Policing and Public Transportation (2022)

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TCRP LRD 58 7 an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”23 Con- sequently, there is no vicarious liability, as exists under common law, of a public transportation authority in a § 1983 action based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. As a federal district also confirmed in Laster v. Metro. Atlanta, RTA,24 a municipal or other local government “may be held liable under § 1983 only ‘when [the] execution of a government’s policy or cus- tom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury….’”25 Cases against public transportation authorities illustrate the fundamental principle that § 1983 liability must be based on a policy or custom of an authority that is the cause of a violation of a plaintiff ’s right under the Constitution or other federal law. However, as discussed in Part II.B, infra, § 1983 liability may be predicated also on a public transportation authority’s deliber- ate indifference to an individual’s constitutional or other federal rights.26 In Stevens v. Metro. Transp. Auth. Police Dep’t,27 the plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to an unconstitutional use of ex- cessive force. A federal district court in New York granted the Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s (MTA) motion for a summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.28 The MTA could be held “liable only if the use of unreasonable force by its police officers was the result of a policy or custom of the MTA” and, moreover, if the plaintiff demonstrates “‘a direct causal link between [the MTA] policy or custom[] and the alleged consti- tutional deprivation.’”29 Clearly, a policy of a public transportation authority is deemed to have been established when a decisionmaker, who is imbued with final authority, “issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.”30 However, a policy or custom may exist when an official with policy-making authority took action or made a specific decision that allegedly violated an individual’s constitu- tional rights.31 A policy or custom may arise when an unlaw- 23 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S. Ct. at 2037-2038, 50 L. Ed.2d at 638 (emphasis supplied). See also, Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-691). 24 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33078, at *1 (N.D. Ga. 2004). 25 Id. at *12 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S. Ct. at 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d at 638). 26 See part II.B, infra. 27 293 F. Supp.2d 415 (S.D. N.Y. 2003). 28 The transit authority was the only defendant served with process. 29 Stevens, 293 F. Supp. at 420 (citations omitted). 30 Roebuck v. Davis, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24117, at 1, *10 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (citations omitted). 31 Bristol, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41655, at *43 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) (cita- tion omitted), Report and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge, adopted by, claim dismissed by, motion denied by, in part, motion denied by Bristol v. Queens County, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38673, at *1, 44 (E.D.N.Y., Mar. 18, 2013). Disabilities Education Act,16 before a plaintiff may commence a § 1983 action. In addition, the Supreme Court “has held that state ‘taxpayers are barred by the principle of comity from as- serting § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts’ without first exhausting their state judicial remedies.”17 Although there are some instances in which the § 1983 juris- diction of state courts is constrained, such as those discussed above, “federal laws control the substantive aspects of federal claims adjudicated in state courts, including § 1983 claims,” but the “states have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to enforce rights created by federal law, including § 1983….”18 D. Elements a Plaintiff must Prove in a § 1983 Action When making a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demon- strate “(1) the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni- ties secured by the Constitution and its laws, (2) by a person act- ing under the color of state law.”19 For the courts, when applying the phrase “under color of state law,” the pertinent inquiry is whether an alleged infringement of a plaintiff ’s federal rights is “‘fairly attributable to the State.’”20 Although there is no “bright line test” for deciding which claims arise under color of state law for the purpose of § 1983 actions, such as claims arising out of policing by public transportation authorities, “[m]ore is re- quired than a simple determination … whether an officer was on or off duty when the challenged incident occurred.”21 That is, even if a constitutional violation occurred while a police of- ficer was off duty, the officer may be held liable under § 1983 if the officer’s conduct “invoked the real or apparent power of the police department.”22 II. PREREQUISITES FOR LIABILITY OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITIES IN § 1983 ACTIONS A. Liability of a Public Transportation Authority for a Claim Caused by a Policy or Custom of a Public Transportation Authority that Violates § 1983 In Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., supra, the Supreme Court held that “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for 16 Kristi H. v. Tri-Valley Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp.2d 628 (M.D. Pa. 2000). 17 Mangiafico, 331 Conn. at 421-422, 204 A.3d at 1150. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 102 S. Ct. 177, 70 L. Ed.2d 271 (1981). 18 Baker v. Rolnick, 210 Ariz. 321, 325, 110 P.3d 1284, 1288 (2019) (citations omitted). The court stated that “when Arizona courts have concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims such as § 1983, they apply the federal substantive law along with the attendant federal rules and policies governing such causes of action, including exhaustion require- ments.” Id., 210 Ariz. at 326, 110 P.3d at 1289 (citations omitted). 19 Moroughan, 514 F. Supp.3d at 511 (citation omitted). 20 Id. (citations omitted). 21 Id. at 512 (citations omitted). 22 Id. (citations omitted).

