3

Committee’s Conclusions and Recommendations

Recent events around the globe, such as the killing of George Floyd by a police officer in the United States, the abuses of Nigeria’s Special Anti-Robbery Squad, violent repression of protests in Colombia, and unprecedented numbers of police killings in Rio de Janeiro have piqued public concern about police use-of-force practices, policies, and controls. Injury and death from use of excessive force by police officers in the task of upholding the rule of law (ROL) and other objectives of the state have been viewed by many as human rights violations. Thus, the committee was asked to examine the policies and practices for police use of force that effectively promote the ROL and protect the population in the international context.

Protecting human rights in the course of policing need not be an obstacle to reducing crime. Rather, the protection of human rights is foundational for promoting the ROL and fairness in the application of the law. Unfortunately, research has shown that communities and populations, particularly (but not exclusively) in the Global South,¹ often see agressive use of force by police as a necessity to reduce the level of violence and control criminals (Americas Barometer, 2019; Bailey et al., 2013; Flores-Macias and Zarkin, 2021). This perceived public support can be used to justify encouraging a scale of force that may lead to an increase of police encounters with killings of citizens, continued violence, as well as severe restrictions on appropriate justice and community safety.

___________________

¹ The committee uses the term “Global South” to refer to low- to middle-income countries most likely to receive assistance from the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). “Global North” refers to developed countries, notably the United States and the United Kingdom, and includes Australia despite its geographic location.

Efforts to incorporate human rights principles into police reforms have been challenging. Research studies have observed real backlash and other unintended consequences of such attempts, including increased vigilantism and extrajudicial violence (Hanson and Kronick, forthcoming). Such concerning outcomes suggest that interventions aimed at minimizing police use of force may need to be accompanied by the adoption of evidence-based strategies to promote crime reduction. This may be particularly true where aggressive and even indiscriminate displays of force have historically been central to police operations.

Historical reviews of police reforms indicate that a multipronged approach, with mechanisms both internal and external to police agencies, are promising. The committee encourages consideration and implementation of nested layers of policies, practices, and accountability mechanisms for tracking, monitoring, and disciplining police use of force, and training officers on when to use force legally and how to do so with great constraint. Given the current state of global policing and the variations in how physical force and weapons are used in different contexts, in many respects reform efforts are going to be “building the airplane as it is flying.” While there are notable differences across contexts, several countries seem to have similarities, including gaps in record-keeping, policy compliance, and supervision and accountability infrastructure. As such, data collection is critical to track progress, measure outcomes, and support rigorous research efforts.

In this chapter, the committee calls attention to multiple elements that, if supported by international donor organizations, would improve the knowledge available on incidents of use of excessive force and their prevention. These include guidance for improving the tracking, monitoring, and supervision of officer use of force and identifying effective interventions aimed at reducing police use of force. This chapter highlights the committee’s significant findings (observations based on facts and research results), conclusions (expert judgments about the findings), and recommendations (calls for action or change) regarding data collection and use-of-force policies, training, oversight, and supervision.

DATA NEEDS

The current state of research on police use of force is crippled by a lack of reliable tracking and data collected on even lethal uses of force, let alone nonlethal force. Diverse definitions of “excessive” force, as well as the wide range of injuries and rights violations, create complexities that few nations have been able to track with precision. Even a reliable, official annual count of people killed in police interactions is generally unavailable across the Global South. Notably, standardized national data on police use of force are also absent in the United States (Shane, 2018). One of the

most critical government actions required to control the use of force is to develop, resource, and institutionalize a reliable, transparent, and consistent system of recording civilian deaths by police. Failure to do so creates a prima facie threat to the ROL.

Establishing good practices for ongoing and systematic measurement is essential to provide the necessary information for public policy, to identify and control problem areas before they reach crisis levels, and to achieve continuous improvements. The same can be said about establishing a measurement system to restore a failing institution; it enables the identification of problems and potential solutions. The quality and reliability of recorded data are critical, and with a plan in place and the appropriate allocation of resources, data collection is not a significant burden on officers or institutions. While the need for measurement is recognized across the police and justice reform communities, developing specific measurements that are relevant, collectible, and elucidating is a significant challenge. In addition to commonly collected data such as training outcomes, periodic comparison of official records to independently generated estimates should be part of a measurement system. For example, journalistic accounts can potentially identify under- (or over-) reporting in official records. This has been the case in the United States, where the Washington Post, for the last six years, has counted every fatal shooting by an on-duty police officer in the country through crowdsourced information derived from news accounts, social media posts, and police reports (Tate et al., 2022).

Through funding mechanisms, international donor organizations are uniquely positioned to encourage implementing partners to collect standardized information about force used by officers in the field. This type of data

collection could occur within existing police reform programs, or it could be accomplished as a new program designed to test strategies to collect accurate data. In addition to clarifying the physical aspects of force (e.g., the discharge of a firearm, physical attack with a close-fisted strike, etc.), data collection needs to be sufficient to estimate the likelihood that any force used was proportional to a reasonable assessment of the immediate threat.

