3

Project Management and Contracting

INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses the first element (i.e., Task Element A) of the task statement for this study (see Box 1.1 in Chapter 1) to

The committee provides two additional findings and four additional recommendations in this chapter to address this task element. These findings and recommendations are focused on the following topics:

• End-state contracting
• Order 413.3B
• Technology innovation

END-STATE CONTRACTING

The committee’s view of outcomes-based end-state contracting is discussed in Annex 3.A.

• It does not require that cleanup end states covering the full contract period be defined, as contrasted with the completion contracts that led to the successful cleanups of the Rocky Flats and Fernald sites (see Annex 3.A).
• The 10-year contract lengths, with possible extensions, locks DOE-EM into particular contractors and allows them to play a central role in defining task orders post-award, thereby limiting opportunities for competition, inclusion of new entrants into the DOE-EM contractor community, and injection of new ideas into the cleanup program.
• The contract cost ceilings imply annual funding levels that are significantly higher than historical experience, resulting in inefficiencies in contract execution if higher annual funding levels are not achieved.
• Task order scopes of work are established after contract award, limiting incentives for technology and business model innovations in incumbent contractor proposals.
• The existence of multiple task orders poses increased demands on DOE contract managers to ensure program and project effectiveness and increase the complexity of maintaining alignment to achieve end-state outcomes and objectives.

According to DOE-EM, “the ESCM drives better results by establishing a work scope that combines accelerated cleanup with significant reductions in both environmental risk and financial liability, while simultaneously fairly sharing risk between the contractor and government” (DOE, 2020, p. 1). The model uses a two-step contract award process. The first step results in a single-award indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract to cover a broad statement of the scope of work. The contracts awarded under the ESCM include a 10-year ordering period with the ability to issue task orders that span an additional 5 years of performance for a potential total of up to 15 years of performance. The second step involves the development and issuance of task orders to achieve identified work scopes. The task orders, which can be firm fixed price or cost reimbursement, collectively progress toward the broad objectives of the IDIQ.

To date, DOE has awarded IDIQ end-state contracts at the Hanford, Idaho, Moab, Nevada, Oak Ridge, and Savannah River sites. A draft request for proposal (RFP) for an end-state contract has also been issued at the Portsmouth site. These contracts have a collective ceiling of almost $98 billion (see Table 3.1). The committee’s estimates of annualized cost ceilings in Table 3.1 is based on the 10-year order period established in the various end-state contracts.

The ESCM is the latest in a series of efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the DOE-EM contracting process. The DOE report Making Contracting Work Better and Cost Less (DOE, 1994) was the initial vision for a performance-based contracting approach that incentivizes contractor execution and completion of work with clearly established performance expectations. This vision was substantially achieved in the completion contracts for cleanups of the Rocky Flats and Fernald sites, which began in the early 2000s. These projects had strong management cultures that emphasized the following:¹

• A clear vision of what site closure looked like and that allowed for a clear and comprehensive scope of work.
• A commitment of intensity to “get it done.”
• Empowerment and flexibility to encourage contractor innovation.
• Performance based accountability.

The Rocky Flats Closure Legacy Report (DOE, 2006, p. 1-15) noted

___________________

¹ See L. Martinez, 2020, “Rocky Flats Contract Model,” presentation to the committee, February 24, available from the National Academies Public Access Records Office.

In early 1995, DOE estimated that cleaning up Rocky Flats would take approximately 65 years and cost more than $37 billion. When complete in 2005, the project cost $10 billion and took 11 years.²

The Phase 1 report (NASEM, 2021) highlighted the substantive achievements of the closure contracts that enabled the Rocky Flats and Fernald cleanups. Unfortunately, the principles that guided these cleanups and helped to create the necessary management culture to successfully complete them are not found in the ESCM. The model’s use of IDIQ contracts does not support the degree of program management responsibility and risk transfer to the private sector that the committee judges is necessary to achieve success. DOE-EM’s current implementation of the ESCM creates a low-risk, low-innovation environment for the prime contractor and limited incentives to achieve completion of well-defined intermediate end states linked to the overall site cleanup and closure.