6 TCRP LRD 58 violations only if “they were personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivations.”9 Importantly, however, as the United States Supreme Court held in 1978 in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,10 “Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies,” mean- ing that “local governments . . . may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.”11 As discussed in Section II, infra, a plaintiff may institute a § 1983 action against a municipality or other unit of local government and/or their respective authorities and agencies for two specific categories of violations of the Constitution or other federal law. Judicial opin- ions may refer to such permissible § 1983 claims against muni- cipal and other local governmental authorities, such as public transportation authorities, as “Monell claims.” C. Concurrent Jurisdiction of Federal and State Courts of § 1983 Actions Both federal and state courts have jurisdiction to decide § 1983 claims.12 As stated in Mangiafico v. Town of Farmington,13 [s]ection 1983 claims often are filed in federal court, but state courts unquestionably “have concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought under § 1983.” . . . This does not mean, of course, that state courts hear- ing § 1983 claims are free to depart from United States Supreme Court precedent governing the construction and application of the federal statute. . . . The elements of a § 1983 action, and the defenses thereto, “are defined by federal law[,]” … and state courts applying § 1983 “may not expand or contract the contours” of the right to relief.14 Some statutes require the exhaustion of other remedies, such as the Prison Litigation Reform Act15 and the Individuals with 9 Bristol v. Queens County, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41655, at *1, 17-18 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) (Report and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge) (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied), adopted by, claim dis- missed by, motion denied by, in part, motion denied by Bristol v. Queens County, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38673, at *1 (E.D. N.Y., Mar. 18, 2013). 10 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2035, 50 L. Ed.2d 611, 635 (1978) (emphasis in original) (overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473, 5 L. Ed.2d 492 (1961)). 11 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-691, 98 S. Ct. at 2036, 50 L. Ed.2d at 635. 12 See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S. Ct. 2557, 73 L. Ed.2d 172 (1982) (holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not a prerequisite to a § 1983 action because Congress assigned the role of protecting constitutional rights to the courts and did not intend that under most circumstances for civil rights claims to be initially addressed through state administrative procedures). However, as dis- cussed in this subsection of the digest, for some § 1983 claims, the Patsy decision is superseded by statute. See, e.g., Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., 407 F.3d 674 (4th Cir. 2005) (Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA)). 13 331 Conn. 404, 408, 204 A.3d 1138, 1142 (2019). 14 Id., 331 Conn. at 419, 204 A.3d at 1148 (citation omitted). 15 Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 519-520, 122 S. Ct. 983, 985, 152 L. Ed.2d 12, 18 (2002) (holding that the “exhaustion requirement” in 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) “applies to all prisoners seeking redress for prison cir- cumstances or occurrences”). Section 1983 is based on the constitutional authority of Con- gress to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1983 does not create, in and of itself, a cause of action.1 That is, § 1983 is not a source of substantive rights but merely provides a means for the vindication of violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights that are conferred elsewhere.2 “‘The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.’”3 As a federal district court in Pennsylvania explained, § 1983 incorporates common law tort principles of damages and causation, including the concept of proximate cause. When a plaintiff seeks to recover damages for injuries suffered during successive steps of state action—e.g., search, arrest, interrogation, detention, and trial—each stage of conduct must be separately judged by the constitutional stan- dard applicable to the particular right violated, whether Fourth, Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.4 In sum, under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has been harmed, or otherwise adversely affected, by a defendant’s deprivation of a person’s right, privilege, or immu- nity that is conferred by the United States Constitution or other federal law.5 B. “Persons” Potentially Liable in a § 1983 Action Although all “persons” ostensibly are potentially liable under § 1983 for a civil rights violation, the courts have held that a state or state agency is not a “person,” i.e., not an actionable de- fendant, within the meaning of § 1983.6 Thus, neither a state nor a state agency may be sued under § 1983 for allegedly vio- lating an individual’s constitutional or other federal rights.7 A state official who is sued in his or her official capacity also is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.8 Defendants who are sued in their individual capacity may be held liable for § 1983 1 See McCann v. Borough of Magnolia, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 48040, at *1 (D.N.J. 2014) (stating that because § 1983 is neither a source of substantive rights nor a means to redress common law torts, a § 1983 plaintiff must allege a violation of a federal right), aff’d, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 21086, at *1 (3d Cir. 2014). 2 Mosely v. Yaletsko, 275 F. Supp.2d 608, 612 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 3 Moroughan v. City of Suffolk, 514 F. Supp.3d 479, 511 (E.D. N.Y. 2021) (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 118 L. Ed.2d (1992)). 4 Padilla v. Miller, 143 F. Supp.2d 453, 471-472 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (citation omitted), amended, corrected by, Padilla v. Miller, 143 F. Supp.2d 479, 495 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that “[c]ompensatory dam- ages for the harm sustained during the course of the wrongful detention of the plaintiffs will be awarded”). 5 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 5, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2503, 65 L. Ed.2d 555, 559 (1980). 6 A state transportation department is not a person subject to suit under § 1983. See, e.g., Vickroy v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Transp., 73 Fed. Appx. 172, 173 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, Vickroy v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., 540 U.S. 1107, 124 S. Ct. 1061, 57 L. Ed.2d 892 (2004). 7 Nichols v. Danley, 266 F. Supp.2d 1310, 1313 (D. N.M. 2003). 8 Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 1997).