Consensus Study Report
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International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-309-68845-1
International Standard Book Number-IO: 0-309-68845-0
Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.17226/26558
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Suggested citation: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2023. Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Monitoring, Detection, and Verification: A National Security Priority: Summary of the Final Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/26558.
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COMMITTEE ON THE REVIEW OF CAPABILITIES FOR DETECTION, VERIFICATION, AND MONITORING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FISSILE MATERIAL
Sallie Ann Keller, chair, University of Virginia, Charlottesville
Andrew G. Alleyne, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis
Charles M. Craft, Sandia National Laboratories (retired)
*Joseph DeTrani, (until May 2021), Independent Consultant
Mona Dreicer, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (retired)
*Corey Hinderstein, (vice chair/chair until August 2021), Nuclear Threat Initiative
*Jill Hruby, (chair until May 2021), Sandia National Laboratories (retired)
*Annie B. Kersting, (until August 2021), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
*Thorne Lay, (until August 2021), University of California, Santa Cruz
Keith J. Masback, Plum Run, LLC
Chris A. Pickett, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (retired)
Dean A. Souleles, (since July 2021), Ginsoko Consulting
William H. Tobey, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Terry C. Wallace, Jr., (since September 2021), Los Alamos National Laboratory (retired)
Ned Wogman, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (retired)
* Note: these members resigned from the committee prior to the second phase of the study due to time/travel constraints and/or new affiliations.
Study Staff
Marie C. Kirkegaard, Study Co-Director
Benjamin Rusek, Study Co-Director
Micah Lowenthal, Director, Committee on International Security and Arms Control
Charles Ferguson, Director, Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board
Hope Hare, Administrative Assistant
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Acknowledgment of Reviewers
The Consensus Study Report was reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine in making each published report as sound as possible and to ensure that it meets the institutional standards for quality, objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process.
We thank the following individuals for their review of this report:
Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Alton Romig (NAE Executive Officer, Lockheed Martin [retired]). He was responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with the standards of the National Academies and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content rests entirely with the authoring committee and the National Academies.
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PREFACE
This report is a summary of the final report of the Committee on the Review of Capabilities for Detection, Verification, and Monitoring of Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the committee addressed the congressionally mandated statement of task in two phases. The first phase, conducted entirely virtually due to pandemic-related restrictions on travel and access to classified information, resulted in an extensive interim report.1 This interim report addressed much of the statement of task, exploring national and international monitoring, detection, and verification (MDV) capabilities and priorities, and issuing important findings and recommendations that the committee reaffirms in this final report. However, some topics, such as the organization of the mission within the executive branch; some specific MDV capabilities, priorities, and gaps; and the role of the intelligence community across the MDV mission, could not be addressed in the interim report. The committee was also unable to visit key government sites during the first phase of the study to observe operational and research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) elements of the MDV mission.
The committee began the second phase of this project in August 2021. The composition of the committee and its leadership changed between the two phases. Five members of the original committee stepped down from the committee for the second phase due to time/travel constraints and/or new affiliations, including the original committee chair, Jill Hruby, and original committee vice-chair (and briefly committee co-chair) Corey Hinderstein, who were nominated and confirmed to serve as the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Administrator and NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, respectively. Two new committee members were appointed to ensure that the committee maintained appropriate expertise and balance to carry out the second phase of the study. In this second phase, the committee was able to meet in-person for the first time to have classified discussions and receive classified briefings from key government entities. In addition, committee members were able to visit several important MDV operational and RDT&E sites to better understand the entirety of the MDV enterprise and the challenges facing those carrying out the daily MDV mission and conducting RDT&E to support the mission. COVID-19 continued to present a challenge throughout this phase of the study, forcing the committee to reschedule multiple meetings and site visits or to conduct them via secure videoconferencing. The result of the second phase, a final report that reaffirms and complements the interim report, was completed in June 2022 and finalized with classification markings in January 2023. The committee was able to complete the final report (and this public summary of the final report) due to the commitment of its members and project staff with essential support from federal public servants and experts across the nuclear security enterprise. NNSA, and
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1 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2021. Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Monitoring, Detection, and Verification: A National Security Priority: Interim Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: https://doi.org/10.17226/26088.
David LaGraffe in particular, assisted immensely with navigating the complex and extensive requirements of the study and security review of the final report and summary.
A robust, well-funded, and future-oriented capability to monitor, detect, and verify nuclear proliferation activities is critical to the national security of the United States and its allies. The committee stressed in the interim report and reinforced in the final report that the MDV mission must be a higher national priority with more support and attention than it currently receives. The committee is thus encouraged to see that many of the findings and recommendations from the interim report have gained traction within the MDV enterprise and in Congress. For example, the committee notes that the enterprise has recently increased focus and funding on ensuring future arms control MDV capabilities, and that Congress has expressed interest in the expansion of the MDV test bed program. The committee hopes that its final report will provide additional guidance and further reinvigorate attention to the MDV mission, and that its findings and recommendations will be reviewed and acted on promptly to achieve a sustained and prioritized MDV program that stewards and improves capabilities, meets future capabilities needs, and minimizes surprise.
Sallie Ann Keller, Committee Chair
CONTENTS
2 GOVERNANCE OF THE MDV ENTERPRISE
MDV Policy, Operations, and RDT&E Integration
Stewardship of MDV Capabilities
Increasing MDV RDT&E Efficacy and Innovation
3 TECHNICAL MDV CAPABILITIES AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
MDV for the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
MDV for Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions
Leveraging Data for the MDV Mission
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