The committee noted these limitations in its Phase 1 report (NASEM, 2021, p. 11):

Finding A-1 identifies several problems with the ESCM as it is currently being implemented by DOE-EM:

• The ESCM does not require that cleanup end states be defined for the full contract, as contrasted with the completion contracts that led to the successful cleanups of the Rocky Flats and Fernald sites. Although final cleanup end states at sites are generally well understood and embodied in estimates of total liability,³ meaningful program plans with well-defined intermediate end states are lacking. This limits the ability to clearly link end-state cleanup and closure contracts to well-defined contract objectives and outcomes. Put simply, the absence of intermediate end-state definitions translates into a lack of clarity in program scope,

___________________

² Department of Energy, 2020, “Fact Sheet: Rocky Flats Site, Colorado,” June, https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2020/06/f75/RockyFlatsFactSheet.pdf.

³ Defined broadly as our nation’s financial obligation to clean up the former nuclear weapons complex to meet applicable environmental standards and regulations.

• which is further obscured by the use of IDIQ contracts that measure success through execution of individual pieces of work. Measuring progress toward an end-state in an IDIQ contract with multiple task orders necessitates setting metrics at the outset of the draw period aiming toward a defined end state (or intermediate end state) that will have been reached at the completion of the task orders.
•    DOE-EM appears to be taking steps to address this concern. Its recently issued end-state contracting plan,⁴ which was provided to the committee just as this report was being finalized for review (see Chapter 1 of this report), states that “Each contract will incentivize the contractor to achieve a stated outcome, or ‘end state’ with defined completion criteria, for the end of the contract.” The committee did not have the opportunity to be briefed on this plan by DOE-EM to understand how end states would be defined and how they would be applied to already issued end-state contracts (see Table 3.1).
• The 10-year contract lengths, with possible extensions, locks DOE-EM into particular contractors and allows them to play a central role in defining task orders post-award, thereby limiting opportunities for competition, inclusion of new entrants into the DOE-EM contractor community, and injection of new ideas into the cleanup program. The IDIQ contract structure is intended to encourage multiple contractors to be pre-qualified to bid on individual task orders. Under the ESCM, however, task orders are being issued solely to incumbent contractors. Moreover, the committee observed that new ESCM contracts are being let to the same suite of contractors who have historically supported the DOE-EM program under prior contract models, in some cases dating back to the management and operating contracts employed in the program’s early days. New entrants, including small businesses, are not benefitting under this contracting model.⁵
•    Fostering competition and encouraging the use of small businesses are defined objectives in the DOE-EM cleanup program. The committee saw limited evidence that these objectives were being met or even encouraged under the ESCM.

___________________

⁴ Department of Energy, 2020, “Policy Directive: End State Contracting Model Program Plan,” https://www.emcbc.doe.gov/SEB/em_escm/Documents/Document%20Library/EM%20Policy%20Directive%20for%20the%20ESCM%20Program%20Plan.pdf.

⁵ See Tri-Cities Washington, 2021, Letter to Acting Secretary Huizenga, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55c4c892e4b0d1ec35bc5efb/t/6026a68165b09f586ff1a0b7/1613145729879/02.10.2021+-+Tri-City+Community+Letter+re.+Hanford+Small+Business+Subcontracting.pdf; Energy Communities Alliance, 2021, Letter to Acting Assistant Secretary White, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55c4c892e4b0d1ec35bc5efb/t/6026a6a09fbe7f2adbe9d1b5/1613145760953/ECA+Letter+on+Negative+Impacts+of+EM+Contracting+on+Small+Businesses+at+Hanford+%28002%29+%28002%29.pdf.

