Policing and Public Transportation (2022)

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TCRP LRD 58 9 of MTA’s inaction were “sufficient to allege a custom or policy of inaction.”57 The plaintiff also alleged deliberate indifference in Villegas v. City of El Paso, supra.58 Villegas argued that the City of El Paso’s failure to train its officers “‘constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.’”59 Villegas averred that the City’s deficiencies included a lack of training to ensure that its officers did not engage in “violence and psychological coercion” during interviews and interrogations, a lack of training on the proper documentation of investigations and preservation of evi- dence, and a lack of supervisory oversight.60 The court held that the City’s “[p]olicy makers were deliberately indifferent to their failure to train or supervise officers.”61 Furthermore, the plain- tiff demonstrated “a clear causal connection between failure to instruct police officers on proper interrogation techniques and the failure of those officers to use appropriate techniques and to substitute coercion.”62 A claim of inadequate police training is a basis for § 1983 liability only when “‘the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.’”63 In Laster v. Metro. Atlanta, RTA,64 supra, the court relied on Supreme Court precedent holding that “there are limited circumstances in which an allegation of failure to train can serve as a basis for municipal liability under § 1983.”65 The district court rejected Laster’s claim that MARTA failed to develop policies and adequately train its police officers. The record did not show that “MARTA was on notice of the need for training with respect to communications between the MARTA police officers and call-takers or dispatchers;” thus, there was insufficient evidence of MARTA’s alleged deliberate indifference to Laster’s constitutional rights.66 Moreover, the court held that “a single violation of a constitutional right does not amount to an official policy or custom sufficient to impose liability on the municipality.”67 In Marom v. City of New York,68 the plaintiffs had participated in a protest in Zuccotti Park in New York to mark the six-month 57 Id. at *42 (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied). 58 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34907, at *1 (W.D. Tex. 2020), aff’d, Ville- gas v. Arbogast, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 4487, at *1 (5th Cir. Tex., Feb. 17, 2021) (per curiam) (Fifth Circuit stating that it affirmed “for essentially the reasons given by the district court in its thorough opinion”). 59 Villegas, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34907, at *44 (footnote omitted). 60 Id. at *45 (footnote omitted). 61 Id. at *46. 62 Id. *45-46. 63 Laster v. Metro Atlanta RTA, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33078, at *1, 18 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (citations omitted). 64 Id. at *1. 65 Id. at *17-18. 66 Id. at *19. The court further stated that “a single violation of a constitutional right does not amount to an official policy or custom suf- ficient to impose liability on the municipality.” Id. (citation omitted) (footnote omitted). 67 Id. (citation omitted). 68 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28466, at *1 (S.D. N.Y. 2016), settled by, dismissed by, without prejudice, motion dismissed by, as moot, Rocek v. could not rely on “a single incident of an alleged constitutional deprivation” to establish a municipal or other local government’s liability under § 1983 without proof of an existing, unconstitu- tional municipal policy, one that was attributable to a municipal policymaker, that was the cause of an alleged constitutional vio- lation.51 Laster failed to furnish “evidence that any of the City of Atlanta’s policies and procedures with respect to responding to an inmate’s medical needs are constitutionally deficient”52 or “that a policy or custom by MARTA was the moving force” that was responsible for the alleged violation of Laster’s rights.53 B. Liability of a Public Transportation Authority under § 1983 for “Deliberate Indifference” A municipality or other local government authority may be held liable under § 1983 when the public authority had a policy or custom of deliberate indifference that abridged an individu- al’s constitutional or other federal rights. However, as a federal district court in Texas has observed, the term “[d]eliberate in- difference is a stringent standard of fault—requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of [its] action.”54 In Kirk v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth.,55 in which a § 1983 claim was based on the defendant municipality’s alleged fail- ure to train, a federal district court in New York elaborated as follows. Such a policy or custom need not be explicit, but may be inferred cir- cumstantially by a showing [of] “deliberate indifference” by one of two methods: (1) the MTA and its supervisory officials made a “deliberate choice” not to fully train its employees despite an obvious need for training in light of the inadequacy thereof and the likelihood of [a] violation of constitutional rights . . . ; or (2) the MTA and its supervi- sory officials “knew about a pattern of constitutionally offensive acts by their subordinates and failed to take remedial action in response thereto” such that they were deliberately indifferent….56 The court denied the MTA’s motion for a summary judg- ment on Kirk’s failure-to-train claim. There was evidence of three occasions, namely after two evaluations, respectively, in 1991 and 1994, and complaints regarding another incident, when MTA officials had become aware of the likelihood that an officer (Rocket) was unduly aggressive. The three occasions 51 Id. at *13-14 (citations omitted). 52 Id. at *13. 53 Id. at *17. In a latter action, Laster v. Brooks, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103259, at *1, 7-8 (N.D. Ga. 2006), against MARTA Police Offi- cer Burks, who Laster dismissed without prejudice in the previous case, the court held that “for the purposes of Plaintiff ’s action against Officer Burks in his official capacity, MARTA and Officer Burks have the same identity. The third element of the res judicata doctrine is, therefore, met and Plaintiff is barred from suing Officer Burks in his official capacity as a MARTA officer.” 54 Villegas v. City of El Paso, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34907, at *1, 44 (W.D. Tex. 2020) (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied), aff’d, Villegas v. Arbogast, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 4487, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 17, 2021) (per curiam). 55 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2786, at *1 (S.D. N.Y. 2001). 56 Id. at *38 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).