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Policing and Public Transportation (2022)

Chapter: A. Liability of a Public Transportation Authority for a Claim Caused by a Policy or Custom of a Public Transportation Authority that Violates 1983

« Previous: II. PREREQUISITES FOR LIABILITY OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITIES IN 1983 ACTIONS
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Suggested Citation:"A. Liability of a Public Transportation Authority for a Claim Caused by a Policy or Custom of a Public Transportation Authority that Violates 1983." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Policing and Public Transportation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26652.
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Suggested Citation:"A. Liability of a Public Transportation Authority for a Claim Caused by a Policy or Custom of a Public Transportation Authority that Violates 1983." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Policing and Public Transportation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26652.
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TCRP LRD 58 7 an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”23 Con- sequently, there is no vicarious liability, as exists under common law, of a public transportation authority in a § 1983 action based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. As a federal district also confirmed in Laster v. Metro. Atlanta, RTA,24 a municipal or other local government “may be held liable under § 1983 only ‘when [the] execution of a government’s policy or cus- tom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury….’”25 Cases against public transportation authorities illustrate the fundamental principle that § 1983 liability must be based on a policy or custom of an authority that is the cause of a violation of a plaintiff ’s right under the Constitution or other federal law. However, as discussed in Part II.B, infra, § 1983 liability may be predicated also on a public transportation authority’s deliber- ate indifference to an individual’s constitutional or other federal rights.26 In Stevens v. Metro. Transp. Auth. Police Dep’t,27 the plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to an unconstitutional use of ex- cessive force. A federal district court in New York granted the Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s (MTA) motion for a summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.28 The MTA could be held “liable only if the use of unreasonable force by its police officers was the result of a policy or custom of the MTA” and, moreover, if the plaintiff demonstrates “‘a direct causal link between [the MTA] policy or custom[] and the alleged consti- tutional deprivation.’”29 Clearly, a policy of a public transportation authority is deemed to have been established when a decisionmaker, who is imbued with final authority, “issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.”30 However, a policy or custom may exist when an official with policy-making authority took action or made a specific decision that allegedly violated an individual’s constitu- tional rights.31 A policy or custom may arise when an unlaw- 23 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S. Ct. at 2037-2038, 50 L. Ed.2d at 638 (emphasis supplied). See also, Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-691). 24 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33078, at *1 (N.D. Ga. 2004). 25 Id. at *12 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S. Ct. at 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d at 638). 26 See part II.B, infra. 27 293 F. Supp.2d 415 (S.D. N.Y. 2003). 28 The transit authority was the only defendant served with process. 29 Stevens, 293 F. Supp. at 420 (citations omitted). 30 Roebuck v. Davis, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24117, at 1, *10 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (citations omitted). 31 Bristol, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41655, at *43 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) (cita- tion omitted), Report and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge, adopted by, claim dismissed by, motion denied by, in part, motion denied by Bristol v. Queens County, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38673, at *1, 44 (E.D.N.Y., Mar. 18, 2013). Disabilities Education Act,16 before a plaintiff may commence a § 1983 action. In addition, the Supreme Court “has held that state ‘taxpayers are barred by the principle of comity from as- serting § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts’ without first exhausting their state judicial remedies.”17 Although there are some instances in which the § 1983 juris- diction of state courts is constrained, such as those discussed above, “federal laws control the substantive aspects of federal claims adjudicated in state courts, including § 1983 claims,” but the “states have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to enforce rights created by federal law, including § 1983….”18 D. Elements a Plaintiff must Prove in a § 1983 Action When making a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demon- strate “(1) the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni- ties secured by the Constitution and its laws, (2) by a person act- ing under the color of state law.”19 For the courts, when applying the phrase “under color of state law,” the pertinent inquiry is whether an alleged infringement of a plaintiff ’s federal rights is “‘fairly attributable to the State.’”20 Although there is no “bright line test” for deciding which claims arise under color of state law for the purpose of § 1983 actions, such as claims arising out of policing by public transportation authorities, “[m]ore is re- quired than a simple determination … whether an officer was on or off duty when the challenged incident occurred.”21 That is, even if a constitutional violation occurred while a police of- ficer was off duty, the officer may be held liable under § 1983 if the officer’s conduct “invoked the real or apparent power of the police department.”22 II. PREREQUISITES FOR LIABILITY OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITIES IN § 1983 ACTIONS A. Liability of a Public Transportation Authority for a Claim Caused by a Policy or Custom of a Public Transportation Authority that Violates § 1983 In Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., supra, the Supreme Court held that “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for 16 Kristi H. v. Tri-Valley Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp.2d 628 (M.D. Pa. 2000). 17 Mangiafico, 331 Conn. at 421-422, 204 A.3d at 1150. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 102 S. Ct. 177, 70 L. Ed.2d 271 (1981). 18 Baker v. Rolnick, 210 Ariz. 321, 325, 110 P.3d 1284, 1288 (2019) (citations omitted). The court stated that “when Arizona courts have concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims such as § 1983, they apply the federal substantive law along with the attendant federal rules and policies governing such causes of action, including exhaustion require- ments.” Id., 210 Ariz. at 326, 110 P.3d at 1289 (citations omitted). 19 Moroughan, 514 F. Supp.3d at 511 (citation omitted). 20 Id. (citations omitted). 21 Id. at 512 (citations omitted). 22 Id. (citations omitted).