•    Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR⁶) expresses a preference for multiple contract awards unless one or more of six specific factors are identified, which provide a basis for exceptions to the traditional IDIQ acquisition strategy. DOE-EM provided no documentation to the committee as to which of the six factors were used as the basis for the EM determination, nor was the committee able to obtain specific documentation from its virtual site visits on any individual end-state contract.
• The contract cost ceilings are set at levels significantly higher than current annual funding levels, providing no effective cost control or accountability, and possibly leading to inefficiencies in contract execution if annual funding levels do not keep pace with future cost adjustments. The cost ceilings for IDIQ contracts awarded to date are approximately $98 billion, or $9.8 billion per year on average over their 10-year draw periods (see Table 3.1, columns 3 and 4). The funding allocated to these contracts in fiscal year 2021 was approximately $5.8 billion—$4.0 billion less than the 10-year average (see Table 3.1, columns 5 and 6). High cost ceilings allow DOE-EM contract managers broad flexibility to increase the size of task orders to allow scope creep, cost growth, or both without the more rigorous discipline that would accompany a tighter cost ceiling. Moreover, if DOE-EM fails to obtain increased annual funding levels to keep pace with upward cost adjustments, even if permissible within the contract cost ceiling, the funding shortfall could lead to schedule slippage or inefficient work execution. These issues were identified by DOE-EM staff, who indicated that the contract cost ceilings were set in some instances to cover a period of up to 15 years (the 10-year order period plus a possible extension of up to 5 additional years). However, the description of the end states, to the extent they were defined (see Table 3.1 for examples) apply to the end of the 10-year order period, creating an inconsistency between cost ceilings and projected end states. The committee further notes that both the described end states, as well as the contract cost ceilings, are not explicitly correlated with DOE-EM’s 2022-2032 Strategic Vision Report (DOE, 2022). Consequently, the committee’s estimates of annualized cost ceilings in Table 3.1 is based on the 10-year order period established in the various end-state contracts.
• Task order scopes of work are established after contract award through a process that limits incentives to identify and explore technology and business model innovations in incumbent contractor

___________________

⁶ Except for indefinite-quantity contracts for advisory and assistance services as provided in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the contracting officer must, to the maximum extent practicable, give preference to making multiple awards of indefinite-quantity contracts under a single solicitation for the same or similar supplies or services to two or more sources.” See U.S. General Services Administration, 2022, “16.504 Indefinite-Quantity Contracts,” FAC Number: 2022-06, https://www.acquisition.gov/far/16.504.

• proposals. Under the ESCM, work scopes and implementation plans are established after the award of the end-state contract, precluding opportunities to identify and assess technology and business in the contractor selection process. The committee observed that the development of the task orders resides largely with the site ESCM contractors, with DOE-EM staff playing a management role. It is unclear to the committee how contractors can be empowered to be innovative and efficient when task orders are small, limited to short-term activities of no more than several years, and financially constrained. No ESCM contracts have reached the level of maturity to assess whether any significant innovation is occurring. During the virtual site visits, the sites with ESCM contracts told the committee that they were “feeling their way” with this new model.
• The existence of multiple task orders poses increased demands on DOE contract managers to ensure program and project effectiveness. The committee observed varying degrees of certification and training of DOE-EM staff in project management and end state. For example, DOE-EM has not sent any staff⁷ to the Project Leadership Institute hosted by Stanford University since it was established in 2014, despite its creation by former Secretary Ernest Moniz to prepare future leaders for managing large and complex projects. Moreover, the expansion of coverage of Order 413.3B to all capital asset projects, as recommended in the Phase 1 report (NASEM, 2021) and again later in this report (Recommendation C-2 in Chapter 5), will further add to the need for certification of additional DOE-EM federal project directors.
•    DOE-EM sometimes subcontracts out project management responsibilities to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers when it lacks staffing for particular projects. The committee did not attempt to assess the effectiveness of the Corps’ project management activities, but simply notes that this approach, while meeting short-term project management needs, does not necessarily solve the longer-term need for development of the highly trained workforce that DOE-EM requires to manage a cleanup program that is planned to last for at least another five decades.

Recommendation A-1 calls on DOE-EM to take several additional steps that can be implemented immediately to improve the design of the ESCM, specifically the following:

• Ensure that contracts have explicitly defined end states.
• Ensure that task orders are prioritized, have well-defined outcomes and are logically connected to those end states in an integrated manner.

___________________

⁷ A member of the Savannah River National Laboratory staff was sent to the Project Leadership Institute in 2021.

• Include provisions in those orders to incentivize innovation and schedule acceleration.
• Establish feasible multi-year budget projections to guide work scopes and schedules.
• Increase the number of qualified DOE-EM project managers, as appropriate, to manage end-state contracts.

Recommendation A-1 complements and builds on Recommendations 5-1, 6-1, and 6-2 in the Phase 1 report (NASEM, 2021; see Annex 2.A in Chapter 2 of this report).

Recommendation A-2 calls on the Office of Management and Budget to establish a program evaluation review process of the ESCM as more information becomes available on its implementation and report on its effectiveness and recommend further improvements to the Secretary of Energy and Congress. Such a review is needed to inform improvements in the execution of the existing 10-year ESCM and the design of any additional decade-long IDIQ contracts for major cleanup projects at its sites.

