Policing and Public Transportation (2022)

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6 TCRP LRD 58 violations only if “they were personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivations.”9 Importantly, however, as the United States Supreme Court held in 1978 in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,10 “Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies,” mean- ing that “local governments . . . may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.”11 As discussed in Section II, infra, a plaintiff may institute a § 1983 action against a municipality or other unit of local government and/or their respective authorities and agencies for two specific categories of violations of the Constitution or other federal law. Judicial opin- ions may refer to such permissible § 1983 claims against muni- cipal and other local governmental authorities, such as public transportation authorities, as “Monell claims.” C. Concurrent Jurisdiction of Federal and State Courts of § 1983 Actions Both federal and state courts have jurisdiction to decide § 1983 claims.12 As stated in Mangiafico v. Town of Farmington,13 [s]ection 1983 claims often are filed in federal court, but state courts unquestionably “have concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought under § 1983.” . . . This does not mean, of course, that state courts hear- ing § 1983 claims are free to depart from United States Supreme Court precedent governing the construction and application of the federal statute. . . . The elements of a § 1983 action, and the defenses thereto, “are defined by federal law[,]” … and state courts applying § 1983 “may not expand or contract the contours” of the right to relief.14 Some statutes require the exhaustion of other remedies, such as the Prison Litigation Reform Act15 and the Individuals with 9 Bristol v. Queens County, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41655, at *1, 17-18 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) (Report and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge) (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied), adopted by, claim dis- missed by, motion denied by, in part, motion denied by Bristol v. Queens County, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38673, at *1 (E.D. N.Y., Mar. 18, 2013). 10 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2035, 50 L. Ed.2d 611, 635 (1978) (emphasis in original) (overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473, 5 L. Ed.2d 492 (1961)). 11 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-691, 98 S. Ct. at 2036, 50 L. Ed.2d at 635. 12 See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S. Ct. 2557, 73 L. Ed.2d 172 (1982) (holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not a prerequisite to a § 1983 action because Congress assigned the role of protecting constitutional rights to the courts and did not intend that under most circumstances for civil rights claims to be initially addressed through state administrative procedures). However, as dis- cussed in this subsection of the digest, for some § 1983 claims, the Patsy decision is superseded by statute. See, e.g., Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., 407 F.3d 674 (4th Cir. 2005) (Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA)). 13 331 Conn. 404, 408, 204 A.3d 1138, 1142 (2019). 14 Id., 331 Conn. at 419, 204 A.3d at 1148 (citation omitted). 15 Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 519-520, 122 S. Ct. 983, 985, 152 L. Ed.2d 12, 18 (2002) (holding that the “exhaustion requirement” in 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) “applies to all prisoners seeking redress for prison cir- cumstances or occurrences”). Section 1983 is based on the constitutional authority of Con- gress to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1983 does not create, in and of itself, a cause of action.1 That is, § 1983 is not a source of substantive rights but merely provides a means for the vindication of violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights that are conferred elsewhere.2 “‘The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.’”3 As a federal district court in Pennsylvania explained, § 1983 incorporates common law tort principles of damages and causation, including the concept of proximate cause. When a plaintiff seeks to recover damages for injuries suffered during successive steps of state action—e.g., search, arrest, interrogation, detention, and trial—each stage of conduct must be separately judged by the constitutional stan- dard applicable to the particular right violated, whether Fourth, Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.4 In sum, under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has been harmed, or otherwise adversely affected, by a defendant’s deprivation of a person’s right, privilege, or immu- nity that is conferred by the United States Constitution or other federal law.5 B. “Persons” Potentially Liable in a § 1983 Action Although all “persons” ostensibly are potentially liable under § 1983 for a civil rights violation, the courts have held that a state or state agency is not a “person,” i.e., not an actionable de- fendant, within the meaning of § 1983.6 Thus, neither a state nor a state agency may be sued under § 1983 for allegedly vio- lating an individual’s constitutional or other federal rights.7 A state official who is sued in his or her official capacity also is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.8 Defendants who are sued in their individual capacity may be held liable for § 1983 1 See McCann v. Borough of Magnolia, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 48040, at *1 (D.N.J. 2014) (stating that because § 1983 is neither a source of substantive rights nor a means to redress common law torts, a § 1983 plaintiff must allege a violation of a federal right), aff’d, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 21086, at *1 (3d Cir. 2014). 2 Mosely v. Yaletsko, 275 F. Supp.2d 608, 612 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 3 Moroughan v. City of Suffolk, 514 F. Supp.3d 479, 511 (E.D. N.Y. 2021) (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 118 L. Ed.2d (1992)). 4 Padilla v. Miller, 143 F. Supp.2d 453, 471-472 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (citation omitted), amended, corrected by, Padilla v. Miller, 143 F. Supp.2d 479, 495 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that “[c]ompensatory dam- ages for the harm sustained during the course of the wrongful detention of the plaintiffs will be awarded”). 5 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 5, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2503, 65 L. Ed.2d 555, 559 (1980). 6 A state transportation department is not a person subject to suit under § 1983. See, e.g., Vickroy v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Transp., 73 Fed. Appx. 172, 173 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, Vickroy v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., 540 U.S. 1107, 124 S. Ct. 1061, 57 L. Ed.2d 892 (2004). 7 Nichols v. Danley, 266 F. Supp.2d 1310, 1313 (D. N.M. 2003). 8 Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 1997).