This standardized data collection is necessary for tracking the progress of reform efforts and having the information necessary to make adjustments. It is also necessary to further develop an evidence base from which a scientific consensus can be built, concerning how policy or training can reduce the frequency of force that degrades the ROL.

The sufficiency of data collection and analysis is best determined by researchers with expertise in multiple ways of capturing data on

police–citizen interactions and in rigorous approaches to collecting, recording, and analyzing the data. International donor organizations could consider including this stipulation to work with scientists on data collection and impact assessments in contracts, grants, and agreements.

One example of how the necessary data could be constructed, in a way that is both informative from a scientific perspective and less likely to impose an undue burden on law enforcement agencies, would be to include a checklist of types of physical engagement used by an officer, as well as the behavior and posed threats of the citizens involved, that could be filled out in conjunction with the reporting of an arrest. While this would not capture the universe of all force used, such a requirement adds a small amount of paperwork to what is (in many cases) an existing form most officers complete, rather than the creation of an entirely new administrative task for the officer. This also would allow for a linkage between the type and frequency of force used by type of crime, allowing for an assessment of proportionality.

Finally, the committee notes that there is some evidence (a pre-post comparison) from Sao Paulo and Dallas that instructing officers to collect data on force, and using the frequency of force used by all officers in a division as an internal metric to evaluate command staff, may itself be an effective strategy to reduce police violence (Cano, 2021). The need to fill in a detailed report has, in some cases, served as a warning that use of force is meant to be an exceptional measure and subject to scrutiny.

In an ideal world, every incident when a police officer uses force, however minor, could be recorded and analyzed. However, it can be difficult to achieve this goal without dedicated resources and effort, even in the context of developed democracies. The committee has developed a shortlist of priority data: counts of people (both civilians and police) who die during police encounters; counts of people shot (both citizens and police) in police encounters; and counts of deaths in police custody. These counts should be supplemented with data on demographics of persons killed or injured, nature of crime or disorder for the police intervention, time of day, location, and nature of death or injury.² While it is possible to measure other things, nothing is more important than the number of people who die during police encounters.

In developing a data infrastructure, stakeholders need to consider who and what institutions will be involved in collecting and verifying the data and ensuring quality control. Appropriate incentive structures are also

___________________

² See Dallas Police Department website for an example of publicly reported data for on-duty officer involved shootings (https://dallaspolice.net/ois/ois). The Police Data Initiative also catalogues available use of force datasets for agencies in the United States (https://www.policedatainitiative.org/datasets/use-of-force/).

important to encourage accurate data collection. Unintended consequences need to be considered, particularly when incentives (e.g., bonuses, promotions) encourage false reporting. Multiple independent systems for collecting and publishing data on police use of force can serve as checks for other systems. For example, in the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) maintains the National Violent Death Reporting System, which tracks data including fatalities resulting from the use of force by officers on duty. A 2016 comparison found that the National Violent Death Reporting System provides more complete data on deaths in police encounters than existing systems, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Supplementary Homicide Reports, the CDC’s National Vital Statistics System, and the Bureau of Justice Statistics Arrest-Related Deaths Program, all of which have issues with serious underreporting of these deaths (Barber et al., 2016; Loftin et al., 2003; Shields and Ward, 2008).

As discussed in the committee’s second report (NASEM, 2022), to report data accurately, police officers will need the skills to understand basic crime information and trends and appreciate how the data collected and analyzed can be used to improve policing operations, safeguard their role as guardians, and protect the communities they serve.

The committee recognizes that capabilities and resources will vary across different countries. For example, some police stations are without computers or even electricity. While many places will have in-house tools and resources, or be able to leverage the Internet for crowdsourced information, some places will have to launch their data infrastructure with rudimentary tools. In either case, the goal is the same: to develop a measurement system to routinely and accurately count incidents to effectively measure and manage police use of force. There are likely various methods of counting fatalities by police across and within countries. A comparison of methods across countries in the Global South could be conducted to determine the extent to which there are multiple ways of measuring people killed by the police, how they compare, and which methods—of collection and verification—lead to more consistent counts.

USE OF FORCE POLICIES

Given the information presented to it, the committee finds that laws and policies on police use of force in many countries fall short of incorporating tenets of international human rights standards (Flores, 2021). There is much room for improvement in translating international human rights standards to national laws and police policies at the organizational level. This is true in both the Global North and the Global South. However, we recognize that legal or policy compliance with international standards is neither necessary nor sufficient for police actions to be consistent with the

ROL. Nonetheless, they can serve as powerful frameworks to guide police reform and use of force policies and practices.