ORDER 413.3B

DOE Order 413.3B, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets, provides

This order was discussed in detail in the Phase 1 report (NASEM, 2021, pp. 36-37):

The Phase 1 report recommended that DOE expand coverage of the order to all capital asset projects (Recommendation 4-1), clarify the order to incorporate best practices for dispute prevention and resolution (Recommendation 4-2), and apply the requirements for project execution plans equivalent to those in the order to projects that are not formally being managed under the order (Recommendation 4-3). Recommendation A-3 in the present report, to incorporate procedural requirements for compliance with CERCLA into the DOE Order 413.3B process, is intended to build on Recommendation 4-3.

Order 413.3B is not being used to manage DOE-EM cleanup projects conducted under CERCLA because many of its steps are duplicative of the CERCLA process, particularly in remedy selection. However, the CERCLA process does not contain the strong project management tools found in Order 413.3B. The committee judges that DOE-EM could improve the management of its CERCLA cleanup projects by incorporating procedural and documentation requirements for compliance with CERCLA into Order 413.3B. DOE would likely need to work with federal and state regulators to implement this change.

TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION

___________________

⁸ Subsequent to the release of the report from which this quote is extracted, a new protocol was incorporated to Order 413.3B as part of Change 6 to the Order issued on January 12, 2021. Therefore, demolition projects are now subject to DOE Order 413.3B.

An important focus of the committee’s virtual site visits and discussions with DOE-EM leadership was to understand how DOE-EM uses innovation and technology insertion in its cleanup program. DOE-EM recently issued guidance on the technology innovation process (see DOE [2021], discussed later in this section, and a presentation from DOE to another National Academies committee studying low-activity waste disposition at the Hanford Site⁹), but the committee saw no evidence of a formal headquarters-driven strategic process for identifying, developing, or introducing technological innovations across the DOE complex.

The committee did see evidence for technological innovation at individual sites, largely driven by contractors, to meet near-term cleanup project needs. Technology development activities at the Savannah River National Laboratory, DOE-EM’s lead national laboratory, seemed to focus on providing technical assistance to sites, paid for by contractors or DOE-EM headquarters, to meet these near-term needs.

Several organizations including the National Academies have highlighted the importance of technological innovation in the cleanup program, for example:

___________________

⁹ M. Zhu and C. Herman, 2021, “R&D Roadmap for Accelerating Hanford Tank Waste Mission,” presentation to the Committee Reviewing the Continued Analysis of Supplemental Treatment of Low-Activity Waste at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, October 12, available from the National Academies Public Access Records.

DOE-EM invested heavily in innovation (i.e., scientific research, technology development, and technology deployment) from shortly after it was created in 1989 through the early 2000s. NASEM (2019, p. 10) noted that

DOE-EM created focus areas¹⁰ in the early 1990s to identify and deploy technologies and share best cleanup practices across its sites (see NRC, 1997). These focus areas involved staff from DOE-EM headquarters and sites as well as national laboratory experts. The focus areas were discontinued in the early 2000s.

In 1996 and at the direction of Congress, DOE-EM created and co-managed (with DOE’s Office of Science) the Environmental Management Science Program to develop scientific talent and promote innovation to address DOE-EM’s cleanup challenges (e.g., NRC, 1997). One of the innovations of this program was to connect scientists directly with cleanup problem holders (i.e., DOE-EM site staff and contractors) to help inform and focus the scientific work and promote the transfer of results to site cleanup.

DOE-EM’s focus on and investments in science, technology, and innovation has declined since the early 2000s as office leadership changed across administrations and the focus of cleanup activities turned to site closure using existing technologies. Funding for headquarters-directed technology development in FY2021 was $30 million, about 0.4 percent of DOE-EM’s $7.6 billion annual budget.

DOE-EM’s views of its needs for innovation may be changing again. It recently issued the EM Technology Development Framework (DOE, 2021) that is intended to

___________________

¹⁰ EM’s original five focus areas were (1) Contaminant Plume Containment and Remediation; (2) Landfill Stabilization; (3) High-Level Radioactive Waste Tank Remediation; (4) Mixed-Waste Characterization, Treatment and Disposal; and (5) Facility Transitioning, Decommissioning and Final Disposition (NRC, 1997).