8 TCRP LRD 58 Ray failed to show that a policy or custom of the LIRR caused the alleged constitutional violation or that the LIRR’s training or supervision of Willet was so inadequate that the LIRR was deliberately indifferent to Ray’s constitutional rights.40 Similarly, in Roebuck v. Davis,41 supra, the plaintiff brought claims under § 1983 against individual officers of the Philadelphia Police Department and the Transit Police Department, as well as a Monell claim against the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transpor- tation Authority (SEPTA), for alleged violations of Roebuck’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.42 A federal district court in Pennsylvania held that the plaintiff ’s complaint against the officers was insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. The plaintiff had not alleged that the defendant officer (Ramos) had acted under color of state law so as to deprive Roebuck of a right secured by the Constitution or other federal law.43 The plaintiff ’s allegations also were insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for municipal liability under the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell, supra. Roebuck failed to show that a SEPTA policy or a custom was the cause of a constitutional violation that was amenable to a § 1983 action.44 In Laster v. Metro. Atlanta, RTA,45 supra, Laster alleged that the City of Atlanta and the director (Pocock) of the Atlanta Pre- trial Detention Center (ACDC) (“City Defendants”) and the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) and the chief (Wilson) of MARTA’s Police Department (“MARTA Defendants”) violated Laster’s constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Laster claimed that the defendants failed to care for his serious medical needs when he was de- tained at the ACDC.46 Laster further alleged that the City Defendants maintained policies or customs that exhibited de- liberate in difference, (discussed in Section II. B, infra), to the constitutional rights of persons detained at the ACDC.47 Laster alleged that the defendants “failed to instruct, supervise, and train their employees with respect to the medical care of pre- trial detainees.”48 Second, Laster averred that the MARTA De- fendants developed policies or customs that exhibited deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons traveling on MARTA, because the defendants failed “to adequately train and supervise their law enforcement personnel….”49 A federal district court in Georgia held that Laster failed to demonstrate that the City or MARTA had a policy or custom that was the cause of the plaintiff ’s injuries.50 Moreover, Laster 40 Id. at 163 (citations omitted). 41 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24117, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 2020). 42 Id. at *1. 43 Id. at *7-8. (citation omitted). 44 Id. at *11-12. 45 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33078, at *1 (N.D. Ga. 2004). 46 The court dismissed the claim against Pocock in his individual capacity as he apparently was not involved in the case or treatment of Laster. Id. at *14. 47 Id. at *8. 48 Id. at *11. 49 Id. at *16. 50 Id. at *12, 17. ful practice by subordinate officials becomes so permanent or well settled that it constitutes a “custom or usage” or the custom or practice “was so widespread as to imply the constructive ac- quiescence of policy-making officials.”32 Importantly, “‘[u]nder certain circumstances, a municipality’s failure to act can consti- tute a policy and thus give rise to liability under Section 1983.’”33 Although § 1983 liability must be “predicated upon depri- vations [of one’s constitutional rights] derived from a policy or custom of the municipality,” it has been held that “[a] true pat- tern of harassment by government officials may make out a sec- tion 1983 claim for violation of due process of law, [when] the municipal defendant’s actions are illegal, or place a discrimina- tory burden on a constitutionally protected activity….”34 A public transportation authority’s policy or custom need not be formalized as a rule or regulation or even set forth in a written document. In Brietkopf v. Gentile,35 involving the alleged use of excessive force and other § 1983 violations, a federal dis- trict court in New York held that a “policy or custom need not be memorialized in a specific rule or regulation.”36 Instead, constitutional violations by government officials that are “persistent and widespread” can be “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law, and thereby generate municipal liability.” … In addition, a policy, custom, or prac- tice of the entity may be inferred where “‘the municipality so failed to train its employees as to display a deliberate indifference to the consti- tutional rights of those within its jurisdiction.’”37 A public transportation authority is not liable under § 1983 for a police officer’s conduct as long as a municipal government’s policy or custom, or deliberate indifference, was not the cause of the violation of a plaintiff ’s constitutional rights. In Ray v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth.,38 a § 1983 case, the transportation authority was held not liable for the alleged conduct of one of its police officers. In Ray, a police officer (Willet) for the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) had taken Ray to a secluded loading dock. After Officer Willett removed his uniform shirt, bullet- proof vest, and holster, and turned off his radio, he repeatedly beat and then handcuffed Ray. Ray’s action against Willet and the LIRR included claims for battery and false arrest and im- prisonment. However, because “Willet was not acting in his offi- cial capacity or exercising his responsibilities pursuant to State law,”39 the LIRR was not liable under § 1983 for Willet’s actions. 32 Id. (citation omitted). See also, Roebuck, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24117, at *11 (holding that a plaintiff ’s evidence may be sufficient to prove the existence of a policy or custom when “‘a given course of con- duct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well- settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law’”) (citations omitted). 33 Bristol, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41655, at *47 (citations omitted). 34 Manti v. New York City Transit Auth., 165 A.D.2d 373, 378, 568 N.Y.S.2d 16, 20 (N.Y. App., 1st Dept., 1991) (citations omitted) (empha- sis supplied). 35 41 F. Supp.3d 220 (E.D. N.Y. 2014). 36 Id. at 252 (citations omitted). 37 Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). 38 634 N.Y.S.2d 160 (N.Y. App., 2nd Dept. 1995), appeal denied, writ denied. 39 Id. at 162-163 (citation omitted).

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Compliance with transit-equipment and operations guidelines, FTA financing initiatives, private-sector programs, and labor or environmental standards relating to transit operations are some of the legal issues and problems unique to transit agencies.

The TRB Transit Cooperative Research Program's TCRP Legal Research Digest 58: Policing and Public Transportation provides a comprehensive analysis of constitutional issues and summarizes current laws and practices that apply to policing by public transportation agencies.

Supplemental to the Digest is Appendix A: Agreements, Policies, Reports, and Other Documents Provided by Public Transportation Authorities for the Report.

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