In almost all policing contexts, police have written directives from the government and/or agency itself on when, how, and under what circumstances lethal force can be used. From the studies and cases shared at the workshop, the committee determined that use of force policies serve three critical purposes:

1. Informative: Policies provide a mechanism for educating and reeducating police officers on what is directed and permissible under law and what are the expected considerations for deciding whether a use of force is appropriate. Having clear, documented policies on use of force can increase the likelihood that officers have accurate information about when force is appropriate and lawful.
2. Administrative: Policies can disincentivize the use of force, through both carrots and sticks, particularly the use of force that exceeds the minimum amount necessary to establish control over a situation.
3. Restrictive: Policies can prohibit the use of force in certain situations (e.g., curbing shots on fleeing suspects who pose no threat to other individuals).

Policies on police use of force are an important part of layered efforts to reduce the occurrence of excessive force. It is fundamental to promoting the ROL and protecting the population to have policies that are clear, impartially enforced, aligned to local laws and international human rights standards, inclusive of mechanisms for civilian oversight, and regularly communicated to police officers through ongoing training opportunities.

TRAINING FOR POLICE OFFICERS

It almost goes without saying that training (both formal and informal, both in classroom and on the job) is a critical component of efforts to control and restrain police use of force. However, open questions revolve around what content should be delivered, how, and with what frequency. In

its second report (NASEM, 2022), the committee offered that incorporating empirical facts about and well-accepted theories of crime and victimization into training can provide the foundational knowledge police officers need to make more informed decisions about managing crime, offenders, and victims. The committee concludes that these facts and theories not only form the building blocks of police strategies that are now known to be effective at reducing crime but can also inform policies, strategies, and everyday police actions that better protect the public from harm.

Research is just beginning to examine the consequences (positive or negative) of training designed for other purposes on police use of force. Much existing research regarding use of force has focused on training that was specifically aimed at reducing use of force that might be excessive, often in response to significant events of police misconduct and public complaints. This type of training has centered on developing procedural justice and de-escalation skills, and/or educating officers on human rights documents and principles. Other trainings have focused on how to use force in a non-lethal manner.

Although such evaluations of attitudes are relevant, it is not known whether the expression of different attitudes by police officers, in a context where social desirability may lead them to do so, ultimately affects the way they behave in the field. Numerous scholars have noted that informal socialization and police (sub)cultures are at least as important as formal training in determining police behavior, including with respect to the use of force (Belur, 2010; Chan, 2000). This issue also has been noted previously by the National Academies (NASEM, 2018). The continued resistance of policing agencies to linking training and officer actions is detrimental to improving practice and building credible police science.

Ideally, impact evaluation of such training would monitor incidents of use of force by officers over time to compare the results among those who took the training with the results among those who did not. Such evaluations can be expensive and time-consuming and require the full cooperation of the law enforcement institution involved. That said, dedicating more time and resources to this critical topic is a vital first step in reducing the use of excessive force.

Moreover, studies that attempt to replicate existing evaluations of police training are needed, as the existing evidence base for any particular training programs is limited to studies of individual jurisdictions. Replication is important for knowledge accumulation and to improve confidence in the generalizability of the findings. Further, most existing evaluations of training programs have evaluated those that involve one or two days of training. Best practices for adult learning in training from other fields suggest that high-repetition training over more prolonged periods is important for both retention and understanding (Ericsson, 2004; Ericsson and Ward, 2007).

OVERSIGHT AND SUPERVISION

Chapter 2 discussed different accountability measures to monitor and restrain police use of force: external oversight bodies, internal control mechanisms, technological innovations to prevent abuses of power, and administrative incentives. The committee views accountability systems as critical to the control of police use of force. It recognizes that contextual factors will affect the success of accountability measures and encourages continuous, systematic assessment across time to track outcomes and unintended consequences and adjust policies and practices as warranted. It also supports mechanisms to engage the public in providing oversight to police use of force. Members of the public need to be able to report and file complaints against officers or entire agencies, preferably to an independent investigating body (NASEM, 2021).

Controlling the use of force requires not only normative approaches through law and guidelines, but mechanisms that support the implementation of use-of-force policies, practices, and normative ideals. While regular reports and information collected through technologies may assist in recording and monitoring uses of force, these systems need layers of active supervision that not only mentor officers and aim to correct poor behavior, but also track, report, and provide discipline to officers who violate norms, laws, policies, procedures, and training. As discussed in the committee’s

second report (NASEM, 2022), direct supervisors need training, resources, and institutional support to achieve these goals.

External mechanisms or oversight boards have been instituted or considered in many countries to address deficiencies with internal investigations and discipline and to improve public transparency. There is much variation in how such boards operate, and many studies attribute any shortcomings to the lack of proper investigatory powers, political support, human and financial resources, powers of recommendation and followup, and financial and operational independence separate from police and government officials required to carry out truly effective oversight. There is not yet a body of empirical evidence to support the effectiveness of external monitoring bodies to minimize police use of force.