However, during the information gathering for this report, no site personnel (DOE-EM staff or contractors) acknowledged this new framework or presented any information that would suggest any change in practice to the committee during its virtual site visits.

In 2017, Congress requested that the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine undertake a review of DOE-EM’s science and technology (S&T) programs.¹¹ The report from this study (NASEM, 2019) contains many detailed findings; those most directly relevant to this report are shown in Annex 3.B. This committee endorses these findings and recommends (Recommendation A-4) that DOE-EM implement all of the recommendations from the NASEM (2019) report, which are shown below verbatim.

___________________

¹¹ National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year (FY) 2017, Public Law 114-328.

Congress has already taken the first step in implementing Recommendation C. Title X, Section 10001 of the Energy Act of 2020¹² directs ARPA-E to “provide transformative solutions to improve the management, clean-up, and disposal of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.” Implementing the remainder of this recommendation will require close cooperation between DOE-EM and ARPA-E.

REFERENCES

___________________

¹² This act is part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Public Law 116-260.

DOE. 2021. “Technology Development Framework.” Washington, DC: Office of Environmental Management. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-04/EM-TechnologyDevelopment-Framework-January-2021-V2.pdf.

NASEM (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine). 2019. Independent Assessment of Science and Technology for the Department of Energy’s Defense Environmental Cleanup Program. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/25338.

NASEM. 2021. Effectiveness and Efficiency of Defense Environmental Cleanup Activities of DOE’s Office of Environmental Management: Report 1. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/26000.

NRC (National Research Council). 1995. Improving the Environment: An Evaluation of DOE’s Environmental Management Program. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/5173.

NRC. 1997. Building an Effective Environmental Management Science Program: Final Assessment. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/5557.

ANNEX 3.A: COMMITTEE VIEW OF OUTCOMES-BASED END-STATE CONTRACTS; DEFINITION AND EXAMPLES

“End state” describes the ultimate outcomes to be achieved through the implementation of a program to achieve a specific and measurable result. In long-duration programs or programs of scale, it may be desirable to define a series of intermediate outcomes or end states, each linked clearly to achievement of the final set of outcomes.¹

Outcomes-based contracting and performance-based contracting are typically used to deliver definable outcomes. This was the completion outcomes achieved at Rocky Flats and Fernald. EM’s end-state contracting model is not a contract type but an approach. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 made formal, outcomes-based performance evaluations mandatory for federal programs.

In outcomes and performance-based contracts the typical process would include the following:

• Business case—outlining potential risks, benefits and other impacts of a program to aid in decision making.
• Outcomes—Strategic Business Outcomes (SBOs) are a set of short statements reflecting the desired result or final deliverable of the program. They must be clearly articulated, agreed to, and continuously communicated. They are defined before any intermediate outcomes are established as part of an overall delivery strategy.
• Delivery strategy—top-level plan and guidance on how the established SBOs are to be achieved. If intermediate outcomes are required, they are defined at this stage.
• Metrics—a set of key performance measures that collectively measure the organization’s performance against the SBOs and strategy, including any intermediate outcomes that may have been established.
• Performance—criteria that establish what acceptable performance looks like when measured by the established performance metrics. These will relate to the payments and incentives developed for an outcomes-based contract (OBC) or performance-based contract (PBC) and clearly reflect the overall program outcomes or any intermediate outcomes that have been established.
• Payment—established pay for performance regime linked to the established performance levels.

___________________

¹ As described by EM, “End-state contracting is not a contract type but an approach to creating meaningful and visible progress through defined end states, even at sites with completion dates far into the future.”

• Incentives—encourage positive behaviors and discourage negative behaviors that support the achievement of the top level and any applicable intermediate outcomes.
• Contract—solicit and execute a contract that covers all aspects of the performance, payment, and terms and conditions of the relationship, clearly linked to the overall SBOs or, if a series of intermediate outcomes defined, the specific intermediate outcome.
• Review—ongoing analysis of the outcomes of the OBC or PBC with respect to achievement of the overall program’s SBOs and any intermediate outcomes established for the specific contract.

