN-SOURCE INFORMATION
Proliferating sensors and big data are generating increasing amounts of open-source information that can be leveraged more by the IC community and integrated with information from classified sources. The enormous quantity of open-source data from numerous sources creates challenges for IC analysts. It has been challenging to take technical advances achieved in unclassified channels and apply them to the same effect with classified data sources. This includes fusing unclassified and classified information into a single intelligence product.
Open-source intelligence and AI tools are also potential areas for increased engagement with the FVEY, NATO and like-minded partners. One indication of the magnitude of the task of analyzing global open-source information on S&T is that China reportedly has devoted some 60,000 to 100,000 analysts to this mission.37 It is true that
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36 IBM Research, 2021, “IBM Science and Technology Outlook 2021,” January, https://www.research.ibm.com/downloads/ces_2021/IBM-Research_STO_2021_Whitepaper.pdf, p. 19.
37 W.C. Hannas and Huey-Meei Chang, 2021, China’s STI Operations: Monitoring Foreign Science and Technology Through Open Sources, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Center for Security and Emerging Technologies, January, pp. 11, 17.
Chinese needs for open-source S&T information are different from those of the United States and its Five Eyes partners, and this model is not necessarily one that the United States should emulate. But it does indicate the scale of the open-source S&T information that China is interested in understanding.
It would be beneficial to work on open-source reporting on S&T globally as a collection priority across FVEY, NATO and like-minded partners. The IC could benefit from leveraging our allies’ expertise in integrating these sources, in addition to their particular areas of expertise and their foreign language capabilities. The IC could also potentially benefit by learning about our allies’ experience with application of AI tools and techniques for open-source information analysis, including use of data and algorithms to determine the credibility and reliability of open-source information to identify and assess the impact of foreign disinformation campaigns.
Two IARPA forecasting programs and subsequent work at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) could also serve as models for leveraging global open-source information to obtain S&T foresight. IARPA conducted the Forecasting and Understanding from Scientific Exposition (FUSE) program between 2011 and 2017. FUSE conducted searches on open science literature in English and Chinese, as well as patent information, for early detection of technology trends and new technical capabilities to avoid technological surprise.38 IARPA’s Forecasting Science and Technology (ForeST) Program, conducted between 2014 and 2016, used crowd sourcing (“Wisdom of the Crowd”) to forecast S&T milestones.39 ForeST established the accuracy of crowd forecasting on well-defined questions.40 Building on the work of FUSE and ForeST, CSET developed the Foretell Program based on open literature and patent information. Foretell is designed to identify what fundamental S&T innovations are moving quickly that merit attention from policy makers because they are performance changers, have the capability to be disruptive, or represent significant advancements.41 Initially focused on AI, Foretell has focused to date on identifying which basic science AI-related areas will become emerging technologies, the relevant interest community, and in which areas the United States and allies have an advantage over China.42
The quantity, speed, and scope of available global open-source information on new developments and trends in S&T is vast. Obtaining situational awareness of significant and rapidly moving S&T developments and innovations across the globe and across scientific fields will require a concerted effort at a dedicated operations facility, appropriate platforms, relevant analytical and data expertise, and significant resources. As one high-ranking official at NATO Headquarters observed, this increased digital footprint requires transformations in both digital infrastructure and capabilities.43
The IC itself may not be the best place to house such an open-source facility, given legal and policy limitations on its ability to collect domestic information and the fact that its deepest expertise is in the collection of classified rather than open-source information. Options include the establishment of a center, institute, or consortium at a non-profit or academic institution to perform this operational function. Another option is to create a center operated by a combination of non-IC and IC agencies. One potential model is the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which produces analysis, maintains the authoritative database, shares information, and conducts strategic operational planning, notwithstanding considerable differences among its member IC and non-IC agencies in their counterterrorism authorities.
RECOMMENDATION 5.3: The Intelligence Community (IC) should work to establish a center (e.g., a nonprofit or at a federally funded research and development center or university affiliated research center) operated
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38 Dewey Murdick, CSET, presentation at June 9, 2021, workshop, documented in Appendix B. See also Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Fuse,” Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/research-programs/fuse, accessed August 7, 2022.
39 Dewey Murdick, CSET, presentation at June 9, 2021, workshop, documented in Appendix B. See also Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Forest,” Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/research-programs/forest, accessed August 7, 2022.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 M. Page, C. Aiken, and D. Murdick, 2020, Future Indices, Washington, DC: Center for Security and Emerging Technologies, Georgetown University, October 19, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/future-indices.
43 Jeffrey Reynolds, Operations Research Officer, NATO Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command Transformation, e-mail, and telecom, June 15, 2021.
external to the IC, focused on open-source science and technology (S&T) information collection. This center should take full advantage of collection opportunities, through a presence at international symposia, where potential competitors display their state-of-the-art efforts in mission-critical areas, such as semiconductors, information technology, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, quantum computing/sensing, biotechnology, and other emergent fields of S&T.
The committee also finds merit in the Intelligence Edge CSIS report’s recommendation that line officers be empowered to directly liaise with IC open-source experts on foreign S&T.44 Of relevance is the fact that NATO’s Allied Command Transformation is currently working on building its capabilities in open-source intelligence. NATO has encountered some of the same challenges as the FVEYs in establishing an international open-source system given the different laws and policies among the NATO partners regarding permissible access and use of open-source information. The IC and NATO could benefit from exchanging experiences and strategies.
Open-source intelligence is well placed to monitor research and innovation produced in the open by academics and in companies which publish and oftentimes promote their breakthroughs. However, much new R&D and innovation still occurs in secret, particularly in authoritarian countries like China and Russia. Given this, the IC must increase its collection of S&TI through clandestine means. The CSIS report also notes this and provides specific recommendations for improvements in doing this, such as increasing integration and support of collection on S&TI issues through new recruiting, training, and office integration. The study committee agrees with this CSIS report recommendation. Beyond this, closer interaction with other U.S. government agencies, as is now being done in collaboration with ONR and AFOSR, could improve timely awareness of adversary trends in S&T that are not part of general and open communication among the global S&T community.
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44 CSIS, 2021, Maintaining the Intelligence Edge, p. 16.
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