Policing and Public Transportation (2022)

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16 TCRP LRD 58 committed or was committing an offense.’”175 Because the facts did not support the plaintiff ’s claim that he was arrested without probable cause, the court held that Officer Burks was entitled to qualified immunity for all of the plaintiff ’s claims against the officer. In Dant v. District of Columbia,176 the Superior Court dis- missed a criminal case against Dant for fare evasion. Thereafter, Dant sued WMATA, the arresting officer for the transit author- ity, and the District of Columbia for damages and injunctive relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that there was probable cause for Dant’s arrest. Thus, Dant had no claim against the District of Columbia for false arrest and imprisonment, and absolute prosecutorial im- munity barred Dant’s claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process against the District. In Davis v. Pavlik,177 Davis brought § 1983 claims alleging false arrest, the use of excessive force, and deliberate indiffer- ence to his constitutional rights. Davis claimed that on the day of his arrest, as he was exiting a WMATA train at the Suitland, Maryland station, Officer Estime of the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) prevented Davis from exiting the station and told him to return to the exit gate and tap his SmarTrip card. Davis was carrying several SmarTrip cards, but he was unsure which card he had used at the start of his trip. The officer tested the card Davis gave him and determined that the card had not been used that day. When Officer Estime accused Davis of fare evasion, Davis claimed that when he tried to explain, the officer, “without provocation, pepper sprayed Plaintiff twice in the face, beat Plaintiff with a MTPD-issued baton, and arrested him.”178 Although Davis was charged with theft of WMATA services and possession of counterfeit currency with unlawful intent, he was found not guilty. Thereafter, Davis filed an eight-count com- plaint against WMATA, the MTPD, and Officer Estime. Regarding the plaintiff ’s § 1983 claim of false arrest against Officer Estime, the court held that, based on the allegations of the complaint, there was probable cause for Officer Estime to arrest Davis. Moreover, even if Davis told the officer that he had additional SmarTrip cards, such a fact did not mean that there was no probable cause for Davis’s arrest. An officer is not “‘obli- gated to rule out the validity of a suspect’s claims of innocence prior to arresting him.’”179 Because there was probable cause for Davis’s arrest, the court dismissed the plaintiff ’s § 1983 claim for false arrest.180 In contrast to the Davis case, in Figueroa v. Miami-Dade County,181 a federal district court in Florida ruled that probable cause was lacking for an arrest that led to Figueroa’s later filing 175 Id. at *9 (citations omitted) (some internal quotation marks omitted). 176 829 F.2d 69 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 177 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 239693, at *1 (D. Md. 2020). 178 Id. at *3 (citation omitted). 179 Id. at *11 (citations omitted) (some internal quotation marks omitted). 180 Id. at *12. 181 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78809, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 2012). his handgun. It may be noted that, prior to the officer’s stop of Raissi, there had been several amendments to Georgia’s firearms laws that had become effective on July 1, 2008. One amendment allowed a person having a Georgia firearms license to “board a bus or rail vehicle while carrying a concealed firearm….”165 Raissi’s complaint asserted Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims under § 1983 on the basis that Officer Nicholas stopped Raissi without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The district court stated, first, that “not every encounter be- tween law enforcement officers and a citizen constitutes a sei- zure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”166 Second, since Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court “‘has recognized a lim- ited class of cases where the police-citizen encounter qualifies as a seizure within the Fourth Amendment but may be justified by less than probable cause.’”167 However, the MARTA “officers had reasonable suspicion that Raissi was committing the crime of boarding a vehicle providing public transportation with a concealed weapon.”168 The court held that the “possession of a firearms license is an affirmative defense to, not an element of, the crimes of boarding with a concealed weapon and carrying a concealed weapon.”169 The court granted the motion of the two defendant officers (Nicholas and Milton) for a summary judg- ment on the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims.170 Finally, as stated, under the Fourth Amendment, when an officer conducts an investigatory stop, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the individual being detained is com- mitting, or has committed, a criminal offense.171 A person’s race, whether considered by itself or together with other factors, “‘does not generate reasonable suspicion for a stop.’”172 C. Whether a Finding of Probable Cause for an Arrest Precludes a § 1983 Claim for False Arrest A judicial finding that there was probable cause for an arrest likely precludes a later § 1983 claim for false arrest. Probable cause exists when there are sufficient circumstances to warrant a prudent person to believe that a suspect committed or is com- mitting an offense.173 In Laster v. Burks,174 supra, a federal district court in Georgia, stated that, although “[a] warrantless arrest without probable cause would violate the Constitution…, [i]f probable cause ex- ists at the time of [the] arrest, . . . it absolutely bars a §1983 claim. . . . Probable cause exists when there are sufficient circum stances ‘to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had 165 GeorgiaCarry.com, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117989, at *2. 166 Id. at *8 (citation omitted). 167 Id. (citation omitted). 168 Id. at *10. 169 Id. at *11. 170 Id. at *21-22. 171 United States v. Walker, 965 F.3d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 2020). 172 Id. at 183 (citation omitted). 173 Laster v. Burks, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103259, at 1, *9 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (citations omitted). 174 Id. at *1, 11.