POLARIS—EXAMPLE OF AN OUTCOMES-DRIVEN PROGRAM

The origin of Polaris goes back to that point in time when the Navy stopped a joint venture with the Air Force to modify a liquid-fueled Jupiter missile. It then received the go ahead to develop an entirely new solid-fueled missile for use on submarines (December 1956).²

Less than 4 years later, the first test firing from a submarine was on July 20, 1960. By the end of the year, two Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) submarines were on patrol and another dozen at various stages of outfitting or construction. Like Atlas, Polaris was schedule driven.

Polaris was a success. Key achievements included the following:

• Deployed several years ahead of the original FBM schedule
• No cost overruns
• Met strategic mission objectives
• Special Projects Office recognized as one of the most effective agencies within the government

Success factors included clearly defined, agreed to, and a constantly articulated strategic outcome—focus on schedule to meet threat (deployable system).

Polaris pioneered several managerial techniques that included the following:

• Outcomes focus (Navy ballistic missile capability) versus an output focus (hardware).
• Integrated management control system that focused decision making on program costs in relationship to program performance.
• Full system life cycle focus.
• Concept of project management.

___________________

² The Fleet Ballistic Missile was supported outside regular Navy allocations during the initial joint effort with Army. Jupiter S (solid-fueled version of Jupiter) gives way to a new, designed from scratch, Polaris.

• Program management center.
• Program management plans (PMPs)—hierarchal structure in which each plan is tied to another. Describe tasks, responsibilities, time-related milestones and sequence of accomplishments, end products (outputs) and their components specified.
• Weekly program review meetings.

OTHER OUTCOMES-BASED CONTRACT EXAMPLES³

Outcomes-based contracting got its legs with Polaris and was deployed to a high degree in the U.S. defense industry in the 1960s with major weapons systems acquisitions. It then found a ready home in defense industries in the United Kingdom and Australia where its use was expanded ultimately into information technology, infrastructure, health care, and other social programs, being exported back into the United States in some form in each of these industries.

Rolls Royce “Power by the Hour®” is one of the oldest and best known examples of an outcomes-based business model. Over 20 years ago, Rolls Royce transformed its support and maintenance contracting model for engines used in commercial jets. Instead of charging customers for repairs, maintenance, and the provision of spare parts, customers paid a fee per hour based on the number of hours of flying time for an engine. The company recognized that by focusing the contractual arrangement on the real underlying need of the customer—keeping a jet in the air—it could deliver greater satisfaction to the customer while at the same time reducing inefficiencies and increasing its own revenue. This contractual structure has since become the industry standard in commercial aviation.

In the United States, several outcomes-based public–private partnerships, such as the I-495 Capital Beltway expansion, have delivered the capital project outcomes and financial benefits the Commonwealth of Virginia sought with a capital cost reduction of nearly $1 billion while significantly reducing the property takes initially envisioned by the state by nearly 300.

Currently, at Sellafield in the United Kingdom, outcomes-based remediation contracts are being initially deployed.⁴

___________________

³ B. Prieto, 2020, “Strengthening Outcomes Based Capital Project Delivery,” PM World Journal IX(VI).

⁴ NEC, 2019, “Sellafield Pilots Outcome Based NEC Contracts,” https://www.neccontract.com/news/sellafield-pilots-outcome-based-nec-contracts.

ANNEX 3.B: KEY FINDINGS FROM NASEM (2019)

Finding 2: Most DOE-EM-related S&T activities are site based, contractor driven and managed, and have a short-term focus on addressing technical challenges in existing cleanup projects. DOE-EM headquarters has a limited role in selecting, managing, and coordinating this site-based S&T to ensure that it meets the cleanup program’s needs, particularly over the long term and across different sites.

Finding 3: DOE-EM’s management of S&T is ad hoc and uncoordinated and thus less effective than it should be. DOE-EM lacks formal, documented processes for (1) managing the technology lifecycle—from basic research through technology deployment—and (2) sharing lessons learned, including failures, successes, and good practices, from its technology development and deployment efforts both within and outside of DOE-EM.

Finding 4: DOE-EM has substantially reduced investments in S&T development over the past 15 years and has focused instead on technology deployment in current cleanup projects. In particular, DOE-EM has demonstrated little to no interest in investing in S&T development that might lead to breakthrough solutions and technologies that can substantially reduce cleanup lifecycle costs, schedules, risks, and uncertainties.